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Extracts

from the MS. Narrative by Brig.
Gen. Johnson Hagood, C.S.A. of the
defense of Morris Island
from July 10/63 to Sep 7/63

Extracts from Ms narrative

by
Brig. Gen. Johnson Hagood of S.C.

~~Brig. Gen. Johnson Hagood of S.C.~~
(1873)

Gen. Gillman on the 10 July¹⁸⁶³ assaulted and carried the south end of Morris Island. His Infantry moved in a flotilla of small boats from the north end of Holly Island under cover of heavy fire from Batteries on the latter constructed without attracting serious attention from the Confederates. The movement was well planned and executed with considerable dash. Co-operation with it was the attempt to cut the Charleston and Savannah R.R. at Jacksonboro, the failure of which has^{been} already mentioned in speaking of events in the 2d Milly District, and a demonstration in force from the stores on James Island.

Upon reporting on the evening of the 10 of July at Gen Beauregard's Head Quarters in pursuance of the dispatch received at Barnwell, Gen Hagood was sent to James Island to take command of that sub District. - All day from Black Miler down, wherever the ears ~~stop~~ stopped the booming of the guns from Morris Island could be heard

landed that night at Legare's landing, it is probable that Fort Johnson, unentrenched to the rear, would have fallen before day; and within the limits of possibility that before the following night the whole of James Island except the garrisons of Secessionville and Fort Mifflin which would have been cut off and isolated, would have been in their possession. A vigorous co-operation march of Gen. Wm. M. Davis's force on the Stono side of the Island against the center of our line by way of Royal's House would have made it almost a certain thing. And then the northern shore of James Island held by four thousand men would have been safe against any force at Beauregard's command for several days. Gillmore could have been reinforced after word as fast as Beauregard. Had the James Island route instead of the Morris Island route to Charleston been taken this was at that time and for a day or two the promising plan.

The Confederate force on James Island consisted of the Regiment of Frederick

(late Leiman's), the Battalions of White and Lucas; three Companies of Rhode-Island Heavy Artillery; the Siege Train consisting of 4 Companies, under Maj Manigault; and one Regiment of Infantry, the 25th Co, under Col Simonton. This last was the only force available for movement. The Heavy Artillery were barely enough to garrison the three Forts in which they were stationed, and to man the few guns in position on the lines. Maj Manigault was with all dispatch moved that night from his camp near ~~Wapoo~~^{Wapoo} to Legare's Landing, where he arrived at daylight and immediately proceeded to erect ~~emplacements~~^{emplacements} for his siege guns. This was the beginning of Battery Haswell and the series of works on the eastern shore of the Island. The enemy on the Toms under Gen Terry remained quiet, advancing their pickets without opposition some short distance. Gen Beauregard rapidly pushed reinforcements over to James Island as they arrived.

Large working parties of Negroes were together with the troops. Kept steadily at work, and in a few days the opportunity of doing any thing by surprise or assault on James Island had passed away. Subsequently, Gen. T. B. Telfair was assigned to the command of James Island, and General Heagood and a Lt. Colonel commanded the eastern and western divisions of the line respectively under him. Secession was the deciding point in these sub commands. These General officers served with others on the detail of Commanders on Morris Island during the operations in that quarter: and when not on duty there, resumed their positions on James Island. Gen. Heagood's tour of duty on Morris Island were

From the	18 th	to the	22	July
"	"	6 th	"	10 th Aug
"	"	21	"	25

arriving and leaving generally on the nights of these respective dates. His next tour of duty would have

commenced on the 7th of Sept. The Island was evacuated on the previous night. Of his staff Capt Melony A. G. and his aides Ben Martin and Tracy with his orderly S. R. Bellenge always accompanied him. Majors Hay and Lortigan and Capt Haynie (comd'g Dr Master, and ordnance officer) were with him on the first tour; afterwards these officers on the Island were made post offices, and others filled them. Lt Col Dil Kemper served the first tour with him as chief of artillery. This officer had ~~very~~ distinguished himself in Virginia at 1st Manassas and subsequently. An unhealed wound in his shoulder unfitting him for field duty and he was sent to this Department when he served the rest of the war. He was in person very like Gen Beauregard, of high mental and social culture, and an officer of much dash and merit. Gen Hagood was thrown much with and formed a warm regard for him. Lt Col Melman Brown served the second

town as Chief of Artillery and Major
 F. F. Bailey the Third. These officers all
 discharged their duties with credit to
 themselves, and to the entire satis-
 faction of their Chief. Capt. Molony
 especially was invaluable - cool
 intelligent and indefatigable he
 relieved the Command of half its
 burden. The period of active
 operations against Charleston, look-
 ing to its direct capture was from
 the 10th July, to 10th of September,
 after which the siege was marked
 only by the bombardment of
 Sumter and the City, with com-
 paratively harmless cannonading
 of each other by the opposing
 batteries, and some skirmishes.

This continued until the spring
 of 1864, when Gillmore and
 Beauregard were both, with the
 bulk of their troops, transferred
 to the theatre of war in Virginia
 where the conflict was then cul-
 minating, and Charleston was
 left with a skeleton garrison to
 hold its own against a force
 adequate to little more than

protected from assault the long range
guns which continued day and night
to hurl their crashing and exploding
missiles into the ruins of the devoted
city. For twelve months longer
this continued while the contest
open which depended alike the
fate of Charleston and the Con-
federacy was elsewhere presented
to the better end. At length in
the spring of '65 when all that
was left of the Confederacy was
concentrated for the last desperate
hazard, the Garrison of Charleston,
his artillery converted into infan-
try silently and sadly and bearing
with them their war worn banners
marched to ~~marched~~ to strengthen the
hands of Johnston in North Carolina.
Then upon the fields of Averysboro
and Bentonville - in two field fights
they lost nearly as many men in
killed and wounded as in all
their service under Gill Meade's
guns and before his assailing
columns. So much for the act
of the Engineer.

In arranging the material

of the ~~the~~ main of the siege Gen Beauregard's Report - Embracing the time from his assumption of Command until the Evacuation of Morris Island is taken; Gen Ripley's report continues the Narrative till the 10th of September; and from that time till the departure of Gen. Haggood for Virginia in May '64 his recollections is relied upon. In notes to these official papers the writer has embodied such comments as appeared to him

proper ^{of operations} ~~of operations~~ in and around Charleston subsequent to April '64, in the absence of personal knowledge or official reports, no attempt

will be made to give an account (Beauregard's Report is not copied. Mr. Martin no doubt has it)

Extract from Gen Ripley's Report continuing Narrative of siege from 7th to 10th Sept 1863.

x x x x x x x x x x x

" Sept 8th. The Enemy occupied Battery Wagner about daylight and was opened upon by batteries ^{and ~~shots~~ shows} Simkins and Fort Moultrie with the works

adjacent soon after Admiral Dal-
green Commanding Emergence Fleet sent
a demand to Major Stephen Elliott
Commanding Fort Sumter for a sur-
render of that Post. Maj Elliott de-
clined, meantime referring the
matter to the Head Quarters of the
District. Under instructions from
the Head Quarters of the Department
Admiral Dalgreen was informed
that he could have Fort Sumter
when he could take and hold it.
At about 6 PM the Frenches and
five Monitors came up the Channel
and opened fire on Fort Sumter
and the Batteries on Sullivan
Island which was promptly replied
to by our guns and with some
effect until it was too dark to
observe the results. The enemy
kept up his fire until about nine
o'clock, doing but little damage
to the works, Lt E of Edwin 1st
Inf was killed at Battery Beau-
regard

Sept-8th On the morning of the
8th a Monitor supposed to be
the Weehawken was observed

aground in the Channel leading to Cummings Point and the shore of Morris Island. A slow fire was opened upon her from a tubed breech loaded Brooke gun and a x in Columbiad from Sullivan's Island and such guns as could be brought to bear from Fort Johnson. The Endeavour was made to strike her below ^{her} armor which was out of water at low tide, she was struck several times below the usual water line, and about 9 o'clock the French and five monitors came to her assistance, engaging the Fort and Batteries at distances ranging from 800 to 1500 yds, keeping up a very heavy cannonade.

A shell from the Weehawken struck and disabled an xiii in Columbiad in Fort Moultrie and glancing burst near a summer magazine which was protected by a heavy traverse throwing incendiary contents into, and exploding the magazine, killing sixteen and maiming twelve men of Capt R Pres Smith Company, 1st Inf-

This disaster interrupted the practice but little for Capt Bennett's company relieved Capt Smith's under a heavy cannonade and an accurate and deliberate ^{fire} was maintained against the Enemy from all the Batteries on the Island for about five hours, when the Enemy with crew much cut up and disabled, from personal observation I take pleasure in commending the conduct and practice of the officers and men engaged in Col Butler's Regt. The effect on the Ironclads I believe to have been greater than on the 7th April, and since the action but one Monitor has fired again: and ~~their number~~ ^{their number} has been decreasing; four only are now in view. Besides the casualties from the explosion three men and two officers were killed - Capt Hardlow and St Desaussure; and fourteen men were wounded at Fort Moultrie. Having met with but little success in the cannonade of the Sullivan's Island Batteries, the Enemy's Naval Commander next

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made an attempt to take possession of
Fort Sumter and at one o'clock on the
morning of the 9th attacked that fort
with a fleet of from thirty to forty
barges. Maj. Elliott caused his fire
to be resumed until the ^{enemy} ~~evening~~ was
within a few yards of the southern
and eastern faces upon which the
landing was attempted. He was then
renewed with a close fire of musketry,
hand grenades, ~~of~~ ^{also} fragments of
Epaulements were thrown over the
heads of his men, demoralizing
and completely repulsing him.
The crews near the fort sought
refuge in the recesses and breaches
in the scarp and those at a dis-
tance turned and pulled rapidly,
a way. The gunboat "Chico" the
Sullivan Island Batteries, and Fort
Johnson ~~re~~ opened a fire enfilading
the faces of Sumter as soon as the
signal was made, cutting up the
retreating barges of which several
were seen floating capsized and
disabled. Next morning, Maj. Elliott
succeeded in securing five boats
five stand of color, twelve officers

and one hundred and nine men
including two officers and nineteen
men wounded.

The Prisoners reported the attacking force
four hundred strong. It was probably
larger, and the enemy's loss undoubted-
ly ^{larger} than that portion which fell into
our hands; and under our observations
amongst the captured colors was a
brown and tan garrison flag, reported
by some of the prisoners as that which
Maj Anclissen was permitted to take
from the Fort on the occasion of
his being compelled to surrender it
in April 1861. This had ^{long} brought to
hoist and to be made the subject
of boast had the assault & success.
Whether it was really the flag in ques-
tion or not, it would doubtless have
been so asserted x x x x The gallant
conduct of Maj Stephen Elliott Comd'y
Fort Sumter and of his garrison -
The Charleston Battalion under Maj
Blake - in repelling the assault
is to be especially commended x x x x

Thus terminated the ^{direct} effort of the
Enemy to take Charleston. With the

Capture of Morris Island and the demolition of the offensive power of Sumter, Gen. Gillmore with his land forces had done all he was able to do; and contended that he had done all he had engaged to do; and that it was enough - that the gate was now open for the Fleet to enter and finish the undertaking. The Fleet thought otherwise. From thence forward until the operations of Sherman in the interior of the state compelled the evacuation of the city, the enemy's operations before Charleston as heretofore stated were confined to a cannonade upon Sumter to prevent its rehabilitation as an artillery post, to the exchange of shots with our James Island Batteries from which nothing resulted, and to the regular bombardment of the city from Cumming's Point. The Fleet occasionally joined in the pounding of Sumter or engaged in desecrating the Sullivan's Island Batteries.

Gen Beauregard's efforts were confined principally to completing the defenses of Charleston. On James Island, with which the Union was most familiar

then became very complete. Pemberton
and Ripley lines from Seaside wharf
by way of Royal House to Ft. Pemberton
were abandoned. Starting at Seaside wharf
a line much shorter was carried to
Dills, just above Grimballs on the
Stone. This was a Cornalline Infantry

breast work of strong profile, with heavy
enclosed redoubts at distances of
700 and 800 yds having the same
relations to each other. On the Stone
were one or two heavy redoubts se-
curing that flank. Ft. Pemberton
was nearly if not quite dismantled.

~~From~~ ^{From} Seaside wharf to Fort Johnson
along the eastern shore of the Island
looking towards Holly and Mours
Islands, heavy Batteries open to the
sea with trenches or breast works for
Infantry supports were erected.
and from Johnson to opposite
the City, heavy Batteries for the
defence of the Inner Harbor.

Bombproof, covered ways, rifle pits
and all the appliances of the Engineer
Art were exhausted in strengthening
this system of works. Magnetic tel-
-e-graphs were put up from Pemberton,

Secessionists, Fort Haskell and Johnson
 respectively to Head Quarters at Royal
 House, and a complete system of
 signals, ^{by rocket &c} established. The Command
 was divided into ~~two~~ ^{two} divisions - General
 Haygood and Colquhoun, ^{as previously mentioned} in charge, and
 Gen Taliaferro commanded the Island.
 In November, President Davis visited James
 Island. Gen Taliaferro was absent on
 leave, and Gen Haygood in command.
 Mr Davis inspected the works closely
 going at a rapid gallop with his
 carriage from Battery to Battery, and
 stopping long enough to receive a
 salute and ride around the Regiments
 which were drawn up along his
 route, each at post. He seemed in
 good spirits; the troops he traversed
 with enthusiasm, but he acknowl-
 edged their cheers for "Our President"
 by simply raising his hat. Gen
 Haygood rode with him as Com-
 mander of the Island, and ne-
 cessarily had much conversation
 with him. This, and on the Field of
 Battle at Drewry's Bluff when Gen
 Beauregard was pleased to present
 him again. With a compliment,

to the President were the only times he
was ever in conversation with the dis-
tinguished man, that night Ex. Gov. Aikin,
with whom Mr Davis was a guest,
entertained the party in the city.

In February 1864, the enemy inaugurated
a campaign in Florida, covering the
movement of troops from before Shreve-
port by a demonstration upon Johns
Island. Colquitt was sent with
his Brigade to reinforce our ^{Troop} force
in that quarter, and the Battle of
Olustee terminated the campaign.
The 11th So Co. was sent after Colquitt,
but arrived after the battle. It was
however creditably engaged afterwards
in an affair of Pickett.

Olustee like Secessionville, was one of
the decisive battles of the war, with
comparatively small forces engaged.
At the time, and so far since, the
credit of it seemed to attach to Gen
Fitzgerald, the District Commander.
From what Gen. Stogood learned of it
from those engaged he was inclined
to believe the credit is wholly due
to Colquitt. He was said to have
been on a reconnaissance in force

Under orders from Finneyan when he unexpectedly encountered the advance of the Yankee Army, and engaged it without orders. He received no orders or reinforcements during the fight, until just as he was preparing for his decisive charge, a messenger from Finneyan five miles in rear directed him to fall back. The charge was made and the enemy thoroughly routed. No fresh troops were sent in pursuit. Colquitt ordered forward a Squadron or two of Cavalry which had accompanied his reconnaissance and ^{it was} been engaged in the fight. They did not get out of sight of the field of battle before they bivouacked for the night. The enemy, it was said abandoned Artillery in the wood, twenty miles from the field of action. Taliaferro was now sent to Florida to take command of that District; he was in a short time superseded by Maj Gen Patten Anderson, and returned to James Island.

The troops on James Island were

generally killed. and from the facility
of getting private supplies from home,
(they were chiefly Georgians and South
Carolinians) lived tolerably well. The
commissionary supply was irregular and
poor. Maj Guerin in Charleston and
Northrop in Richmond were too much
for us. Under Confederate regulations
the commissary Dept was almost in de-
pendent of even a General Comdr a
separate Army; and Gen Beauregard
more than once spoke to the merit
of his plans being thwarted by the
interference of Northrop the Chief at
Richmond. As to Northrop's qualifi-
cations for the high position, it was
said with sarcastic bitterness, were
to have been at West Point with Presi-
dent Davis some thirty years before,
and to have lived a misanthrope
since, without active participation
in even Civil life. It was a pop-
ular notion among the soldiers
that he was a vegetarian and
did not think meat healthy.
~~General~~ Guerin had been an officer clerk for
a Physician in Charleston before the
war, and had married Northrop's niece. 2

The writer knows that the movement and supply of troops is the most difficult of the problems of war. and he trusts he is not disposed to criticize harshly any man or set of men who "share the grey". But he also knows that on James Island had it not ^{been} for private sources of supply the troops would have often been on siege rations, and that when there was uninterrupted communication with the Middle and back Country of Georgia and South Carolina which teemed with provisions. A year later Sherman and his men expressed themselves amazed at the abundance they encountered here. During the winter (of 1863-64) the wives of many of the officers came down and there was quite a pleasant society on the Island. Ladies on shore back and in carriage were not ^{an} uncommon sight, and some times during a lull in the firing of the batteries a dancing party was had at a post ^{to be opened up on} table at any time. Horse racing, coursing rabbits with grey hounds, and cock fighting amused the fanciers of each sport, and so.

casualty a whole Regiment - would be seen
on a grand battle. Deploying as skirmishers,
Each man armed only with a club, they
would sweep over the extensive fields whoop-
ing and yelling; and it was astonishing
to see what numbers of Rabbits partridge
and other small game, too scared to
escape, they would bring to bag. The
health of the troops was good, their Mor-
ale excellent; and many a Veteran, who
followed the Red Cross Flag under
Lee and Johnston in '64 and '65, look-
ed back upon this portion of his
service at the siege of Charleston with
fond regret.

Before leaving for Virginia whether he
had been advised in April 1864,

Gen H. G. Wood went over to Sumter
to look at its condition. He had
last seen it on the night of the 18th
July 1863 on his way to Wagner.

Then it was an imposing Artillery
Fortress, armed at all points, equalled
for offensive power by few perhaps in
the world, and triumphant in its
recent decisive repulse of the Pres-
ident's Fleet. The first day from
Gullmore huge rifled projectiles

had demonstrated the inability of its
 masonry to withstand land breaching
 batteries - and disported by friends
 and battered by foes at New Bay in
 the moonlight, a huge muskaper
 mound upon the quint base of the
 bay. There was no sign of life or occu-
 pation save the battle flag floating
 in the night breeze, as we approach-
 ed, until the quick decisive challenge
 of the warden obscured in the shade
 of the ruin arrested us. The watch,
 word given, and landing, the visit
 aided by a zigzag and obstructed
 entrance into the bowels of the mass
 of debris, and came into a security
 ceiled and well lighted gallery sur-
 rounding the whole circle of the ruin:
 neatly whitewashed, thoroughly ventilated,
 widening here into a barometer room
 misty banks ⁱⁿ which the remains of the
 garrison were quietly sleeping; narrowing
 then into a covered way drop holed to
 give a musketry fire upon what was
 once the parade; and again enveloping
 itself into a Hospital Room, a com-
 pact Head Q. Office, ~~with~~ ^{with} ~~ample~~
 and a Place of Arms for the force,

with ample, and ingeniously defended passages for egress to ^{the} summit of the ruins. Here sentinels in single rifle pits were stationed having for giving the alarm in addition to their guns, a wire by each upon pulling which a bell was rung at the same time in Head Quarters office and in each station of the galleries within. Boat-Horizontally securely sheltered upon the interior slope of the debris were so ~~placed~~ ^{placed} and combined with arrangements for musketry fire as to sweep every part of the parade. Wire entanglements, movable ^{during} the day or a bombardment, upon the exterior slope added to the difficulties of Escalade, which the action of the trees already made difficult enough. For at the edge of the water the debris which from the summit so far had a natural slope, was washed away, making here a nearly perpendicular wall five or six feet high. One or two heavy guns were mounted in the North ~~and~~ West angle of the Fort which was sheltered by its position from Gillmore's land batteries. These had

a field of fire upon the Inner Harbor and would have been serviceable upon vessels succeeding in reaching that position in advance of the Fleet upon the City. The general appearance of the Rock now as viewed from the summit ridge of the Ruin and looking in ward was that of the crater of an extinct volcano. As barracks and bombproof, and Casemate, and magazines of the original Fort had crumbled under the enemy's unparalleled fire, until protected alone by what had once been its defenses, no living thing could have survived even one day's ordinary bombardment, the Garrison clinging tenaciously to the site had burrowed into the increasing debris. Working under almost ceaseless fire they had converted the ~~rock~~^{work} of an Artillery Fort, without a single gun to reply to her long range assailants, into an Infantry Post comparatively safe for its defenders, and with which after one feeble effort its assailants had never the means to grapple in assault. Elliott who had

held the Fort since the fall of Morris Island without relief in the arduous and weary duty, had just been promoted to a Regiment and gone to Virginia, where in further recognition of his services he ^{was promoted} ~~was~~ the first lieutenant South Carolina Brigade. Capt Mitchell ⁺ was now in command and Capt Johnson remained the resident Engineer.

After the war and not long before his untimely death, ^{Elliott +} the ~~latter~~ ^{latter} were walking on the street of less later Columbia when they met and stopped to speak with Mrs. Pickens. After a few moments of conversation the lady presented her little daughter to him, and said in an aside to the child, "When you are old enough, My Dear, to read the story of Fort Sumter you will know why Ma-ma wished to present you to Gen Elliott."

Mitchell found his grave amidst its ruins: and Johnson here established a reputation for genius in his profession and devoted gallantry unsurpassed in the war ⁺

+ a son of Mitchell, the Park Walk

= Johnson is now pastor of the Episcopal Church in Charleston

Note C

The affair of the 16th July on James Island.

Hd Qrs, Sub Div, 1st Mily Dist

James Island July 18th 1863...

Capt Wm F. Hance

A. A. G.

Captain

I have the honor to make the following report of the operations of the troops under my command on the 16th Inst.

I had been instructed on the day previous to observe and report the possibility of offensive operations against the enemy in my front; and had reported two plans, the one of which limited to driving in their pickets on the left and making a reconnaissance of that part of their line with the further object of capturing or destroying the part of their force nearest Gumball, was the one approved.

The enemy occupied Battery Island and Legare Plantation principally, and a part of Gumballs; and their Gunboats lay in Holly and Stone

Rivers giving in front of their position
a cross fire extending as far as our
picket lines.

Gen Colquhoun was ordered with
about 14,000(?) Infantry and a Field Battery
to cross the Marsh clearing Legan's
Plantation from Gamball at the lower
nearest Secession mill, drove the enemy
rapidly as far as the lower lower (?)
(nearest stone), recross the Marsh at
that point by a flank movement
and cut off and capture the force,
Camped near Gamball's House.

Col ~~May~~ ^{May}, 54th Ga, with about 800
Infantry was directed to follow
en echelon on the Gamball side
of the Marsh, the advance of Gen
Colquhoun and to operate with
him. A reserve of one section of
Artillery supported by a Company
of Infantry and a Squadron ^{Cavalry} of
under Lt Col Jeffords, 5-S.C. Cavalry
was held ~~in reserve~~ near ~~the~~ ^{River's}

House. On the extreme right a Battery
of 4 rifled 12 lbs and one of 4 moun-
teons under Lt Col Del Kepner; sup-
ported by Col Radcliff's ^{with} M.C. ~~with~~
about 400 Infantry was ordered

to engage the Gunboats lying highest
up the Stems. The troops moved
upon the enemy in the grey of the
morning, and the whole enterprise
was carried out as planned. The force
at Grimball's was however smaller than
was anticipated, and by retreating a-
cross to Battery Island as soon as
Colquhoun's firing was heard managed
to save themselves before he could
get into position to intercept them.
Col Kemper engaged the Pawnee
and another Gunboat at 250 yds
and after some ten rounds drove
them down the River beyond ^{his} range.
The reserve Artillery was not brought
into action. The Cavalry did good
service in sweeping up fugitives
over which the advancing Infantry
had run. The Troops were under
fire one hour and a half and
behaved well. This fire was chiefly
by shell from Gunboats and
shell and case from a Field
Battery. The enemy's Infantry fought
badly. Those encountered were
chiefly coloured troops, 14 of whom
were captured. I beg leave to

1
20
refer to the accompanying reports
of subordinate commanders for
full details. The enemy were sup-
posed to have not been above 2000
Infantry and one battery of Field
Artillery. Upon the following night
they evacuated James and Battery
Islands leaving behind them arms
and stores of which a full return
will be made. Our casualties were
3 killed 18 wounded, and 5 missing.
Col Bull and Capt Beauregard of
the staff of Gen Beauregard and
Capt B H Bull of Gen Ripley's
staff reported to me for duty on
the occasion, and together with
my own staff rendered efficient
service.

I am Captain
Your Obedt servant
Johnson Hagood
Br Gen Cdy

The foregoing is the official
report. Colquitt drove in the
pickets and the main body of
the enemy with only a string line
of Skirmishers until they reached

The narrow neck between James and Battery Islets. Here they formed a double line of battle with Field Artillery on the flank and a cross fire at close range from Gunboats in Stone and Holly River sweeping their front. A rapid exchange of fire of Field Artillery took place. The force at Gambell had already escaped, and the instructions of Deptmt Head Qrs not permitting a further advance, which would probably have resulted in little good, after a close reconnaissance of the position the troops were recalled. Federal newspapers, accounts and their subsequent Histories state that this force on this occasion was Gen Terry's Division consisting of Montgomery's black brigade (two Regts) and Gen Sturgeson's Brig (white). This would make their force over 3000 men. The prisoners on that day insisted that there were 8 Regts. It seems they were right. The Assistant Surgeon of the Pamlico, who had been detailed to assist the command of the land forces, after the assault

on Wagon of the 18th July, and wander-
 ing into our lines on the field was
 picked up by our picket, told Gen. H.
 that the Pawnee was struck 43 times prin-
 cipally in her upper works. She
 slipped her cables and fled after
 the 10th round. Kemper galloped
 up and unlimbered at the short
 range stated, in an open field,
 and fought without equipment.
 The enemy's fire all passed over him,
 and he had neither man or horse
 wounded. Greeley's History (Am. Conflict)
 states Terry's loss at 100. This is be-
 lieved to have been the first time
 the colored troops of the Federal Army
 were ever in action. It was certainly
 the first time they were captured
 by the Confederates. When it was
 understood that such troops were being
 organized, by Confederate Proclamations,
 it was announced that prisoners taken
 from them would be turned over to the State
 authorities to be tried under the local laws
 relating to servile insurrection; and that
 white men coming to their aid would be dealt
 with as outlaws. It was not done in this
 or any subsequent case.

"I impressed upon Gen Stuyvesant Conroy
 the work that I did not consider
 x in Columbiad essential to the de-
 fence of the position, for Volck large
guns Musketry, stout arms and heart,
and the strength of land parapets
must be re lief on" Gen Beauregard's
 Report.

Note D

The style of fighting Traguer in the bay was
in the style of fighting in the bay was

There was but one gun at the time
 refused to try Gen Beauregard ^{in the above passage} on the
 sea face to reply to the Iron clad fire,
 which greatly annoyed the garrison of
 Traguer - these vessels being enabled to take
 us ^{both} in reverse and enfilade, ^{where}

rigorously worked the gun (the x inch
 Columbiad spoken of) kept these vessel
 at a greater distance, rendered their fire
 less accurate, and the Iron clad
 seemed to have considerable respect for its
 missile. On that day a Monitor took
 up position for action within 800
 yds of the Fort, but on being struck
 once or twice by the Columbiad
 withdrew two or three hundred yds,
 and the Union never knew them to

closer

engage the Fort at ~~close~~ range after ward. Besides, the demoralizing effect of making no reply to the very destructive fire was marked. It was in the light of the experience that Gen Hoagwood telegraphed the dismounting of the gun and asked that steps be taken to replace it that night. The gun by the way was an old one and said by an Artillery Officer who knew its history to have already been fired 1200 times. Gen Beauregard sent in substance the reply indicated in the report; and with all deference the writer would say that it foreshadowed the only defect as it occurred to him, in the immediate defence of Wagner. It was too passive. Its Artillery was not used enough to delay the approaches of the enemy, and the right kind of Artillery was not used. Sentries too should have been resorted to. There was but one (Breons, a success) during the siege. Its true no doubt as stated in Gen B's report that he ordered them made when practicable; but the writer as a commander of the Fort does not recollect to have had this order extended to him - and it certainly should have had obedience to it enforced. Until the enemy captured the Rifle Pit, or Ridge as they called it, sentries were entirely practicable not with standing the torpedoes in front of the work. The troops could have been

moved
~~placed~~ out in column by the path which the
pickets used aboarding the torpedoes, and
formed behind the Pits for the attack.
With regard to the artillery - When the
tour of duty was over, Gen Hoagland brought
fully to Gen B's attention the importance
and efficiency of Columbiads on the
sea face - stating that he thought a battery
of two or three x in guns should be
placed there; and further called atten-
tion to the absence of ~~guns~~^{mortars} for curved
fire against the enemy's approaches, the
only one in the Fort - a x in sea coast
having been disabled on the 10 July by
the breaking of one of its trunnions and
not having been used since. The General
spoke of his inability to spare the guns
and ~~mortars~~^{mortars}, and laid less stress
upon their importance to the defence
of the Fort. The dismounted Columbiad
however was in a few days re-mounted.
Later in the siege another was sent
down, but by this time or shortly after
the first form continuous use had
become unserviceable. So that in fact
one x in Columbiad was the only armament
opposed to the Fleet during the siege.
A 32 lb Repeating, on the sea face, became
unserviceable after very few discharges.
The landward armament consisted
for ~~of~~ ^{of} officers chiefly of 32 lb Howitzers and
VIII inch naval guns; a section of field

guns on the left flank and one field gun on the right flank were kept for defence against assault; and this armament in the entire operation was not worked as much as it might have been by the successive commanders of the Fort, upon the enemy's saps. The plan of defence generally adopted upon was a vigorous use of sharpshooters and but a moderate use of artillery from Wagner, while the fire of distant batteries was to retard the enemy's approaches and the garrison of Wagner should be husbanded in bomb proofs to repel assaults. Upon relieving his predecessor the first day on the 21st Aug. Gen. Slocum found the embrasures on the land face closed with sand bags and learned that for three or four days sharp shooting alone had been used from Wagner. He directed Maj. Parley, accompanying him as Chief of Artillery, to open at once a vigorous fire from his 32 drs. This fire by the enemy's saps journal put a stop to their work until daylight when it ceased. At 9 o'clock we opened again with the result as learned from the same source of stopping it for the day; and no further effort was made to advance their saps till the 23rd when Wagner again opened, "completely destroying it," says the Journal.

This mode of fighting Wagner drew ^{very} heavy artillery fire, and we were com-
pelled quickly after each discharge to
fill the throats of the embrasures with
sand bags to prevent the main firing
our guns - not with standing which
on the evening of the 24th the last
one on the land face was tempora-
rily disabled. Gen. Hoagland now com-
mended Maj. Wiley to try the experiment
of wedging up into position the
disabled mortar and throwing shell
with small charges into the head
of the sap, then some three hun-
dred and fifty yds off. Eight ounces
of powder was found sufficient and
the practice was beautiful. This was
the first time curved fire was used
from the Fort. The enemys progress
was stopped. His siege Journal says
"This mortar proved to be a great
"annoyance. Its fire was directed on
"the head of the sap, was very accu-
"rate and our ~~sappers~~ ^{sappers} had no
"shells from it. Six such mortars
"well served would have stopped
"our work till subdued by superior
"fire." The battery of Parrot heretofore
breaching summit was now turned up-
on the parapet of Wagner to get at the
mortar by breaching, but the mortar
was not silenced. Again on the

25th The mortar fire ~~was~~ greatly retarded their saps and Maj. Brakes in their siege journal records "This has been the saddest day of the siege to me. Less has been done than on any other. No advance has been made." And so through out the siege the enemy record shows that whenever the artillery ^{of power} was actively brought to bear upon them the result was always to stop or greatly retard their progress. The value of the mortar as exhibited at this time caused another to be sent to replace it, when the old one became utterly unusable: and curved fire was more or less used till the end of the siege.

These comments upon the masterly defence of Wagner by Gen Beauregard are made with much hesitation. They are given for what they are worth.

NOTE C

The Flag of Truce and Exchange of Prisoners

On the 21st of July, the enemy's ^{lines} ceasing and a flag of truce appearing, Capt. Tracy A.D.C. was sent to meet it. After a short interview the flags separated and before either party had reached their lines the Fleet opened on the Fort.

Capt Tracy had to proceed a distance of two hundred yds across the exposed beach across which every projectile fired at Wagner from the Fleet passed at the height of a man, they firing low to ricochet. Capt Tracy providentially reached the foot without being harmed, and he received a communication from Gen Gill more requesting a personal interview between the officer commanding Wagner and Gen Taylor and in the trenches. He also said the next afternoon had been suggested for the interview. The Commander of Wagner deeming the fire of the Fleet an accident and that it would every moment cease, did not at first permit his guns to reply. But the enemy's land batteries soon took it up; Wagner responded, and the bombardment went on.

On the 22nd at the hour suggested the enemy's flag reappeared, and the matter was also stated by Gen Beauregard the interview was refused until the breach of truce was explained. The excuse as mentioned was some misunderstanding between the Naval and ~~land~~^{land} Commanders and the fire could not be immediately stopped on account of Gen

Gillmore's absence on Folly Island and Gen Dodge had no authority or perhaps means of communicating with the Fleet. It was a lame excuse for the outrage as far as the Navy was concerned, for the whole interview had been on the open beach, in sight of the whole Fleet, and Tracy was perfectly visible to every gunner as he returned with his flag in his hand. The explanation was however accepted with the proviso a apology tendered, and the interview accorded. Gen Dodge stated his mission to be to ask for Col Putnam's body and to return to us St-Bee's with the sword of the latter. He had with him poor Bee's body for delivery. His request was complied with, and he then verbally proposed an exchange of prisoners, mentioning that they had but few of ours, all except those recently captured having been sent North - that "as we had the excess, of course we could select whom to exchange," whilst intimating that a general exchange with out regard to excess would be ~~acceptable~~ ^{acceptable}. Pending the interview Gen Haigood recd a dispatch from Ripley Head Dns in Charleston when the interview and its object were known directing him to agree to an exchange of wounded prisoners without regard to

excess on our side, except the ^{negro} ~~negro~~ prisoners; not to introduce them into the negotiation, but if introduced by Gen. Dodge, to refuse, as they would not be given up; and that it was desirable on the score of humanity to get rid of the numerous white prisoners wounded in our hands and for whom no adequate accommodation existed in our hospitals. The contents of the dispatch is given in substance and was not communicated to Dodge. He carefully avoided any direct mention of negro prisoners; and his remarks quoted above that having the excess we could choose whom to exchange he was in allusion to them, and all that was made. The Confederate Proclamation outlawing negro troops and white officers commanding them was well known to the enemy; and anyone to effect the exchange, it was apparent that the Federal Party did not desire to complicate matters. It was observed that neither Gen. V. or either of the three or four officers accompanying him enquired after Sherman, the Colonel of the Negro Regiment engaged in the recent assault, altho they asked after every body else, and we subsequently learned by their newspapers that they did not then know whether he was killed or captured.

The negotiation was arranged, all in parcel, by accepting the basis proposed by Gen. Dodge - the time to be the following Friday at 10 A.M. and the place the point in the outer harbor from which the fleet generally conducted the attack on Magner. The exchange took place; and Gen. Gill more after said ~~accuse~~ Bean regarded of bad faith in not sending the negro prisoners for delivery. The foregoing narrative is believed to be perfectly correct.

Note E.

Sharp shooting.

Whatever may be said of the artillery of Magner not having been sufficiently active at all times, no objection as that score can be taken to the sharpshooters. At first the Infantry of the garrison served in this capacity by detail, and used their ordinary weapon - the Enfield rifle. Later, upon a suggestion which Gen. Hagoel had the honor to make, a special detail of men from the 21st and 27th Regts was made under Lt Woodhouse of the 21st, and armed with Whitworth's telescopic rifles, a small lot of which had recently been brought thro' the blockade. The detail was sent to Sullivan's Island for a few days to

became familiar by target practice with the weapon, and were then put on duty in the Fort. At night they slept undisturbed in the Hospital Bomb Proof, and were excused from all fatigue duty at any time. From dawn until dark they were incessantly at work with their rifles and of the value of their services the siege Journal of the enemy gives abundant proof. They were used at times used against the Grenadiers. In revolving their turrets, after a discharge, in order to bring the opposite gun to bear, a man on each side of the turret would for a moment expose himself, and would be complimented with the notice of a sharpshooter. The men detailed became greatly interested in the duty and were not relieved regularly as the rest of the garrison was. Late in the siege, when the enemy got nearer to the Fort the Whitworths were returned to the City, and the infantry resumed as before adapted to snipe-shooting at close quarters. The sharpshooters perched themselves when ever they could best get a good view of the enemy from the Fort, and sheltered themselves with little sand bag & paulments hoop holed.

Note G.
The Rifle Pits.

About 300 yds in advance of Wagner a flattened ridge ran from the sea beach to the marsh, and here the Island was narrowest. Behind this ridge in pits, two men to each, were stationed until the 26th Aug an Infantry force, which served both as a picket and as sharpshooters. It served by ordinary detail from the garrison and used the habitual Enfield Rifles. The sustained efforts of the enemy to shell them but with curved fire met with no success; and against direct artillery fire they seemed to be better sheltered than men in the Fort who could be enveloped because or less behind the breast height. The fact of the pits being detached one from the other seemed to traverse them especially against the flank fire of the Fleet. The detail here served twenty four hours; at dusk however it was doubled, and the reinforcement withdrawn at dawn of day. Their sharp shooting was very annoying to the enemy and as a Picket they were invaluable, giving notice of assault in time to get the garrison out of the bombproofs. When the enemy's sap approached this ridge, he made an

effort on the 21st of Aug to carry it
by assault with 100th N.Y. Vol., but
failed. Again on the 25th a more deter-
mined effort was made. "Experimenter" says
"May Brooks Journal, 'had now proved
that the sap can not proceed unless
the artillery fire of Wagner be sustained,
or the enemy driven ^{out} of the Ridge. x x
"At 5-1/2 P.M. four 8" mortars and three
"Coe how mortars opened on the Ridge.
"At the same time the Navy Howitzer
"and ~~Regina~~ ^{Regina} Battery fired to enfilade
"the reverse of the Ridge, x x The two
"~~Regina~~ ^{Regina} Batteries in the fourth parallel
"also took part." An Infantry assault
and repulse followed.
Both these efforts were made during
Gen. Hays' last tour of duty in
Wagner. Upon relieving Col. Keitt
on the 21st he discovered after day-
light that in accordance with the
practice established by the Col
on his recent tour, but 19 men were
left in the pits for the day instead
of the nine to four usual number of
seventy five or eighty. They could not
be reinforced until night and the
enemy were greatly nearer to them
for attack than we were for sup-
port. To add to the General's anxiety,
a flag of truce came in during the
day, and the Beamer was immediately

allowed to come near enough to observe the weakness of the force in the Pit. When therefore in the evening a heavy and continuous bombardment of the Pit and the space intervening between them and the Fort commenced, it was evident what was coming; and the General drew out four Companies (about 125 men) from the Bomb Proofs and formed them behind the breast height of the land face, ready to go out of the Right Sally Port by a flank when required.

Hearing fully explained to the senior Captain his anxiety and anticipations, he took his place, sheltered as best he could to watch from the parapet the time to start the reinforcement. To start them too soon before the fading light would obscure them was to send them to butchery under the concentrated fire of Artillery that could be concentrated on the intervening space; to send them too late was to lose the Pit, for the enemy, once in them, would be as hard pressed their construction to draw out as the original occupants were. Deeming the time to have arrived, the General gave the word—"Now Captain go"—"General I wish you would detail some other man to take this command; I do not feel competent to it." Fortunately, Gen

He saw just then, Lt. Col. Dantzer of the 20th S.I. standing in the door of the bomb proof opening on the parade, and he coming to him, he came at double quick under the shelling going on. Explaining hastily the situation, the General put him in command; and as he moved off, the assault commenced. Going at a run, Dantzer reached the Pits after them on the right had been captured. The fight continued obstinately till 10 o'clock at night, when forced out of the captured Pits, the enemy gave over his efforts. After putting out his advanced vedettes who were required to crawl forward and lie on their stomachs, during the night, some twenty paces in front of the Pits - the enemy's vedettes in like position - facing them some twenty paces beyond - Dantzer was going on his hands and knees down the line inspecting them, when he discovered one post vacant. The heart of the occupant had failed him and he had slunk back into the Pits, jerking him forward into his place with some harsh words, the attention of the opposite vedette was attracted and his fire drawn. The bullet struck the Colonel as he stood upon his hands and knees, in the breast of his coat and passed down the length of his body between his clothing and skin and out over his hip without other

injury than a decided wheel. Poor Dantzer! Few braver men shed their blood in the war. At Warrenton Church in Virginia in '64, he threw away his life in the effort by a deed of "derring do" to make something of a worthless Regiment to which he had been promoted. And the Captain so inopportunistly modest! In Dec '64 on the lines before Richmond, when in the current slang of the soldiers, Captains were "played out," General H. was invited by the commanding officer of one of his Regiments to attend Divine service to be conducted by one of his line officers. After listening to an excellent sermon from an officer whom he had noticed during the past campaign as always at his post and doing his duty well, his aide, Ben Martin, asked him if he remembered his first introduction to the preacher. It was the modest Battery Wagner Captain. - In the second attack (on the 25th) upon the Pitt, a full force was in them during the day from the 54th Ga, Capt Roberts' Regt; and they were reinforced at dark by Col De Vornor 61st Mo Ca. The fight was gallantly and obstinately maintained. The

Enemy giving over without success
about 9 P.M. Capt Roberts was mortally
wounded before sundown, but could not
be brought into the Fort before dark.

When the Fort had been arranged for
the night, the Cdey officer went into the
Hospital Bomb proof to inquire after him.
Heaving expressed the hope that he was
not seriously wounded, he replied that
his wounds injuries were mortal; his
Commander spoke of his gallant bearing
in the fight; when the brave fellow
half rose from his litter and said
"Thank you General," and fell back
exhausted. He asked for a Chaplain,
but there was none in the Fort - no

"Pious man whom duty brought
To dubious edge of battle fought
To shine the dying, bless the dead!"
A layman - a member of Parker's
Light Battery (the ~~Marion~~^{Marion}), a section of
which was on duty in the Fort visited
him at the request of the Cdey officer,
and spent the time until his removal
to the City in administering to him
the consolations of religion. On the
16th of July a Catholic clergyman
was in the Fort, and administered

The rites of his church in the bomb proof just before the troops were drawn out to meet the assault. The Chaplain of Olmstead Georgia Command and Mr Dickens, Chaplain of the 25 S. I., each accompanied his Regt on its tour of duty in the Fort. The writer heard of no others. Upon being relieved before day on the 26th by Col. Harrison, Gen. Hagood called his attention specially to the critical conditions of the Rifle Pts. They were carried by an Infantry assault that night. The special circumstances the writer never learned. But the trouble was in reinforcing them at the right time, for a sufficient force could not with safety be kept in them during the day, nor could they be reinforced while there was light - and as before remarked the enemy could mass for attack closer than we men for support. Ripley's report says "Just before dark the enemy threw forward an over whelming force on the advanced positions, and succeeded in overpowering them there before they could be supported."

Note 26.

Incidents of service at Wagner

First Sgt Jones of Capt Gary's Co, Lucas Battalion, a plain man from one of the Mountain Districts of So. Cal., but

a true patriot and a good soldier was mortally wounded at his gun. To Gary's expression of sympathy, he replied "I am glad it is I, and not you Captain; the Country can better spare me!" Gen Beauregard on being informed of this incident, ordered one of the best of his new James Island Batteries, to be called "Battery Times", in honor of the noble fellow. Gary himself was killed a few days afterward. He was a younger brother of Gen M A Gary, a generous and spirited officer and much beloved by his comrades.

On the 24th of August Capt Robert Pringle of the same battalion was commanding a gun replying to the fire of a Monitor. These shells fired at a low elevation would ricochet twice upon the water, the last time close to the beach, and then explode just over the parapet of the Fort. The practice was extremely accurate; and altho' bright-day light, the huge projectiles coming straight for the spectator could be seen from the time they left the gun - presenting the appearance of a rapidly enlarging disk as they approached. One of these shells struck a school of mullet at its last rebound on the water, and knocked one of the

Lt Col Presley of Harpolds Brig - a very valuable officer - dis. killed at Smith Creek Va in '64. now a leading Penn.

+ Mrs. Sweeney Mott who furnished to Light Horse
Harry Lee & Tom Marion, the Indian arrows to fire
her own dwelling which sheltered the enemy.

31

fish at least 100 yds into the gun cham-
ber. Pungli pecked it up, and gayly
remarked that he "had made his din-
ner". At the next fire from the prom-
itor he was killed. The writer had
been a good deal thrown with this
young officer, and had been much
pleased with his fine social traits
and soldierly qualities. He was
a descendent of the ~~Rev.~~ ^{Mrs. Mott} ~~of~~ ^{of} rev-
olutionary fame. †

Extracts from the Diary of Lt Col
Presley 25-26. - †

"1 Sept. Ordered to Chaguer. x x x
Embarked from Fort Johnson all of
the Regt except Co A in a light
draft Steamer; Co A went in a row
boat. The Steamer stopped near Sum-
ter, harbor very rough. I got in
the only boat the Steamer had for de-
barking us, with about 50 officers and
men. When we ^{had} got half way from the
Steamer to Cummings Point, a bombard-
ment of Sumter by Monitor commenced,
and the Steamer returned to Fort
Johnson with the balance of the
Regiment. At Cummings Point I met
Co A. Making with the men I brought
80 or 90 men of my command, and
no prospect of getting the other till
next night. Reported to Gen Colquhoun
in command and was ordered to

at Mrs. Mott's house, 1100 Broadway, New York City, now a leading lawyer of New York City, California

the sand hills in rear of Wagner, so we
spent the night in what the soldiers called
"for make home proofs" - holes in the sand.
Not finding these comfortable, I myself
spread my blanket between two sand
hills. Fort Wagner and the enemy
exchanged shots slowly all night.

2 Sept. Went into Wagner at daylight.
Found the enemy's saps within about
120 yds of the salient; enemy working
industriously; garrison busy repairing
damages, and keeping up a slow fire.
My command detailed as a working
party for Battery Gregg. Enemy shelling
Wagner, Gregg, and Sumner all day.
Transferred to Wagner at night, and
by 11 P.M. the balance of my Regt
arrived and reported to me. My
Companies as they arrived were station-
ed around the parapet, relieving a
North Carolina Regt. We occupied
from the extreme left along the sea face
around the left salient, and part of
the land face; the 28th Ga the rest. These
two Regts with the artillery occupied
the fort; another Regt, the 27th Ga was
in the sand hills in rear. Enemy fired
very little to night. I was up most
of the night, probing and visiting
my men; tomorrow morning took
a nap in the left salient resting my
head against the parapet.

3 Sept. One or two of our guns and one mortar keep up a fire against the enemy's approaching saps. My command in high spirits - a great amount building loop holes with sand bags for sharp shooting. This has become very dangerous work, as soon as a hole is darkened on either side a shot from the opposite sharp shooter follows, and with frequent success. Not much artillery fire by us at Wagner, but the enemy are hard at work and approaching. Our James sold Batteries are firing briskly on the enemy's trenches. During the day from $\frac{1}{3}$ to $\frac{1}{4}$ the garrison are kept at the parapet; the rest in the bomb proofs; at night all are turned out. The Yankees are so near they can hear when we turn out and quicken their fire. The garrison is heavily worked repairing damages. Col Kitt as Lt. relieved Gen Colquitt last night in command of Morris sold. I was up nearly all night; slept a little before day in the same salient as last night.

4 Sept Quite a lively bombardment from the enemy today - number of the sand bag covers for sharp shooter knocked away. Sharp shooting still very brisk, however. x x x Batteries on James sold do good shooting, particularly Battery Simkins. Maj Bradley, Ch of Artillery, wounded;

Capt. Huggins replaces him. Her party
very hard at work repairing damage.
A corporal of Co D and several men
wounded in my Regt. Several killed
and a good many wounded in bal-
ance of garrison. Enemy's fire slack-
ed after dark. They display a calcium
light to night upon Vincent's Creek.
To night day tried to get a little sleep
in my old place in the left-salient.
The shells from Fort Moultrie were passing
immediately over it. - A fragment of
one of our own mortar shells came
back into the Fort and nearly struck
me. This had been happening for some
time, the enemy were so close.

x x x x x x

The Fleet early this morning opened
upon the Fort; the land batteries also
cannonading with great fury - 200
and 100 lb Parrot, 8 and 10 inch mortar
shells and 15 inch shells from the Navy
pounding into us. The shells are explod-
ing so fast, they can not be counted.

All our guns are silenced; working
them under such a fire is out of the
question. The men are being wounded
and killed in every direction. I have
been around amongst my men; a good
many times and am covered with
sand when I return. The 3/4 of the
garrison are still kept in the bomb-

proof. The suffering of these from heat and want of water is intolerable. The supply of water brought from the City is very inadequate; that from the shallow wells dug in the sand in and adjacent to the Fort is horrible. Thirsting alone, enables the men to drink it. x x x I have seen some horrible sights - men mangled in almost every manner. I saw a sharp shooter knocked from the parapet to the middle of the parade, some 40 or 50 feet, and going fully 20 ft in the air. This was Rawlinson of Co G. and the brave fellow clutched his rifle to the last. Of course he lived but a short time. St Montgomerie of Co C. was killed this morning - his head taken off by a shell. An attack upon Battery Gregg is expected to night; a detachment of my Regt under Capt Sellers and of the 28th Co under Capt Hoag are to be sent to reinforce it. As they march out, Capt Hoag enquires of St Blum for Capt Sellers; a shell kills both. x x x It is apparent that our force manning the parapet to night must be as small as possible. x x x In making our arrangements for the night there are many casualties; in one detachment commanded by St Ramsay Co A. 25th

in a short time after it was passed every
man but one was killed or wounded.
The fleet has withdrawn and the land
batteries slacken their fire save the mor-
tars which are as active as ever. I have
seen four shells start from the same
battery at the same time. x x x x
There was an alarm of an assault
to night. It was felt to be a relief
the prospect of changing this passive
endurance of artillery into the hot
blood of an infantry fight. The enemy
attacked Gage and were repulsed. x x x
Mills dug in the bombproofs give some
relief in bitter water, but not enough. x
x x " - Lt Col Pressley served till the
evacuation; but the foregoing extracts
from his diary are sufficient to give
a picture of life in Wagner.

Results and Specalties of the Siege.

In the Councils before undertaking the
operation on Morris Island. "The principal
question" says Gen Gullmer's official
Report, "was to what extent the fall of
Fort Sumter ^{or} the destruction of its
"offensive power would exert an in-
"fluence on the fall of Charleston, thus
"of course being the ultimate object

"in view, a consideration which passed
 "and which might was the great prac-
 "tical advantage of a blockade thorough
 "and complete of Charleston Harbor. The
 "capture of Morris Island by allowing a
 "portion of the blockading Fleet to lie
 "inside the bar even tho' they should
 "fail to finally occupy the Sumner Har-
 "bor would seem still end. The
 "Naval Authorities at the seat of
 "Government, regarded Fort Sumter as the
 "key to the position. That stronghold
 "once destroyed or its offensive power
 "practically destroyed, the monitors
 "and other iron clads they affirmed
 "could remove the channel obstruc-
 "tions, secure the control of the entire
 "Harbor and reach the City."

- Were these purposes accomplished?
1. Did Charleston fall before Gillmore's operations? Certainly not. Charleston when at this fall was evacuated in consequence of Sherman's March. It had withstood the direct attacks until the enemy marched nearer out abandoned further effort than to capture the City.
 2. Was a "blockade in all respects thorough and complete" established? No. Moffet Channel under Sullivan's Island remained available to the Confederates, and tho' the hazards of blockade running were greatly increased it still went on.

3. Did the disabling of Sumter open the
passes Inner Harbor to the Fleet? Sumter
was thoroughly destroyed as an Artillery
Post, but the Channel obstructions and
the new Batteries that sprang up on
the shores of the Inner Harbor kept
the fleet lying off Morris Island. And
here it may as well be remarked
that these same channel obstructions
were far less formidable than imag-
ined. The tide destroyed most of them
about as fast as they were devised.
What then was accomplished? Narrow-
ly limited were set to blockade run-
ning, and by the bombardment
much suffering and damage to prop-
erty was inflicted upon the Inhabitants
of Charleston. Was the game worth
the candle. It was upon the "Attitude"
the only said Gen Grant in 1865 - "The
"resources of the enemy and his mu-
"litical strength were greatly inferior
"to ours. x x x & therefore determined
"x x to hammer continually against
"him until by attrition if in no
"other way there should be nothing
"left to him, but submission." - And
he succeeded. The attrition at Charleston
contributed its share to the result.

In Engineering the serge taught no
new principles. On the contrary

its lessons enforced most ~~explicitly~~ emphatically the time honored principles of the schools. The masonry of Sumner Crumpler like an egg shell before the breasting batteries of the enemy, and when its debris had been pounded into earth with natural slopes, no further impulsion could be made upon it. On the other hand, the parapets of Wagner constructed from the first with natural slopes of sand were good to the last. For tho' Col Kitt talks of a breach, the writer is persuaded there was no breach in the engineering sense, both from Col Morris' report and from the diagram in Gullmours report of the effect of his fire on the left salient to which Col Kitt alludes.

The truth was the superior artillery fire of the enemy could at all times when concentrated upon the Fort, make of a butcher pen, if the whole garrison were at their posts. But few men could be kept on the lines of the work during a bombardment - artillery enough to man the guns, just infantry enough to act as a lookout and but little more. The practice

always was during the day time to keep a part of the garrison in the sand hills in rear of the Fort. and during a bombardment to keep out of the bombproofs about 100 men. By the 6th of Sept, the Saps of the enemy on the crest of the glacis put them in position when deployed along its length they could rush over the parapets of Wagner upon the cessation of the bombardment before its garrison could be drawn from the bombproof to its defense. The relief of the Fort was never greater than that of a strong Field Work and the ditch was now half full by the drifting sand. The Fort was therefore no longer tenable.

The great development of the Moulou between the guns was claimed by Gen Beauregard as an improvement of his own: and it certainly is in earth works where casemates are impossible, a great one. The writer became satisfied from his observations of these operations that Dahlenblads such as were opposed to us could be kept out of any Harbor

where land batteries could be located within 1000 yds of the channel, provided the batteries did not exceed one or two guns to each and were sufficiently detached. Where infantry supports were needed they should be bomb-proofed at convenient supporting distance and not at the guns. This with the ~~now~~ necessary covered ways would be preferably his plan of defence.

The defences of Colis Isld as arranged during the latter part of our occupation were an illustration of this plan. In this ^{it is presumed} siege more novelties were developed in artillery and larger experience gained than any of modern times. The range and accuracy of fire obtained was never before equalled.

The objections which the enemy's experience found to the larger sized Parrotts, thus liability to burst, it is not thought were found by us to apply to the Brooke gun which was the equal of the Parrott in every other respect. An admirable invention of Lt Col Yates for traversing guns on columbiad carriage was used with perfect success. It was a wheel

and ratchet arrangement by which the
gunner alone could quickly and accu-
rately bring the gun to bear.

The progress made in the use of torpedoes,
both for offence and defence was mark-
ed. Much however is yet to be attained.

When used for defence and required
to be put in position for any time
before hand they were liable to get
out of order and fail at the right
moment. They were freely used in
front of Wagner yet the enemy suf-
fered through them with but 8 casual-
ties from the source. About half
that number, ^{occurred} with us from careles-
ness with regard to them. In
the assault on Wagner on the
18th July, the enemy's official
Report makes no mention of torpedoes.
Their newspapers accounts spoke of hand
grenades used by the defence. This was
not so; but in the night the impression
might have been produced by torpe-
does. Next day the officer in charge not
knowing of the torpedoes, the enemy's
dead on the glacis were buried among
them where they were placed and no
casualties secured. The burial party

dug them up, but as they were ordi-
 nary spherical shell with the explosion
 arrangement in the fuse, they were
 deemed to have been fired the previous
 day with out exploding. When used
 for offense the water thought more
 of them, and his impression is that
 their use at the prow of small
 boats moving totally or partially
 submerged was very near a success.
 The fleet of "Cigar boats" that sprung
 up in Charleston Harbor, and the
 "Diving Boat" were curious things to
 a landsman eye; and some of
 the highest heroism of the war was
 exhibited in their use. The writer
 regrets that he has not the data to
 speak fully of this exploit, or to record
 the names of the gallant men who were
 distinguished in this service.

The balloon light of the enemy
 was novel and efficient.
 As a tactical movement, ^{the evacuation} was an em-
 inent success; and tho' admirably ex-
 ecuted, the chief credit is due to the com-
 prehension and explicit ^{order} in relation
 to it prepared by Gen Beauregard
 himself. (signed) Johnson Hagood