

under consideration there can be no doubt of the power of the Legislature to enact such laws.

One might, assuredly, though fearful of the effect of immediately and unrestrainedly admitting the entire female population to the ballot, yet find many and cogent considerations in favor of such a limited and tentative measure.

Some one has said that municipal administration is, after all, a matter of housekeeping on a great scale. Women from this stand-point would come to the exercise of suffrage with obvious advantages.

Men have so unquestionably failed in the administration of large cities, that the admission of women to a participation in their government would test the merits of female suffrage in a sphere where, even should it fail in producing all the results its advocates claim for it, yet it is hardly possible that failure would render municipal affairs worse than they now are. Many potent reasons will suggest themselves why improvement is rather to be anticipated.

AUGUSTUS A. LEVEY.

VIII.

THIS letter from Lord Byron to Shelley does not appear in any edition of the correspondence of either of the poets. It is addressed "to P. B. Shelley, Esqre, Signore Inglese, Pisa."

P^a Sep^r 8th 1821.

DEAR SHELLEY: They pretend here to *two hundred scudi* for the carriage of about two-thirds of my furniture *only*, and *not for the whole*. As this seems to me very exorbitant (and indeed whether it be so or no) I should prefer that you sent one from Pisa—*wagons, horses and drivers*—according to the fairest contract you can make with them for me. I will sanction it, be it more or less. It's the same thing, as the drivers, &c., wont *return* here, and the Tuscans will only have to come here first. The number of wagons wanted on the whole will be *eight*, the number of beasts what they please; the baggage is heavy, and whether drawn by horses, mules or oxen, is indifferent to me.

It was for *six* cars only that the indigenous masters of horse asked two hundred crowns, i. e., half a years rent of the house for a transport of chattels. Send me Etrurians at their own price, for of the two, I prefer being cheated by the new comers to continuing to minister to the ancient scoundrels of this remarkable city.

When I talked to you about purchase of other movables, I meant such as may be requisite to complete mine in a new mansion. Of course, I meant things requisite, according to the premises, and did not mean to bind the [party *] to an exact sum or to a few scudi more or less, according to what was wanted. Of course, you have seen *this* house and *that* house and can judge. You may do it now or wait till I come—as you please.

Believe me yours ever and truly

BYRON.

P. S.—Expedite the baggage waggon. Will wait only now for those to march. Make my remembrances to everybody I don't know and my respects to all I do.

* Word destroyed.

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DEFENSE OF CHARLESTON, SOUTH CAROLINA,

In 1862, 1863 and 1864.

I.

A TELEGRAM from General Cooper, dated Richmond, September the 10th, 1862, reached me on that day in Mobile, and contained the information that, by special orders issued August 29, I had been assigned to the command of South Carolina and Georgia, with head-quarters at Charleston. I had anticipated some communication of the kind, having about two weeks before officially reported for "duty in the field." The next day I left for my new scene of action and, so advising the War Department, requested that copies of the order referred to by General Cooper, be forwarded to Charleston, where I arrived on the 15th of September.

Accompanied by Major-General Pemberton, whom I was to relieve, I immediately began a general inspection of the main defenses already constructed and in process of construction, in the two States then composing the department placed under me. I assumed command on the 24th of the same month.

The work before me was serious; all the more so that it had to be executed without loss of time. Rumors and threats were afloat, filling the columns of the Northern journals, to the effect that mighty preparations were being made for such a land and naval attack upon the city of Charleston, as would prove irresistible. This, at the North, was deemed all the more easy of accomplishment because the harbor and inner defenses were believed to

be insufficient to withstand a well-directed and prolonged assault ; and for the further reason that there existed several avenues of approach, by any of which, it was thought, the ulterior object aimed at could be attained.

That there was ample cause for apprehension on our part became apparent to me upon my first conference with General Pemberton, in which I learned that by his orders a complete abandonment had been made, not only of the system of coast defenses devised by me as early as April, 1861, but also of the one said to have been projected by General Lee while in command of the same department from December, 1861, to March, 1862. For these had been substituted another and interior system rendering our lines vulnerable at various points, and necessitating more labor and a greater armament than we could command. The inspection made by me a few days later confirmed that opinion ; for the works in and around Charleston, most of which had been badly located, were not in a state of completion, nor was their armament by any means adequate to the disproportionate dimensions of some of them. The concluding remarks of my Report of Inspection to the War Department were : "Adaptation 'of means to an end' has not always been consulted in the works around this city and Savannah. Much unnecessary work has been bestowed upon many of them." The defenses of the harbor existing at that time consisted of : 1. Fort Sumter, with an armament of seventy-nine guns of divers calibers, from 32 pounders to 8 inch columbiads, and seven 10 inch mortars manned by three hundred and fifty effectives of the First South Carolina Artillery (regulars). 2. Fort Moultrie, with thirty-eight guns, from 24 pounders to 8 inch columbiads, and a garrison of three hundred effectives belonging to the First South Carolina Infantry (regulars). These works were in very good condition though repairs were then in progress in the former. 3. Battery Beauregard, across Sullivan's Island, the location of which I had selected in the spring of 1861, in advance of Fort Moultrie, with a view to protect the approach from the east. It was armed with five guns. 4. Four sand batteries, *en barbette*, erected at the west end of Sullivan's Island and bearing on the floating boom then in process of construction across the Fort Sumter channel. These batteries were not completed and had at the time only four guns, two of them being 10 inch columbiads. No magazines had been constructed for them. 5.

The "Neck" battery, on Morris Island, afterward called Battery Wagner, an open work erected to defend the approach to Fort Sumter. It was intended for eleven guns and was not entirely finished even as originally designed. 6. A small work (Fort Ripley) equidistant from Castle Pinkney and Fort Johnson, not yet armed, but planned for five heavy guns *en barbette*. 7. Castle Pinkney, armed with nine 24 pounders and one 24 pounder rifled, a work of no value for the defense of the city. 8. Fort Johnson, near the north-east end of James Island, with one rifled 32 pounder, likewise of very little importance.

Some batteries had also been arranged and begun for the defense of the city proper, but no heavy guns had been procured for them, and none were disposable. The floating boom was incomplete, and was destined to remain so. I never looked upon it as a serious barrier to the enemy's fleet. The defensive line on James Island from the Wappoo to Secessionville, consisted of "a system of forts, redoubts, redans and *crémaillères*," very injudiciously located, except Fort Pemberton on the Stono and some few of the redoubts. There were also two batteries on the Ashley River for its protection and that of the entrance of Dill's Creek and the Wappoo. One of them had no guns ; the other, at Lawton's, was armed with four 32 pounders but could be of little use. The works at Secessionville, which were poorly devised and poorly executed were still unfinished. Their armament was two 8 inch naval guns, one 18 pounder howitzer, six 32 pounders, one 32 pounder rifle, two 24 pounder rifles, and two 10 inch mortars.

The line of defenses constructed on the Neck to protect the city from a land attack on the north side, was made up of a continuous "bastion line," which was not suitable to the site where it had been located.

The total number of troops of all arms in South Carolina at that time was as follows :

Infantry.....	6,564
Artillery in position.....	1,787
Field artillery.....	1,379
Cavalry.....	2,817
	<u>12,547</u>

Adding the number of troops then in the State of Georgia, to wit.....

7,189
The aggregate force in the whole Department amounted on the 24th of September, 1862, to.....19,736 men.

At my request, before being relieved, General Pemberton gave an estimate of the minimum force requisite in his opinion for the Department: It was of forty-three thousand six hundred and fifty (43,650) men of all arms. I adopted it as the basis of my future calculations.*

On the 30th of September and again on the 2d of October, I urgently called on the War Department for an increase of heavy ordnance for the works intended to command the anchorage in the Charleston harbor, and the entrance into the Ashley and Cooper rivers. I asked for twenty 10 inch columbiads, five banded, rifled, 42 pounders, and five banded, 32 pounders; or "fifteen of the first quality, ten of the second, and five or more of the third." In my second communication to General Cooper above referred to, I said: "I cannot place before the War Department in too strong language the vital importance to us, if the harbor is to be retained, of increasing the armament of heavy guns to the greatest possible extent as soon as practicable and in all possible ways." † The Secretary of War, Mr. Randolph, had used every endeavor to assist me in my efforts to be ready for the impending attack of the enemy. But he had just at this time, unfortunately, tendered his resignation, and had been succeeded in office by Mr. Seddon. From that moment my demands on the War Department seemed to meet with much less favor, and I had to rely, in a great measure, on the scant resources of my command to accomplish the work necessary for the safety of the city of Charleston. The State authorities, and in fact the whole people of South Carolina, were equally anxious with myself for the rapid completion of my preparations and afforded me every assistance in their power, though I was never able to procure the necessary amount of slave-labor required for work on the fortifications. By great exertion and with no assistance from the government, was executed under my orders the rifling and banding of guns otherwise too inferior for the proper armament of our works. This was done "at the rate of one gun per two and a half days," whereas it had required "thirty-five days" to remodel each gun, under the supervision of the War Department. ‡

* See "Military Operations of General Beauregard," vol. II, chap. xxvi, p. 9.

† See "Military Operations of General Beauregard," Appendix to vol. II, chap. xxvi, p. 440.

‡ See "Military Operations of General Beauregard," vol. II, chap. xxviii, p. 49.

My anxiety was all the greater, that the enemy before making his final attack upon Charleston, and with a view no doubt to distract attention from it, had been for some time past preparing a descent along the Southern Atlantic coast, though he afterward appeared to have altered his original purpose and to be directing his course toward Cape Lookout. With the inadequate force under me, my only hope was to endeavor to frustrate any demonstration that might be attempted within the limits of my own extensive command, and yet the War Department, through the new Secretary of War, was at that very time, and against repeated protests on my part, depleting it of troops to re-enforce other points.

The approaches to Charleston were five in number: 1. The enemy could land a large force to the northward, at or in the close vicinity of Bull's Bay, and from thence marching across the country could take possession of Mount Pleasant and all the north shore of the inner harbor. 2. A large force of the enemy could also land to the southward, destroy the Charleston and Savannah Railroad and invest Charleston in the rear. These two avenues of approach, however, were not likely to be adopted by the enemy as the strength of his land force would not have justified such an attempt, unaided by his iron-clads and gun-boats. The co-operation of the Federal fleet was possible for either of the other three modes of approach, namely: James Island, Sullivan's Island and Morris Island. 3. Of these the approach by James Island was unquestionably the one to be most apprehended. The Confederate troops stationed there were insufficient in number and had to defend "a long, defective and irregular line of works." The enemy after overpowering them could have constructed batteries which would have controlled the inner harbor, taken in rear our outer lines of defenses, opened fire directly against Charleston itself, thus forcing an almost immediate surrender. 4. By Sullivan's Island the approach was also a very important one. In taking it Fort Sumter might have been silenced and the inner harbor thrown open to the enemy's iron-clad fleet. 5. The approach by Morris Island was, as afterward proved, the least dangerous to us. It involved none of the contingencies threatened by the other modes of attack. It had always been my opinion, however, that the enemy would elect to make his approach by that route, for the reason that being already in possession of Folly Island, which was in close proximity to Morris Island, he would thereby enjoy cer-

tain facilities for the movements of his troops; while close at hand lay the harbor of Edisto, convenient as a shelter for his fleet. The seizure of Morris Island would also be a great encouragement to the North.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to give more than a cursory glance over the many and radical changes effected by me, or to detail the amount of work done to put the department, and notably the harbor of Charleston, in a state of readiness for the formidable attack almost daily expected. The preparations of the North were upon a scale of such magnitude, with engines of war "*such as the hand of man had never yet put afloat,*" that they had consumed more time than was at first anticipated. Hence the delay that ensued; hence the opportunity afforded me to perfect our means of resistance.

The extension of my territorial command by the addition of "that part of Florida east of the Appalachian River,"* which had increased my responsibility, was another reason for congratulation that the enemy was not yet ready to effect what, with a view to convince the European powers of its ability to "*crush the Rebellion,*" the Federal Government had all but promised Mr. Adams, U. S. Minister to England, it would soon accomplish, namely, the capture of Fort Sumter and the destruction of Charleston.

Weeks and months went by, during which I succeeded in almost doubling the strength of Sumter, of Moultrie, and of all the defensive works of the harbor, including Battery Wagner, which was thus almost entirely rebuilt. I also established along the coast of South Carolina, Georgia and Florida, a continuous line of signal (flag) stations by means of which constant information was furnished Department Head-quarters of the exact movement and of the least change that took place in the Federal fleet. I multiplied the laying out of torpedoes in all navigable streams liable to be run up by Federal gun-boats and other craft, and gave close attention to the rope obstructions dividing the outer and inner harbors. I likewise used my best endeavors, and importuned the War and Navy Departments, to have constructed a few "torpedo-rams," on the model of Captain F. D. Lee, with which it was my firm conviction more injury could be inflicted upon the Federal fleet than

* Gen. Cooper's telegram to Gen. Beauregard dated Richmond, Oct. 7, 1862.

could be hoped for from all such gun-boats as the government was then having built for the protection of Charleston harbor. Speaking of these torpedo-rams, and while expressing my confidence in their ability to drive off the Federal fleet and thus raise the blockade of Charleston, I wrote as follows to Governor Pickens: . . . "I fear not to put on record, now, that half a dozen of these torpedo-rams, of small comparative cost, would keep this harbor clear of four times the number of the enemy's iron-clad gun-boats." And, as early as October 31, 1862, in a letter to the Hon. S. B. Mallory, Secretary of the Navy, I said: . . . "I thank you for the prompt and favorable support you have given me in the desire to construct one of Captain F. D. Lee's marine torpedo-rams, which, I think, is destined ere long to change the system of naval warfare. . . ." That this appreciation was not exaggerated has been shown by many results accomplished at a subsequent date by torpedo-boats, in our own war and in naval encounters between foreign nations, notably, during the late Franco-Chinese war. It is but simple justice to add, that from the first experiments made, in April, 1861, against Fort Sumter with an iron-clad floating battery and an iron-clad land battery, the respective inventions of Captain John Randolph Hamilton, formerly of the U. S. N., and of Mr. C. H. Steven, afterward Brigadier-General in the Confederate Army, and both from South Carolina, is attributable also the revolution in naval architecture and armaments, by which iron-clad war vessels have entirely superseded the now almost obsolete wooden men-of-war.

There were two Confederate gun-boats (iron-clad rams) at that time in Charleston, the "Palmetto State" and the "Chicora." Captain Rutledge, C. S. N., commanded the first, and Captain Tucker, C. S. N., commanded the second. Besides these there were three small harbor steamers to be used as tenders for them. The "Palmetto State" and the "Chicora" were, unfortunately, of too heavy a draught to be of much practical use in the defense of the harbor. They were also lacking in motive power, consequently in speed, and their guns, on account of the smallness of the port-holes, could not be sufficiently elevated and were of but very short range. Aply officered and manned as they were known to be, they proved of real service once only during the whole siege of Charleston. It was on this occasion:

While our work of armament and of general preparation was

progressing on all points of the Department, it occurred to me that our two gun-boats, inferior as they were in many respects, could, nevertheless, by a bold night attack on the wooden fleet of the enemy, cause considerable damage and compel it to leave its anchorage outside the bar. And the time to do it in, I suggested, was before the threatened arrival of the Federal monitors. Commodore Ingraham agreed with me, and immediately ordered the attack. It took place on the early morning of January 31st. The "Palmetto State," on board of which for the occasion was Commodore Ingraham himself, steamed out directly toward the Federal fleet followed by the "Chicora," and fell upon and fired into the steamer "Mercedita" before the latter had fully realized the peril she was in. Disabled and reported to be sinking, the "Mercedita" immediately surrendered. The "Palmetto State" left her and went in pursuit of a second and of a third Federal steamer, but was soon out-distanced by their superior speed. On the other hand the "Chicora" had not remained idle: she had set fire to a schooner-rigged propeller, engaged and crippled the "Quaker City" and run into and fired the "Keystone State," which then and there struck her flag. The other vessels composing the blockading squadron, seeing the fate of their consorts and fearing the same one for themselves, hurriedly steamed out to sea and entirely disappeared. The outer harbor remained in the full possession of the two Confederate rams. Not a Federal sail was visible, even with spy-glasses, for over twenty-four hours. It is, therefore, strictly correct to state that the blockade of the port of Charleston had been raised, for the time being, as was certified to by Commodore Ingraham, by the foreign consuls then in Charleston, and by myself.

It is evident that had the seaworthy qualities of the two Confederate gun-boats been greater, and could we have given them the co-operation of the torpedo-rams I had anxiously endeavored to have constructed, the blockade of Charleston would not have been at that time and for months afterward, an impediment to our free and open intercourse with the outer world. And it is simple history to add that, even as it was, through private enterprise which should have tempted our government to a bolder course, lines of blockade-running steamers entered and left the port of Charleston at regular, stated intervals, up to nearly the very close of the war. Almost at the moment of this naval attack on the Federal fleet,

occurred another incident of note in the operations around Charleston.

General Pemberton, in abandoning the outer system of defensive works for an inner and; in his opinion, safer line (as has already been explained), had caused to be removed from Cole's Island eleven guns of heavy caliber which served to guard the entrance of the Stono River. This barrier removed, the Federal gun-boats had free ingress and egress to the river, and as often as they chose to do so plied up with impunity as near to Fort Pemberton as safety allowed, harassing our camps on James and John's Islands, by the fire of their long-ranged rifled guns. The "Isaac Smith," carrying nine heavy guns, was one of these. Desirous of putting a stop to such incursions I called the Commander of the First Military District* to a conference at Department Head-quarters, and instructed him to at once organize an expedition and have erected masked batteries at designated points on the banks of the Stono, near where the Federal gun-boat habitually passed and occasionally remained overnight. The instructions were to allow her to steam by unmolested as far as she chose to go, then to open fire and cut off her retreat. The expedition was intrusted to Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph A. Yates, First South Carolina Artillery (regulars), and was most successfully conducted. On the evening of January 30th, the "Isaac Smith" came up the Stono and leisurely anchored just above our masked batteries. Fire was now opened upon her. She endeavored to make her escape, returning our fire as she passed, but was so roughly handled, and at such close range, that she dropped anchor and surrendered. Her armament consisted of one 30 pounder Parrott, and eight 8 inch heavy columbiads. Her crew was of eleven officers and one hundred and eight men. Upon examination the damage she had sustained was found to be slight. She was thoroughly repaired and, under the name of the "Stono," became a guard-boat in the Charleston harbor, with Captain W. J. Hartstein, C. S. N., as commander.

As a corollary to this engagement, on the morning of February 1st, another Federal iron-clad, afterward ascertained to be the single-turreted monitor "Montauk" appeared before Fort McAllister, at Genesis Point, in the Georgia District; and, accompanied by

* Brigadier-General R. S. Ripley.

three gun-boats and a mortar-boat, approached to within a short distance of the work, and opened a heavy fire upon it. The action was very brisk on both sides. The parapet of the fort was breached, and both guns and gunners fully exposed. Nevertheless, after a four-hours' combat, the monitor slowly retired, evidently in a damaged condition. The importance of the success of this engagement lay in the demonstrated fact, that iron-clads were not as formidable as they were supposed to be against sand batteries. As yet, their final test of invulnerability had not been fully ascertained. Reflecting upon the result of that encounter I wrote to Brigadier-General Ripley, February 8, 1863:

"GENERAL—The recent attack of the enemy's iron clad monitor "Montauk" on the battery at Genesis Point (the first day at about one mile, and the second at about eight hundred or one thousand yards) would seem to indicate that the enemy is not so confident of the invulnerability of this kind of naval vessels. But I consider also that the attack on Sumter, whenever it takes place, will probably be made at long range with their heaviest guns and mortars. This being admitted, they will necessarily attack it where it is weakest—*i. e.*, the gorge, south-east angle, and east face—taking their position close along the eastern shore of Morris Island, after silencing Battery Wagner. By adopting this plan their steamers, gun-boats, etc., would be, moreover, farther removed from the batteries of Sullivan's Island.

"The enemy may also establish land rifled and mortar batteries on the sand hills along the sea-shore of Morris Island, at the distance of from one to two miles from Sumter, as was done in the reduction of Fort Pulaski last year. He might possibly send one or more monitors during the night to take a position in the small channel north of Cummings' Point, within close range, to batter down the gorge of Sumter, and endeavor to blow up the magazines.

"That mode of attack, being the one most to be apprehended, should be guarded against as well as our limited means will permit—first, by transferring as many heavy rifled guns as can be spared from the other faces of the fort to the gorge, angle, and face already referred to; and the Brooke's rifled gun now on its way here from Richmond must likewise be put there, substituting in its place at Fort Johnson the 10 inch gun now expected from that city, so locating it as to fire towards Morris Island when required; secondly, a strong field-work should be thrown up as soon as sufficient labor can be procured on Cummings' Point, open in the gorge towards Fort Sumter, to act besides as a kind of traverse to this work from the fire of the batteries located by the enemy along the sea-shore of Morris Island. The Cummings' Point Battery should be armed with the heaviest and longest ranged guns we may be able to obtain for that purpose.

"The introduction of heavy rifled guns and iron-clad steamers in the attack of masonry forts has greatly changed the condition of the problem applicable to Fort Sumter when it was built; and we must now use the few and imper-

fect means at our command to increase its defensive features as far as practicable. The chief engineers of this department and of the State will be ordered to report to you at once, to confer with you, so as to carry out the views expressed by me in this letter.

"Major Harris, Chief Engineer, has received my instructions relative to locating some of the 'Rain's torpedoes' about Cummings's Point and within the harbor, independently of the electrical torpedoes under the charge of Mr. Weldon.

"Respectfully, your obedient servant,

"G. T. BEAUREGARD.

"GENL. COMDG."

I was thus minute in my instructions to General Ripley, because, though he was an able artillery officer, I knew that he possessed but scant knowledge, and no experience, of military engineering. My best and almost only assistant for planning the construction of batteries and making the selection of the sites on which they were to be erected, was Major Harris, the chief engineer of the department, on whom I placed the utmost reliance, and who always thoroughly understood and entered into my views. It is an error to state, as I am informed one or two writers have done, even in South Carolina, that the erection of batteries along the shores of the inner harbor, and in the city of Charleston itself, was due to what has been termed the untiring zeal, forethought and engineering ability of General Ripley. My letters of instruction and my official orders to General Ripley, from his arrival in my department up to the time of my leaving it, in April, 1864, conclusively show that those batteries were all planned and located by me, and that I passed upon all questions relative, not only to their armament, but even to the caliber of the guns that were to be placed in them.* I take this broad, formal position, not that I intend to detract from the merit of that officer, but because I desire to occupy before the country the position which is rightfully mine.

My fear was that an attack upon Sumter might be attempted at night. One or two monitors, I thought, during a dark night could approach the fort within easy range, and open fire upon its weakest face with almost certain impunity. Sumter, even at night, could be sufficiently seen by the monitors to be seriously damaged by their fire; whereas the monitors being very low in the water could only be visible from the fort by the flash of their guns.

* See "Military Operations of General Beauregard," vol. II, chapters xxix, xxx, xxxi, xxxii, xxxiii, and the appendices to the same.

To guard against such an attempt of the enemy, on the first of March, I wrote as follows to Commodore Ingraham :

"SIR—The movements of the enemy in Port Royal harbor, yesterday, looked suspicious and have the appearance of an early movement of some sort. Thus forewarned it will appear assuredly the part of prudence to be on the watch. I must therefore request that the Confederate steamer "Stono" should take her position as a guard-boat, in advance of the forts, as far as practicable to-night, and thereafter every night for the present."

I also caused a train of cars to be held in readiness at the Pocotaligo Station to bring such re-enforcements as might be drawn from the military district commanded by General Walker; and I informed the latter that "all his movements should look to the final defense of Charleston, where I would concentrate all my troops when required."

On the 28th of February, the enemy again attacked Fort McAllister, with an iron-clad, three gun-boats and a mortar-boat, and also, on the 3d of March, with three monitors. He was evidently trying his hand before his final venture against Fort Sumter. But the result must have sorely disappointed him; for notwithstanding the vigor of these two engagements—the first lasting more than two hours, the second at least seven—the Confederate battery was found, after inspection, to have sustained no material damage. The next day (4th of March), I informed the War Department of what had occurred and used the following language :

"Fort McAllister has again repulsed enemy's attack. Iron-clads retired at 8 P.M., yesterday; mortar-boats shelled until 6 o'clock this morning. All damage repaired during night; 8 inch columbiads mounted, and fort as good as ever. No casualties reported. Result encouraging. Enemy's vessels still in sight."

On the 5th of April, the enemy's force had materially increased in the Stono and the North Edisto. His iron-clads, including the frigate "New Ironsides," and eight monitors had crossed the outer bar and cast anchor in the main channel. No doubt could be had of their intention.

Two days later—on the 7th—a date ever memorable in the annals of the late war, the signal for the attack on Fort Sumter, so long anticipated and so long delayed, was finally given.

First steamed up, in line, one following the other, the "Weehawken," the "Passaic," the "Montauk" and the "Patapsco"; four single-turreted monitors. The "New Ironsides," the flag-

ship of the fleet, came next. Then came the "Catskill," the "Nantucket," the "Nahant"; three other single-turreted monitors. The double-turreted "Keokuk" was the eighth, and closed the line. Experienced and gallant officers commanded them all. Rear-Admiral Dupont was on board the flag-ship. Other Federal steamers stood outside the bar, but evidently with no intent to take part in the action. They were the "Canandaigua," the "Housatonic," the "Unadilla," the "Wissahickon" and the "Huron." The armament of the others, that is to say, of all the iron-clads that were to take part in the engagement, consisted of thirty-three guns "of the heaviest caliber ever used in war," up to that time, "to wit, 15 and 11 inch Dahlgren guns, and 8 inch rifled pieces."*

The attacking squadron was "to pass up the main ship channel without returning the fire of the batteries on Morris Island, unless signal should be made to commence action." Fire was to be opened "on Fort Sumter when within easy range."

The "left or north-east face" of the fort was to be engaged, "at a distance of from one thousand to eight hundred yards, firing low, and aiming at the center embrasures." The officers and men were instructed "to carefully avoid wasting a shot." "Precision rather than rapidity of fire," was the injunction made to all.

Such was, in substance, the laconic but expressive language of the plan of attack and order of battle prepared and adopted by Rear-Admiral Dupont, and distributed among his subordinate commanders.

Sumter was his objective. It was doomed, and must be reduced. "After the reduction of Fort Sumter," continued the same order of battle, "it is probable the next point of attack will be the batteries on Morris Island."

It is clear that Admiral Dupont had no doubt of his ability to carry out his programme; and that the only question open to his mind was, which of the other works around the harbor he would reduce after the fall of Sumter. The Admiral had little idea while thus predicting the result of his attack, that on the very same day and scarcely half an hour after firing his first gun, he would be forced to acknowledge—and his officers likewise—"the utter impracticability of taking the city of Charleston with the

* See "Military Operations of General Beauregard," vol. II, chap. xxx, p. 67.

force under his command"; and that "a renewal of the attack . . . would be attended with disastrous results, involving the loss" of the whole South Carolina coast.

To oppose this formidable array of new and reputed invulnerable floating batteries, gotten up at such heavy cost and with every anticipation of success by the Federal government, we had, on our side: 1. Fort Sumter, under Colonel Alfred Rhett, with a garrison of seven companies of the First South Carolina Artillery (regulars); the guns it brought into action on that day, were two 7 inch Brookes, four 10 inch columbiads, four 8 inch navy guns, seven banded and rifled 42 pounders, one banded and rifled 32 pounder, thirteen smooth-bore 32 pounders, and seven 10 inch sea-coast mortars—in all, forty-four guns and mortars. 2. Fort Moultrie, under Colonel William Butler, with five companies of the First South Carolina Infantry (regulars); the guns engaged were, nine 8 inch columbiads, five banded and rifled 32 pounders, five smooth-bore 32 pounders, and two 10 inch mortars—in all, twenty-one guns and mortars. 3. Battery Bee, on Sullivan's Island, under Lieutenant-Colonel Simkins, with three companies of the First South Carolina Infantry (regulars), and six guns—five 10 inch, and one 8 inch, columbiads. 4. Battery Beauregard, under Captain Sitgreaves, with two companies of regulars, —one from Sumter and one from Moultrie—and three guns: an 8 inch columbiad, and two thirty-two pounders, rifled. 5. Battery Wagner, under Major Huger, with two companies of regulars from Sumter. There, only one gun was used—a 32 pounder, rifled. 6. Cummings' Point Battery, under Lieutenant Lesesne, with a detachment of regulars from Fort Sumter. Two guns were engaged—one 10 inch columbiad and one 8 inch Dahlgren.

The number of guns actually engaged on our side against the iron-clad fleet, on the 7th of April, was therefore seventy-six, of which nine were mortars.

Two companies of infantry had been placed on Sullivan's and Morris Islands, to guard against a land attack. Commodore Ingraham had also been cautioned to hold the gun-boats "Palmetto State" and "Chicora" in readiness, to assist our batteries in case of need; but they were not needed.

The approach of the monitors was slow and cautious. They dreaded the rope obstructions which were known to be connected with heavily charged torpedoes. But the report afterward circu-

lated—to which Mr. Seward gave the weight of his official name—that the "rope obstructions in the channel fouled the screws of the iron-clads," was entirely erroneous. Not one of the iron-clads ever approached nearer than six hundred yards to any of these obstructions, with the exception of the "Keokuk," "which dropped in, to about three hundred yards" of them before being able to "get again under way."* How, therefore, could the screws or propellers of the "Weehawken," the leading monitor, or of any of the others, have "*fallen into these entanglements*," to quote an expression used at the time?

At three o'clock p.m., the first shot was fired. It came from Fort Moultrie, and was aimed at the "Weehawken." No heed was taken of it. The turreted iron-clad kept on her way until within fourteen hundred yards of Fort Sumter, when she paused a moment and opened fire on it. Fully two minutes elapsed; and Sumter then replied, firing by battery. The other monitors now steamed up, taking their respective positions, but with apparent hesitation and as far out of range as possible. The action had become general; Sumter being the central point of the attack. An occasional shot was sent at Moultrie, an occasional one at Batteries, Bee and Beauregard.

The spectacle of this singular combat between what appeared to be nine floating iron turrets—for the hulls of the monitors were almost wholly submerged—and the grand old fortress, that barred their way and defied them all, was, indeed, an impressive one, not to be easily forgotten. It fully deserved the epithet of "*sublimely terrific*" afterward applied to it by a Northern writer who had witnessed the scene.†

After a lapse of about three-quarters of an hour, Admiral Dupont's flag-ship, the "New Ironsides," advanced to within some seventeen hundred yards of Sumter, evidently with a view to breach its walls. But the concentrated fire from our batteries forced her to withdraw hurriedly out of range, as the "Passaic" had already done, in an apparent crippled condition. The fire of Sumter was so accurate that two other monitors were compelled to retire. At four o'clock p.m., the "Keokuk" advanced alone to within nine hundred yards of Sumter, but with no better success than her con-

* See letter to Gen. Cooper, dated Oct. 15, 1863, in "Military Operations of General Beauregard," vol. II, chap. xxx, p. 71.

† "Military Operations of General Beauregard," vol. II, chap. xxx, p. 68.

sorts. She soon withdrew, badly worsted. In his report Colonel Rhett says: "The wrought-iron bolts from a 7 inch Brooke gun, were plainly seen to penetrate her turret and hull, and she retired in forty minutes riddled and apparently almost disabled." The whole attacking squadron now slowly withdrew from an engagement which had lasted not more than two hours and twenty-five minutes, but which had been, for the enemy, a most disastrous defeat. The following are extracts from reports of officers in command or on duty, that day, including portions of an official communication of mine forwarded a few weeks afterward to the War Department. They will aid in a better understanding of the various features of the attack just described.

Colonel Rhett said :

"The enemy's fire was mostly ricochet and not very accurate; most of their shot passed over the fort and several to the right and left. The greater portion of their shots were from thirteen to fourteen hundred yards distant, which appeared to be the extent of their effective range; some shots were from a greater distance and did not reach the fort at all."

General Ripley said :

"The action was purely of artillery—forts and batteries against the iron-clad vessels of the enemy—other means of defense, obstructions and torpedoes not having come into play. Fort Sumter was the principal object of the attack, and to that garrison, . . . special credit is due for sustaining the shock, and, with their powerful armament, contributing principally to the repulse."

Major Echols, of the Corps of Engineers, in his report to Major Harris, Chief Engineer of the department, used this language :

"The first turret opened fire at five minutes past three, and moved backward, thus developing their maneuver of attack. . . . The second turret passed the first, fired, moved backward; the first moved forward, passed the second, fired, and backed, then retired from action; the other turrets maneuvering in the same relative manner, each time nearing or receding a little from the fort, in order not to present a permanent target. . . . The 'Keokuk' sank off the south end of Morris Island, at half-past eight o'clock the following morning (April 8). Her smoke-stack and turrets are now visible at low water. From her wreck floated ashore a book, a spy-glass, and pieces of furniture bespattered with blood, and small fragments of iron sticking in them."

"The firing of the turrets was timed; they discharged generally at intervals of ten minutes. . . . Allowing six of them constantly engaged, they delivered eighty-seven shots; one fired twice and retired; the 'Keokuk' fired three or four times, and the 'Ironsides' about seventeen—making the total

number fired by the enemy about one hundred and ten, which were principally directed at Sumter.* Her walls show the effect of fifty-five missiles—shot, shells and fragments. . . .

"The casualties are slight. At Sumter five men were wounded by fragments of masonry and wood. . . . At Moultrie one man was killed by the falling of the flag-staff when shot away. At Battery Wagner an ammunition chest . . . exploded from the blast of the gun, killing three men, mortally wounding one, slightly wounding Lieutenant Steadman, in charge of the gun, and three men."

"On the following day (April 8) the fleet lay inside the bar, in the same line of battle in which they approached—the first one about two miles and a half from Sumter, and one and a half miles from Morris Island. Men were visible all day on the turret of one, hammering, evidently repairing her plating. . . . About noon one of the turrets † went south, probably to Port Royal, for repairs, etc."

"The 'Ironsides' has kept up a full head of steam since the engagement, as can be seen by her constantly blowing off. Three holes are distinctly seen in her stern, two just above the water line."

"The hull of the turrets in running trim stands about two feet above water-level, carrying a whistle, smoke-stack, and stanchions for swinging a small boat on deck, with a light railing around it. When cleared for action she is submerged almost to the water-level—the other articles all removed flush with the deck."

Major Harris, the Chief Engineer, in his report said :

"The manner in which the fort withstood the bombardment is a matter of congratulation, and encourages us to believe that the repairs that have been made, and the measures now in progress to strengthen and protect its walls, will enable the fort to withstand a much more formidable bombardment with like good results. . . . The sinking of the 'Keokuk' and the discomfiture of the iron-clads have established their vulnerability to our heavy projectiles at a range, say, of from nine to twelve hundred yards."

In the communication sent by me to the War Department, dated May 24, recapitulating the various phases of the attack of April 7, I made the following statement :

"The action lasted two hours and twenty-five minutes; but the chief damage is reported by the enemy to have been done in thirty minutes. The 'Keokuk' did not come nearer than nine hundred yards of Fort Sumter. She was destroyed. The 'New Ironsides' could not stand the fire at the range of a mile. Four of her consorts, monitors, were disabled at the distance of not less than thirteen hundred yards. They had only reached the gorge of the harbor, never within it, and were baffled and driven back before reaching our lines of

*The number of shots fired by the Federal iron-clads was from 151 to 154.

†The "Passaic," towed to Port Royal for repairs.

torpedoes and obstructions, which had been constructed as an ultimate defensive resort as far as they could be provided. The heaviest batteries had not been employed; therefore it may be accepted as shown, that these vaunted monitor batteries, though formidable engines of war, after all are not invulnerable or invincible, and may be destroyed or defeated by heavy ordnance properly placed and skillfully handled. In reality they have not materially altered the military relations of forts and ships.

"On this occasion the monitors operated under the most favorable circumstances. The day was calm; and the water, consequently, was as stable as that of a river. Their guns were fired with deliberation, doubtless by trained artillerymen. According to the enemy's statements the fleet fired one hundred and fifty-one shots, eight of which were ascribed to the 'New Ironsides,' three to the 'Keokuk,' and but nine to the 'Passaic,' which was so badly damaged. Not more than thirty-four shots * took effect on the walls of Fort Sumter—a broad mark—which, with the number of discharges, suggests that the monitor arrangement, as yet, is not convenient for accuracy or celerity of fire.

"Fort Moultrie and other batteries were not touched in a way to be considered, while in return they threw one thousand three hundred and ninety-nine shots. At the same time Sumter discharged eight hundred and ten shots; making the total number of shots fired two thousand two hundred and nine, of which the enemy reports that five hundred and twenty struck the different vessels—a most satisfactory accuracy, when the smallness of the target is considered.

"Too much praise cannot be given to the officers and men in all the works engaged, for their spirit, gallantry and discipline, which indeed I had a right to expect, from the high soldierly condition into which those garrisons had been brought by their officers. My expectations were fully realized; and the country, as well as the State of South Carolina, may well be proud of the men who first met and vanquished the iron-mailed, terribly-armed armada, so confidently prepared, and sent forth by the enemy to certain and easy victory."

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

* Major Echols's report puts the number at *fifty-five*, which it is conceded is the correct one.

THE FUTURE OF THE COLORED RACE.

It is quite impossible, at this early date, to say with any decided emphasis what the future of the colored people will be. Speculations of that kind, thus far, have only reflected the mental bias and education of the many who have essayed to solve the problem.

We all know what the negro has been as a slave. In this relation we have his experience of two hundred and fifty years before us, and can easily know the character and qualities he has developed and exhibited, during this long and severe ordeal. In his new relation to his environments, we see him only in the twilight of twenty years of semi-freedom; for he has scarcely been free long enough to outgrow the marks of the lash on his back and the fetters on his limbs. He stands before us, to-day, physically, a maimed and mutilated man. His mother was lashed to agony before the birth of her babe, and the bitter anguish of the mother is seen in the countenance of her offspring. Slavery has twisted his limbs, shattered his feet, deformed his body and distorted his features. He remains black, but no longer comely. Sleeping on the dirt floor of the slave cabin in infancy, cold on one side and warm on the other, a forced circulation of blood on the one side and chilled and retarded circulation on the other, it has come to pass that he has not the vertical bearing of a perfect man. His lack of symmetry, caused by no fault of his own, creates a resistance to his progress which cannot well be overestimated, and should be taken into account, when measuring his speed in the new race of life upon which he has now entered. As I have often said before, we should not measure the negro from the heights which the white race has attained, but from the depths from which he has come. You will not find Burke, Grattan, Curran and O'Connell among the oppressed and famished poor of the famine-stricken districts of Ireland. Such men come of comfortable antecedents and sound parents.

DEFENSE OF CHARLESTON, SOUTH CAROLINA,

In 1862, 1863 and 1864.

II.

THE repulse of Admiral Dupont's iron-clad fleet before Charleston had not been looked upon as a thing possible by the North; and when the news of the Federal discomfiture reached that section, it engendered a heavy gloom of disappointment and discouragement—a feeling not unlike that which had prevailed there after the Confederate victory at Manassas, on July 21st, 1861. It was clear to me, however, that the enemy, whose land forces had not co-operated in this naval attack, would not rest upon his defeat, but would soon make another effort, with renewed vigor, and on a larger scale. Public opinion at the North would have given the Federal Administration no quiet had nothing further been attempted to retrieve what the New York Herald had already called "one of our most discouraging disasters," and another journal had denounced as "a shameful abandonment of the siege." I was therefore very much concerned when, scarcely a week afterward, the War Department compelled me to send back to North Carolina Cooke's and Clingman's commands, and, early in May, two other brigades, numbering 5,000 men, with two batteries of light artillery, to re-enforce General Joseph E. Johnston, at Jackson, Mississippi. The fact is, that on the 10th of May, Mr. Seddon, the Secretary of War, had even directed that still another force of 5,000 men should be withdrawn from my department to be sent to Vicksburg to the assistance of General Pemberton. But my protest against so exhaustive a drain upon my command was fortunately heeded, and I was allowed to retain the reduced force I then had under me, amounting on the 1st of June, for the whole State of North Carolina, to not more than 10,000 men. With these, it was evident, I could not protect each and every vulnerable point at the same time, and, henceforth, whenever the occasion arose, I had to withdraw troops from one quarter of the department to re-enforce another.

When, on the 12th of June, 1863, General Gillmore relieved

General Hunter and assumed command of what was called "the Department of the South," the enemy already occupied "Folly Island, north of the Stono; Seabrook Island, on the north Edisto; St. Helena Island, Port Royal Island, Hilton Head Island, Tybee Islands, Fort Pulaski, Ossabaw Islands, Fort Clinch, and Amelia Island, and the City of St. Augustine."* The fact that a new commander, of high engineering repute, had been sent to supersede General Hunter, confirmed me in the opinion that we would not have to wait long before another and more serious attack was made. A further reason for such a belief was the presence at that time of six Federal regiments on Folly Island, under Brigadier-General Vogdes, an officer of merit, perfectly familiar with Charleston and the surrounding country, he having been stationed at Fort Moultrie before the war. I had notified the War Department to that effect by a telegram dated May the 10th. It read as follows:

"Enemy in force on Folly Island, actively erecting batteries yesterday."

Again on the 15th of June, speaking of the depletion of the forces under me, I drew the attention of the War Department to the danger of an attack by Morris Island, and even indicated the possible result of General Gillmore's operations. I said:

" . . . The force in the department is already at the minimum necessary to hold the works around Charleston and Savannah, constantly menaced by the proximity of the enemy's iron-clads.

"The garrison of no work in the harbor can be withdrawn or diminished, as they are all necessary links in the chain of defenses. . . . It is not safe to have less than a regiment of infantry on Morris Island, which, if once carried by the enemy, would expose Fort Sumter to be taken in reverse and demolished."

I was making the greatest exertion to have finished an important battery which, by my orders, was in progress of construction near the south end of Morris Island. Want of adequate labor prevented its completion in time. Another paramount obstacle also thwarted me: no heavy guns could be procured for it.

On the 7th of July four monitors were seen off the Charleston bar. The fleet had not otherwise increased up to that day. During the night of the 8th the noise, apparently made by extensive chopping with axes, was distinctly heard from the extreme south-

* General Gillmore's book "Engineer and Artillery Preparation against Charleston," p. 18.

ern end of Morris Island. The sound reached us, but we were unable to distinguish what was really going on. The sand hills, so numerous on Little Folly Island, afforded much facility to the enemy for keeping us in the dark as to his ulterior designs, although nothing indicated any effort on his part at concealment. The following is an extract from my official report to the War Department upon this important event in the siege of Charleston :

"On the night of the 9th of July an immediate attack being anticipated, the whole infantry force on the island was kept under arms at the south end.

"At five o'clock on the morning of the 10th of July the enemy's attack commenced by a heavy fire on our position, from a great number of light guns apparently placed during the preceding forty-eight hours in the works lately thrown up on Little Folly Island. Three monitors about the same time crossed the bar, and brought their formidable armaments to bear on the left flank of our position, while several barges with howitzers in Light-house Inlet flanked our right.

"For two hours the enemy kept up the fire from these three different points, our batteries replying vigorously.

"The barges of the enemy, filled with troops, having been seen in Light-house Inlet in the direction of Black Island, and Oyster Point being the nearest and most accessible spot for debarkation from them, it was justly considered the one most necessary to protect, and therefore the infantry, consisting of the Twenty-first South Carolina Volunteers, about 350 effective men, were stationed by Colonel R. F. Graham, the immediate commander of the island, on the peninsula leading to that point.

"In this position the infantry were unavoidably exposed to the fire of the boat howitzers, but sheltered by the nature of the ground from that of the guns on Little Folly Island.

"About seven o'clock the enemy advanced on Oyster Point in a flotilla of boats containing between two and three thousand men, a considerable portion of whom endeavored to effect and hold a landing, in which they were opposed by the infantry until about eight o'clock, when another force of two or three regiments made good a landing in front of our batteries on the south end of Morris Island proper. These formed in line of battle on the beach, and advanced directly upon our works, throwing out on each flank numerous skirmishers, who very soon succeeded in flanking and taking the batteries in reverse. After an obstinate resistance our artillery had to abandon their pieces—three 8-inch navy shell guns, two 8-inch sea-coast howitzers, one rifled 24-pounder, one 30-pounder Parrott, one 12-pounder Whitworth, three 10-inch sea-coast mortars—eleven in all—and fall back.

"Two companies of the Seventh South Carolina Battalion, which arrived about this time, were ordered to the support of the batteries; but they could not make head against the overwhelming numbers of the enemy.

"This success of the enemy threatened to cut off our infantry engaged at Oyster Point from their line of retreat; and, consequently, about nine o'clock,

Colonel Graham gave the order to fall back to Battery Wagner, which was accomplished under a severe flanking fire from the monitors.

"The enemy thus gained possession of the South end of Morris Island, by rapidly throwing a large number of troops across the inlet, which it was impossible for the available infantry on the spot, about 400 effective men, to resist.

"It was not the erection of works on Little Folly Island that caused the abandonment of our position, it was clearly the want on our side of infantry support, and the enemy's superior weight and number of guns, and the heavy supporting brigade of infantry, that swept away our feeble, stunted means of resistance."

It is not true that this attack was a surprise. The commander of Morris Island and all the troops on it knew that the enemy was preparing to make one from Little Folly. I knew it as well, and the War Department was also aware of it; for I had kept the Secretary of War and General Cooper well advised of all the operations of the enemy in my command, and, especially, of his movements in that particular quarter. The real cause of the Federal success, on the 10th of July, was insufficiency of our infantry force on Morris Island; let alone the fact that I could not, for want of necessary labor, complete the battery already referred to, and which was of no service whatever to us on that occasion. The following table shows what force I could dispose of, at that time, in and around Charleston, that is to say, in all the First Military District of South Carolina. I had :

1.—On James Island—			
Infantry	1,184	
Heavy and light artillery	1,569	
Cavalry	153	
			2,906
2.—On Morris Island—			
Infantry	612	
Heavy and light artillery	289	
Cavalry	26	
			927
3.—On Sullivan's Island—			
Infantry	204	
Heavy and light artillery	726	
Cavalry	228	
			1,158
4.—In Charleston proper—			
Infantry	462	
Heavy and light artillery	235	
Cavalry	153	850
			5,841
Total		5,841

Nor should it be forgotten that the enemy, in order to divert our attention from the main object he had in view, was not only landing troops at the southern end of Morris Island, but was also seriously threatening James Island, and had made a strong demonstration against it by the Stono River. It is clear to me that, but for my determination not to weaken my force there for the support of Morris Island, this demonstration would have been converted into a real attack, the results of which might have been far more disastrous; for, as I have already stated, James Island was the avenue of approach I dreaded the most to see selected, and which on that account I feared the enemy would select. It was, in reality, the "entrance gate" to the avenue which would have almost assuredly led into the heart of Charleston. The enemy had preferred breaking in through the "window;" and I certainly had no cause to regret his having done so. That he was held in check there, and never got in, until we finally opened the "gate" ourselves, toward the end of the war, is not to be denied. On the evening of July 10th detachments from various Georgia regiments which I had called for, began to arrive. They were re-enforced by the Twenty-first South Carolina Volunteers, and Nelson's Battalion now garrisoned Battery Wagner. I also urgently pressed the War Department to order back Clingman's brigade to Charleston. Part of it came on the 12th. The day before, at early dawn, the enemy assaulted Battery Wagner, but was repulsed with great loss to him. Two Federal officers and some ninety-five men were killed within pistol range of our works. We captured six officers and about one hundred and thirteen men. Most of them were wounded. Three monitors and three wooden gun-boats assisted the Federal land forces on that occasion. Battery Wagner was again shelled on the 12th by part of the fleet, while the land forces were engaged in putting up works near the middle of Morris Island. They were very much disturbed by the accurate firing of Fort Sumter and of Battery Gregg.

On the arrival of the whole of Clingman's brigade and of other troops called from the Second and Third Military Districts of my Department, I was about to issue an order for an attempt in force to expel the enemy from Morris Island. But the configuration of that island, its proximity to the Federal monitors, and the fact, no less important, that fully four thousand men would have been required for that purpose, convinced me that no step of that kind

could have then been successful. Our limited means of transportation was also a great drawback to us, and strongly militated against the adoption of any such offensive move on my part. Upon further reflection I came to the conclusion that we could do more toward checking the progress of the enemy by erecting new batteries on James Island and by strengthening others already in position there and elsewhere. I issued orders to that effect and they were vigorously carried out. Battery Simkins, in advance of Fort Johnson, on Shell Point, was one of these new batteries. It was armed with one 10-inch columbiad, one 6.40 Brooke, and three 10-inch mortars; and guns were taken from Sumter to increase the armament of Moultrie.

The damages in Battery Wagner were soon repaired, and the fire of the monitors and gun-boats regularly answered. Three guns, instead of two, were mounted at the Shell Point Battery; and I also caused gun-batteries of 10-inch columbiads to be substituted for the mortar-batteries at Fort Johnson. I ordered the forces on Morris Island to be reduced to a number strictly sufficient to hold our works there. And the enemy's pickets along the Stono having been increased at that time, I instructed General Hagood to advance at once on the position occupied by the Federals, and thus ascertain what was their real intent as to James Island. This was done with General Hagood's usual promptitude of action, and on the 16th the Federal forces were driven to the shelter of their gun-boats, our troops occupying the ground they had lost on that occasion. My order to Major Harris, Chief-Engineer, was, nevertheless, "to increase the batteries on James Island bearing on Morris Island by at least twenty guns on siege carriages, so as to envelop the enemy with a 'circle of fire' whenever he might gain possession of the north-east end of Morris Island; all works to be pushed on day and night."* On the 18th the Federal troops crowded the south end of Morris Island and took position behind their breastworks. It was clear that another attempt was about to be made against Wagner, and it was made with no less vigor than obstinacy. The "New Ironsides," five monitors, and a large wooden frigate joined in the bombardment. The firing of the enemy was more rapid on that occasion than it had ever been before. General Taliaferro, of Virginia, the gallant and efficient officer in command of Battery Wagner at the time,

* "Military Operations of General Beauregard," vol. ii., chap. xxxii., p. 117.

estimated "that nine hundred shot and shell were thrown in and against the battery during the eleven hours that the bombardment lasted." Wagner answered but slowly to this terrible onslaught. Not so, however, with Sumter and Gregg, which fired with even more rapidity than the enemy, and, as ever, did splendid work. After dusk on the same evening the Federal fleet was seen to retire and the land forces advanced to attack Wagner. They displayed great determination. A portion of them succeeded in crossing the ditch and actually gained a foothold on the southern salient of the battery. General Hagood, with Colonel Harrison's Thirty-second Georgia, arrived opportunely at that hour, as per orders received from me, and was of great assistance in precipitating the flight of the enemy, though it had fairly begun before his arrival. In my report of this incident of the day is found the following language :

"The assault was terribly disastrous to the enemy. His loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners must have been three thousand, as eight hundred bodies were interred in front of Battery Wagner on the following morning. . . . Our own loss during the bombardment and assault was one hundred and seventy-four, killed and wounded."

From that time up to the evacuation of Morris Island, the enemy scarcely allowed a day to pass without heavily firing upon our works—sometimes with his land forces alone, at other times with these and his fleet combined. He was also busily engaged on his batteries and trenches, while, on our side, we were straining every nerve to repair the damages done to our works and to strengthen the weakened walls of Sumter, whose disarmament was carefully carried on at night, in view of the disastrous effects of the enemy's heavy guns, from stationary batteries which would eventually render it untenable as an artillery post. That such a result was inevitable no one could possibly doubt, and that the whole of Morris Island would, sooner or later, fall into the hands of the enemy, was no less evident. But, so long as the batteries in process of construction on the main were unfinished, I had resolved to hold Wagner and Gregg to the last extremity. Every movement of the enemy was, in the mean time, watched with the utmost vigilance ; while the accurate firing of Sumter, Gregg, and Wagner continued to seriously interfere with the working parties engaged on his lines of gradual approaches.

Among the most memorable incidents of this period of the

siege was the seven days' bombardment of Fort Sumter, which commenced on the 17th of August and lasted up to the 23d. It appeared to be, on the part of the Federals, a desperate and final attempt to force the surrender of the fort, and thus effect the reduction of Morris Island, and even of the City of Charleston. This was evidenced by the peremptory demand which I received from General Gillmore on the 21st, for the "immediate evacuation of Morris Island and Fort Sumter," followed by the threat that, if within "four hours" after the delivery of his letter into the hands of the commander of Battery Wagner no reply was had, he would "open fire on the City of Charleston from batteries already established within easy range of the heart of the city." This communication reached me after the time specified, as must have been anticipated by General Gillmore ; for it was evident that no message could go from Battery Wagner to Charleston and be answered within the limited space of "four hours."

I protested against the bombardment of a city filled with old men, women and children, before giving the customary notice of three or four days in which to allow them to escape from danger. From a work which was called "the Swamp Angel," because of the spot where it had been erected, the enemy, with an eight-inch Parrott rifle-gun, and before receiving my answer, did open fire upon "the heart" of the city. I have reason to believe, however, that the energy of my protest, which in due time reached the head-quarters of the Federal commander, forced him to somewhat recede from the position he had at first taken ; for he ultimately ordered the firing upon the city to be suspended for the space of two days. When resumed it was not continued long ; the "Swamp Angel" gun, after thirty-six rounds, very fortunately burst, and none other was mounted in that locality to take its place. The result of the seven days' bombardment of Sumter was to convert that historic fort into a confused mass of crumbling *débris*, but without altogether impairing its capacity of resistance. The greatest danger threatening the garrison just then, and one, no doubt, counted upon by the enemy, was the probability of the explosion, by shot and shell, of its powder magazine, which was, indeed, momentarily apprehended by the gallant men within the work.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

(To be Concluded.)

DEFENSE OF CHARLESTON, SOUTH CAROLINA,

In 1862, 1863 and 1864.

III.

In the meanwhile, General Gillmore's working parties, ever on the increase, were gradually but surely approaching their trenches and mining operations nearer and nearer to Battery Wagner. On the 26th, our rifle pits in front of the work were assailed by an overpowering force and actually taken. And on the 1st of September the fire on Sumter was so intense as to effect its final destruction. The following extract from the Engineer's report, forwarded at that time to the War Department, will give an idea of the condition of the work :

" Toward noon the effect of the fire was to carry away at one fall, four rampart arches on north-east front, with *terre-plein* platforms and guns, thus leaving on this front only one arch and a half, which are adjacent to the east spiral stair. Some of the lower casemate piers of same front have been seriously damaged, rendering unsafe the service of two guns hitherto available in that quarter. On the exterior, the chief injury done is to be noticed at south-east *pan-coupé* and two next upper casemates on east front. From these localities the scarp wall has fallen away completely, and left the arches exposed, as well as the sand filling half down to the floor of the second tier."

The next day six monitors, together with the "Ironsides," opened fire on the fort, using the heaviest projectiles, namely: "8 inch Parrotts, rifle-shells, and 11 and 15 inch smooth-bore shot and shell." Sumter remained silent. It had not one single gun in working order with which to reply. The following is an extract from my report to the War Department :

"The north-east and north-west *terre-pleins* had fallen in, and the western wall had a crack entirely through from parapet to berme. The greater portion of the southern wall was down, the upper east magazine penetrated, and lower east magazine wall cracked; the eastern wall itself nearly shot away, and large

portions down; ramparts gone, and nearly every casemate breached. The casemates on the eastern face were still filled with sand, and gave some protection to the garrison from shells. Not a single gun remained in barbette, and but a single smooth-bore 32 pounder in the west face that could be fired as the morning and evening gun."

While Sumter had thus been made a mass of crumbling ruins, the enemy, except at short intervals, spared no effort to also effect the demolition of Wagner. In spite of the ability and determination of the several commanders—Taliaferro, Hagood, Colquitt, Clingman, Graham, Harrison and Keitt—who, in turn, were placed there; in spite of the almost superhuman energy and pluck of its garrison and working parties to repair, at night, the damage done during the day, it became evident, on the 5th of September, that any further attempt to retain possession of it, would result in the useless loss of the garrisons of both Wagner and Gregg. The enemy's sap had reached the moat of the former work. The heavy Parrott shells used against its parapets had breached them, and knocked away the bomb-proofs. It had become impossible to repair the damages done. Such was the substance of the different reports of Colonel Keitt, the officer then in command, confirmed the same day by Major Harris, the Chief Engineer.

Colonel Rhett and his artillery command of regulars, be it remembered, had already been transferred to the batteries forming the inner defenses, which were now almost entirely completed, and mostly armed with the very guns of Sumter. Major Stephen Elliott, with an infantry force taken from various regiments in and around the city—for Sumter was no longer an artillery post—had been put there to hold the ruins of the fort against any storming parties of the enemy, and to give the morning and evening salute to the Confederate flag, still floating to the breeze. Major Elliott had been selected by me with care for that post of honor and danger. He proved himself worthy of the confidence placed in him; as did, later on, Captain John Mitchel, who relieved him on the 4th of May, 1864, and lost his life while in command there on the 20th of July, 1864; he was succeeded by another brave officer, Captain T. A. Huguenin, who was fortunate enough to escape uninjured and only left the fort at its final evacuation, on the 17th of February, 1865. I take this opportunity to mention another gallant officer, Captain John Johnson, of the C. S. Engineers, who was of much assistance in the defense of those

ruins and remained therein to the last moment they were held by us.

The instructions for the evacuation of Batteries Wagner and Gregg had been prepared by me with much deliberation and thought. They are given in full in "Military Operations of General Beauregard," Vol. II, pp. 133-4.

The withdrawal of the troops began as previously agreed upon, and was conducted in silence, with great coolness and precision. My orders were carried out almost to the letter. Owing to some defect in the fuses, however, the powder magazines of neither Wagner nor Gregg were exploded, although they had been lit, with all due precaution, by able officers. The wounded and sick had been first removed; then the companies were marched by detachments to the boats prepared to receive them, and embarked under the supervision of the naval officers in command. Two companies remained in Battery Wagner, as a rear guard, until all the others were embarked, when they also were withdrawn. Our loss was slight, both in men and materials; and the Federal victory was barren, as admitted by General Gillmore, in his dispatch to Admiral Dahlgren, dated September 7th, 5.10 A.M.; he said:

"The whole island is ours, but the enemy have escaped us."

It cannot be expected that in the limited space at my command for the purposes of this article, I should write a full history of the defense of Charleston, or that I should place before the reader all the particulars connected with that period of the late war between the States. My object has been to record those episodes only which were of superior importance. Nor do I deem it necessary to mention here what may have taken place in that department after my departure from it in April, 1864.

I have dwelt somewhat at length upon the details of the gradual destruction of Fort Sumter, for the reason that, apart from the high interest of the recital, the matchless spirit and discipline displayed by its commander and garrison, reacted upon all the commands in my department, and aroused a feeling of pride and emulation among the troops defending Charleston, which resulted in the greatest heroism. And it is history to say that the defense of Sumter and Wagner are feats of war unsurpassed in ancient or modern times.

I now propose, before closing, to review some few passages of

General Gillmore's book, published just after the war, and, as it appears on its title page, "by authority." Most of its errors have already been refuted in my "Morris Island Report," which is given, *in extenso*, in the second volume of the "Military Operations of General Beauregard."* It only remains, therefore, to comment briefly upon certain misapprehensions and false conclusions of the author.

General Gillmore was considered during the war the first engineer officer in the Federal service. Such is his standing up to this day. He had evidently been sent in command of the "Department of the South," to effect what his predecessor, General Hunter, had failed to do, to wit—the capture of Charleston.

General Gillmore's book is valuable in many respects. It furnishes new and important information to the student of military history. Its tabular statements are generally accurate; the plates, drawings and carefully prepared maps annexed to it, are interesting and instructive. It embraces one hundred and thirty-three pages, exclusive of the plates, of what General Gillmore terms his "Report." The reports of his subordinate commanders, added to the appendix, confirm what he himself alleges.

The description he gives of the city of Charleston, and of the fortifications in and around its harbor, is exact. But the inference to be drawn from the paragraph numbered 19 in the book, is exceptionable. It reads as follows:

"The strength of the James Island works was tested by a bold but unsuccessful assault by our forces under Brigadier-General Benham, on the 16th of June, 1862." †

I deem it necessary to place the facts of this attack in their proper light, because that is the reason assigned by General Gillmore for not having attacked by way of James Island, in July, 1863, when instead he attempted the Morris Island route.

The truth of the matter is, that the point attacked by Generals Benham and Stevens, near Secessionville, was the strongest one of the whole line, which was then unfinished and was designed to be some five miles in length. The two Federal commanders might have overcome the obstacles in their front, had they proceeded further up the Stono. Even as it was, the fight at Secessionville

* Chap. xxxii, pp. 102, *et seq.*

† General Gillmore's book, p. 11.

was lost, in great measure, by lack of tenacity on the part of Generals Benham and Stevens. Their troops outnumbered ours more than two to one and fought with considerable dash. Some of them, in the impetus of the assault, went even inside one of the salients of the work. It was saved by the skin of our teeth. General Benham's attack was, therefore, hardly a "test" of the possibility or impossibility of carrying the James Island works. The failure, in June, 1862, was no good reason for not making the attempt over again, in July, 1863; 1. Because that point of the attack was the strongest instead of the weakest, of the line, other parts of it, further west, being but feebly guarded and poorly armed; 2. Because the forces under me, in July, 1863, were much less than those under General Pemberton, in June, 1862; 3. Because, in July, 1863, I had only 1,184 infantry on the whole of James Island, whereas in order to guard the defensive lines properly I should have had a force of at least 8,000 men there. Further on General Gillmore says:

"A land attack upon Charleston was not even discussed at any of the interviews to which I was invited and was certainly never contemplated by me." *

His reasons for not having contemplated such a movement are shown in paragraph 27 of his book, where he asserts, in substance, that beyond the capture of Morris Island and the demolition of Fort Sumter, he never intended, with an army of only 11,000 men, and with so many difficulties in his way, to undertake any operations against the land defenses of Charleston, knowing as he did how superior my forces were to his own, and what facilities I had "for concentrating troops by railroad." "The capture of Charleston" was, after all—and General Gillmore admits it—"the ultimate object in view." †

The possession of Morris Island and the demolition of Sumter by the Federal land and naval forces, were mere incidents in the drama. These did not cause the fall of the much hated and much coveted rebel city; and General Gillmore, "though he had overcome difficulties almost unknown in modern sieges," ‡ achieved not "the ultimate object in view."

General Gillmore attempts to place the weight of that failure

* Paragraph 28, p. 12, of his book.

† Paragraph 29, p. 14, of his book.

‡ General Halleck's Report of November 15, 1863.

on the non co-operation of the navy. He argues, in effect, as follows: "I destroyed Sumter and thereby opened the way to Charleston. Why did not the fleet push on and reach the city, as the fleet should and could have done?" In a letter to Admiral Dahlgren, dated September 27, 1863, General Gillmore expresses such views. And in a note to be found at pages 63, 64, 65, 66, of his book, he also says:

"The failure of the fleet to enter immediately after the 23d August, whether unavoidable or otherwise, gave the enemy an opportunity, doubtless much needed, to improve the interior defenses."

Admiral Dahlgren, in what he wrote and said at the time, attributes "the principal cause of the delay in reaching Charleston, that subsequently ensued," to the failure of the second assault on Wagner, July 18th, and "to the slow and laborious occupation by trench and cannon, which had to be resorted to." *

The difficulties General Gillmore speaks of as militating against all idea on his part of making a land attack upon Charleston, and the supposed superiority in numbers upon which he lays so much stress, remind me of the reckless assertion made by Professor Draper, in his "History of the Civil War," that 30,000 Confederates were kept in readiness for the defense of Charleston. And, speaking of the descent on Morris Island, by the Federal forces, he adds this to his former averment:

"At the time, Beauregard had twice as many men and five times as much artillery for the defense of Charleston, as Gillmore had for attack." †

The fact is that, on or about the 10th of July, 1863, the Confederate forces available for the defense of the exterior lines of Charleston, did not exceed 6,500 men, distributed to the best advantage for the protection of James, Sullivan's and Morris Islands, and of the city proper. Whereas, General Gillmore had, at that time, according to his own estimate, 11,000 men, whom he might have easily concentrated against any special point. Suppose that point to have been the James Island lines, the weak Confederate force there stationed, 1,184 infantry, would have had to withstand an overwhelming assault.

Transportation was altogether inadequate; and all effort made to re-enforce any of the above-named localities, would have necessarily uncovered some other point equally liable to attack.

* Official Report of Admiral Dahlgren, January 28, 1864.

† Draper's "History of the Civil War," vol. III, p. 169.

General Gillmore exaggerates "the formidable strength of 'Fort' Wagner," as he persistently calls it, and explains how "its position, trace, armament and interior arrangements," compelled him to change the plan of operations first adopted against it. He says :

"It had an excellent command and a bold relief. . . . It was constructed of compact sand, upon which the heaviest projectiles produced but little effect, and in which damages could be easily and speedily repaired. It was known to contain a secure and capacious bomb-proof shelter for its entire garrison, and to be armed with between fifteen and twenty guns, of various calibers, nearly all bearing upon and completely covering the only approach to it, which was over a shallow and shifting beach, of scarcely half a company front in width in many places, subject to frequent overflow by the tides, and swept by the guns of not only 'Fort' Wagner itself, but of Battery Gregg, Fort Sumter, and several heavily-armed batteries on James Island."*

"Battery" Wagner, as it should be called—for it never was a "fort," had successfully repulsed two assaults by overpowering numbers, and with such bloody results as to deter the enemy from again attempting the same mode of attack. It withstood and baffled the combined efforts of the Federal naval and land forces, during fifty-eight consecutive days. Indisputably General Gillmore's success on Morris Island was tardy, and unquestionably barren of the fruit expected and sought.

Battery Wagner was originally an ordinary field battery, erected, as already stated, by General Pemberton, to prevent a near approach from the south end of Morris Island. It was pierced for eleven guns, only three of which were heavy pieces. These were two 10 inch columbiads, and one 32 pounder rifled, which was of but slight service, for it burst after firing a few rounds and was never replaced. The other guns were 32 pounder carronades and 12 pounder mortars, placed on the "curtain" of the battery, facing the approach from the south. Most of these had been disabled by the terrible fire opened upon them. The remaining ones were field pieces and two 8 and 10 inch mortars, the latter being used as "coehorns" against the enemy's trenches. The work was strengthened and improved, its plan gradually modified; traverses and merlons, and bomb-proofs capable of sheltering some seven hundred and fifty men (not sixteen hundred as General Gillmore says †), were added to it by my orders, partly before the attack, partly after, and while

* Paragraph 105, p. 43, General Gillmore's book.

† Paragraph 166, p. 74, of General Gillmore's book.

the enemy was still making his advance. By the addition of a light parapet which I had caused to be thrown across its "gorge," Wagner had thus become a closed battery, protected from a surprise on the rear. But it never was a "formidable work" and, in fact, it fought the enemy from the 10th of July, 1863, to the 6th of September of the same year, with men, artillery, and with "sand." "Such was the celerity" of the enemy's "flight," says General Gillmore, "that nearly the whole of his force made its escape. Seventy men were intercepted and taken."*

That "flight," as General Gillmore was pleased to term the evacuation of Batteries Wagner and Gregg, and of the whole of Morris Island, was, in every respect, an orderly one. It began at the appointed hour, to wit—9 o'clock P.M.—and lasted until 1.30 A.M. There was no hurry, no confusion. Calm and deliberate written orders were issued, and just as calmly and deliberately obeyed. Forty-six of our men, including nineteen sailors, whose boats had strayed in the darkness out of the line of retreat, were captured by the enemy; not "seventy," as asserted by the Federal commander.

The passage of General Gillmore's book, headed, "Errors in Enemy's Defense," requires some few remarks. He wrote :

"Fort Wagner affords a striking example of the injudicious location of an outwork. Its office was to hold and control possession of all that portion of Morris Island upon which effective breaching batteries against Fort Sumter could be established. We have seen how signally it failed to do so. The instructive and suggestive lesson of Fort Pulaski, which was lost to the enemy because Big Tybee Island, the proper position for a heavily armed outwork, was abandoned to us without an attempt being made to hold it, was not practically applied in defending the approaches to Fort Sumter.

"After the primary error of abandoning Coles's Island, therefore, the great mistake of the enemy . . . consisted in locating Fort Wagner near the north end of Morris Island instead of on the sand hills two miles further south, near Light-house Inlet. He would not have been forced to witness the humiliating spectacle of the destruction of his principal work on an interior line, over the heads of the defenders of an exterior one, had Fort Wagner been even one mile further to the southward. With only one inclosed work for the defense of Morris Island, the proper location for it was near the south end," etc. †

I have already shown by whose order Battery Wagner was built,

* Paragraph 166, p. 74, of General Gillmore's book.

† See paragraphs 254, 255, 256, *et seq.* from page 125 to 133, of General Gillmore's book.

and why General Pemberton had it located near the north end of Morris Island. What had occurred at Fort Pulaski was no guide for him, as the breaching batteries there had been placed at 1,650 yards, whereas Battery Wagner was at a distance of 2,600 yards from Fort Sumter, and the nearest breaching batteries against the latter were subsequently put at 3,475 yards from it.*

The abandonment of Coles's Island was, undoubtedly, a great error. My opinion on the subject has already been expressed. General Gillmore's remarks on that injudicious move are correct. He labors under misapprehension, however, in his criticism of the proper location of the batteries for the defense of Morris Island. A military engineer of inferior order could easily perceive what was necessary for its effectual defense, but would have effected very little, unless supplied with resources in labor, men, materials, and guns. With our restricted means we were compelled to construct such defenses only as were most needed at the time. Had we put a heavy work at the south end, or toward the middle, of the island, or both, we would have had no heavy guns with which to arm either, and no strong garrison to hold it. Moreover, a sufficient force on the island would have been indispensable, to defend it against an enterprising enemy, who would have landed a superior force between that battery and Cummings's Point; a feat easy of accomplishment from the outer harbor, which was generally smooth, and with a magnificent beach several miles long.

The two Confederate works put in position south of Battery Wagner, were only armed with one or two 24 and 32 pounder guns, to keep off the enemy's reconnoitering and landing parties. They were not meant for channel defenses, being entirely too far for any such purpose, and were, in reality, nothing more than "scare-crows." The system of detached batteries referred to by General Gillmore, and which he thought should have been adopted by his adversary, had been used by me on Morris and Sullivan's Islands, as early as the Spring of 1861, to prevent the enemy from relieving or re-enforcing Fort Sumter. I was, therefore, well conversant with the advantages to be procured from them, when judiciously located and well supported, which would not have been the case in this instance.

Further on, General Gillmore says :

* Paragraph 234, p. 116, of General Gillmore's book.

"A wise defense would have kept us off Morris Island entirely, as the simplest and least expensive method of solving the problem." *

If I had had proper means at my disposal when I first arrived at Charleston, or later, I would not have experienced much difficulty in keeping the enemy off Morris Island. But with my small resources in labor, men, guns, etc., I had to do what was most pressing at the time, and to act on the supposition that the possession of James Island by my antagonist would be mortal to Charleston, whereas that of Morris Island *might* give him Fort Sumter, though not necessarily the inner harbor. This the result unquestionably showed,† and on this view I acted.

At page 128 of his book, paragraph 259, General Gillmore makes the following statement :

"The special defense of Fort Wagner was faulty in two particulars, viz. :

"First : It was too passive. All the advantage that might have been derived from vigorous night sorties, against which the fire of the fleet could have taken no effective part with safety to us, was voluntarily relinquished when the system of defense by torpedo mines, placed on and in advance of the glacis, was resorted to.

"Second : Curved fire was not used enough. The armament of the work contained but two mortars (one 8 inch and one 10 inch).

"These, when earnestly served, caused the most serious delay in the progress of our work, and on one occasion suspended it entirely."

This is conclusive evidence of how completely General Gillmore misunderstood the real condition of the defenders of Charleston.

1. Sorties were made by us so long as they were found judicious. They had cost many lives to the Confederates—who had none to spare—without effecting much damage to the enemy, on such a limited front. And when the Federals had arrived nearer to the Battery, there was danger of their rushing "pell-mell" into it along with the men undertaking the sortie. Especially might it be the case when most of the garrison had to be kept under shelter. The torpedoes used by us in front of Wagner were indeed efficacious and offered respite to the men. They were, as I was wont to call them, the "watch dogs" of the battery ; for they held the enemy at bay, and gave timely notice of the approach

* End of paragraph 258, p. 127.

† See my "Morris Island Report," in "Military Operations of General Beauregard," vol. II, chap. xxxii.

of any attacking force. The description given of them at page 235 of General Gillmore's book (notes to Major Brooke's Journal), is correct. I am not surprised that the Federal commander should blame me for "resorting" to that means of defense, demoralizing always, but legitimate nevertheless, and perfectly accredited in civilized warfare.

2. "Curved fire" was not more frequently resorted to by us, for the simple reason that it was out of our power to do so. Before the occupation of the south end of Morris Island by the Federals, I had endeavored to obtain all the guns and mortars I could collect from Richmond and Mobile, but had not been successful in my efforts. After the landing of the enemy, I had also asked for "coehorns." None could be procured. Nor could any be made in Richmond, whose foundry was too busy making guns of the heaviest caliber for other points of the Confederacy. I did for the best with the few mortars I had, and distributed them in the different batteries bearing on Morris Island, beyond Battery Wagner. Four of these had been placed in the latter work, but as the enemy progressed with his trenches, could no longer be used as "coehorns," and were removed to some of the flanking batteries on James Island, from Battery Cheves to Secessionville. Others had been transferred there from Fort Sumter, after its demolition, and when its "parade" had been dug up for earth with which to construct "traverses" and "paradoses."

The two mortars and a few of the 12-pounder howitzers in Battery Wagner were used as "coehorns," with very reduced charges and great elevation, but with imperfect results, until the interior of the work became untenable by the incessant bombardment and vertical fire of the enemy.

General Gillmore appears to think that I had only to ask for labor, men, guns, and materials of any kind, when I needed them, and that all would be forthwith furnished me. It might have been the case with General Gillmore's requisitions of the same nature on his government, but not so with mine. This is shown by my correspondence with the War Department and with the chairman of the Military Committee of the Confederate House of Representatives. The fact is, we had to stop for weeks at a time the firing of some of our important guns, for want of powder and of shot, reserving only twenty rounds per gun and mortar for an emergency.

General Gillmore's assertion that he could "have pushed forward his approaches to Fort Wagner without the co-operating fire from the gun-boats,"* is dubious, to say the least of it. A close reading of that Federal account of the attack and the correspondence between Admiral Dahlgren and General Gillmore, as given in the latter's own book, establish that the assistance of the navy was constantly asked for and readily obtained, by the commander of the land forces operating against Charleston.

The defense of Battery Wagner, with the great difficulty of access to it and the paucity of our resources—while those of the enemy were almost unlimited—will bear a favorable comparison with any modern siege on record. But why, may it be asked, did General Gillmore, who blames his adversary for not having used "the curved fire" to check the Federals in their approaches to Wagner, wait until "toward the end of the siege of 'Fort' Wagner" before resorting to it himself, when it is known that to this fire, especially, was due the final abandonment of the battery? The answer is plain: Because General Gillmore was groping his way in the dark, and did so, day after day, for weeks before he eventually discovered the real advantage of the "curved fire." As it was, the last bombardment of Wagner began on the morning of the 5th of September, and lasted forty-two hours, during which were thrown by the Federal land batteries alone 1,663 rifle projectiles and 1,553 mortar shells. The total number of projectiles thrown by the land batteries against Fort Sumter, up to September 7th, was 6,451, and against Battery Wagner, from July 26th to September 7th, 9,875, making in all 16,326. And yet only Wagner was taken. Sumter, though a mass of ruins, remained ours to the last, and Charleston was evacuated by the Confederate troops near the close of the war, namely, on the 17th of February, 1865, and only to furnish additional men to the army in the field.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

* Paragraph 262, p. 130, of General Gillmore's book.

NOTES AND COMMENTS.

I.

A MISTAKE OF GENERAL BEAUREGARD.

THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW for May contains a paper on the "Defense of Charleston" by General G. T. Beauregard. The greater part of page 426 is devoted to the attack on the blockading force by the "two Confederate gun-boats (iron-clad rams)" called the "Palmetto State" and the "Chicora," on the morning of January 31, 1863. He says:

"The 'Palmetto State,' on board of which for the occasion was Commodore Ingraham himself, steamed out toward the Federal fleet, followed by the 'Chicora,' and fell upon and fired into the steamer 'Mercedita,' before the latter had realized the peril she was in. Disabled and reported to be sinking, the 'Mercedita' immediately surrendered. The 'Palmetto State' left her and went in pursuit of a second and a third Federal steamer, but was soon outdistanced by their superior speed. On the other hand, the 'Chicora' had not remained idle; she had set fire to a schooner-rigged propeller, engaged and crippled the 'Quaker City,' and ran into and fired the 'Keystone State,' which then and there struck her flag. *The other vessels composing the blockading squadron, seeing the fate of their consorts, and fearing the same one for themselves, hurriedly steamed out to sea and entirely disappeared. The entire harbor remained in the full possession of the Confederate rams. Not a Federal sail was visible, even with spy-glasses, for over twenty-four hours. It is, therefore, strictly correct to state that the blockade of the port of Charleston had been raised, for the time being, as was certified to by Commodore Ingraham, by the foreign consuls then in Charleston, and by myself.*"

These assertions require examination and correction.

The blockading force at that date consisted of the "Housatonic," "Mercedita," "Keystone State," "Quaker City," "Augusta," "Flag," "Ottawa," "Unadilla," "Memphis," and "Stettin." Of these the "Flag," "Ottawa," "Unadilla," and "Stettin" did not get into action, owing to their positions at the extremities of the long line. The "Mercedita," "Keystone State," "Quaker City," and "Memphis," were alone engaged until the arrival of the "Housatonic" and "Augusta," after all the damage that was done had been inflicted. The "Mercedita" was surrendered as stated. The "Keystone State" was seriously injured, and was at the mercy of the enemy; to prevent a greater loss of life than had already been suffered, the colors were hauled down. The enemy, though very near, made no attempt to take possession, but, according to the report of Commander Le Roy, continued to fire upon the disabled ship. That officer then ordered the colors to be rehoisted, and to re-

sume fire from the after battery. His loss was one officer and nineteen men killed and twenty wounded. The "Quaker City" was injured, but not disabled. No schooner-rigged propeller was set on fire, because there was no such vessel present.

This brings matters up to that point in General Beauregard's statement, where I have placed what follows in italics.

The "Augusta" and "Housatonic" now for the first moment suspected danger. Firing along the line was so common an occurrence that no apprehension was excited by the guns heard at this time. It was supposed that a number of vessels were attempting to run the blockade at the same time. But suspicion being aroused by the duration of the firing, both these vessels slipped their cables and ran under full steam *towards* the scene of action. The former soon opened fire, and the latter was run between her and her opponent which was then seen to be an iron-clad ram, bearing the Confederate flag, steering directly *towards the mouth of the harbor*, leaving all the vessels above named upon the ground of the conflict. The "Housatonic" was steered as close to the shore as the water would permit; fire was opened as soon as she got within range of the ram, and was continued as long as the latter, all the while retreating, continued in their range. We fired thirty-four shot and shells at her. She returned our fire, and her shells struck near us and beyond us, but none hit us. Never once did she deviate from the course she was steering when we first saw her, except that she gained time sufficiently to bring her stern gun to bear upon us.

Whilst the "Housatonic" was running down from her anchorage, a ram was seen to the westward, steering towards the harbor. She was discovered, in the early light of the morning, by her black smoke. She made no demonstration of coming towards us, or of wishing to attack us. I then believed, and I now believe, that she was inside of the outer shoals. We neither saw nor heard any more of her.

The firing having ceased by the withdrawal of the enemy, the battery was secured at eight o'clock A.M.

The "Keystone State" was sent to Port Royal in tow of the "Memphis;" and the "Augusta" was dispatched to the same place with information for Admiral Du Pont. The "Princess Royal," a captured blockade runner, was also sent to Port Royal about 9.30 A.M.

The "Quaker City" picked up her anchor in the course of the forenoon, and the "Unadilla" resumed her station inside of Rattlesnake Shoal, and remained there during the day. The "Housatonic" picked up her anchor in the course of the afternoon. The blockading vessels went to their usual stations after necessary communication with the senior officer, but most of them were kept under way to insure greater watchfulness, rendered necessary by the number being reduced by four. No vessel ran in or out of the port that day, nor was any attempt made to do so. As the haze diminished, the two rams were seen lying in Moffitt's Channel, close to the shore, some distance to the northward and eastward of Fort Moultrie. About five o'clock they went back into Charleston harbor, nor were they ever seen outside afterwards.

Commander Le Roy, in his extracts from the log-book of the "Keystone

State," after giving his reasons for rehoisting his colors and to resume firing, says :

"Now the enemy, either injured, or to avoid the squadron approaching, sheered off toward the harbor, exchanging shots with the "Housatonic," which vessel was in chase."

Lieut.-Commander Watmough in his report, after mentioning his taking the "Keystone State" in tow by the "Memphis," adds :

"It was apparent that both the iron-clads avoided a close action with the "Housatonic," and other heavily-armed vessels, and placed themselves prudently with the Swash Channel under their lee, as a safe retreat to port."

I think that the italicized portion of General Beauregard's statement, as quoted herein, may be regarded as incorrect in every particular. His proclamation alluded to therein was contradicted, officially, in the most positive terms by the several officers commanding the blockading vessels, as soon as it came to their notice. Their rejoinder is dated February 10, 1863, more than twenty-three years ago. It can be found with all other official documents bearing upon this question, in the "Report of the Secretary of the Navy for 1863," pages 163-180.

A few extracts from Confederate authorities will close this article.

The "Charleston Courier" of the 2d February, 1863, contains a statement, which, from internal evidence, must have been written by some person on board the "Chicora." After describing some alleged actions of that vessel, the writer proceeds to say :

"Discovering that the flag-boat had ceased firing, and was standing in shore, orders were given to follow her. On our return we came across a three-masted bark-rigged vessel which we engaged, firing our guns as we passed. We then kept on our way to the bay, having sustained no damage in the action, nor a single casualty on board. The last ship mentioned above kept firing at us until we got out of range, and we giving them our return compliments." ("Rebellion Record," vol. vi., page 415.)

The "Housatonic" was the only ship agreeing with the above description. There is no appearance of our running away in this account; and we were evidently left in possession of the field.

A book entitled "Recollections of a Naval Officer," written by Captain William Harmar Parker, who, at the time in question, was first lieutenant of the "Palmetto State" (see page 292 of said book), says that the statement accompanying the proclamation of General Beauregard and Commodore Ingraham, viz.: that "the British Consul and the commander of the British war-steamer 'Petrel' had previously gone five miles beyond the usual anchorage of the blockaders, and could see nothing of them with their glasses," was a "foolish statement."

Again, "as we entered the harbor the Federal vessels closed in and resumed the blockade."

And again, "as to the proclamation in regard to the blockade being broken, I looked upon it as *all bosh*. No vessels went out or came in during the day."

And, "I am constrained to say that this was a badly managed affair on our

part, and we did not make the best use of our opportunity." Pages 303 and 304 of said book.

The "Housatonic" opened fire at 7.08 A.M. and at 7.37 A.M. the ram was out of range, having crossed the bar. At 8.30 A.M. the rams anchored in Beach Channel, and at 5 P.M. they returned to Charleston harbor.

As I happened to be senior officer off Charleston at the time in question, I deem it a duty to correct the misrepresentations of General Beauregard in relation to this affair, in justice to the gallant officers and men whom I had the honor to command on that day.

WM. ROGERS TAYLOR,
Rear Admiral, U. S. N.

For the information of the non-professional reader, it seems proper to say that the blockading vessels, when getting under way in a hurry, always slipped their cables with a buoy attached to the inner end. In "picking up" their anchors, the buoy was grappled, the end of the cable hauled in and secured, and they were then in the same position as they were before slipping.

II.

GOLD AND SILVER MONEY.

If gold and silver of the same weight were always of the same value, then they could be safely coined by the State at will. But these, like other metals and all articles of trade, have a commercial value, independent of their uses as *money*—the superadded value being measured by the additional demand, the expense of coinage, and their artificial use as *money*, and no more. Governments, therefore, one or all combined, can no more fix—render permanent—the relative or absolute value of gold and silver money, than they can regulate the tides of the ocean. The idea of calling a congress of nations to establish the relative price of gold and silver *moneys* is therefore absurd. The value of the whole mass of gold and silver in the world is determined by the supply and demand, and the action of such a congress of nations by putting more or less silver or gold into the dollar is a *disturbing* factor, by the new and artificial demand, which at last would fluctuate again by the laws of trade, which would cause the melting down of coin whenever it fell in value to a certain degree below bullion. The ratio of silver to gold in France is 15½ of silver to one of gold; in the United States, 16 to one. Suppose the "congress" should attempt "to swing the par" and make the silver here and there the same, they would be as wise as if they should decree that wheat here should be the same in price as in France or England. This being the great producing nation of silver, and France being the seat of the fine arts, where silver is most used commercially, the true status of silver would be probably what it is now—freight, insurance, and profits to the carrier, and interest covering the one-half grain, as a unit of value, which silver holds in France over silver here.

It would be most desirable for the commerce of the world if gold and silver, as *money*, should remain the same in relative value, but this being impossible, the next best thing is to approximate stability. It is true that a single metal would accomplish this result, but the Constitution and laws have settled the ques-