Reports of the battle of Murfreesboro Dec. 30, 1862--Jan. 2, 63

1. William S. Rosecrans
2. George H. Thomas
3. Joseph B. Dodge
4. Braxton Bragg
5. Patrick R. Cleburne
6. Leonidas Polk


1. William S. Rosecrans
O.R.-- SERIES I--VOL. XX/1 [S# 29] DEC. 26, 1862-JAN. 5, 1863.--The Stone's River or Murfreesborough, Tenn., Campaign. No. 2.--Reports of Maj. Gen. William S. Rosecrans, U.S. Army, commanding Army of the Cumberland, with congratulatory resolutions, orders, &c.

<ar29_183>
LA VERGNE, TENN., December 28,
By messenger to Louisville, Ky., December 31, 1862--noon.
Our advance was delayed one day. The right wing, under McCook, drove Hardee's skirmishers 18 miles down the Nolensville pike, and advanced on Triune for battle. A heavy fog delayed this advance, and gave Hardee time to escape toward Murfreesborough. Our left wing drove the enemy on the main Murfreesborough turnpike with heavy skirmishing, and seized all the bridges over Stewart's Creek last night, by dark. Our total loss on both lines does not exceed 20 killed, 100 wounded, and 10 missing. We have some 50 prisoners. Our center crossed from Nolensville yesterday and to-day, and now occupy the north side of Stewart's Creek, 10 miles from Murfreesborough--the right at Triune. Pursuing division went 7 miles toward Shelbyville. We have report from Murfreesborough to 10 o'clock yesterday. All his right wing, closed in, came toward Stewart's Creek. If, under Kentucky and Tennessee influence or orders, they fight as they propose, I think we are in position, by God's help, to win, and McCook will cut off their retreat.
 W. S. ROSECRANS, Major-general.
 Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief.
-----
GENERAL ORDERS No. --.
HDQRS. DEPT. OF THE CUMBERLAND, In front of Murfreesborough, December 31, 1862.
The general commanding desires to say to the soldiers of the Army of the Cumberland that he was well pleased with their conduct yesterday; it is all he could have wished for; he neither saw nor heard of any skulking; they behaved with the coolness and gallantry of veterans. He now feels perfectly confident, with God's grace and their help, of striking this day a blow for the country the most crushing, perhaps, which the rebellion has yet sustained.
Soldiers, the eyes of the whole nation are upon you; the very fate of the nation may be said to hang on the issue of this day's battle. Be true, then, to yourselves, true to your own manly character and soldierly reputation, true to the love of your dear ones at home, whose prayers ascend to God this day for your success.
Be cool? I need not ask you to be brave. Keep ranks. Do not throw away your fire. Fire slowly, deliberately; above all, fire low, and be always sure of your aim. Close steadily in upon the enemy, and, when you get within charging distance, rush on him with the bayonet. Do this, and the victory will certainly be yours. Recollect that there are hardly any troops in the world that will stand a bayonet charge, and that those who make it, therefore, are sure to win.
By cornmand of Maj. Gen. W. S. Rosecrans:
 J.P. GARESCHE, Assistant Adjutant-General and Chief of Staff.
 <ar29_184>
MURFREESBOROUGH, TENN., January 3, 1863.
On December 26 we moved from Nashville in three columns. Me. Cook's corps by Nolensville pike; Thomas' from its encampment on Franklin pike, via Wilson pike; Crittenden's on main Murfreesborough pike. The left and center met with a strong resistance, such as the nature of the country permits--rolling or hilly routes, skirted by cedar thickets, farms, and intersected by small streams, with rocky bluff banks, forming serious obstacles. McCook drove Hardee's corps 1½ miles from Nolensville, and occupied the place. Crittenden reached within 1½ miles of LaVergne. Thomas reached the Wilson pike, meeting with no serious opposition. On the 27th, McCook drove Hardee from Nolensville, and pushed reconnoitering division 6 miles toward Shelbyville, and found Hardee had retreated toward Murfreesborough. Crittenden fought and drove the enemy before him, occupying the line of Stewart's Creek, capturing some prisoners, with slight loss. Thomas occupied the vicinity of Nolensville. On the 28th, McCook completed his reconnaissance on Hardee's movements. Crittenden remained, awaiting the result and bringing up trains. Thomas moved on to Stewart's Creek. On the 29th, McCook moved into Wilkinson's CrossRoads, 7 miles from Murfreesborough, the end of a short pike, the road rough, through rolling country, skirted by bluffs, covered with dense cedar thickets, tops open timber. Crittenden pushed the enemy rapidly, saved all the bridges, and reached a point within 3 miles of Mur-freesborough, his advance driving all their outposts to within sight of town. Thomas, with two divisions, closed up with Crittenden, and took position on the right. On the 30th, McCook advanced on Wilkinson pike, having to make his way through dense woods, meeting with a determined resistance. Got into position 3 miles from Murfreesborough, occupying the extreme right of our line. The left stood fast; the center advanced slightly, and were engaged in cutting roads through an almost impenetrable growth of cedars, which separated them from our right, rendering communication with them exceedingly difficult. The combat and the roughness of the country had brought forward McCook's right division, so as to face strongly to the southeast, instead of being refused to face south, with the reserve division, between the center and right, and sufficiently from the rear to support, and, if necessary, to extend it, the grave consequences of which were developed the next day. The 31st found our left crossing Murfreesborough pike and railroad., one division front, one forming crotchet on Stone's River, and one in reserve. Center, Negley between left and right; Rousseau in reserve. The plan of the battle was to open on the right and engage enemy sufficiently to hold him firmly, and to cross the river with our left, consisting of three divisions, to oppose which they had but two divisions, the country being favorable to an attack from that part of the town. But the enemy attacked the whole front of our right wing, massing his forces on its right flank, which was partially surprised, thrown into confusion, and driven back. Sheridan's division repulsed the enemy four times, protected the flanks of the center, which not only held its own, but advanced until this untoward event compelled me to retain the left wing to support the right, until it should be rallied and assume a new position. [January] 1, the rebels opened by an attack on us, and were again repulsed. On the 2d, skirmishing along the front, with warm threats of attack, until about 3 o'clock in the afternoon. Evening, advanced one small division thrown across Stone's River, to occupy commanding ground. While reconnoitering the ground occupied by this division, which had no artillery, I saw heavy forces emerging <ar29_185> from the woods and advancing in line of battle, three lines deep. They drove our little division before them, after a sharp contest, in which we lost 70 or 80 killed, and 375 wounded; but they were repulsed by Negley's division and the remaining troops of the left wing, headed by Morton's Pioneer Brigade, and fled far over the field and beyond their intrenchments, their officers rallying them with great difficulty. They lost heavily. We occupied the ground with the left wing last night. The lines were completed at 4 o'clock this morning. The 3d was spent in bringing up and distributing provisions and ammunition. It has been raining all day; ground very heavy. Tomorrow, being Sunday, we shall probably not fight, unless attacked. This whole country is a natural fortification, and worse than Corinth. No great battle can be fought without regular approaches. Our total loss in wounded, up to this date, is 4,500; killed, 700 or 800. Our communication with Nashville is open. We have provisions there to last to the 25th instant. Further report by letter as soon as I can get an opportunity.
 W. S. ROSECRANS, Major-General, Commanding.
 H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief.
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CAMP NEAR MURFREESBOROUGH, TENN.,
January 4, [1863.]
Following my dispatch of last evening, I have to announce that the enemy is in full retreat. They left last night. Rain having raised the river, and the bridge across it, between the left wing and center, being incomplete, I deemed it prudent to withdraw that wing during the night. This occupied my time until 4 o'clock, and fatigued the troops. The commencement of the retreat was known to me at 7 o'clock this morning. Our ammunition train arrived during the night. To.day was occupied in distributing ammunition, bringing in the dead, and collecting arms from the field of battle. The pursuit was commenced by the center, the two leading brigades arriving at the west side of Stone's River this evening. The railroad bridge was saved, but in what condition is not known. We shall occupy the town and push the pursuit to-morrow with the center. Will not, probably, be prudent to advance the army very far until communication shall be open to Nashville. We labor under great disadvantages from the inferior number of our cavalry, necessitating large detachments of infantry to guard our trains. Our medical director estimates the wounded in hospital at short of 5,500 wounded, and our dead at 1,000. We have to deplore the loss of Lieutenant-Colonel Garesche, whose capacity and gentlemanly deportment had already endeared him to all the officers of this command, and whose gallantry on the field of battle excited their admiration.
 W. S. ROSECRANS, Major-General.
 Maj. Gen. H. W. HALECK, General-in-Chief.
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MURFREESBOROUGH, January 5, 1863--4.30 a.m.
God has crowned our arms with victory. The enemy are badly beaten, and in full retreat. We shall press them as rapidly as our means of <ar29_186> traveling and subsistence will permit. Will you please ask the President to have Captain Morton, engineer, made brigadier-general? He has distinguished himself in the fortification and defense of Nashville, after our army left for Kentucky. He has organized a Pioneer Corps of 1,700 picked men, which he now commands, with the rank of captain, and behaved like a hero during the whole battle of Stone's River. He not only deserves the promotion, but it is absolutely necessary to the interest of the service that he should have the rank to command his brigade.
 W. S. ROSECRANS, Major-General.
 Hon. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War.
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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND, Via Nashville, Tenn., January 5, 1863.
We have fought one of the greatest battles of the war, and are victorious. Our entire success on the 31st was prevented by a surprise of the right flank; but have, nevertheless, beaten the enemy, after a three-days' battle. They fled with great precipitancy on Saturday night. The last of their columns of cavalry left this morning. Their loss has been very heavy. Generals Rains and Hanson killed. Chalmers, Adams, and Breckinridge are wounded.
 W. S. ROSECRANS, Major-General.
 H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief.
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EXECUTIVE MANSION, Washington, January 5, 1863.
 Maj. Gen. W. S. ROSECRANS, Murfreesborough, Tenn.:
Your dispatch announcing retreat of enemy has just reached here. God bless you, and all with you! Please tender to all, and accept for yourself, the nation's gratitude for your and their skill, endurance, and dauntless courage.
 A. LINCOLN.
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MURFREESBOROUGH, TENN., January 8, [1863.]
Did not have up trains before close of battle. Bringing up subsistence rapidly. Will have railroad completed here in a few days. Rebels had eight divisions of infantry. Seven have gone by Manchester and one by Shelbyville. Their prisoners and doctors estimate their loss at from 13,000 to 15,000 men. The weight of testimony warrants these figures. Glad to hear of batteries coming. To secure our long lines of communication requires a large force. To fight and maneuver in these regions of roads, ravines, cedar thickets and mountains, against a determined defensive policy, with certainty of success, demand the same. The Cumberland River is now navigable.
 W. S. ROSECRANS, Major-General.
 Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief.
 <ar29_187>
WAR DEPARTMENT, Washington, January 9, 1863--1.05 p.m.
 Maj. Gen. W S. ROSECRANS, Commanding Army of the Cumberland:
GENERAL: Rebel accounts fully confirm your telegrams from the battle-field. The victory was well earned and one of the most brilliant of the war. You and your brave army have won the gratitude of your country and the admiration of the world. The field of Murfreesborough is made historical, and future generations will point out the places where so many heroes fell, gloriously, in defense of the Constitution and the Union. All honor to the Army of the Cumberland--thanks to the living and tears for the lamented dead.
 H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief.
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GENERAL ORDERS No. 7.
HDQRS. DEPT. OF THE CUMBERLAND, Murfreesborough, Tenn., January 31, 1863.
The following resolutions of the General Assembly of the State of Ohio have been received, and, in accordance with the request contained therein, are published to this army:
JOINT RESOLUTIONS RELATIVE TO A VOTE OF THANKS TO MAJOR-GENERAL ROSECRANS.
Resolved by the General Assembly of the State of Ohio, That the thanks of this General Assembly are hereby tendered to Major-General Rosecrans, staff, officers, and the brave men under their command, for the glorious victory resulting in the capture of Murfreesborough and the defeat of the rebel forces at that place.
Resolved, That the sympathies of the General Assembly are extended to the families of the brave and noble patriots that have fallen in defense of freedom and constitutional liberty, and that their memories will ever be cherished by a grateful people.
Resolved, That the Governor be requested to forward a copy of the foregoing resolutions to General Rosecrans, with the request that they be read to his command.
 JAMES R. HUBBELL, Speaker of the House of Representatives.
 P. HITCHCOCK, Pro Tem. President of the Senate.
By command of Major-General Rosecrans:
 C. GODDARD, Assistant Adjutant-General and Chief of Staff.
-----
MURFREESBOROUGH, TENN., February 9, 1863.
We have now all the reports of the subordinate commanders and staff officers. Will have my report of the battle sent forward in a few days. Some facts in it are worth stating in advance. We have prisoners from one hundred and thirty-one regiments of infantry, twelve battalions of sharpshooters, twenty-three batteries of artillery, and fifty-three regiments of cavalry, giving their fighting force at what all our officers consider a low estimate, near 46,000 infantry, 1,200 sharpshooters, 1,800 artillery, and 13,200 cavalry. Total, 62,000 men. We fought them with 42,000. We hit 165 to their 100. Their loss was 23½, ours 21, per cent. of the fighting force. These figures are significant.
Yours, very respectfully,
 W. S. ROSECRANS, Major-General, Commanding.
 Maj Gen. H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief.
 <ar29_188>
 MURFREESBOROUGH, TENN., February 11, 1863--11.30 p.m.
Capt. Elmer Otis, Fourth Cavalry, in the recent battle, with 400 men charged the enemy, recaptured 300 prisoners, and greatly distinguished himself. By their consent, and at their request, he is commanding a brigade of three regiments, each with a colonel. I earnestly urge his appointment as brigadier-general, in order that he may continue to command, as cavalry officers are greatly needed.
 W. S. ROSECRANS, Major-General.
Hon. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War.
-----
GENERAL ORDERS No. 20.
HDQRS. DEPT. OF THE CUMBERLAND, Murfreesborough, Tenn., February 15, 1863.
The following resolutions of the General Assembly of the State of Indiana having been received, are published to this army, in accordance with the request contained therein:
Resolved by the senate (the house concurring), That the thanks of this General Assembly are hereby tendered to Major-General Rosecrans, and the officers and soldiers under his command, for the well-earned victory of Murfreesborough, Tenn. That they, one and all, merit the lasting gratitude of the nation and the admiration of the world.
Resolved, That the patriotic earnestness, skill, sleepless vigilance, and pertinacity displayed by the commanding general in his advance upon the enemy, his plan of battle, and especially in promptly meeting the exigencies of its varying fortunes, prove that he was "the right man in the right place;" that the hearty and prompt co-operation, the gallantry and skill of his division and other commanders, the ready obedience, unyielding and hardy courage of the soldiers are worthy of the highest commendation.
Resolved, That the Army of the Cumberland, Murfreesborough, and the name of each fallen and surviving patriot soldier who took part in the perilous struggle, are forever linked together in historic renown, and Indiana will preserve, and gratefully cherish, their memory to the latest generation, as among the brightest jewels of an undivided republic.
Resolved, That the secretary of the senate be directed to forward a copy of these resolutions to Major-General Rosecrans, with the request that they be read at the head of each regiment taking part in the great battle, if consistent with the rules of military propriety and discipline.
We hereby certify that the accompanying resolutions unanimously passed both branches of the General Assembly of the State of Indiana.
PARIS C. DUNNING, President of Senate.
SAM. H. BUSKIRK, Speaker of House of Representatives.
JAMES H. VAWTER, Secretary of Senate.
A. T. WHITLESEY, Clerk of House of Representatives.
By command of Major-General Rosecrans:
 C. GODDARD, Assistant Adjutant-General and Chief of Staff.
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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND, Murfreesborough, Tenn., February 12, 1863.
GENERAL: As the sub-reports are now nearly all in, I have the honor to submit, for the information of the General-in-Chief, the subjoined report, with accompanying sub-reports, maps, and statistical tables of the <ar29_189> battle of Stone's River. To a proper understanding of this battle it will be necessary to state the preliminary movements and preparations:
Assuming command of the army at Louisville on October 27, it was found concentrated at Bowling Green and Glasgow, distant about 113 miles from Louisville, from whence, after replenishing with ammunition, supplies, and clothing, they moved on to Nashville, the advance corps reaching that place on the morning of November 7, a distance of 183 miles from Louisville.
At this distance from my base of supplies, the first thing to be done was to provide for the subsistence of the troops and open the Louisville and Nashville Railroad. The cars commenced running through on November 26, previous to which time our supplies had been brought by rail to Mitchellsville, 35 miles north of Nashville, and from thence, by constant labor, we had been able to haul enough to replenish the exhausted stores for the garrison at Nashville and subsist the troops of the moving army.
From November 26 to December 26 every effort was bent to complete the clothing of the army; to provide it with ammunition, and replenish the depot at Nashville with needful supplies; to insure us against want from the largest possible detention likely to occur by the breaking of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad, and to insure this work the road was guarded by a heavy force posted at Gallatin. The enormous superiority in numbers of the rebel cavalry kept our little cavalry force almost within the infantry lines, and gave the enemy control of the entire country around us. It was obvious from the beginning that we should be confronted by Bragg's army, recruited by an inexorable conscription, and aided by clans of mounted men, formed into a guerrilla-like cavalry, to avoid the hardships of conscription and infantry service. The evident difficulties and labors of an advance into this country, and against such a force, and at such distance from our base of operations, with which we were connected but by a single precarious thread, made it manifest that our policy was to induce the enemy to travel over as much as possible of the space that separated us, thus avoiding for us the wear and tear and diminution of our forces, and subjecting the enemy to all this inconvenience, besides increasing for him and diminishing for us the dangerous consequences of a defeat. The means taken to obtain this end were eminently successful. The enemy, expecting us to go into winter quarters at Nashville, had prepared his own winter quarters at Murfreesborough, with the hope of possibly making them at Nashville, and had sent a large cavalry force into West Tennessee to annoy Grant, and another large force into Kentucky to break up the railroad.
In the absence of these forces, and with adequate supplies in Nashville, the moment was judged opportune for an advance on the rebels. Polk's and Kirby Smith's forces were at Murfreesborough, and Hardee's corps on the Shelbyville and Nolensville pike, between Triune and Eagleville, with an advance guard at Nolensville, while our troops lay in front of Nashville, on the Franklin, Nolensville, and Murfreesborough turnpikes.
The plan of the movement was as follows: McCook, with three divisions, to advance by Nolensville pike to Triune. Thomas, with two divisions (Negley's and Rousseau's), to advance on his right, by the Franklin and Wilson pikes, threatening Hardee's right, and then to fall in by the cross-roads to Nolensville. Crittenden, with Wood's, Palmer's, and Van Cleve's divisions, to advance by the Murfreesborough pike to La Vergne. <ar29_190>
With Thomas' two divisions at Nolensville, McCook was to attack Hardee at Triune, and, if the enemy re-enforced Hardee, Thomas was to support McCook. If McCook beat Hardee, or Hardee retreated, and the enemy met us at Stewart's Creek, 5 miles south of La Vergne, Crittenden was to attack him, Thomas was to come in on his left flank, and McCook, after detaching a division to pursue or observe Hardee, if retreating south, was to move with the remainder of his force on their rear.
The movement began on the morning of December 26. McCook advanced on the Nolensville pike, skirmishing his way all day, meeting with stiff resistance from cavalry and artillery, and closing the day by a brisk fight, which gave him possession of Nolensville and the hills 1½ miles in front, capturing one gun by the One hundred and first Ohio and Fifteenth Wisconsin Regiments, his loss this day being about 75 killed and wounded. Thomas followed on the right, and closed Negley's division on Nolensville, leaving the other (Rousseau's) division on the right flank.
Crittenden advanced to La Vergne, skirmishing heavily on his front, over a rough country, intersected by forests and cedar brakes, with but slight loss.
On the 28th [27th] General McCook advanced on Triune, but his movement was retarded by a dense fog.
Crittenden had orders to delay his movements until McCook had reached Triune and developed the intentions of the enemy at that point, so that it could be determined which Thomas was to support.
McCook arrived at Triune, and reported that Hardee had retreated, and that he had sent a division in pursuit.
Crittenden began his advance about 11 a.m., driving before him a brigade of cavalry, supported by Maney's brigade of rebel infantry, and reached Stewart's Creek, the Third Kentucky gallantly charging the rear guard of the enemy, and saving the bridge, on which had been placed a pile of rails that had been set on fire. This was Saturday night.
McCook having settled the fact of Hardee's retreat, Thomas moved Negley's division on to join Crittenden at Stewart's Creek, and moved Rousseau's to Nolensville.
On Sunday the troops rested, except Rousseau's division, which was ordered to move on to Stewartston, and Willich's brigade, which had pursued Hardee as far as Riggs' Cross.Roads, and had determined the fact that Hardee had gone to Murfreesborough, when they returned to Triune.
On Monday morning, McCook was ordered to move from Triune to Wilkinson's Cross-Roads, 6 miles from Murfreesborough, leaving a brigade at Triune. Crittenden crossed Stewart's Creek by the Smyrna Bridge and the main Murfreesborough pike, and Negley by the ford 2 miles above; their whole force to advance on Murfreesborough, distant about 11 miles. Rousseau was to remain at Stewart's Creek until his train came up, and prepare himself to follow. McCook reached Wilkinson's Cross-Roads by evening, with an advance brigade at Overall's Creek, saving and holding the bridge, meeting with but little resistance. Crittenden's corps advanced, Palmer leading, on the Murfreesborough pike, followed by Negley, of Thomas' corps, to within 3 miles of Murfreesborough, having had several brisk skirmishes, driving the enemy rapidly, saving two bridges on the route, and forcing the enemy back to his intrenchments.
About 3 p.m. a signal message coming from the front, from General Palmer, that he was in sight of Murfreesborough, and that the enemy  <ar29_191> were running, an order was sent to General Crittenden to send a division to occupy Murfreesborough.  This led General Crittenden, on reaching the enemy's front, to order Harker's brigade to cross the river at a ford on his left, where he surprised a regiment of Breckinridge's division and drove it back on its main line, not more than 500 yards distant, in considerable confusion; and he held this position until General Crittenden was advised, by prisoners captured by Harker's brigade, that Breckinridge was in force on his front, when, it being dark, he ordered the brigade back across the river, and reported the circumstances to the commanding general on his arrival, to whom he apologized for not having carried out the order to occupy Murfreesborough. The general approved of his action, of course, the order to occupy Murfreesborough having been based on the information received from General Crittenden's advance division that the enemy were retreating from Murfreesborough.
Crittenden's corps, with Negley's division, bivouacked in order of battle, distant 700 yards from the enemy's intrenchments, our left extending down the river some 500 yards. The Pioneer Brigade, bivouacking still lower down, prepared three fords, and covered one of them, while Wood's division covered the other two, Van Cleve's division being in reserve.
On the morning of the 30th, Rousseau, with two brigades, was ordered down early from Stewart's Creek, leaving one brigade there and sending another to Smyrna to cover our left and rear, and took his place in reserve, in rear of Palmer's right, while General Negley moved on through the cedar brakes until his right rested on the Wilkinson pike, as shown by the accompanying plan.(*) The Pioneer Corps cut roads through the cedars for his ambulances and ammunition wagons.
The commanding general remained with the left and center, examining the ground, while General McCook moved forward from Wilkinson's Cross-Roads, slowly and steadily, meeting with heavy resistance, fighting his way from Overall's Creek until he got into position, with a loss of some 135 killed and wounded.
Our small division of cavalry, say 3,000 men, had been divided into three parts, of which General Stanley took two and accompanied General McCook, fighting his way across from the Wilkinson to the Franklin pike, and below it, Colonel Zahm's brigade leading gallantly, and meeting with such heavy resistance that McCook sent two brigades from Johnson's division, who succeeded in fighting their way into the position shown on the accompanying plan, marked A,(*) while the third brigade, which had been left at Triune, moved forward from that place, and arrived at nightfall near General McCook's headquarters. Thus, on the close of the 30th, the troops had all get into the position, substantially., as shown in the accompanying drawing, the rebels occupying the position marked A.(*)
At 4 o'clock in the afternoon General McCook had reported his arrival on the Wilkinson pike, joining Thomas; the result of the combat in the afternoon near Griscom's house, and the fact that Sheridan was in position there; that his right was advancing to support the cavalry; also that Hardee's corps, with two divisions of Polk's, was on his front, extending down toward the Salem pike, without any map of the ground, which was to us terra incognita. When General McCook informed the general commanding that his corps was facing strongly toward the east, the general commanding told him that such a direction to his line did not appear to him a proper one, but; that it ought, with the exception <ar29_192> of his left, to face much more nearly south, with Johnson's division in reserve, but that this matter must be confided to him, who knew the ground over which he had fought.
A meeting of the corps commanders was called at the headquarters of the commanding general for this evening. General Thomas arrived early, received his instructions, and retired. General Crittenden, with whom the commanding general had talked freely during the afternoon, was sent for, but was excused at the request of his chief of staff, who sent word that he was very much fatigued and was asleep. Generals McCook and Stanley arrived about 9 o'clock, to whom was explained the following
PLAN OF BATTLE.
McCook was to occupy the most advantageous position, refusing his right as much as practicable and necessary to secure it, to receive the attack of the enemy; or, if that did not come, to attack himself, sufficient to hold all the force on his front; Thomas and Palmer to open with skirmishing, and engage the enemy's center and left as far as the river; Crittenden to cross Van Cleve's division at the lower ford, covered and supported by the sappers and miners, and to advance on Breckinridge; Wood's division to follow by brigades, crossing at the upper ford and moving on Van Cleve's right, to carry everything before them into Murfreesborough. This would have given us two divisions against one, and, as soon as Breckinridge had been dislodged from his position, the batteries of Wood's division, taking position on the heights east of Stone's River, in advance, would see the enemy's works in reverse, would dislodge them, and enable Palmer's division to press them back, and drive them westward across the river or through the woods, while Thomas, sustaining the movement on the center, would advance on the right of Palmer, crushing their right, and Crittenden's corps, advancing, would take Murfreesborough, and then, moving westward on the Franklin road, get in their flank and rear and drive them into the country toward Salem, with the prospect of cutting off their retreat and probably destroying their army.
It was explained to them that this combination, insuring us a vast superiority on our left, required for its success that General McCook should be able to hold his position for three hours; that, if necessary to recede at all, he should recede, as he had advanced on the preceding day, slowly and steadily, refusing his right, thereby rendering our success certain.
Having thus explained the plan, the general commanding addressed General McCook as follows: "You know the ground; you have fought over it; you know its difficulties. Can you hold your present position for three hours? To which General McCook responded, "Yes, I think I can." The general commanding then said, 6, I don't like the facing so much to the east, but must confide that to you, who know the ground. If you don't think your present the best position, change it. It is only necessary for you to make things sure." And the officers then returned to their commands.
At daylight on the morning of the 31st the troops breakfasted and stood to their arms, and by 7 o'clock were preparing for the
BATTLE.
The movement began on the left by Van Cleve, who crossed at the lower fords. Wood prepared to sustain and follow him. The enemy, meanwhile, had prepared to attack General McCook, and by 6.30 o'clock <ar29_193> advanced in heavy columns--regimental front--his left attacking Willich's and Kirk's brigades, of Johnson's division, which, being disposed, as shown in the map, thin and light, without support, were, after a sharp but fruitless contest, crumbled to pieces and driven back, leaving Edgarton's and part of Goodspeed's battery in the hands of the enemy.
The enemy following up, attacked Davis' division and speedily dislodged Post's brigade. Carlin's brigade was compelled to follow, as Woodruff's brigade, from the weight of testimony, had previously left its position on his left. Johnson's brigades, in retiring, inclined too far to the west, and were too much scattered to make a combined resistance, though they fought bravely at one or two points before reaching Wilkinson's pike. The reserve brigade of Johnson's division, advancing from its bivouac, near the Wilkinson pike, toward the right, took a good position, and made a gallant but ineffectual stand, as the whole rebel left was moving up on the ground abandoned by our troops.
Within an hour from the time of the opening of the battle, a staff officer from General McCook arrived, announcing to me that the right wing was heavily pressed and needed assistance; but I was not advised of the rout of Willich's and Kirk's brigades, nor of the rapid withdrawal of Davis' division, necessitated thereby--moreover, having supposed his wing posted more compactly, and his right more refused than it really was, the direction of the noise of battle did not indicate to me the true state of affairs. I consequently directed him to return and direct General McCook to dispose his troops to the best advantage, and to hold his ground obstinately. Soon after, a second officer from General McCook arrived, and stated that the right wing was being driven--a fact that was but too manifest by the rapid movement of the noise of battle toward the north.
General Thomas was immediately dispatched to order Rousseau, then in reserve, into the cedar brakes to the right and rear of Sheridan. General Crittenden was ordered to suspend Van Cleve's movement across the river, on the left, and to cover the crossing with one brigade, and move the other two brigades westward across the fields toward the railroad for a reserve. Wood was also directed to suspend his preparations for crossing, and to hold Hascall in reserve. At this moment fugitives and stragglers from McCook's corps began to make their appearance through the cedar-brakes in such numbers that I became satisfied that McCook's corps was routed. I, therefore, directed General Crittenden to send Van Cleve in to the right of Rousseau; Wood to send Colonel Harker's brigade farther down the Murfreesborough pike, to go in and attack the enemy on the right of Van Cleve's, the Pioneer Brigade meanwhile occupying the knoll of ground west of Murfreesborough pike, and about 400 or 500 yards in rear of Palmer's center, supporting Stokes' battery (see accompanying drawing). Sheridan, after sustaining four successive attacks, gradually swung his right from a southeasterly to a northwesterly direction, repulsing the enemy four times, losing the gallant General Sill, of his right, and Colonel Roberts, of his left brigade, when, having exhausted his ammunition, Negley's division being in the same predicament, and heavily pressed, after desperate fighting, they fell back from the position held at the commencement, through the cedar woods, in which Rousseau's division, with a portion of Negley's and Sheridan's, met the advancing enemy and checked his movements.
The ammunition train of the right wing, endangered by its sudden discomfiture, was taken charge of by Captain Thruston, of the First Ohio Regiment, ordnance officer, who, by his energy and gallantry, «13 R R--VOL XX, PT I»  <ar29_194> aided by a charge of cavalry and such troops as he could pick up, carried it through the woods to the Murfreesborough pike, around to the rear of the left wing, thus enabling the troops of Sheridan's division to replenish their empty cartridge-boxes. During all this time Palmer's front had likewise been in action, the enemy having made several attempts to advance upon it. At this stage it became necessary to readjust the line of battle to the new state of affairs. Rousseau and Van Cleve's advance having relieved Sheridan's division from the pressure, Negley's division and Cruft's brigade, from Palmer's division, withdrew from their original position in front of the cedars, and crossed the open field to the east of the Murfreesborough pike, about 400 yards in rear of our front line, where Negley was ordered to replenish his ammunition and form in close column in reserve.
The right and center of our line now extended from Hazen, on the Murfreesborough pike, in a northwesterly direction; Hascall supporting Hazen; Rousseau filling the interval to the Pioneer Brigade; Negley in reserve; Van Cleve west of the Pioneer Brigade; McCook's corps refused on his right, and slightly to the rear, on Murfreesborough pike; the cavalry being still farther to the rear, on Murfreesborough pike, at and beyond Overall's Creek.
The enemy's infantry and cavalry attack on our extreme right was repulsed by Van Cleve's division, with Harker's brigade and the cavalry. After several attempts of the enemy to advance on this new line, which were thoroughly repulsed, as were also their attempts on the left, the day closed, leaving us masters of the original ground on our left, and our new line advantageously posted, with open ground in front, swept at all points by our artillery.
We had lost heavily in killed and wounded, and a considerable number in stragglers and prisoners; also twenty-eight pieces of artillery, the horses having been slain, and our troops being unable to with draw them by hand over the rough ground; but the enemy had been thoroughly handled and badly damaged at all points, having had no success where we had open ground and our troops were properly posted: none which did not depend on the original crushing in of our right and the superior masses which were in consequence brought to bear upon the narrow front of Sheridan's and Negley's divisions, and a part of Palmer's, coupled with the scarcity of ammunition, caused by the circuitous road which the train had taken, and the inconvenience of getting it from a remote distance through the cedars. Orders were given for the issue of all the spare ammunition, and we found that we had enough for another battle, the only question being where that battle was to be fought.
It was decided, in order to complete our present lines, that the left should be retired some 250 yards to a more advantageous ground, the extreme left resting on Stone's River, above the lower ford, and extending to Stokes' battery. Starkweather's and Walker's brigades arriving near the close of the evening, the former bivouacked in close column, in reserve, in rear of McCook's left, and the latter was posted on the left of Sheridan, near the Murfreesborough pike, and next morning relieved Van Cleve, who returned to his position in the left wing.
DISPOSITION FOR JANUARY 1, 1863.
After careful examination and free consultation with corps commanders, followed by a personal examination of the ground in rear as far as Overall's Creek, it was determined to await the enemy's attack <ar29_195> in that position; to send for the provision train, and order up fresh supplies of ammunition; on the arrival of which, should the enemy not attack, offensive operations were to be resumed.
No demonstration [being made] on the morning of January 1, Crittenden was ordered to occupy the point opposite the ford, on his left, with a brigade.
About 2 o'clock in the afternoon, the enemy, who had shown signs of movement and massing on our right, appeared at the extremity of a field 1½ miles from the Murfreesborough pike, but the presence of Gibson's brigade, with a battery, occupying the woods near Overall's Creek, and Negley's division, and a portion of Rousseau's, on the Murfreesborough pike, opposite the field, put an end to this demonstration, and the day closed with another demonstration by the enemy on Walker's brigade, which ended in the same manner.
On Friday morning the enemy opened four heavy batteries on our center, and made a strong demonstration of attack a little farther to the right, but a well-directed fire of artillery soon silenced his batteries, while the guns of Walker and Sheridan put an end to his efforts there.
About 3 p.m., while the commanding general was examining the position of Crittenden's left across the river, which was now held by Van Cleve's division, supported by a brigade from Palmer's, a double line of skirmishers was seen to emerge from the woods in a southeasterly direction, advancing across the fields, and they were soon followed by heavy columns of infantry, battalion front, with three batteries of artillery. Our only battery on that side of the river had been withdrawn from an eligible point, but the most available spot was pointed out, and it soon opened fire upon the enemy. The line, however, advanced steadily to within 100 yards of the front of Van Cleve's division, when a short and fierce contest ensued. Van Cleve's division, giving way, retired in considerable confusion across the river, followed closely by the enemy.
General Crittenden immediately directed his chief of artillery to dispose the batteries on the hill on the west side of the river so as to open on them, while two brigades of Negley's division, from the reserve, and the Pioneer Brigade, were ordered up to meet the onset. The firing was terrific and the havoc terrible. The enemy retreated more rapidly than they had advanced. In forty minutes they lost 2,000 men.
General Davis, seeing some stragglers from Van Cleve's division, took one of his brigades and crossed at a ford below, to attack the enemy on his left flank, and, by General McCook's order, the rest of his division was permitted to follow; but, when he arrived, two brigades of Negley's division and Hazen's brigade, of Palmer's division, had pursued the fleeing enemy well across the fields, capturing four pieces of artillery and a stand of colors.
It was now after dark, and raining, or we should have pursued the enemy into Murfreesborough. As it was, Crittenden's corps passed over, and, with Davis', occupied the crests, which were intrenched in a few hours.
Deeming it possible that the enemy might again attack our right and center, thus weakened, I thought it advisable to make a demonstration on our right by a heavy division of camp-fires, and by laying out a line of battle with torches, which answered the purpose.
Saturday, January 3. it rained heavily from 3 o'clock in the morning. The plowed ground over which our left would be obliged to advance was impassable for artillery. The ammunition trains did not arrive  <ar29_196> until 10 o'clock. It was, therefore, deemed unadvisable to advance; but batteries were put in position on the left, by which the ground could be swept, and even Murfreesborough reached by Parrott shells.
A heavy and constant picket firing had been kept up on our right and center, and extending to our left, which at last became so annoying that in the afternoon I directed the corps commanders to clear their fronts.
Occupying the wood to the left of Murfreesborough pike with sharpshooters, the enemy had annoyed Rousseau all day, and General Thomas and himself requested permission to dislodge them and their supports, which covered a ford. This was granted, and a sharp fire from four batteries was opened for ten or fifteen minutes, when Rousseau sent two of his regiments, which, with Spears' Tennesseans and the Eighty-fifth Illinois Volunteers, that had come out with the wagon-train, charged upon the enemy, and, after a sharp contest, cleared the woods and drove the enemy from his trenches, capturing from 70 to 80 prisoners.
Sunday morning, January 4, it was not deemed advisable to commence offensive movements, and news soon reached us that the enemy had fled from Murfreesborough. Burial parties were sent out to bury the dead, and the cavalry was sent to reconnoiter.
Early Monday morning General Thomas advanced, driving the rear guard of rebel cavalry before him 6 or 7 miles toward Manchester. McCook's and Crittenden's corps following, took position in front of the town, occupying Murfreesborough.
We learned that the enemy's infantry had reached Shelbyville by 12 m. on Sunday, but, owing to the impracticability of bringing up supplies, and the loss of 557 artillery horses, farther pursuit was deemed inadvisable.
It may be of use to give the following general summary of the operations and results of the series of skirmishes closing with the battle of Stoners River and occupation of Murfreesborough:
We moved on the enemy with the following forces: Infantry, 41,421; artillery, 2,223; cavalry, 3,296. Total, 46,940.
We fought the battle with the following forces: Infantry, 37,977; artillery, 2,223; cavalry, 3,200. Total, 43,400.
We lost in killed: Officers, 92; enlisted men, 1,441; total, 1,533. Wounded: Officers, 384; enlisted men, 6,861; total, 7,245. Total killed and wounded, 8,778, being 20.03 per cent. of the entire force in action?
Our loss in prisoners is not fully made out, but the provost-marshal-general says, from present information, they will fall short of 2,800.(*)
If there are many more bloody battles on record, considering the newness and inexperience of the troops, both officers and men, or if there has been more true fighting qualities displayed by any people, I should be pleased to know it.
As to the condition of the fight, we may say that we operated over an unknown country, against a position which was 15 per cent. better than our own, every foot of ground and approaches being well known to the enemy, and that these disadvantages were fatally enhanced by the faulty position of our right wing.
The force we fought is estimated as follows:
We have prisoners from one hundred and thirty-two regiments of infantry (consolidations counted as one), averaging from those in General Bushrod Johnson's <ar29_197> division 411 each, say, for certain, 350 men each, which will give--(*)

132 regiments of infantry, say 350 men each  46,200
12 battalions of sharpshooters, say 100 men each  1,200
23 batteries of artillery, say 80 men each  1,840
29 regiments of cavalry, say 400 men each, and
24 organizations of cavalry, say 70 men each   13,250
 62,490
Their average loss, taken from the statistics of Cleburne's, Breckinridge's, and Withers' divisions, was about 2,080 each. This, for six divisions of infantry and one of cavalry, will amount to 14,560 men, or to ours nearly as 165 to 100.
Of 14,560 rebels struck by our missiles, it is estimated that 20,000 rounds of artillery hit 728 men; 2,000,000 rounds of musketry hit 13,832 men, averaging 27.4 cannon-shots to hit 1 man; 145 musket-shots to hit 1 man.
Our relative loss was as follows: Right wing, 15,933 musketry and artillery; loss, 20.72 per cent. Center, 10,866 musketry and artillery; loss, 18.4 per cent. Left wing, 13,288 musketry and artillery; loss, 24.6 per cent.
On the whole, it is evident that we fought superior numbers on unknown ground; inflicted much more injury than we suffered; were always superior on equal ground with equal numbers, and failed of a most crushing victory on Wednesday by the extension and direction of our right wing.
This closes the narrative of the movements and seven days' fighting which terminated with the occupation of Murfreesborough. For a detailed history of the parts taken in the battles by the different commands, their obstinate bravery and patient endurance, in which the new regiments vied with those of more experience, I must refer to the accompanying sub-reports of the corps, division, brigade, regimental, and artillery commanders.
Besides the mention which has been already made of the services of our artillery by the brigade, division, and corps commanders, I deem it a duty to say that such a marked evidence of skill in handling the batteries, and in firing low and with such good effect, appears in this battle to deserve special commendation.
Among the lesser commands which deserve special mention for distinguished services in the battle the Pioneer Corps, a body of 1,700 men, composed of details from the companies of each infantry regiment, organized and instructed by Capt. James St. Clair Morton, Corps of Engineers, chief engineer of this army, which marched as an infantry brigade with the left wing, making bridges at Stewart's Creek; prepared and guarded the ford at Stone's River on the night of the 29th and 30th; supported Stokes' battery, and fought with valor and determination on the 31st, holding its position till relieved on the morning of the 2d; advancing with the greatest promptitude and gallantry to support Van Cleve's division against the attack on our left on the evening of the same day, constructing a bridge and batteries between that time and Saturday evening. The efficiency and esprit du corps suddenly developed in this command, its gallant behavior in action, and the eminent services it is <ar29_198> continually rendering the army, entitle both officers and men to special public notice and thanks, while they reflect the highest credit on the distinguished ability and capacity of Captain Morton, who will do honor to his promotion to a brigadier-general, which the President has promised him.
The ability, order, and method exhibited in the management of the wounded elicited the warmest commendations from all our general officers, in which I most cordially join. Notwithstanding the numbers to be cared for, through the energy of Dr. Swift, medical director, ably assisted by Dr. Weeds and the senior surgeons of the various commands, there was less suffering from delay than I have ever before witnessed.
The Tenth Regiment of Ohio Volunteers, at Stewart's Creek, Lieut. Col. J. W. Burke commanding, deserves especial praise for the ability and spirit with which they held that post, defended our trains, succored their guards, chased away Wheeler's rebel cavalry, saving a large wagon-train, and arrested and retained for service stragglers from the battlefield.
The First Regiment of Michigan Engineers and Mechanics, at La Vergne, under the command of Colonel Innes, fighting behind a slight protection of wagons and brush, gallantly repulsed a charge from more than ten times their number of Wheeler's cavalry.
For distinguished acts of individual zeal, heroism, gallantry, and good conduct, I refer to the accompanying lists of special mentions and recommendations for promotion, wherein are named some of the many noble men who have distinguished themselves and done honor to their country and the starry symbol of its unity. But those named there are by no means all whose names will be inscribed on the rolls of honor we are preparing, and hope to have held in grateful remembrance by our countrymen.
To say that such men as Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas, true and prudent, distinguished in council and on many a battle-field for his courage, or Major-General McCook, a tried, faithful, and loyal soldier, who bravely breasted the battle at Shiloh and at Perryville, and as bravely on the bloody field of Stone's River, and Maj. Gen. Thomas L. Crittenden, whose heart is that of a true soldier and patriot, and whose gallantry, often attested by his companions in arms on other fields, witnessed many times by this army long before I had the honor to command it, and never more conspicuously than in this combat, maintained their high character throughout this action, but feebly expresses my feeling of obligation to them for counsel and support from the time of my arrival to the present hour. I doubly thank them, as well as the gallant and ever-ready Major-General Rousseau, for their support in this battle.
Brig. Gen. D. S. Stanley, already distinguished in four successful battles--Island No. 10; May 27, before Corinth; Iuka, and the battle of Corinth--at this time in command of our ten regiments of cavalry, fought the enemy's forty regiments of cavalry, and held them at bay, or beat them wherever he could meet them. He ought to be made a major-general for his service, and also for the good of the service.
As for such brigadiers as Negley, Jefferson C. Davis, Johnson, Palmer, Hascall, Van Cleve, Wood, Mitchell, Cruft, and Sheridan, they ought to be major-generals in our service. In such brigade commanders as Colonels Carlin, Miller, Hazen, Samuel Beatty, of the Nineteenth Ohio; Gibson, Grose, Wagner, John Beatty, of the Third Ohio; Harker, Starkweather, Stanley, and others, whose names are mentioned in the  <ar29_199> accompanying reports, the Government may well confide. They are the men from whom our troops should at once be supplied with brigadier-generals; and justice to the brave men and officers of the regiments equally demand their promotion to give them and their regiments their proper leaders. Many captains and subalterns also showed great gallantry and capacity for superior commands. But, above all, the sturdy rank and file showed invincible fighting courage and stamina, worthy of a great and free nation, requiring only good officers, discipline, and instructions to make them equal, if not superior, to any troops in ancient or modern times. To them I offer my most heartfelt thanks and good wishes. Words of mine cannot add to the renown of our brave and patriotic officers and soldiers who fell on the field of honor, nor increase respect for their memory in the hearts of our countrymen.
The names of such men as Lieut. Col. J.P. Garesche, the pure and noble Christian gentleman and chivalric officer, who gave his life an early offering on the altar of his country's freedom; the gentle, true, and accomplished General Sill; the brave, ingenuous, and able Colonels Roberts, Milliken, Schaefer, McKee, Read, Forman, Fred. Jones, Hawkins, Kell, and the gallant and faithful Major Carpenter, of the Nineteenth Regulars, and many other field officers, will live in our country's history, as will those of many others of inferior rank, whose soldierly deeds on this memorable battle-field won for them the admiration of their companions, and will dwell in our memories in long future years, after God, in his mercy, shall have given us peace, and restored us to the bosom of our homes and families.
Simple justice to the gallant officers of my staff, the noble and lamented Lieutenant-Colonel Garesche, chief of staff; Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor, chief quartermaster; Lieutenant-Colonel Simmons, chief commissary; Maj. C. Goddard, senior aide.de-camp; Maj. Ralston Skinner,judge-advocate-general; Lieut. Frank S. Bond, aide-de-camp of General Tyler; Capt. Charles R. Thompson, my aide-de-camp; Lieut. Byron Kirby, Sixth U.S. Infantry, aide-de-camp, who was wounded on the 31st; R. S. Thorns, esq., a member of the Cincinnati bar, who acted as volunteer aide-de-camp, behaved with distinguished gallantry; Colonel Barnett, chief of artillery and ordnance; Capt. J. H. Gilman, Nineteenth U.S. Infantry, inspector of artillery; Capt. James Curtis, Fifteenth U.S. Infantry, assistant inspector-general; Captain Wiles, Twenty-second Indiana, provost-marshal-general; Captain Michler, chief of Topographical Engineers; Capt. Jesse Merrill, Signal Corps, whose corps behaved well; Capt. Elmer Otis, Fourth Regular Cavalry, who commanded the courier line connecting the various headquarters most successfully, and who made a most opportune and brilliant charge on Wheeler's cavalry, routing a brigade and recapturing 300 of our prisoners; Lieutenant Ed-son, United States ordnance officer, who, during the battle of Wednesday, distributed ammunition under the fire of the enemy's batteries, and behaved bravely; Captain Hubbard and Lieutenant Newberry, who joined my staff on the field and acted as aides, rendered valuable service in carrying orders on the field; Lieut. E.G. Roys, Fourth U.S. Cavalry, who commanded the escort of the headquarters train, and distinguished himself for gallantry and efficiency--all not only performed their appropriate duties to my entire satisfaction, but, accompanying me everywhere, carrying orders through the thickest of the fight, watching while others slept, and never weary when duty called, deserve my public thanks and the respect and gratitude of the army.
With all the facts of the battle fully before me, the relative numbers and positions of our troops and those of the rebels, the gallantry and <ar29_200> obstinacy of the contest and the final result, I say, from conviction, and as public acknowledgment due to Almighty God, in closing this report, "Non nobis Domine! non nobis sed nomini tuo da gloriam."
 W. S. ROSECRANS, Major-General, Commanding.
 Brig. Gen. LORENZO THOMAS, Adjutant-General, U. S. Army.
-----
Effective force of infantry and artillery, December 31, 1862.

RIGHT WING.

FIRST DIVISION.

Brigadier-General DAVIS

    Command. Strength. Killed and wounded. Percentage
1st.Brigade,.Colonel.Post 1,418 161 11.33
2d.Brigade,.Colonel.Carlin 1,781 619 34.75
3d.Brigade,.Colonel.Woodruff 1,445 226 15.64
Total.division  4,644 1,006 21.66

SECOND DIVISION.

Brigadier-General JOHNSON.
1st.Brigade,.Colonel Gibson 1,650 472 28.66
2d.Brigade,.Colonel.Dodge 2,100 405 19.28
3d.Brigade,.Colonel.Baldwin  2,500 291 11.64
Total.division. 6,250 1,168 18.68

THIRD DIVISION.

Brigadier-General SHERIDAN.
1st.Brigade,.Colonel.Greusel  1,839 479 26.05
2d.Brigade,.Colonel.Laiboldt  1,680 206 12.25
3d.Brigade,.Colonel.Bradley  1,520 443 29.14
Total.division  5,039 1,128 20.72
Total.right.wing  15,933 3,302 20.72

CENTER.(*)

FIRST [THIRD] DIVISION.

Major-General ROUSSEAU.
1st.Brigade,.Colonel.Scribner 1,588 208 13.10
2d.Brigade,.Colonel.Beatty 1,534 281 18.33
3d.Brigade,.Colonel.Starkweather 1,548 28 1.80
4th.Brigade,.Colonel.Shepherd 1,566 561 35.82
Total.division  6,236 1,078 17.28

SECOND [EIGHTH] DIVISION.

Brigadier-General NEGLEY.
1st.Brigade,.Brigadier-General.Spears  812 16 2.00
2d.[29th].Brigade,.Colonel Stanley 1,822 500 27.44
3d.[7th].Brigade,.Colonel Miller  1,998 410 20.00
Total.division  4,632 926 20.00
Total.center.corps  10,868 2,004 18.44

 <ar29_201>
Effective force of infantry and artillery, &c.--Continued.

.
LEFT WING.

FIRST DIVISION.

Brigadier-General WOOD.

                Command. Strength. Killedandwounded. Percentage
1st.Brigade,.Brigadier-General.Hascall  1,701 343 20.17
2d.Brigade,.Colonel.Wagner  1,644 329 20.00
3d.Brigade,.Colonel.Harker  1,747 454 26.00
Total.division  5,092 1,126 22.11

SECOND DIVISION.

Brigadier-General PALMER.
1st.Brigade,.Brigadier-General.Cruft  1,207 255 21.12
2d.Brigade,.Colonel.Hazen  1,385 336 24.25
3d.Brigade,.Colonel.Grose  1,768 516 29.18
Total.division  4,360 1,107 25.40

THIRD DIVISION.

Brigadier-General VAN CLEVE.
1st.Brigade,.Col..S..Beatty  1,216 411 33.80
2d.Brigade,.Colonel.Fyffe  798 288 36.09
3d.Brigade,.Colonel.Matthews.[Price]  1,822 342 18.75
Total.division  3,836 1,041 27.14
Total.left.wing  13,288 3,274 24.64

PIONEER BRIGADE.

Captain Morton  1,700 30 1.75

CAVALRY.

Cavalry  3,200 84 2.60

RECAPITULATION.
Right wing  15,944
Center corps  10,868
Left wing  13,288
Pioneer Brigade  1,700
Total infantry and artillery  41,800
Cavalry division  3,200
Total  45,000
Deducting wagon guard  1,600
Total  43,400
Combined loss, killed and wounded, 8,778, or 20.22 per cent. of the forces engaged.(*)
-----
Names specially mentioned for important services and particular acts, &c., in official reports.
Name and rank. Regiment or detachment. Service performed.
R. W. Johnson, brigadier-general.P. H. Sheridan, brigadier-general.Jefferson C. Davis, brigadier-general. }}}Commanding divisions }in the right wing.}} For gallant conduct during the battle, and for prompt support and conscientious attention to duty during their services with the right wing.

 <ar29_202>
Names specially mentioned for important services, &c.--Continued.
Name and rank. Regiment or detachment.  Service performed.
D. S. Stanley, brigadier-general. Chief of cavalry   Commanded advance of right wing during its advance from Nolensville; is specially mentioned for energy and skill.
Hascall, brigadier-general Commanding 1st Brigade.  Deserves commendation and gratitude of his country.
Cruft, brigadier- general  1st Brigade   For holding an important position, and for extricating his command from the mass of confusion around him.
T. J. Wood, brigadier-general.H. P. Van Cleve, brigadier-general.John M. Palmer, brigadier-general.J. S. Negley, brigadier-general. }}}} {{{{ Specially mentioned for distinguished gallantry and the skill with which they handled their commands. Generals Van Cleve and Wood were wounded, but remained with their commands until after the battle was over. Specially mentioned for the courage and skill displayed in handling his command.
C. McDermont, surgeon  Medical director, staff of Major-General McCook.  For gallant conduct in the field, and great care and consideration for the wounded.
G. D. Beebe, surgeon  Medical director, staff of Major-General Thomas.  For great zeal, energy, and efficiency.
A. J. Phelps, surgeon  Medical director, on staff of Major-General Crittenden.  For prompt attention to the wounded; great energy and efficiency in discharge of his duties.
Minty, colonel, commanding First Brigade. 4th Michigan Cavalry   Deserves credit for the management of his command on the march and in several engagements.
Murray, colonel  3d Kentucky Cavalry   Rendered important and distinguished service, gallantly charging and dispersing the enemy's cavalry in their attack on our train on Wednesday, 31st.
Zahm, colonel  3d Ohio Cavalry   Contributed greatly, by his personal example, to the restoration of order and confidence in that portion of the Second Brigade stampeded by the enemy's attack on Wednesday.
W. H. Gibson, colonel  49th Ohio Volunteers; commanded Willich's brigade.  Has been several times before recommended for promotion, and is again recommended by General Johnson, for meritorious conduct. Is also specially mentioned by Major-Generals McCook and Crittenden.
Charles Anderson, colonel. 93d Ohio Volunteers   Honorable mention for gallant conduct, by Major-General Rousseau.
Wallace, colonelDodge, colonelBaldwin, colonel  15th Ohio Volunteers30th Indiana Volunteers.6th Indiana Volunteers. }}} Recommended for promotion, for coolness and courage on the field of battle.
G. D. Wagner, colonel  15th Indiana, commanding brigade.  Has commanded a brigade for a year; is recommended for promotion for brave and skillful conduct during the late battles.
C.G. Harker, colonel  65th Ohio Volunteers   Has commanded a brigade for a year; is recommended for promotion for brave and skillful conduct. He is also specially mentioned by Major-General McCook, for valuable services with the right wing.
John W. Blake, colonel  40th Indiana Volunteers   Recommended to be dishonorably discharged for being so drunk as to be unfit for duty. Before going into action on the 31st, was ordered in arrest by his immediate commander, Colonel Wagner, and was next heard from in Nashville, claiming to be wounded and a paroled prisoner.
Hazen, colonel  41st Ohio Volunteers   Commanded a brigade; is specially mentioned for courage and skill in handling his troops, and for maintaining an important position.
W. Grose, colonel  36th Indiana Volunteers   Commanded brigade; is recommended for coolness and bravery in fighting his troops against a superior force.
Sedgewick, colonel  2d Kentucky Volunteer Infantry.

Enyart, colonelRoss, colonel Osborn, colonel  1st Kentucky Volunteer Infantry.90th Ohio Volunteer Infantry.31st Indiana Volunteer Infantry. }}}} Displayed marked gallantry on the field, and handled their respective commands with skill and judgment.
Samuel Beatty, colonel 19th Ohio Volunteer Infantry.  Commanding brigade; for coolness, intrepidity, and skill.
 <ar29_203>
Names specially mentioned for important services, &c.--Continued.
Name and rank. Regiment or detachment.  Service performed.
Fyffe, colonel  59th Ohio Volunteer Infantry  Is recommended for coolness, intrepidity, and skill. Is also specially mentioned by Major-General McCook, for valuable services with the right wing.
Grider, colonel  9th Kentucky Volunteer Infantry.  Commanded brigade, and is specially mentioned for gallantry and coolness under trying circumstances.
C. O. Loomis, colonel  1st Michigan Artillery   Rendered most important services throughout the battle.
John C. Starkweather, colonel 1st Wisconsin Volunteer Infantry.  Commanding brigade: especially mentioned for coolness, skill, and courage.
William Sirwell, colonel 78th Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry. }
Granville Moody, colonel  74th Ohio Volunteer Infantry. } For the skill and ability with which they handled their respective commands.
Hull, colonel  37th Indiana Volunteer Infantry. }
Greusel, colonelBradley, colonel  36th Illinois Volunteers51st Illinois Volunteers }} Are specially commended for skill and courage.
Sherman, colonel  88th Illinois Volunteers  Honorably mentioned for distinguished service.
Hotchkiss, lieutenant -colonel. 89th Illinois Volunteer Infantry. } Recommended for promotion for meritorious conduct.
Jones, lieutenant-colonel 89th Indiana Volunteer Infantry. }
W. W. Berry, lieutenant-colonel. Commanding Louisville Legion.  Specially mentioned for gallant and meritorious conduct. Is also specially mentioned by Major-General Rousseau, for retreating in good order before an overwhelming force, and drawing off by hand a section of artillery he had been ordered to support.
Shepherd, lieutenant- colonel. 18th U.S. Infantry, commanding regular brigade.  Specially mentioned by Maj. Gen. L. H. Rousseau.
Neibling, lieutenant-colonel Commanding 21st Ohio Volunteer Infantry.  For skill and ability during the battles.
Laiboldt, lieutenant colonel 2d Missouri Volunteer Infantry.  Specially commended for skill and courage.
McCreery, lieutenant-colonel. 21st Michigan Volunteer Infantry.  Honorably mentioned for distinguished services.
Klein, major  3d Indiana Cavalry  On the 27th engaged the enemy on the Nolensville pike and put them to flight.
Otis, captain  Commanding 4th U. S. Cavalry.  With his regiment rendered important and distinguished service, gallantly charging and dispersing the enemy's cavalry, in their attack upon our train on Wednesday, the 3lst.
Lyne Starling, major  Assistant adjutant-general.  Specially mentioned by Major-General Crittenden, for gallantry in the battle, general efficiency, and eighteen months' faithful service.
John H. King, majorCarpenter, major Slemmer, major Townsend, major Caldwell, major 15th U. S. Infantry 19th U.S. Infantry16th U. S. Infantry 18th U.S. Infantry 18th U.S. Infantry }}}}} Commanding their respective regiments;are specially mentioned for distinguished gallantry and ability. Major Carpenter was killed, and Majors King and Slemmer wounded.
Miller, major Chandler, majorHibbard, major  36th Illinois Volunteers88th Illinois Volunteers24th Wisconsin Vols }}} Honorably mentioned.
John Mendenhall, captain,chief of artillery, and topographical engineer, staff of Major-General Crittenden. 4th U. S. Artillery   Recommended for promotion, for general efficiency and personal bravery and good conduct in battle.
Chambers captain Gladwyn, captain  51st Indiana Volunteer Infantry73d Indiana Volunteer Infantry }}}} These brave officers, with 120 men, drove a large force of the enemy from a covered position and unmasked his battery.
Standart, captain  Company B, 1st Ohio Artillery.  For the gallant manner in which he handled his guns and brought them off the field.
Edgarton, captain Company E, 1st Ohio Artillery.  Was guilty of a grave error in taking even a part of his battery horses to water at an unseasonable hour, and thereby losing his guns.
G. P. Thruston, captain 1st Ohio Volunteer Infantry.  Is specially mentioned by Major-General McCook and others for particular acts of gallantry, skill, and good conduct. Mentioned by Generals Sheridan, Johnson, Davis and by. Colonel Carlin, commanding brigade.
 <ar29_204>
Names specially mentioned for important services, &c.--Continued.
Name and rank. Regiment or detachment.  Service performed.
Hale, captain  75th Illinois Volunteers  Specially mentioned for gallant conduct
Litson, captain  22d Indiana Volunteers  in skirmishing.
Crofton, captain Fulmer, captain Mulligan, captain 16th U.S. Infantry15th U.S. Infantry 19th U. S. Infantry  {{{{{{ These three infantry captains commanded their respective battalions after their majors had been disabled, and behaved with great gallantry and skill, although opposed by an overwhelming number.
Guenther, captain  Company H. 5th Artillery  Deserves great credit and special mention.
Hescock, captain  1st Missouri Battery   Specially mentioned for bravery and skill in the battles and for general efficiency.
Bridges, captain  19th Illinois Volunteers   Continued in command of his regiment after receiving a painful wound.
Belding, lieutenant  Commanding Company A, 1st Ohio Artillery.  Recommended for promotion for saving three guns of his battery. (Goodspeed's.)
Richard Jervis, lieutenant 8th Indiana Battery   Behaved in a cowardly manner, by retiring his section at a critical moment without notifying his company commander. He is recommended for dismissal.
Lamberson, lieutenantWyman Murphy, lieutenant 19th Illinois Volunteers21st Wisconsin Volunteers  {{ Inspectors of Pioneer Brigade. Are specially mentioned in two reports for gallant conduct and energy.
W. S. Fish, assistant surgeon. 3d Indiana Cavalry   Fled during the battle to Nashville, and is recommended by Major-General McCook for dismissal. This man passed himself off as an assistant surgeon; proved to be a private. Case being attended to.
Enlisted men recommended for gallant conduct during the battle of Stone's River, Tenn.
Quartermaster-Sergeant Colburn, Thirty-third Ohio Volunteers.
First Sergeant German, Eighth Wisconsin Battery.
Sergeant Ferguson, Company G, Fifty-ninth Illinois Volunteer Infantry.
Sergeant Holden, Company G, Sixty-fourth Ohio Volunteer Infantry.
Sergeant McKay, Company E, Forty-first Ohio Volunteer Infantry.
Sergeant McMahon, Company H, Forty-first Ohio Volunteer Infantry.
Sergt. R. B. Rhodes, First Ohio Volunteer Cavalry.
Sergt. Jason Hurd, Nineteenth Ohio Volunteer Infantry.
Sergt. It. A. Mills, Seventy-eighth Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry.
Sergt. A. R. Weaver, Seventy-eighth Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry.
Sergt. F. Mechling, Seventy-eighth Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry.
Sergt. P. A. Weaver, Seventy-fourth Ohio Volunteer Infantry.
Corpl. James T. Slater, Second Indiana Volunteer Cavalry.
Corpl. J. P. Patterson, Company G, Forty-first Ohio Volunteer Infantry.
Corpl. W. Hughes, Seventy-eighth Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry.
Private R. J. Pindle, Company L, wagoner. (Especially recommended by Colonel Murray, colonel of Third Kentucky Cavalry.)
Private A. F. Freeman, orderly, with Brigadier-General Davis.
Private Abijah Lee, orderly, with Brigadier-General Davis.
Private James Gray, Company E, Thirty-ninth Indiana Volunteer Infantry.
Private William Hayman, Second Indiana Volunteer Cavalry.
Private William Brown, Fifty-ninth Ohio Volunteer Infantry.
Private Nelson Shields, Thirteenth Ohio Volunteer Infantry.
Private S. T. Mitchell, Company B, Thirty-third Ohio Volunteer Infantry.
ADDENDA.
Special mention of gallantry, &c.
Lieutenant-Colonel Housum, Seventy-seventh Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry.
Captain Brigham, Sixty-ninth Ohio Volunteer Infantry.
Captain Cox, Tenth Indiana Battery.
Capt. James P. Mead, Thirty-eighth Illinois Volunteer Infantry.
Lieut. John L. Dillon, Thirty-eighth Illinois Volunteer Infantry.
Lieutenant Jones, Post's brigade.
1st. Seventy-eighth Pennsylvania Regiment captured a rebel flag from the Twenty sixth Regiment Tennessee, assisted by other regiments of General Negley's division. <ar29_205>
2d. Lieutenant Guenther's battery and the Second Ohio Volunteers captured the flag of the Thirtieth Arkansas Volunteers.
3d. Fifteenth Indiana Volunteers, Lieutenant-Colonel Wood commanding, charged and captured 173 prisoners front Twentieth Louisiana Regiment.
4th. Thirteenth Michigan Volunteers gallantly recaptured two guns belonging to Captain Bradley's battery.
5th. Carlin's brigade lost half its field officers in killed and wounded.
6th. Fifth Kentucky Volunteers dragged front the field by hand a section of artillery, through deep mini and under heavy fire.
7th. Four color-bearers of the Twenty-first Illinois were shot down, yet the colors were borne safely through the light.
-----
WASHINGTON, D.C., February 27, 1863.
 Colonel KELTON, Staff of the General-in Chief, Washington:
COLONEL: I have the honor to forward to you the inclosed letter of Maj. Gen. W. S. Rosecrans, commanding department. The general desired me to make such verbal explanations as the General-in-Chief might require.
I also inclose a statement of our available force in and about Murfreesborough, which differs considerably from the "paper" army.
I shall remain in the city no longer than to-morrow, as my health will not permit me to put further off that care and treatment which I can only obtain at home.
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
 J. C. PETERSON, Captain Fifteenth Infantry, and Acting Assistant Inspector-General,
Department of the Cumberland. [Inclosures.]
-----
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND, Murfreesborough, Tenn., February 20, 1863.
 Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, Commander-in-Chief, Washington, D. C. :
GENERAL: Captain Peterson, acting assistant inspector-general, being obliged to change climate by medical direction, I avail myself of his zeal and intelligence to send you some details of this army, showing the percentage of absentees and the wear and tear of an army in battle:
1st. I find from careful examination that the average percentage of the present and absent, now present, is:

 Per cent.
For the Fourteenth Army Corps  56.01
For the Twentieth Army Corps  50.16
For the Twenty-first Army Corps  50.44
Presuming that each of these corps has fought but one great battle, in which they lost as follows, viz:
 Per cent.
Fourteenth Army Corps  18.44
Twentieth Army Corps  20.50
Twenty-first Army Corps  24.64
Average loss for the entire command  20.03
We have before the battle:
 Per cent.
Fourteenth Army Corps  63.42
Twentieth Army Corps  64.60
Twenty-first Army Corps  66.93
 <ar29_206>
Hence, before the battle we have to pay 100 men for the above per cent., and we now have the preceding percentage for each hundred on the pay-roll. Although these are better results than I have expected, they are much worse than they ought to be. I am now endeavoring to bring the absentees to some rule, and reduce their numbers. The inspection system detects the illegal absentees, but it requires in addition the paymasters with the corps to know who ought not to be paid.
Captain Peterson comes to show what means we use to detect absentees, and what even then are our results.
He is also charged to carry on a form of return, which, if adopted in the Adjutant-General's office and throughout the army, will force the various commanders to give such data in their returns as will afford means of knowing the true condition and strength of ore: forces, which, with the present forms in use, is not the case.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
 W. S. ROSECRANS, Major-General, Commanding Department.
-----
STATEMENT OF FORCE.
Fourteenth Army Corps  27,725
Twentieth Army Corps  13,031
Twenty-first Army Corps  13,061
Cavalry not included  4,295
Total  58,112

Detached troops:
Nashville  7,495
Gallatin  3,550
Bowling Green  1,840
Clarksville  1,674
Total   14,559
Grand total present   72,671

Strength present and absent February 14, 1863  133,305
Discount   60,634
Detached troops   14,559
Number that cannot be led against the enemy   75,193
-----
MURFREESBOROUGH, TENN., March 1, 1863---12.23 p.m.
 Hon. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War:
I see that by your permission the reports of the corps commanders of the battle of Stone's River are published. They are but a partial view of the operations, and an omission in General McCook's report to state the meeting of corps commanders at my headquarters, and his final instructions on Tuesday night, coupled with an erroneous statement in General Johnson's report, are calculated to mislead.(*) Mine should also be published, omitting such statistics as ought not to be made public.
 W. S. ROSECRANS.
 <ar29_207>
 MURFREESBOROUGH, TENN., March 23, 1863--10.38 p.m.
 Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, General-in- Chief:
Recent reports of the senior surgeon of General Bragg's army, left here in care of the wounded rebels, prepared to be sent to his superior, of the deaths in hospitals, carefully analyzed as to confirm the analytical report of our provost-marshal as to the number of regiments, show that Breckinridge had thirty-six infantry and five cavalry regiments, four batteries, and some minor organizations in his division.
 W. S. ROSECRANS, Major-General.



2. George H. Thomas
O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XX/1 [S# 29] DECEMBER 26, 1862-JANUARY 5, 1863.--The Stone's River or Murfreesborough, Tenn., Campaign.
No. 62.--Reports of Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas, U.S. Army, commanding Center.

[ar29_371 con't]
HDQRS. (CENTER) FOURTEENTH ARMY CORPS,
DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND, Murfreesborough, Tenn., January 15, 1863.
MAJOR: I have the honor to submit to the major-general commanding the Department of the Cumberland the following report of the operations of that part of my command which was engaged in the battle of Stone's River, in front of Murfreesborough:
It is proper to state here that two brigades of Fry's division and Reynolds' entire division were detained near Gallatin and along the Louisville and Nashville Railroad, to watch the movements of the rebel leader Morgan, who had been, for a long time, on the watch for an opportunity <ar29_372> to destroy the railroad. Rousseau s, Negley's, and Mitchell's divisions, and Walker's brigade, of Fry's division, were concentrated at Nashville, but Mitchell's division being required to garrison Nashville, my only available force was Rousseau's and Negley's divisions, and Walker's brigade, of Fry's division, about 13,395 effective men.
December 26, Negley's division, followed by Rousseau's division and Walker's brigade, marched by the Franklin pike to Brentwood, at that point taking the Wilson pike. Negley and Rousseau were to have encamped for the night at Owen's store.
On reaching the latter place, Negley, hearing heavy firing in the direction of Nolensville, left his train with a guard, to follow, and pushed forward with his troops to the support of Brig. Gen. J. C. Davis, commanding the advanced division of McCook's corps, Davis having become hotly engaged with the enemy posted in Nolensville, and in the pass through the hills south of that village. Rousseau encamped with his division at Owen's store; Walker with his brigade at Brentwood.
During the night a very heavy rain fell, making the cross-roads almost impassable, and it was not until night of the 27th that Rousseau reached Nolensville with his troops and train. Negley remained at Nolensville until 10 a.m. on the 27th, when, having brought his train across from Wilson's pike, he moved to the east, over an exceedingly rough by-road to the right of Crittenden at Stewartsborough, on the Murfreesborough pike. Walker, by my orders, retraced his steps from Brentwood, and crossed over to the Nolensville pike.
December 28, Negley remained in camp at Stewartsborough, bringing his train from the rear. Rousseau reached Stewartsborough on the night of the 28th. His train arrived early next day.
December 29, Negley's division crossed Stewart's Creek, 2 miles southwest and above the turnpike bridge, and marched in support of the head and right flank of Crittenden's corps, which moved by the Murfreesborough pike to a point within 2 miles of Murfreesborough. The enemy fell back before our advance, contesting the ground obstinately with their cavalry rear guard. Rousseau remained in camp at Stewartsborough, detaching Starkweather's brigade, with a section of artillery, to the Jefferson pike crossing of Stone's River, to observe the movements of the enemy in that direction. Walker reached Stewartsborough from the Nolensville pike about dark.
December 30, a cavalry force of the enemy, something over 400 strong, with two pieces of artillery, attacked Starkweather about 9 a.m., but was soon driven off. The enemy opened a brisk fire on Crittenden's advance, doing but little execution, however, about 7 a.m.
During the morning Negley's division was obliqued to the right, and took up a position on the right of Palmer's division, of Crittenden's corps, and was then advanced through a dense cedar thicket, several hundred yards in width, to the Wilkinson Cross-Roads, driving the enemy's skirmishers steadily and with considerable loss. Our loss comparatively small.
About noon Sheridan's division, of McCook's corps, approached by the Wilkinson Cross-Roads, joined Negley's right, McCook's two other divisions coming up on Sheridan's right, thus forming a continuous line, the left resting on Stone's River, the right stretching in a westerly direction, and resting on high, wooded ground, a short distance t the south of the Wilkinson Cross-Roads, and, as has since been ascertained, nearly parallel with the enemy's intrenchments thrown up on the sloping land bordering the northwest bank of Stone's River. Rousseau's division (with the exception of Starkweather's brigade), being ordered <ar29_373> up from Stewartsborough, reached the position occupied by the army about 4 p.m., and bivouacked on the Murfreesborough pike in rear of the center.
During the night of the 30th I sent orders to Walker to take up a strong position near the turnpike bridge over Stewart's Creek, and defend the position against any attempts of the enemy's cavalry to destroy it. Rousseau was ordered to move by 6 a.m. on the 31st to a position in rear of Negley. This position placed his division with its left on the Murfreesborough pike, and its right extending into the cedar thicket through which Negley had marched on the 30th. In front of Negley's position, bordering a large open field, reaching to the Murfreesborough pike, a heavy growth of timber extended in a southerly direction toward the river. Across the field, running in an easterly direction, the enemy had thrown up rifle-pits at intervals, from the timber to the river bank, to the east side of the turnpike. Along this line of intrenchments, on an eminence about 800 yards from Negley's position, and nearly in front of his left, some cannon had been placed, affording the enemy great advantage in covering an attack on our center. However, Palmer, Negley, and Sheridan held the position their troops had so manfully won the morning of the 30th against every attempt to drive them back, and remained in line of battle during the night.
December 31, between 6 and 7 a.m., the enemy, having massed a heavy force on McCook's right during the night of the 30th, attacked and drove it back, pushing his division in pursuit en échelon, and in supporting distance, until he had gained sufficient ground to our rear to wheel his masses to the right and throw them upon the right flank of the center, at the same moment attacking Negley and Palmer in front with a greatly superior force. To counteract this movement, I had ordered Rousseau to place two brigades, with a battery, to the right and rear of Sheridan's division, facing toward the west, so as to support Sheridan, should he be able to hold his ground, or to cover him, should he be compelled to fall back.
About 11 o'clock General Sheridan reported to me that his ammunition was entirely out, and he would be compelled to fall back to get more. As it became necessary for General Sheridan to fall back, the enemy pressed on still farther to our rear, and soon took up a position which gave them a concentrated cross-fire of musketry and cannon on Negley's and Rousseau's troops at short range. This compelled me to fall back out of the cedar woods, and take up a line along a depression in the open ground, within good musket-range of the edge of the woods, while the artillery was retired to the high ground to the right of the turnpike. From this last position we were enabled to drive back the enemy, cover the formation of our troops, and secure the center on the high ground. In the execution of this last movement, the regular brigade, under Lieutenant-Colonel Shepherd, Eighteenth U.S. Infantry, came under a most murderous fire, losing 22 officers and 508 men in killed and wounded, but, with the co-operation of Scribner's and Beatty's brigades and Guenther's and Loomis' batteries, gallantly held its ground against overwhelming odds. The center having succeeded in driving back the enemy from its front, and our artillery concentrating its fire on the cedar thicket on our right, drove him back far under cover, from which, though repeatedly attempting it, he could not make any advance.
January 1, 1863, repeated attempts were made by the enemy to advance on my position during the morning, but they were driven back before emerging from the woods. Colonel Starkweather's brigade of Rousseau's division and Walker's brigade of Fry's division having re-enforced <ar29_374> us during the night.. took post on the right of Rousseau and left of Sheridan, and bore their share in repelling the attempts of the enemy on the morning of the 1st instant.
For the details of the most valuable service rendered by these two brigades on December 30 and 31, 1862, and January 1, 2. and 3, 1863, I refer you to their reports. In this connection I also refer you to the report of Lieutenant-Colonel Parkhurst, commanding Ninth Michigan Infantry (on provost duty at my headquarters), for the details of most valuable services rendered by his command on December 31 and January 1 and 2. Negley's division was ordered early in the day to the support of McCook's right, and in which position it remained during the night. January 2, about 7 a.m., the enemy opened a direct and cross fire from his batteries in our front, and from a position on the east bank of Stone's River to our left and front, at the same time making a strong demonstration with infantry, resulting, however, in no serious attack. Our artillery (Loomis', Guenther's, Stokes', and another battery, the commander's name I cannot now recall) soon drove back their infantry. Negley was withdrawn from the extreme right and placed in reserve behind Crittenden's right.
About 4 p.m. a division of Crittenden's corps, which had crossed Stone's River to reconnoiter, was attacked by an overwhelming force of the enemy, and, after a gallant resistance, compelled to fall back. The movements of the enemy having been observed and reported by some of my troops in the center, I sent orders to Negley to advance to the support of Crittenden's troops, should they want help. This order was obeyed in most gallant style, and resulted in the complete annihilation of the Twenty-sixth Tennessee (rebel) Regiment and the capture of their flag; also in the capture of a battery, which the enemy had been forced to abandon at the point of the bayonet. (See Negley's report.)
January 3, soon after daylight, the Forty-second Indiana, on picket in a clump of woods about 800 yards in front of our lines, was attacked by a brigade of the enemy, evidently by superior numbers, and driven in with considerable loss. Lieutenant-Colonel Shanklin, commanding the regiment, was surrounded and taken prisoner while gallantly endeavoring to draw off his men from under the fire of such superior numbers. From this woods the enemy's sharpshooters continued to fire occasionally during the day on our pickets.
About 6 p.m. two regiments from Col. John Beatty's brigade, Rousseau's division, co-operating with two regiments of Spears' brigade, of Negley's division, covered by the skillful and well-directed fire of Guenther's Fifth U.S. Artillery and Loomis' First Michigan Batteries, advanced on the woods and drove the enemy not only from their cover, but from their intrenchments, a short distance beyond.
For the details of this gallant night attack I refer you to the reports of Brigadier-General Spears, commanding Third Brigade of Negley's division, and Col. John Beatty, commanding Second Brigade of Rousseau's division. The enemy having retreated during the night of the 3d, our troops were occupied during the morning of the 4th in burying the dead left on the field. In the afternoon one brigade of Negley's division was advanced to the crossing of Stone's River, with a brigade of Rousseau's division in supporting distance, in reserve.
January 5, my entire command, preceded by Stanley's cavalry, marched into Murfreesborough and took up the position which we now hold. The enemy's rear guard of cavalry was overtaken on the Shelbyville and Manchester roads, about 5 miles from Murfreesborough, and, after sharp skirmishing for two or three hours, was driven from our immediate front. <ar29_375>
The conduct of my command from the time the army left Nashville, to its entry into Murfreesborough is deserving of the highest praise, both for their patient endurance of the fatigues and discomforts of a five days' battle, and for the manly spirit exhibited by them in the various phases in this memorable contest. I refer you to the detailed reports of the division and brigade commanders, forwarded herewith, for special mention of those officers and men of their commands whose conduct they thought worthy of particular notice.
All the members of my staff. Maj. G. E. Flynt, assistant adjutant-general; Lieut. Col. A. Von Schrader, Seventy-fourth Ohio, acting inspector-general; Capt. O. A. Mack, Thirteenth U.S. Infantry, acting chief commissary, and Capt. A. J. Mackay, chief quartermaster, were actively employed in carrying my orders to various parts of my command and in the execution of the appropriate duties of their office. Capt. O. A. Mack was dangerously wounded in the right hip and abdomen while conveying orders from me to Major-General Rousseau.
The officers of the signal corps attached to my headquarters did excellent service in their appropriate sphere, when possible, and as aides-de-camp, carrying orders. My escort, composed of a select detail from the First Ohio Cavalry, commanded by First Lieut. J. D. Barker, of the same regiment, who have been on duty with me for nearly a year, deserve commendation for the faithful performance of their appropriate duties. Private Guiteau was killed by a cannon shot on the morning of January 2. Surg. G. D. Beebe, medical director, deserves special mention for his efficient arrangements for moving the wounded from the field and giving them immediate attention.
Annexed hereto is a consolidated return of the casualties of my command. The details will be seen in the accompanying reports of division and brigade commanders.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
 GEO. H. THOMAS,  Major-General of Volunteers, Commanding.
 Maj. C. GODDARD, Assistant Adjutant-General and Chief of Staff.
-----
Consolidated report of casualties of the Center, Fourteenth Army Corps, in the five days' battle before Murfreesborough, Tenn., commencing December 31, 1862, and ending January 4, 1863.(*)
A Commissioned officers. G Killed
B Enlisted men. H Wounded
C Horses I Missing
D Gun (artillery) J Lost
E Commissioned K Disabled
F Enlisted.

  --------------------------Lost in action.-----------------------
  ---------In action.------ Killed. Wounded. Missing. --Horses.-- -Guns.-
. A B C D E F E F E F G H I J K
First.Division,.Major-General.Rousseau. 303 5,883 .... 18 8 171 43 903 3 324 8 5 .... ....  ....
Second.Division,.Brigadier-General.Negley. 237 4,632 257 13 11 167 47 704 1 308 62 24 9 6 1
First.Brigade,.Third.Division,.Col..M.B..Walker. 97 2,243 .... 6 .... .... 4 19 .... 1 .... .... .... .... ....
 Total 637 12,758 257 37 19 338 94 1,626 4 633 70 29 9 6 1

 <ar29_376>
HEADQUARTERS FOURTEENTH ARMY CORPS,
Murfreesborough, Tenn., May 16, 1863.
COLONEL: My attention having been called by Major-General Rousseau to the fact that Col. B. F. Scribner's brigade had not been mentioned by the major-general commanding the department, for the part it took in the battle of Stone's River, I cheerfully submit the following statement, premising that in my official report of the battle of Stone's River it was my earnest endeavor to do equal justice to the commands of Colonels Beatty, Scribner, and Lieutenant-Colonel Shepherd, as well as to all the other troops under my command, and thought the best way of so doing, without extending my report to too great a length, was to give a succinct narrative of the events of the battle, and then refer to the reports of the subordinate commanders for more detailed information. This I did, with the more confidence in the justice of that course, from the fact that, after a careful reading of the different reports, I perceived no discrepancy in the accounts given in these reports of the events of the battle in which different portions of my command acted together. In my official report is the following:
As it became necessary for General Sheridan to fall back, the enemy pressed on still farther to our rear, and soon took up a position which gave them a concentrated crossfire of musketry and cannon on Generals Negley's and Rousseau's troops at short range. This compelled me to fall back through the cedar woods and take up a line along a depression in the open ground, within good musket-range of the edge of the woods, while the artillery was retired to the high ground on the right of the turnpike. From this last position we were enabled to drive back the enemy, cover the formation of our troops, and secure the center on the high ground. In the execution of this last movement, the regular brigade, under Lieutenant-Colonel Shepherd, Eighteenth U.S. Infantry, came under a most murderous fire, losing 22 officers and 508 men in killed and wounded, but, with the co-operation of Scribner's and Beatty's brigades and Guenther's and Loomis' batteries, gallantly held its ground against overwhelming odds---
thus connecting these three gallant brigades together in the honorable and distinguished work of covering the formation of the troops on the elevated ground in their rear, when the enemy was straining every nerve to gain possession of the same point.
I now quote Colonel Scribner's report of the part taken by his brigade at this period of the battle :(*)
*          *          *          *          *          *          *          *          *          *
Colonel Scribner's brigade was at this time to the right of the regular brigade, and advanced into the cedars.
It gives me much pleasure to be able to testify, further, that the efficiency of this brigade, so long commanded by Colonel Scribner, is second to none in this army.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
 GEO. H. THOMAS, Major-general, U.S. Volunteers, Commanding.
 Lieut. Col. C. GODDARD, Assistant Adjutant-General, Hdqrs. Dept. of the Cumberland.
[ Indorsement. ]
HDQRS. DEPT. CUMBERLAND, May 18, 1863.
I forward with pleasure General Thomas' special notice of the part taken by Colonel Scribner in the battle of Stone's River. It supplies an omission in the report of General Rousseau, which was the reason why a notice of it did not appear in my report.
 W. S. ROSECRANS, Major-General.
 <ar29_377>
HEADQUARTERS FOURTEENTH ARMY CORPS.
DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND, Murfreesborough, February 9, 1863.
 Col. C. GODDARD,  Chief of Staff:
The last semi-weekly return of effective force before the battle of Stone's River, dated December 24, shows as follows, to wit:

Rousseau's division  303 + 5,883 =  6,186
Negley's division  212 + 5,284 = 5,496
  11,682
General Negley's report of the actual force engaged shows a deficiency of 664. This deficiency is in cavalry, which had been assigned to General Stanley between the 24th and 31st of December. I shall certainly hold my officers responsible for all reports differing from the above. The supposition was that the whole effective force was engaged. Please send me the reports showing the discrepancy.
Very respectfully,
 GEO. H. THOMAS,  Major-General, U. S. Volunteers, Commanding.


3. Col. Joseph B. Dodge, Thirtieth Indiana Infantry, commanding Second Brigade.
December 26, 1862-January 5, 1863.--The Stone's River or Murfreesborough, Tenn., Campaign.
O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XX/1 [S# 29]
HEADQUARTERS SECOND BRIGADE, SECOND DIVISION,
In Camp near Murfreesborough, Tenn., January 8, 1863.
Captain BARTLETT, Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.
    SIR: In compliance with your order of the 7th instant I have the honor to respectfully submit the following report of the operations of this command since the 26th of December last up to the evening of the 31st ultimo:
   On the morning of December 26, last, this brigade left camp, near Nashville, under command of Brig. Gen. E. N. Kirk, and marched out on the Nolensville pike about 12 miles, where we encamped during the night. Although there was heavy skirmishing in our front and on each flank, we were in nowise engaged with the enemy during that day, as there was a heavy three of Federal troops in front of this brigade and between it and the enemy.
    On the morning of the 27th we were ordered to resume the march, and on that day the brigade was in advance of our whole forces, with the exception of the cavalry, which was thrown out as skirmishers in advance.
    About 1 mile from where we hard bivouacked for the night the enemy made his appearance in considerable force, composed of cavalry and supported by artillery, all of which opened upon us, and he showed a disposition to contest the ground over which we wished to pass. The Thirty-fourth Regiment Illinois Volunteers and the Twenty-ninth Indiana were promptly deployed as skirmishers, each regiment retaining a good reserve, and thrown forward, with instructions to push on as rapidly as possible, which order was obeyed with alacrity and skill, and the other regiments of the brigade moved forward in line of battle, the Thirtieth Indiana supporting Edgarton's battery.
    Owing to a dense fog, which enveloped everything, so that we could not distinguish the troops of the enemy from our own, it was deemed prudent to halt until the fog partially disappeared, when we again moved forward, with continued skirmishing on our front, until we gained an elevated position overlooking the village of Triune. Here the enemy were in plain view, drawn up in line of battle, the center of their line being in the village. Edgarton's battery opened upon them immediately with splendid effect, soon throwing them into disorder, and disabling at least one piece of their artillery, as I have good reason to believe. While in this position a very heavy rain commenced, accompanied with fog, rendering an advance immediately hazardous.
    The fog disappeared again in the course of about an hour, when we again advanced; but, owing to the ground being very much softened by the rain, the men's clothes were so saturated with water that it was impossible to do so at the rate of speed desired. The enemy had destroyed a bridge across a stream that runs through the edge of the town, thus compelling the artillery to make a detour of nearly a mile to a ford, and by this means gained time to collect his scattered forces and withdraw. On that night we bivouacked about 1 mile south of Triune.
    During that day this brigade lost none in killed or wounded, but inflicted considerable loss upon the enemy. The officers and men engaged showed themselves to be cool, skillful, and courageous, and behaved splendidly.
    We staid at the above-mentioned place all of the 28th, and on the morning of the 29th took up our march for Murfreesborough. During this day nothing of importance occurred. We bivouacked that night in an open field, without fires, and in a cold, drenching rain.
    On the morning of the 30th we were ordered out to take position, preparatory to an expected attack upon the enemy. Heavy skirmishing and fighting was going on in front of us during the whole day, in which we took no active part until about 3 p.m., at about which time we arrived at the extreme right of the line of our army.
    At that time the enemy had a battery of artillery stationed directly in front of this brigade, which was pouring a destructive fire into some troops on our left, belonging to Brig. Gen. J. C. Davis' division. General Kirk immediately ordered Captain Edgarton's battery to open upon it, which order was complied with, with great execution, dismounting one of the enemy's pieces, and killing quite a number of men in a very few moments, and driving him from his position.
    There was no more firing, either from artillery or infantry, that evening or night. The brigade was formed in line of battle, the Thirty-fourth Illinois, Maj. A. P. Dysart commanding, on the extreme right; the Twenty-ninth Indiana, Lieutenant-Colonel Dunn commanding, next on the left: the Thirtieth Indiana, Col. J. B. Dodge, next, and the Seventy-seventh' Pennsylvania, Lieutenant-Colonel Honsum commanding, on the left; Edgarton's battery (E, First Ohio Artillery) in the rear and to the left of the Thirty-fourth Illinois, in a cedar grove, with a rather dense thicket immediately in front of the three left regiments. A strong picket line was thrown out from 150 to 200 yards in front, with a cornfield in front of their (the picket) line. Every precaution that was possible was taken to prevent surprise, and to give seasonable warning of the approach of the enemy.
    The brigade was up and under arms for nearly or quite an hour before daylight. Just after daylight a part of the horses of the battery were unhitched from the caissons and taken to water, which was close by. Just at this moment the enemy made his appearance on our front and right in immense force, and formed in close columns, with a front equal to the length of a battalion in line and ten or twelve ranks in depth. General Kirk immediately ordered the Thirty-fourth Illinois to advance to near where the picket was stationed, in order to check, at least, the advance of the enemy, and save the battery, if possible, which movement was promptly executed under an awful fire, which almost annihilated the picket line or line of skirmishers, which it really was, and killed or wounded a large number in the line, some 150 or 200 yards in the rear. The battery under command of Captain Edgarton immediately opened with canister upon the enemy, and only had time to fire eight rounds before the battery was taken. Nearly or quite one-half of the horses were killed or wounded, so as to be unmanageable, by the first fire from the enemy, and it was impossible to remove it from the ground.
    Captain Edgarton and his officers and men fought nobly, as the number of killed and wounded will testify, and did everything possible to maintain their ground against all overpowering force. The captain was taken prisoner while assisting to work his guns, and Lieutenant Berwick was bayoneted and taken prisoner while assisting him. General Kirk was seriously wounded at almost the first fire, and I then succeeded to the command of the brigade.
    The fire the enemy received from us, although well directed, and as effective as a fire from two ranks generally is, produced no visible effect upon him as he moved his heavy column forward upon a double-quick. General Rains, who commanded a part of their column, fell dead or mortally wounded at this point.
    The enemy then moved to the left oblique, or nearly, by his left flank, until his center was Opposite our extreme right, when he moved forward again, changing direction to his right as he did so, so as to bring his whole force upon our most exposed point. We held our ground until our ranks were not more than 20 yards from the enemy, when I was forced to retire, having no support and seeing that it was a needless waste of life to contend in that position with at least twenty times the number of men I their had left, which was done in the best order possible, across a corn-field in the rear and to the left of our first position, to a field one side of which was on rising ground and overlooking the ground over which the enemy must advance to attack.
    I here formed the Thirtieth Indiana at that time under command of Lieut. Col. O. D. Hurd, of that regiment, and the Seventy-ninth Illinois, Col. S. P. Read commanding, that had just reported to me (it having been detailed to guard a train the day before, and had just arrived upon the field), behind a fence on the rise of ground before spoken of. Before the Seventy-ninth Illinois reached the fence and while it was at least 200 yards distant from it, the enemy made his appearance and instantly poured a terrible fire into their ranks. Although a new regiment, they advanced with a firmness that would have done credit to veterans, and, after reaching the fence poured a terribly destructive fire into the enemy Here, assisted by Captain Simonson's (Fifth Indiana) battery, this brigade, unsupported, except by the Third Brigade, which was on our left, and almost alone, succeeded in checking the enemy, bringing his columns to a halt, and requiring the utmost exertions of his officers to keep his men from fleeing in disorder from the field, during all of which time a tremendous fire was kept up. The enemy finally succeeded in throwing his left wing forward across the fence, thus outflanking this brigade and dislodging us from that position; but the number of dead left by him on that ground for five days afterward shows conclusively that it was by far the dearest position to him that he gained that day.
    Colonel Read, of the Seventy-ninth Illinois, was killed instantly while bravely urging his men on. In his death the service has lost a fine officer, a brave soldier, and a true man. Adjutant Stribley, of the Thirtieth Indiana, was also killed here. The service contained no braver or cooler officer than he. The Seventy-seventh Pennsylvania, Lieutenant-Colonel Housum commanding, at the time of the occurrences above mentioned was some 600 yards on the left of the troops under my immediate command, acting with a brigade in General Davis' division. While hotly engaged with the enemy, Colonel Housum was wounded severely, from which he died shortly afterward. He was a cool, clear-headed, courageous officer and gentleman.
    After being driven from the fence, I retired my command to a piece of woods in the rear of my former position, the enemy closely following up with infantry on our rear and cavalry on our left flank. I halted my command twice, and formed a line and undertook to hold him in check, but it was impossible to do but little, owing to our weakened condition and the absence of all support.
    I finally fell back to near the Murfreesborough and Nashville turnpike, and made up my mind that the enemy must be stopped there. I had at that time t he Seventy-seventh Pennsylvania, Captain Rose commanding, Twenty-ninth Indiana, Major Collins commanding, and about 100 men belonging to the Thirtieth Indiana, Thirty-fourth Illinois, and Seventy-ninth Illinois; in all, about, at that time, 500 men. By command of Brigadier-General Johnson, I formed my little force on the right of Captain Simonson's battery, which was in action with one of the enemy's batteries, which was soon silenced, immediately after which it (Captain Simonson's battery) was placed in another position.
    I wish to be pardoned for testifying here to the skill, efficiency, and courage displayed by Captain Simonson and his officers and men during that day. I then moved my command some 150 yards to the right of where it had been while supporting the battery, into a piece of woods, and took a good position for defense.
    Some troops belonging to some other division moved in on my left just at that moment, and a moment after the remains of the column that made the first attack in the morning made its appearance, coming up on a doublequick. I immediately gave the command forward, and my command met them, poured in a deadly volley, and rushed forward. Their advance was stopped, their line wavered, and in a moment was in full retreat, and thus the brigade that received the first attack from this column in the morning had the satisfaction of giving it the first repulse it received during the day. I followed them but a short distance, when I got a regiment to relieve the command I had left, as they were entirely out of ammunition, and, by order of General Johnson, I took them back and formed along the railroad, and got a supply.
    I was then ordered back to the bank of the river, where I awaited further orders. While there, an officer rode up and informed me that the enemy's cavalry was attempting to cross the river some distance below, near a hospital, and that it was important that we should have a force there. There was no superior officer near, and I took the responsibility of at once moving to the point designated and forming in line. The enemy, seeing us approach, promptly fell back, but not until he had taken quite a number of prisoners, as I understand.
    I then returned to the turnpike, and at dark bivouacked in the woods near by, where we spent the night.
    On the morning of the I at instant I placed my command in line, under your directions, and we immediately threw up a line of breastworks, behind which we bivouacked until the evening of the 3d instant, without any movement of importance on our part, with the exception that on the 2d instant, at about 9 p.m., I was ordered to take four companies from my command and a like number from the Third Brigade of this division, and to advance to our front until I reached the Franklin turnpike or found the enemy in force.
    It was a very dark night, and I took my little Command according to your orders, deployed the whole as skirmishers, and started. I first crossed an open field or fields nearly to the woods in our front, where I could distinctly hear the enemy chopping and moving either artillery or heavy wagons. When we got about 20 yards from the edge of the woods, I distinctly heard officers giving commands to their men, and, fearful that I was going into a trap, I ordered my men to fire, which was promptly obeyed, and my suspicions confirmed, as the enemy returned a withering volley in reply. Found at least ten times the number I had with me. Having ascertained that the enemy were in heavy force near our lines, thereby accomplishing the purpose for which I was sent our, I ordered my men to retire, which they did in good order, losing but 4 wounded; none killed.
    The officers and men under my command, during this terrible battle, behaved with great coolness and courage under the most trying circumstances.
    I cannot help but bring to the notice of the commanding general the gallant conduct of Capt. T. E. Rose, of the Seventy-seventh Pennsylvania Regiment, who took command of his regiment after Lieutenant-Colonel Housum was wounded, and who, by his skill, perseverance, and energy, kept his regiment well together, and, by his example, urged on his men to attack the enemy when all around was disorder and confusion.
    Major Collins, of the Twenty-ninth Indiana, took command of that regiment about 9 a.m. on the 31st, after Lieutenant-Colonel Dunn had, by some means, become separated from his command, and fought nobly.
    Major Buckner, of the Seventy-ninth Illinois, took command of that regiment after the death of Colonel Read, and gallantly rallied his men, and showed himself worthy of a higher position than he now holds.
    Maj. A. P. Dysart, commanding the Thirty-fourth Illinois, distinguished himself in his efforts to arrest the enemy's progress, and his regiment stood by him until it was utterly impossible for the same number of men, without Support to do so longer.
    Lieutenant-Colonel Hurd, commanding, and Major Fitzsimmons (who was taken by the enemy), of the Thirtieth Indiana, showed that they were worthy of the positions they occupy. Both needlessly, almost, exposed themselves, and were untiring in their efforts to stop the progress of what seemed a victorious enemy.
    I can but express my heartfelt thanks to my staff for their conduct on the field--firm, cool, energetic, and fearless, their assistance was invaluable. Capt. D.C. Wagner, acting assistant adjutant-general; Capt. E. P. Edsall, acting assistant inspector-general; Lieut. I. C. McElfatric, topographical engineer, and Lieutenants Baldwin and Walker, aides, were untiring in their efforts to rally the troops, and to their exertions the whole right wing of the army is, in my opinion, indebted.
    Dr. George W. Hewitt, acting brigade surgeon, was untiring in his exertions in behalf of the wounded, and was captured while at his post by the enemy, as was also Dr. Hostetter, of the Thirty-fourth Illinois, Dr. Keen, of the Twenty-ninth Indiana, and Dr. McAllister, of the Seventy-ninth Illinois, were all taken where a surgeon should be in time of action, attending to the duties of their profession. While in the enemy's lines they were engaged night and day in taking care of our wounded-They have been released since, and their horses retained by the enemy, in pursuance, as they report, of order of General Wharton. Surgeon Downey, of the Seventy-seventh Pennsylvania, was fortunately spared, and staid with the brigade. He was of invaluable service to those who were so unfortunate as to require the attention of a surgeon.
    The medical department of this brigade was in splendid condition, thanks to Dr. Hewitt and division medical director, Dr. Marks, and, notwithstanding' our loss in surgeons, the wounded were well cared for.
    Chaplain Bradshaw, Seventy-ninth Illinois, and Chaplain Decker, of the Thirty-fourth Illinois, exposed themselves in the most fearless manner in taking care of the wounded, taking them off the field, &c., and proved themselves to be well worthy, at least, of the positions they occupy.
    This brigade met with a serious loss, in the person of General Kirk, early in the engagement. He fell at the head of his brigade, trying manfully to resist and repel the overwhelming force thrown against it.
    Accompanying, please find a summary of killed, wounded, and missing of this command. The missing are, a large majority of them, I fear, wounded and in the hands of the enemy; also, please find reports of regimental commanders of this brigade and complete list, by name, of casualties.Respectfully submitted.
J. B. DODGE, Colonel Thirtieth Indiana, Commanding Second Brigade.
P. S.--Excuse me for calling the attention of the general commanding to a gallant charge made by the Seventy-seventh Pennsylvania, while they were separated from this brigade, and were acting in concert with a brigade in Brig. Gen. J. C. Davis' division. A battery in possession of the enemy made its appearance directly in their front and opened upon them. Lieutenant-Colonel Housum immediately ordered a charge upon it, which was obeyed instantly by his command. The cannoneers were either killed or wounded, the horses disabled, so they could not move back. The Seventy-seventh had possession of Captain Edgarton's battery, which the enemy had brought along with them, for a few moments, but before they could do anything more than compel the enemy to strike the guns, a heavy force of infantry made its appearance in their front and flank, and they were compelled to retire, during which movement Lieutenant-Colonel Housum was mortally wounded.

4. Braxton Bragg
O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XX/1 [S# 29] DECEMBER 26, 1862-JANUARY 5, 1863.--The Stone's River or Murfreesborough, Tenn., Campaign.
No. 190.--Reports of General Braxton Bragg, C. S. Army, commanding Army of Tennessee, with congratulatory orders, &c.

[ar29_661 con't]
MURFREESBOROUGH, TENN., December 30, 1862.
(Received at Richmond, Va., January 1, 1863.)
Artillery firing at intervals and heavy skirmishing of light troops all day. Enemy very cautious, and declining a general engagement. Armies are in line of battle within sight.
 BRAXTON BRAGG.
 General S. COOPER.
 <ar29_662>
MURFREESBOROUGH, TENN., December 31, 1862.
We assailed the enemy at 7 o'clock this morning, and after ten hours' hard fighting have driven him from every position except his extreme left, which [where] he has successfully resisted us. With the exception of this point, we occupy the whole field. We captured 4,000 prisoners, including 2 brigadier-generals, 31 pieces of artillery, and some 200 wagons and teams.(*) Our loss is heavy; that of the enemy much greater.
 BRAXTON BRAGG, General, Commanding.
 General S. COOPER.
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MURFREESBOROUGH, January 3, 1863.
(Received January 4, 1863.) The enemy retired last night but a short distance to intrenchments in his rear. In a sharp and short contest this evening we drove his left flank from position, but our assaulting party again retired with considerable loss to both sides. Wheeler and Wharton were again in their rear yesterday; captured 200 prisoners, one piece of artillery, and destroyed 200 loaded wagons.
 BRAXTON BRAGG, General, Commanding.
 General S. COOPER, Adjutant and Inspector General.
-----
TULLAHOMA, January 5, 1863.
Unable to dislodge the enemy from his intrenched position, and learning of re-enforcements to him, I withdrew from his front night before last; he has not followed; my cavalry is still close in his front.
 BRAXTON BRAGG, General, Commanding.
 General S. COOPER,
Richmond, Va.
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DECHERD, January 6, 1863.
Enemy have not yet followed us in force. My command is now concentrated on line of Elk Run. From papers captured on the field, their force was from 60,000 to 70,000; ours not over half that. We hope to check any advance; but to save East Tennessee, and enable us to advance again, re-enforcements are necessary. They are bringing forward every man from Kentucky.
 BRAXTON BRAGG.
 General S. COOPER, Adjutant and Inspector General.
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DECHERD, January 7, 1863.
We shall hold line of Duck River, if possible. Our losses will reach 9,000; the enemy has not advanced from Murfreesborough.
 BRAXTON BRAGG.
 General S. COOPER.
 <ar29_663>
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TENNESSEE, Tullahoma, Tenn., February 23, 1863.
SIR: On December 26, last, the enemy advanced in force from Nashville to attack us at Murfreesborough. It had been well ascertained that his strength was over 60,000 effective men. Before night on that day the object of the movement was developed by our dispositions in front, and orders were given for the necessary concentration of our forces, then distributed as follows: Polk's corps and three brigades of Breckinridge's division, Hardee's corps, at Murfreesborough; the balance of Hardee's corps near Eagleville, about 20 miles west of Murfreesborough; McCown's division (which, with Stevenson's division removed, constituted Smith's corps) at Readyville, 12 miles east of Murfreesborough, the three cavalry brigades of Wheeler, Wharton, and Pegram occupying the entire front of our infantry, and covering all approaches to within 10 miles of Nashville; Buford's small cavalry brigade, of about 600, at McMinnville. The brigades of Forrest and Morgan (about 5,000 effective cavalry) were absent on special service in West Tennessee and Northern Kentucky, as will be more fully noticed hereafter. Jackson's small infantry brigade was in rear, guarding the railroad front Bridgeport, Ala., to the mountains.
On Sunday, the 28th, our main force of infantry and artillery was concentrated in front of Murfreesborough, while the cavalry, supported by three brigades of infantry and three batteries of artillery, impeded the advance of the enemy by constant skirmishing and sudden and unexpected attacks. To the skillful manner in which the cavalry, thus ably supported, was handled, and to the exceeding gallantry of its officers and men, must be attributed the four days' time consumed by the enemy in reaching the battle-field, a distance of only 20 miles from his encampments, over fine macadamized roads.
Fully aware of the greatly superior numbers of the enemy, as indicated in my early reports from this quarter, it was our policy to await attack. The position was selected and line developed with this intention. Owing to the convergence upon our depot at Murfreesborough of so many fine roads by which the enemy could approach, as will appear from the inclosed map, marked 1,(*) we were confined in our selection to a line near enough the point of juncture to enable us to successfully cover them all until the real point of attack should be developed.
On Monday, the 29th, it was r