

Liquidation," Feb. 28, 1945, FHA Records, C81, Correspondence 2; "Liquidation Report," June 30, 1945, FHA Records, C81, Contracts 2.

<sup>60</sup>Letters, B. Joel Williams to E. S. Morgan, May 29, 1945, Hon. Stephen Pace to Frank Hancock, June 8, 1945, Hazel H. Elrod to C. S. Noble, June 4, 1945, E. S. Morgan to T. W. Crutcher, May 31, 1945, all in FHA Records, C81 Correspondence 2.

<sup>61</sup>Interview with E. C. Foster (formerly assistant purchasing agent at the project), June 15, 1960.

<sup>62</sup>Letters, Henry Kimbrough to Harry Hopkins, Dec. 26, 1944, Hopkins to Kimbrough, Jan. 5, 1945, FHA Records, C81, Correspondence 2; "Pine Mountain Valley Contracts," 1945, FHA Records, C81, Contracts 2.

<sup>63</sup>Letter, B. Joel Williams to E. S. Morgan, May 29, 1945, FHA Records, C81, Correspondence 2.

<sup>64</sup>Letter, Regional Director, Region IV Farm Security Administration to Administrators, 1945, FHA Records, C73, File 1942; "Annual Financial Report, Dec. 31, 1945," FHA Records, C81, Fiscal 2; the individual sales contracts are in FHA Records, C81, Contracts 1 and 2.

<sup>65</sup>"Pine Mountain Valley, Balance, June 30, 1945," FHA Records, C81, Fiscal 2; Columbus *Enquirer*, Jan. 28, 1951.

<sup>66</sup>Letter, S. L. VanLandingham to Dillard B. Lasseter, May 26, 1948, FHA Records, C81, Correspondence 2.

## Hardee's Defense of Savannah

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**A**MONG the episodes of the Civil War which have been consigned to limbo is the capture of Savannah by Sherman in the winter of 1864. Chronologically located midway between the fall of Atlanta and the surrender at Appomattox, the capture of Savannah lacks the excitement of the former and the heart-twisting pathos of the latter. Yet this episode merits study because it gives insight into the strategic and operational mind of one of the greatest Union commanders. Moreover, for the student of Confederate history, the siege of Savannah provides an opportunity to observe one of the abler Confederate commanders, Lieutenant General William Joseph Hardee. In this action Hardee was not acting in his customary subordinate capacity, but in direct operational control of a sizeable number of troops. Hardee's assignment was to hold the city of Savannah against Sherman.

In a post-war letter to the Georgia historian, Charles C. Jones, Hardee stated that "there is no part of my military life to which I look back with so much satisfaction."<sup>1</sup> How could this veteran of Shiloh, Murfreesboro, and Atlanta make such a statement? At Savannah he evacuated one of the most important Confederate seaports with a considerable loss of war material. This study will endeavor to answer this question and to make an analysis and appraisal of Hardee's performance.

In September, 1864, following his release from the Army of Tennessee, Hardee assumed command of the Department of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida. He spent the months of October and November strengthening the defenses of Charleston and organizing his 12,000 troops, scattered along the south Atlantic seaboard. While General Hardee adjusted himself to the problems and personnel of his geographic command, Hood and Sherman maneuvered across North Georgia. Hood finally broke

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off contact with the enemy and moved his army into Alabama. Sherman reacted by dividing his army, assigning the able George H. Thomas to watch Hood with one-third of the command, while he, himself, grouped the four remaining corps around Atlanta.

On November 16, 1864, Sherman's army departed from Atlanta and disappeared into central Georgia. Sherman had decided to "strike out for Savannah," destroying as he went the military resources and the morale of the Confederate "heartland." With a base established at Savannah, he felt confident that a new vista of military possibilities would be opened. Sherman's objective was unknown to the Confederate commanders and they spent the following month ineffectually opposing his advance. In desperation the Confederate War Department combined the inactive forces in Augusta under Bragg with Hardee's troops in front of Sherman. Bragg was given command of both forces and ordered to halt Sherman. Bragg accepted the task but declared "that no practicable combination of my available men can avert disaster."<sup>2</sup> With Bragg in command of the theater, Hardee's activities and responsibilities were confined to the Savannah area. At Savannah Hardee would act independently until he came under Beauregard's control in December.

Panic gripped the Savannah area during the closing days of November, 1864. Places that had not seen a blue uniform since 1860 and that would not see another until after the surrender were reported occupied. Rumors had Sherman's columns crossing every stream and menacing every town in southeastern Georgia. Hardee found it trying to sift information under such circumstances. Even Wheeler, the reliable source of information in the first three and a half years of the war, seemed unable to penetrate the heavy curtain of foragers that surrounded Sherman's army. Behind these "bummers" ranged cavalry patrols that insulated the main columns and deceived the defenders as to the actual strength behind the screen. The general direction of Sherman's advance, however, could not be concealed for long.

Anticipating an attack on Savannah, Hardee set to work to

prepare the city's defenses. As early as November 20, he had transferred guns from the coastal fortifications to the western side of the city.<sup>3</sup> He now ordered all able-bodied men in the city to report for duty. All soldiers on furlough and assignment together with convalescents were organized into battalions under Major General Lafayette McLaws. A few units from the north, including the veteran Tenth North Carolina, arrived and were put to work on the trenches. Hardee arranged with his navy commander, W. W. Hunter, to use the gunboat *Macon* to patrol the Savannah River. He assigned Wheeler the task of destroying everything the enemy could use between the Ocmulgee River and the city. As soon as all the roads leading to Savannah had been obstructed, Hardee released Wheeler from his position in front of Sherman and ordered him to operate on the enemy's flanks and rear. Thus Hardee sacrificed the buffer between Sherman's army and his own infantry, but it meant that Wheeler would not be confined in the narrow, marshy terrain around Savannah.<sup>4</sup>

Amid the calamity reports pouring into Savannah came one dispatch that gave Hardee serious concern. A lonely Confederate sentinel on the bank of the Broad River sat eating sweet potatoes that he had just fried for his breakfast. The river that he guarded lay just above Savannah and led directly inland to the Savannah and Charleston Railroad that constituted Hardee's line of communications with the rest of the Confederacy. As the sentinel peered into the heavy fog that had hung over the river several large enemy steamers suddenly loomed out of the haze. They were headed up the river. The astonished picket hurried off leaving his breakfast untouched.<sup>5</sup> These steamers brought the division of General John P. Hatch, part of John C. Foster's Union forces at Port Royal. Hatch disembarked about 5,000 men at Boyd's Landing and advanced inland toward the railroad. To oppose them was only one cavalry regiment.<sup>6</sup>

Hardee responded to the threat to his communications by ordering General Sam Jones at Charleston to Grahamville and

Pocotaligo with two Georgia infantry regiments.<sup>7</sup> After dispatching Jones to the threatened point, Hardee wrote to Secretary of War Seddon, "As railroad and telegraphic communications may soon be cut with Charleston I desire you to know that I have, including the local troops, less than 1,000 men of all arms. General [Gustavus W.] Smith is expected with 3,200 men, but has not yet arrived. If railroad communication is cut with Charleston, which is threatened by ten gun-boats and barges, of course no reinforcements can be sent from Augusta."<sup>8</sup> The fate of Savannah depended upon blocking Hatch's advance. Hardee wired Smith to take the first two train loads of Georgia militia through Savannah to Grahamville, and to "drive the enemy back to their gun-boats."<sup>9</sup>

General Smith and his sleeping soldiers pulled into Savannah from Macon at 2 a.m., November 30. Smith received Hardee's dispatch at the railroad depot. He left his men asleep and went directly to Hardee's headquarters. Smith awakened his commander and said, "If you can satisfy me that it is absolutely necessary that my commander shall go into South Carolina [the enemy landing had occurred across the river] I will endeavor to carry out your orders. If you do not satisfy me . . . I will be under the disagreeable necessity of withdrawing the State forces from your control." With the help of a map and a handful of dispatches, Hardee satisfied Smith that it was necessary.<sup>10</sup> While Smith's troops hurried into South Carolina, Hardee impatiently wired Jones asking why his troops had not left Charleston. Where were the troops from Augusta?<sup>11</sup>

At mid-morning on November 30, Smith reported to Hardee that he had engaged the enemy at Honey Hill and that he needed reinforcements. The Charleston troops had not arrived. Later in the day Hardee anxiously opened another dispatch from Smith. It proved to be one of the most welcome reports that he received during the war. Smith sent the news that the enemy had been repulsed.<sup>12</sup>

As soon as he learned that reinforcements were nearing Graham-

ville, Hardee left his headquarters and went to join Smith. He found the enemy "badly whipped" and allowed Smith to take his troops back to Savannah. The enemy advanced again on December 2, but retired without a battle. Hardee left the defense of the railroad to Jones and returned to Savannah. To keep the situation under control Hardee needed about three thousand troops. Bragg sent word on December 3 that he was dispatching 10,000 men to Hardee's assistance. If he had sent 10,000, Hardee could have forgotten about his exposed communications. The few thousand that Bragg did send were needed in the lines about Savannah while the Pocotaligo and Grahamville situation remained in Jones' hands. Jones expressed dismay when he inspected his motley command of two Georgia regiments, some reserves, and several battalions from other units.<sup>13</sup>

Jones might well have been dismayed, but the situation could not have been remedied without more assistance from Augusta or Richmond. Hardee worried more about Sherman's 60,000 troops already around Millen and the Augusta railroad.

To slow Sherman's advance Hardee sent McLaws with a brigade of Georgia militia and Baker's North Carolina troops to Station Number 4½ on the Georgia Central Railroad. McLaws found the position untenable and fell back, with Hardee's approval, to Station Number 1½, about four miles from the city.<sup>14</sup>

Sherman drew closer to Savannah on December 5-7. The enemy who had crossed the Ogeechee River forced the abandonment of the outposts on the Augusta railroad.<sup>15</sup> Hardee now brought the navy into play, ordering the *Macon* and a floating battery to protect the railroad bridge across the Savannah River.<sup>16</sup> In Hardee's rear at Grahamville trouble also developed as the enemy secured a lodgment near the railroad. Jones attempted to drive the enemy from their new positions but failed.<sup>17</sup> Hardee urged Jones to encourage his men and to try to drive the enemy back. He needed a fighting commander at Grahamville as badly as he needed more troops.

Beauregard in Charleston displayed alarm at the deterioration

of the situation as revealed in Hardee's telegrams. He asked both Hardee and Jones to come up for a conference. Hardee replied that he and Jones could not come "without injury to the service" and suggested that Beauregard come to Savannah. Later on December 8, Hardee wired Beauregard stating, "I hope you will not fail to come here tonight. It is all important that I should confer with you."<sup>18</sup>

Before leaving Charleston for Savannah, Beauregard sent Hardee a wire that set forth the guiding principle for the defense of Savannah: "Having no army of relief to look to, and your forces being essential to the defense of Georgia and South Carolina, whenever you shall have to select between their safety and that of Savannah, sacrifice the latter, and form a junction with General Jones, holding the left bank of the Savannah River and the railroad to this place as long as possible."<sup>19</sup>

While waiting for Beauregard's arrival Hardee received from Wheeler an intercepted enemy message disclosing Sherman's planned dispositions for the direct investment of Savannah. This relieved Hardee's worries about Sherman swinging north to cut his communications with Charleston. Now certain of the enemy's objective and dispositions, Hardee immediately ordered all able-bodied men in Savannah to the trenches and began moving his troops to the main defense line located about two and a half miles from the city. He urged the people of the city to send him their spades, axes, and other tools. The mayor of Savannah strongly backed the request.<sup>20</sup>

Beauregard arrived early on December 9 and spent most of the day conferring with Hardee. Hardee informed him that the enemy was about six miles from his intermediary line which protected the Charleston and Savannah Railroad and its bridge across the Savannah River. Sherman's army was advancing in separate columns down the Middle Ground Road, the River Road, and the Augusta Railroad, with 35,000 to 40,000 men, the bulk of his army of 60,000. The main body of Hardee's 10,000 troops occupied the main works while General Hugh W. Mercer and

Adjutant General Henry Wayne delayed Sherman. Hardee expected the enemy to strike the main line on December 9 or 10. As for the defenses on the north side of the Savannah River, Hardee did not place troops there, believing that the navy would deter the enemy. If the enemy did succeed in crossing the river the boggy rice fields would prevent a rapid strike in force. Beauregard asked Hardee about his plans for evacuation. Hardee told him that none had been made since he relied on the gunboats in Savannah harbor to ferry his troops across to South Carolina. Beauregard thereupon directed Hardee to begin at once the construction of pontoon bridges across the Savannah. After reiterating his order giving the safety of the army priority over that of the city and cautioning Hardee to look to his communications, Beauregard left the city to visit Jones at Pocotaligo.<sup>21</sup>

The intermediate line of which Hardee spoke collapsed before Beauregard left the city. Old and infirm General Hugh Mercer, who had commanded one of Hardee's brigades at Atlanta, had no sooner occupied this line of detached works behind the Monteith Swamp than the enemy outflanked him and rushed toward the main defense line.<sup>22</sup> The two armies had at last made contact.

The armies of Sherman and Hardee confronted each other on a peninsula about thirteen miles wide, bordered on the north by the Savannah River and on the south by the Little Ogeechee River. Below the Little Ogeechee existed "a natural barrier, consisting of small rivers, creeks, and impassable swamps."<sup>23</sup> The peninsula was cut and cross-cut by innumerable creeks and marshes. Hardee availed himself of the advantages of the terrain. His line followed a series of creeks from the Savannah to the Little Ogeechee. All approaches to Savannah from the west, and there were only five, must cross this line. Hardee first obstructed these approaches, then he had all of the canals and rice dikes cut. When they had been cut, he opened the sluices and flooded the fields. "Thus the entire front of the Confederate line . . . was submerged to a depth varying from three to six feet."<sup>24</sup>

The advantage of terrain could only assist, not replace, the

human barrier. Opposed to Sherman's 60,000 troops were only 10,000 Confederates divided into divisions under Smith, McLaws, and Ambrose R. Wright. Wright had replaced Mercer on December 10, when the siege proper opened. He had had only limited combat experience, and that early in the year. His division assignment rested primarily upon the fact that as president of the Georgia Senate, he had taken command of the Georgia State forces east of the Oconee River after the fall of Milledgeville. Wright held the left of Hardee's line with a scrambled force of veterans, workers, clerks, militia, and locals. His line, mounting thirty-two guns, extended for seven miles from the Little Ogeechee River to Shaw's Dam.

McLaws held the center. Major General McLaws had had ample combat experience under Longstreet in Virginia, but "his record as a divisional commander had not been one of uniform promptness and of average success."<sup>25</sup> This professional soldier and fellow-Georgian had come into the department after he had been relieved of command at Knoxville. At Savannah he commanded the best troops and held the key position. Among the 4,000 tried troops holding his four miles of trenches from Shaw's Dam to the Georgia Central Railroad crossing was the famous Orphan Brigade from Kentucky. These men knew Hardee well, and he knew that they could be relied on. As their spokesman Johnny Green put it, "We have seen a great deal of service with [Hardee] and the men all admire him."<sup>26</sup>

Gustavus W. Smith held the right. Smith and Hardee had been associated during the battle around Atlanta when Smith commanded a division of Georgia militia. Smith was known in the South as a one-time engineer, manufacturer, politician, wing commander, and assistant secretary of war. His military competence was suspect. His part of the line at Savannah consisted of two and a half miles of trenches stretching from the railroad crossing to the Savannah River. To hold this line he had about 2,000 militia and twenty guns.<sup>27</sup>

Generally Hardee's defense line centered about a tandem of

earth redoubts that commanded likely avenues of approach. One or more forts had been advanced to give enfilade fire down the line. As much as possible Hardee had these forts connected with rifle trenches, two or more in depth. At points where the five main causeways entered his defenses Hardee placed twenty-four and thirty-two-pound cannon that easily out-matched the light Union artillery. He had drawn this heavy ordnance from the wealth of guns protecting Savannah's seaward side.<sup>28</sup> Savannah, like Charleston, had successfully withstood attack throughout the war. Its coastal defenses were the work of the Confederate Department of Engineers and contained an enormous amount of firepower from three mutually supporting defense lines. The entrance to the Savannah River was impassable because of the obstructions and network of guns.<sup>29</sup>

When both wings of Sherman's army closed in on his works, Hardee withdrew the outposts defending the Savannah and Charleston Railroad bridge and had the bridge destroyed. By this action he cut off Savannah from her normal and most important means of communication. Hardee reported to Beauregard that the enemy was all along his front and that skirmishing had begun in earnest. "I have not a reserve."<sup>30</sup> Hardee tried to manufacture some corps reserves by having McLaws withdraw a Georgia regiment from his line hoping to replace it with more artillery.<sup>31</sup> Seeking a more realistic reserve Hardee requested that a Georgia regiment serving with Sam Jones be sent to him.<sup>32</sup> Beauregard, who had taken over supervision of Jones' command, tried to procure the troops for Hardee in South Carolina, but could not take away Jones' troops at the moment for he was planning an attack on Hatch, an attack which never materialized. The following day, December 11, Hardee again called on Beauregard for troops: "I have been obliged to extend my lines. It is impossible to hold it without immediate reinforcement."<sup>33</sup> Hardee did receive some help at this time by the acquisition of E. C. Anderson's detached cavalry regiment and by ordering S. W. Ferguson's cavalry into the trenches.<sup>34</sup>

On December 10 and 11, the skirmishing continued and minor attacks were repelled at Shaw's Dam, Fort Hardeman, and at Williamson's. To strengthen his right flank at Fort Hardeman and to provide cover in the event of evacuation over the river, Hardee ordered back the *Macon* and the *Sampson* from their patrol duty. On their return down the winding Savannah, Federal batteries surprised them, disabled and captured the tender *Resolute* and forced the two larger ships back up the river.<sup>35</sup> This action disquieted Hardee. It deprived him of the *Sampson* which he intended to station at the right flank of his line to deliver supporting fire, but more important it meant that Sherman had challenged his control of the river and might send troops to the north bank of the Savannah. In anticipation of this movement Hardee ordered Wheeler to move his cavalry from Sherman's rear to the South Carolina side of the Savannah. With his headquarters at Hardeeville, Wheeler was to prevent the enemy from crossing.<sup>36</sup>

By this time little doubt existed that Savannah would ultimately have to be evacuated but no threat as yet rendered immediate evacuation imperative. The nature of Sherman's previous campaigns indicated that he would adopt the surest methods first. At Savannah this meant that he would open a line of communications with his naval forces lying off the coast and with Foster's infantry at Hilton Head. An attack against Hardee's lines of breastworks, arranged in depth, seemed imprudent without an established base. Sherman felt little apprehension that his quarry could escape quickly. The city had been isolated from the rest of the Confederacy except for a tenuous route by water across the Savannah, then by way of rice dikes to Hardeeville. General Henry Slocum had broken the Savannah and Charleston rail communications when he moved up against the right of Hardee's line. His position on the Savannah River also halted traffic on the river. General Oliver O. Howard had penetrated south to Flemingo, breaking the Gulf Railroad at that point.

The immediate obstacle preventing Sherman from opening his communications with the sea was Fort McAllister, an isolated

bastion dominating the Great Ogeechee River. The army already felt the need for supplies. In the Union camps even hard crackers were selling for a dollar a piece when they could be found.<sup>37</sup>

Anxious to open his communications with the fleet, Sherman decided to move against Fort McAllister immediately. He directed Hazen with his division to attack the fort from the land side. About 250 men garrisoned Fort McAllister. They expected attack from the sea and their guns on barbette mounts pointed out over the river. When Hazen attacked on December 13 the defenders were quickly overcome. That evening the army opened communications with Dahlgren's naval forces. Sherman was jubilant. One of his staff officers who disdained his commander's "cockiness" wrote, "[Sherman] says the city is his sure game and stretches out his arm and claws his bony fingers in the air to illustrate how he has his grip on it."<sup>38</sup>

With Fort McAllister gone and with heavy Union guns coming ashore, Hardee began to feel those "bony fingers." He wrote Davis emphasizing the seriousness of the situation. Foster's force under Hatch menaced his flimsy line of communication and Sherman was now ready to strike. "Unless assured that force sufficient to keep open my communications can be sent me, I shall be compelled to evacuate Savannah."<sup>39</sup> Davis replied that because of the critical state of affairs in Virginia no troops could be sent.<sup>40</sup> Hardee also communicated his anxiety to Beauregard: "Our occupation of Savannah depends on your ability to hold the railroad. Whenever you are unable to hold the road I must evacuate. . . . Inform me instantly if Foster is reinforced by Sherman or otherwise. I feel uneasy about my communications."<sup>41</sup>

A new threat began to materialize north of the Savannah. Elements of Slocum's corps that held a position on the south banks of the Savannah jumped in small numbers from island to island in the middle of the river searching for rice and better flank protection. A regiment was soon on Argyle Island and Wheeler, after repelling several sorties on the north bank, admitted reluctantly that a lodgment had been made. If this lodgment

grew to brigade or division strength Hardee's last lifeline could be cut. Hardee also had serious trouble at his main defense line. A mutiny had occurred in the Foreign Battalion that he himself had recruited with care. Fortunately the mutiny exposed itself prematurely and was easily put down. Hardee dealt with the situation summarily, executing seven ringleaders on the spot and shipping the battalion immediately to Florence, South Carolina. In exasperation Hardee urged that similar efforts to enlist foreign troops be prohibited.<sup>42</sup>

On December 16 Hardee called his generals together for a council of war. Most of the generals agreed that Savannah should be evacuated as soon as the pontoon bridge had been completed. General P. M. B. Young, fresh from the Army of Northern Virginia was ordered by Hardee to collect rice flats along the Savannah. They would be used in the construction of the bridge. Young reminded Hardee that he had intended to attack the enemy lodged on the north side of the river the next morning. Hardee replied that the assault "was of no importance" compared to procuring the rice flats.<sup>43</sup> Young with difficulty gathered the flats and also managed to deliver an effective attack.<sup>44</sup>

While the Confederates attacked the enemy fragments that had roamed across the river, the Federal commanders prepared for the assault of Hardee's main line. They constructed fascines, stringers, and ladders, all the while skirmishing constantly to develop the weak points in Hardee's line. Larger guns brought by boat from Hilton Head and the navy assured additional artillery support. Fully confident of success, Sherman demanded Hardee's surrender on December 17. Sherman told Hardee that he had a supply base established and guns large enough to reduce the city. "I have for some days held and controlled every avenue by which the people and garrison of Savannah can be supplied. . . ." He would be willing to grant reasonable terms, but if forced to resort to assaults or a prolonged siege, he would "make little effort to restrain [his] army burning to avenge."<sup>45</sup>

Hardee waited a day before replying to Sherman. Beauregard

had arrived and the two discussed plans for the evacuation and the subsequent disposition of the troops.<sup>46</sup> On December 19, Hardee in that frozen language that he could command so well, wrote to Sherman refusing to surrender. He stated that his two lines of defense still remained intact, that Sherman did not have any troops nearer than four miles to the city, and that in spite of Sherman's efforts, he still kept in touch daily with Charleston. In reply to Sherman's threat Hardee answered, "I have hitherto conducted the military operations entrusted to my direction in strict accordance with the rules of civilized warfare, and I should deeply regret the adoption of any course by you that may force me to deviate from them in the future."<sup>47</sup>

December 19th, 1864, should have been evacuation day for the Confederate forces. Everything, however, depended on the completion of the pontoon bridge which had been delayed by fogs, ships running aground, and many other unpredictables. During the day the enemy attacked on A. R. Wright's front, but was repulsed.<sup>48</sup> On the north side of the river the enemy became aggressive as they grew in numbers. The Union regiments there attacked and drove back a Confederate cavalry brigade, establishing themselves at Izards—much closer to the Confederate line of retreat. Hardee crossed the river to observe the fighting. The situation looked critical and he wired General Taliaferro in Charleston to come to Hardeeville with what men he had.<sup>49</sup> Hardee also sent Wheeler about 700 men and 6 guns. He cautioned Wheeler that "the road to Hardeeville must be kept open at all hazards."<sup>50</sup>

The successful evacuation of Savannah depended upon the pontoon bridge. Until the moment the formal siege began, or perhaps even later, Hardee seems to have entertained the idea of evacuating the garrison by boat.<sup>51</sup> The limited number of craft, accentuated by Slocum's cutting off the *Macon* and the *Sampson*, relegated this plan to an alternate status and Hardee gave priority to the completion of the bridge. The engineers fastened about thirty rice flats seventy to eighty feet long end to end and covered



them with timber ripped from the Savannah wharves.<sup>52</sup> To supplement the inadequate engineer companies, Georgia militia and Confederate sailors provided the necessary working parties.<sup>53</sup> The bridge spanned the Savannah River in three sections. The first segment ran from the city to Hutchinson's Island, then across that island by causeway to the second bridge which spanned the middle of the river to Pennyworth Island. A road across Pennyworth Island connected with the third span which reached across the Black River to Screven's Ferry.<sup>54</sup> On December 13, when Fort McAllister fell, Hardee had completed the bridge only as far as Hutchinson's Island. When the enemy appeared in increasing numbers on the north side of the river, Hardee decided to build a floating dock on the north side of Hutchinson's Island and complete the crossing by ferry. He discarded this plan when Sherman did not press his riverhead advantage on the north side of the Savannah. Throughout the period of construction the Confederate navy protected and concealed the pontoon bridge from the enemy. It is plausible to assume, however, that Sherman knew that it was being built or at least expected it to be built. The engineers completed the bridge about nine o'clock on the night of December 19. Hardee would have evacuated Savannah that night if the bridge had been completed a few hours earlier.<sup>55</sup>

December 20, 1864, was a day of suspense for the Confederates. The men knew the city would be evacuated and anxiously awaited the order. The Confederates on the main defense line kept the Union soldiers pinned down in their trenches all day, with the surplus ammunition they knew would have to be destroyed if it was not expended.<sup>56</sup> Early in the day Hardee visited the South Carolina shore and found that Carmen's Union brigade had crossed the river and engaged Wheeler's cavalry. With his communication line in jeopardy, Hardee ordered Taliaferro to furnish Wheeler all the men he called for.<sup>57</sup> To further agitate the Confederate commander news arrived that advanced enemy units had penetrated to within three-fourths of a mile of the Savannah and Charleston Railroad at Pocotaligo.<sup>58</sup> Fortunately for Hardee, Fos-

ter's advance lacked the finality that Sherman wished. On this very day Sherman had decided to reinforce Foster's troops with one of his divisions. The united force would then move on the Savannah and Charleston Railroad and place themselves athwart Hardee's escape route.<sup>59</sup>

Hardee knew only too well that he must act quickly to avert destruction of his command. His orders, based on the experience gained in the Atlanta Campaign, called for the customary night withdrawal. Prior to moving his troops and artillery, Hardee directed that all the army wagons and caissons be sent across the bridges.<sup>60</sup> A confidential circular outlined the troop movement. The light artillery would be pulled by hand to the bridges and sent across before the men left their trenches. Troops at outlying posts, such as Forts Jackson and Bartow, would assemble at 9 p.m. and move by steamer to Screven's Ferry. At the nearer forts, such as Rosedew and Beaulieu, the men would withdraw at dusk, march into the city and over the bridge. Hardee would begin the uncovering of the main line from the left with the troops having the longest distance to cover. This force, A. R. Wright's division, would pull out of the trenches at 8 p.m., McLaws at 10 p.m., and Smith at 11 p.m. The division skirmish lines would be strengthened and left in a position for about two hours after their parent units had left. After the skirmishers had crossed, Colonel Clarke of Hardee's staff would destroy the pontoon bridge. All powder to be abandoned would be destroyed by dousing it with water; ammunition would be dumped into the river, and the numerous heavy guns that must be left would be spiked at the exact time their division withdrew from the line.<sup>61</sup>

Hardee had worked out the plans for the disposition of the naval force with Beauregard on December 18. The *Isandiga* and *Firefly* would proceed up the river to join Commodore Hunter near Augusta. The *Georgia* would be scuttled. The *Savannah* would cover the evacuation, wait two days to protect the rear of the army and the stores at Screven's Ferry, and then proceed to sea.<sup>62</sup>



During the morning of December 20, Union troops on the South Carolina side of the river witnessed a scene that they never forgot. Over the pontoons, as it seemed, came the entire civilian population of Savannah, "wagons, family carriages, men and women on foot. . . . The stream of fugitives and number of carriages and wagons increased as the day wore on. . . ." <sup>63</sup> To discourage Carmen's troops from molesting this procession, Hardee strongly reinforced Wheeler's line just to the west of the line of retreat. Next he subjected the Union soldiers to a bombardment by the *Savannah* which steamed up to their flank. <sup>64</sup>

While the cavalry and navy held Carmen in check, the infantry in the main line began their withdrawal on schedule. Preceded by forty-nine pieces of artillery, the three divisions retired without incident. The last, Smith's division, began crossing at 1 a.m. When Smith had passed over the bridge, rockets were fired to inform the forts down by the sea that the city had been evacuated. Hardee, himself, with most of his staff crossed the river on the steamer *Swan* about 9 p.m. He left one staff officer behind with a detail "to preserve order" in Savannah until the last possible moment and to be certain that no skirmishers had been left behind. Hardee also left behind many of his sick and wounded because he could not provide transportation for them. <sup>65</sup>

Despite the precautions taken to insure a minimum of noise, the wind carried the grinding and the rumbling of the wagons up the river to the Union positions. General Carmen informed his superiors "but was instructed not to risk interference with the movement, as [the Confederates] would be cut off from above [by Foster]." <sup>66</sup> Many of the Confederates also expected to be cut off. There seems to have been some confusion, some units became tangled, and everyone appeared to be ill-humored. It was a bitter moment; many of the Savannah garrison were leaving not only their long-held military post but their homes as well. The fires of the burning ships gave the whole column a garish appearance. As one Confederate noted, "the constant tread of the troops and the rumblings of the artillery as they poured over those long

floating bridges was a sad sound, and by the glare of the large fires at the east of the bridge it seemed like an immense funeral procession stealing out of the city in the dead of night." <sup>67</sup>

The solemnity of the Confederate evacuation contrasted sharply with the exuberance of the triumphant Federals. Sherman demonstrated the attitude of his troops when he presented Savannah to President Lincoln as a Christmas present. <sup>68</sup> And the Confederates left some presents for Sherman. Although most of the movable war materials had been carried away, the heavy guns and equipment alone represented a rich prize. Over 200 guns fell into Union hands. <sup>69</sup> To their amazement Sherman's soldiers uncovered an even richer prize: at least 35,000 bales of cotton, negotiable anywhere at the best prices. This cotton caused the pulses of merchants and speculators throughout the North to quicken and brought droves of "seekers" to Savannah. <sup>70</sup>

Why did Hardee fail to destroy the cotton? This the Confederate House of Representatives demanded of Davis, and this in turn Davis demanded of Hardee. <sup>71</sup> The cotton was of great economic benefit to the enemy and the general who neglected to destroy it had a brother, Noble Andrew Hardee, who was a prominent Savannah cotton merchant. Hardee replied:

The cotton was distributed throughout the city in cellars, garrets and warehouses, where it could not have been burnt without destroying the city. It had not been sent off by railroad previous to the cutting of the road, because railroad transportation was monopolized for removal of ordnance, commissary, and other important Government stores. From the cutting of the road to the evacuation of the city—twelve days—every man was required to work in the lines, and every wagon, dray and cart that could be impressed was needed to keep the troops in a line of twelve miles long supplied with ordnance and commissary stores. Not a man nor a woman could have been spared to collect the cotton in a place where it could have been burnt. <sup>72</sup>

When one reflects on the harried use of trains by the Confederates during the last few weeks when the road was in operation and the necessity of preventing the destruction of the town without alerting the enemy, Hardee's answer seems self-

evident. That the financial interests of his brother influenced him is inconsistent with the scrupulous integrity with which Hardee had conducted his life heretofore. Furthermore, the commissary and ordnance stores salvaged from Savannah did more to prolong the life of Confederate military resistance than any amount of cotton could have done.

Hardee's role in the capture of Fort McAllister merits closer scrutiny as well. General Josiah Gorgas and others criticized him for the sacrifice of this garrison. Why did Hardee leave this fort exposed and fail to recall the garrison in time? Or, if Hardee knew, as he should have known, that the Great Ogeechee was Sherman's most feasible line of communication, why did he fail to strengthen the garrison and make a determined effort to hold the position? Charles C. Jones, the historian of the Savannah siege, believed that Hardee hoped that a "bold retention" of the fort might lead Sherman to hesitate, perhaps to give up the idea of establishing a base near Savannah or even of attacking Savannah. Jones admits, however, that this thin reasoning hardly justifies the loss of the garrison.<sup>73</sup> Two other factors should be considered. First, Hardee, who had an intimate knowledge of the terrain probably believed, as did others, that Sherman could not maneuver a large assaulting body through the supposedly impassable area around the Great Ogeechee. Here, as later, Hardee appears to have underestimated the ability of Sherman's men in overcoming natural obstacles. Second, and most important, Hardee probably had little choice. If he abandoned the fort, Sherman got his line of communication gratis; if he reinforced the fort he would weaken a line already bare of reserves and hardly strong enough to withstand a determined attack by a Union corps.

Could Sherman have captured Hardee's army in Savannah? It is doubtful that Sherman could have cut off this body of 10,000 men unless he had planted at least a strong army corps across Hardee's line of retreat after the siege had opened. To have attempted the movement earlier would have led to a rapid and fairly easy evasion by Hardee up the coast line by rail while Bragg

applied pressure against Sherman's left flank. Sherman hesitated to place a body of men across Hardee's communications once the siege had begun for he feared that Hardee might crush an isolated force with his advantage of interior lines. Sherman also worried about the Confederate ships that commanded the vital stretch of the Savannah River and the soft, marshy ground just across the river on the South Carolina side.<sup>74</sup> Actually Sherman's primary objective appears to have been not Hardee's army but a base on the Atlantic. After he secured this base he steadily prepared for the destruction of his opponent. The real criticism of Sherman comes in the question of timing. Surely he and Foster could have arranged to attack the railroad at Pocatoligo in force sooner than they did. Hardee, however, with a large segment of his pontoon bridge completed and a sizeable number of steamers on hand probably could have evacuated most of the garrison as early as December 17. The methodical Sherman risked the escape of his foe so that he might establish his base. Once it had been established he would be able to close in on Hardee with the number of variables reduced to a minimum.

Although credit for the successful evacuation must be given to Hardee, Beauregard's contributions should not be overlooked. Beauregard remained in general control of the operation throughout. He made the basic decision placing the army's welfare above the city's. He sketched the general plan for the line and method of retreat, checking constantly with Hardee to insure that the details had been worked out properly. Most important, perhaps, he succeeded in giving Hardee additional troops when they were so desperately needed and dispatched the men necessary to keep the line of retreat open.

In light of Beauregard's contributions and the conclusion that perhaps Sherman could not have cut off all of Hardee's garrison if he had made a supreme effort, how can Hardee be justified in stating, "Tho' compelled to evacuate the city, there is no part of my military life to which I look back with so much satisfaction."

Beauregard's contributions and Sherman's slim hope of success both were predicted on the assumption that Hardee had immediate operational control of the Savannah forces and would conduct the withdrawal in his proven excellence in this type of endeavor. As the commander of this garrison he went beyond his traditional successful retreat in the face of the enemy. He had to. Never had he operated so close to the enemy with such limited means in regard to the number and quality of his troops. He displayed a signal aptitude in improvisation and in the utilization of terrain and resources. Sherman's men marveled at the Confederate battery mounted on a railroad car that skipped from one front to another with celerity, firing accurately into exposed groups of men and generally harassing the Union army. To Hardee should be given credit for the novel technique of employing ships not only to hinder Union troop movements, but also to guard land features and to serve as mobile forts on the Confederate right flank. This close integration of naval and land forces represents one of the finest displays of joint operations by a Confederate commander during the war. The nature and location of Hardee's main defense position demonstrates his skill in the advantageous use of terrain. He used the flooded rice fields and canals effectively to offset the disparity in numbers. Hardee's main line evoked admiring comments from friend and foe alike and gave great assurance to the many untried defenders who badly needed it.

In assembling the Savannah garrison and giving it a combat efficiency quite disproportionate to its surface capabilities, Hardee displayed once again his talent for getting the maximum yield from his human resources. Through two weeks of constant skirmishing and periodic attacks both the officers and men handled themselves effectively. Smith and Wright exhibited remarkable steadiness and consistency in light of their spotted military backgrounds. McLaws and Wheeler behaved in a manner that rivaled better performances in the salad days of their careers. In building this effective garrison, a great deal must be attributed to Hardee's personal leadership. His confident and decisive manner pervaded

all ranks, giving his militia, laborers, clerks, dismounted cavalry, and the others faith in themselves and the troops next to them.

To remove the large civilian group, the war material, and 10,000 men from the presence of 60,000 veteran troopers led by one of the ablest Civil War commanders, represents one of Hardee's finest achievements. After 10:30 p.m. December 20, one enemy assault in only division strength might have disrupted the evacuation and resulted in the capture of most of the garrison. To minimize this risk Hardee insured secrecy by the silent destruction of ordnance, muffled cannon wheels, and strong skirmish lines. The orders upon which the withdrawal was based were detailed and precise, providing for the most expeditious movement of troops. This scrupulous regard for proper planning prevented panic, disaster, and blundering that in one form or another occurred in the evacuations of Corinth, Nashville, New Orleans, and other cities. Thus in getting the maximum performance out of his nondescript force, in utilizing his terrain, and in conducting a skillful retirement in the face of an overwhelming opponent, Hardee's accomplishment could justifiably be a source of satisfaction to him.

After pulling his forces out of the city, Hardee marched them across a slender line of South Carolina rice dikes in sight of the enemy, but protected by a heavy force entrenched along the threatened side of the road. While the infantry column labored on its way to Hardeeville the navy remained behind with the army details to forward the stores deposited at Screven's Ferry. The gunboat *Savannah* discouraged any Union attempt to molest the removal of these stores. When the last supplies had been started inland Hardee ordered the wharf, the steamer *Firefly*, the cotton-clad *Isandiga*, and the *Savannah* burned. For the second night in succession the water around Savannah reflected the lurid glare of burning vessels.<sup>75</sup>

The Confederate army followed by the navy detachments on foot arrived in Hardeeville, disgruntled and half-frozen. The first to arrive mounted the water tanks, smashed the thick layers of ice,

and formed relays to pass the water over to the locomotives' boilers. Hardee assigned priorities to the units and dispatched them toward their destinations as quickly as he could. At this time Hardee released the volunteer battalions of workers from the Macon and Augusta war factories and all the men that he had forced into the army at Savannah.<sup>76</sup>

Hardee departed on December 22, leaving McLaws in command and instructing him to expedite the shipment of the supplies and troops to Charleston.<sup>77</sup> With the garrison and supplies safe in South Carolina, the troops distributed, and a new defense line being drawn behind the Combahee River, Hardee made his way to Charleston to set that house in order before the uninvited arrived.

### NOTES

<sup>1</sup>William J. Hardee to Charles C. Jones, May 14, 1866, in Georgia Portfolio, Manuscript Division, Duke University Library; author's interview with Mrs. Howard Bowen, August 5, 1957, in Birmingham, Alabama.

<sup>2</sup>United States War Department, *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies* (70 vols., Washington, 1880-1901), Series I, XLIV, 901 (Hereinafter cited as OR).

<sup>3</sup>OR, Series I, XLIV, 877; W. J. Hardee to P. G. T. Beauregard, November 21, 1864, in Confederate States of America Archives, 1861-1865, Manuscript Division, Duke University Library (Hereinafter cited as CSA Archives); Charles Colcock Jones, Jr., *The Siege of Savannah in December, 1864, and the Confederate Operations in Georgia and the Third Military District of South Carolina during General Sherman's March from Atlanta to the Sea* (Albany, 1874), 96.

<sup>4</sup>*Savannah Daily Morning News*, November 28, 29, 1964; W. J. Hardee to W. W. Hunter, November 27, 1864, in Savannah Squadron Papers, 1862-1865, Manuscript Division, Emory University Library (Hereinafter cited as Savannah Squadron Papers); OR, Series I, XLIV, 906.

<sup>5</sup>Madeleine Vinton Dahlgren, *Memoir of John A. Dahlgren, Rear-Admiral United States Navy* (Boston, 1882), 479-80.

<sup>6</sup>OR, Series I, XLIV, 420; Charles Colcock Jones, Jr. *The Battle of Honey Hill. An Address Delivered Before the Confederate Survivors' Association in Augusta, Georgia, at Its Seventh Annual Meeting, on Memorial Day, April 27, 1885* (Augusta, 1885), 11; Richard Taylor, *Destruction and Reconstruction. Personal Experiences of the Late War* (New York, 1955), 262.

<sup>7</sup>W. J. Hardee to S. Jones, November 29, 1864, in Sam Jones Papers, 1861-1864, Record Group 109, National Archives and Record Service, Washington, D. C. (Hereinafter cited as S. Jones Papers).

<sup>8</sup>OR, Series I, XLIV, 905.

<sup>9</sup>T. B. Roy to G. W. Smith, November 29, 1864, in Department of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida, Letters Sent, 1863-1864, Record Group 109, National Archives and Record Service, Washington, D. C. (Hereinafter cited as Dept. S. C., Ga., Fla., Letters Sent).

<sup>10</sup>Gustavus Woodson Smith, "The Georgia Militia During Sherman's March

to the Sea," in R. V. Johnson and C. C. Buel, eds., *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Being for the Most Part Contributions by Union and Confederate Officers. Based Upon "The Century War Series,"* (New York, 1884), IV, 666-67, OR, Series I, XLIV, 415.

<sup>11</sup>W. J. Hardee to S. Jones, November 30, 1864, in S. Jones Papers.

<sup>12</sup>OR, Series I, XLIV, 911, 914, 920. Contributing to Smith's creditable and fortunate victory were the facts that Hatch had been misguided upon landing and thus prevented him from breaking the railroad, and that his troops were not battle seasoned.

<sup>13</sup>Jones, *Siege of Savannah*, 92; OR, Series I, XLIV, 929; W. J. Hardee to S. Jones, December 5, 1864, in S. Jones Papers; S. Jones to T. B. Roy, January 11, 1865, in Confederate Miscellany, Manuscript Division, Emory University Library (Hereinafter cited as CSA Miscellany).

<sup>14</sup>OR, Series I, LIII, 35; Jones, *Siege of Savannah*, 55.

<sup>15</sup>Jones, *Siege of Savannah*, 51-52; OR, Series I, XLIV, 938.

<sup>16</sup>United States Navy Department, *Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion*, (31 vols., Washington, 1894-1919), Series I, XVI, 472 (Hereinafter cited as NOR); T. B. Roy to W. W. Hunter, December 7, 1864, Savannah Squadron Papers.

<sup>17</sup>To Jones's credit, he never allowed the enemy to approach any closer to the railroad. Although the enemy could and did shell the line, only one locomotive and one car were damaged during the next two and a half weeks as the trains continued to run. S. Jones to T. B. Roy, January 11, 1865, CSA Miscellany; Jones, *Siege of Savannah*, 93-94; OR, Series I, XLIV, 420, 443-44, 934-35.

<sup>18</sup>W. J. Hardee to S. Jones, December 8, 1864, T. B. Roy to S. Jones, December 8, 1864, in S. Jones Papers; W. J. Hardee to P. G. T. Beauregard, December 8, 1864, in CSA Archives.

<sup>19</sup>OR, Series I, XLIV, 940.

<sup>20</sup>OR, Series I, XLIV, 410; W. J. Hardee to P. G. T. Beauregard, December 9, 1864, in CSA Archives; *Savannah Daily Morning News*, December 8-9, 1864.

<sup>21</sup>Alexander Robert Chisolm, "The Failure to Capture Hardee," in Johnson and Buel, eds., *Battles and Leaders*, IV, 680; W. J. Hardee to P. G. T. Beauregard, December 9, 1864, CSA Archives; OR, Series I, LIII, 381-382.

<sup>22</sup>George Anderson Mercer Diary, 1851-1865, December 8, 1864 entry, in the Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina Library (Hereinafter cited as Mercer Diary).

<sup>23</sup>Charles Seton Henry Hardee, "Reminiscences and Recollections of Old Savannah," n.d., the Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina Library (Hereinafter cited as C. S. H. Hardee, "Reminiscences").

<sup>24</sup>OR, Series I, XLIV, 277; Berry G. Benson Manuscript, in Berry Greenwood Benson Papers, 1845-1922, the Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina Library (Hereinafter cited as Berry Benson Manuscript); Jones, *Siege of Savannah*, 78.

<sup>25</sup>Douglas Southall Freeman, *Lee's Lieutenants: A Study in Command* (3 vols., New York, 1942) I, 435.

<sup>26</sup>John William Green, *Johnny Green of the Orphan Brigade. The Journal of a Confederate Soldier* edited by A. D. Kirwan, Lexington, Ky., 1956), 179.

<sup>27</sup>Jones, *Siege of Savannah*, 86, 112-13; Ezra A. Carman, *General Hardee's Escape from Savannah* (Military Order of the Loyal Legion of the United States, Commandery of the District of Columbia, War Papers, No. 13, Washington, 1893), 4 (Hereinafter cited as Carman, *Hardee's Escape*).

<sup>28</sup>OR, Series I, XLIV, 57; Jones, *Siege of Savannah*, 80-85; C. S. H. Hardee, "Reminiscences."

<sup>29</sup>Jones, *Siege of Savannah*, 98; OR, Series I, XLIV, 13; Dahlgren, *Memoirs*, 488-89.

- <sup>30</sup>W. J. Hardee to P. G. T. Beauregard, December 10, 1864, in CSA Archives.  
<sup>31</sup>OR, Series I, XLIV, 951-952.  
<sup>32</sup>W. J. Hardee to P. G. T. Beauregard, December 10, 1864, in CSA Archives.  
<sup>33</sup>W. J. Hardee to P. G. T. Beauregard, December 11, 1864, in CSA Archives.  
<sup>34</sup>E. C. Anderson to T. B. Roy, December 26, 1864, in George W. and Edward C. Anderson Papers, 1784-1896, the Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina Library; S. W. Ferguson Reminiscences, in Heyward-Ferguson Papers and Books, 1806-1923, the Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina Library.  
<sup>35</sup>Frobel Notes of the siege of Savannah, in Charles Colcock Jones Papers, 1763-1893, Manuscript Division, Duke University Library (Hereinafter cited as C. C. Jones Papers); Jones, *Siege of Savannah*, 117-18; W. J. Hardee to P. G. T. Beauregard, December 12, 1864, in CSA Archives; Carman, *Hardee's Escape*, 12-13; W. J. Hardee to W. W. Hunter, December 12, 1864, in Savannah Squadron Papers.  
<sup>36</sup>W. J. Hardee to P. G. T. Beauregard, December 12, 1864, in CSA Archives.  
<sup>37</sup>William Tecumseh Sherman, *Memoirs of General William T. Sherman, By Himself* (2 vols., 1875), II, 193 (Hereinafter cited as Sherman, *Memoirs*); John C. Van Duzer Diary, December 13, 1864 entry, Manuscript Division, Duke University Library.  
<sup>38</sup>J. C. Gray, Jr. to J. C. Ropes, December 14, 1864, in John Chipman Gray and John Codman Ropes, *War Letters 1862-1865 of John Chipman Gray and John Codman Ropes* (New York, 1927), 42.  
<sup>39</sup>OR, Series I, XLIV, 10, 61.  
<sup>40</sup>Jefferson Davis to W. J. Hardee, December 17, 1864, in Dunbar Rowland, ed., *Jefferson Davis, Constitutionalist, His Letters, Papers and Speeches* (10 vols. Jackson, Miss., 1923), VI, 421.  
<sup>41</sup>OR, Series I, XLIV, 960.  
<sup>42</sup>Carman, *Hardee's Escape*, 13ff; Mercer Diary, December 15, 1864 entry; Jones, *Siege of Savannah*, 138; OR, Series II, VII, 1263; OR, Series I, XLIV, 966.  
<sup>43</sup>P. M. B. Young to C. C. Jones, n. d., C. C. Jones Papers; OR, Series I, XLIV, 962-63.  
<sup>44</sup>P. M. B. Young to C. C. Jones, n. d., C. C. Jones Papers; Carman, *Hardee's Escape*, 20.  
<sup>45</sup>Jones, *Siege of Savannah*, 139-40.  
<sup>46</sup>NOR, Series I, XVI, 484; OR, Series I, XLIV, 964-65.  
<sup>47</sup>Jones, *Siege of Savannah*, 141-42.  
<sup>48</sup>A. R. Wright to T. B. Roy, January 20, 1865, in CSA Miscellany.  
<sup>49</sup>Jones, *Siege of Savannah*, 145; W. J. Hardee to P. G. T. Beauregard, December 19, 1864, in CSA Archives; Carman, *Hardee's Escape*, 23-25; OR, Series I, XLIV, 968-69.  
<sup>50</sup>OR, Series I, XLIV, 967-69.  
<sup>51</sup>Frobel Notes on the Siege of Savannah, C. C. Jones Papers; W. J. Hardee to J. G. Clarke, Pierre Gustave Toutant Beauregard Papers, 1854-1893, Manuscript Division, Duke University Library (Hereinafter cited as P. G. T. Beauregard Papers-Duke).  
<sup>52</sup>This unusual and unstable method was adopted because the Confederates could obtain only half the number of boats necessary to complete the bridge with pontoons perpendicular to the bridge as customary.  
<sup>53</sup>Frobel Notes on the Siege of Savannah, in C. C. Jones Papers; NOR, Series II, XVI, 484.  
<sup>54</sup>Frobel Notes on the Siege of Savannah, in C. C. Jones Papers; J. G. Clarke to P. G. T. Beauregard, April 6, 1875, quoted in P. G. T. Beauregard to C. C. Jones, April 13, 1875, in C. C. Jones Papers; Jones, *Siege of Savannah*, 133-34.

- <sup>55</sup>Jones, *Siege of Savannah*, 134.  
<sup>56</sup>Berry G. Benson Manuscript.  
<sup>57</sup>P. M. B. Young to C. C. Jones, n. d., in C. C. Jones Papers; OR, Series I, 58OR, Series I, XLIV, 450-51.  
<sup>59</sup>J. C. Gray, Jr. to J. C. Ropes, December 14, 1864, Gray and Ropes, *War Letters*, 42; OR, Series I, XLIV, 6-7; D. H. Poole to L. McLaws, December 19, 1864, in Lafayette McLaws Papers, 1861-1865, Record Group 109, National Archives and Record Service, Washington, D. C. (Hereinafter cited as McLaws Papers NARS).  
<sup>60</sup>T. B. Roy to L. McLaws, December 20, 1864, McLaws Papers; OR, XLIV, 973; Carman, *Hardee's Escape*, 26-27. NARS.  
<sup>61</sup>OR, Series I, XLIV, 967.  
<sup>62</sup>OR, Series I, XLIV, 965; NOR, Series II, XVI, 482. The *Savannah* found she could not escape to sea through the obstacle choked waterways and had to be burned. The *Isandiga* ran aground and had to be burned. The *Firefly* met the same fate after doing good service in ferrying material. The several ships under construction in the city had to be burned also.  
<sup>63</sup>Carman, *Hardee's Escape*, 27. <sup>64</sup>*Ibid.*, 27.  
<sup>65</sup>Frobel Notes on the Siege of Savannah, C. C. Jones Papers; C. S. H. Hardee, "Reminiscences"; Jones, *Siege of Savannah*, 162.  
<sup>66</sup>Carman, *Hardee's Escape*, 29.  
<sup>67</sup>J. B. Elliott to his mother, January 10, 1865, in Habersham-Elliott Papers, 1863-1885, the Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina Library (Hereinafter cited as Habersham-Elliott Papers).  
<sup>68</sup>Sherman, *Memoirs*, II, 231. <sup>69</sup>OR, Series I, XLIV, 63-65.  
<sup>70</sup>OR, Series I, XLIV, 63-65.  
<sup>71</sup>George Winston Smith, "Cotton from Savannah in 1865," in *Journal of Southern History*, XXI (November, 1955), 495-96.  
<sup>72</sup>OR, Series I, LIII, 413.  
<sup>73</sup>W. J. Hardee to S. Cooper, February 6, 1865, Adjutant and Inspector General's Office, Record of Telegrams Received, 1862-1865, Record Group 109, National Archives and Record Service, Washington, D. C.  
<sup>74</sup>Jones, *Siege of Savannah*, 107-108.  
<sup>75</sup>Sherman, *Memoirs* II, 216; J. C. Gray to J. C. Ropes, December 14, 1864, Gray and Ropes, *War Letters*, 42; OR, Series I, XLIV, 6-7.  
<sup>76</sup>W. J. Hardee to P. G. T. Beauregard, December 21, 1864, CSA Archives; NOR, Series I, XVI, 484; William Douglas Pickett, *Sketch of the Military Career of William J. Hardee, Lieutenant-General C. S. A.* (Lexington, 1910), 42.  
<sup>77</sup>C. S. H. Hardee, "Reminiscences"; W. J. Hardee to P. G. T. Beauregard, December 21, 1864, in CSA Archives; OR, Series I, LIII, 38.  
<sup>78</sup>T. B. Roy to L. McLaws, December 22, 1864, L. McLaws to wife, December 27, 1864, in Lafayette McLaws Papers, 1836-1897, the Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina Library.