

Remarks

by Gen. Beauregard, on Gen. Gillman's
Book relative to his attack on
Charleston S.C., during 1863.

12⁵ 7, 8, 9, 10 & 11 - Give a correct description of Charle-
ston harbor, & of its defenses before
& during the late war. But when
he says, page 19. "The strength of ^{the} ~~the~~
island works were tested by a
bold but unsuccessful assault
upon them by our forces under
Gen. Benham, on the 16th of June 1862
he is entirely misinforming his inter-
viewer to palliate his own inaction
during the late war. What had he
should have done, July 1862, instead of
from Beaufort to Morris Island?

The left flank of the line at-
tacked by Gen. Benham's Stearns
near Secessionville, was the only
strong point of the whole of that
line, still unfinished & designed
to be some 3 or 4 miles long. These com-
manders would have had little
trouble to overcome the obstacles
in their front, for then up the Stono
River as shown, the fight at Seces-

Sierraville, as named - was
lost by the inefficiency, timidity
& lack of tenacity of those two
Commanders. For their troops
brought with considerable im-
pulse & dash - getting at one
time inside of one of the salients
of the principal work.

p. 11 to 21 - are taken up with what the
writer calls "Plan of Operations"
which commenced by the descent
on the So. side of Morris Island, ~~the~~
July 9/63 -

2. Two unsuccessful attacks
on Fort (Baly) Wagner, July 11th & 18th

3. The Demolition of "Sumter" by
two bombardments: from 17th
to 23rd Aug^r, & from 27th Oct^r to
9th Nov^r 1863 -

4. The siege & reduction of Fort
(Batteries) Wagner & Gregg, ending
Sept^r 7/63 -

On p. 73, par. 27, is a lame ac-
count given of making a land attack
on Charleston, owing principally to our

Superiority of Nos & facilities for con-
 centrating our troops! Nothing of
 which statements is correct!
 Par. 28 & 29 show how necessary
 were the authorities he con-
 ferred with, but which he does not
 name.

On pages 16 & 17 is the brief
 synopsis of the plan of attack
 agreed upon:

- 1. Descent upon it to get possession
 of So. End of Morris Is. - which ^{was} ~~was~~
 being strongly fortified, as he assumed;
 for want of laborers to build it, troops
 to occupy it & guns to arm it with.
- 2. To lay siege to said end (Fort (Battery)
 Wagner, a heavily armed and thick
 of strong plan & relief, situated
 near the N. end of Morris Is.;
 & distant about 2,000 yds from
 Ft. Sumter. With Fort (Battery) W.,
 the work on possession of N. End of Morris Is.

In the 1st place, Wagner was not
 a fort, but a mere battery, to pre-
 vent an approach from the So. end
 of Morris Is. It had not a strong plan
 & relief when I arrived there, & had
 not even a bomb proof. but I saw.

= got somewhat its plan, gave it gradually
merchandise & added a bomb proof
traverse & merlon to it.

*but it never
was formidable!

It had only a few - some fine
races cannon added to sweep the
approach to it. It had ^{first} not at
all a single gun bearing on the sea,
or rather "water harbor". I had
a 32 pdr rifle, ^{gun} & two 18" inch Columbiads
added to its armament,
on the sea face of the work, & I
had the latter changed into a
closed battery, by having a
parapet thrown across its
"gorge", to prevent a surprise
via its rear.

3. "From the position then received
to demolish St. Simons, & afterwards
to operate with the fleet, when
it was ready to occur, by a
shanty party fire."

4. "The Monitor & Iron clads to
enter, remove the channel ob-
structions, pull the batteries on
"The City" & Sullivan's side, & render
them disposable!!"

p. 20. par. 48. Gives the aggregate man, according to Gen. Gillman, who is not always scrupulously accurate, for carrying on his offensive operations, ^{with} some 11,000 troops of all arms & an abundance of the latter -

p. 21. par. 51. Contradicts the plan - in 3 parts -
1. of the preliminary attack.
2. from Folly Isl. to Morrisred.
3. Advancing via the Stone -
cutting Chas. & Sas. R. R. at Lockshoro via the S. Bridge, to delay reinforcements from Sas. -
It is "false" that the demonstration up the Stone was a part of the game plan from M. Isl. to James. Nothing of the kind occurred, that I am aware of -

p. 22 to 37. Give the Discourt. report (Morris Isl. July 20/63 - which contains many exaggerations & false assertions, some of which I have marked in the book. The rec. in my Report of the Defense of M. Isl. being perfectly correct. I will not go further into the matter.

p. 40 to 42 Give the disastrous assault on
 Battery Wagner, July 1863 - which takes
 up only two pages. He says but
 little on the subject & avoids to
 give his losses. My "Report
 of Morris Is." is more full &
 correct.

p. 42 to 46 Give an exaggerated statement
 of the strength of Wagner & ob-
 tains the one come in its
 "Siege & bombardment of Ft.
 Sumter".

Battery Wagner, having de-
 fied some shelling & repulsed
^{two} assaults, ^{bloody} made with over-
 powering force, he exaggeratedly
 everything opposed to him to
 render his own success less
 praiseworthy. Admiral
 Dahlgren himself accuses
 him, further on, of lack of
 frankness & truth.

p. 52 to 55 Give interesting details relative to the
 progress of the siege & means of de-
 fence used by me.

p^s 7 to 69 Refer to arrangements made & orders given to batter down Fort Sumter whose garrison prevented the further progress of the Siege. On the 16th Capt. Stone's breaching batteries being ready the fire commenced on the 17th & was continued steadily through the day until the 23rd when the Siege operations were resumed. ^{gradually} i.e. from the 18th is more correct.

Par. 147. p. 61. gives a false statement of his demand ^{August 21st} for the surrender of the City of Charleston as may be seen in my "Review of the capture of Robert Adams & my correspondence with him" p. 312 of his book.

p^s 69 to 81. Final Bombardment & capture of Ft. Mifflin. This is a very interesting acc^t of that last act of the War. which, I think, ought to give an appendix with a few appropriate remarks. In p. 166-174 Mr. H. says, that he was informed about midnight of our flight, as he said. I must have been later, as my report states.

The evacuation was a very orderly
 one, & prepared long before hand.
 * Last day from 9h. P.M. on 6th to 1.30 P.M. on the 7th.
 The last 2000 men, as he says, we
 left, of course the same number, only one
 man too desperately wounded to be
 removed, & one deserter who in-
 formed the British at about
 1.30h. A.M. on the 7th, that we had
 left. Two of the last boats containing 19 Sa-
 & 24 soldiers, or 43 in all were captured.

Those boats had drifted away
 in the darkness, out of the line
 of retreat, & were captured by some
 of the enemy's picket boats.

In par. 167 p. 71 he says that
 18 pieces, nearly all large, were cap-
 tured in Wagon. This is entirely
false. The battery was piece
 only for 12 guns - only 3 of which
 were heavy pieces. They failed to
~~send~~ these & were put there by
 my order. For Gen. Buxton re-
 minded him to go guns in that
 direction, as they could not stand
 he said, the terrible fire of the fleet.
 These guns were 2-10 inch caliber.

* There were numbers of small arms, guns & but only
 3 were ever mounted - including a 32 lb. r. fl.

⊗ A
 new
 the
 of the
 Gen.

X. X. 6
 121

birds, & one 32rd rifled which burst after a few rounds. At ~~last~~ ~~the~~ ~~the~~ ~~the~~ was now replaced. The other 7 guns were, 32rd ^{or 32rd "the Minnie"} cannon, on the summit of the battery, (facing the approach from the South) & ~~from~~ its flanks. The remainder were: 6 field pieces & two, 8" 10^{lb} mortars; the latter being used as "columns" against the enemy's trenches (468).

4 of these seven were disabled by the terrible fire of the Federal land & naval batteries. Some of the 12^{lb} howitzers

In the next part is an outrageous piece of exaggeration, where he says that Fort Wagner was a "work of the most formidable character" & was an ordinary field battery, strengthened as the enemy advanced on it. But was never formidable! Its bomb proof could not hold over 800 men crowded together. The whole force on the island of the fort did not exceed 900, if my memory serves me correctly, of whom about 500 were the latter part of the 54th in Wagner.

Par. 173 & 174, p. 77, refer to the assault on Fort Sumter, already given.

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full in my "Memoranda Report"
& referred to also in my "Memoranda"

Sept. 11



11
"Errors in Enemy's Defence"

p. 125 to 133.

This is an important Chapter which requires special attention, altho' nearly all the points referred to in it have been individually met in my Report of the Prisoner's Defence written long before I had any knowledge of Gen. G's book.

Par. 234 - The location of Party Wagner was made by Gen. Wheeler in 1862 before I reached Charleston, & for want of time & labor, I made changes & modified the plan, increased the thickness of its parapets, & put a heavy gun on its sea face. I subsequently added a large bomb proof turret, heavy traverses between its guns & closed its "gaps" to make it a ⁴⁷perfectly enclosed work. All this

* Reported upon
& approved.

was done gradually, as labor could be temporarily procured or spare guns & material, which was considered by me of much greater importance than Morris Isl. - Gen. G's remarks in

the final result
showed that it
was correct.

"Report" of that defence, they were "a revelation to a com-⁴⁸mander."

Moreover, at that time, what
 had occurred to Fort Pulaski
 near Savannah, was no guide for
 the position; for the beaching
 batteries there, had been located
 at 1,650 yds (p. 116. par 234) whereas
 Battery Wagner was placed at 2,600
 yds from Fort Mifflin, & the near-
 est beaching batteries against
 the latter were ^{at a distance of} 1,475 yds from
 it. (p. 116. par 234) -

Par. 235. It is entirely true that this was
 a grave error, attributed by Gen. G.
 L. Long to Gen. R. Lee. But I know
 it was done by order of G. L. P. The
 remarks of Gen. G. on the subject
 are perfectly correct. There is
 gross error, however, in his cri-
 ticism - par. 235. 6 & 7 - about the
 proper location of the batteries for
 the defence of Morris Is. I do not
 see why they could have been
 what was necessary for the effec-
 tual defence, provided they had
 had the unlimited resources
 in men, materials & guns of the

U.S. to back him - but our limited resources of all kinds compelled ^{us} to resort only to those few ^{means} places, which were most needed. If we had put a heavy weight at the South ^{or middle} end of the Island, we would have had no heavy guns with which to arm it, & no strong garrison to hold it. Moreover, a suff. force on the S. end would have been indispensable to defend it against an enterprising enemy who would have landed a superior force between West Battery & Crown Point, which could easily have been done from the N. harbor, which was generally smooth, with a magnificent beach several miles long. The "proper & perfect" objection for Mr. S. given in par. 206, is, to say the least, perfectly ridiculous! How could three two mill. weights have resisted, long, the powerful bombardment of the fleet & land batteries that would have been put on the S. end of the Island?

Moreover, while being bombarded
unprotected by any land force,
they could easily have been
stormed by a force landed at
night in their rear & the de-
tached batteries would have
fallen necessarily.

The ^(as I think) four ^{of} batteries in position
South of Battery Wagner, were only
armed with one or two 24 & 32
p. guns, to keep off the enemy's
reconnoitering parties - but were
not meant for manual defence;
they were sitting too far for any such
purpose - In reality they were mud batteries.

As to the use of detached batteries
of a few guns each, I had used
that system on Morris & Sullivan
island in the Spring of
1861 - to prevent the Federal from
relieving or reinforcing Fort Sumter.

As there is no want of means of par-
tying - that a wise defence would
have kept us off Morris Isl, ^{entirely}
as the simplest & least expensive
method of solving the problem, I

* Secy
Report
p. 11-5-

I can assure him that, if I had
 had proper means at my dis-
 posal, when I first arrived at
 Charleston, or even later, I would
 not have experienced much dif-
 ficulty in doing that. But with
 our small resources in men
 guns etc, I had to do what I
 thought most pressing, &
 to go on the supposition that
 my adversary had sense enough
 to know that the possession of
 James Is^l would be mortal
 to Charleston, whereas that of
 Morris Is^l might give him
 J. Sumter, but not necessarily
 the river harbor, as the result
 proved. All that he could do
 about the capture of that fort
 "being in their view" he did
 to the "good enough to say
 to the natives" but he did
 object of all these movements
 preparation & expenditure
 of the Govt of the U.S. was the
 taking of Charleston! The
 possession of J. Sumter was
 merely an incident in the

* See my Memoirs of
 the Rev. J. S. Sumter, Vol.
 1. No. 5. So. Mag.

Grand Spanna about to be per-
formed. Even if determined
upon in Washington, when
he arrived in the locality he
sh. have seen the real & fatal
p. of attack, if he had had
the ability required on such
an occasion.) The failure

of the attack on James Bell,
the year before, by Gen. Benton
I believe, was no good reason
for not trying it again in
1853. For:

1st, The point of attack had
been strongly selected. Gen. Benton
chose that of Secessionville,
which was the strongest part
of the line, ^{the} only one well gar-
risoned. The rest of the line
about 8 mi. long, was but feebly
guarded & poorly supplied
with men.

2^d. The question was in the hands
very much greater than when
Gen. Madsen's attack. I had
only 11000 men on land, & when

15000 - 15000 - 15000

always and

about 8,000 men were required
 (consult ^{1st part of} my "Minisota" Report)
 It would be a less "humili-
 ating spectacle" (see par. 255)
 to see Gen. G. admit that he
 had committed a grave er-
 ror in trying to do Fort Pulaski
 over again, than to show up the
 supposed errors of his adver-
 sary - or "voir dans l'œil deson
 vision", "la posture qui est dans
 le sien" -

b. 128 par 239 - This pm. contains a criticism
 of Gen. Gillmore which shows that
 he did not understand the situation
 of the defenders. ^{1st} Notices were
 made as long as found judi-
 cious but each one cost many
 lives to the Army who had none
 to spare, without effecting
 much damage to the Forts,
 or so limited a good. Moreover,
 when they arrived close to the
 Battery there was danger of
 their pushing "pell-mell" into
 it with the artillery, especial-
 ly when most of the Garrison

had to be ^{kept} ~~kept~~ sheltered from the constant bombardment by the ^{General} ~~General~~. The torpedoes ^{offered} ~~offered~~ the garrison some respite from that terrible fire & enabled it to be fresh & ready for any assault which might be undertaken.

2^d "Canned fire" was not used more largely for the same reason that ^{Jack} ~~Jack~~ did not get his supply because he had none long before the occupation (by Gen. G. W. G.) of the South of Mobile by the ^{General} ~~General~~. I had no means to get all the guns & mortars I could collect from Rich- & Mobile, but I obtained only a few. Soon after the landing, I tried to get some "cannon" also, but not one could be had in the City, & none could be made in Rich because the foundry was too busy making the most excellent ^{guns} ~~guns~~ for the Dept. of the Army. Hence I did the best that I could with the few mortars that I had.

Answers of Secy of War of April 23/63
"Desires to be admitted to space the guns
"was for the equal treatment." The claim
"of Williams for the Mississippi are ours
"the guns of the Government"

* Aug. 2^d See Morris
2^d Report

Distributing them to the best ad-
 vantage in the diff. batteries
 bearing on Morris Isd. beyond
 Wagner. As were in the latter
 work at one time, but as the
 Federals approached closer
 they could not be used to ad-
 vantage as "Cochrons" & were
 removed to some of the flank-
 ing batteries on James Isd.
 from battery "Cheris" to Success
 cille, to which had been trans-
 ferred also, some of those in front,
 after the latter was reduced
 to a ruin & the "Orade" was
 no longer tenable, & was dug
 up for earth with which to
 construct our "Parasites" & "pa-
 radises":

The two mortars & a few of the
 12 p^o mortars in Wagner were
 used as "Cochrons" with very re-
 sulted charges & great elevation, but
 with imperfect results. However, un-
 til the inside of the work became
 untenable by the infernal fire
 of the land & naval batteries &
 vertical fires of the enemy.

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Gen. G. appears to think that
all the Conf. Com^{rs} had to do
was to ask for men, guns & ma-
terials of various kinds which
them furnished by the earliest
train! When I met some per-
sons with the Bull. Sept. & Chair
of the House Mil. Com^{rs} show
that no efforts were spared to
procure many things absolu-
tely needed for the Defense, but
it was necessary I met with
the answer, that with the best
wishes to comply with
my requisitions it could not
be done. I have already stated
that we had to stop, the firing
for weeks above the city the
siege of Charleston, the firing of
such guns as we had, the want
of powder & shot. I had also
to improvise machinery, & to
repair my mortar & 20 lb. howitzers.
From the attack of the S. part,
on Sumter, we could not get
a sufficient quantity of heavy & rifled guns

from Richmond. I suppose that
 Mr. G. having made his re-
 quisitions, perhaps ordered
 red-tape, would have folded
 his arms, & said: "after that
 the Devil's! In critique as usual,
 mais l'art est difficile!"

This assertion in Jan 262. p. 130
 that he could have pushed his
 approaches to Battery Wagner
 without the co-operation of
 the gun-boats, is both ungru-
 nous & untrue - a close reading
 of his own acc^t of the attack
 shows this. & I have no doubt
 that the Report of ad. Col. ^{Wagner}
 would prove it conclusively.

I say it, boldly & fearlessly,
 that the defence of Battery Wagner
 not taking into our consideration
 the difficulty of access to it,
 the paucity of our resources
 while that of the enemy was
 unlimited - will bear a most
 favorable comparison with
 any modern siege we read!
 particularly when we consider
 that the gallant Officers & Men

^{of the garrison}
 since all "Volunteers" & but one
 Col. D. B. Harris ~~but~~ ^{beside} the Gen. Comd.
 had received a Phil. education.
 Gen. Gilmer, Ch. Eng., C. S. A., arrived
 at Charleston too late, about the 20th of Aug.
 to be of much weight in that re-
 markable defence - altho he was
 of some service in inspiring ad-
 vidual confidence to the garriso-
 ners of Ft. Sumter & Fort Wagner.
 But we may ask, why, Gen. Gil-
 mer, U. S. A., with all the resources
 of the Federal Govt. to back him,
 waited until the ^{"top"} of the siege
 of Fort Wagner before he resorted
 to that "summed up" which finally
 caused the evacuation of
 that battery? Because, I suppose,
 he was groping his way in the
 dark, before he drew that con-
 clusion - & yet he has the auda-
 city of sailing at his adversary
 for not resisting that kind
 of fire to check the Federal in
 their approaches to Wagner.

Remarks
by Gen. Beauregard on Gen. L.
Willmore's Report - Continued.

July 27th p. 146 & 7. The final bombardment of Wagner
commenced on morning of Sep. 5th
& lasted 12 hrs., during which were
thrown by the land batteries, ex-
clusive of the naval ones, 1663
rifle projectiles & 1,553 mortar shells,
a most terrible fire. The result
was given in par. 3 & 4 p. 146.
The total no. of projectiles thrown
by the land batteries against Sumter
up to Sep. 1st, was 6,457; and against
Wagner, from Sep. 6th to Sep. 17th,
was 9,875; making a total of
16,326. *None but Wagner was taken.

Toposes part. infernal of Wagner.

p. 233

This gives a correct description of
the three kinds of torpedoes used by
us in front of Wagner, which were
found very efficacious. They were
served as the "watch dogs" of the
batteries holding the battery on Bay
& giving timely notice of the approach
of an attacking force.

Number of shells
at Wagner
and Sumter.

Aug 21st
p. 321 to 349

One important telegrams & letters between Gen. Gillmore & Ad^l Sublgreen relative to their intended operations against Wagner & Gregg & the attempt of the Ad^l to remove the Channel Obstructions to enter the Harbor of Charleston. It has been succeeded. I believe that he would never have gotten out again except as a prisoner. Altho in Sep^r our interior line of defense was in an incomplete state. That correspondence is worth a careful perusal.

The reports about the attacks on Gregg & Wagner were intercepted by us, & we acted accordingly.

Supplementary Report

p. 8 to 8.

Is a correct description of Fort Sumter when evacuated by the Confederates, in July 1865. but not one word of praise is given them by the reporting the Report or the Gen^l Comd^r!

p. 25 to 33

Is quite a correct description of the channel obstructions in Charleston Harbor.

Aug 19 - 6.45 P.M.
p. 81

"Despatch intercepted. The Ad^l is going to try Sumter & will be back quick as he can. He got in?"

In Supplemental Report

From
July 9th p. 101
to
Oct. 1st p. 110

Journal of the Defence of Fort Sumter being extracts from my papers stolen in Ga. after the war. One telegram rec^d at my Ft. Sumter from Gov Sumter, during the important period, from the landing of the Federals on the South End of Morris Island until after its occupation by us Sep^r 7/63.

From
July 10th p. 111
to
" 20th " 118

Refers to landing on S. end of M. Isl^d & assaults of the 11th & 18th on Ft. Wagner as observed at Ft. Sumter.

From
Aug. 17th p. 76
to
" 23rd p. 91

Was the severe bombardment of Ft. Sumter, to destroy its Artillery, & to enable the Enemy to advance with their saps (approaches) on Wagner.

189th p. 81. Dispatch of Gen. S. relative to intention of Gen. S. was intercepted.

which could not otherwise have made much progress - especially ^{also} for prevention of another assault. (See Book p. 5, 14, 6 & 7.)

Aug. 21st =
p. 86

The Enemy having established his "marsh battery" (Swamp Angel) in the marshes, W. of M. Isl^d, demanded the Surrender of Wagner & Sumter, otherwise w^o open fire on the City - giving 4 hours for an answer & for women & children to leave that City. The correspondence bet^h W. & G. is given on p. 312 of Book -

Aug. 31. p. 97 - Harbor Str. "Sumter", while coming from the
Isle with troops, was fired upon by batteries
on Sullivan's Id. & sunk. Killing 4 & drowning se-
veral. Some 600 soldiers ^{were} saved by small
boats from Sumter & Conf. Ironclad.

From
Sep. 1. p. 99
" 12. " 110

Refer to preparations for evacuation
of Morris Id. - night of 6th, completed at
1.30 A.M. on 7th p. 106. On the night
of the 3rd an assault was attempted
by a flank movement on Patz Grey
but failed. The party came by local ^{and light} H. Id.

Sep. 7th p. 107

Ad. D. Sullivan demanded the surren-
der of Ft. Sumter which was refused by
Gen. Com. of Sept.

" 9th - 7th A.M.
p. 109

The ^{naval} attack on Ft. S., by boats, containing
some 500 men was made, which lasted
only some ^{15 to} 30 minutes. Our loss being
125 killed, 1 wounded & taken, besides several
colors, & a large U.S. flag captured & the hat of Maj. Anderson.

" 3rd p.m. p. 104

Gen. Gilmer & Col. Harris visited Ft. S.
& Morris Id.

" 4th " 103
" 106

Gen. Steph. Elliott received Col. Alg.
Rhett of the Com. of Ft. Sumter.

See also p. 118 - for letter of Gen. S.E. #.

whose statement
is correct as to our
condition at the time.

The rest of the despatches to Sanz 21/64 p. 166
is interesting but offers nothing salient.

A condensed statement of condition
of Battery Wagner & Gregg, from July 14 -
to Sep 7/63, compiled by Lt. Fulcott, of Federal.

p. 167 to 172. This may be correct, but sh. be looked
into. It is valuable as referred. The
force given as being on Memorial &
the ornaments of these two batteries
appear to me as overstated.

July 23 p. 167 - The force & arm. given him by Gen.
Hagood is doubtless correct. At that
time the force was at its full com-
plement -

Aug. 22 p. 170 - Since a list of arm. of Battery Wagner
(on the 21st) which I have no doubt
is incorrect for the battery had only
11 embrasures, I think, & many of
the guns were disabled by that
time & not renewed because the
fire was too intense for instance
the 10 inch Col., & the 32 pdr rifled
(which I think exploded) - This last
was replaced, I think, by a 32 pdr
smooth bore, from some other battery.
It may well be imagined that
under such a terrible fire of
the heaviest artillery & artillery fire
no arm. could remain long un-

See plan of Battery
Wagner p. 76
of Book

See p. 146 & 147 of the
of shots fired against
Wagner, by Landlot
troops alone, from
July 26 to Sep 1, was
2,875 - including the
was 3,216!

inferred I am sure that about
Sep 1st very few guns were
serviceable & I cannot under-
stand why as many as 204 Ar-
tillerists sh^d have been kept
there - ~~And~~ I am sure that
about that period I ordered the
total force to be reduced to 1,000
in all, & not long after to 900 -

I believe that Col. Keith, shortly
before the evacuation, reported
only 700 men in Wagner -

It w^d be well to compare those
statements of Gilmore with
my "Morris Des^o Report"

Gen. G. tries to make the arm^t of
Wagner as large as possible to exalt his
achievement, but, even admitting that
statement as correct, that com^o com-
pared to his own was like a battery
of "pop-guns" to one of field-pieces, five
times as numerous!

p. 172

Gen. G's concluding paragraph is
the most remarkable of all his mis-
statements - to wit: The total force

under Gen. B.'s command did not vary
 much from 2500 men, so located
 that they could all be concentrated at
 Charleston, in a few hours notice. From
 1,500 to 700 men were kept in & near
 the work defending Charleston. A
 most embarrassing collection of lies!

My "Morris's Sol. Report" shows
 that, on July 10th, when Gen. G. made
 his abortive attack on Morris Is. I had,
 in the whole State of S. C., 3,461 Suffs, of which
 only 2,462 in the Dist. of Charleston, compris-
 ing of the City, James, Morris, Sullivan & Sol. Is.
 & Christ Church parishes. In the State of
 Ga. I had only 1,745 Suffs, or in both States
5,206 Suffs as a matter of course, only
 any few of these could be moved away
 any distance from their proper Station,
 which would, otherwise, have been
 left defenceless. We had but few
 light batteries, & the heavy Artillery
 could not be taken away from their
 Station any batteries. The Cavalry
 was scattered all along the Coasts
 of S. C. & Ga. & would have been of
 but little service in the defence of
 the Islands about Charleston.

When Morris Is. was attacked, July 10th

I had only 672 Infy there, 1184 on James Is. - guarding lines on S. M^s long - 204 on Sullivan's Is^d, & 462 in Charleston. Making the 2462 already stated.

During July & August 1862 a permanent addition of ^{depleted} ~~4~~ ¹⁰ regts (Clingman's, Colquhoun's, Hargood's & ^{Evans}) amounting to about 6000 men of whom Evans ^{brigade} was sent to Georgia to some demonstrations against the

6000 Infy
1200
3000 men

State, & Clingman's was sent to Sullivan's Is^d & West Church parish. So that only some 2,600 men of those reinforcements were sent to James Is^d & Morris Is^d, which added to their former forces, made the ^{new} ~~total~~ ^{total} of 5396 of which

1184 - James Is^d
672 - M. Is^d
3,600
5396

very few were available. Of this force we generally had from 2000 to 2200 men on Morris Island. & they were ^{habitually} ~~generally~~ renewed every 3 or 4 days, at the rate of some 300 or 400 per night when the Federal Gov permitted our Harbor Stations to get to Cummings's Pt. Landing.