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Spain and the American Civil War: Relations at Mid-Century, 1855-1868

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Dora

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PREFACE

Relations between the United States and Spain have always drawn the attention of historians on both sides of the Atlantic. War years tended to be the most popular—1776–1780s, 1895–1898, 1936–1945. Other eras have also been studied but to a lesser extent. Yet gaps remain in our knowledge of the subject. One uncharted area has been selected as the subject of this book. The two decades of the mid-nineteenth century were diplomatically significant since the balance of power in Europe and in the New World was changing. The forces of nationalism influenced European international relations while at the same time emerging powers in America forged the politics of their continent. These were also times when Spain's political significance in Europe appeared on the rise because of her growing strength in North Africa and involvement in international affairs. In South America, however, her position eroded as that of the United States increased. By 1868, Spanish influence both in Europe and Latin America had suffered drastic setbacks while that of the United States experienced the opposite. Some of the causes of these changes can be usefully explored by examining Spanish-American diplomacy.

The American Civil War offered a convenient point of reference for a large number of specific diplomatic and political problems involving Europe and the New World. Also, at the same time, Spain was heavily involved in a number of military ventures in Hispanic America. The era of the 1850s and 1860s always had been considered a neatly bracketed one by historians in terms of issues and events. The study of Spanish-American relations confirms this view. Moreover, because of the variety of activities and worries which involved both nations, it proved absolutely necessary to examine relations over a broader period of time than just during the years of the Civil War. Only in such a fashion could the smouldering concerns over slavery, economics, imperialism, balance-of-power diplomacy, and military events make any coherent sense in the study of the Civil War's diplomacy.

The case study method employed here also permits detailed examination of a nation's foreign policy. Spain's policy in the 1850s and 1860s could have been studied in one of two ways: first, her attitude toward Europe through Franco-Spanish relations, or second, her attitude towards Latin America through her diplomatic relations with the United States. The second option proved to be more expedient because, while in terms of political importance to Spain Spaniards ranked European affairs as first, their nation's actual impact on Hispanic America was greater. In other words, Spain's ability to influence European diplomatic affairs never matched the significance of her effect in the New World. Since no examination of Spanish-Latin American policy would be possible without a thorough understanding of her relations with the United States, it seemed appropriate to undertake such a study. In this way, Spanish and American policies toward South America could be developed in great detail without the complications inherent in writing a diplomatic history of nearly two dozen governments.

American foreign policies toward Europe and the New World during these years have been examined more extensively than Spain's. Studies on Franco- and Anglo-American diplomacy have appeared along with others on relations with specific Latin American governments. Many American diplomats in the 1850s considered their nation's relations with Spain to be her most important yet this topic has not been sufficiently explored. Surveying Spanish-American diplomacy offered a chance to fill this substantial gap while testing accepted interpretations about Washington's international policies to determine if they needed modification or confirmation, particularly for the years of the Civil War and Reconstruction.

Another reason for studying Spanish-American diplomacy derives from an obvious need to call attention to the impact of cultural differences on the development and implementation of foreign policies which historians have not always considered. Diplomacy has never been solely influenced by cold, analytical considerations so fondly labeled by scholars as *Realpolitik*. It is a human activity bound to human prejudices, interests, and frailties. Although difficult to study, a small attempt has been made in the following pages to suggest cultural influences on Spanish-American relations. Because almost no basic research has been done into the archival remains dealing with relations between the two nations, much of the style of this book can be called traditional diplomatic historiography since before any cultural or topical analysis could be performed, day-to-day diplomacy had to be described. Thus much of the format of this book is structured to describe in detail daily activities, crisis by crisis.

Many people have contributed their time and talents while I prepared this study. Librarians have been especially helpful at the Library of Congress, National Archives, Department of State, Georgetown University, Rutgers University, Princeton University, Universities of Virginia, North Carolina, Duke, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Rochester, Harvard, Florida State University, Louisiana State University, and at the New York City Public Library and the Hispanic Society of America. In Europe, librarians and archivists were equally generous with their help at the Public Record Office and at the University of London. In Paris, the archivists at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs made research enjoyable. In Madrid, the following libraries

allowed me to use their facilities, for which I am most grateful: Biblioteca Nacional, Archivo Histórico Nacional, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Hemeroteca Municipal de Madrid, Instituto de Cultura Hispanica, Real Academia de Historia, and the University of Madrid. The University of Barcelona also allowed me to use with profit their library.

I would also like to thank all those people who helped me in various ways. Because there were so many, only a few can be mentioned; yet I am grateful to all of them. Professor Earl R. Beck, of Florida State University, gave the manuscript considerable attention in its early stages. Dr. Nelson Duran enlightened me on the Liberal Union, while Dr. Daniel B. Carroll and Dr. Lynn M. Case suggested sources of information. The late Jesús Pabón shared his insights into Narváez's ideas and allowed me access to the manuscript collections of the Real Academia de Historia, while Doña Consuelo de Castillo and her staff at the Spanish foreign office always assisted me in hundreds of ways. Professor Stanley G. Payne, of the University of Wisconsin, encouraged me over the past decade and always gave me good advice. Frederick B. Pike and the late Arthur P. Whitaker read the manuscript and offered suggestions for improvements. I am also indebted to members of my family on both sides of the Atlantic for their patience, help, and encouragement. Yet I alone accept responsibility for this volume's weaknesses, which have survived despite the efforts of colleagues and relatives to correct them.

My greatest debt is to my wife, who lived with a cantankerous husband and mountains of notes which she tiptoed around over the past ten years. Because she did not complain about the manuscript which stole my attention from her, I am grateful.

J. W. C.

December, 1979

SPAIN AND THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR: RELATIONS AT MID-CENTURY, 1855–1868

JAMES W. CORTADA

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I. A TRADITION OF CONFLICT

"The interval of thirteen years, 1855 to 1868, was one of comparative quiet in Spanish-American relations." [1] With that the author of a leading general survey of United States-Spanish relations in the nineteenth century dismissed a period in which Madrid and Washington faced a multitude of diplomatic issues growing out of Latin American politics, the American Civil War, European crises, and, of course, the endemic problem of a Cuba constantly restive under Spanish control and always eyed jealously by its northern neighbor. The years in question exemplified the continuing problems that had troubled relations between the two governments since the 1770s. From the early days of the American Revolution, both countries competed for territory and concessions in the New World. Culturally, they misunderstood and distrusted each other. Political conflicts and cultural differences colored relations between the two nations throughout the nineteenth century, creating a tradition of conflict of a generally unfriendly nature. By 1855, a heritage of problems, hostile images, and suspicions existed which profoundly influenced their relations.

Politically, the American Revolution started the competitive process by establishing precedents for future relations. More accurately than Spanish scholars, American historians defined Spain's policy toward the English colonists. Writing in the 1930s, Samuel Flagg Bemis expressed a widely held academic view that "Spain had too many political hostages of her own on the other side of the Atlantic to allow her to champion American independence." [2] The possibility of losing her possessions in the New World more than offset Spain's desire to see Great Britain defeated by the thirteen colonies. Spaniards also feared that an independent nation might pose a political and cultural threat to their own holdings. One high Spanish official, the Marqués de Castejon, felt "the English and American powers would still be of one nation, one character and one religion, and would so form their treaties and compacts as to obtain the objectives they both desire." [3] This common opinion did not change throughout the 1770s and early 1780s despite the fact that Spain cautiously aided the English colonies.

Madrid viewed the revolution as an opportunity to cripple Great Britain, regain Gibraltar and Minorca, and control the Gulf of Mexico. The extent of Spain's assistance to the colonies, however, varied according to conditions in Europe where King Charles III enjoyed some success with his foreign policy. Minorca, the Gulf of Mexico, and the two Floridas came under the Spanish flag, although Gibraltar still eluded him. The rebels, frustrated and disappointed with Spain's performance, learned to distrust Madrid in the post-revolutionary era. That bias even carried over into traditional interpretations of Spanish-American relations.

The years following the revolution were marked by territorial disputes involving the Mississippi Valley and later the Floridas. Spain attempted to preserve her holdings in these regions while the United States, for purposes of trade and emigration, expanded into them. The resultant debates and quarrels dominated relations through the 1820s. By then the United States emerged as the owner of these regions. The difficult negotiations, military clashes, and economic competition further embittered relations between the two governments, which now faced even more serious problems resulting from the revolutions in Latin America.

[1] French Ensor Chadwick, *The Relations of the United States and Spain* (New York, 1909), p. 273.

[2] Samuel Flagg Bemis, *The Diplomacy of the American Revolution* (New York, 1935), p. 41.

[3] Quoted in Edward S. Corwin, *French Policy and the American Alliance of 1778* (Hamden, 1962, reprint of 1916 ed.), p. 109.

Napoleon's invasion of Spain in 1808 encouraged the series of revolts culminating in Latin American independence. The liberation of this region involved political and economic interests of the United States, Spain, Portugal, Great Britain, and Europe in general. While published studies on Spanish policies in Latin America vary in interpretation and detail, the significance of the revolts for relations between Washington and Madrid is more clearly discernible. Spain faced the problem of preserving an empire that provided her with prestige and revenues. Madrid also feared the disruption of her cultural identification with the area. Latin American independence created complex problems for the United States, too, since officials believed Spain opposed the expansion of American trade. Many Americans wanted to see their neighbors adopt forms of government similar to theirs, welcoming the revolutions against "despotic" Spain. Consequently, the diplomatic problems grew immense for the two nations.

On the one hand, both clearly knew that Great Britain, France, Portugal, and to some extent Russia and Austria, took great interest in Latin American developments. They feared their trade might be interrupted or more important, that the international balance of power in Europe, as reflected in the settlement of Vienna and in the subsequent alliances, might be altered by drastic political changes in Latin America. Moreover, both Spain and the United States recognized that further European involvement in the New World would threaten their control over foreign policy.

On the other hand, individual problems affected the two governments differently. The United States did not want to recognize the independence of Latin America too quickly for fear Spain would not cede the Floridas, then under consideration, to Washington. Also the possibility of war with Spain worried American diplomats. They did not want France or Great Britain to become so involved in the crisis that they would emerge with territorial acquisitions (perhaps in the Gulf of Mexico), thereby creating a series of future international problems for the United States. In Madrid there was much concern for the security of non-rebelling areas such as Cuba and Puerto Rico. Apprehension that the collapse of her Latin American empire would cause a sharp decline in government revenues and the possibility of further political unrest in Spain made diplomats want peaceful relations with the United States. The loss of prestige in Europe that would inevitably accompany the shrinking of the empire also caused Spaniards to adopt a cautious attitude toward Washington.

The effects of the successful revolutions in Latin America added to the growing tradition of hostilities between Washington and Madrid while reflecting the diplomatic, economic, and cultural competition between the two. By the mid-1820s, Spaniards viewed the United States as wanting to control the entire New World at Spain's expense, viewing the recent revolts in Latin America as proof of this.[4] Fear of Washington's imperialism became a permanent fixture in Spanish foreign policy during the remainder of the century. Americans, both in the United States and in South America, saw Spain as a slow, inefficient, despotic power reluctant to change with the times. They believed she would never forgive what had happened and might well try to reclaim lost territories at some future date. The growth of Pan-Americanism partially reflected the reaction against this possibility. In short, Madrid and Washington again reaffirmed their mistrust and dislike for each other. With such an atmosphere, it is easy to understand why both governments would suspect the motives of the other in all future negotiations, especially when such talks were characterized by outwardly friendly intentions.

The most important point of friction between the two during the nineteenth century was Cuba. The island was also the problem that received the greatest amount of attention by polemicists, politicians, and historians in both countries. Indeed, most scholars agree that Cuban problems dominated Spanish-American relations between the 1820s and the end of the century. While Cuba most clearly reflected the fundamental crisis of competition and mistrust existing between the two governments, most historians have ignored other issues that might well have drawn the attention of Spanish and American diplomats. Moreover, the important role of Cuba in Spanish-American relations cannot be fully appreciated without understanding all the issues at play and their relations to one another. It is also necessary to fill in the details about the Spanish perspective. Much of the discussion in the chapters to come will pay attention to Spanish sources and views ignored by historians in the past because it is Spain's views that round out our understanding of Cuba's position in international affairs of the mid-nineteenth century. Thus the first step in understanding the number of complex issues existing in the 1850s and 1860s, between Spain and the United States, is to survey the political and economic rivalry over Cuba. As a symbol, the island profoundly influenced the diplomatic and cultural difficulties besetting the two nations throughout the century.

The Cuban issue prior to the 1860s may be divided conveniently into two periods for the purpose of defining Spanish-American diplomacy. Because the United States consistently initiated Cuban diplomacy, Spain usually reacted with defensive responses; there-

[4] José Luciano Franco, *Política continental americana de España en Cuba, 1812–1830* (Havana, 1947), *passim;* Selim Carrasco Domínguez, "Los Estados Unidos y la independencia hispanoamericana," *Revista de Marina* **65** (1959), pp. 619–627.

fore, American Cuban policy was more important than Spain's. Beginning with the 1790s through the late 1830s, American officials believed an independent Cuba would be detrimental to the political interests of their country. A free Cuba might well be an Afro-Hispanic Cuba which in turn would encourage slave rebellions in the southern part of the United States. Further, any revolutionary activity in the island or the threat of its seizure by Washington, could prompt Great Britain into occupying the colony in order to protect her remaining possessions in the Caribbean. Either possibility posed threats to American territorial security and to peace at home. The British similarly concluded that a Spanish owned Cuba offered the only feasible insurance against what might otherwise have been a major problem with the United States.[5]

During the 1820s evidence of American interest in Cuba was consistently there. John Quincy Adams, for example, envisioned Cuba being drawn into the sphere of North American influence in years to come through the dint of geographic proximity and intimate trade relations. Diplomats in Washington refused to join any power in guaranteeing Spain's control over Cuba as well, believing such diplomacy contrary to American interests and unsupportable within the U. S. Senate. Thus the image of a grasping United States remained a firm one in the eyes and minds of most Europeans from as early as the 1820s.[6]

A major interest of the United States, in more specific terms, was to expand its trade and investments in Cuba. Americans felt that the proximity of the isle coupled with its agricultural output complemented their economy. Spanish officials enforced a series of commercial regulations designed to discourage such relations in the belief that American economic encroachment would pose a political threat to their hold on the island and would reduce Spain's favorable financial position within her own colony. Such an attitude of mistrust led to numerous commercial complaints by Washington throughout the 1830s. The Spaniards repeatedly rejected these and all requests for tariff and trade reforms.

Spain believed the United States wanted eventually to take possession of Cuba. Coupled with a decline in Spain's ability to maintain optimum trade relations with her own colony, anticipation of American imperialism went far to explain Spanish stubbornness in opening Cuba and even Puerto Rico to trade and investments from the United States. Madrid refused to consider the possibility that American interest in Cuba during the period prior to the late 1830s was only economic. Officials at the Foreign Office consistently advised the cabinet not to grant the United States any concessions on penalty of encouraging revolutionary activity, evidence for which lay in reports of filibustering expeditions from the mainland. Therefore, even before Washington made any decision to acquire Cuba, the Spanish government had concluded that Americans would attempt to seize their island and they fashioned their colonial policies accordingly.

During the closing days of the Van Buren Administration, American diplomats expressed concern over British pressures on Spain to abolish slavery in the island. Abolition threatened to create a haven for runaway slaves from the United States; therefore, they began to consider reevaluating their Cuban policy. The next president, James K. Polk, and his Secretary of State, James Buchanan, gave serious thought to the idea of acquiring Cuba by purchase or if need be, through force. Annexation would forestall British encroachment into the Caribbean while providing the South with another slave area. Cuba's strategic value to the United States and her commercial ties to American interests also lent force to acquisition.[7]

Naïvely, Secretary Buchanan thought Spain would see the logic and justice of selling Cuba to Washington. Knowing little about Spain, he believed Madrid recognized that Cuba's expenses burdened the Spanish treasury to the breaking point. However, he overlooked two factors. France and Great Britain would hardly tolerate any change in the balance of power in the Caribbean. More important, Buchanan failed to appreciate Cuba's symbolic value to Spain. The island was the India of the Spanish empire and a source of great pride to the nation. The cost of maintaining this colony consequently was only a secondary issue for Spaniards. Buchanan's offer to purchase Cuba represented a mistaken appraisal of Spanish policies and was regarded as bordering on national insult.

Spanish officials harshly rejected his offer in 1848 since they could not accept such an affront to national *dignidad*, if the government wished to remain in power. The American proposal again confirmed their view that the United States wanted to expand into Latin America at the expense of Spain's political and cultural influence in the area. The Prime Minister, General Ramón María Narváez, who considered the United States one of his country's greatest enemies, expressed indignation that the suggestion had even been made. Buchanan apparently learned very little from this experience because when he became president, he again offered to buy Cuba. Since Spaniards began in 1848 to view all of his statements

[5] For the American position see Lester D. Langley, *The Cuban Policy of the United States* (New York, 1968), pp. 4–22.

[6] For details see James W. Cortada, *Two Nations Over Time: Spain and the United States, 1776–1977* (Westport, 1978), pp. 57–60; Spain, *Negociaciones diplomáticas para garantar a España la posesión de Cuba desde 1823 a 1858* (Madrid, 1897), *passim*.

[7] Langley, *The Cuban Policy of the United States*, pp. 23–26.

and actions with suspicion, they carefully watched his political career until he retired from politics in 1861.

The attitudes of most Spaniards regarding Cuba and the paranoia they felt about Washington is better understood within the context of Spain's international position during the reign of Isabel II (1833–1868). With the end of the Napoleonic wars, Spain's diplomatic role in European affairs declined. Events between 1789 and 1833 had ruined her position within the European balance-of-power system as developed in the early 1700s. In effect, her claim to major power status ceased to be valid and the loss of Latin America merely confirmed this.

Domestic unrest in the 1830s and 1840s further undermined Spain's international standing and certainly restricted her options. On the one hand were Isabel's supporters pitted against those of her uncle, Carlos, who sought to take her throne. On the other, there were the liberal and conservative politicians in her camp who competed among themselves for power. This unstable situation led to a major civil war and to constant changes in the cabinet. For example, between December, 1843, when Isabel became of age and September, 1868, when she fell from power, thirty-three cabinets provided Spain with truncated government. Moreover, the nation's debt, which grew as a result of the Napoleonic wars, bungling fiscal policies under Ferdinand VII, and the expenses of fighting the Carlists, suggested that Spain could do little in international affairs.

The Carlist conflict in the 1830s made Spaniards painfully insecure about their diplomatic position. Austria, Russia, Rome, and Germany initially failed to approve Isabel as queen of Spain and unofficially supported the candidature of her uncle. Billed as a liberal, Isabel found support only with the British and French governments. The British sent an expeditionary force into Spain to help defeat the Carlists and later, along with France, established alliances and signed trade agreements with Madrid. This situation led to Spain's diplomatic dependence on Paris and London down to 1868 and explains to a large extent why Madrid repeatedly turned to them for support against the Americans on the Cuban question.

Spain's international situation during the next decade, when Buchanan served as Secretary of State, continued to be delicate. Since Spain avoided revolution in 1848–1849, her image as a conservative power increased, allowing Narváez to win approval in those European circles which had supported Carlos. This increased prestige gave Spain confidence to defy Buchanan. But because Spanish governments changed too often, it proved virtually impossible to do more than implement defensive tactics in protecting Cuba. In short, Spain had less flexibility in international affairs than the United States in the Caribbean.

Despite the advantage of the American government, Washington also experienced difficulties in implementing Cuban policies because, as in Spain, events extended beyond diplomatic control. During the 1840s, the public in the United States took great interest in Cuba. Many Southerners viewed the acquisition of Cuba as essential in creating a political balance both in the Senate and in national politics. Insensitive to Spain's need to feel important in the New World, Southerners believed that Cuba's seizure, even by force, could be rationalized since American civilization would be exported to this culturally underdeveloped area. In comparison with the "decadent" society of Spain, Southerners viewed American culture as progressive, new, and superior thereby justifying the use of violence. Because the Cuban issue became a national topic of political and social discussion in both countries, it grew increasingly difficult for the two governments to deal with the island in any diplomatic vacuum.[8]

Further pressures came from the British who urged Spain to curb slavery in the island, colonial officials complaining about economic difficulties partly due to the slave issue, and politicians using Cuban problems as a political lance pointed at whatever group of politicos held office. Diplomats believed that Cuba's security, although potentially threatened all the time, could probably be protected with British and French assistance. Besides their growing friendliness in Europe, Great Britain shared similar concerns since she had major holdings to worry about near Cuba. Napoleon III supported the Spanish monarchy on many issues and Madrid believed little reason existed to think, should Cuba be endangered, that he would ignore a plea for help. London and Paris also knew that unlike Puerto Rico or the Philippines, Cuba became a topic of public discussion in Spain, as in the United States, and consequently the island would need to be approached as an issue outside the relative isolation of diplomatic conference rooms.[9]

Another source of uncontrollable crises came from Cuban and American filibustering groups bent on liberating Cuba or presenting her to the United States for annexation. While many such expeditions originated in the United States, the efforts of Narcisco Lopez posed the greatest number of problems to both

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[8] C. S. Urban, "The Ideology of Southern Imperialism: New Orleans and the Caribbean, 1845–1860," *The Louisiana Historical Quarterly* **39** (January, 1956): pp. 48–73; J. F. H. Claiborne (ed.), *Life and Correspondence of John A. Quitman* (New York, 1860), **2**: pp. 348–349, 354–355.

[9] Roberto Mesa, *El Colonialismo en la crisis de XIX español* (Madrid, 1967), pp. 69–223, 255–265; Viluma to Min. of St., No. 298, May 16, 1854, Spanish Foreign Office Archives/correspondencia/Francia/legajo 1506 (hereafter cited Sp/record group, e.g., corr, pol/country/file number); Nancy N. Barker, *Distaff Diplomacy: The Empress Eugenie and the Foreign Policy of the Second Empire* (Austin, 1967), p. 20.

countries. His adventures into Cuba, although ultimately failures, created bitterness and mistrust between Washington and Madrid to such an extent that his exploits remained constantly on the minds of diplomats for years to come. Briefly told, Lopez used the United States, and more specifically New Orleans, as his base of operations for launching a series of invasions into Cuba between 1848 and 1851 when Spanish officials finally captured and executed him. Throughout this period, the United States remained neutral and to some extent even attempted to thwart his activities. Public opinion in the South favored Lopez and Southerners gave him considerable support in the forms of money and manpower. The Spanish government refused to believe that the United States could not prevent a Lopez expedition of some 1,000 men from leaving New Orleans. As one historian correctly observed, however, violators of American neutrality laws were tried in the area of violation, which in this case meant New Orleans where no convictions were possible due to the public's support of such expeditions.[10]

Spain naturally thought these activities took place with the tacit approval of the American government. To a Spaniard, who knew that in Spain the outcome of a trial could be influenced by the regime in Madrid, it proved difficult to believe that the same did not apply in the United States. Spanish newspapers complained about the violation of Spain's rights and discussion continued about the insult to Spanish honor. During the same period and especially after the failure of the last expedition, the American press bitterly criticized Spain's barbarism in quelling the invasion, taking the opportunity to condemn many Spanish colonial policies. These developments obviously continued the tradition of conflict diplomacy.

In fact, these expeditions so profoundly influenced Madrid that officials wanted to find some further means of securing Cuba against future attacks. Although the number of troops and naval vessels in the colony multiplied slowly during the early 1850s, Spain took one other step. Between 1851 and 1852, she turned to her two allies and proposed a pact guaranteeing Cuba to Spain. Madrid told London that by this means, Great Britain's own possessions in the area would be protected. France, although a smaller landowner in the Caribbean, received similar comments along with arguments about the balance of power and trade in the New World. Both London and Paris agreed in principle to Madrid's arguments but they lacked the necessary military muscle and desire to commit themselves to possible action in a distant theater especially at a time when tensions were growing in Europe. The American government saw no need for such a treaty, arguing the United States had repeatedly assured Spain that Cuba would not be seized. Officials in Washington viewed with alarm arrangements whereby any European power could increase its influence so close to the United States. In fact, Secretary of State Edward Everett went so far as to claim the Caribbean as a legitimate region for future American expansion. Such contradictory statements hardly ingratiated the United States to an already nervous Spain.[11]

Political differences were not all that separated Americans from Spaniards. Images and cultures divided them as well. In the United States, people viewed Spain as a backward, crude, and despotic country condemned by the *leyenda negra* (black legend) of cruelty through the Catholic Inquisition in the Old and New Worlds and by the torturous treatment of Indians. Americans labeled Spain as a critic of the Monroe Doctrine and an enemy of Manifest Destiny. They experienced frustrations with her antiquated laws and could not understand Spain's sense of tradition. In sharp contrast, Americans viewed themselves as a traditionless nation vibrant with a sense of modernity pitted against an inflexible anachronism.

Yet at the same time, there existed an interested, almost sympathetic image of Spain that romanticized Spanish history and culture. Flamboyant travel literature on Spain sold well in the United States regardless of its accuracy. During the first half of the nineteenth century, the writings of Prescott, Irving, and Longfellow created a great deal of friendly spirit for Spain.[12] While reading Prescott or some other commentator on Spanish subjects, Americans also absorbed thousands of lines of newspaper barrages against Spain's political and colonial structure. In consequence, it became difficult for them to understand Spanish culture let alone its confusing politics and policies.

Spaniards also developed a highly articulated image of the United States. As early as 1821, Spaniards formed an opinion of the new nation that would survive deep into the twentieth century. In that year an observant Spaniard wrote that Americans:

> consider themselves superior to all the nations of Europe; and believe that their dominion is destined to extend, now

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[10] Langley, *The Cuban Policy of the United States*, pp. 26–33.

[11] Chadwick, *The Relations of the United States and Spain*, pp. 241–246; Jerónimo Becker, *Historia de las relaciones exteriores de España durante el siglo XIX* (Madrid, 1924), 2: pp. 159–181, 207–233; Henry Blumenthal, *A Reappraisal of Franco-American Relations, 1830–1871* (Chapel Hill, 1959), p. 52; Herminio Portell Vilá, *Historia de Cuba en sus relaciones con los Estados Unidos y España* (Miami, 1960), II: pp. 9–37.

[12] Stanley T. Williams surveys this body of publications in *The Spanish Background of American Literature* (New Haven, 1955), I.

to the isthmus of Panama, and hereafter, over all the regions of the New World.[13]

This suggestion that Spain was pitted against the United States soon became reflected in racial ideas which came to be identified with the word *hispanismo*. Fredrick B. Pike has been its most important historian, providing one of the best definitions of this word:

> *Hispanismo* rests on the conviction that through the course of history Spaniards have developed a life style and culture, a set of characteristics, of traditions, and value judgments that render them distinct from all other peoples.[14]

He added a corollary to this idea, namely, "that Spain had the right to wield spiritual hegemony over the one-time colonies." [15]

As the nineteenth century grew older, Spaniards added to the storehouse of ideas related to *hispanismo*. The most important additions included the concept that Americans constituted an Anglo-Saxon culture marked by anti-Catholicism and disrespect for Spain's own sense of importance. With this logic one step further was all that would be necessary to view Spanish-American difficulties in the New World as a conflict between the Anglo-Saxon race and Spain's own *raza*. By the 1850s, the struggle emerged beyond cultural dimensions into political battles. Andrés Borrego, an informed Spanish diplomat, wrote in the 1850s that North Americans were the "other race," trying to mold Spanish society in Latin America into its "ideas, sentiments, and customs." He further explained that Washington did this by political subterfuge. He warned against this danger by recommending that all Hispanic people unite against this common threat. Bluntly put, Borrego wrote:

> The antagonism that has been declared in the New World between the people of Spanish blood and the republic of the United States does not constitute a power struggle between the large northern confederation and the southern countries; it is purely and exclusively a racial contest for influence that dispute the possession and dominance of the richest and largest part of the world.[16]

Borrego's message became quite common in Spanish polemical literature in mid-century especially as Cuba became politically more volatile.

More widely read authors published articles and books on *hispanismo* and of the great northern threat to Spanish interests. One of the most popular of these, José Ferrer de Couto, spent much of the 1850s traveling in Latin America. He wrote several books, pamphlets, and dozens of articles about America's problems. He relayed Borrego's ideas so well that his publications surpassed the diplomat's original views in militancy. By the start of the 1860s, Ferrer de Couto had a wide audience in both continents where his books, articles, and conversations influenced some of Spain's leading conservative and reactionary elements by confirming their fears of the United States.[17]

The confluence of political problems and lack of accurate information about each other did much to complicate relations between Spain and the United States throughout the century. During the years selected for this study, the power struggle continued in the New World at a time when Spanish influence there declined while that of the United States increased. Long standing conditions, accidents, and personalities profoundly influenced the course of events in these two decades, but there was also no escape from a tradition of conflict and suspicion that had always disturbed Spanish-American relations.

II. THE CUBAN NEMESIS

The diplomatic flurry which grew out of the Lopez expeditions coupled with heightened American public concern about the fate of the filibusters caused politicians and officials in Washington to reconsider their policy of leaving Cuba in Spanish hands. In March, 1853, President Franklin Pierce stated in his inaugural address that he would not object to "the acquisition of certain possessions," meaning Cuba.[1] His Democratic Party approved, as did most of the South, to save slavery, and for humanitarian purposes. His Secretary of State, William L. Marcy, agreed to the purchase of Cuba but could not justify war with Spain. The president's ministers to London, Paris, and Madrid, James Buchanan, John Y. Mason, and Pierre Soulé

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[13] Quoted in Richard W. Van Alstyne, "The American Empire Makes Its Bow on the World Stage, 1803–1845," in William A. Williams (ed.), *From Colony to Empire Essays in the History of American Foreign Relations* (New York, 1972), p. 48.

[14] Fredrick B. Pike, *Hispanismo, 1898–1936: Spanish Conservatives and Liberals and Their Relations with Spanish America* (Notre Dame, 1971), p. 1.

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 2.

[16] Andrés Borrego, "Memorandum espositivo de las gravísimas consideraciones en que se funda el interés que las grandes potencias marítimas y en particular España, tienen en concertar los oportunos medios de poner un correctivo a la absorcio moral y material que de todos los estados independientes, formados a consecuencía de la emancipación de las colonias españolas, aspiran a consumer los Estados Unidos de América, presentado a D. Xavier de Istúriz, Presidente del Consejo de Ministros, por D. Andrés Borrego, ex-Ministro plenipotenciario de S.M.," June 15, 1858, Manuscript No. 20228, pp. 42–43, 147–155, Biblioteca Nacional.

[17] For biographical data on Ferrer de Couto (1820–1877) see *Enciclopedia universal ilustrada* (Madrid, 1924), **23**: pp. 924–925. The Mexican minister to Spain in the 1850s called him an influential public opinion molder, Buenaventura Vivó, *Memorias de Buenaventura Vivó ministro de Méjico en España durante los años 1853, 1854 y 1855* (Madrid, 1856), p. 376.

[1] James D. Richardson (ed.), *A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789–1897* (Washington, 1897), **6**: pp. 2731–2732.

respectively, believed violence should be employed, if need be, to acquire the island.[2]

The most critical appointment Pierce made to Europe in 1853 was to Madrid, selecting the highly flamboyant, volatile Louisianian Pierre Soulé. Although the new minister advocated Cuban annexation, the president chose him in order to placate an extremist faction in the Democratic Party. Spanish officials worried about this appointment since they knew Soulé held virulent anti-Spanish views. The French suggested to Spain that she accept him in the belief that one man could not change Washington's long standing Cuban policy. Also it would be foolish to risk a diplomatic rupture at this moment when Paris could not devote adequate attention to Cuba. The British believed the appointment symbolized American desire "to provoke conflicts which will lead much later to a break between the two countries." [3] Spanish diplomats expressed much the same concern, reporting London would give Madrid some support in the anticipated difficulties.[4]

An apprehensive Spain, governed by an unpopular *camarilla*, waited for the next American move. Marcy warned London and Paris not to become involved in Cuban affairs. He next instructed Soulé not to create any further tensions with Madrid but rather to suggest quietly the possibility of selling Cuba to the United States. Between the time that the decision had been made to ask Spain to sell the island and the arrival of appropriate instructions in Spain, a maritime incident occurred in Havana similar to dozens of previous ones but with the difference that this time Soulé sought to use it as a means for acquiring Cuba. Colonial officials seized an American trader, the *Black Warrior*, for minor infractions of port regulations in February, 1854. Secretary Marcy reacted in anger and frustration since this incident exemplified the problems Americans encountered in their attempts to trade with Cuba. However, rather than press the issue into a crisis, the president chose to be cautious in order not to disrupt plans for negotiating the purchase of Cuba.[5]

Soulé viewed the situation far differently than his superior. Having received instructions from Marcy to request $100,000 in reparations and also aware of the public outcry in the United States against Spain, he addressed several firm notes to the Spanish government on the affair. Ordinarily in such instances, a few polite letters would be exchanged to determine which government should pay reparations and in what amounts. Rarely did such negotiations ever become bitter as in this case. The Spanish response, predictably in sharply worded language, complained about the near rudeness of Soulé's comments. With her pride ruffled, Spain gave an appearance of stubborn resistance to Soulé. The issue escalated in importance with each passing note during the spring of 1854. Soulé wanted the crisis to grow to the point where Madrid had to discard Cuba in the belief that London and Paris would deny her diplomatic and military support. Marcy inquired if Spain wanted to sell Cuba or grant her independence. He warned Madrid that the president could not tolerate any interference from London or Paris in the Cuban issue.[6]

Spain found none of the American tactics persuasive. Soulé's notes irritated officials. The suggestion of selling Cuba, especially at a time when it would appear to have been done under duress, made Madrid even angrier at Washington. Soulé further erred in evaluating Spain's position because in April he predicted she would soon have to give up Cuba and probably sell it to the United States. Nothing could be further from the truth. Determined to retain Cuba, the minister of state wrote to the Spanish War and Navy Departments to inquire if Cuba's defenses could adequately stand attack from the United States.[7]

Spain also sought British and French views in case of war. Both supported Spain's policy of defending Cuba and Havana's port regulations, realizing that Cuban authorities never intended to insult the United States. Spaniards told other Europeans they wanted peace and to close the incident before irresponsible, anti-Spanish elements in the United States could use the issue as an excuse to seize Cuba. While European diplomats expressed sympathy for Spain, France suggested reforms in colonial commercial laws and abolishing slavery as a cure for Southern hostility and Northern disdain over Cuba. But, if it came to a fight, Napoleon III promised to provide some military assistance to Spain. Madrid's real fear of war grew during April and May, 1854. In instructions to the Spanish envoy in Washington, the government suggested closing the incident quickly but, if that were not possible, to propose arbitration "as a last resort." [8]

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[2] Ivor D. Spencer, *The Victor and the Spoils: A Life of William L. Marcy* (Providence, 1959), pp. 318–335.

[3] A. A. Ettinger, *The Mission to Spain of Pierce Soulé, 1853–1855* (New Haven, 1932), pp. 101–109, 163; Turgot to Drouyn de Lhuys, No. 4, May 2, 1853, French Foreign Office Archives/politique/Espagne/vol. 842 and Drouyn de Lhuys to Turgot, No. 10, May 10, 1853, *Ibid.* (hereafter cited Fr/record group/country/vol); quote from Istúriz to Min. of St., No. 121, May 19, 1853, Sp/pol/USA/2401.

[4] Luborde y Ruda to Min. of St., April 9, 1853, *Ibid.*; Min. of St. to Istúriz, May 6, 1853, *Ibid.*; Calderon de la Barca to Min. of St., No. 55, April 29, 1853, *Ibid.*

[5] Marcy to Buchanan, No. 29, March 11, 1854, William L. Marcy Papers, Library of Congress.

[6] Marcy to Buchanan, March 11, 1854, *Ibid.*

[7] Soulé to Marcy, April 7, 1854, U. S. Department of State, despatches/Spain/vol. 39 (hereafter cited US/record group/country/vol); Min. of St. to Mins. of War and Navy, May 1, 1854, Sp/pol/USA/2401.

[8] Turgot to Drouyn de Lhuys, No. 76, May 1, 1854, Fr/pol/Esp/844: Drouyn de Lhuys to Turgot, No. 11, March 25,

The suggestion of arbitration involved enormous dangers for Spain since she did not know what government would sit in judgment. Orders on how to close down the legation at the same time also indicated the seriousness with which Spain viewed her problem with Washington.

Poor relations continued into the summer months. London and Paris expressed disappointment with Washington's position since it openly indicated America's resolution to acquire Cuba. European public opinion sided with Spain. Marcy soon tired of Soulé's activities and the president finally realized that no progress was being made in settling the *Black Warrior* affair or in gaining Cuba. Each note that either government presented the other appeared to worsen the situation. Moreover, Soulé became involved in anti-Bourbon politics. Spanish agents in southern France reported his visits with Carlist leaders and rumors circulated that he would be willing to help finance a revolution against the queen's government. He did not realize that the arch-conservative Carlist groups would never have surrendered Cuba without a fight. Spain's minister to the United States, Leopoldo Augusto de Cueto, also irritated American officials with his known anti-American attitude and his stiff rebuttals to Marcy's demands regarding the *Black Warrior*.[9]

Soulé's plottings seriously threatened to worsen Spanish-American relations. He tried to take advantage of the unstable political situation in Spain to advance his Cuban plans. During the summer of 1854 a major shift took place in the Spanish government suggesting to him opportunities for clandestine activities. The cabinet headed by the Conde de San Luis resigned on July 8. Another moderate politician, Fernández de Córdoba, next ruled for one day. From July 9 to July 17, Madrid was governed by juntas. On July 17 the Duque de Rivas became head of a cabinet. Three days later Queen Isabel called General Baldomero Espartero back to form yet another government. His *bienio progresista* regime then functioned for two years. With such a turnover in personnel, officials could only react to American tactics by conciliation or, at best, with stop-gap notes designed to delay for time. Soulé realized this and could not resist playing a very Spanish game.

Marcy contributed to the hectic diplomatic situation probably without appreciating the potential dangers involved because he ordered Soulé, Buchanan, and Mason to meet and write a position paper on Cuba. Officials in Washington knew that current tactics had led nowhere and hence the need to revamp Cuban policy. The ministers met on October 15, 1854, at Aix-la-Chapelle, Belgium, and prepared what became known as the Ostend Manifesto. Between August, when Marcy sent his instructions calling the meeting, and October, the European press found out about the conference. Giving it wide coverage and much interpretation, Spain monitored a great deal of information on potential American policy. Very worried, Spanish officials watched the development of the Ostend Manifesto. The American ministers suggested in their report that Cuba be purchased and if Spain refused to sell it, they recommended that Washington should consider its seizure. The old reasons of security and trade were given as arguments in bold language. Besides causing considerable controversy in the United States, the conference convinced Spain that Washington would stop at nothing to obtain Cuba.[10]

Underlying much thought and talk among the American officials (many of them from the South) who implemented foreign policy for many years was still the fear that Cuba might become a black republic. As British pressure built up to slow the slave trade on the one hand, while advocating abolition at a time when such movements were being born in Spain and Cuba, on the other, diplomats, cabinet officials, and presidents expressed concern that free Africans in Cuba might revolt, set up their own government, foster black rebellion in the United States, and thus undermine a whole economic and social system in the South. Throughout the 1840s and 1850s this theme appeared in many diplomatic talks concerning Spanish-American relations and no more so clearly as during the days of the Ostend Manifesto and the problems associated with the *Black Warrior*.

Soulé reflected the fears and concerns of the American government and of the South in this matter. On various occasions he made clear to British, French, and Spanish diplomats that part of the motivation for the Ostend Manifesto was precisely to avoid the Africanization of Cuba. He accused the British of fostering such a possibility, thus forcing Americans to consider Cuba's annexation as "absolutely necessary for the peaceful existence of the Southern States of the Union." It would be difficult to argue that the fear of Africanization did not have a significant impact on U.S.-Spanish relations during this era because without this concern much of the motivation for wanting to take Cuba from Spain would have not existed.[11]

The controversy resulting from the Ostend conference, regardless of motivations, along with per-

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1854, *Ibid.*; Turgot to Drouyn de Lhuys, No. 66, March 25, 1854, *Ibid.*/843; Viluma to Calderon de la Barca, No. 298, "Confidential," May 16, 1854, Sp/corr/Fr/1506; Min. of St. to Cueto, "Reserved," May 7, 1854, Sp/pol/USA/2401.

[9] Mason to Marcy, July 5, 1854, Marcy Papers; Montemoir to Min. of St., No. 53, November 10, 1854, Sp/Soulé personnel file/legajo 227, file 665.

[10] H. L. Janes, "The Black Warrior Affair," *American Historical Review* **12** (1907): pp. 280–298.

[11] Ettinger, *The Soulé Mission to Spain* on the Africanization fear, pp. 21–28, 273–274, and on impact on Ostend Manifesto, pp. 186, 248, 456–458.

sonnel problems in the legation, finally led Pierce and Marcy to remove Soulé from Madrid. When in February, 1855, he left Spain, the highly relieved Spanish immediately offered to compensate the owners of the *Black Warrior* in an attempt to reduce friction. Washington gladly accepted this offer and the incident rapidly came to a close. The immediate crisis of the past two years declined, but bitterness remained in both capitals. During the period when Soulé served in Madrid, Spain had attempted to avoid war by maintaining a low diplomatic profile. Because the United States appeared as the potential aggressor, Spain enjoyed much official and public sympathy in Europe. Yet Madrid did not realize in February, 1855, that the United States had already decided to retreat from its bellicose Cuban policy thereby altering relations between them. Although Soulé's withdrawal from Spain appeared to indicate a change in policy, General Espartero could not be sure; and, therefore, he faced the spring and summer of 1855 with apprehension.[12]

In fact, Soulé's withdrawal proved sufficiently significant to warrant a brief summary of what the two countries now faced. Each side had badly irritated the other. Both entertained precise objectives which perhaps might have been achieved by other means; but, at least in Washington's case, abrasive diplomacy characterized these years. The only explanation that applies in general terms to the question of why relations remained acrimonious is that each misinterpreted the other's goals and the various factors weighing on the minds of policy makers. Both appointed envoys who did not understand the people with whom they negotiated. In Soulé's case especially, personality clashes with Spaniards indicated he lacked any understanding of Spanish culture. The bitter fruits of these days thus added to the bumper crop of past conflicts.

Soulé's removal from Madrid only temporarily reduced tensions between Spain and the United States. Irrespective of the president's wish to avoid repeating his previous mistakes, or of Espartero's hopes for more peaceful relations, during the next two years (1855–1857), serious problems remained. The *Black Warrior's* heritage soon surfaced. For example, Soulé's belligerent politics had irritated his Secretary of Legation, Horatio J. Perry, who had attempted to counteract his superior's efforts while in Madrid.[13] He wrote Marcy about the envoy on several occasions and, once back in the United States, the ex-minister condemned Perry's correspondence. Their quarrel soon became a newspaper topic and by the end of the summer Perry was relieved of his duties for allowing the quarrel to become public.[14] Anti-Soulé newspapers in the United States defended Perry, arguing that he simply tried to prevent a war. In both countries, many felt his dismissal reflected Washington's continued desire to obtain Cuba even at the price of war.[15]

While the controversy was drawing public attention, other concerns developed. Pierce selected as Soulé's replacement an Iowa politician, August C. Dodge. The new envoy came from the Democratic Party and sympathized with the South's view of slavery and Cuba.[16] Beyond that his qualifications were questionable. The *New York Times* editorialized that "his active capacity for evil is exceedingly limited. He has neither the intellect nor the education necessary to give his counsels much weight, or to originate any special scheme of diplomatic wickedness," further stating that since he lost his bid for reelection to the Senate, the president wanted to find him a post. The Washington *Union*, an administration paper, defended him against such personal attacks. It is difficult to discern, therefore, whether the majority of the American press approved his appointment or not.[17] Marcy felt that Dodge would "follow instructions at all events" and his view was the most important. One independent newspaper in Madrid summarized local opinion by endorsing his appointment while the government made no comments. When Dodge presented his credentials in June, 1855, officials treated him politely.[18]

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[12] Langley, *The Cuban Policy of the United States*, pp. 48–49. The personnal problems concerned differences of opinion between Soulé and his secretary of legation, Horatio J. Perry.

[13] For biographical data on Perry (1824–1891) consult Francis Erskine (ed.), *The Attaché in Madrid or Sketches of the Court of Isabella II* (New York, 1856), pp. 72–73; Edward Wheelwright, *The Class of 1844, Harvard College Fifty Years' After Graduation* (Cambridge, 1896), pp. 173–184; Clifford L. Egan, "An American Diplomat in Spain: Selected Civil War Letters of Horatio J. Perry," *Lincoln Herald* (Summer, 1971), pp. 67–75.

[14] William Barnes and J. H. Morgan, *The Foreign Service of the United States. Origins, Development, and Functions* (Washington, 1961), p. 72; Perry to Marcy, February 6, March 2, April 28, May 26, 1855, Marcy Papers; Marcy to Perry, May 26, 1855, US/instructions/Sp/15; Britain's envoy predicted more problems for Spain and the U.S. as a result, Howden to Clarendon, "Private," June 22, 1855, Public Record Office, Foreign Office 72/vol. 867 (hereafter cited FO record group/vol.). The Spanish account favored Perry, Cueto to Min. of St., June 11, 1855, Sp/corr/USA/1467.

[15] *Daily National Intelligencer*, September 18, 1885, p. 1 and September 28, 1885, p. 3; *New York Times*, May 5, 1855, p. 3, May 10, 1855, p. 1, May 23, 1855, p. 1, June 6, 1855, p. 4, November 26, 1855, p. 1; for a sampling of Spanish press reaction see *New York Times*, May 10, 1855, p. 1; *Las Novedades*, June 24, 1855, pp. 1–2, July 5, 1855, p. 1; *El Diario Español*, April 14, 1855, pp. 1–2; *La Epoca*, April 16, 1855, p. 2.

[16] For biographical data on Dodge (1812–1883), Louis Pelzer, *Augustus Caesar Dodge* (Iowa City, 1908).

[17] *New York Times*, May 3, 1855, p. 4; Pelzer, *Augustus Caesar Dodge*, pp. 197–198.

[18] Quoted in Spencer, *The Victor and the Spoils*, p. 336; *Las Novedades*, March 27, 1855, p. 2; the British reported that Spanish officials thought Dodge would be as "amicable as possible," Howden to Clarendon, No. 234, June 7, 1855, F072/867; Perry to Marcy, June 10, 1855, US/desp/Sp/39. *La Epoca* expressed similar hopes, May 14, 1855, p. 3.

Soulé's views and the attitudes of many Democrats, particularly those of the South, formed a key issue in Spanish-American relations over Cuba. Soulé represented an important element in American society that aggressively sought to acquire Cuba and which wanted to convert the island into one or more states as a means of gaining pro-slavery votes in the Congress. As the decade of the 1850s grew older, fierce rivalry between the slave holding and free states increased in intensity, leading each side to search for more votes in newly acquired territories. Hence much of the furor over Kansas, for example, and interest in Cuba. Along with economic concerns over sugar and cotton trade and the fear of Africanization, the element of domestic political events thus proved important to the South. To the slave holding portions of the nation Cuba offered the opportunity to obtain up to four new slave states with congressional votes and added economic strength for the cotton-based Southern economy. Thus the South would be able to redress a growing political imbalance that was beginning to favor the free states. Soulé's appointment and actions, therefore, were symbols of an attitude and a real gesture favoring one faction in the American political scene. His appointment was one that would provide a perspective on Cuba's role in American-Spanish relations for a number of years.

Some controversy also developed in Spain's search for a new envoy to the United States. Like Soulé, Cueto opposed the settlement of the *Black Warrior* affair, arguing Spain had been within her rights to seize the ship. As a consequence of his stubborn attitude, the United States asked for his recall "immediately." Similarly, Cueto enjoyed about as popular a following in the United States as Soulé did in Spain. He, too, spent the summer of 1855 involved in a press controversy over his mission. Cueto found little approval in Madrid's press although ultra-conservative elements hostile to Washington generally defended his conduct. Finally, Alfonso de Escalante, a close friend of Espartero and a member of the Cortes, received the appointment. The United States interpreted his commission as a conciliatory gesture on the part of Spain for peace and Pierce welcomed him in October without incident.[19]

While the two governments struggled with personnel problems, more fundamental issues attracted their attention. Although the American government in the summer of 1855 had not abandoned its efforts to acquire Cuba, but rather wanted to do so by pacific means, events seemed to indicate otherwise. At the start of the year, Cuban officials uncovered a significant revolutionary plot in Cuba. Spain suspected the United States of involvement. Of greater concern to Washington was the blockade established around the island by the Cuban Captain General to ward off filibusters. American officials realized that such a blockade could seriously jeopardize their nation's trade with the colony. In an attempt to have the blockade lifted, Marcy dissuaded revolutionary elements in the United States from invading the island. John Quitman's filibustering expeditions, which originally had the president's blessings, now received no government encouragement. Spaniards believed the United States was still doing little to stop such escapades. Throughout that spring reports came into Madrid about groups being outfitted or supported in various parts of the Republic.[20]

The Cuban revolutionary plot excited colonial officials and the Spanish public. The Cortes discussed the issue at some length. One of Spain's more informed officials, Francisco Serrano y Dominguez, told the legislators that troops reinforcements had just sailed for the colony. Another delegate, Sebastiano Olózaga, suggested "that we should give our entire support to the government on this occasion," something rarely done during these years. As always when Cuba appeared threatened, partisan politics melted away. Spanish diplomats in Washington reported during March that filibustering expeditions would lead to war. The Spanish envoy believed, along with his French and British colleagues, that Pierce would avoid the risk of "a declaration of war that the nation does not desire." [21]

British activities complicated the picture for all involved. The United States, not wanting to irritate Spain out of fear that Great Britain would support Madrid, also had problems with London. At the time, the British were recruiting in the United States for the Crimean war contrary to Washington's wishes. If Spain asked for help, London might agree to stop recruiting in the United States only in return for some formal commitment by Washington to leave Cuba alone. Believing that London's influence in Madrid could also be decisive, Marcy worried about the British factor and at first had a difficult time making other

[19] *New York Times*, August 4, 1855, p. 2; Turgot to Drouyn de Lhuys, No. 196, May 10, 1885, Fr/pol/Esp/847; *Las Novedades*, July 13, 1855, p. 1; Dodge to Marcy, No. 5, July 10, 1855, US/desp/Sp/40; ed.'s note, William R. Manning, *Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States: Inter-American Affairs, 1831–1860,* 11, *Spain* (Washington, 1939), p. 218 (hereafter cited Manning, *Spain*).

[20] Chester S. Urban, "The Idea of Progress and Southern Imperialism: New Orleans and the Caribbean, 1845–1861" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University, 1943), pp. 631–646; Portell Vilá, *Historia de Cuba en sus relaciones con los Estados Unidos y España* 2: pp. 98–106; many such reports are in Sp/pol/USA/2402.

[21] *Gaceta de Madrid*, March 9, 1855, pp. 1–4; Perry to Marcy, March 8, 1885, US/desp/Sp/39; Cueto to Min. of St., No. 34, March 12, 1855, Sp/pol/USA/2402; Cueto to Min. of St., No. 47, March 26, 1855, *Ibid.*; Cueto to Min. of St. No. 66, April 23, 1855, Sp/corr/USA/1467; quote in Cueto to Min. of St., No. 84, May 21, 1855, Sp/pol/USA/2402.

members of the cabinet, such as Caleb Cushing, aware of the problem.[22]

Indeed England and France influenced Spain's Cuban policy considerably. Madrid was able to prevent British recruiting in Spain in part by listening to London's recommendations regarding Cuba. Moreover, Spanish officials did not want London to become further involved in Cuban affairs—something that could become more difficult to prevent if relations deteriorated with the American government. Both the United States and Spain knew that the British considered the Cuban issue a fundamental part of their policies toward Washington and Central America. The English also used Cuba as a point of cooperation with France throughout the 1850s and no reason existed to suggest that this avenue of communication would be cut in the near future. In fact, both European powers attempted to block American expansion into Cuba in 1855 by diplomatic cooperation.[23]

Despite these European machinations, filibustering remained of prime concern to Spanish officials in the United States during April and May . The press in Spain reported that Soulé encouraged such expeditions. Protests were registered with the American government, but to no avail. American newspapers reported mass arrests in Cuba, called for the formation of military units to free the island, and suggested that Spain sell the colony. Some journals such as the New York *Herald*, scoffed at any suggestion of war in response to belligerent Southern editorials.[24]

Concurrent with filibustering were two other events: another maritime incident and the issuance of initial instructions to Dodge before leaving for Madrid. On March 6, a Spanish warship, *El Dorado*, stopped an American vessel off Cuba for forty-five minutes to check her papers. Coming on the heels of the *Black Warrior* affair and the Ostend Manifesto, the incident rapidly took on serious proportions. Within days, Southern newspapers were screaming for revenge while discussing freedom of the seas. The Pierce Administration also allowed its own supporters to protest. One scholar, Robert B. Leard, held that the administration gave the event an undeserved importance in order to divert public attention from domestic problems.[25] To a certain extent this was true since the incident could be used to increase support for the government. But to give this motive primary importance makes little sense since the risk of war with Spain would have been too high a price to pay merely to broaden public support for the Democratic Party.

Southern cotton dealers would find little profit in such a conflict since much of their produce sailed near Cuba on its way to Europe. Also, Marcy and Cushing, who often displayed caution in critical situations, probably would not want to deviate from their previous prudence. Rather, the incident should be viewed as another example of American frustration over Cuban maritime rights, trade problems, and concern over treatment of nationals in Cuba. In fact, the incident proved more useful as another excuse to be used by the United States to negotiate for a commercial treaty covering Cuban-American problems. Perhaps more for this reason than any other, the United States could justify the policy it implemented.

The secretary of state told the Spanish envoy that such maritime occurrences would make it "impossible to preserve peace between Spain and the United States." In his report of the meeting, the minister noted that Marcy never mentioned warlike threats to him before. He responded to Marcy that Spain only meant to monitor traffic in Cuban waters in order to arrest all possible filibusters; American trade and honor were not being hampered or insulted. Marcy in turn demanded reparations and punishment for those guilty of violating international law.[26] During this exchange many American newspapers ran articles critical of the Spanish position. A typical comment came from the *New York Times* which editorialized that "a large majority of the people of the United States are in favor of the acquisition of Cuba," in part, to avoid such incidents.[27] Was this a game of bluff being played by the United States? Perhaps; at least the Spanish took the Americans seriously enough to worry.

The Spanish legation in Washington informed Madrid that an American naval squadron had recently arrived in the Cuban area to protect other ships. Despite his complaints about their violating Cuban waters, Marcy told the Spanish envoy the United States could no longer recognize maritime rights beyond three miles. Yet the Spaniard reported that Pierce hesitated to push for war since he would not have the nation's backing in such an adventure.

[22] M. M. C. Hodgson, *Caleb Cushing Attorney General of the United States, 1853–1857* (Washington, 1955), pp. 181, 210.

[23] Perry to Marcy, No. 14, undated, US/desp/Sp/39; Kenneth Bourne, *Britain and the Balance of Power in North America, 1815–1908* (Berkeley, 1967), pp. 180–185.

[24] Cueto to Min. of St. in a series, No. 57, April 9, 1855, No. 72, May 1, 1855, No. 77, May 2, 1855, Sp/pol/USA/2402; *Las Novedades*, April 1, 1855, p. 2 and April 28, 1855, p. 1. In contrast *La Iberia* reported relations were not that dangerous with the U.S., May 4, 1855, p. 1. *New York Times*, April 4, 1855, p. 2, April 14, 1855, p. 4, April 18, 1855, p. 4; New York *Herald*, April 23, 1855, p. 1.

[25] Robert B. Leard, "Bonds of Destiny: The United States and Cuba, 1848–1861" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, 1953), pp. 203–211. Leard's work influenced most historians working on Cuban-American topics.

[26] Quote in Cueto to Min. of St., No. 42, March 19, 1855, Sp/pol/USA/2402; Manning, *Spain*, pp. 201–204; Cueto to Marcy, March 31, 1855, IS/notes/Sp/15; Cueto to Min. of St., No. 51, April 3, 1855, Sp/pol/USA/2402 summarizes this press.

[27] *New York Times*, April 9, 1855, p. 4.

Madrid ordered their representative to defend Spain's position in the face of such grave dangers.[28]

Marcy commented to a friend: "I am entirely opposed to getting up a war for the purpose of seizing Cuba; but if the conduct of Spain should be such as to justify a war, I should not hesitate to meet that state of things." Dodge demanded reparations in line with this peaceful policy on the grounds that a ship detained ten miles from shore constituted a violation of international law and practice. He further called for a clarification of Spain's position regarding her territorial limits off Cuba but received no satisfaction.[29]

While both governments argued in public whether the incident took place in Cuban waters or not, behind the scenes their sensitivity to national honor and concern about basic questions of legal rights and wrongs filled many dispatches. Pierce wanted to settle the legal aspect at the same time that he used the *El Dorado* incident as an excuse to ask for a commercial treaty. The Spanish determined in May not to let the affair disturb relations with the United States or force them into negotiating a treaty before they were ready to do so. Spanish diplomats felt that it could not really be determined whether the ship had been illegally stopped and worse, they feared that the "forces of reason" in the United States might give way to those wishing to seize Cuba. The Spanish envoy reported that he did not believe "there is much danger of collision between the United States and Spain," yet concluded that Spain would not emerge from the crisis with advantages since the United States would continue to press for a three-mile limit.[30]

Marcy told the Spanish envoy in late October that the three-mile limit should be recognized by Spain before Congress met, implying that if this were not done, the legislators would complicate matters since the incident constantly received public attention. The blackmail attempt obviously received the president's approval since he mentioned *El Dorado* in his annual address saying the incident would soon be closed and an agreement worked out to "prevent the recurrence of difficulties in Cuba." [31]

The case dragged on through 1856 with no settlement. Spain did not like the belligerent attitude of the United States, and therefore in January decided to approve the act of the Spanish navy in stopping the ship as a way to save public face at home. Ten months later Dodge protested again as an excuse to propose the sale of Cuba to his government. Spain refused to budge from its stand. By 1859, the United States concluded that Spain would never settle the case, reluctantly retiring it as a bargaining tool.[32]

What gave the affair more significance, however, were Marcy's initial instructions to Dodge written on May 1—after the event took place. Since Spaniards fully appreciated what Washington attempted to accomplish by means of the incident, they waited for Dodge to arrive with his new instructions. His lengthy orders began with the statement: "The President considers the incorporation of Cuba into the American Union, essential to the welfare both of the United States and Cuba." Moreover, added Marcy, Cuba would inevitably gravitate into the United States. Brushing aside the question of Spanish honor, which Spain feared would be damaged should Cuba be sold by recalling that Spain earlier had done just that with the Floridas, Marcy declared that the United States "reiterate the declaration of our continued readiness to negotiate with Spain for the cession of the Island of Cuba to the United States." If Spain proved uncooperative, Pierce would look for other means to insure the good relations between Madrid and Washington, implying the seizure of Cuba. Also, the president wanted "arbitrary" acts against Americans in Cuba to stop. The United States Consul in Havana needed permission to negotiate the settlement of minor incidents directly with the Cuban Captain General rather than refer such questions to Madrid. Finally Marcy ordered Dodge "to negotiate a new commercial treaty" which included Cuban trade.[33]

The two most immediate tasks before Dodge—Cuba's purchase and the negotiation of a commercial treaty—were not new goals by any means but they would be difficult to achieve and not because of a lack of effort on his part. By 1854, the minister had gone on record with a view on Cuba whole-heartedly approved by Pierce and Marcy and in part by Soulé and Buchanan. He told the Congress:

> I want Cuba; first, because it would greatly increase our national wealth and strength; secondly, because . . . it would be a point whence the commerce of the southwest, and most of the northwest, could be assailed and annihilated. I want Cuba as soon as it can be fairly, honorably obtained.[34]

But he did not believe war with Spain over Cuba could be rationalized, at least not yet. "It has always seemed

[28] Cueto to Min. of St., No. 60, "Very Confidential," April 12–13, 1855, Sp/corr/USA/1467; Min. of St. to Cueto, May 1, 1855, Sp/pol/USA/2402.

[29] Quote in Manning, *Spain*, pp. 214–217, data from 878–886, 218–219; memorandum by Min. of St., May 13, 1855, Sp/pol/USA/2402.

[30] Quote from Cueto to Min. of St., No. 95, June 12, 1855, Sp/corr/USA/1467; Cueto to Min. of St., No. 117, July 8, 1855, Sp/pol/USA/2402.

[31] Escalante to Min. of St., No. 154, October 29, 1855, Sp/pol/USA/2402; Richardson, *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, V, 336.

[32] Becker, *relaciones exteriores* 2: pp. 342–345; Manning, *Spain*, pp. 897–901, 223–224, 908–911; Min. of St. to García Tassara, August 19, 1857, Sp/corr/USA/1468; on Cass to Preston, Manning, *Spain*, p. 231.

[33] Manning, *Spain*, pp. 210–214.

[34] *Congressional Globe*, 33rd Congr., 1st sess., Appendix, p. 381.

to me that the great battle for Cuban annexation was to be fought at home and between the respective parties of our own country."[35] Like many of his contemporaries, he too did not understand the depth of Spain's determination to keep Cuba and overestimated his country's ability to obtain the colony.

In order to ease pressure and possibly deny the United States an arguing point in any purchase diplomacy, Spain lifted the Cuban blockade on May 23 allowing American trade with the colony to resume. Some American newspapers quickly picked up the message and in the following days called for better relations between the two nations. Later during the same year, diplomats quickly resolved other minor claims with the exception of *El Dorado*'s. Negotiations on Cuba did not change. The reshuffling of the queen's cabinet in June failed to produce a new Spanish policy toward the United States.[36] Dodge complained that the Spanish press totally opposed the sale of Cuba. In fact, he quoted a paper in the capital to show the intensity of Spanish feelings on the matter: "Spain will never abandon Cuba till she burns her last cartridge." He grumbled that the talks could not even be conducted:

> Influenced by the same false pride and disregard of their own interests, of our interests, and of those of the civilized world, Spain, it seems to me, is determined to act towards us in reference to Cuba as Mexico did respecting Texas.[37]

Minister of State Zavala told Dodge, "the cession of Cuba to any power . . . was a measure so remote from the intuition of Spain that there were not two men in the Kindgom favorable to such a cession," further adding "that as an officer and a Spaniard it was a subject painful to him even to talk about or to consider." [38]

By the end of 1855, further reports of filibustering gave Spanish officials more excuse for refusing to consider all sale ideas. During the month of December alone, a flood of dispatches left the Spanish legation for Madrid describing various expeditions currently forming. The validity of these stories is unimportant. The fact that Spanish authorities took them seriously justifies their significance. As usual, complaints yielded no results, leaving to Escalante the futile task of merely reporting these activities to his government by sending Madrid hundreds of American news articles as evidence of extensive filibustering.[39]

Negotiations for a commercial treaty also fared very badly in 1855. Numerous serious economic differences slowed the talks. The United States wanted permission to sell Cuba flour on an equal basis with any Spanish merchant but this ran into strong opposition from Andalusian wheat interests who wanted to preserve the duty structure for their own profit. Spanish authorities were also reluctant to negotiate a treaty for fear that American economic interests would grow in Cuba to their detriment. It would be foolish to disrupt too much what Madrid considered a favorable trade relationship with Cuba with an overabundance of American competition, evidence for which lay in the increased trade from the United States to Cuba during the first half of the 1850s.[40]

The talks were further crippled by individuals. Frustrated, Dodge penned an amusing yet irritating letter indicating part of the problem:

> I have come to the conclusion that it will be impracticable to effect it during the continuance in place of the present Minister of Foreign Affairs, General Juan de Zavala . . . owing to a general want of civil capacity, business capabilities and attention to the affairs of his office combined with the most extraordinary want of memory I ever met in any man in or out of official station. He rarely ever meets an appointment and never seems to remember what was said or promised in the last conference.

Dodge complained that the general remembered the treaty only when the envoy mentioned it. The British and French representatives experienced the same problem.[41] Howden further believed Spain would only negotiate with the United States once she had decided to sign agreements with France and Great Britain as well.[42] This made sense since a major portion of any

[35] Dodge to Marcy, October 8, 1855, Marcy Papers.

[36] Cueto to Min. of St., No. 89, May 30, 1855, Sp/corr/USA/1467; *Daily National Intelligencer*, June 1, 1855, p. 2 and June 5, 1855, p. 5; *New York Times*, June 1, 1855, p. 2; Dodge to Marcy, October 14, 1855, US/desp/Sp/40 and Dodge to Marcy, No. 21, December 28, 1855, *Ibid.* General Juan de Zavala (1804–1879) was appointed to the Foreign Office on June 8, 1856.

[37] *Las Novedades*, July 20, 1855, p. 1; Manning, *Spain*, p. 875, Dodge quote from p. 874.

[38] Memorandum of conversation, August 25, 1855, US/desp/Sp/40.

[39] Escalante to all consuls, December 4, 1855, Charleston Consular Papers, Duke University (hereafter cited CCP); Escalante to Min. of St., No. 167, December 11, 1855, Sp/corr/USA/1467; Cueto to Min. of St. in a series, No. 170, December 15, 1855, No. 175, December 24, 1855, No. 176, December 31, 1855, *Ibid.*

[40] Perry to Marcy, June 10, 1855, US/desp/Sp/39; Memorandum of conversation, August 25, 1855, *Ibid.*/40; Eustaquio Toledano, *Historia de los tratados, convenios y declaraciones de comercio entre España y las démas potencias* (Madrid, 1858), pp. 116–117, 119, 181–212. During the first half of the 1850s, Spain made trade between Cuba and the U.S. easier due to food shortages in the colony.

[41] Dodge to Marcy, "Private," No. 26, April 10, 1856, US/desp/Sp/40. Lord Howden commented, "The Spanish government, as a whole, are occupied with nothing but the difficulty they find in living from day to day and the Minister for Foreign Affairs individually is wholly incapable of conducting anything of so grave a nature as a treaty with the United States," Howden to Clarendon, No. 336, December 1, 1855, F072/871. On the frustrated talks between France and Spain, Octave Noël, *Histoire du commerce extérieur de la France depuis la révolution* (Paris, 1879), pp. 202–264.

[42] Howden to Clarendon, undated (spring, 1856) copy in US/desp/Sp/40.

such treaty would revolve around the Cuban trade and Spain knew how sensitive Paris and London were to changes of any sort in the Caribbean.

While the problem of Zavala's incompetence could not be swept away, Marcy believed objections to such a treaty might be. In September he sent Dodge specific instructions to ask for a reduction of duties on flour shipped to Cuba, Puerto Rico, and Spain due to currently low Spanish wheat stocks. However, the Pierce Administration came to a close in March, 1857, without the badly wanted commercial treaty or even with meaningful negotiations in progress.[43]

Because Spain continued to be concerned with filibustering attempts and acquisition rhetoric in 1856, all discussions about commercial arrangements were viewed by Madrid with the possible loss of Cuba in mind. Escalante reported to his government in the spring the president's insensitivity to Spain's hold on the island and expressed the view that Marcy approved of the "filibustering spirit of his friends." [44] Walker's missions into Nicaragua from the United States especially posed a threat to Cuba and Spaniards quickly connected these efforts to Cuban filibustering.

During 1855 and 1856, William Walker attempted to conquer Nicaragua. He received considerable public support in the United States especially from Southerners who saw his efforts as a stepping stone to Cuba. Pierce, claiming partial credit for Walker's successes, said that the filibuster's new government received "the assistance and cooperation of a small body of citizens of the United States." [45] Cubans also helped Walker from New York in hopes of receiving his aid in liberating Cuba. Washington's recognition of his government in the fall of 1856 led Spaniards to conclude that if the United States were willing to recognize a "pirate" government born as a result of destroying a legally constituted one, then little doubt remained that the same government would support illegal efforts to overthrow Madrid's control over Cuba. The Spanish press agreed and condemned American newspapers for not criticizing Washington's policy toward Central American revolutionaries.[46] The minister of state instructed Escalante to avoid creating a crisis out of the Nicaraguan problem which might jeopardize Cuba's security.[47] Spain quietly held back in its dealings with Washington waiting to see if the entire area of the Gulf of Mexico would explode into an international crisis. After all, if Walker's efforts failed, there would be no need to make an issue out of his expeditions.

Spain did not rely solely on avoiding confrontations with the United States to protect her colony. As in previous years, Madrid turned to London and Paris for commitments to prevent the United States from seizing the island. England, as usual, expressed little interest in any formal pledge. Spain hoped to exploit the irritation London felt over Washington's encouragement of Walker but the British were not prepared to go to the brink of war with the United States in 1856. Howden raised another problem as well: "if the Spanish government know, or feel, that England and France will infallibly protect Cuba there is no imprudence they are not ready to commit with the small army and the wretched fleet they have collected." [48]

France also took great interest in American activities in the Gulf of Mexico. Like England and Spain, she too felt the threat of Washington's policies toward Cuba and the Walker expeditions. Central America's independence and European trade with the New World could suffer by such conditions. France had considerable economic and political interests in Mexico to protect. French officials wanted to take some undefined, yet determined, action against the United States, but not alone. Their message to Spain stressed the need for "concerted" measures requiring British participation. Without such a multi-national effort, Paris hesitated to give Madrid any formal promise of support.[49] At least Paris found a clever way of turn down Spain's request without actually saying no.

Aside from Spain's European efforts, Madrid attempted to develop a Latin American alliance aimed at protecting Cuba while directing it against the United States. Madrid saw the New World's governments as natural allies forged by common cultural experiences and bonded by the threat of an expanding United States. Escalante reported in February, 1856, that he had "left nothing undone . . . with the representatives here of Spanish America in order that they might

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[43] Dodge to Zavala, July 2, 1856, *Ibid.*; Marcy to Dodge, No. 35, September 25, 1856, US/inst/Sp/15.

[44] Escalante to Min. of St., No. 45, March 13, 1856, Sp/corr/USA/1468.

[45] Richardson, *Messages and Papers of the Presidents* **V**: pp. 371–373; *Las Novedades* editorialized, for example, that "the filibuster Walker in Central America has for us an importance and consequence that is not possible to hide . . . concerning the preservation of our precious and coveted Antilles," January 9, 1857, p. 1.

[46] Manning, *Spain*, pp. 901–902, 908; *Las Novedades*, November 16, 1856, pp. 1–2.

[47] Min. of St. to Escalante, March 11, 1856 and again, April 6, 1856, Sp/corr/USA/1468.

[48] Howden to Clarendon, No. 212, June 25, 1856, F072/894; quote in Howden to Clarendon, No. 229, June 30, 1856, *Ibid.*

[49] Memorandum, June 30, 1856, Fr/mémoires et documents/366; Comte de Comminger-Guitaud to Walewski, No. 82, August 29, 1856, Fr/pol/849. France was aware of Spain's concern. . . . the great battle that Spain has in that hemisphere is the Cuban struggle," Sartiges to Walewski, No. 17, June 23, 1856, *Ibid.*/848. Spain's new minister to the U.S. expressed the traditional Spanish view that France would support Spain on the Cuban issue in a note to General Narváez, then prime minister, January 13, 1857, Narváez Papers, Real Academia de Historia.

remove the peril which threatens those states from this powerful republic." He discussed with other Hispanic envoys assigned to Washington the formation of a confederation composed of Latin states and Brazil all agreeing not to attack each other and to come to the defense of fellow members. Other provisions included no surrendering of land to another nation; no concessions of road and canal rights to non-member countries; recognition of the right of people to change their national citizenship from one member to another; establishment of a confederation delegation center at Rio Janeiro, the diet to have sufficient power to settle diplomatic problems among members and to study conflicts between a member government and a non-member nation.[50]

Although Escalante was not the first Spaniard to propose such a confederation, his suggestion received attention in Madrid since Latin Americans had encouraged him and because Cuba appeared to be threatened by Washington. Zavala expressed interest in the project promising to study it for the potential impact on European affairs.[51] Zavala thought that not only would such a confederation help protect Cuba but it could provide the support Paris and London denied Spain in the New World. Commercial and cultural ties with America would grow further. However, Zavala wanted French and British approval of the project before moving forward on it. He instructed Escalante to work with his European colleagues in Washington and, of course, not let the United States government know of these negotiations.[52] Latin American diplomats approved of Madrid's concern over such threatening issues as Walker's expeditions and filibustering, especially in Central America. Spanish diplomats in Europe encouraged the development of an alliance but Latin American distrust for Spain, British reluctance to support the project, differences among the South Americans, and fear of the United States prevented Escalante from achieving his goal. Nevertheless, his efforts illustrated once again Spain's commitment to protect Cuba.[53]

The one other area in which Spain took the initiative to secure her interests lay in colonial policy. First, in order to appease the British, Madrid decided to reduce the slave trade into Cuba. This program continued to be in effect throughout the 1850s as succeeding captain generals in Havana tried to stop this traffic. The reduction of slavery also had as a purpose to appease North American opinion. Second, aware of his reputation for arbitrarily dealing with American citizens in Cuba, officials removed Captain General the Marquís de Pezuela from Havana after the *Black Warrior* affair in 1855, sending him to a post in Santander, Spain, where it was hoped his anti-American opinions would have no influence on relations. Orders went out to treat Americans with more deference. In practice, however, these policies and programs did not appease the United States.[54]

It should be emphasized that the Spanish government was aware of the role slavery played in American thinking and in international affairs of the Caribbean. Prior to the *Black Warrior* affair, the Spanish government made a genuine attempt for twenty years to reduce the slave trade to Cuba by increasing naval patrols around the island. Interceptions of slavers were twice as numerous in the 1850s as they had been during the period of the previous two decades. A number of captains general during this time also took aggressive steps to reduce the slave trade and thus were clearly symbols of the threat such policies posed for the southern part of the United States. Such governors as José de la Concha and the Marquís of Pezuela did reduce the trade and thus were enemies to the South. The removal of Pezuela, for example, was as much due to specific friction with the United States as it was to reducing the concerns of the South.[55]

Soon after the events in Cuba, Spain's diplomatic activity became more complicated due to the American presidential election of 1856 and because of a significant reversion to autocratic government at home. Running on the Democratic ticket against John C. Frémont and Millard Fillmore, Buchanan expressed his desire to acquire Cuba. Article five of his party's platform bluntly stated "every proper effort (will) be made to insure our ascendency in the Gulf of Mexico." To make things worse, Escalante knew that many Americans supported such an attitude. Statements that Cuba eventually would fall into American hands could be heard all over the country. No doubt, some of this rhetoric reflected election year excitement but Spain took note of it.[56] The Spanish legation reported the campaign and final outcome in detail and afterwards, Escalante expressed the hope that the influence

[50] Escalante to Min. of St., No. 20, February 28, 1856, Sp/corr/USA/1468.

[51] Min. of St. to Escalante, March 22, 1856, *Ibid.*

[52] *Ibid.*; English translation from Luis M. Perez, "Project of Latin-American Confederation, 1856," *American Historical Review* 12 (October, 1906): pp. 97–99.

[53] Escalante to Min. of St., No. 38, April 21, 1856, Sp/corr/USA/1468; Escalante to Min. of St., No. 44, May 5, 1856, *Ibid.*; Olózaga to Min. of St., No. 317, May 22, 1856, *Ibid.*

[54] F. W. Knight, *Slave Society in Cuba during the Nineteenth Century* (Madison, 1970), pp. 143–146; Min. of St. to Concha, January 8, 1855, Estado/esclavitud/8047, Archivo Histórico Nacional; New York *Times*, January 15, 1856, p. 2, April 30, 1856, p. 2; *Las Novedades*, April 8, 1856, p. 1.

[55] Knight, *Slave Society in Cuba*, 52, 92, 140.

[56] Kirk H. Porter and Donald Bruce Johnson, *National Party Platforms, 1840–1968* (Urbana, 1970), p. 26; *Congressional Globe*, 34th Cong., 1st sess., Appendix, pp. 1294–1297; A. C. Wilgus, "Official Expressions of Manifest Destiny Sentiments Concerning Hispanic America, 1848–1871," *Louisiana Historical Quarterly* 15 (July, 1932): pp. 486–506.

of presidential power would make Buchanan more responsible regarding Cuba.[57]

Domestic developments in Spain proved equally influential on international affairs. The nature of Iberian politics and the personalities involved led to a reconfirmation of Spain's traditional attitude toward the United States as she continued to employ what essentially were defensive tactics against the annexationist drive in America. Marked by a period of labor strikes, economic hardships, and general discontent with the central government, a series of revolts occurred which led to a widespread feeling of political uncertainty between 1854 and the end of the decade. Between October, 1856, when the strongly monarchist and semi-reactionary General Narváez once again assumed the leadership of the government and the time General Leopoldo O'Donnell came to power in June, 1858, liberals were pitted against conservatives, Carlist politicians worked against the interests of the throne, and political fortunes seemed precarious at best.

Three political generals dominated Spanish politics between 1854 and 1863. During the 1850s until the formation of the Liberal Union, Generals Espartero and Narváez influenced Spanish foreign policy. The third general, O'Donnell, had been the major architect of the revolution in 1854 but was relegated to a secondary position under Narváez, held a brief ministry of his own, and then broke with Narváez's ministry. However, his major era of power began in 1858 and ran into the mid-1860s. Meanwhile during the years of the Pierce and Buchanan administrations, Espartero and Narváez developed their country's reaction to American policies—an attitude that O'Donnell inherited. Both Espartero and Narváez mistrusted Washington and were sensitive to their nation's dignity yet worried about the security of the throne. Any crisis leading to war with the United States or the loss of Cuba would obviously have endangered the queen's power. Therefore, these two generals avoided international problems knowing that with her downfall, their own political fortunes would tumble.

They had much to worry about. One contemporary observer at Isabel's court wrote that "the government is vainly endeavoring to make its way through all the complications that impede its march." The same writer noted "parties are divided—civil war threatens the country . . . and the Carlist party naturally conceive hopes of success from the anarchy in which the country is plunged." Chaotic political conditions, marked by a sharp decline in the queen's popularity helped cripple government efficiency. Napoleon III feared that Isabel II would be toppled from her throne, thereby upsetting the balance of power in Europe.[58] No wonder Spanish authorities studied the American electoral campaign for omens of ill times ahead!

With Buchanan's election, Spain knew that another round of Cuban problems would start. In fact, earlier that year, officials in Madrid concluded that a better envoy more capable of reducing tensions with the United States should be stationed in Washington. Escalante's replacement, Gabriel García Tassara, arrived in the United States in the closing days of the Pierce administration. García Tassara, monarchist, conservative, even reactionary by Spanish political and social standards, enjoyed writing poetry more than delving into politics. Most important, the Foreign Office knew he would follow orders and not offend the United States. García Tassara had never made public his views on the North American republic and expressed his willingness to work quietly.[59]

The new envoy's initial instructions, dated December 7, were penned by the Minister of State after receiving some indication about the results to be expected from the American election. It is unlikely that he knew Buchanan had won, since returns took time to tabulate and communications across the Atlantic still required over a month. But the document anticipated Buchanan's victory. It began with a statement that relations between the two nations were always "susceptible to changes." Spain wanted to watch American activities relative to Cuba, ever careful to guard "the sacred rights of Her Majesty in the Cuban territory" and frustrate all filibustering activities. The Foreign Minister ordered García Tassara to cultivate friendships with high government officials, reporting back their Cuban views. All consuls were to coordinate their Cuban watch, keeping the captain general in Havana fully informed.

García Tassara was to encourage Cuban-Latin American and Canadian trade. While commercial relations with the United States, already massive with Cuba, were not to be discouraged, caution had to be exercised not to promote it with enthusiasm. Spain regarded the proposed American commercial treaty "prejudicial to our interests and also contrary to the laws of the country." Tied closely to this remained the problem of territorial waters as reflected in the yet

[57] Numerous election dispatches are in Sp/corr/USA/1468. *La Discusion* commented that at least his election would insure "peace and agreement between the North and the South," in preserving the Union, November 26, 1856, p. 3 while *Las Novedades* editorialized that his election "gave new life to the annexationists and to the partisans of slavery," December 31, 1857, p. 1.

[58] Quote in Erskine, *The Attaché in Madrid*, p. 367; John Edwin Fagg, "Isabel II and the Cause of Constitutional Monarchy," in Richard Herr and Herald T. Parker (eds), *Ideas in History, Essays Presented to Luis Gottschalk by His former Students* (Durham, 1965), pp. 254–256; Mason to Marcy, No. 156, August 2, 1856, US/desp/Fr/39.

[59] Dodge to Marcy, No. 36, October 11, 1856, US/desp/Sp/40; Escalante to Min. of St., No. 104, November 11, 1856, Sp/Escalante personnel file/legajo 86, file 4226. For biographical data on Tassara (1817–1885) see Mario Menéndez Bejareno, *Tassara, nueva biografía crítica* (Madrid, 1928).

unresolved case of *El Dorado*. "The federal government has the pretension of reducing the juridical sea limits of the Isle of Cuba to one maritime league or three miles," but Spain remained adamant in claiming a four league area around the colony. García Tassara was advised not to capitulate to American pressures or retreat on the question of maritime limits. In short, the entire set of instructions concerned Cuba in uncompromising language.[60]

Although other issues would begin to attract Spanish and American interests as the Civil War drew closer, even during the closing days of the Pierce administration, Cuba continued to be of paramount concern to both. Like a nemesis, during the years 1853–1857, annexation questions continued to plague both governments. Historians in the past believed that after the flurry of activity and resentment as a result of the *Black Warrior* case and the Ostend Manifesto, interest in Cuba declined both in the United States and Spain. Rather, the two governments continued to work diligently respectively to acquire Cuba or keep it. The American efforts were conducted with less flamboyant means than before. Spain continued to employ essentially defensive tactics in protecting her colony, but the intensity of Spanish concern for Cuba never diminished.

III. AN ELUSIVE CUBA

Buchanan's inauguration as president in March, 1857, signaled the start of a more intensified effort by the government of the United States to acquire Cuba. In summarizing his first speech, *La Epoca* reflected Spanish determination to retain Cuba by declaring "it will not be bought." *Las Novedades* warned its readers to be prepared for more American attempts to seize the island. Cueto, now writing anonymously for the ultra-conservative *El León*, reiterated the same forecast. García Tassara believed that the president would try to obtain Cuba by negotiations rather than by force. He speculated that the American would instruct his envoys to prepare the diplomatic groundwork for such talks. The Spaniard strongly argued that Buchanan could not risk a war over Cuba because of the sectional crisis in the United States. Moreover, British and French policy toward the Caribbean would continue to discourage any radical move by the president. Yet García Tassara predicted that some American effort would be made to gain their support in a purchase endeavor.[1]

[60] Min. of St. to García Tassara, December 7, 1856, Sp/corr/USA/1468. *El Diario Español* earlier indicated that a commercial treaty with the U.S. would seriously hurt Spanish interests in Cuba, April 15, 1855, p. 1.

[1] *La Epoca*, April 2, 1857, p. 2; *Las Novedades*, March 26, 1857, p. 1; *El Léon*, March 20, 1857, p. 1; García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 29, March 9, 1857, Sp/corr/USA/1468.

Much controversy surrounded Buchanan's Cuban policy. Clearly Americans believed Cuba would eventually fall into their hands. On this point both the protagonists of the 1850s and their historians agreed. Buchanan's first secretary of state, Lewis Cass, bluntly stated "I desire the possession of Cuba." William H. Seward, the secretary of state under Presidents Abraham Lincoln and Andrew Johnson, also believed in the inevitability of American acquisition. The Richmond, Virginia *Enquirer* proclaimed "Cuba is within an arm's reach, occupying a position by which nature would seem to have assigned it to our care." This pro-Buchanan paper reminded its readers, however, that the island should not be obtained by "connivance on the part of our government." Dodge wrote Buchanan from Madrid that "the acquisition of Cuba I am well aware from your early and unflagging advocacy of the measure, is one which will be cherished and promoted throughout your entire administration." Further, "it is emphatically an American question—one broad as our nationality, involving not only progress and civilization but even our security in time of peace." [2]

Historians argued over motives and the nature of Buchanan's policies for years. Some saw the drive for annexation as a Southern plot "to shore up the decaying hulk of slavery," while others viewed it as an assault against Spanish and even Cuban wishes.[3] The most common and traditional thesis held that this acquisition would benefit the American economy, increase military security, and raise the standard of living in Cuba—all not so easy to prove.[4] The important issues for the period 1857–1861 involved the nature of economic relations between Spain, the United States, and Cuba; the development of Buchanan's Cuban policy, in contrast to his predecessor's; and Spain's reaction. Surprisingly, historians have not provided sufficient analysis of the economics involved nor details on the actual diplomatic exchanges between the two governments. All too often, the reasons for annexation were given without any study of the specifics surrounding motives and actions.[5] The key question is how much was the drive for Cuba an American program rather than Buchanan's pet project?

[2] Richmond *Enquirer*, May 5, 1857, p. 1, December 22, 1857, p. 2; Dodge to Buchanan, September 26, 1857, quoted in Louis Pelzer, "The Diplomatic Correspondence of Augustus Caesar Dodge," *Historical Association Proceedings* 1 (1909): p. 119.

[3] Langley, *The Cuban Policy of the United States*, p. 51.

[4] Isidro Fabela, *Los Estados Unidos contra la libertad: estudios de historia diplomática americana* (Barcelona, 1921), pp. 49–53; James M. Callahan, *Cuba and International Relations* (Baltimore, 1899), pp. 298–306.

[5] Because of this lack of investigation, one knowledgeable historian wrote that there existed no adequate study of Cuban-American relations, Langley, *The Cuban Policy of the United States*, pp. ix–x.

Although national pride, manifest destiny, and military security have long been acknowledged as contributing factors in United States-Spanish-Cuban relations, historians often believed that economic factors played the major role in influencing diplomacy. Both nations knew that American commercial relations with Cuba were extensive. The United States wanted to expand this trade while the Spanish feared their interests would suffer as a consequence. At the same time, Cubans agitated for broader commercial freedom to trade with the United States.[6]

The North American republic sold to Cuba various items such as lumber, flour, codfish, canned goods, machines, and other manufactured consumer products. During the mid-1850s, Spanish sales of flour to Cuba did not meet local demand; therefore, the captain general asked Madrid on various occasions to reduce the high tariff on American grains. Spain, realizing that national wheat producers could not satisfy the colonial market, reluctantly lowered such duties as needed. Many Cubans welcomed the possibility of a Spanish-American commercial treaty because it would mean a permanent reduction in the cost of flour. Throughout the decade, Americans complained about Spain's hesitancy in encouraging North American wheat sales even in the face of flour shortages in the colony. The Spanish tariff significantly increased flour costs. In the 1850s, the tax on a barrel of American flour averaged $9.50 while for Spanish flour it was only $2.00.[7] To complicate matters, during the monetary crisis in the United States in 1857, Spaniards noticed related economic problems in Cuba where wheat sales fluctuated with the ebb and flow of the dollar's value. The decline in the number of dollars available in the Cuban market also made officials more aware that there were dangers in being too closely linked to the American economy.[8]

Cuba mainly sold sugar and molasses to the United States. The *New York Times* reported in 1858, for example, that the Republic purchased 89 per cent of these two Cuban products. The following year, 41.9 per cent of her trade on all items went to the United States while only twelve per cent went to the mother country. Sugar dominated this traffic. For instance, in 1855, 83.78 per cent of all Cuban exports was sugar, most of which went to North America. Cigars sold well also; so much in fact, that in 1857 when the economic crisis in the United States forced a sharp decline in cigar purchases, thousands of Cubans went unemployed.[9]

Spanish sales to Cuba remained important in this period but not to the same degree as Cuban-American trade. Although accurate trade figures are impossible to calculate, approximately nine per cent of Spain's exports went directly to Cuba in the 1850s. For the same decade, about eight per cent of Spain's imports came from the island, mostly in the form of sugar and tobacco. In comparison with the United States, the figures fluctuated. In 1855, Spain imported slightly more from Cuba than from the United States but by the end of 1860, imports exceeded Cuba's by about seven per cent. In exports, Spain sent to Cuba eleven times as much in 1855 as it did to the United States in the same year and by 1860, exports to Cuba had increased slightly more. The combined American and Cuban trade amounted to about 16 per cent of the total value of Spanish imports and exports in the decade.[10]

Of more importance to Spain were the revenues collected in Cuba. Spanish diplomats paid more attention to this economic factor when dealing with Cuban problems than to trade figures. The loss of revenues resulting from the sale of Cuba would have hurt the government's credit rating. It should be emphasized that economic conditions only partially influenced Spain's colonial policies since national pride in Cuba continued to be a significant consideration.[11] From the economic point of view, then, Spain's Cuban trade was not so extensive as might have otherwise been thought. In fact, the Cuban market was more important to the United States. The above figures on import and export commerce came from published contemporary sources; therefore, Spanish and American policy makers knew the relative importance of the Cuban trade to their respective countries. In strict economic terms, trade figures even suggested that being tied to Spain was enormously disadvantageous for Cuba and possibly served as a cause of difficulties on the island for the Spanish.

Since the Buchanan administration took the initiative in starting negotiations for purchase, greater discussion of the economic factors logically took place in

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[6] *New York Times*, May 3, 1858, p. 2; García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 19, March 13, 1858, Sp/corr/USA/1469; José Comas, *El mundo pintoresco: historia y descripción de los Estados Unidos* (Barcelona, 1868), p. 414.

[7] Leard, "Bonds of Destiny," p. 22.

[8] Ascensión Fornies Baigorri, *La vida comercial española, 1829–1885* (Zaragoza, 1968), p. 117.

[9] *New York Times*, May 3, 1858, p. 2; Knight, *Slave Society in Cuba*, pp. 44–45; Philip S. Foner, *A History of Cuba and Its Relations with the United States* (New York, 1963), 2: p. 138. The growth of American sugar production proved to be a source of decline for Cuban trade and concern to Spain especially in the 1870s and 1880s. For more details see James W. Cortada, "Economic Issues in Caribbean Politics: Rivalry between Spain and the United States in Cuba, 1848–1898," *Revista de Historia de America*, No. 88 (July–December, 1978), pp. 233–267.

[10] Spanish trade figures compiled from annual editions of *Cuadro general del comercio exterior de España* (Madrid, annual).

[11] Raymond Carr, *Spain, 1808–1939* (Oxford, 1966), p. 306; Hugh Thomas, *Cuba, The Pursuit of Freedom* (New York, 1971), p. 111.

the United States. One article in the *New York Times* summarized the relative merits of the Cuban trade for the United States within the context of sectional politics:

The states (southern) consider the acquisition of Cuba as a matter of special importance . . . . We do not:—nor are we surprised to find, among Southern men, that differences of sentiment and of action which the State deplores. The Cuban question is primarily a Northern question. The only way in which the acquisition of the island could benefit the South, would be by adding one more slave state to the Union and so increasing the political power of slavery. But Cuba, if acquired, must be a province before it is a State—and we shall have a half dozen more Free States before she enters the Confederacy.[12]

Carrying this logic one step further, the writer argued that Cuban sugar would then compete with Louisiana's because there would be no tariff to protect the southern cane grower. As opposed to agriculture, commerce could profit the most since Cuba purchased food and manufactured items from the North and very little that the South produced. Endowed with a climate similar to Cuba's, the South would acquire a competitor region where wages and standard of living were lower. The *New York Times* estimated that with Cuba in the Union, trade would increase by about ten to fifteen million dollars a year with most of this benefiting the North. Cuba's economic ties with manufacturers in New England and mid-western wheat growers bound her to the North. Northern capitalists would also invest their cash in Cuban plantations and cigar factories. Later, the same newspaper repeated this logic while adding that businessmen in New York, Boston, and Maine eagerly awaited Cuban annexation.[13]

While newspapers on both sides of the Atlantic discussed economic politics, the American government quietly began to formulate plans for continuing its drive for Cuba. In his inaugural address, Buchanan talked about acquiring the island. As García Tassara had predicted, the new government did its diplomatic homework. Old grievances with the Spanish received fresh attention. For examples, Dodge agitated for the captain general of Cuba to have power to settle minor diplomatic problems in Havana and called for a commercial treaty.[14] The envoy met with General Narváez, then head of the Spanish cabinet, to discuss Cuban policy. He told the Spaniard "we must always strongly sympathize with Cuba in any effort she might make for the establishment of her independence—but that Spain should not infer from this, that the government of the United States had any idea of forcibly seizing the island." He reminded Narváez that Washington's greatest interest lay more in expanding trade than in conquest. Understandably the Spaniard still feared the United States would make some effort to acquire the island. Dodge found out that Spain had sent an extra thirty thousand troops to the island in anticipation of further troubles with Washington in the summer of 1857.[15]

The envoy's confidence in reaching an agreement received another shock when on October 14, 1857, General Narváez left the cabinet due to lack of majority in the Cortes. The queen then turned to an obscure *moderado*, Francisco Armero de Peñaranda, to form a new government. Dodge at least understood Narváez's position regarding Cuba but he did not know what the new minister might do. He thought little of the new cabinet's abilities, one composed of colorless members of the *moderado* faction. The new foreign minister was Francisco Martínez de la Rosa, whom the envoy billed as one of the brighter members of the cabinet, calling him "an exceedingly urbane and accomplished gentleman—the very antipodes of his predecessor in all that relates to the *suaviter in modo*."[16]

Yet hardly had Dodge become reassured when the vagaries of Spanish politics intruded once again, interrupting normal diplomatic business. In January, Armero de Peñaranda's government fell. The queen searched for a new chief minister, finally settling on Francisco Javier Istúriz who chose to hold the portfolio of the Foreign Office as well. He selected a weak cabinet although his own personal qualifications to be Spain's chief diplomat seemed solid since he had served as minister to London and St. Petersburg. However, Dodge noted that Istúriz "is generally regarded as an honest and worthy gentleman, but by none as possessing the ability requisite to discharge with credit to himself and benefit to his country the duties . . . to which he has been called."[17] Like his predecessors, his abilities to survive in office and work with the temperamental queen were not good and, in fact, suggested that more cabinets would be formed in the near future. Yet this mattered little to Buchanan who still searched for the magic key that unlocked the door to Cuba.

Spain's political instability did not discourage Americans outside Spain from dreaming about Cuba. The president's old friend, John Y. Mason, still minister to Paris, wrote Cass: "I feel . . . that the time approaches when . . . the island of Cuba by fair and honorable purchase" will become part of the Republic. Mason outlined what Buchanan's attitude would be, merely, peaceful acquisition without resort to arms. And

[12] *New York Times*, April 8, 1858, p. 4.
[13] *Ibid.*, and May 3, 1858, p. 2.
[14] Richardson, *Messages and Papers of the Presidents* **V**: p. 436; Manning, *Spain*, pp. 922–923, 933–934; Dodge to Pidal, September 7, 1857, US/desp/Sp/41; Pidal to Dodge, September 29, 1857, *Ibid.*

[15] Manning, *Spain*, pp. 935–936.
[16] Dodge to Cass, No. 64, October 27, 1857, US/desp/Sp/41.
[17] Dodge to Cass, No. 72, January 18, 1858, *Ibid.*

in the fall, he mounted a major campaign along this line from Washington.[18]

For several years, friends of the president had proposed that one way to force the sale of Cuba would be to convince the Spanish government's creditors to put pressure on Queen Isabel to retire the national debt. She could do this with dollars raised from Cuba's sale. August Belmont, a close friend of Buchanan and an annexationist, repeatedly made this suggestion. Then in the fall of 1857, Christopher Fallon, a Philadelphia investor and financial adviser to Queen Mother María Christina, offered to talk with bankers in Rome, Paris, and London about pressuring the Spanish regime into redeeming the bonds it held. The president approved and Fallon sailed to Europe. The bankers liked the idea since they might finally receive some payment from the Spanish that way, but they doubted that their influence in Madrid would be sufficient to implement it successfully. They suggested that the American minister be supplied with an expense account to bribe key Spanish officials who could persuade the queen and cabinet to sell Cuba. Buchanan then attempted to appoint Belmont as minister to Spain and arm him with a slush fund. His plans failed since the Senate refused to confirm the appointment.[19]

Proponents of this dubious plan argued that Spain indeed owed over a half billion dollars to such houses as Rothschilds, Barings, and Loth. These financial firms also felt pessimistic about receiving payments in the near future.[20] Fallon's intimate connections with leading European bankers made Buchanan more than willing to try the scheme. Bribery, of course, was not uncommon in the Spanish government. Conditions seemed right for such a maneuver, but the president failed to appreciate the insulting nature of such a plot to Spain. To try and buy Cuba with duress would have sufficiently hurt Spanish sensibilities; but to attack the queen's government through the pocketbook could only have brought forth all of Isabel's stubbornness and fury. The Spanish learned of the plan soon enough and viewed the president's efforts with disgust and indignation. Yet since Buchanan's scheme was never carried out, Spain had no need to protest publicly, which in turn would have drawn attention to the nation's debt—something officials could do little to reduce. As a result of the plan becoming known in Madrid then, Cuba's purchase became more remote since the plot reinforced the government's determination not to surrender the island.[21]

Irrespective of the scheme's merits, the president in 1858 decided to seek a large enough appropriation from Congress to purchase Cuba. Since Dodge disapproved of bribery and was not so committed to acquiring the colony as Buchanan, the chief executive needed a new minister who would follow his orders enthusiastically. Finally, William Preston from Kentucky, a supporter of the president, received his commission on December 15, ending months of speculation in both countries on the question.[22] When word arrived in Madrid that Dodge might be replaced, the minister of state wrote García Tassara that it would be a shame to see him leave since Dodge had "a loyal and conciliatory spirit . . . contributing to the formation of peaceful relations that the Madrid cabinet wants to maintain with the Washington government." He wanted García Tassara to tell the State Department in an "extraofficial" way that Madrid liked Dodge and did not want him removed. The government feared his replacement might well be another Soulé. But this request came too late to block the appointment.[23]

During the previous months much speculation had also developed about Buchanan's next diplomatic move in public. The *New York Times* editorialized in January that the administration wanted Cuba to divert public attention from internal problems "and rally to its support the great mass of the people in all sections of the country." The paper also suspected that the president had military plans in mind. George W. Jones, a friend of Dodge, wrote to him in September that "the President is overwhelmingly committed . . . upon the Cuban question—aye even to attempting some *coup-de-état* (sic) by which we may acquire the queen of the Antilles." Reuben Davis, a Mississippi supporter of Buchanan, tried unsuccessfully to rally congressional approval for the president's Cuban program in June. He concentrated his efforts in the

[18] Mason to Cass, No. 284, December 12, 1857, US/desp/Fr/42.

[19] Leard, "Bonds of Destiny," pp. 224–226; John Bassett Moore (ed.), *Works of James Buchanan* (New York, 1960), **X**: p. 165; Belmont to Buchanan, November 22 and 30, 1852, March 3, 1853, September 25, 1854, Buchanan Papers, Library of Congress.

[20] Some controversy exists regarding the amount of Spain's debt. About half was owed to England while over a half million dollars was due to Americans, Leard, "Bonds of Destiny," pp. 224–225.

[21] García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 34, December 14, 1857, Sp/corr/USA/1468. Spain's reaction against the proposed sale spilled over into the Spanish press, *La España*, a pro-queen mother paper, argued that the "public spirit in Spain would rise against the government (that) would consent to such a sale," January 26, 1858, p. 1.

[22] Pelzer, *Augustus Caesar Dodge*, p. 232; Preston to Cass, October 6, 1858, US/desp/Sp/42. For biographical data on Preston (1816–1887) see Charles Lanman, *Biographical Annals of the Civil Government of the United States during Its first Century* (Washington, D.C., 1876), p. 345. Preston presented his credentials on March 16, 1859.

[23] Min. of St. to García Tassara, September 27, 1858, Sp/corr/USA/1469; García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 92, November 1, 1858, *Ibid.*

House, calling for a strong policy directed against Spanish tyranny toward Americans.[24]

With concern acute in Spain, *La España* announced that "Buchanan does not conceal his wish that the Island of Cuba should become a part of the American Union," predicting that its readers could anticipate further expeditions to the island. Dodge, commenting upon the press mood of the day, wrote: "how much so ever divided the Spanish press may be upon other questions—it speaks but one language upon that to which these articles refer." [25] In November, 1858, newspapers began predicting that Preston would continue the president's push for Cuba.. Spain's minister of state in November asked Dodge for an explanation of the various rumors on American policy. He wanted Buchanan to state publicly that the United States would not seize Cuba, reminding Dodge of the colony's strong defenses. The envoy assured him that Cuba would not be taken; Buchanan's interest lay in purchasing it, not in stealing Spain's property.[26]

Officials in Washington viewed Spanish diplomats as if they were a homogeneous group bent on denying the Republic her just rewards in the Caribbean, and in June, 1858, a man equal to Buchanan in his determination never to surrender Cuba came to power and with him other Spaniards who were united in their belief that the colony should never be sold. General Leopoldo O'Donnell, one of the more talented military politicians, received his portfolio on June 30 based on his promise to form a combination of liberal politicians into what became known as the Liberal Union. He governed Spain until March, 1863, staying in power so long because his Liberal Union along with his strong leadership gave Spain political tolerance in a period of economic prosperity. Because Spain and the United States would quarrel over Cuban problems, and others in Santo Domingo and Mexico during his years in office, O'Donnell's advent to power was significant; even if President Buchanan failed to realize this.

Dodge sensed that an important event had taken place in Spain and reported on the general in detail not matched in his other commentaries on Spanish politics. He predicted that O'Donnell would "be the master spirit and guiding genius of the government." The envoy praised his judgment and thought his cabinet good. He noted that O'Donnell's appointment involved radical changes since the general planned to replace a large number of officials. One exception for the time being would be Captain General José Gutiérrez de la Concha in Havana since his brother, Manuel, also a general, supported the new regime.[27]

The American envoy believed O'Donnell would stay in office longer than other generals because of his good relations with Queen Isabel, whom he had protected on previous occasions from rebellious subjects. Even his foes recognized that "although bred in the profession of arms, and ranking very high as a military man," he possessed "fine civil and administrative talents." Dodge said O'Donnell spoke and wrote well and his friends called him "bold, independent and decisive" with an "iron will." The envoy also commented that O'Donnell's experience as captain general in Cuba during the 1840s gave him intimate knowledge about American designs on the island which confirmed his resolve to thwart Buchanan's efforts.[28]

Napoleon III's reaction to O'Donnell's rise to power equaled Washingon's in importance since Paris always influenced the Cuban situation. The emperor took great interest in Spanish affairs knowing France could be influenced by them both domestically and internationally. He believed the general would be pro-French unlike Espartero who acted too much like an Anglophile. Napoleon thought O'Donnell might even make a good ruler for Spain. More important, the Spanish general gave indications of supporting the throne against its numerous detractors. The French ruler considered this of great importance since he wanted an ally in the Mediterranean who would not upset the balance of power in European international affairs.[29]

O'Donnell chose Saturnino Calderon Collantes as his foreign minister. The aged Calderon Collantes had served in the Cortes and later in cabinets headed by Espartero and Narváez. He started his political career as a liberal and ended it as a conservative.[30] Dodge took note of this new member of the cabinet, commenting that he "is much more a man of business than was his predecessor. He makes fair promises both personally and in writing." The envoy felt optimistic about being able to negotiate a settlement of outstanding claims with him, predicting that the only impasse to friendlier Spanish-American relations would be the "want of permanency in the government." [31] It was Calderon Collantes who told Dodge later in November that Spain could never sell Cuba, portending the unbending position of the new ministry.

Despite the new regime's outward display of confidence and its firm position on Cuba, Calderon Col-

[24] *New York Times*, January 14, 1858, p. 4; letter quoted in Pelzer, *Augustus Caesar Dodge*, p. 232; Reuben Davis' speech, June 7, 1858, *Congressional Globe*, 35th Cong., 1st sess., Appendix, p. 496.

[25] *La España*, January 26, 1858, quoted by Dodge, also his own quote, Manning, *Spain*, p. 943.

[26] Manning, *Spain*, pp. 953–956, 958–960.

[27] Dodge to Cass, No. 82, July 2, 1858, US/desp/Sp/41.

[28] *Ibid.*

[29] Unsigned memorandum, July 31, 1856, Fr/pol/Esp/847.

[30] For biographical data on Calderon Collantes (1789–1864), Antonio Garcia y Pérez, *Antecedentes político-diplomático de la expedición española á Mexico, 1836–1862* (Madrid, 1904), 2: pp. 164–165.

[31] Manning, *Spain*, p. 951.

lantes and his staff worried with much cause. For months, García Tassara had been sending to Madrid newspaper clippings from all over the United States dealing with Cuban matters. More significant than these press speculations were reports of filibustering. García Tassara mistrusted the president even when he ordered the Navy to thwart Walker's activities in Central America. The envoy ordered his consuls to remain alert to possible expeditions, especially Walker's. In November, rumors reached him that another contingent would soon leave New Orleans—the traditional launch site of such adventures—for Cuba, while other filibustering stories circulated in New York City. Although some Spanish newspapers approved Buchanan's new-found hostility for Walker, editors still worried. *Las Novedades*, for example, commented that "it is not possible that the North Americans (will) abandon the annexation project and sometimes by force and others by astuteness they will continue their plans to form a general confederation of all the republics of the New World." [32] Such editorials could hardly make Calderon Collantes feel relaxed about Spain's American policy.

The president's major public move came with his annual address to the Congress on December 6, 1858. He reiterated previous complaints against Spain: the treatment of Americans in Cuba, lack of direct diplomatic communication with the captain general, maritime incidents, and commercial barriers to the Cuban market. "The truth is that Cuba, in its existing colonial condition, is a constant source of injury and annoyance to the American people." He hinted that the "law of self-preservation" might force the United States to deviate from its previous policy of purchasing its new territories. After describing Cuba's strategic importance, Buchanan stated that "its value to Spain is comparatively unimportant." He then asked that the Congress appropriate money to be used as an advance payment on the purchase of Cuba "without awaiting the ratification of it by the Senate." [33]

The speech shocked Spanish officials, probably more by its unabashed bluntness than by its content. García Tassara called it "impudent." Predicting the president's proposals would not be taken seriously by his fellow politicians, the envoy hypothesized that Buchanan made them in order to reorganize and expand his party since the crisis in Kansas posed serious political threats to his position. Buchanan wanted to draw upon Southern support, "restore his popularity, destroy Mr. Douglas who today is his major rival and make possible his reelection for the next presidency." García Tassara predicted Congress would reject his request for money.[34] The envoy, however, visited Cass to tell him that points of differences between their governments could always be worked out but that "no Spanish government will ever sell the island of Cuba, and that any proposition made to that purpose would not be received at Madrid as a friendly one on the part of this government." Cass asked if any sale proposal would be studied by Spain and García Tassara said "no." [35]

Although Secretary Cass told him that Buchanan wrote the speech for domestic consumption, much like the English queen's annual address, Spain took it seriously. First, O'Donnell used the speech to build up support at home and second, protested to Washington while explaining his country's position to European diplomats. Calderon Collantes, for instance, rose in the Cortes on January 4 to state that Spain wanted friendly relations with the United States. But, he warned, "the question of the conservation of the island of Cuba is for Spain one of dignity and honor" and in no way could he participate in any negotiations for its sale.[36] The Conde de Reus spoke later, calling Buchanan's speech a plan to cause "war against Spain, with the object of seeing if it is possible to take possession of our colonial provinces." [37] Olózaga led the Cortes once again in calling for the passage of a statement fully supporting O'Donnell's regime. Passed by both houses, it stated "the national honor will remain unsullied by this new trial, and that the integrity of the Spanish possessions . . . will be preserved." [38]

The other Spanish tactic involved informing European governments that Spain would not tolerate any change in Cuba's status. All Spanish legations received copies of the proceedings in the Cortes of early January with orders to determine Europe's position on the matter. Universally supported in its stand, Spanish diplomats from all over the world reported their own personal approval of Madrid's policy. Good will toward her grew in January as news of the president's speech appeared in European

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[32] García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 4, January 11, 1858, Sp/corr/USA/1469; on filibustering, García Tassara to Min. of St. in No. 82, September 28, 1858, No. 99, November 29, 1858, No. 103, December 7, 1858, *Ibid.*; García Tassara to Spanish Consuls, November 11 and 20, 1858, CCP; expeditions did land in Cuba in 1858, for an account see J. H. Bloomfield, *A Cuban Expedition* (London, 1896); *Las Novedades*, December 31, 1857, p. 1.

[33] Richardson, *Messages and Papers of the Presidents* **5**: pp. 509–511.

[34] García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 104, December 7, 1858, Sp/pol/USA/2403.

[35] García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 105, December 13, 1858, *Ibid.*; Memorandum of conversation, December 11, 1858, US/notes/Sp/6.

[36] Manning, *Spain*, pp. 963–965; Francisco Melgar, *O'Donnell* (Madrid, 1946), pp. 104–105; Havana's semi-official *Diario de la Marina* called the message "preposterous," quoted in New York *Times*, December 10, 1858, p. 1; *Diario de las sesiones de Cortes, senado (1858–1859)* (Madrid, 1859), **1**: pp. 192–194.

[37] *Ibid.*, 199.

[38] Dodge to Cass, No. 106, January 5, 1858, US/desp/Sp/41.

and Latin American newspapers. Calderon Collantes wrote García Tassara that "in no case are you to proceed with a rupture of relations with the republic;" rather, for the time being, all insults were to be met only with stiff protest notes. Buchanan's "domestic" speech had backfired outside of the United States and self-righteous Spain took advantage of it.[39]

The message resulted in another benefit for Spain. At the time, officials questioned whether or not to send Spanish troops to Italy in support of the pope. The queen favored this while the majority of the cabinet did not. Now with a potential threat to Cuba, O'Donnell told Isabel that troops needed for the defense of their colony could not be diverted to Italy. Also, since France had requested a Spanish military commitment to Rome, the same excuse worked gracefully in Paris.[40]

Immediate reactions to Buchanan's speech in the United States ranged from surprise and political concern to approval. One newspaper cautioned that a war with Spain might also mean fighting France. Republicans condemned the address for domestic reasons. Other Americans thought the moment ripe for annexation since problems in Italy and Central Europe were occupying Europe's attention. Seward called the appropriation bride money and an insult to Spain. The Charleston *Mercury* accused Buchanan of using Cuba as a "lever by which to raise the Democratic Party out of the slough of despondency." Washington's *Daily National Intelligencer* came out against acquisition, suggesting that a commercial treaty be negotiated instead. Cuba, it stated, should not be admitted until slavery declined in the island, raising the question of what influence the colony would have on the United States as a state. Even some Southerners expressed apprehension that with Cuba in the Union slaves would be diverted to the island, virtually making states such as Virginia free soil areas. They agreed with many Northerners that presidential power might increase too much if Buchanan received his appropriation. As usual, the *New York Times* criticized his Cuban policy.[41] The Richmond *Enquirer* expressed its concern not so much about the purchase as with the increase in presidential power that would result with the passage of this appropriation.[42]

The most documented and important reaction to the speech in the United States came from Congress, which debated the proposal. On January 10, John Slidell introduced a bill in the Senate to provide Buchanan with his funds and within two weeks the Committee on Foreign Affairs reported it out favorably, explaining that this inevitable acquisition had to be made before some European power seized it. The committee recommended that thirty million dollars be allocated for it. American historians examining these debates discovered that hostility toward the proposal cut across sectional lines. Most congressmen felt that some of the money would go for bribes which insulted Spain and degraded the United States. A few Southerners, but mainly Northern Republicans, opposed acquiring Cuba at the moment, arguing that domestic problems would be further aggravated. From one end of the political spectrum to the other, politicians feared presidential power would grow too much. Some even questioned the constitutionality of Buchanan purchasing and paying for Cuba without the advice and consent of the Senate. The debate proceeded during January, February, and March without the bill ever coming to a vote. The session ended with no action on the measure. A combination of sectional issues, serious doubts about its legality, concern about international ramifications, and distrust of Buchanan caused the defeat of his project in 1858.[43]

Concurrently with these discussions came the conduct of Spanish and American diplomacy. Preston paid his first call on Calderon Collantes on March 9. Without wasting time, the Spaniard described to the new envoy Spain's feelings regarding Buchanan's speech, warning him not even to mention sale negotiations to any Spanish official.[44] Therefore, when Preston saw the queen several days later, he kept his comments short and bland. Afterwards Preston penned an interesting analysis of affairs:

> Our relations with Spain at this time are peculiar and require great discretion . . . . Affairs are in a far more unfavorable position than they were before I arrived. The Message of the President in regard to Cuba has created alarm not because it evoked any new policy on the part of the United States, but because it presented

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[39] Min. of St. to all ministers, January 5, 1859, Sp/pol/USA/2403; legajo 2403 is filled with the responses from Spanish diplomats in Europe and America. *El Diario Español* commented, "What illusion, what madness could have induced the Yankees to think that such a proposition would be received. . . . Cuba must be conquered at the point of the bayonet," January 1, 1859, p. 1.

[40] Eduardo de Palacio, *España desde el primer borbon hasta la revolución de septiembre* (Madrid, 1869), **5**: p. 734.

[41] *New York Times*, December 11, 1858, p. 4; quoted in Callahan, *Cuba and International Relations*, pp. 306–313; *Daily National Intelligencer*, January 1, 1859, p. 3; Urban, "The Idea of Progress and Southern Imperialism," pp. 669–674; *New York Times*, January 18, 1859, p. 4.

[42] Reported in *New York Times*, January 21, 1859, p. 4; García Tassara sent Calderon Collantes newspaper articles on the issue, No. 20, February 1, 1859, No. 24, February 15, 1859, No. 26, February 21, 1859, No. 29, March 1, 1859, Sp/pol/USA/2403.

[43] Callahan, *Cuba and International Relations*, pp. 313–323; Leard, "Bonds of Destiny," pp. 12–24, 227–237; Wilgus, "Official Expressions of Manifest Destiny Sentiments. . . ," pp. 486–506. The debates were carefully monitored by the Spanish, García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 15, January 18, 1859 and No. 21, February 7, 1859, Sp/corr/USA/1470.

[44] Preston to Cass, No. 2, March 9, 1859, US/desp/Sp/42.

the alternative distinctly that Cuba would ultimately be annexed to the United States, either by force . . . or by treaty.[45]

Eager to acquire Cuba, the American persisted. In April, he recommended that Buchanan agitate for the settlement of old claims; then, using Spain's anticipated reluctance as an excuse for war, seize Cuba. Or should Great Britain and France become involved in a conflict in Europe, this too could be used as the opportunity to take the colony. Francis J. Grund, special agent of the United States, confirmed that Europeans would not stop the United States in the event of war in Europe. Preston, British diplomats, and American officials clearly saw that in a struggle between France and Austria there existed an opportunity to obtain Cuba.[46] Then on October 22, 1859, Spain declared war on Morocco. Preston the next day expressed the hope that Spain would sell Cuba in order to defray part of her army's expenses. Fearing war with the Spanish, Buchanan hesitated to seize Cuba, still opting for negotiations. Believing that with cash in hand Spain would consider selling the island, he again requested Congress to appropriate sufficient funds.[47]

Ever hopeful, Buchanan refused to take "no" for an answer from O'Donnell. In 1860 he suggested that all outstanding claims between the two nations be settled by a joint commission, hoping to eliminate small irritants before making another bid for Cuba. The talks quickly led to a draft of a treaty in March which the Senate rejected on the grounds that it did not include all unsettled claims. That spring, García Tassara began complaining again that American navy ships were violating Cuban waters.[48]

The Senate would not approve any effort to purchase Cuba at the moment despite the problems posed by this attitude. The Senate's reluctance to cooperate stemmed mainly from election year politics. The Democratic Party again called for the acquisition of Cuba. García Tassara hesitated to make predictions since American politics were too much in flux at the moment. However, he did inform Madrid that John C. Breckinridge's candidature would be of greatest importance to the Cuban issue since he held the strongest annexationist views of any presidential candidate.[49]

Buchanan continued to use Cuba to help his party. He asked Slidell once again to introduce another purchase bill and in December, the president requested that the appropriation be passed. Once again the Senate rejected his plea. Too many other domestic problems drew the Senate's attention.[50]

Spain was not passive throughout this period yet she seemed more concerned about filibustering in 1859–1861 than in Buchanan's lone efforts. In fact, Madrid informed García Tassara and the captain general in Havana that if need be, more troops would be sent to Cuba to protect the island from "pirates."[51] García Tassara predicted disunion for the United States and saw in Buchanan's activities one last try to prevent such a catastrophe. Twice in December he wrote "the Union is dead." By now, the envoy had set his sights on Abraham Lincoln and his Cuban attitude. Virtually ignoring Buchanan, he suggested on Christmas Eve, 1860, that a Southern confederacy would carry "forward the conquest of Cuba, Mexico and Central America." The Spanish press also began to see beyond Buchanan; but, not without leaving some comments behind on the old chief executive. On Christmas day, *Las Novedades* called his Cuban policy an "illusion." *La Correspondencia* went further, labeling him "the greatest enemy of the Union."[52] On such a sad note, Buchanan's era ended.

Throughout the last few years of the decade, European governments carefully watched the negotiations between Madrid and Washington in respect to Cuba, attempting to determine potential influence on their own foreign policies. The British and the French wanted to avoid a Cuban crisis. Neither could devote much attention to it since other problems concerned them in Italy, Germany, Austria, and Morocco. Paris and London did worry, however, about the rapidly deteriorating relations between Mexico and Spain during 1857, growing out of unsolved claims. Lord Clarendon suspected that Spain might go to war with Mexico secure in the belief that France and Great Britain would never allow the

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[45] Preston to Cass, No. 5, April 4, 1859, *Ibid.*

[46] Preston to Cass in a series, No. 9, April 25, 1859, July 3, 1859, No. 22, November 15, 1859, *Ibid.*; Manning, *Spain*, p. 971.

[47] Manning, *Spain*, 973–974; Richardson, *Messages and Papers of the Presidents* **V**: p. 561.

[48] García Tassara to Cass, January 20, 1860, US/notes/Sp/16; Cass to García Tassara, April 20, 1860, *Ibid.*; Black to A. B. Moore, December 22, 1860, US/domestic letters/53 (hereafter cited US/DL/).

[49] García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 37, March 19, 1860, Sp/corr/USA/1470; García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 59, May 14, 1860, *Ibid.*; García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 76, June 25, 1860, Sp/pol/USA/2403; Porter and Johnson, *National Party Platforms*, p. 31.

[50] García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 157, December 14, 1860, Sp/pol/USA/2403.

[51] García Tassara to Spanish Consuls, March 26, 1859, CCP; García Tassara to Seward, April 9, 1859, Seward Papers, University of Rochester; García Tassara to Min. of St. in a series in 1859, No. 43, March 29, No. 46, April 4, No. 47, April 13, No. 48, April 19, No. 53, April 27, No. 50, May 2, Sp/corr/USA/1470; on troops to Cuba, Min. of St. to García Tassara, May 9, 1859, *Ibid.* and Min. of St. to Serrano, June 1, 1859, *Ibid.* Julia Ward Howe, then visiting Cuba, commented on local Spanish concerns about filibustering, *A Trip to Cuba* (Boston, 1860), *passim.*

[52] García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 160, December 18, 1860 and No. 162, December 24, 1860, Sp/pol/USA/2403; *Las Novedades*, December 25, 1860, p. 1; *La Correspondencia*, January 21, 1861, p. 2.

United States to seize Cuba. But because at the time Anglo-French relations were not good, the British could hardly count on French cooperation in a Cuban crisis. Mason in Paris essentially repeated this logic in a dispatch to the State Department adding that France, if hard pressed, might supply Spain with some military support in order to guarantee Spanish cooperation in other French projects. Mason predicted that under no circumstances would Napoleon III go to war over Cuba. France could not afford the financial burden of such a struggle and her economic ties to the United States (in the cotton trade for example) militated against a break in relations.[53]

Great Britain's representative in Madrid reported on several occasions that Spain counted on continued British and French aid. Lord Howden did not like this situation and complained to Clarendon. French Minister Turgot told Howden that the two governments should not allow the United States to seize Cuba. The uncomfortable British envoy simply passed that empty remark on to London without comment.[54]

Down to the end of the decade, the Spanish still believed Paris and London would help them. In fact, such officials as Calderon Collantes and O'Donnell studied with great interest every slight change in British and Franco-American relations trying to determine the significance for their country. The British envoy observed that Spain hardly appreciated the considerable naval strength that the United States could muster in the Gulf of Mexico, worrying that the Spanish might irritate Buchanan to the point of military conflict, but there is no guarantee of accuracy in any nation's observations. Most Britons believed Buchanan could not justify seizing Cuba in legal terms; that the island would probably fare better under the control of the United States; but, from the point of view of British self-interest, Cuba should remain under Spanish sovereignty. The French also criticized Spanish policies, perhaps fearing that with a general in charge of Spain's affairs, his solution to diplomatic problems might be military force. Moreover, any situation which diverted Spanish attention away from such areas as Rome, France, and the Mediterranean meant that Paris could count on less support from Madrid for their more European interests.[55]

With the exception of Spain, activities in the colony during the late 1850s hardly influenced the foreign policies of Europe, contrary to the efforts of some writers to show the opposite.[56] Europe virtually ignored internal developments. In the United States, such colonial issues as slavery, the treatment of American citizens, and trade did affect Spanish-American relations since both Madrid and Washington used Cuba as a domestic football. And each government knew that the other took advantage of Cuba for the same reason.[57]

In the United States Buchanan thought of the next presidential election and, therefore, wanted to expand his base of support. He also wished to unite the Democratic Party which had been badly split by his demand that Kansas be admitted into the Union as a slave state. He failed to gain the approval of the abolitionists, southern and northern businessmen, and sugar cane growers, those concerned with national dignity in its diplomacy, Republicans and senators fearing the growth of presidential power. He drew to his banner expansionists from both North and South, a few writers, speculators, grain and flour dealers, and those crying for expansion of slavery.[58] In view of the widespread hostility for his Cuban policy, it is hard to believe that there existed a grass-roots movement to annex Cuba in the last few years prior to the Civil War with the exception of New Orleans and a few pockets in the South. Behind all the rhetoric stood Buchanan virtually alone waging a private campaign for Cuba.

The Spanish and especially O'Donnell, found Cuban diplomacy to their advantage. Leaving aside the very real fear they felt that the United States might seize Cuba, the government could appeal to a nation threatened by a foreign power. Successful in drawing some bipartisan support to the Liberal Union, General O'Donnell easily avoided even negotiating with the

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[53] Bourne, *Britain and the Balance of Power in North America*, pp. 201–204; Mason to Cass, July 10, 1858, US/desp/Fr/44.

[54] Howden to Clarendon, Telegram, April 11, 1857, FO72/915; Howden to Clarendon in a series, No. 153, April 25, 1857, No. 156, April 25, 1857, No. 189, May 10, 1857, FO72/916; Fournier to Walewski, No. 67, November 10, 1858, Fr/pol/Esp/852.

[55] *El Diario Español*, January 26, 1858, p. 2; García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 46, June 8, 1858, Sp/corr/USA/1469; García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 50, June 28, 1858, *Ibid.*; G. M. Dallas to Cass, No. 123, September 16, 1858, US/desp/Great Britain/72 (hereafter cited GB/); Buchanan to Malmesbury, No. 258, November 20, 1858, FO72/940 (British minister had the same last name as the U.S. president); *The Edinburgh Review* **228** (October, 1860): pp. 545–582; Anthony Trollope, *The West Indies and the Spanish Main* (London, 1867), pp. 132, 135–137; Walewski to Turgot, September 19, 1857, Fr/pol/Esp/850; Turgot to Walewski, No. 43, September 7, 1857, *Ibid.*

[56] For example, Foner, Callahan, and Emeterio S. Santovenia, *Lincoln, el precursor de la buena vecindad* (Havana, 1951), pp. 34–36, 54–57; Diego González y Gutiérrez, *Historia documentada de los movimientos revolucionarios par la independencía de Cuba, de 1851 á 1867* (Havana, 1939) both volumes.

[57] García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 23, March 16, 1858, Sp/corr/USA/1469; García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 109, December 27, 1858, Sp/pol/USA/2403; *New York Times*, March 30, 1858, p. 4 and September 11, 1858, p. 1; Nicholas to Crittenden, January 19, 1859, Crittenden Papers, Library of Congress.

[58] Leard, "Bonds of Destiny," pp. 243–256.

Americans since he could simply claim that the mere mention of the subject constituted an insult to "the dignity and decorum of a noble nation such as Spain." [59] In large part this also explained the frustration Dodge felt throughout his tour of duty.

Soon other problems with the annexation of Santo Domingo, intervention in Mexico, and the Civil War in the United States, would change American and Spanish policies regarding Cuba. But before these can be discussed attention must be focused on other parts of the Caribbean.

IV. RIVALRY IN SANTO DOMINGO

Santo Domingo served as another source of conflict between Spain and the United States. In formulating programs for the entire Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico area, each included Santo Domingo as an integral part of their plans. Although less important than Cuba, Santo Domingo could not be separated from Cuban politics; therefore, the island republic contributed to the tradition of conflict that continued to develop between the United States and Spain in mid-century.

Santo Domingo, once an important part of the Spanish empire in the New World, continued to attract Spain's interest. Intriguing for her return to Spanish control, Spaniards believed the island could be used to show the rest of Latin America their folly in breaking away from the mother country. Acquisition would also add prestige to the government while giving Spain a new sense of resurgence. Most important, whether or not Santo Domingo became part of the Spanish empire again, was to keep the United States from seizing this territory. Should Washington ever do so Cuba's military security would seriously be threatened because Samaná Bay could be turned into an American naval base or a filibustering center. More for military reasons than glory then, Spain exerted a tremendous effort to block an obvious American interest in Santo Domingo.[1]

The United States competed with Spain for influence in the island throughout the 1850s and into the 1860s for a variety of reasons. Economic considerations played only a minor role. Annexation by Spain would violate the Monroe Doctrine. With Santo Domingo in her control, Madrid could militarily threaten the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico. The United States would then have difficulty in reducing Spanish influence there and in Central America, all at the expense of American expansion. It would become more difficult to acquire Cuba as well. However, American policy makers expressed greater concern in blocking Spanish expansion into the island than in acquiring it as a colony or state. As with Spain, military strategy dominated American policy.[2]

It is widely believed that Spain annexed Santo Domingo because the United States could not prevent such a move, thanks to her own preoccupation with the Civil War. However, Spanish penetration into Santo Domingo predated 1861 by many years and with the encouragement of the Dominicans. As early as 1843, Dominican discussion of returning to Spanish sovereignty began as economic crises and Haitian intrigues threatened their national extinction. Spain hesitated to consider such a proposal because of the possible problems attending such a project. However, in 1846, British and French diplomats informed Madrid that their governments would not object to annexation. Soon after, Spain sent a naval squadron and civilian authorities to Santo Domingo to study the question. Yet again Spain refused to do more. From 1848 to 1851, little occurred in relations between the two governments. But with the election of President Pierce, Cuba appeared threatened so Spanish officials decided to increase their influence in Santo Domingo.[3]

With the danger to Cuba, Spain worried that Santo Domingo's liberal immigration laws would allow filibusterers to use the island as a base of operations. Madrid offered to sign an alliance with the Dominican government in 1852. The Spanish negotiated with the island's president, Pedro Santana, and others in 1853 and 1854. By then rumors began arriving in Madrid that Washington might annex Santo Domingo. Spain quickly pushed talks aforward on a recognition and trade treaty, ratifying it in 1855.[4] Now Spain could fight American influence in the island more effectively since the United States did not have normal diplomatic relations with Santo Domingo. At this point the island could have taken the option of returning to Spanish control or seeking protection from the United States. Although both Madrid and Washington viewed such possibilities with skepticism and reluctance, they monitored Dominician thinking. France displayed a favoritism toward Haiti which disturbed

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[59] Serrano to Min. of St., December 24, 1858, Sp/pol/USA/2403.

[1] Rayford W. Logan, *The Diplomatic Relations of the United States with Haiti, 1776–1891* (Chapel Hill, 1941), p. 312; José Gabriel García, *Compendio de la historia de Santo Domingo* (Santo Domingo, 1893–1906), **3**: p. 259.

[2] Davis G. Yuengling, *Highlights in the Debates in the Spanish Chamber of Deputies Relative to the Abandonment of Santo Domingo* (Washington, 1941), pp. 2–3; R. Olivar Bertrand, "Conflictos de España en el Caribe juzgados por los Estados Unidos, 1860–1870," *Cuadernos Americanos* **150** (January-February, 1967): pp. 157–173.

[3] Victor Garrido, *Política de Francia en Santo Domingo 1844–1846* (Santo Domingo, 1962), p. 9; Emilio Rodríguez Demorizi (ed.), *Relaciones dominicoespañoles, 1844–1859* (Ciudad Trujillo, 1955), pp. 7–51.

[4] Rodríguez Demorizi, *Relaciones dominocoespañoles*, pp. 109–163; Elliott to Conrad, No. 45, January 17, 1853 and Elliott to Everett, No. 48, March 7, 1853, US/desp/Santo Domingo/1 (hereafter cited /SD/).

the Dominicans by complicating the political situation on the island. In 1853, a local official left for Puerto Rico to ask for Spanish protection. The American commercial agent there suggested that the Spanish could do nothing, predicting the United States would receive a similar Dominican request for protection.[5]

During 1854 and early 1855, American agents studied local political conditions. In the spring of 1855, Spanish officials there reported that American influence remained negligible, recording that a proposed treaty between Washington and the island republic would not be finalized. In November, negotiations for this treaty were concluded although the document was not yet ratified. It provided that Samaná Bay would be ceded to the United States. France, Great Britain, and Haiti expressed deep concern over this clause. Spaniards began to increase their interference in domestic affairs in an attempt to abort the treaty's passage since the cession of Samaná Bay would encourage the growth of American interest in what they essentially considered their private preserve. A local Spanish representative advised that "a war between the United States and Spain is indispensable this year, and it will better suit Spain to meet the Americans here as a field of battle instead of Cuba." [6]

In the fall of 1855, an energetic Spaniard was appointed chargé d'affaires to Santo Domingo. Antonío María Segovia, an obscure poet with little political experience, arrived in the island at the end of the year with instructions to arrest the growth of American influence. At first, he found little enthusiasm for his mission. President Santana virtually ignored him, although in the past the Dominican had been much friendlier to Spain. Segovia opposed the American treaty, decided to have Santana removed from office, and increase Spanish influence in the republic by building a new political machine friendly to Spain. The British and French did not interfere. Immediately, Jonathan Elliott, Washington's commercial agent there, complained that the clever Spaniard was conducting a vilification campaign against the American treaty.[7]

By March, Segovia managed to convince the Dominicans to ratify a Spanish-Dominican commercial treaty. Most important to him, Article VII permitted Dominicans to become Spanish citizens. Segovia wanted this clause in order to build a strong Spanish party in the island by allowing almost anybody to become a citizen of Spain. He would also have the right to bring in Spaniards and make them local residents. Segovia strengthened his negotiations with a visit of several Spanish warships and by the end of the month had insured the treaty's ratification. These tactics caused the French to warn Spain that the United States might send its own ships into the area to counter Segovia's high handed activities. Elliott also complained. Spanish diplomats were convinced that Segovia's methods were necessary since "the United States proposed to get close to the western part of Cuba." [8]

During the summer Segovia continued blocking American treaty proposals. He offered money, a protectorate, and Spanish troops to the local government if it would reject the American treaty. Elliott asked that an American warship pay an extended visit to Santo Domingo: "I beg sir, immediate attention to this, as this Republic cannot last long, if some action is not promptly taken by the United States." However, Washington never sent him a ship. Meanwhile the Spanish grew tired of Elliott and in August Captain General Concha in Havana suggested that a protectorate over Santo Domingo now be considered. By this time, the French and British had concluded that Segovia's tactics would probably draw the Haitians or the Americans into taking some action in the island. Newspapers in the United States began to complain about Segovia and in September, Elliott came to Washington on consultation over the man. No sooner had he left for the United States when his deputy, Jacob Pereira, reported that "the object now before Spain is evidently to colonize" the republic.[9]

By the end of 1856 Segovia had broken the Dominican will to approve their treaty with the United States. Also, he built his own political structure and used it to have Buenaventura Baez made vice-president since he approved of Spain and supported Segovia. Santana, realizing that the Spaniard had outmaneuvered him and irritated with Spain's Dominican policy, could do nothing except resign. Baez then became president of Santo Domingo. This so

[5] Elliott to Marcy, No. 65, December 13, 1853, US/desp/SD/1.

[6] San Just to Min. of St., No. 26, April 19, 1855, Sp/corr/SD/2057; San Just to Min. of St., No. 35, May 5, 1855, *Ibid.*; Min. of St. to García Tassara, December 3, 1855, *Ibid.*; Min. of St. to San Just. December 4, 1855, *Ibid.*; quoted in Mary Treudley, *The United States and Santo Domingo, 1789–1866* (Worcester, 1916), p. 251.

[7] Elliott to Marcy, No. 13, July 5, 1856, US/desp/SD/2.

[8] Walewski to Comminges-Guitaud, No. 25, August 25, 1856, Fr/pol/Esp/849; Elliott to Marcy, No. 5, March 22, 1856, US/dep/SD/2; González to Min. of St., No. 75, March 30, 1856, Sp/corr/USA/1468.

[9] Elliott to Pierce, July 20, 1856, US/desp/SD/2; Rodríguez Demorizi, *Relaciones dominicoespañoles*, pp. 265–266; Walewski to Turgot, No. 2, January 25, 1856, Fr/pol/Esp/842; Otway to Clarendon, August 27, 1856, F072/896; Clarendon to Howden, No. 63, September 24, 1856, F072/890. Spain asked Britain and France if they would object to her reoccupying Santo Domingo in order to block a possible invasion by the United States and Haiti, Howden to Clarendon, Telegram, January 23, 1856, F072/891; *New York Times*, September 2, 1856, p. 2 and October 22, 1856, p. 3 summarize public opinion; Pereira to Marcy, No. 20, November 6, 1856, US/desp/SD/2.

irked Washington that frightened Spanish diplomats in various parts of Latin America complained to Madrid that Segovia would cause a war with the United States. In February, 1857, just to be on the safe side, Segovia was relieved of his duties despite the fact that he had successfully carried out his orders. His replacement, Harreros de Tejeda, continued to broaden Spain's influence with the help of a generous foreign aid program.[10]

A new phase in United States-Spanish competition in Santo Domingo began in 1858 and ended with Spain's annexation of the republic in 1861. In September, 1858, Santana came back to power but by now old age, experience, and unstable political and economic conditions led him to conclude that a Spanish protectorate provided the only solution to his country's problems. Elliott aptly described conditions a month later:

> This Republic is in a very distressed state, no commerce, no credit and a currency depreciated to a nominal value, their people worn out and ruined by the fourteen months revolution they have just passed through; renders them an easy conquest for their enemies the Haytians; who, if they succeed, will trample on and oppress the whites and mulattoes of this part.

In fact, he also recommended that Americans not invest money there.[11]

In October, 1858, Santana asked the Spanish to protect his country from Haiti should the need arise. Madrid sent a non-committal answer back in April, 1859. O'Donnell expressed confidence that Haiti would not attack Santana. Nevertheless, a Dominican delegate left for Madrid with instructions to negotiate a treaty of alliance. By mid-1859, Spanish officials had made the decision to encourage even closer relations with Santo Domingo in hopes of improving their Latin American position. But until the Moroccan war ended no military commitments could be made to Santana.[12]

During the same period, the United States attempted to shore up its poor situation in Santo Domingo. Under the impression that Santana favored the United States over Spain, William L. Cazneau received an appointment as special commissioner in April, 1859, with orders to negotiate a base agreement. Optimistic, he suggested the United States extend formal diplomatic recognition to the Dominicans. Little did he know that Santana disliked the United States. The northern government represented a culture entirely different from his. He feared that under an American protectorate Santo Domingo would undergo too many drastic changes. Elliott reported that the regime opposed "everything having connection with the United States Government, or its citizens." Cazneau soon predicted Spain would occupy Santo Domingo.[13]

With the end of the Moroccan war in February, 1860, Spain confidently now began to pay closer attention to some of her other international problems. Dominican diplomats spent the next few months negotiating with the Spanish. Arms were sent and settlers given permission to go to Santo Domingo. In April Santana wrote Queen Isabel asking for a closer bond. By early fall, large numbers of Spanish immigrants and soldiers had arrived in the island and a campaign was mounted to convince the public that annexation would benefit them.[14]

Clearly this effort, conducted by Spaniards, continued without the total support of Madrid. O'Donnell had some reservations about annexing the island. Santana's efforts to convince him were going slowly. O'Donnell believed that despite internal dissension in the United States, a blatant violation of the Monroe Doctrine would probably draw the country together putting Washington in a position to react against Spanish incorporation. When Santana sent a representative to Cuba to inform the captain general that Santo Domingo had decided to reincorporate itself into Spain, O'Donnell became apprehensive. Having once served as captain general of Cuba he realized that many dangers would accompany annexation. He questioned whether twenty years of independence had not altered legal and social institutions to the point where Spanish control could not survive. Santo Domingo had emancipated her slaves, broadened civil liberties, and boasted greater religious toleration than Spain. Occupying the island republic would also be expensive. He could not predict the political repercussions in Spain should the annexation fail. Also, British and French reactions worried him. And then he could not forget Washington. Therefore, at least until the fall of 1860 when it became clear that the United States had serious domestic problems of her own, O'Donnell expressed little desire to acquire a potentially dangerous colony.[15]

During this period of analysis, officials in Santo Domingo reported that Spain's popularity in the island was growing. This in turn worried London's minister in Madrid who thought that "they entertain a very

[10] Rodríguez Demorizi, *Relaciones dominicoespañoles*, pp. 275–277; Charles C. Tansill, *The United States and Santo Domingo, 1798–1873: A Chapter in Caribbean Diplomacy* (Baltimore, 1938), pp. 200–206.

[11] Elliott to Cass, No. 12, October 22, 1858, US/desp/SD/3. The Spanish Consul General continued to believe Elliott encouraged American businesses there, Juan del Cantillo to Min. of St., No. 70, October 23, 1858, Sp/corr/SD/2057.

[12] Sumner Welles, *Naboth's Vineyard: The Dominican Republic, 1844–1924* (New York, 1928), **1**: pp. 192–193.

[13] For the Cazneau mission see Tansill, *The United States and Santo Domingo*, pp. 118–120, 206–210; Elliott to Cass, No. 27, December 17, 1859, US/desp/SD/3.

[14] Welles, *Naboth's Vineyard* **1**: pp. 202–204.

[15] *Ibid.*, pp. 206–207; Felix de Bona, *Cuba, Santo Domingo, y Puerto Rico* (Madrid, 1861), p. 41.

erroneous opinion of the power of the United States while the successful issue of the late war in Africa induces all Spaniards to form an exaggerated estimate of the military resources of their own country." He predicted that Spain would insult the United States which then would seize Cuba.[16] O'Donnell, however, did not allow overconfidence to disturb his thinking during the first half of 1860. The most he would allow was explained by his minister of state:

The government of Her Majesty will continue to offer her protection to the Republic and will contribute to the augmentation of the Spanish population as she assured me of its prosperity and guaranteed its independence.[17]

Yet he did not mention annexation.

The next critical phase in relations between Spain, the United States, and Santo Domingo began in October, 1860. Dominican diplomats visited Captain General Serrano in Havana again requesting Spanish annexation. Sympathetic to their cause, Serrano recommended that Spain annex the island republic. He felt Spain would eventually fight the United States over Cuba and Puerto Rico and that now was as good a time as any. He reiterated the well worn argument that Washington could not be allowed to take Santo Domingo if Madrid wanted to protect Cuba. O'Donnell thought this too rash a move and ordered Serrano to stall for time by providing Santo Domingo with cash and supplies. He further instructed him not to annex the republic without orders.[18]

In the fall O'Donnell's government began to rethink its policies now that it hopefully had time to do so. There were many reasons for annexation that could be considered. Providing a protectorate, which Spain already promised to do, was not much different from annexation. Either policy would irritate the United States and elicit domestic support for the Spanish regime. Santo Domingo could be used as a base to block attacks against Cuba. Trade between Spain and Santo Domingo would increase. And the return to the fold of Spain's first New World colony on the heels of her victory in North Africa would have a pleasant effect on the national ego. By December, O'Donnell had decided to move slowly toward annexation writing Serrano:

To attain this object, it is necessary that the Northern Republic . . . lose, by virtue of the events which have begun to take place there and which at no distant time will acquire all the gravity implicit in them, the immense prestige which derives from the example of a country which, without suffering the slightest reverse, has triumphantly survived the first eight years of its existence as an independent nation. The question of time, therefore, is of immense importance for Spain. Its means of action increase from day to day, and it will soon be able to dispose of a respectable squadron; while the moment is coming in which the North American Confederation will divide into two states of opposing interests, one of which will be the natural ally of Spain in all the efforts which it may be obliged to make in America. The reunion of Santo Dimingo brought about in such a manner as would give rise to suspicions not destitute of foundation, would not only turn the gaze of the terrified states of Latin America towards the United States, thus destroying the basis of our policy in America, the unity of our race, but also perhaps making the contending parties in America forget their internal discords, might lead them to group themselves under the Monroe Doctrine, a principle accepted without reserve by the slave states no less than by those where free labor prevails.

O'Donnell concluded his dispatch by stating "the immediate incorporation would be neither prudent nor proper." In short, he ordered Serrano to be calm for the moment.[19]

By February, 1861, Dominican and Spanish diplomats had worked out the details of transfer. It stipulated provisions to make public Santo Domingo's "spontaneous" desire to come under Spanish control. Slavery would not be reintroduced (inserted to eliminate British objections to annexation); Dominican officials were to be kept in the colonial government; Spain would amortize the local currency; and Madrid recognized the legality of existing Dominican laws. Such an agreement could be reached because the United States was too busy with her own problems; France found herself occupied especially with invasion plans of her own for Mexico; the British were promised no slavery in the island, and Haiti could not muster sufficient strength to fight Spain.[20] All of these negotiations had been kept secret but word leaked out about the treaty and opposition in Santo Domingo to Santana's plans grew. In order to forestall any mishap, he formally announced the reincorporation of Santo Domingo into the Spanish empire on March 18, 1861, and sent word to Havana the same day.[21]

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[16] Alvarez to Min. of St., No. 2, January 6, 1860, Sp/corr/SD/2057; Alvarez to Min. of St., No. 12, February 6, 1860, *Ibid.*; Buchanan to Russell, No. 275, May 8, 1860, F072/981.

[17] Min. of St. to Alvarez, September 22, 1860, Sp/corr/SD/2057.

[18] Becker, *relaciones exteriores* **2**: pp. 568–573; Marqués de Miraflores, *Memorias del reinado de Isabel II* (Madrid, 1964), **3**: pp. 191. The Dominicans argued that "Santo Domingo will be Haitian or Yankee," unless Spain acted, Pelaez Camponanes to Serrano, November 8, 1860, Sp/Ultramar/gobierno/SD/3526, Archivo Histórico Nacional.

[19] Quoted in Dexter Perkins, *The Monroe Doctrine, 1826–1867* (Baltimore, 1933), 284–285; Becker, *relaciones exteriores*, has the full text which Perkins does not, **2**: pp. 570–574.

[20] For details on the agreement, José de la Gándara y Navarro, *Anexión y guerra de Santo Domingo* (Madrid, 1884), **1**, pp. 183–184; Charles C. Hauch, "Attitudes of Foreign Governments toward the Spanish Reoccupation of the Dominican Republic, *Hispanic American Historical Review* **27** (May, 1947): pp. 247–268.

[21] For details, Gándara y Navarro, *Anexión y guerra de Santo Domingo* **1**: pp. 140, 166–169, 177.

A surprised Serrano seriously questioned the wisdom of Santana's move in light of his own instructions. He wondered about Dominican approval of reintegration not to mention what O'Donnell would think. He agreed to send some troops to the Republic on a temporary basis only and subject to their removal by O'Donnell. Some Dominicans resisted Spanish authority but were quickly silenced by the police. Therefore, Serrano concluded that there was little objection to annexation and wrote to Madrid proposing acceptance of Santana's proclamation and his transfer of troops to the island.[22]

The news shocked Madrid and bewildered O'Donnell's cabinet. Annexation had been discussed for months but now Santana had moved and a decision on Spain's reaction was needed. Immediately the Foreign Office checked Europe's reaction before recommending any steps. Fear of war with the United States also dictated caution. Cabinet officials thought that a Dominican revolution would cost Spain a fortune in blood and gold. France approved and Napoleon III suggested that O'Donnell boldly block any American countermoves. With an eye cast on Mexico, the French told Spain that the Monroe Doctrine finally should die. On the morning of April 10, O'Donnell told French Minister Barrot that Santo Domingo, in danger from the United States, had come to Spain for help. He said that the cabinet also worried about American interest in Samaná Bay and Cuba. Barrot made it clear that Paris did not want any problems to develop with Haiti because the Haitians were heavily indebted to France. At the end of April the French minister confirmed that not only did Spain not want a war with the United States but that O'Donnell would avoid allowing Santo Domingo to become an international problem.[23]

The British expressed much concern because they believed Spain eventually would go to war with the United States thereby endangering Britain's interests in the Caribbean. They worried about slavery being reintroduced even though O'Donnell assured London that this would not be the case. In a private dispatch Foreign Minister John Russell called the Spaniards "fools" predicting that North and South would unite in a solid United States reaction against annexation. As early as March 5, the British knew Spain had plans to reincorporate the island nation and send troops there. Yet O'Donnell repeatedly told the British that he would avoid war with the United States.[24] Asked about Washington's influence on the issue, he said: "The United States of today are very different from that they were a year ago; they have differences of their own to settle." Despite his attitude, O'Donnell was slowly weighing the issue. The British predicted he would agree to annexation and like the French, they saw only troubles ahead for him.[25]

The reaction of the United States counted for a great deal in the initial Spanish deliberations on Santo Domingo. For the first time in years, Washington could possibly have a significant excuse to use against Spain for acquisition of Cuba. Therefore, O'Donnell took pains to determine the official American view toward Santana's move. Preston told Calderon Collantes that his government would resist the reestablishment of royal government on any Latin American nation. Moreover, any such effort would be considered "as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States." Dexter Perkins, one of the leading historians of the Monroe Doctrine, called Preston's comments a milestone in American diplomatic history because the diplomat's arguments rested squarely on the Doctrine. Preston warned the new Secretary of State, William Seward, that Spain would stay in Santo Domingo if the United States did not take a firm stand against it. Perry wrote Seward that "there is little doubt at all that the step of annexation taken by President Santana comes upon this government by surprise. They hardly know what to do with it." [26]

The Spanish government treated Preston's comments as a "private communication" of no official consequence since the queen had not formally annexed the country. No doubt, this position grew out of Spanish concern to leave open a door should Lincoln choose not to protest Dominican developments. By the end of April the Spanish cabinet decided to extend its *protection* to Santo Domingo leaving the question of *annexation* unanswered for the time being.[27]

O'Donnell's decision to extend protection may well have been reached because of serious domestic problems. During 1860 and early 1861 his popularity, which had increased at the end of the African war, was declining. In the spring of 1860, a widely publi-

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[22] Gándara y Navarro, *Anexión y guerra de Santo Domingo* 1, pp. 157–169; Welles, *Naboth's Vineyard* 1: pp. 229–230.

[23] Barrot to Thouvenel in a series, No. 36, April 10, 1861, No. 40, April 17, 1861, No. 41, April 20, 1861, No. 43, April 29, 1861, Fr/pol/Esp/858; Thouvenel to Barrot, No. 13, April 23, 1861 and No. 18, May 28, 1861, *Ibid.*

[24] Quoted in Bourne, *Britain and the Balance of Power in North America,* p. 254; Buchanan to Russell, No. 97, March 5, 1861, F072/10004; Edwards to Russell, No. 10, April 17, 1861, *Ibid.*/10005; Edwards to Russell, No. 14, April 22, 1861, *Ibid.*

[25] Quote in Edwards to Russell, "Confidential," No. 21, April 22, 1861, F072/10005; Edwards to Russell, No. 22, April 26, 1861, predicting Spain would send troops to Cuba in anticipation of trouble in Santo Domingo, *Ibid.*

[26] Preston to Calderon Collantes, April 12, 1861, US/desp/Sp/42; Perkins, *The Monroe Doctrine, 1826–1867,* pp. 290–291; Preston to Seward, April 27, 1861, US/desp/Sp/42; Perry to Seward, April 20, 1861, *Ibid.*/43. When Seward became Secretary of State, Perry was reappointed to his old job in Madrid.

[27] Edwards to Russell, No. 16, April 22, 1861, F072/10005; Perry to Seward, April 24, 1861, US/desp/Sp/43.

cized Carlist revolt took place which, while quickly suppressed, indicated all was not well. Reports followed of embezzlement by Spanish officials, purchases of shoddy supplies for the armed services, and friction in the Cortes over various domestic and foreign issues. Then in early April, Ríos Rosas, closely linked to the Liberal Union, publicly criticized the regime. His split with O'Donnell seriously damaged the general's prestige as a national leader. Up to early April, O'Donnell had continued to doubt the practicality of drawing Santo Domingo into the Spanish empire but after his quarrel with Ríos Rosas he needed some event to raise his popularity at home quickly and Santo Domingo seemed convenient for this purpose.[28]

Meanwhile in Washington, Seward tackled the Dominican problem with an eagerness born of a new found challenge. Unknown to any of the local European diplomats, Seward addressed "Some Thoughts for the President's Consideration" on April 1 suggesting among other policies that Lincoln "demand" explanations from Spain on why she took over Santo Domingo and if need be, "convene Congress and declare war against" her and France. Such a war would allow the United States to occupy Cuba and thereby appease the South into returning to the Union. The president rejected his suggestions. Seward's proposals indicated he did not fully understand the depth of the South's discontent, but quickly realized that Lincoln would only implement a foreign policy that kept the United States out of war; at least until the Civil War ended.[29]

The next day after his written proposals to Lincoln, Seward warned García Tassara that the United States would interpret Spain's Dominican policy as "unfriendly " and if not careful, the American government would block Spain "with a prompt, persistent, and if possible, effective resistance." But Seward only protested. García Tassara knew from Seward's language that the United States could do nothing else in April. García Tassara's formal reply stated that "the Government and people of Santo Domingo, threatened with invasion from Hayti, had recourse to the Captain General of the Island of Cuba, asking for the protection of the Government of Her Catholic Majesty."[30] Edouard de Stoeckl, the Russian minister in Washington wrote:

> Mr. Lincoln has placed himself in the position where he must either discontinue these protests or wage war against Spain. Tassara assured me that . . . if Lincoln dared to threaten Spain, his government would immediately recognize the independence of the Southern Confederacy. Spain has a rather large squadron of ships in the port of Havana and in the Gulf of Mexico, and the garrison in Cuba has been augmented to 24,000 men, all excellent troops. Thus prepared, Spain does not fear war. Tassara would relish such a conflict to avenge her many grievances against the United States.[31]

Obviously García Tassara's good friend incorrectly stated Spain's position regarding war with the United States. The Spanish envoy's comments on Seward's tactics unfortunately have either been lost or never recorded, but Stoeckl's dispatch indicated some of the Spaniard's feelings.[32]

Convinced that the United States had too many problems of her own to offer any real resistance, Spanish officials therefore determined that Spain could safely annex Santo Domingo. A formal request for this, drawn up by the Council of Ministers, arrived at the queen's palace on May 19. The same day, Queen Isabel issued an appropriate royal decree.[33] The first news of Santana's proclamation and later of the queen's annexation met with public approval. *La Epoca* on May 23, defended the policy because the United States would otherwise have seized the island and Cuba. The same paper in January had anticipated this possibility by declaring "In the event of a fight between the two races which dispute the dominance of America, Spain can only follow one line of conduct: that of fortifying by any diplomatic means available the Ibero-American nations." Resistance to Washington was suggested by *La Iberia* arguing that "the acquisition of the island of Santo Domingo gives us a step between Cuba and Puerto Rico, the Antilla which, even though forgotten, can be considered the Malta of the Columbia archipelago." *El Contemporaneo* and *Las Novedades* mentioned growing American interest in Santo Domingo as justification for Spain's actions. The latter on April 17 commented that Santana's move "has all the appearances of spontaneity." *La Discusión* on April 20 urged annexation as protection for Cuba. One other factor in the government's thinking, therefore, must have been the public's reaction to annexation since such a move was virtually guaranteed the nation's approval.[34]

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[28] Carr, *Spain*, pp. 262–263.

[29] For Seward's note see Daniel B. Carroll, *Henri Mercier and the American Civil War* (Princeton, 1971), pp. 53–56. Seward mentioned the French since they were interested in Mexican affairs.

[30] Seward to García Tassara, April 2, 1861, US/notes/Sp/16A; García Tassara to Seward, April 4, 1861, *Ibid.*

[31] Quoted in Albert A. Woldman, *Lincoln and the Russians* (New York, 1961), p. 84. Stoeckl wrote his government that "the United States will resist this move as a violation of the Monroe Doctrine," *Ibid.*, p. 57.

[32] The author and archivists at the Spanish foreign office found few of García Tassara's dispatches on Santo Domingo.

[33] Both documents appeared in *Papers Relating to the Annexation of Eastern Santo Domingo to Spain*, House of Lords Command Paper (London, 1861), pp. 28–30.

[34] *La Epoca*, April 20, 1861, p. 2 and January 4, 1861, p. 2; *La Iberia*, May 23, 1861, p. 1; *El Contemporaneo's* view along with those of *Las Novedades* and *La Discusión* appeared in Gaspar Nuñez de Arce, *Santo Domingo* (Madrid, 1865), pp. 144, 150–152.

After the formal annexation, hispanisists wrote articles, pamphlets, and books defending Spain's policy. Approving pieces appeared in *La America*, the important pan-hispanisist newspaper, and in *El Museo Universal.* The prolific Spanish nationalist and self-styled expert on Latin America, Ferrer de Couto, wrote a pamphlet praising Spain's courage in annexing Santo Domingo. He argued that the act would establish a barrier "against the absorbing tendencies of the *yankees* in Central America and for Cuba." Preston found "the tone of the Spanish press . . . very strongly in favor of annexation." He also reported that Spanish officials feared journalistic criticism should they retract their annexation.[35]

The public in the United States did not react to annexation with the same enthusiasm. What little opinion there was clearly reflected mistrust for Spain's motives. The *Daily National Intelligencer* reported on April 13 that Spain would send thousands of troops to Santo Domingo to impress the Dominicans with the nature of this "happy event." The Albany, New York *Atlas and Argus* commented "If we were a government that deserved respect, the Court of Madrid would not have ventured on this act." The Richmond *Enquirer* argued that Spain attempted to regain an old colony at a time when the mother country herself was falling apart. Highly critical of Spain, the *New York Times* also condemned Santana because he gave away his country's independence. García Tassara reported, however, that the American press made few comments on the annexation. On June 28, he even predicted Congress would not discuss the issue.[36]

In private, feelings were strong. Carl Schurz wrote Lincoln that Europe would take advantage of the American Civil War with Spain's Dominican annexation as only the start. The Confederacy raised no objections to the Spanish move and later in 1862, indicated so to Napoleon III. Seward did not entirely accept the situation, despite Lincoln's orders, because in May he wrote a friend that "we are by no means indifferent and have not been inattentive to this subject." [37]

Seward indeed had not been inattentive. He asked the British if they would join the United States in protesting, arguing that slavery might be reintroduced into the island and that Great Britain's own possessions in the West Indies were threatened. Lord Lyons rejected Seward's proposal since Spain promised not to reintroduce slavery. France also refused to consider Seward's proposal. Napoleon III would not contest the Spanish move although the French did not like the dangers involved. In fact, French policy consisted of doing and saying nothing officially. Isabel II did not even receive congratulations from Napoleon. The only hint of the French view came from the *Revue des Deux Mondes* which called Seward's use of the Monroe Doctrine in his Dominican stance "pretended international law," applauding the setback he suffered.[38]

By July, Seward decided to drop the issue for a while since Britain, France, and Lincoln would not cooperate in a strong objection. American domestic problems simply took precedence over the Monroe Doctrine. When Congress asked for the diplomatic correspondence on the annexation, the legislators were told that those papers could not be delivered and the subject was soon forgotten. Obviously Lincoln did not want the issue blown up at that time.[39]

While these policy changes were taking place in Washington during June and July, the patient yet resolved Spanish continued to deal with Perry and the new American minister, Carl Schurz, both of whom were unaware of Washington's current position.[40] Perry protested the annexation but avoided Preston's earlier reference to the phrase "Monroe Doctrine" in order to avoid offending Spanish sensibilities. He later wrote Seward that the entire issue of an American protest turned on the question of whether or not the Dominicans came under Spanish control "spontaneously." Calderon Collantes argued that they did but the Americans found this difficult to believe because thousands of Spanish troops were being sent to Santo Domingo.[41]

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[35] For a summary of this literature see Mark J. Van Aken, *Pan-Hispanism: Its Origins and Development to 1866* (Berkeley, 1959), p. 108; José Ferrer de Couto, *Reincorporación de Santo Domingo a España* (Madrid, 1861), p. 7. For the same message see his *Cuestiones de Méjico, Venezuela y America en general* (Madrid, 1861), p. 625; Preston to Seward, April 25, 1861, US/desp/Sp/42; Preston's protest to Calderon Collantes, April 23, 1861, *Ibid.*

[36] *Daily National Intelligencer*, April 13, 1861; p. 3; *Atlas and Argus*, April 1, 1861, p. 2; Richmond *Enquirer*, April 6, 1861, p. 2; *New York Times*, June 3, 1861, p. 4 and September 16, 1861, p. 4; García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 90, June 24, 1861, Sp/pol/USA/2404; García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 92, June 28, 1861, *Ibid.*; summary of U.S. press views, Howard C. Perkins (ed.), *Northern Editorials on Secession* (New York, 1942), 2: pp. 961–962.

[37] Schurz to Lincoln, April 5, 1861, Abraham Lincoln Papers, Library of Congress; J. M. Callahan, *The Diplomatic History of the Southern Confederacy* (New York, 1964), p. 204; Seward to John L. O'Sullivan, May 22, 1861, US/DL/54.

[38] Ephraim Douglas Adams, *Great Britain and the American Civil War* (New York, 1924), 2: p. 126; Logan, *The Diplomatic Relations of the United States with Haiti*, p. 295; Seward to Schurz, June 21, 1861, US/inst/Sp/15; Dayton to Seward, No. 18, July 13, 1861, US/desp/Fr/50; Dayton to Schurz, July 29, 1861, US/desp/Sp/43; *Revue des Deux Mondes* 33 (1861): pp. 661–662, 664–665.

[39] Roy P. Basler (ed.), *The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln* (New Brunswick, 1953–1955), 4, p. 446; Congressional resolution, US/desp/Sp/43.

[40] Schurz (1829–1906) was appointed minister to Madrid in the spring of 1861. For biographical data see Chester V. Easum, *The Americanization of Carl Schurz* (Chicago, 1929).

[41] Perry to Calderon Collantes, June 19, 1861, US/desp/Sp/43; Calderon Collantes to Perry, July 9, 1861, *Ibid.*; Perry to

By this time O'Donnell concluded that the United States could do little to stop him. Perry reported that "Spain has little idea of receding from her position in San Domingo." He said "pride" prevented any retreat. Also, the queen, "flattered by the supposed fact that an independent state experiencing the evils of liberty and republicanism has spontaneously returned to seek her protection and renew the oath of allegiance to her throne" made a policy change impossible. García Tassara reinforced this fact by protesting Seward's objections to the annexation.[42]

The Spanish Cortes briefly disturbed the uneasy silence over Santo Domingo in December when some discussion of Spain's Dominican policy took place. A byproduct of those debates were comments on the United States. For example, O'Donnell indicated to the Cortes that the Americans did not want to conquer Santo Domingo or Cuba at the moment. Later he said that the Civil War influenced Spanish policy in Santo Domingo, but he did not elaborate. Olózaga reiterated the standard theme that the annexation saved Cuba from Washington's imperialism. Moreover, he acknowledged that the American Civil War guaranteed Spain a free hand in the colony. Calderon Collantes decided to qualify this statement for the regime by declaring that the duration of the Civil War could not be predicted. Also, Dominican policy "was a question of honor for Spain," after which he recited the story about Santo Domingo's "spontaneous" return to Spanish control.[43]

O'Donnell could not rest comfortably with the knowledge that the Civil War meant a free hand in Santo Domingo. Calderon Collantes made that clear in the Cortes. Also, García Tassara had cautioned his government, writing that he could not predict what the United States would do about the island. The Union army consisted of 150,000 men who could attack the colony. Although this army appeared inferior to Spain's in organization, it was well equipped. The Union navy, he argued, also could present problems despite its preoccupation with the Civil War. The envoy believed the South would favor Spain in such a war. He recommended that Madrid impose a protectorate over the ex-colony and let reincorporation come later, naturally, otherwise Europe would become involved. In short, he suggested that Spain keep her options open until both the European and American political pictures became clearer.[44]

Santo Domingo continued to disturb relations in 1862 when rumors circulated in Madrid that Washington might help free Santo Domingo, especially when a few reports leaked from the colony about local unrest. Americans reportedly conspired with Haiti against Spain out of some fear that Madrid would order the conquest of Santo Domingo's neighbor. *La Correspondencia* in March, 1862, called these stories absurd. What gave the rumors some semblance of truth was Haiti's publicized role as her neighbor's defender against Spain. Madrid worried about Washington's policy toward Haiti but at no time did the United States give the Haitians any encouragement or supplies for their struggle against Spain. Spaniards could never be sure and their fears grew in 1863–1864, despite Washington's reassurances.[45]

In the spring of 1863, the State Department began receiving reports about revolutionary activity in Santo Domingo. Although the Union extended no help to the Dominican rebels, local anti-Spanish forces always hoped for such aid and believed that as soon as the Civil War ended, they would receive it. The major revolt that finally led to Spain's withdrawal from the island began in August-September although there had been minor outbreaks since the spring of 1861. The causes of the revolution were many. Dominican patriots, who never accepted Spanish rule, initiated the revolution. Spain's mismanagement of the local government, increased taxes, displacement of Dominican officials by Spaniards, corruption, and archaic colonial regulations flying in the face of recent trends in Dominican law, all contributed to the growing discontent on the island. The economy failed to expand, local currency continued to be unstable, and the colonial government controlled business in a mercantilist fashion, thereby injuring what little foreign trade Santo Domingo had developed.[46]

Seward, No. 12, July 11, 1861, *Ibid.*; Schurz to Seward, No. 3, July 18, 1861, *Ibid.*

[42] Perry to Seward, No. 8, July 1, 1861, *Ibid.*; Perkins, *Hands Off! A History of the Monroe Doctrine* (Boston, 1941), pp. 138–144.

[43] Nuñez de Arce, *Santo Domingo*, pp. 128–129.

[44] García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 72, May 19, 1861, Sp/pol/USA/2404. Cazneau reported on Spain's military strength in Santo Domingo: "Spain has become a naval power of no mean rank and with the controlling position she already holds in our seas, the addition of such a decisive geographical advantage as the island of Hayti brings to her colonial empire, is a serious menace to the freedom of our Isthmus transits." So Seward's caution was justified much like O'Donnell's—mutual political uncertainty and military blackmail, Cazneau to Seward, No. 22, July 2, 1861, US/desp/SD/4.

[45] *La Correspondencia*, March 8, 1862, p. 1; Logan, *The Diplomatic Relations of the United States with Haiti*, pp. 76, 293.

[46] Yaeger to Seward in a series, No. 6, March 3, 1863, No. 25, August 31, 1863, No. 43, November 25, 1863, US/desp/SD/4; on causes Emilio Rodríguez Demorizi (ed.), *Diarios de la guerra Dominico-española de 1863–1865* (Santo Domingo, 1963); Spain's Captain General in Santo Domingo, José de la Gándara y Navarro, complained that many of the problems in the colony's administration existed in Spain as well and since they received no attention at home how could they in Santo Domingo?, Gándara y Navarro, *Anexión y guerra de Santo Domingo* 2: p. 164.

The immediate Spanish reaction in Santo Domingo and at home centered on alleged involvement by the United States. The American agent in the colony wrote that "the Spaniards here, have a great horror of the 'yankees,' and are nightly dreaming that they are upon them." He complained that with "every revolution and disturbance that takes place on the island, the cry is at once raised by the Spaniards, 'Oh the yankees have landed men and arms.' " Washington, however, announced its neutrality when the Dominican rebels declared a republic on September 14. In fact, American naval forces in the area had orders to stop any illegal aid from American sources to them. Seward also refused to see Dominican agents in any official capacity.[47]

In Spain, important events took place which eventually influenced Madrid's policy toward Santo Domingo. Throughout 1862, O'Donnell's Liberal Union suffered a series of political reverses which finally led to its fall in February, 1863. Ideological differences among leading politicians encouraged the breakup of the general's faction which in turn caused the queen to deny him support. Eventually she forced him out of power and chose the Marqués de Miraflores to form a cabinet of *moderados* as a temporary measure. Miraflores ruled for the queen from March 2, 1863, until January 16, 1864. During his term in office, the fruits of the unwise decision to annex Santo Domingo were harvested.[48]

Disturbing the United States, he worried about Spain's deteriorating situation in the New World. He dispatched more troops to the island to put down the revolt. In October, the Spanish government declared a blockade around the colony.[49] Gustave Koerner, Schurz's replacement in Madrid, criticized Spanish officials for accusing the United States of unneutral behavior, reporting that the French were also charging Washington with fomenting the revolt. Seward sympathized with his minister's problems writing him that "all reports or intimations of any kind that the government or people of the United States have practiced, or are practicing interference in that quarter, or in Cuba, or elsewhere, are entirely without any foundation in fact." Yet Miraflores still suspected Seward of improper behavior.[50]

By 1864, Spain's position had deteriorated in the colony while the United States slowly was winning the Civil War. Washington kept quiet on the Dominican revolt in 1863 knowing there would be plenty of time to deal with the problem once her civil war ended. Seward also feared that an extreme move might cause the Spanish to recognize the Confederacy. On February 2, he mentioned to the cabinet that Dominican agents had again come to him for recognition, commenting that on the one hand, Spain had encountered unpredictable difficulties in Santo Domingo warranting American sympathy for Madrid especially since the Spaniards were currently attempting to better relations with Washington. Yet on the other hand, the revolt called for American approval and aid. Lincoln answered him with a story. Two Blacks in Tennessee were talking. One, a preacher, was admonishing his friend about "the importance of religion and the dangers of the future." The preacher said that there lay before the man two roads. One led straight to Hell while the other "right to damnation." The preacher's friend replied that with the dangers that lay before him he was taking neither road and would instead head for the woods. Lincoln then said to Seward: I am not willing to assume any new troubles or responsibility at this time, and shall therefore avoid going to one place with Spain or with the negro to the other, [I] shall take to the woods. We will maintain an honest and strict neutrality." [51]

His policy continued in force to the end of the Spanish colonization of Santo Domingo. García Tassara's complaints about ships going to Santo Domingo were denied. Reports kept coming into Washington about Spain's deteriorating military situation while the Spanish press often reported victories. But still the United States remained quiet. By early 1864, the real situation became obvious to everyone, including Madrid's public.[52] Open discussion in Spain began on Dominican policy with some politicians begin-

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[47] Yaeger to Seward, No. 25, August 31, 1863, US/desp/SD/4. Like many Spanish diplomats, Augusto Conte believed U.S. officials helped the rebels, *Recuerdos de un diplomático* (Madrid, 1901), **2**: pp. 532–533; United States, Department of the Navy, *Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion* (Washington, 1894–1927), Series 1, **2**: pp. 492–493, 504–505 (hereafter cited *ORN/series/* volume).

[48] Miraflores, *Memorias del reinado de Isabel*, III, 193–195; for biographical data on Miraflores (1792–1872) see Manuel Fernandez Suarez, "El Marqués de Miraflores: el hombre y el político," *Ibid.*, **1**: pp. vii–xxvi.

[49] London *Times*, October 5, 1863, p. 10; text of Spain's blockade reprinted in Great Britain, Foreign Office, *British and Foreign State Papers (1863–1864)* (London, 1869), **54**: pp. 536–537; the British devoted much attention to the blockade, F072/1164-1167.

[50] Koerner to Seward, No. 57, October 8, 1863, US/desp/Sp/45; Koerner served as minister to Spain from October 20, 1862 to July 14, 1864. For biographical data see his memoirs, Thomas J. McCormack (ed.), *Memoirs of Gustave Koerner, 1809–1869* (Cedar Rapids, 1909), both volumes; Seward to Koerner, No. 57, November 17, 1863, US/inst/Sp/15.

[51] Gideon Welles, *Diary of Gideon Welles* (New York, 1960), **1**: pp. 519–520.

[52] Seward to García Tassara, February 3, 1864, US/notes to foreign legations/86; Seward to Koerner, No. 72, March 12, 1864, US/inst/Sp/15; García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 233, December 16, 1864, Sp/corr/USA/1471; Koerner to Seward, No. 96, May 15, 1864, US/desp/Sp/46; London *Times*, March 5, 1864, p. 14, May 6, 1864, p. 12 and November 7, 1864, p. 12.

ning to call for Spain's withdrawal. At first, the regime refused to discuss such a move in public. In February, the minister of state sent a circular to all his legations detailing the heroic efforts of Spain's soldiers, complaining about foreign agents helping the rebels, and expressing the hope that other governments would not become involved. London, Paris, Vienna, and St. Petersburg among others, agreed that anyone aiding the rebels should be considered a pirate. The United States avoided making such a blanket statement. García Tassara reported that Washington might thereby be helping the revolutionaries by virtually recognizing them as belligerents.[53]

In January, 1864, as more news of the revolt arrived in Madrid, the vagaries of domestic politics again disrupted affairs. Unable to form a working coalition in the government, Miraflores resigned. Between then and September, 1864, Lorenzo Arrazola and Alejandro Mon, both *moderados,* ruled but were unable to provide stable government. The period was obviously one of political transition. Consequently, as never before, various political factions began to discuss Spain's problems in greater detail, among them the Dominican revolt. There were those who felt if Spain cut her ties to Santo Domingo, Cuban security would be threatened. And although Minister of State Joaquín Francisco Pacheco told Koerner in April that the annexation had been a mistake, to pull out now would be seen as a sign of weakness. Other officials felt withdrawing might encourage revolts in Cuba and Puerto Rico. In such a situation, Washington would be expected to seize Cuba.[54] On the other side of the argument were those who believed annexation had been a mistake. They pointed out that the island required large outlays of money and men. Coming during a period when many believed their nation's credit could not be expanded at the same time that the country was involved in a war with Peru, Chile, and their allies, it seemed foolish to linger on in the colony. Moreover, with the reconquest of the South almost completed, Washington would be able to participate in Latin American affairs once again.[55]

Spain sent a commission to Santo Domingo in the spring of 1864 to investigate the situation. Their report indicated Madrid could not possibly conquer the island because of the guerrila units operating in the interior jungles. The commission predicted Haiti would continue to support the rebels; and the public would not tolerate the expense in lives in a stern effort to crush them. The Haitians offered to mediate between the Spanish and the rebels and sought the cooperation of Britain, France, and the United States. Koerner reported that the Spanish did not trust the Haitians but probably would accept French mediation if it should come to that. The British continued to recommend that Spain do nothing to irritate Washington, such as invading Haiti. Many Spaniards still believed the United States would not really intervene in Latin American affairs until she had recovered from her civil war. Anyway, in October, the Foreign Office notified Perry that Spain had decided not to compromise; the rebels would have to submit to Madrid before peace terms could be discussed.[56]

A fundamental change took place in Spain when on September 16, 1864, Narváez came back to power for the sixth time. On foreign affairs, he disagreed with O'Donnell's policy of becoming involved in various international projects. Narváez wanted to liquidate both the Dominican episode and the war in the Pacific. He ran into stiff opposition from other officials who worried about national honor, the political impact at home, and effects abroad. His biggest clash came with the queen in late November and early December leading to a ministerial crisis. He won and in her annual address she omitted any statement about vindicating Spanish honor in the island—signaling a slight shift in policy.[57]

The debate within the Spanish government continued into January, 1865. O'Donnell and his allies threw up opposition in the Cortes. At one point he said that given power "he would have guaranteed with his head to put down the rebellion in three months." The General also declared that the United States was the reason for originally annexing the island. To García Tassara Seward rebutted: "There is one national passion which the United States has not developed . . . , the passion of conquest." [58] O'Donnell called any proposal to evacuate the island "a humiliating declaration of impotence." The London

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[53] Becker, *relaciones exteriores,* **2**: pp. 402–407; *Archives diplomatiques 1864. Recueil de diplomatie et d'histoire* 3, *Juillet, Aout, Septembre 1864* (Paris, 1869): pp. 374–375.

[54] Cayetano Martin y Oñate, *España y Santo Domingo* (Toledo, 1864), pp. 87–93; Joaquin Martí de Mozquiz y Callejas, *Una idea sobre la cuestión de Santo Domingo* (Madrid, 1864), p. 16; Gonzalez Tablas, *Historia de la dominación y ultima guerra de España en Santo Domingo* (Madrid, 1870), pp. 195–222; Koerner to Seward, No. 87, April 10, 1864, US/desp/Sp/46; Barrot to Drouyn de Lhuys, No. 65, October 5, 1864, Fr/pol/Esp/866.

[55] Koerner to Seward, No. 59, October 24, 1863, US/desp/Sp/45; London *Times,* September 14, 1864, p. 8; Crampton to Russell, No. 277, F072/1082; Miguel Villalba Hervás, *Recuerdos de cinco lustros, 1843–1868* (Madrid, 1896), pp. 232–233.

[56] United States, Department of State, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Affairs (Relations) of the United States, 1864* (Washington, 1865), **4**: pp. 19–20, 29–30 (hereafter cited *FRUS(year)*);Perry to Seward, No. 135, October 28, 1864, US/desp/Sp/46.

[57] Perry to Seward, December 19, 1864, US/desp/Sp/46; London *Times,* January 5, 1865, p. 10 and January 9, 1865, p. 6.

[58] London *Times,* January 5, 1865, p. 10; *FRUS(1865),* **2**: p. 508.

Times reported that the only people opposed to abandonment were members of the Liberal Union. Calderon Collantes and Narváez debated each other on the floor of the Cortes, each a symbol of opposing views. On January 7, Narváez formally proposed a bill to the Cortes calling for abandonment and cancellation of the act of May 19, 1861.[59]

The Cortes continued debating the issue through March and these discussions reflected various views on the United States. For example, the minister of state, António Benavides, on March 29, commented that no country would be going to war with the United States in the near future. After the American Civil War, "the United States are certainly not going to start any trouble with Europe. They are going to strengthen the union of the conquering part of the United States. This is its passion, this has always been its force." [60] Another legislator suggested that if Santo Domingo had not revolted "we would have had to lament very soon . . . a fight with the United States." [61]

On April 1, the lower house passed the abandonment bill by a vote of 153 to 68. The Senate continued to debate the issue. However, the feeling there soon became clear. As one senator said:

> Before peopling Santo Domingo let us people and civilize our Spanish providences. We shall not lose strength or prestige by abandoning that island. We shall, on the contrary, gain moral force by bestowing upon the Cubans the political rights enjoyed by the Spaniards.[62]

The Senate passed the bill on April 29 by 93 to 39 votes and the queen signed it the next day. It simply ordered the evacuation of all Spanish navy, army, and civil service personnel.[63]

Throughout the period in which Spain debated its Dominican policy, the United States observed quietly. Seward knew of the discontent in the government as early as October, 1862, when Elliott reported Cuban officials were recommending that Madrid abandon Santo Domingo because of the revolutionary threat and the lack of significant trade relations. In January some newspapers began to publicize the differences of views within Spanish circles. In March Seward told García Tassara that although some delegates in the Cortes wanted to keep Santo Domingo in order to protect Cuba, Spain had nothing to fear because the United States would not seize Cuba.[64]

Benavidas told Perry on March 10 that a Haitian diplomat had recently suggested the entire island be neutralized with Haiti and the United States already agreeable to such a measure. Perry noted that Benavidas was "the first Spaniard, almost the first European . . . to fix himself seriously on the point of reciprocal non-intervention in Europe and in America which was the grand idea of President Monroe's administration, and which I thought proper to bring out clearly again in the Santo Domingo protest." Although excited, Perry tempered his comments with a warning that Narváez might be forced out of office before abandonment could be effected. Perry, a close friend of the general, told him that the United States had only economic interests in Cuba. The Spaniard responded only with a promise to untangle the Dominican problem as quickly as possible. Like Perry, the French wondered if he could do this since Spain had so many problems.[65]

Perry continued Koerner's policy of leaving the Dominican issue "in abeyance" letting events take their own course. Seward approved only commenting when he thought helpful to Narváez's position. Also, the American did not want to disturb the French who intended to block any sudden attempt by Washington to seize Santo Domingo. When the abandonment bill passed, Haiti's proposal received no further attention by Washington. Finally in July, Spain removed her last soldiers following a few prisoner exchange complications.[66]

Tempted by the possibility of easy acquisition, pushed into it in large part by Serrano's cooperation with Santana, and influenced by the development of a civil war in the United States, Spain annexed Santo Domingo. Poor administration and endemic Dominican nationalism spelled the doom of her adventure. The revolt tragically cost Spain about ten thousand lives and millions of reales. Another price included the loss of prestige in Latin America. Combined with Spanish involvement in Mexico and a war against other American governments, Spain suffered the indignity of being considered Latin America's number one enemy. Since Spaniards viewed Latin Americans as

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[59] Nuñez de Arce, *Santo Domingo*, 6; London *Times*, January 9, 1865, p. 6, January 12, 1865, p. 12, January 14, 1865, pp. 6, 9; Yuengling, *Highlights of the Debates in the Spanish Chamber of Deputies*, pp. 123, 144, 154.

[60] *Diario de las sesiones del Congreso legislatura de 1864*, 2: p. 1297.

[61] *Ibid.*, p. 1280.

[62] London *Times*, April 28, 1865, p. 12.

[63] *FRUS (1865)*, 2: p. 534–536.

[64] Elliott to Seward, "Private," October 3, 1862, US/desp/SD/4; *New York Times*, January 1, 1865, p. 4; London *Times*, January 5, 1865, p. 10; García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 31, March 3, 1865, Sp/pol/USA/2408.

[65] Perry to Seward, "Confidential," March 12, 1865, Seward Papers; Mercier to Drouyan de Lhuys, No. 20, March 24, 1865, Fr/pol/Esp/866. This is the same Henri Mercier who served as minister in the U.S. during the first three years of the Civil War.

[66] McCormack, *Memoirs of Gustave Koerner*, 2, p. 288; Walewski to Turgot, No. 3, January 25, 1857, Fr/pol/Esp/850; Drouyn de Lhuys to Barrot, No. 18, June 9, 1863, *Ibid.*/863; Castro to García Tassara, August 10, 1865, wrote that once the soldiers were out, Madrid would break "every sort of relations between Spain and that Island," US/notes/Sp/21; *FRUS (1865)* 2: pp. 553–554; García Tassara to Seward, August 30, 1865, US/notes/Sp/21.

cultural brothers, this consequence humiliated them.[67] Clearly, Spain did not suddenly become interested in Santo Domingo when the Civil War broke out. Events climaxed into annexation at the same time that South Carolinians bombarded Fort Sumter in April, 1861. The same could be said of Spain's abandonment in the spring of 1865. Besides shattering hopes for a revived empire in the New World, the episode helped discredit both the Liberal Union and Queen Isabel.

On the other hand, the United States profited from Spain's annexation. Temporarily, the Latin Americans did not consider the United States their primary enemy. Spain's failure also served as a lesson to other Europeans who might have thought of involving themselves in the New World. The United States learned that she needed bases in the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico in order to protect herself from similar episodes. But during the Civil War, Washington followed the wise policy of not protesting too vigorously against what Spain did.[68]

Santo Domingo sincerely searched for stability and security in the 1850s and Santana thought he could find it in Spanish colonization. O'Donnell's government found his logic surprising even if pleasing and correctly anticipated problems ahead. The Dominican experience, no doubt, gave the islanders a greater sense of nationalism and self-confidence after 1865 although they bought their political maturity with a bloody revolution.

Spanish-American competition in Santo Domingo never took on the seriousness that it did in Cuba, remaining subservient to Cuban policies. Even more so than the United States, Spain believed that if any power were to take over Santo Domingo she had the greatest claim and indeed the responsibility to do so. The United States only took an interest in Samaná Bay. Talk of seizing the island never became serious. Most important, Santo Domingo clearly proved to be another point of friction irritating to both governments.

V. INTERVENTION IN MEXICO

As if Santo Domingo and Cuba did not cause enough problems for Spain and the United States, Mexico also contributed to their complex relations. Simultaneously with competition in Santo Domingo, Washington and Madrid tried to implement policies in Mexico which brought them into conflict with each other. Mexico, once part of the Spanish empire, continued to attract Spain's concern. The United States took a great deal of interest in Mexico because the two countries shared borders. American expansion into the southwestern part of the North American Continent had already led to one war with Mexico in 1846–1848 and Spain found this disturbing, fearing Washington would eventually seize all of Mexico if nothing were done to stop her. Moreover, Mexico's political instability resulted in the accumulation of Spanish debt and reparation claims. The occasional murder of a Spanish citizen also aroused concern in Madrid. The resulting confluence of Spanish and American claims, concerns, and policies turned Mexico into another battleground in the ongoing diplomatic conflict between Madrid and Washington.

Even before the start of the Mexican civil war in 1857, each country worried about the other trying to invade Mexico or at least establish a government there friendly to its interests. For example, prior to the overthrow of General Antonio López de Santa Anna as president of Mexico in 1857, rumors reached Washington about Spanish intrigues. Such stories constantly worried the United States. Washington was also concerned that such reports might not be true since, in fact, Spanish-Mexican relations were deteriorating and might possibly lead to the opposite; that is, to a war between the two Latin countries thereby compelling the United States to intervene because of the Monroe Doctrine. Madrid had been approached by Santa Anna at one point to form an alliance hostile to the United States, but he was turned down because of the possibility of a conflict arising as a consequence. The British and the French also refused to cooperate with the Mexican. In June, 1856, the British envoy in Madrid reported that the Spanish hoped Britain and France would distract the United States with a small crisis in Central America so that Spain could expand her influence in Mexico with the use of men and supplies from Cuba.[1]

Mexico went through a period of serious political instability between 1855 and 1857. In February, 1857, a new constitution went into effect which in numerous ways borrowed from that of the United States, indicating to many Europeans the extent of American influence in the country. The Washington government supported Benito Juárez's liberal regime to the consternation of the Spanish, who opposed any such government in Mexico. When Buchanan assumed the presidency, the Spanish press reported

[67] Villalba Hervás, *Recuerdos de cinco lustros*, p. 214; Emeterio S. Santovenia, "México y España en 1861–1862," *Revista de historia de América*, No. 7 (1930), pp. 39–102; Van Aken, *Pan-Hispanism* pp. 108, 110–111; Becker, *relaciones exteriores* **2**: pp, 571–581; Robert W. Frazer, "Latin American Projects to Aid Mexico during the French Intervention," *Hispanic American Historical Review* **28** (August, 1948): p. 377.

[68] Clifford L. Egan, "The Monroe Doctrine and Santo Domingo in Spanish-American Diplomacy, 1861-1865," *Lincoln Herald* **71** (Summer, 1969): pp. 55–68.

[1] Manning, *Mexico*, pp. 750–754, 771–776; Carl Bock, *Prelude to Tragedy: The Negotiation and Breakdown of the Tripartite Convention of London, October 31, 1861* (Philadelphia, 1966), p. 28; Howden to Clarendon, No. 190, June 4, 1856, F072/893.

he would even support Mexico against Spain's interests.[2]

Relations between Spain and Mexico deteriorated rapidly in the second half of the 1850s. Debts owed to Spain were not paid and Spanish citizens complained of being mistreated and even murdered. In an attempt to satisfy growing public demands at home to do something about Mexico, a Spanish fleet sailed to Vera Cruz in 1856 to pressure the Mexicans into honoring their obligations. In the following year Spain demanded reparations for the deaths of several Spaniards. The Spanish Minister of State notified Escalante in February, 1857, that if citizens could not be safe, "Her Majesty's Government has arranged that, without delay, a number of vessels of war, and troops for landing, sufficient for the sole and exclusive object of protecting" its people would be sent. Soon after, diplomatic relations with Mexico were severed. The envoy in Washington told Secretary Cass that Spain only wanted to prevent Spanish lives being lost during the current Mexican civil war. Cass recognized Spain's right to send ships to Mexico but only for that purpose. The envoy assured him that his country had no intention of conquering Mexico. Madrid did not plan to impose a Spanish king on a Mexican throne in the spring of 1857, despite American fears to the contrary.[3]

The British feared that Mexico's political instability and Washington's concern about Spain's policy would give the United States the excuse to expand into Mexico or even worse, to seize Cuba. William Walker's efforts constantly drew their attention and those of the Americans and the French. Therefore, London and Paris suggested to the Spanish that they settle all their differences with Mexico quickly before a major crisis developed. The possibility of American imperialism seemingly kept growing because newspapers discussed it openly to the consternation of Spanish, British, and French diplomats. The next effect was to give the English suggestions a heightened sense of urgency.[4]

Reports on European intrigues flowing into Washington were no less disturbing to the Americans. The consul in Havana reported that Spain, France, and Britain were working "to cripple our power and check our influence" and postulated that Madrid would send Santa Anna back into Mexico to establish a pro-Spanish government. Dodge believed "there is no act of stupidity or folly that I am not prepared to see either Spain or Mexico commit." Anglo-French attempts to help the Spanish settle their differences with Mexico peacefully met with American approval and Dodge was able to report on July 25 that Spain had definitely accepted their mediation.[5] Spain wanted those who had killed Spaniards punished. They demanded unconditional compliance of Mexico to a previously negotiated debt treaty and called for reparations to be paid injured Spaniards. Spain had accepted mediation reluctantly more to please the British and the French than to settle claims. Dodge suggested that since Santa Anna was trying to regain power in Mexico, Spain wanted to delay a settlement until the outcome of that effort became known.[6]

The London *Times* reported that the Spanish government determined to obtain satisfaction for debts incurred and crimes committed. One Spanish newspaper, expressing the opinion of many officials, speculated that since Mexico also owed money to the United States, Washington might propose an exchange of territory for cancellation of all debts, a development Spain could not tolerate. It warned that in order to achieve this, Buchanan might encourage a war between Spain and Mexico. Ferrer de Couto, voicing the view of many ultra-conservatives, suggested Spain impose a protectorate in Mexico to block Washington's imperialism. French Minister Turgot learned in Madrid that the Cuban captain general, José Gutiérrez de la Concha, also believed the United States would move either into Mexico or Cuba and had asked for troop reinforcements.[7]

In 1858 Spanish concern about Mexico increased. Queen Isabel discussed it in her January message to the Cortes calling it a "shame" that Spain's reclamations could not be obtained. Apparently Spaniards saw a real danger in not making a settlement despite Howden's report to London that the Mexican issue was one "between Spain and the United States" in which Madrid "appears to me not to be alive to the dangers of its situation." As usual, he complained that Madrid believed London and Paris would protect Cuba from the United States thereby leaving the Spanish the option of maintaining poor relations with Mexico. However, because Spain's Mexican problems were national in scope and involved her honor, Mexico's refusal to make a final debt settlement proved irritating and politically embarrassing to Madrid. Some ultra-conservative members of the Cortes talked of war against Mexico, but the regime's supporters, including members of Prim's democratic faction, deflected such

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[2] Manning, *Spain*, pp. 913–914.

[3] Marqués de Pidal to Escalante, February 15, 1857, copy in US/notes/Sp/16; García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 40, April 6, 1857, Sp/corr/USA/1468.

[4] Howden to Clarendon, No. 172, April 30, 1857, F072/915; García Tassara to Min. of St. in a series, No. 42, April 14, No. 46, April 20, No. 61, May 2, 1857, Sp/corr/USA/1468.

[5] Blythe to Cass, No. 27, May 16, 1857, US/desp/Havana/36; Manning, *Spain*, 916–917; Dodge to Cass, No. 56, July 25, 1857, US/desp/Sp/40.

[6] Dodge to Cass, No. 57, August 3, 1857, US/desp/Sp/40.

[7] London *Times*, June 6, 1857, p. 10; *El Diario Español*, July 1, 1857, p. 1; Ferrer de Couto, *Cuestiones de Méjico*, pp. 293–345, 353–359; Turgot to Walewski, No. 28, June 17, 1857, Fr/pol/Esp/850.

discussion. Dodge reported that Spaniards would generally approve of Santa Anna being back in power because of his pro-Spanish views and "well known hostility . . . towards the United States." [8]

During the spring a great deal of talk about a protectorate took place in the United States both within the government and in the press because a diplomatic settlement of Mexican debts running into millions of dollars could not be concluded. Spain's Mexican problems coupled with the possibility of her forming a protectorate of some sort added to American concern. The French minister to Mexico, Alexis de Gabriac, wrote to Paris that "the current state of decomposition in which Mexico finds itself inspires large and numerous articles in the press of the United States about the necessity of a protectorate." In July García Tassara informed his government that because relations between the United States and Mexico were on the verge of being ruptured, French influence would grow in the Central American country.[9]

Frustrated at not being able to resolve Spanish differences with Mexico, Spain refrained from any definitive action. Much in line with the pattern of moving with caution in Latin American affairs, Spain still hoped for a pacific settlement. On October 7, Calderon Collantes told the British envoy that "Spain had no intention of interfering in the internal affairs of Mexico, and that the United States would therefore have no excuse for taking the measure she might adopt." But this did little to stop rumors of Spain sending an expedition to Mexico.[10]

By November, O'Donnell had lost his patience with Mexico. Unresolved issues with this country were already giving his opponents political ammunition. Other domestic problems called for solutions and since these were not forthcoming, he wanted some diplomatic event to improve his image. His government became noisier in its complaints about Mexico. He told the British and French envoys that Mexican anarchy was no reason for avoiding payments or for excusing the loss of Spanish lives. If results were not soon forthcoming on the diplomatic front, Spain would use whatever means she had to settle her problems. O'Donnell told these diplomats that sufficient military forces in Cuba dispelled any doubts about his being able to defend the colony from an American invasion while dealing with Mexico. However, he said Spain would take no immediate action in order to allow London and Paris time to help negotiate a settlement.[11]

Soon after, Spain decided to send a naval contingent to Mexico to protect Spanish lives, force Mexico into paying reparations, and honor her debts. The minister of state instructed García Tassara to tell the Americans of this and to indicate that Spain would not disturb "the integrity of this territory." The American envoy in Madrid also received a similar message from Calderon Collantes. The available evidence tends to confirm that Spain did not want to conquer Mexico. The risk of armed conflict with the United States and its implied threat to Cuba, coupled with the possibility that the regime would not receive full domestic support for such a war indicated that only diplomacy could really be used abroad while at home the nation could be cajoled into believing a war threat existed. Moreover, when force was planned, it took the token form of a small naval unit since no soldiers were to be sent. Obviously, it would have been impossible to conquer Mexico with just a navy.[12]

As was predictable, the reaction of the United States called Spain's motives into question. Cass wrote Dodge that Washington would not allow "the subjugation of any of the Independent States of this Continent to European powers, nor the exercise of a protectorate over them." After so notifying the Spanish government, Dodge remarked that O'Donnell wanted a settlement as well as an increase in domestic support for his government. He predicted O'Donnell, "proverbial for his stubbornness and determination," would not back down especially since anything but firm efforts might cause his ministry to fall. Meanwhile, the Spanish would continue to offer support to the conservative faction pitted against Juárez and his liberal backers in the Mexican civil war.[13]

By early December, Cass concluded Spain could ill afford a full scale invasion of Mexico because of the risk of war with the United States, the cost in money and lives, and the resultant loss of Spanish influence in Latin America. He believed that the overthrow of the Mexican government "is evidently beyond her means." Buchanan in his second annual message to the Congress early that month irritated the Spanish, however, by stating "I can imagine no possible remedy for these evils . . . but for the Government of the

[8] R. Olivar Bertrand, *Asi cayó Isabel II* (Barcelona, 1955), p. 26; Howden to Malmesbury, No. 59, March 9, 1858, F072/935; Dodge to Cass, No. 78, March 13, 1858, US/desp/Sp/41.

[9] Quoted in Lilia Díaz, *Versión francesa de México informes diplomáticos 1858–1862* (Mexico, 1964), 2: pp. 12–13; García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 59, July 20, 1858, Sp/corr/USA/1469.

[10] Buchanan to Malmesbury, No. 181, October 7, 1858, F072/939; Callahan, *Cuba and International Relations*, pp. 299–300.

[11] Buchanan to Malmesbury, No. 299, November 7, 1858, F072/940; Fourniet to Walewski, No. 66, November 9, 1858, Fr/pol/Esp/852. France helped mediate Spain's problem in order to prevent the U.S. from invading Mexico, Turgot to Walewski, No. 57, June 10, 1856, *Ibid.*/848; Turgot to Walewski, No. 23, May 24, 1857, *Ibid.*/850.

[12] Min. of St., to García Tassara, November 20, 1858, Sp/corr/USA/1469; Manning, *Spain*, pp. 956–958; Fournier to Walewski, No. 74, December 1, 1858, Fr/pol/Esp/852.

[13] Cass quoted in Manning, *Spain*, pp. 229–230 and Dodge, pp. 956–958.

United States to assume a temporary protectorate over the northern portions of Chihuahua and Sonora and to establish military posts within the same." This proposal received about as much congressional approval as did his simultaneous request for funds with which to purchase Cuba.[14]

Buchanan then sent Robert M. McLane to Mexico as minister to negotiate with whichever Mexican government appeared to control the majority of the country, either Miramon's conservative regime in Mexico City or Juárez's at Vera Cruz. McLane chose to extend diplomatic recognition to Cass's favorite, Juárez, in April, 1859, and immediately began discussing the sale of lower California to the United States and a trade convention. By December the talks had led to a draft treaty allowing American troops to pass through Mexican territory, encouraging favorable commercial relations, and promising Washington's intervention in Mexican affairs if called upon "to enforce treaty stipulations and to maintain order and security." The United States agreed in return to assume a two million dollar debt owed its citizens by Mexico.[15]

A few days before this treaty was finally worked out, Buchanan sent his annual message to the Congress again asking for permission to send troops into Mexico to prevent a European takeover. García Tassara condemned the speech and later the proposed McLane-Ocampo treaty. Madrid closely watched developments in relations between the United States and Mexico in 1859, concerned that Washington might prevent Spain from receiving satisfaction on her claims. Spain and Mexico that year also negotiated a short-lived claims treaty with the help of the British and the French. This did little to calm Madrid's concerns because with two governments in Mexico it appeared doubtful that the Mexicans could honor their obligations. Neither Mexican regime had any funds to pay any government. The British envoy in Washington worried that Buchanan might seize both Cuba and Mexico since Europe was concentrating its attention on the Austro-Sardinian war. Later Lord Lyons suggested that more prudent American officials hesitated to occupy either fearing Europe's reaction and the domestic effects in the United States.[16]

Calderon Collantes came to the conclusion by mid-year that Spain would have to do more than negotiate to receive satisfaction from the Mexicans who had discontinued payments on their foreign debts. Relations with Mexico also had been severed for two years and the murders of several Spaniards went unavenged. Some Spanish politicians, General Juan Prim for example, called for action. In July Calderon Collantes proposed to the British and the French that the three intervene in Mexico. London said no. Paris expressed more interest, and therefore in 1860, London, in an attempt to check the situation, declared its willingness to cooperate providing force was not used. During these talks, Calderon Collantes repeatedly stressed his government's concern that the United States would invade Mexico and when the McLane-Ocampo treaty negotiations became known, he pushed even harder for some sort of European intervention.[17]

While the Spaniards began to discuss intervention, the treaty received attention in the Spanish and American press. García Tassara predicted that it would not be passed by the Senate, basing his view on local press comments. Ferrer de Couto accused the United States of illegally dealing with a pirate government. *La Regeneración* editorialized that "the treaty tells us, in summary, that Juárez sells all of Mexico, physically and politically to the United States for nothing." Officially Spain kept quiet waiting for the results in Congress. The Senate rejected the treaty on May 31, 1860, ending an immediate problem for Spain; but this did little to relax officials who expected Buchanan to try another tack.[18]

The British, French, and Spanish spent the rest of 1860 discussing what to do about Mexico. Calderon Collantes wanted to keep the United States out of the country and help establish a conservative, stable government that could honor its national commitments. After the treaty's rejection in May, Lord Russell proposed to Paris and Madrid that the United States be invited to join in any mediation talks initiated with the Mexicans. Washington let it be known that the United States would refuse to consider such an invitation since this might jeopardize Juárez's regime. Both factions in Mexico also rejected British mediatory proposals.[19]

On September 1, García Tassara talked to Secretary Cass about the possibility of a Spanish squadron landing at Vera Cruz. Cass said that the American Navy would be sent into the area to observe. Again he reiterated Washington's policy that Spain had a right to wage war with Mexico but could not conquer her or impose a new form of government there. A few days later Cass reported to Preston what he had told García Tassara, adding that the American fleet would remain near Mexico to protect the lives and property of American citizens. The secretary ordered Preston

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[14] *Ibid.*, pp. 230–231; Richardson, *Messages and Papers of the Presidents* **5**: p. 514.

[15] Bock, *Prelude to Tragedy*, pp. 35–37.

[16] García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 5, January 3, 1860, Sp/pol/USA/2403; Lord Newton, *Lord Lyons: A Record of British Diplomacy* (London, 1913), summarizes the two dispatches, **1**: pp. 13, 15.

[17] Bock, *Prelude to Tragedy*, pp. 42–55.

[18] García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 23, February 14, 1860, Sp/pol/USA/2403; Ferrer de Couto, *Cuestiones de Méjico*, 468; *La Regeneración*, March 13, 1860, p. 2; Díaz, *Versión francesa de México*, **2**: pp. 153–157.

[19] Bock, *Prelude to Tragedy*, p. 57.

to hint at mediation with Spanish officials. And on September 6, he and García Tassara met again, only covering the same ground as a week before. The Spaniard commented that any occupation "would be temporary" while Cass reminded him about American policy. García Tassara's statement limiting Spain's involvement in Mexico symbolized his government's tacit and unofficial recognition of the Monroe Doctrine without so stating.[20]

García Tassara remained unsure about Washington. He believed Buchanan capable of chicanery despite the State Department's diplomatically fair and detailed statements on Spanish rights in Mexico. That he should worry about a potential clash with the United States made sense since there was always the chance that Washington would apply the Monroe Doctrine rather than merely discuss it. Although he did not know it, Cass had told McLane in September that "I have no reason to anticipate any such effort will be made," but predicted that if Spanish troops landed in Mexico, they would "be met by the armed action of the United States, should Congress adhere to the policy we have so long avowed and publicly proclaimed." Congress had a recent history of rejecting Buchanan's foreign schemes, but García Tassara never trusted the president. In fact, he sent detailed information to Madrid as if anticipating an armed clash.[21]

For the rest of the fall of 1860, Spain and the United States continued to reassure each other that their rights and sensibilities would not be violated. Each also waited to see how the civil war in Mexico would progress. The only excitement during this period came on October 27 when Alcalá Galiano, a member of the Cortes, made a foreign policy statement for the government in which he said that the Monroe Doctrine would be taken into account in developing Spanish foreign policy.[22] By this means Spain made public the assurances she had given the United States in private a month before. This public acknowledgment of the Monroe Doctrine by name signaled a departure from the past since Spain traditionally refused to recognize it openly as a legitimate, binding restriction on her Latin American activities. Spanish recognition of this principle virtually implied serious political restrictions on her *hispanismo*. Although Spaniards were not prepared to say so at the time, the implication for the future was clear. More immediate, it suggested O'Donnell had notified Washington that he did not intend to reconquer Mexico and, by insinuation, acquire other territory in the New World.

During the fall when calm diplomacy preceded active interventionist negotiations, Spanish opinions about the United States and Mexico continued to set. Ferrer de Couto, who believed Washington's activities in Hispanic America always threatened Cuba's security, warned that the proposed American loan treaty with Mexico might prove dangerous to Spanish interests. He had written to the Cuban captain general as early as January, 1860, to say "that the dismemberment of Mexico will be the most evident sign of the loss of Cuba." Since he still subscribed to this idea during the following year, he encouraged Spain to expand its influence in Mexico. García Tassara speculated France would try to impose a king in the country and that Europe would soon have to decide whether or not to allow the United States to enter Mexico. He suggested Madrid do nothing drastic for the moment. But he made his recommendation before news arrived that Juárez had entered Mexico City on January 11, 1861. Journalists in Madrid also worried about Washington's imperialism. *La Epoca* summarized the opinion of the Liberal Union by arguing that Spaniards wanted independence for Mexico with a stable government that could protect its people from "the avarice of the United States." When word reached Madrid that the pro-United States forces of Juárez occupied the capital, the Foreign Office decided to re-study its Mexican policy.[23]

Such an analysis was further encouraged by other Mexican events. After his victory, President Juárez expelled the Spanish envoy, Joaquín Pacheco, for having worked with Miramon's government and for being hostile to his faction. This was not done out of any desire to discourage friendly relations with Spain but for local domestic reasons. However, other diplomats in Mexico feared this insult might cause a war between that country and Spain. By the end of February, Juárez realized that Pacheco's dismissal might have been too hasty, but nothing could be done about it at this point.[24]

Along with word of Pacheco's expulsion came news that Juárez could not honor the Mon-Almonte Claims Convention of 1859 because the Mexican Treasury was empty. At the same time, Spain heard that a Mexican agent would come to Europe to explain his nation's policy. Although furious, Calderon Collantes recommended patience to the cabinet until the man arrived. Part of the reason for this, as in the past, continued to be Madrid's concern about what the United States might do. Pacheco returned to Madrid

[20] García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 106, September 3, 1860, Sp/pol/Mexico/2546; Manning, *Spain*, pp. 239–240; memo of conversation, September 8, 1860, US/notes/Sp/16.

[21] Mercier to Thouvenel, No. 5, September 15, 1860, Fr/pol/Etats-Unis/213; Manning, *Mexico*, pp. 288–293; García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 130, October 15, 1860, Sp/pol/Mexico/2546.

[22] Galiano's speech is in *Diario de las sesiones de Cortes, Senado* 1 (*1860–1861*) : p. 154.

[23] Ferrer de Couto, *Cuestiones de Méjico*, p. 448; García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 8, January 15, 1861, Sp/pol/USA/2404; *La Epoca*, February 15, 1861, p. 3.

[24] Bock, *Prelude to Tragedy*, pp. 94–95.

complaining about the lack of Spanish policy and loudly voiced his wish for revenge. To appease those who listened to Pacheco, Calderon Collantes told the Cortes that an expedition might have to be sent to Mexico. Meanwhile, no Mexican agent arrived in Spain. The British, French, and Spanish agreed that summer to take some action for debt collection but they could not develop any specific plans. Then in August, Spanish diplomats met with a Mexican agent in Paris, telling him that Spain could recognize the new Mexican government only if Juárez agreed to reinstate the convention of 1859. The Mexican said this was impossible and, therefore, by early September, Madrid decided to try some other action for redress of wrongs and collection of debts.[25]

Meanwhile the United States faced the problem of sending a new minister to Mexico who could help keep the international problem from growing during the spring of 1861 while the Civil War occupied Washington's time. Lincoln chose Thomas Corwin, a man who had opposed the Mexican War of 1846–1848, was known for his political abilities, and respected for his moderation and common sense. Corwin's instructions from Seward called for a postponement in the settlement of claims and for him to prevent the Mexicans from recognizing the Confederate States of America. In short, these orders matched those given to all of Lincoln's new ministers in the spring of 1861.[26]

In June Corwin concluded that the three European governments might intervene in Mexico to settle their claims. He asked for permission to negotiate a five to ten-million dollar loan which would be used to pay off debts owed to Europe by Mexico. As in similar previous proposals, he suggested Mexican land as collateral. Since he anticipated Mexico's inability to repay such a loan, the United States could foreclose on some territory. The idea never received much attention because by the time negotiations should have started the United States began to notice increased European diplomatic interest in Mexico. In September, reports filtered in that London, Paris, and Madrid no longer would wait complacently for Mexico to honor her debts. Also Seward had no reason to initiate any new policy during the spring and summer of 1861 since his legation in Madrid had sent no word that Spain or any other power planned an invasion of Mexico, although unsubstantiated rumors to the contrary circulated for months.[27]

Paris, London, and Madrid began negotiating an intervention agreement in September, 1861, for the collection of debts and the protection of lives. Each wanted to prevent the other from seizing Mexico and block land-grabbing efforts by Washington. They desired a stable Mexican government yet disagreed on how to create one. Britain refused to interfere in domestic Mexican politics. France sought to establish a monarchy and supply the new king. Spain, while reluctant to become too involved in such schemes, wanted to offer a candidate if a monarchical form of government was chosen by the Mexicans. Throughout 1861, Calderon Collantes told the British and the French that his government did not want to impose a new regime on Mexico, although London and Washington believed otherwise. Spain could not take a more aggressive stand on this issue because the Spanish would have encountered great difficulties at home.[28] The monarchists, Carlists, and *moderados* wanted a king while the democrats favored a republican government. With such a division of thought, O'Donnell's cabinet took its only real option; it decided not to choose either one for the time being and instead publicly talked about Mexican self-determination. Spain did not want to conquer Mexico, but only to redress serious wrongs. However, Madrid would have been willing to use military force with or without British and French cooperation.

The final agreement, signed on October 31, stipulated that their combined forces would not go into Mexico for the "acquisition of territory nor any special advantages." The treaty further stated that the purpose of the military action would be to protect lives and collect debts from the "arbitrary and vexatious" Mexican government. They agreed to invite the United States to sign their convention and participate in the intervention. The British thought that with Washington involved, they would have help in checking any Spanish drive to acquire control of Mexico.[29]

Throughout the fall, the United States not only observed these diplomatic efforts closely but indirectly influenced them. Schurz reported in early September that the three governments would move into Mexico. The envoy commented to Seward that the Spanish press supported intervention but that the cabinet would pay closer attention to the views of the United States. American officials warned Paris, Madrid, and London that they did not want them to interfere in domestic

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[25] Buchanan to Russell, No. 72, February 20, 1861, F072/1004; Becker, *relaciones exteriores*, II, 496, 498; E. Lefêvre, *Documents officiels. Recueills Dans la Secrêtairerie Privée de Maximilien: Histoire de L'Intervention Française au Mexique* (Brussels, 1869), 1: pp. 100–101.

[26] García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 38, March 15, 1861, Sp/pol/USA/2404; Frank Lawrence Owsley, *King Cotton Diplomacy: Foreign Relations of the Confederate States of America* (Chicago, 1931), pp. 110–111; James Morton Callahan, *Evolution of Seward's Mexican Policy* (Morgantown, 1909), pp. 280–281.

[27] Corwin to Seward, No. 2, June 29, 1861, US/desp/Mexico/28; Lynn M. Case and Warren F. Spencer, *The United States and France: Civil War Diplomacy* (Philadelphia, 1970), pp. 34–37.

[28] Bock, *Prelude to Tragedy*, pp. 122–215.

[29] For text, *Ibid.*, pp. 517–520.

Mexican politics. Schurz suggested that Isabel II wanted to expand Spanish control there and many of her cabinet members were willing to cooperate in order to stay in power. Moreover, intervention would "tickle national vanity." [30]

Seward did not question Spain's right to redress wrongs even if it meant war with Mexico. Instead, García Tassara did the worrying because he saw the possibility of the United States purchasing Mexican land. This would lessen Spain's chances of collecting her debts, lead to a possible clash between his country and Seward's, threaten the security of Cuba, and, not least of all, mean that Mexico would adopt a republican form of government. When the British suggested that Washington participate in the intervention, Spain reluctantly agreed, believing this would obviate any American objections to the expedition. In mid-October Lord Lyons and García Tassara discussed the matter with Seward. The American said he would like to "stave off intervention" by loaning money to Mexico, indicating his government's reluctance to take part in such an adventure.[31]

American discussion continued after the invitation had been made. Seward wrote Schurz that "the United States . . . deem it important to their own safety and welfare that no European or other foreign power shall subjugate that country." William L. Dayton in Paris felt that French and Spanish would quarrel over which one should supply a king for Mexico. The American minister in London, Gerald F. Adams, noted that the current crisis in the United States only encouraged Europeans to turn their attentions westward. The only piece of evidence Seward had that the Europeans would not impose a new government on Mexico came from Schurz in mid-November when he reported that the Spanish commander in the expedition, Juan Prim, opposed forming a monarchy in Mexico. García Tassara confirmed for Madrid that Seward worried about Spanish motives, suspecting Spain would do the same in Mexico as she had in Santo Domingo.[32]

Was Seward correct in suspecting the Spanish of wanting more than mere satisfaction of claims? Many historians feel Spain wanted to reconquer Mexico and took advantage of the American Civil War to do so. But they have argued without providing substantive evidence to prove such a view.[33] Professor Bock believes this claim would have to take secondary precedence to the more urgent need of protecting Spanish lives, property, and debt collection. Only one historian offered any documentary evidence to show Spain was interested in reconquest, citing some Cuban colonial papers.[34] The documentary remains at this time suggest Spanish officials wanted to see a stable government in Mexico friendly to Spain that would honor its national debts and protect Spanish lives and property. If the Mexicans wanted a monarchy Madrid would have been delighted to offer a candidate for that throne. The queen perhaps was the most important member of a minority of high-ranking officials who entertained ideas of reconquest, yet O'Donnell was able to prevent her from dominating Spanish policy on this issue. Arguing that Spain had no master plan for the reconquest of Mexico seems more realistic in light of her tendency to implement *ad hoc* yet conservative policies whenever American and British interests in the New World were involved.

García Tassara asked Seward to adhere to the convention knowing full well the Secretary's suspicions. The envoy believed Seward could not agree because of the Monroe Doctrine. Yet he continued to negotiate with the Department of State under orders from Madrid. García Tassara considered this unpleasant business since he knew the British had insisted on American participation as insurance against possible Spanish imperialism. In early December, he again predicted Seward would reject the offer, remind Spain about the Monroe Doctrine, and reserve for the United States unspecified future rights to Mexican settlements. García Tassara suggested to his government that "another moment should have been picked for this operation." The American consul in Havana reported that Spain could do little to defend Cuba at the moment since troops and supplies were being diverted for use in Santo Domingo and Mexico. This could have been what García Tassara meant by gently upbraiding his government. Seward declined the European offer, as predicted, arguing that the United States could not join the expedition since she made it a policy never to become involved in alliances.[35]

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[30] Schurz to Seward, No. 15, September 7, 1861, US/desp/Sp/43; Adams to Seward, No. 50, September 28, 1861, US/desp/GB/77; Schurz to Seward, No. 22, September 27, 1861, US/desp/Sp/43.

[31] Becker, *relaciones exteriores*, 2: pp. 501–502; Crampton to Russell, Telegram, October 7, 1861, F072/1010; Carroll, *Henri Mercier and the American Civil War*, p. 277.

[32] Seward to Schurz, No. 37, October 14, 1861, US/inst/Sp/15; Dayton to Seward, No. 74, November 6, 1861, US/desp/Fr/51; Adams to Seward, No. 68, November 8, 1861, US/desp/GB/78; Schurz to Seward, No. 41, November 16, 1861, US/desp/Sp/43; García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 183, November 1, 1861, Sp/pol/Mexico/2547.

[33] Javier Pérez de Acevedo, *Europa y Mexico, 1861–1862* (Habana, 1935), p. 37; Olivar Bertrand, *España y los españoles cien años atras* (Madrid, 1970), pp. 87, 107; J. M. Vergés, *El General Prim, en España y en Mexico* (Mexico, 1949), p. 156; Louis Savinhaic, "L'Espagne et l'expédition du Mexique: un lettre inédite du Maréchal Prim," *Revue historique* **36** (January-April, 1888): pp. 335–353; Becker, *relaciones exteriores*, 2: pp. 513–517.

[34] Bock, *Prelude to Tragedy*, pp. 122–140; Santovenia, "Mexico y España en 1861–1865," pp. 39–102.

[35] García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 201, November 23,

By the end of the year, European forces landed in Mexico and within six months the British and Spanish contingents had withdrawn due to disagreements with the French who they felt wished to impose a new regime on Mexico. Although O'Donnell wanted a new, conservative, and stable government in Mexico, he was not prepared to create it without British cooperation. Also, growing problems in Santo Domingo militated against such a risky move. And, of course, the United States always remained a factor. By June, the Spanish forces had retired to Cuba. Their commander, General Prim, took the initiative in removing them without first checking with Madrid. Although this caused a great deal of concern in government circles, the act could not be reversed so easily.[36]

During this period, American and Spanish officials were on guard for some sudden move by the other. Washington knew, for example, that the expedition met with public approval in Spain which could in turn encourage Madrid to go beyond the confines of the treaty. Americans pointed out to their Latin neighbors that the Spaniards were land hungry in order to draw Latin America closer to Washington and away from helping the Confederates. Consequently, diplomatic officials kept the United States informed about British, French, and Spanish activities in South America. Perry repeatedly reminded Madrid about American worries while the Spanish told him they only wanted to redress wrongs. The American press also reported Spain's activities in detail and, more bluntly than the State Department, painted the Spaniards as the arch villains in Mexico.[37]

García Tassara thought Lincoln would wait to see how events developed in Mexico before considering any armed move of his own. And he confirmed that the United States government also believed, like the American press, that Spain was the most dangerous of the three powers in Mexico. In March, 1862, Seward discussed with García Tassara rumors that France and Spain would place a monarch on a Mexican throne. The envoy, and later his government, reiterated their policy of not interfering in domestic Mexican politics. Prim certainly opposed such involvement, as did García Tassara. General Prim did not want a monarchical form of government in Mexico while García Tassara worried about a possible clash with the United States. Serrano, in Havana, like many other Spaniards, thought that if a king mounted the Mexican throne he should be a Spaniard and that Spain must work toward that achievement. Yet García Tassara's advice predominated in Madrid. Although an outspoken critic of the United States and a known monarchist of almost the Ferrer de Couto cloth, he continued to advise prudence. Perhaps the combination of his background and practical advice led officials to believe that a belligerent policy on their part might kill Washington's wait-and-see attitude.[38]

The Spanish press in February and March commented on the United States and its Mexican attitude to the irritation of Americans in Madrid, thereby threatening, from the Spanish government's point of view, Washington's quiet position. *La Regeneración* called for a stable Mexican government but noted that "the immediate, tangible problem is the ambition of the United States." Arguing the government's point of view, *La Epoca* reiterated Spain's concern for a responsible government while criticizing Napoleon's Mexican policy. However, Madrid wanted a conservative Mexican government that could prevent its "absorption by the United States" and a monarchy with a Catholic king appeared to be the best insurance against future American imperialism.[39]

When word reached Washington in late March that the British were going to retire from Mexico, García Tassara again advised his government to exercise restraint. A month later he heard that Prim planned to pull his troops out without instructions from Madrid and recommended this not be done too quickly, otherwise France would dominate Mexico. Although he advised that Latin America not be given cause to worry, he felt a sufficient number of Spanish soldiers should remain in order to give Spain some influence in how Mexican affairs would be governed. In May he reported that Prim's evacuation made the general

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1861, Sp/pol/Mexico/2547; García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 203, December 3, 1861, *Ibid.*; Shufeld to Seward, No. 100, December 9, 1861, US/desp/Havana/41. About 7,000 Spanish troops were earmarked for Mexico. Charles Blanchot, *Mémoires L'Intervention Française au Mexique* (Paris, 1911), 1: p. 16; Seward to García Tassara, December 4, 1861, US/notes from foreign legations/86.

[36] Bock, *Prelude to Tragedy*, pp. 216–453. Not all Spanish politicians supported the intervention decision. Antonio Eiras Roel, *El partido democratica española, 1849–1868* (Madrid, 1961), p. 268.

[37] *El Diario Español*, October 24, 1861, p. 2, October 27, 1861, pp. 1–2; *Las Novedades*, November 5, 1861, p. 3; *New York Times*, October 18, 1861, p. 4, November 8, 1861, p. 4; Nathan L. Ferris, "The Relations of the United States with South America during the American Civil War," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 21 (February, 1941): pp. 51–78; Robert W. Frazer, "Latin American Projects to Aid Mexico during the French Intervention," *Ibid.*, pp. 377–388; *FRUS (1862)*, 1: pp. 491–494; Perry to Seward, "Confidential," April 7, 1862, US/desp/Sp/44; *New York Times*, January 3, p. 4, January 23, p. 4, February 19, p. 4, May 13, 1862, p. 4.

[38] García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 5, January 6, 1862, Sp/pol/Mexico/2547; García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 40, February 17, 1862, *Ibid.*/2548; García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 59, March 11, 1862, *Ibid.*; Min. of St. to García Tassara, April 25, 1862, *Ibid.*

[39] *La Regeneración*, February 19, 1862, p. 1; *La Epoca*, March 13 and 14, 1862 reprinted in *FRUS (1862)* 1: p. 488.

popular in the United States. He reminded the Foreign Office that Spain now had to decide if it would allow France to control Mexico.[40]

When officials in Madrid heard about Prim's decision, several things happened. Opposition politicians, and their press supporters, used this news to criticize the Liberal Union for sacrificing Spanish honor and interests. Newspapers of all political persuasions discussed Spain's Mexican policy, making it the number one political issue of the day. And with the surprise and sense of urgency that the government faced when Santo Domingo announced its reincorporation into Spain, officials had to answer the immediate question of whether or not to approve of the action. If not, the problem of sending troops back had to be solved. If O'Donnell rejected Prim's move, he risked a split in the ranks of his supporters while allowing Prim to consolidate Francophobic feelings into a political weapon aimed directly at him.[41] Also, the regime would be embarrassed. Approval would lead to criticisms of deserting Spanish rights and honor. Either way, the regime faced serious objections as discussion on Mexico continued through 1862. During the same year the United States kept a close watch on the Spaniard's delicate problem, hoping O'Donnell would not opt for a reinvasion of Mexico. Although Prim's evacuation eliminated the immediate problem of Spanish troops there, Madrid and Washington anticipated further difficulties emerging out of unsettled issues in that Latin country.

O'Donnell chose to support Prim's decision. Members of his cabinet explained to the Cortes that Spain did not stay in Mexico because that would have meant violating the convention of October, 1861, which France now wanted to destroy. Adams in London suspected Spain withdrew fearing the power of the Union Army. Local French diplomats told him that Spain never seriously entertained any ideas about undertaking a major operation in Mexico other than to find some military glory helpful to the regime's image. Perry told Calderon Collantes on several occasions that the evacuation had been a wise move popularly received in Mexico. He suggested this would increase Spain's stock in Latin America because the Americans would see she could defend her rights when needed but not abuse her power.[42]

Nevertheless, O'Donnell's position grew more uncomfortable as Prim's support increased in June. Conservative politicians and many of O'Donnell's military friends deserted the Liberal Union. The list of his opponents now began to read like a catalog of Spain's best known celebrities: Pacheco, Mon, Concha, Serrano, and Cánovas del Castillo. All of them demanded that the government do something. Calderon Collantes was sent into the Cortes that June to argue that Spain had fulfilled her treaty obligations and defended Spanish honor. Some of the legislators felt Washington's sway in Mexico proved too much for O'Donnell but Calderon Collantes brushed this aside. García Tassara also worried about this, commenting to French Minister Henri Mercier that he saw the problem in terms of racial competition.[43]

Besides the public reasoning there were several private considerations which led O'Donnell to approve General Prim's withdrawal. First, the Liberal Union wanted to weaken Prim's support by also taking what essentially amounted to an anti-French position. Second, irritated with Napoleon III for not allowing Spain to provide Mexico with a king, Prim's evacuation delighted Isabel as a way of slapping the French emperor's wrist. Third, Mexico could have turned into a bottomless pit of military and diplomatic problems if Spain had become too deeply involved. Yet unpublicized logic did not change the fact that O'Donnell's forced upholding of Prim cost the Liberal Union support in the *progresista* camp where the ex-commander of the Spanish forces in Mexico held court.

Uncomfortable as he felt because of the political damage to the Liberal Union and to relations with France, O'Donnell faced other concerns as well because in June news reached him that the United States had negotiated a loan to Mexico for eleven million dollars. This temporarily disturbed Madrid, confirming Spain's worst fears about American expansion into Mexico. Perry denied his government would use such a loan to acquire new territory. In July he reported to Seward that Franco-Spanish relations, soured by Prim's evacuation, could take a turn for the better as a result of this treaty, fearing that García Tassara and Calderon Collantes might listen to the French and become involved in Mexico again. France was trying to improve relations with Spain by coordinating Mexican policy with Madrid. In the fall García Tassara informed Seward that "Spain will never go to Mexico to defend the cause of a party or to intervene in domestic concerns." [44]

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[40] García Tassara to Min. of St. in a series, No. 69, March 25, 1862, No. 92, April 27, 1862, May 6, 1862, Sp/pol/Mexico/2548.

[41] Emilio Alcala Galiano, Count of Casa Valencia, *Recuerdos políticos, históricos de España y del extranjero* (Madrid, 1906), p. 46.

[42] On Prim's motives, Olivar Bertrand, *Asi cayó Isabel*, 105–110 and *El caballero Prim: Vida política y revolucionaria* (Barcelona, 1952), 2: pp. 105–156; reprints of some proceedings in the Cortes, *FRUS (1862)* 1: pp. 500–504; Adams to Seward, No. 165, May 23, 1862, US/desp/GB/79; Perry's comments, *FRUS (1862)* 1: pp. 504–506.

[43] *Diario de las sesiones de Cortes, Senado, (1862)*, Appendix No. 133, pp. 1–105; Mercier to Thouvenel, No. 105, June 23, 1862, Fr/pol/Etats-Unis/216.

[44] Perry to Seward, "Strictly Confidential," July 8, 1862, US/desp/Sp/44; Senate did not act on it, *FRUS (1862)* 1: pp. 472–473; on serious differences in Franco-Spanish relations, Becker, *relaciones exteriores* 2: pp. 522–528; Melchor

In December, Spain's Mexican policy was further scrutinized in the Cortes, press, and Spanish government. O'Donnell's political opponents hoped to use this issue to break the power of the Liberal Union. And because this represented a serious foreign policy discussion as well, the United States could not ignore it. With it conclusion, the major crisis in relations between the United States and Spain regarding Mexico ended. The reconvening of the Cortes and Prim's desire to defend his decision while increasing his political fortune triggered the debates in December. Prim enjoyed good press coverage and wanted more of it. At first when Madrid heard of his withdrawal, newspapers called him a traitor, an insubordinate, and a deserter. By the time the government approved his move and it became evident that the French would encounter serious difficulties in Mexico, O'Donnell's critics hailed Prim as a hero and a wise man.[45]

The main event in these sessions was Prim's speech defending his evacuation, delivered on December 11. He said that the United States, now armed with a mighty army, disapproved of European intervention and that this opposition presaged serious problems for Spain. Arguing that the French wanted to seize Mexico at Spain's expense, he stated that to cooperate with Napoleon's men by marching inland to Mexico City would have meant violating the October Convention. Koerner labeled the speech as party politics having little effect on Spanish foreign policy. The next day, the Marqués de Miraflores, representing Prim's critics, objected to the politically minded general's efforts to negotiate with Juárez's faction because that implied recognition of the one Mexican party most hostile to Spain. Yet he felt Mexico should be helped in her struggle against the French. Calderon Collantes stood up to regret that politics motivated this discussion. However, he corrected Prim by denying that the French violated the October Convention. After all, the debates in the Cortes could not be allowed to damage relations with an important neighbor.[46]

Debating continued throughout the month. On December 20 Prim spoke again, telling his audience that he never received orders to invade Mexico City. He also argued that Juárez could not share any responsibility for the evacuation declaring that the Mexican liberal had no influence on the poor Franco-Spanish relations in Mexico. Although Manuel Concha opposed Prim's evacuation, he admitted in the Cortes that a Spanish king in Mexico would pose too many problems for Madrid but he could not go the next step and condone Prim's actions. On December 21 O'Donnell talked in support of the withdrawal, criticized Juárez, and stated that Spain had no interests in conquering Mexico. Repeatedly Spanish concern about potential American imperialism emerged from the discussions with various individuals reminding each other about Europe's responsibility to block Washington's expansionist tendencies. January's debates evolved into an analysis of French and Spanish Mexican policies exposing domestic political issues.[47]

O'Donnell's political enemies bore heavily on him at the start of the new year. Cánovas del Castillo, then the undersecretary of the interior, resigned along with others in protest to Spain's Mexican policy. O'Donnell decided to take advantage of this situation to restaff the cabinet in such a manner as to quiet his opponents. Calderon Collantes was made the scapegoat for Mexico by being blamed for his "inconsistent and vacillating course." [48] Other personnel changes included appointing Vega de Armijo, a close friend of O'Donnell, as minister of the interior and Serrano, recently captain general in Havana and an opponent of Prim's, to the Foreign Office. Hopefully, thought O'Donnell, a mixed liberal-conservative cabinet would placate the Liberal Union's domestic enemies while signaling Paris that Spain still wanted to remain friendly. Yet Mexico had cracked the Liberal Union's solidarity and within three months the general would be out of office.

By early 1863, diplomats on both sides of the Atlantic realized that Spain's Mexican adventure was over although some concern lingered since neither government trusted the openly declared policies and motives of the other. The United States showed great interest in presumed French efforts to reinvolve Spain in Mexico. Perry reported in mid-July that several members of the cabinet still wanted to cooperate with France on Mexican problems in order to benefit from their previous intervention. In September he noted that within the diplomatic circle in Madrid, Spaniards

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Fernandez Almagro, *Cánovas: Su vida y su política* (Madrid, 1951), pp. 127–128. Koerner suggested Seward help Spain stay out so that the French would fail, Koerner to Seward, No. 8, December 10, 1862, US/desp/Sp/45; Dayton to Seward, No. 182, August 8, 1862, US/desp/Fr/52; Min. of St. to García Tassara, October 8, 1862, Sp/pol/Mexico/2548.

[45] On Prim's motives, Richard Herr, *Spain* (Englewood Cliffs, 1971), argues Prim "opposed the opportunism of the Liberal Union," p. 104; Santovenia saw a power struggle between Serrano and Prim in the New World, "Mexico y España en 1861–1865," pp. 83–87; Olivar Bertrand, *El caballero Prim* **2**: pp. 109, 147–159.

[46] Olivar Bertrand, *El caballero Prim* **2**: pp. 147–159 summarizes the talks; Koerner to Seward, No. 10, December 12, 1862 and No. 13, undated (December, 1862), US/desp/Sp/15.

[47] The London *Times* covered the debates in a series of articles, December 19, p. 12, December 20, p. 12, December 21, p. 10, December 23, p. 10, December 24, 1862, p. 9, January 5, p. 12, January 7, p. 8, January 9, p. 10, January 12, p. 12, January 15, p. 12, January 26, 1863, p. 12; *La Regeneración* editorialized "if Europe does not throw the United States out of Mexico can Spain save for a long time its precious Antilles?," December 23, 1862, p. 1.

[48] Casa Valencia, *Recuerdos*, pp. 46–47; Koerner to Seward, No. 17, January 17, 1863, US/desp/Sp/45.

debated what to do next. He found out, for example, that García Tassara opposed recognizing Maximilian's government—as did the United States—while Miraflores believed the Austrian should be extended diplomatic recognition. In October Napoleon III's wife, Empress Eugenie, sister of Queen Isabel, visited Spain. The American legation viewed this as French pressure on Spain to support Napoleon's Mexican policy. But Spanish officials refused to budge at the moment. It was obvious by December that the pro-French faction in Madrid, which always opposed the United States, had failed to draw Spain into closer cooperation with France.[49]

An indication of how successful the French were can be gleaned from one of Barrot's dispatches to Paris. He noted in October, 1863, that Spain dropped all Mexican concerns for the moment to concentrate on settling her problems in Santo Domingo. Barrot warned that France would receive little attention until the Dominican revolt ended. Condemning this Spanish attitude, the envoy accused Miraflores of sacrificing "the various interests of state for the satisfaction of a short sighted vanity." [50] It is interesting to note that the American, French, and Spanish ministers did not claim in 1863 that Spain's Mexican policy was influenced by the large number of military victories taking place that year for the Union Army. Clearly, Santo Domingo had become a more important factor in forming policy than the American Civil War.

In the spring of 1864, news arrived in Madrid that the U.S. House of Representatives had passed a resolution disapproving the formation of a monarchy in Mexico. The government kept quiet and pro-regime newspapers in Madrid hardly remarked on the event since it was intended for the French. Prim's supporters and the democratic press were delighted. Koerner remarked that some Spaniards feared this would lead to a war between France and the United States, a struggle Spain wanted to avoid becoming part of for obvious reasons. She still tried to placate Paris even if no military or diplomatic assistance could be forthcoming for her Mexican adventure. In the fall, for example, Alejandro Llorente joined Narváez's cabinet, signaling Spanish sympathy for the French since Llorente was a Francophile.[51]

In 1865 Spanish officials, no doubt, were happy to vacate Santo Domingo. They also witnessed the Union win the Civil War while observing the rapidly deteriorating French situation in Mexico. Thinking in balance-of-power terms, García Tassara worried that the United States might now use her troops to reinstate the Monroe Doctrine as an active policy. He predicted France would soon be expelled from Mexico and in November the Foreign Office concurred in this view. Spain never lost interest in her ex-colony because through the 1860s, the Spanish legation supplied Madrid with information about Mexico.[52]

Madrid's newspapers and Spanish diplomats continued to express concern about Washington's Mexican policy until the last Frenchman left Mexico. *La Epoca*, for example, editorialized in February, 1866, that the United States still wanted to seize Mexico, Cuba, and Canada. Similar fears were entertained at the Foreign Office. Ironically, in the following year when Spain had no diplomatic representative in Mexico, the government asked Washington to take care of her interests there. Spaniards justified this because the United States could be counted on to be neutral in conflicts between Europe and Latin America so long as no European tried to change an American government or acquire territory.[53] This did not fly in the face of a hostile tradition because their mutual animosity stemmed from competition for territorial, cultural, and legal supremacy in the New World. But, whenever a situation developed that posed no threat to either side, cooperation became possible. Both governments were attempting to be friendly: Spain because Narváez might be able to use Washington's assistance in other problems in Latin America and the United States because Spain was liquidating her military involvements in the New World.

Several other observations can be made about Spanish and American diplomacy regarding Mexico. Unquestionably each mistrusted the other. Both claimed diplomatic and political interests there. Their publics were concerned about Mexican developments while the two governments also used the country for domestic political purposes. Yet there were differences. The United States could do little to prevent European intervention with her civil war still in progress. Participation appeared too risky and the chance always existed that Latin Americans would group the United States with Europe, thereby defeating Washington's goal of improving her image in South America. She also worried about the Monroe Doctrine and the possibility of a European dominated

[49] Perry to Seward, No. 97, July 12, 1863, US/desp/Sp/45; Perry to Seward, "Confidential," September 20, 1863, quoted in Egan, "An American Diplomat in Spain," pp. 66–68; Koerner to Seward, No. 58, October 11, 1863 and No. 59, October 24, 1863 for Eugenie's trip, US/desp/Sp/45.

[50] Barrot to Drouyn de Lhuys, No. 97, October 23, 1863, Fr/pol/Esp/864.

[51] *FRUS (1864)*, 4: p. 16; Barrot to Drouyn de Lhuys, No. 59, September 16, 1864, Fr/pol/Esp/866.

[52] García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 126, July 7, 1865, Sp/pol/USA/2409; García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 184, September 27, 1865, *Ibid.*; Min. of St. to García Tassara, November 5, 1865, *Ibid.*; for information on internal Mexican affairs from Washington (1862–1868), Sp/pol/Mexico/2549.

[53] *La Epoca*, February 22, 1866, p. 2; *FRUS (1867)* 1, pp. 546–547.

country on her southern border. Therefore, for a number of reasons, Mexican problems loomed in importance within the general framework of relations with Madrid; certainly more so in political terms than Santo Domingo or even Cuba by the fall of 1861.

Spain sincerely wanted to collect debts, protect lives, and insure that a stable Mexican government would be established which could prevent future problems from developing. If Mexico opted for a king, Spain wanted to offer a candidate; but, she was not prepared to work for such an arrangement with the enthusiasm of the French. In fact, O'Donnell's Mexican policy lacked the imperialist qualities which it seems to have inherited since he did not plan on reestablishing colonial control there. He wanted a flashy diplomatic victory on the heels of a small intervention. It is doubtful he seriously considered further measures. If in fact he had, there was not time to implement them since Mexico became a political liability to the Liberal Union almost from the beginning of the episode. The Mexican interlude also provided evidence that Madrid and Paris did not always cooperate on foreign policy matters as American diplomats believed.[54] Spanish officials did refuse to work closely with France in Mexico after the spring of 1862 when such efforts would have been contrary to Spain's self-interest. Mexico never achieved the diplomatic importance to Madrid that it did for Paris and Washington. Too many other international problems in Santo Domingo, North Africa, and Europe claimed Spain's attention.

VI. CIVIL WAR DIPLOMACY

The outbreak of the American Civil War in April, 1861, added new diplomatic problems to those of Cuba, Santo Domingo, and Mexico. Between 1861 and 1865, Madrid and Washington faced two sets of special questions. The first and most important concerned the issue of diplomatic recognition for the Confederate States of America which had declared their independence from the United States. This problem drew the attention of both nations for the duration of the war and involved the subsidiary issues of Spanish mediation and intervention in the conflict. The second group of problems revolved around violations of international law and proclaimed national foreign policies resulting from the Civil War. This included a host of neutrality crises, disrespect for the Union blockade, and destruction of private property by military units. However, the most important topic bearing directly upon the Civil War remained the difficult issue of recognition.

Throughout the 1850s, the Spanish observed domestic American developments with great interest since the impending crisis that finally burst into civil war threatened to complicate further relations between the two governments. García Tassara watched events closely and especially the presidential election of 1860 which, incidently, he predicted would be won by Stephen A. Douglas. Lincoln's victory caused many Spaniards to conclude that the United States would have a civil war and they looked to South Carolina for the first hint of the anticipated struggle. When this state finally seceded, García Tassara ordered his consul in Charleston to remain calm, report on local events, and not leave. In fact, all three Spanish consuls in the Confederacy eventually received similar instructions. Later Calderon Collantes told García Tassara to let his consuls deal only with local authorities and, for himself, to follow the practices of other European ministers in Washington. In short, Spain, like France and Britain, adopted a wait-and-see attitude between late 1860 and early 1861.[1]

The excited Spanish consul in Mobile, Alabama, Alonso Perés, wrote "that the Republic is irredeemably dissolved." García Tassara, commenting on the national scene in January, noted that members of the government were divided on how to deal with the South. He believed Buchanan and General Winfield Scott, the ancient commander of the Union Army, were too mediocre to handle the crisis effectively. Both Americans also differed in views: "Mr. Buchanan, a Northerner, looks at the Union from the Southern perspective, and General Scott, a Southerner, looks at the Union from the Northern view." [2]

The Spanish press also commented on the confusion in the United States. *El Diario Español* editorialized that the Union had "died." *La Discusión*, *La Epoca*, and *La Iberia* agreed. More conservative editors generally believed democracy as a system failed while their more liberal competitors saw the struggle as one over slavery. Lincoln's inauguration clinched in

[54] Conflicts of interest between Spain and France involving joint military ventures took place elsewhere as well, particularly in Viet Nam where they combined to intervene to protect European lives but which resulted in Spain evacuating while France remained to establish a colony. For further details, see James W. Cortada, "Spain and the French Invasion of Cochinchina," *Journal of Politics and History* **20**, No. 3 (December, 1974): pp. 335–345, and his "Spain and Cochinchina, 1858–1863," *Rivista Di Studi Politici Internazionali* **42**, No. 3 (August-September, 1975): pp. 392–398.

[1] García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 23, February 14, 1860, Sp/pol/USA/2403; Preston to Cass, No. 30, November 26, 1860, US/desp/Sp/42; *Las Novedades*, December 4, 1860, p. 1; García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 155, December 4, 1860, US/pol/USA/2403; Moncada to Min. of St., December 20, 1860, *Ibid.*; García Tassara to Moncada, December (no day), 1860, CCP; García Tassara to Moncada, January 12, 1861, *Ibid.*; Min. of St. to García Tassara, January 18, 1861, Sp/pol/USA/2403; the consuls were Alonso Perés (Mobile), Juan Callejon (New Orleans), and Francisco Moncada (Charleston).

[2] Perés to Min. of St., December 25, 1860, Sp/pol/USA/2403; García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 1, January 1, 1861, *Ibid.*

Spanish minds the widely held view that the Union would have a civil war. *La Correspondencia,* for example, commented on the new president's unpopularity while García Tassara reported without explanation (and quite wrongly) that the inaugural address "anticipated recognition of the new confederation." Yet, Spanish officials in Madrid and diplomats in Washington wanted to coordinate their official reaction to those of London and Paris and, therefore, waited to see what would happen next before officially expressing any views. The United States became one of the most important topics of discussion in Madrid that spring. Many Spaniards now believed that, as a result of secession, Cuba would be safe from American imperialism.[3]

During February and March the United States instructed its representatives to block any Confederate diplomatic effort to obtain recognition and aid from Europe. Meanwhile, the new administration replaced pro-Southern personnel with new diplomats; even Preston had to resign. At first Lincoln considered appointing Marcellus Clay of Kentucky to Isabel's court but decided against this when Madrid announced its annexation of Santo Domingo because he now believed Spain would cause even more problems than ever before requiring a more gifted envoy. In order to fight this apparent threat to American interests in the Caribbean, Lincoln finally selected Carl Schurz for the job. The assignment to Madrid also gave the president a means of paying off a political debt while appointing an able and energetic man.[4]

Well might Lincoln be concerned with the Spanish to the degree that an envoy's appointment might take up his time. There was concern within the government about conditions in Madrid. Spain was ruled by Queen Isabel II, a highly nationalistic and meddlesome person. During the 1850s and 1860s she did manage to appoint a number of skilled individuals to serve as her prime ministers. At the moment, General Leopoldo O'Donnell was in power supported by various liberal factions on the Spanish political scene. Other powerful groups at the moment included the moderates (*moderados*), growing numbers of Republicans, and a cluster of monarchist parties on the right. Political instability in Spain, however, did not prevent all of the parties to express concern for the welfare and security of Cuba at a time when it appeard that liberal elements on the Spanish political scene were riding the waves of influence and power. Most politicians of any persuasion believed that Spanish influence should be increased in the New World at the expense of the United States. Although the Civil War influenced Spanish affairs less dramatically than events in Europe, Santo Domingo, and Mexico, the Lincoln administration assumed otherwise. Thus the appointment of an envoy with a reputation for liberal political feelings coupled with nationalistic fervor for the Union's best interests would seem to Lincoln appealing to a government in Madrid perceived to be liberal in some of its politics.

To complicate the State Department's concern over Spain, Preston reported in April that Madrid would probably view kindly any Confederate diplomatic plea. Then on April 19 and 28, Lincoln issued orders establishing a naval blockade around the South, prohibiting any trade or communications between the Confederacy and the outside world. Within a few months, the consul at Charleston reported its ineffectiveness recommending, by the standards of international law of the day, that Spain not honor it. Perry, now reappointed secretary of legation, wrote about intense pro-Southern feelings among the upper classes in Madrid, especially within the government, worrying about its effect on relations with the United States. He made this known to Washington even though Calderon Collantes told him Spain would not receive any Southern agents.[5]

Because of these various reports, Schurz was ordered to depart for Madrid immediately in late April. His instructions reflected Lincoln's general guidelines on foreign policy issued to all American ministers. The new envoy's "chief duty" would be to block any Confederate attempt to gain recognition and aid from Spain. Madrid could not be allowed to interfere in what Seward viewed as a "domestic controversy." The secretary also wanted trade relations encouraged with Spain. In oral instructions, Seward told Schurz to remind the Spaniards that Southerners were always the Americans who wanted to seize Cuba. He warned that any Spanish involvement in the domestic crisis would be resisted by Washington.[6]

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[3] *El Diario Español,* January 6, 1861, p. 2, February 6, 1861, p. 1; *La Discusión,* January 30, 1861, p. 1; *La Iberia,* January 30, 1861, p. 3; *La Epoca,* February 5, 1861, p. 2; *La Correspondencia,* March 17, 1861, p. 1; García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 36, March 12, 1861, Sp/pol/USA/2404; Preston to Black, No. 37, February 26, 1861, US/desp/Sp/42.

[4] On stopping Confederates, Black to Preston, No. 38, February 28, 1861, US/inst/Sp/15; on replacing pro-Southern diplomats, Frederick W. Seward, *Seward at Washington, as Senator and Secretary of State. A Memoir of His Life, with Selections from His Letters, 1846–1861* (New York, 1891), **2**: p. 541; Schurz's appointment, Joseph Schafer (ed.), *Intimate Letters of Carl Schurz, 1841–1869* (Madison, 1928), pp. 249–253. Schurz commented, "Next to Mexico, Spain is the most important diplomatic post," *Ibid.,* p. 252.

[5] Preston to Seward, No. 40, April 14, 1861, US/desp/Sp/42; for decrees, Richardson, *Messages and Papers of the Presidents,* **6**: pp. 14–15; Becker, *relaciones exteriores* **2**: p. 585; Perry to Seward, "Confidential," April 20, 1861, US/desp/Sp/43; *FRUS (1861)* **1**: p. 244.

[6] Instructions reprinted in G. E. Baker (ed.), *Works of William H. Seward* (Boston, 1884), **5**: pp. 232–236; Seward, *Seward at Washington,* pp. 569–572.

The Spanish were not pleased with Schurz's appointment, convinced that his background as a German revolutionary coupled with his nation's current problems would prove disturbing. Calderon Collantes considered it inappropriate to send such an envoy to a monarchy and even asked García Tassara to see if another individual could be assigned. If not, he speculated that Schurz's mission would probably be "sterile." Calderon Collantes feared he might help Spanish revolutionaries and make his home "the center of intrigues and democratic machinations." And well might he worry about Schurz because during 1861 the Liberal Union began to face a barrage of criticisms from the political left which accused O'Donnell's government of becoming more conservative by its attempts to silence critics and, in general, implement policies on the basis of compromises of principles which originally had elicited democratic and *progresista* support. García Tassara replied to the Foreign Minister that Schurz's appointment would go through but with Horatio Perry reappointed secretary of legation under him, things would not be too bad.[7]

In May, serious discussion on the problem of recognition took place on both sides of the Atlantic. Spanish diplomats in New York and in Washington sent hundreds of news articles on the war and Washington's foreign policy to Madrid. García Tassara reported that Seward heard with apprehension rumors that London would recognize the belligerent status of the South, noting that the secretary viewed this as indicative of Europe's policy regarding the Civil War. He said the secretary worried that Europeans would next grant formal recognition to the Confederate government. Perry complained that a Southern interpretation of events predominated in the local press, no doubt, adding to Seward's concerns. For example, *La Iberia*, a *progresista* mouthpiece, editorialized that the Union was breaking apart. In contrast, the pro-Union, democratic *La Discusión* condemned the South for its slavery while defending the North's "democracy." The Spanish government, however, ignored these occasional public expressions, choosing to remain quiet. In consequence, García Tassara received orders to keep Madrid informed and to do nothing else.[8]

In June Perry increased his efforts to dampen anticipated Confederate sympathy in Madrid. On June 12, he explained to Calderon Collantes how Jefferson Davis and other Confederate leaders had led the annexationists in the previous decade. The Foreign Minister simply repeated his earlier statement that Southerners would not be received by his government. After Schurz arrived in Madrid, Calderon Collantes reiterated this, adding that the North's superior resources indicated probable defeat for the Confederacy. On June 11, the Spaniard had learned the French were on the verge of declaring their neutrality and that London would also. Dayton reported the news to Seward about the same time commenting Spain would follow suit. This news explained why Calderon Collantes refused to say anything to Perry or Schurz; he wanted to wait until the Spanish government decided what to do next[9]

On June 17, the Spanish issued their anticipated declaration of neutrality. Essentially repeating the French announcement, the decree prohibited Spaniards from sailing under letters of marque or to serve in the armed services of either side; warships and privateers could stay in a Spanish port up to twenty-four hours only; selling military supplies was outlawed. The legal basis for this document, like those of Great Britain and France, came from the Declaration of Paris of 1856 which defined the role of neutrals and the nature of blockades. With the Spanish instrument, Calderon Collantes intended, in practice, to keep Confederate warships out of Spain's domestic and colonial ports but to admit merchant ships. As Perry would be told unofficially on many occasions, Spain accepted Washington's "paper" blockade of Southern ports for the time being. In short, Spain added a more sympathetic interpretation to her decree than either Great Britain or France.[10]

Up to the time of the first battle of Bull Run in late July, 1861, when first indications of how the Civil War was progressing could be interpreted, Spanish discussion reflected varying currents of opinion. The noisy liberal press called for the North to abolish slavery. This way the Union, armed with a noble cause to fight for, could gain liberal European sympathy. Such anti-Washington papers as the semi-official *La Correspondencia*, however, did not mention slavery but instead discussed sinister Northern motives behind Lincoln's diplomacy. Many Spaniards believed that Europe would recognize Richmond's government if the war lasted more than six months.[11]

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[7] Min. of St. to García Tassara, April 29, 1861, Sp/corr/USA/1470; García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 82, June 4, 1861, *Ibid.*

[8] Clippings in Sp/pol/USA/2404; García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 72, May 21, 1861, *Ibid.*; *La Iberia*, May 1, 1861, p. 1; *La Discusión*, May 17, 1861, p. 1; Perry to Seward, May 8, 1861, US/desp/Sp/43; Min. of St. to García Tassara, June 25, 1861, S/pol/USA/2405.

[9] *FRUS (1861)*, 1, pp. 245–247; Carl Schurz, *The Reminiscences of Carl Schurz* (New York, 1907), 2: p. 253; Mon. to Min. of St., Telegram, June 11, 1861, Sp/pol/USA/2404; Dayton to Seward, No. 11, June (undated), 1861, US/desp/Fr/53.

[10] For text in English *FRUS(1861)* 1: pp. 247–248; in Spanish Marqués de Olivart, *Colección de los tratados, convenios y documentos internacionales celebrados por nuestros gobiernos desde el reinado de Doña Isabel II hasta nuestra dias* (Madrid, 1894), 2: pp. 226–227; Francis Piggot, *The Declaration of Paris, 1856* (London, 1919), p. 208; Becker, *relaciones exteriores,* 2: pp. 586–590.

[11] *La Discusión*, April 13, 1861, p., June 29, 1861, p. 1;

Then came the battle of Bull Run and the Union's first important military defeat. García Tassara and Schurz said this would help build up Southern confidence and draw Spanish criticism. In fact, some of the Spanish coverage was so insulting that Perry complained to Calderon Collantes. O'Donnell's newspaper, *La Epoca,* on August 6, for example, argued that the split in the United States was permanent. *El Diario Español* repeated this, giving a pro-Confederate analysis of the battle. *La Correspondencia* commented that "the fierce sons of the North have revealed a cowardice which has no example in history." But Schurz believed the diplomatic consequence of the defeat would be minor in Spain because Madrid "was restrained . . . by the exposed situation of her colonial possessions in the West Indies." In November, Perry predicted that Spain would remain neutral, despite some military setbacks for the North.[12]

During the fall, however, Schurz began to bombard Washington with suggestions to augment its diplomatic reasoning that the Civil War was an internal problem by arguing that the Union also wanted to emancipate the slaves. He felt this line of reasoning would create more sympathy in Europe for the North, thereby blocking recognition of the South. The moral issue would prevent any government from opposing the Union. But Lincoln declined to take his suggestion fearing a negative reaction in the North. There was some Spanish basis for Schurz's argument because the liberals opposed slavery. One Spanish diplomat later remarked that most Europeans supported the Union once it declared emancipation. While the influence of the liberal press in Spanish is difficult, if not impossible, to determine, it reflected widely held views. These papers consistently called for emancipation and abolition of slavery everywhere. *La Discusión* summarized the feelings of both liberals and conservatives by stating that the liberals saw slavery as the only major crisis in America while the conservatives believed democracy caused the New World's problems.[13]

Neither side took into consideration economic factors, such as cotton, but rather based their published views on moral principles. The Spanish court, dominated by ultra-conservative nobles and the royal family, generally opposed emancipation and democracy because these would upset Spain's control of Cuba and their political power at home. Since the majority of the highest ranking members of the queen's court and of the Liberal Union considered themselves conservative on the questions of emancipation and monarchism, it would be safe to conclude that Schurz's suggestions were based on his extensive contacts with the liberals in Madrid's society and not on discussions with O'Donnell, Calderon Collantes, and other key members of the regime. Throughout the fall Madrid formally assured Washington of its intention of remaining neutral, denying that Spain would recognize the Confederacy. Even the French minister in Madrid reported that Spain would not recognize the South although she would allow Confederate ships to use her ports.[14]

García Tassara kept his government fully informed about the military campaigns since these would ultimately determine Europe's future policies. He suggested that if Madrid ever contemplated intervention, it should be done in conjunction with several European regimes. Calderon Collantes replied that the government considered nothing of the kind at the moment.[15] Because Washington believed the admission of Confederate ships into Cuban ports reflected Madrid's intention of recognizing the South, García Tassara asked Calderon Collantes to instruct officials in Havana to do nothing that would give the impression of "recognizing the banner of the insurgents." [16]

When it seemed that relations between the United States and Spain regarding the Civil War were about to stabilize, the Trent Affair temporarily threatened to disturb the delicate balance in their diplomacy. The crisis nearly led to war between London and Washington and historians over the years have described Europe's reaction to the crisis almost as if it were a coordinated one. Spain's involvement, while less extensive than Great Britain's, nonetheless proved interesting, yet independent of any other government's.[17]

James Mason and John Slidell, Confederate diplomats assigned to Europe, left for London in early October by way of Nassau and Havana. The two men

La Correspondencia, July 5, 1861, p. 2; García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 90, June 24, 1861, Sp/pol/USA/2404.

[12] García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 121, July 26, 1861, Sp/pol/USA/2405; Schurz to Seward, No. 9, August 9, 1861, US/desp/Sp/43; notes of conversation, August 23, 1861, *Ibid.*; *La Epoca*, August 6, 1861, p. 1; *El Diario Español*, August 7, 1861, p. 1; *La Correspondencia*, August 15, 1861, p. 1; memorandum of conversation, September 4, 1861, US/desp/Sp/43; Perry to Sumner, November 10, 1861, Sumner Papers.

[13] Schurz, *Reminiscenes* 2: pp. 277–286, 302; Conte, *Recuerdos* 2: pp. 530–531; *La Discusión*, September 14, 1861, p. 1.

[14] *FRUS (1861)*, 1: pp. 268–269; Barrot to Thouvenel, No. 120, October 30, 1861, Fr/pol/Esp/858.

[15] On military conditions, Stoughton to Min. of St. in a series, No. 55, November 5, 1861, No. 56, November 12, 1861, No. 57, November 15, 1861, Sp/pol/USA/2405; the Spanish consulate in New York was charged with sending Madrid articles on the war; García Tassara's comments on the war, García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 190, November 11, 1861, *Ibid.*; on Spanish policy, marginal note by Calderon Collantes on García Tassara's No. 150, September 6, 1861, *Ibid.*

[16] García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 155, September 20, 1861, Sp/pol/USA/2404.

[17] Moncada to Min. of St., No. 33, October 11, 1861, *Ibid.*; Stoughton to Min. of St. in a series, No. 51, October 18, 1861, No. 52, October 25, 1861, No. 58, November 19, 1861, *Ibid.*

arrived in Cuba on October 16 and encountered no difficulties in landing. The American consul in Havana reported in early November that Captain Charles Wilkes, commanding the U.S.S. *San Jacinto*, left Havana intending to stop the British mail ship *Trent* bound for Britain which by then had picked up the two commissioners as passengers. The consul said Wilkes thought carefully before setting off after them since his action could be viewed as a major violation of international law. Wilkes decided that it was more important to capture the Confederates than worry about the niceties of law. Moreover, the captain believed the ship was a private vessel and not the property of the British government. He also thought that since the men had not reached a neutral country where their duties would begin, they could not claim diplomatic immunity. Finally on November 8, Wilkes stopped the *Trent,* boarded her, and seized the two Confederates.[18]

García Tassara made his first report on the incident on November 19, commenting that no Spanish ship had been involved and that the arrest took place outside of Spain's territorial waters. He said diplomats in Washington were asking if Lincoln's government ordered the seizure while expressing sympathy for the English and the two Confederates. He also predicted the issue would be an ugly one. The envoy sent Madrid copies of press reports and noted that the American government did not know quite how to handle the problem. Captain General Serrano said the issue was too important for him to judge, telling Calderon Collantes to handle it himself since he wanted no part of this. The American consul in Havana, however, reported that Cuban officials were not sympathetic to the Union. Since the local British consul was always being accused by his American colleague of helping the Confederates, the Englishman felt compelled to write his government denying any involvement in the incident.[19]

A flood of Spanish reports on the problem poured into the Spanish foreign office. In December García Tassara began to report on the deepening crisis and, in anticipation of war between Britain and the United States, about Canada's defenses. The Spanish minister in London also suggested war might occur between the two while at the same time not ruling out the possibility of Spain somehow becoming involved as well. Serrano communicated that he could not determine precisely if the incident occurred in Cuban waters, no doubt, hoping it had not. García Tassara submitted a dispatch in mid-December predicting the United States would not back down from a British ultimatum, suggesting that milder English tactics would end the crisis. Meanwhile in Madrid, London's envoy found out that the Spanish concurred with the French in the belief that the act "was a flagrant breach of international law."[20] At the end of the month García Tassara reported that the Trent Affair would soon be settled. As an afternote, he commented that many Americans blamed Spain for the incident.[21]

Spanish public opinion both in Cuba and in Spain, similar to Europe's in general, sided with the British who were convinced that the United States had violated international law. *Las Novedades* hoped Spain was not involved because of the complexity of the international questions raised. Although *La Regeneración* believed Wilkes acted under orders from Washington, it too did not see any point in Spanish involvement in the affair. *La Discusión* blamed London for being too friendly with the Confederates yet predicted the issue would not lead to war. *La Epoca's* editors also thought war would not come. Perry inspired a series of articles in the press favorable to the United States as a means of detaching Spain from the issue as much as possible. He was later able to report that Spain would not become involved and soon after word arrived that Mason and Slidell had been released.[22]

The crisis could have caused Spain to align with France in support of Great Britain since there seemed no question about the Union's fault. However, the affair ended so quickly that Spain did not have to make a decision either to support the British or revamp its attitude toward the Confederacy. Officials only faced the issue of determining if the incident took place in Cuban waters. Once Madrid concluded that had not

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[18] Shufeld to Seward, No. 79, November 9, 1861, US/desp/Havana/41; Gordon Harris Warren, "The Trent Affair, 1861–1862" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University, 1967), pp. 10–20.

[19] García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 195, November 19, 1861, Sp/pol/USA/2404; García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 198, November 22, 1861, *Ibid.*; Serrano to Min. of St., No. 77, November 26, 1861, *Ibid.*; Shufeld to Seward, No. 91, November 27, 1861, US/desp/Havana/41; Crawford to Russell, No. 54, December 3, 1861, F072/1013.

[20] García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 202, December 3, 1861, Sp/pol/USA/2404; Istúriz to Min. of St., No. 233, December 12, 1861, *Ibid.*; Serrano to Min. of St., No. 87, December 16, 1861, *Ibid.*; García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 214, December 17, 1861, *Ibid.*; Crampton to Russell, No. 200, December 19, 1861, F072/1011.

[21] García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 217, December 23, 1861, Sp/pol/USA/2404; García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 220, December 27, 1861, *Ibid.*; García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 225, December 31, 1861, Sp/pol/Mexico/2547.

[22] *FRUS (1861)* 1: pp. 481–482; *ORN*, Ser. 2, III: p. 309; *Las Novedades*, November 30, 1861, p. 1, December 4, 1861, December 8, 1861, p. 1; *La Regeneración*, December 7, 1861, p. 3; *La Discusión*, December 12, 1861, p. 1; *La Epoca*, January 3, 1862, p. 3, January 9, 1862, p. 2; Perry's inspired articles, *La Discusión*, January 4, 1862, p. 1, January 5, 1862, p. 1; *La Iberia*, January 5, 1862, p. 1; *El Contemporaneo*, January 6, 1862, p. 1; *La Correspondencia*, January 5, 1862, p. 1, January 11, 1862, p. 1; *Diario Español*, January 7, 1862, p. 1; Perry to Seward, No. 22, January 10, 1862, US/desp/Sp/43.

happened, her diplomats quickly separated themselves from the case. Moreover, Spain had little to gain by becoming involved. An Anglo-American war would have disrupted Spanish trade with both countries, the British might have withdrawn from the Mexican expedition, and Cuba's security could have been threatened.

The role of the *Trent* incident on Anglo- and American-Spanish relations thus proved minor. But one might well ask, what of Mexico and Anglo-Hispanic relations? The evidence clearly indicates that the negotiations leading to the intervention in Mexico and the actual decisions involved had taken place before Madrid heard of the ship. The Spanish worried that Britain would have to disengage herself from the Mexican project should war break out with the United States—not an unwelcome development for Spain which would have wanted the British out at some time anyway. From the perspectives of chronology of events, strategy, and interests, the *Trent* incident came and went too quickly to affect Spanish-American or Anglo-Hispanic affairs.

With the case hardly behind them, Spain faced other issues because in 1862 the question of recognizing the Confederacy became more serious than in the year before. Most Europeans realized that as the Civil War continued, the chances of the Confederate government being recognized increased. During this second year the military situation fluctuated with neither side apparently winning. Like the rest of Europe, Spain watched the military picture closely. One primary question asked in American and European capitals was, could Spain remain neutral in the conflict? Calderon Collantes told the British envoy in early January that Spain might have to deal with the Confederates sometime in the future. The British minister commented to London, however, that Spain sincerely wanted to maintain her neutrality. Perry reported that officials in London were pressuring Madrid into supporting them against Washington. He feared that should war break out Spain might not be neutral. He discovered France had tried to unite Spain and Great Britain with her in recognizing Richmond but that the Spanish refused to budge from their stance. But, if one kept in mind the Liberal Union's deteriorating political situation at home, a neutral stance made more sense.[23]

Cuba, as usual, was on Spanish minds during these discussions regarding recognition. This was particularly the case since neither the North or the South would give Madrid written and public guarantees (such as a treaty) that Cuba would never be threatened. Spain firmly believed that American imperialism would resume after the conclusion of the Civil War and thus had always to be prepared for the worst.

García Tassara worried much like his superiors in Madrid. He complained that American officials always thought that London, Paris, and Madrid worked in unison. He warned Foreign Minister Calderon Collantes not to become involved in any French scheme to recognize the Confederacy. London and Paris, he recommended, should recognize the South first. At a dinner party in mid-February, García Tassara discussed recognition with Senator Charles Sumner, chairman of the Senate's committee on foreign relations. The Senator wanted to know what were Spain's current inclinations, but the envoy put him off with "vague comments." Of more specific concern to García Tassara was the military situation which he spent the whole year writing about. He wrote less about relations with the South.[24]

In Madrid Perry once again took charge of the legation since Schurz resigned to accept a commission in the Union Army. Perry commented that at this point the South stood little chance of being recognized by Spain. A similar report came from Archbishop John Hughes, then visiting in Rome. Like Perry, he wrote Seward that Spain would avoid becoming too involved in schemes to help the Confederacy. Hughes also believed most high-ranking Spanish prelates, all close to the powerful Spanish court, would agree with him. At the same time García Tassara reported several Union victories on the battlefields which strengthened the views put forth by Perry and Hughes. The Spanish envoy told Seward that his government would not recognize the Confederacy's belligerency but that his queen's attitude, as outlined in the decree of June, 1861, would not be altered; he thereby recognized Richmond's *de facto* rights as a belligerent.[25]

After his return to the United States, Schurz visited President Lincoln, pressuring him to use the abolition of slavery as a means of advancing American interests in Europe and especially in Spain where the liberals could be counted on to support the Union. With a greater sense of apprehension than the president, Schurz believed Spain might recognize the South. He thought that moderate, progressive, and republican politicians could blunt such a move if given good

[23] Crampton to Russell, No. 4, January 3, 1862, F072/1034; Perry to Seward, No. 18, January 4, 1862, US/desp/Sp/43; Perry to Seward, "Confidential," No. 25, January 19, 1862, *Ibid.*

[24] García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 30, February 7, 1862, Sp/pol/USA/2405; García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 33, February 11, 1862, *Ibid.*; military dispatches were sent at the rate of one or two per week between 1861 and 1864.

[25] Perry to Eggleston, February 14, 1862, US/desp/Sp/43; John R. G. Hassard, *Life of the Most Reverand John Hughes, D.D., First Archbishop of New York with Extracts from his private Correspondence* (New York, 1866), pp. 473–474; García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 49, February 23, 1862, Sp/pol/USA/2405; García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 54, March 1, 1862, *Ibid.*

reason. Lincoln told him that although probably correct, slavery could not be used as a diplomatic tool at the moment. García Tassara, knowing the ex-envoy could be influential with the president, kept pace with these talks, reporting them to Madrid.[26]

Schurz overestimated the influence of the political left on Spanish diplomacy since O'Donnell and Calderon Collantes were cautious men who would not be swayed by such an ideological issue as slavery. The same could be said for the queen's ministers in Washington, London, Paris, Vienna, and St. Petersburg. The basis for Spanish policy toward the Civil War constantly rested on the more practical considerations of domestic factors and the geo-politics of the Caribbean. Like O'Donnell, Lincoln supported the Union's position on slavery out of political considerations, suppressing for the time being personal sympathies for emancipation.

The influence of events proved greater than personal feelings because a critical period in the crisis of recognition for the United States and Spain began in March when a Confederate commissioner, Pierre Rost, arrived in Madrid. Assigned to the Spainsh court in August, 1861, Rost always believed the chances for recognition from Spain were slim. In December, 1861, he wrote to Richmond that "the question of our recognition, had never been mooted at Madrid and would not be until we were recognized by England or France." Yet in January, Charles Helm, Confederate agent at Havana, reported that Captain General Serrano believed recognition would come within sixty days. When Rost asked to see Calderon Collantes, the Spaniard notified him by means of an informal letter that he could not talk to him in any official capacity. However, they soon met in an unofficial manner on March 21. Rost discussed the right of the Confederacy to leave the Union, mentioning how Spain and the South had similar "institutions, ideas, and social habits." While promising that Richmond would not seize Cuba, he asked for recognition. The Spaniard answered that Spain could not grant this. The South would first have to prove it could survive as an independent nation. He suggested that a few decisive military victories would help. Rost left Madrid certain that Spain would not extend recognition before London and Paris. Although no government realized it, a turning point had been reached in Confederate-Spanish relations because Madrid never again paid as much attention to Southern pleas as in March.[27]

Spain's attitude toward the United States during these critical months can also be measured by its press. *La Correspondencia* started out the year saying anyone arguing for recognition suffered from a fever "that has evaporated the brain because there is no other way that anyone could think such nonsense." The press also spoke of the North's military superiority. Both *El Diario Español* and *La Iberia* agreed the war soon might be terminated. Yet Rost's visit to Madrid received some neutral coverage by the press. Many newspapers discussed slavery as the crucial issue of the war. *Las Novedades*, for example, applauded recent Northern interest in emancipation as early as January. *La Discusión* urged it emphatically by summer, arguing that recognition of the South would be impossible because this meant the triumph of slavery.[28]

García Tassara also had his own ideas about recognition. He learned that the United States would soon ask Spain to withdraw her declaration of neutrality, thereby denying the South her *de facto* belligerent status. Seward told him that since Spain never formally recognized the South's belligerency she should be the first to cancel her decree of neutrality. France and Britain were also being approached but the envoy noted, "we are believed to be more accessible and therefore we are pressured accordingly." He recommended that Spain do nothing. It would be absurd to comply with Seward's request, he reasoned, because no nation could ignore the existence of a government with over 200,000 men under arms. Further, he wanted to see how the current campaigns would turn out. The Spaniard commented, as he had done before, "I do not believe the Union can be put together again." This belief went far to explain why the Spanish could never fully turn their backs on the South. Richmond might someday remember how unjust Spain had been during her war of independence and could seize Cuba or deny her cotton in revenge.

Calderon Collantes noted on the back of García Tassara's dispatch of April 22 that Spanish policy could not be changed. The South would be allowed to use Cuban ports but she could not receive recognition. And, Prim's visit to the United States in June on his way home from Mexico indicated to García Tassara that relations with Washington would not suffer by Spain's refusal to rescind her decree of neutrality.[29]

García Tassara's feelings did not reflect Perry's. In July, José de la Concha, late captain general in

[26] Schurz, *Reminiscenes* **2**: pp. 309–310, 329–330; García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 33, February 11, 1862, Sp/pol/USA/2405.

[27] Rost to Davis, December 24, 1861, Pickett Papers, Box 4, Folder 45, Library of Congress; *ORN*, Ser. 2, **3**: p. 317; James W. Cortada, "Pierre Rost and Confederate Diplomacy," *Louisiana Historical Quarterly* **54** (Summer-Fall, 1971): pp. 18–28; Confederate Papers, Real Academia de la Historia.

[28] *La Correspondencia*, January 6, 1862, p. 1; *El Diario Español*, June 4, 1862, p. 3; *La Iberia*, July 3, 1862, p. 3; *La Correspondencia*, July 9, 1862, p. 1; *La Novedades*, January 7, 1862, p. 1; *La Discusión*, July 1, 1862, p. 1, August 3, 1862, p. 1.

[29] García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 85, April 22, 1862, Sp/pol/USA/2405; García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 131, June 17, 1862, Sp/pol/Mexico/2549.

Havana, became ambassador to Paris, leading Perry to speculate that relations between Spain and France would grow more intimate since the new envoy advocated closer ties to Napoleon's government. The French, said Perry, exaggerated defeats of the Union Army and in combination with the new appointment meant Madrid would view the Civil War from a French perspective. He also worried because "the governing classes here, always desirous of the separation of the republic, always secretly and avowedly in sympathy with the rebels have seized with avidity these indications of what they imagine to be the declining power of the North." [30]

However, neither Perry nor García Tassara wanted their governments to make any drastic changes in policy. Any involvement in the American Civil War might set a bad example for Spain's remaining colonies. Although Perry and García Tassara worried, Calderon Collantes and Seward did not intend recommending any changes. In fact, Secretary Seward went so far as to tell Koerner before the latter left for Spain, that Madrid "has acted very friendly, more so than any other neutral power." [31] And since the foreign minister made no changes, Seward's view remained accurate.

During the late summer and early fall, both governments waited for a change in the military situation. García Tassara reported on the increased military activity in September yet said the picture remained unclear. On September 19 he wrote that a Confederate invasion of Maryland might soon come, predicting that such a battle would be decisive. Ten days later he still saw no change in the military situation. Even the press waited for what appeared as an imminent event.[32] Then in October news arrived of the Union's victory at the battle of Antietam. With it also came word of Lincoln's emancipation proclamation.

García Tassara reported that the declaration "has caused a great sensation." He suggested that Spain, France, and Britain restudy their policies toward the United States in light of this development. Spanish conservatives disapproved of emancipation since they now would have to face the same issue in Cuba and Puerto Rico more closely than ever where agitation for emancipation had grown during the decade. Liberals called Lincoln's move generous and brilliant. Perry had argued earlier that the Union fought to free the slaves and now the press enthusiastically picked up the argument as never before. Newspapers began predicting the universal death of slavery. Talk of intervention declined for the moment as the Union donned a mantel of moral purity of purpose that could not easily be ignored. García Tassara simply called the emancipation a clever diplomatic move.[33]

As a result of the fall's events, the year ended on a quiet diplomatic note. Early in January, however, Calderon Collantes left the cabinet and was replaced by Serrano, making a significant change in Spanish politics. Koerner immediately saw this as appeasement of the French because Prim's withdrawal from Mexico had hurt Franco-Spanish relations. He predicted that more difficult times with Spain lay ahead. The question of European intervention into the Civil War, so closely bound to the problem of recognition, did not die. Mercier told García Tassara that France had not dismissed the possibility. García Tassara believed that Spain never had been included in such mediation diplomacy in Europe and knew his government had no intentions of becoming involved in any. Officials in Madrid wrote García Tassara that "the general basis of Her Majesty's policy is to intervene as little as possible in those talks that do not bear directly on Spain." [34]

When he learned that his old friend the ex-captain general had become foreign minister, Charles Helm wrote him in late February asking for recognition, but nothing came of this because Miraflores had replaced Serrano before the note arrived in Madrid. Koerner ignored Miraflores, calling the old conservative's government "transitional." The new foreign minister, however, did declare in the Cortes that Spain would continue its policy of neutrality in the Civil War. These developments, however, did not stop the Confederacy. John Slidell replaced Rost as Southern commissioner to Madrid, receiving the same orders originally sent to Rost. As with Rost, Spain rejected Slidell's petitions. Certainly when news arrived in August of the stunning Confederate defeat at Gettysburg, no Confederate would be received by any Spanish diplomat. Also, Napoleon told Slidell that France could not recognize the South unless Spain did and since Madrid would not, Paris had its excuse to put the Confederate off. It was a weak argument since Napoleon and Slidell both knew that

[30] *FRUS (1862)* 1: pp. 510–511.

[31] McCormack, *Memoirs of Gustave Koerner* 2: p. 230.

[32] García Tassara to Min. of St. in a series, No. 179, September 1, 1862, No. 181, September 9, 1862, No. 185, September 19, 1862, Sp/pol/USA/2403; *La Corresondencia*, September 14, 1862, p. 2.

[33] García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 190, September 29, 1862, Sp/pol/USA/2403; Perry to Seward, No. 89, October 25, 1862, US/desp/Sp/44; *FRUS (1862)* 1: pp. 513–517; *La Iberia*, October 8, 1862, p. 1, November 12, 1862, p. 1, December 3, 1862, p. 1; *La Discusión*, October 25, 1862, p. 1, November 11, 1862, pp. 1–2; *Las Novedades*, November 2, 1862, p. 1; García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 220, November 10, 1862, Sp/pol/USA/2403; García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 228, November 21, 1862, *Ibid.*

[34] McCormack, *Memoirs of Gustave Koerner* 2: pp. 306–307; during the fall the *Blanche* case involved both nations, see next chapter; on the decline of the Liberal Union see chapter nine; García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 18, February 5, 1863 and marginal comments, Sp/corr/USA/1471.

Paris took the initiative in setting policy on the Civil War which Spain followed. However, there was little the Confederate could do to counter the emperor's words. After the battle of Gettysburg and the fall of Vicksburg during the first week of July, García Tassara confidently predicted the war's speedy conclusion in favor of the Union.[35]

The news about Gettysburg and Vicksburg took several weeks to arrive in Madrid and in the meantime the question of recognition continued to be discussed in the press. *La Regeneración*, for example, commented on July 7 that the South's military situation appeared good. Crampton reported to London a week later that the foreign minister, the Marqués de Miraflores, did not want to recognize the South. Later still, *La Discusión*, representing a liberal view, editorialized that recognizing the South would help in "the triumph of slavery and the sanction of the policy of invasion and filibustering." In fact, the press discussed recognition as if it were a very live topic during the latter half of July. Perry felt that the issue had "grown hotter day by day" to the point where he called upon liberal editors to counteract the pro-recognition editorials with articles on the invincibility of the North. Articles soon appeared in *La Epoca, Clamor Publico, Las Novedades, La Iberia,* and *La España* opposing recognition. Miraflores's newspaper, *La Regeneración*, and other conservative papers did not argue against it. *El Pensamiento Español* was the conservative paper that had consistently opposed recognition even before the battle of Gettysburg.[36]

Perry reported that in late July the Spanish cabinet seriously considered the question. Some members favored recognition in order to protect slavery in Cuba. Miraflores, for example, sympathized with this view despite the fluctuating opinions expressed in his newspaper. Moreno López, minister of public works, disagreed leading the faction which feared Northern hostility and the lack of British support. He did not believe Spain should be used by Napoleon III as a trial balloon to determine what would happen if a European government recognized the Confederacy. The issue was not settled in this cabinet meeting because of the sharp divisions within it. Aware of the cabinet's session, Perry decided to put some pressure on Miraflores by repeating to him the well-worn argument of how the South would seize Cuba while the North never could. Having just heard of the victory at Gettysburg, he knew Miraflores would not change Spain's policy. Therefore, Perry wrote Seward: "the field here is won." [37]

Indeed, the military victories had a profound influence on the Union's position in Spain. The American consul at Port Mahon wrote "the impression in my sphere is that the rebellion is now virtually at an end." Madrid's minister in London said the question no longer drew his attention. On August 2, Perry saw the king and queen, who cordially remarked on how well the war went for the North. Perry correctly interpreted this as a favorable sign for his government because he believed the royal pair had favored the South in the past. In an analysis of how he viewed Spanish foreign policy in mid-August, Seward concluded that it was unlikely Spain would recognize the Confederacy even if a European combination were in the offing. But, he did not totally rule out such a possibility.[38]

In September Perry began to send Seward a series of curious dispatches. He reported that a plot existed within the Spanish government, led by ex-Captain General Concha and General Domingo Dulce, to cause a war between the United States and Spain in order to help France in Mexico and guarantee Cuba's security. It was to be provoked by a maritime incident in the colony's waters. Perry commented that Miraflores probably knew little about the plot. His information, he admitted, came from a talk between Miraflores and the Spaniard's priest in the confessional which the prelate later voluntarily divulged to Perry. The American immediately called on the foreign minister to discuss the plot and Miraflores told him that instructions had been sent to Cuba to cancel any previous ones ordering a fabricated maritime incident. On September 19, Perry wrote Seward that in a talk he had with Marshall Concha two days earlier, the general denied ever wanting war with the Union. Perry observed that Barrot had been conveniently "sick" in Paris while Concha plotted. The next day, Perry reported that Spain had told France she would be willing to recognize the Confederacy. But the plot having been exposed, it could not be done.[39]

Koerner, who had been away on vacation for a few days, returned in the middle of this melodrama. He knew that France had at one time pressured Spain into

[35] *ORN*, Ser. 2, **3**: pp. 700–701; Koerner to Seward, No. 28, March 8, 1863, US/desp/Sp/45; London *Times*, April 11, 1863, p. 14; Callahan, *Diplomatic History of the Southern Confederacy*, 98, 207; Becker, *relaciones exteriores* **2**: pp. 620–621; Tassara to Min. of St., No. 148, July 6, 1863, Sp/corr/USA/1471.

[36] *La Regeneración,* July 7, 1863, p. 2; Crampton to Russell, No. 100, July 13, 1863, F072/1060; *La Discusión*, July 19, 1863, p. 1; on Perry's efforts, Perry to Seward, No. 100, July 19, 1863, US/desp/Sp/45.

[37] Perry to Seward, July 25, 1863, US/desp/Sp/45; memorandum of conversation, July 29, 1863, *Ibid.*; quote of Perry to Seward, No. 104, July 31, 1863, *Ibid.*

[38] Robinson to Seward, No. 10, July 31, 1863, US/desp/Port Mahon/3; Becker, *relaciones exteriores* **2**, p. 622; Perry to Seward, No. 105, August 2, 1863, US/desp/Sp/45; *FRUS (1863)* **2**: pp. 904–905.

[39] Perry to Seward in a series, September 13, 1863, No. 113, September 15, 1863, September 19, 1863, US/desp/Sp/45 and September 20, 1863, Seward Papers.

recognizing the South but he did not believe Spain would do this in 1863. He rejected the idea that Miraflores would have supported such a risky policy. The British never heard of the plot during September and it did not come up in conversation between Miraflores and the British envoy on September 19 when it could have since the United States was one topic of conversation. The British and Koerner rejected Perry's allegations as unfounded.[40]

Other than his own reports, there is little evidence at the moment to confirm Perry's serious charges. It is difficult to believe that a responsible priest would have divulged the contents of a confession to anyone. Even if he had, there is hardly other proof to substantiate his statements. A search of the archives of the British and French foreign offices failed to reveal any mention of the story. The French minister had been out of Madrid on annual leave which he had applied for long in advance. Also, examination of the Cuban colonial files did not turn up either the order to stage an incident or the other to prevent a war. Yet curiously enough, the *New York Times* reported the entire story in 1869, specifically stating that "counter orders were sent out by steamer from Cádiz of September 15, 1863, and the whole affair was suppressed." [41] It is possible that some documentary proof exists; but, at the moment, Perry's word is all that is available.

His imagination could have gotten the best of him as Koerner believed. It was true, however, that Napoleon III wanted Spain to support his Mexican policy but only diplomatically. Given the nature of Spanish diplomacy at mid-century, it would be difficult to believe that a palace plot could have nearly reached the point of reversing the government's policy on such an important issue. Moreover, even in small problems involving the United States, Spanish diplomats always consulted France and Great Britain. In this case it appeared they had not. Be that as it may, such a scheme probably would have failed since it was not in Spain's interest to fight a war with the United States.

Several factors militated against such a contest. The American navy and army were large, well equipped, and experienced. Cuba could have been lost, not to mention Puerto Rico and Santo Domingo. Spain's defeat at the hands of the United States would have made her the laughing stock of South America and Europe, destroying any pretensions she might have had of becoming more influential in European affairs. Even arguing that Miraflores wanted to retain political power, which he was close to losing, by uniting the nation behind him in the same way O'Donnell did with the war in Morocco four years earlier makes little sense because it is doubtful the old minister could have retained power in such a serious crisis since Isabel and others would have turned to Generals O'Donnell or Narváez for real leadership. Besides, Miraflores was too cautious an individual to gamble with such high stakes.

During the same period in which the plot supposedly became known, the Spanish diplomatic files were filled with notes on more conventional topics. García Tassara discussed the same problems that had existed for several years as if nothing had happened. On September 22, for example, he reported that Seward believed Spain would recognize the Confederacy and as usual, when judging this American official, he was wrong. The Spanish envoy in London sent in a dispatch dated October 9 dealing with consuls in the Confederacy and speculation about Confederate belligerency.[42] Nothing came in from Paris even hinting about the plot.

In fact, recognition diplomacy continued as if nothing had happened. On October 18, Crampton asked Spain to join Great Britain and France in some joint statement on the treatment of neutral shipping currently suffering as a result of the Civil War. Spain avoided even this sort of a move. The British foreign minister wrote his consul in Havana warning him to observe Britain's neutrality strictly. Helm reported to Richmond that things were quiet in Havana. If any plot had been afoot in that city, this well-informed agent probably would have heard about it, yet he made no mention of it at all.[43]

By the start of 1864, the plot no longer drew anyone's attention. The Union was winning the Civil War and Europeans became increasingly aware that the Confederacy could not be recognized. The United States continued its pressure on Spain, however, forcing the Spaniards still to wrestle with the problem. Carrying on routine diplomatic duties at times seemed difficult. For example, Koerner reported that a new *moderado* foreign minister, Lorenzo Arrazola, who took office in January, knew little about the United States. In fact, during his first interview with Koerner, Arrazola asked him what language was spoken in the United States! Arrazola resigned his position at the end of February, forcing all envoys in Madrid to wait patiently while another foreign minister became familiar with current diplomatic business. On March 1, the new ministry came into being under Alexandro Mon, a one-time ambassador to Paris, and Francisco

[40] Koerner to Seward, No. 54, September 20, 1863, US/desp/Sp/45; Crampton to Russell, No. 105, September 19, 1863, F072/1061.

[41] *New York Times*, June 1, 1869, p. 4.

[42] García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 197, September 22, 1863, Sp/corr/USA/1471; Comyn to Min. of St., No. 251, October 9, 1863, Sp/pol/USA/2407.

[43] Crampton to Min. of St., October 18, 1863, Sp/pol/USA/2407; Min. of St. to Comyn, November 7, 1863, *Ibid.*; Russell to Crawford, No. 1, December 16, 1863, F072/1071; *ORN*, Ser. 2, **3**: p. 912.

Pacheco became his foreign minister. Koerner, pleased with two diplomats in power, felt that remaining problems from the Civil War and Latin America could now be discussed with some sense of professionalism.[44]

Two problems relative to recognition remained fairly dormant in the first half of 1864. The secretary of state reminded García Tassara how perfectly neutral the United States was being in the rebellion in Santo Domingo, asking no less of Spain. Seward also worried about the approval the South still enjoyed in some conservative Spanish circles especially within the aristocracy. The *New York Times* reported Puerto Rico and Cuba still favored the South. Scattered reports like these indicated to Seward that the United States needed to continue its pressure on Spain while García Tassara had to reassure the State Department about his country's neutrality.[45]

In the fall, elections in the United States and a change of government in Spain temporarily reduced interest in recognition. *La Discusión*, reflecting a broad spectrum of views, predicted Lincoln's reelection and victory for the Union. In September, Mon's cabinet resigned and Narváez came back to power. The general quickly stated that Spanish foreign policy toward Washington would not change. In October, Perry sent Seward a long dispatch analyzing Narváez and his ideas regarding international affairs: "He does not like the republic, and has no political sympathy for the United States." Perry noted that in the 1850s, Narváez had advocated invasion of the United States in order to stop Cuban filibustering but that the Civil War indicated how foolish such a move would be now. Perry also predicted Narváez would solve some of Spain's international problems, especially those in Latin America which worried the general a great deal.[46]

Slavery and the Union's survival were closely connected to Lincoln's election, which drew much attention in the Spanish press. Perry reported that democratic papers supported Lincoln. Liberal elements in Madrid also celebrated his victory when word of it arrived in late November and early December. For many this election confirmed that the United States could survive as a republic. There had been considerable doubt in many minds whether a republican form of government could last with the same durability as a monarchy. Lincoln's electoral triumph coupled with the anticipated defeat of the South erased these doubts. Lincoln's greatest base of support in Spain came from Barcelona, long a center of liberal political views, because he had acquired the image of an emancipator. The president became a symbol of humanitarianism in politics. This view drew sympathy for the North even in such areas as Bilbao where previously little interest in American politics existed.[47]

Once again, however, the issue of recognition had to be faced in February, 1865, because Confedrate Commissioner Slidell met with the Spanish ambassador to Paris. Slidell informed him that a Confederate warship, C.S.S. *Stonewall*, then in El Ferrol, Spain, should be allowed to use Spanish facilities. Slidell was told that Spain would adhere to its policy of neutrality but that no promise regarding the vessel's treatment could be made. Spain clearly wanted the ship to leave. The meeting raised the question of how to deal with such vessels at a time when the United States increased its demands that Southern ships be kept out of foreign ports. By April, Seward had felt confident enough about the outcome of the war to ask Spain to cancel its proclamation on neutrality of June, 1861, thereby denying the South belligerent rights, especially for her warships. The Spanish government avoided the issue since the fighting still continued.[48]

Meanwhile, newspapers began commenting on the end of the war. *Las Novedades* discussed the resurgence of the hated Monroe Doctrine while *El Comercio de Barcelona* reported Southern defeats. Throughout April the Spanish press as a whole reported the South's demise while the liberal papers tried to reassure the public that Washington would not seize Cuba. And when word arrived in late April by telegram about the Union's occupation of Richmond, many public officials, including Prim and O'Donnell called on Perry at his home to congratulate him.[49]

In late May the British minister informed the Spanish foreign office that London would no longer recognize the Confederacy as a belligerent. In early June, Perry asked that Spain follow suit by scrapping its neutrality. John Crampton notified the Spanish government on June 3 that London considered the Civil War over. The French had withdrawn the

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[44] Koerner to Seward, No. 75, January 31, 1864, US/desp/Sp/46; McCormack, *Memoirs of Gustave Koerner* 2: pp. 394–395.

[45] Seward to García Tassara, February 3, 1864, US/notes to foreign legations/86; New York *Times*, March 6, 1864, p. 3; *ORN*, Ser. 2, 3: pp. 987–988.

[46] *La Discusión*, September 1, 1864, p. 1, October 18, 1864, p. 1, November 12, 1864, p. 1; *FRUS (1864)* 4: p. 99; Perry to Seward, "Confidential," October 3, 1864, Seward Papers.

[47] Perry to Seward, No. 144, November 22, 1864, US/desp/Sp/46; on Catalan support see Belles Becker Sideman and Lillian Friedman (eds.), *Europe Looks at the Civil War* (New York, 1960), pp. 214–215; on public opinion, *La Iberia*, February 15, 1865, p. 3; Evans to Seward, January 2, 1865, US/desp/Bilbao/1.

[48] *ORN*, Ser. 2, 3: p. 735; *FRUS (1865)* 2: p. 521.

[49] *Las Novedades*, April 9, 1865, p. 1; *El Comercio de Bercelona*, April 16, 1865, p. 2, copy in US/desp/Sp/48; *FRUS (1865)* 2: pp. 525–526; Santovenia discussed press views, *Lincoln*, pp. 182–183; *La Discusión*, April 25, 1865, pp. 1–2; Lincoln's assassination shocked most Spaniards, *FRUS (1865)* 2: pp. 526–528.

status of belligerency from the South a few days before, on May 30. Finally, on June 5, Spain published a decree annulling its declaration of neutrality.[50] With that, recognition as an issue ceased to disturb relations between the United States and Spain.

Throughout the years of the Civil War, the United States constantly pressured Spain not to recognize or aid the Confederacy. Seward, although not always happy with the way Spain observed her neutrality (as will be seen in the next chapter), knew Spain did not pose as great a threat to the United States as either France or Great Britain. Yet, he and the president believed that if sufficiently pressured by Paris and London, Madrid might join in some effort at mediation or intervention, especially during the critical year of 1862.

Spain, by her actions, showed she would not interfere in the Civil War. Too many problems in Santo Domingo, Mexico, and at home dictated this cautious policy. While many Spaniards may have sympathized with the Confederacy, each Spanish administration remained neutral, irrespective of the cabinet's political inclinations. Few military supplies were sold to either side and no more than a handful of Spaniards violated the blockade. Southern ships called at Cuban ports constantly, although the bulk of these visits were strictly for commercial purposes. Thus, in fact, Spain observed her neutrality more faithfully than either France or Great Britain. Although ironic since Americans considered Spain more of any enemy than the other two countries, at least at the start of the Civil War, she could not do otherwise. A politically unstable domestic situation and numerous foreign problems did not give Spain much freedom of action. The *Daily National Intelligencer* in 1866 accurately summarized the case by stating that she was "a nation which though possessing no less opportunities than any other for causing harm would never consent nor connive" in any "foolish" action.[51] The dichotomy between Spain's image and her policy during the Civil War also can be partially explained by the numerous maritime incidents which contributed to her reputation as a friend of the Confederacy. It is on this series of problems that attention must now be focused.

VII. MARITIME INCIDENTS

Spain's neutrality in the Civil War provided an important source of friction for the two governments. Living by that policy led to a series of crises and near confrontations between Madrid and Washington. Simply put, by her decree of neutrality, Spain in effect had recognized the Confederacy's status as a belligerent while the North never did. Since neutrality proclamations were really statements on how one government would treat the ships of another, the application of neutrality laws, policies, and practices centered around maritime problems. The United States in April, 1861, established the Southern blockade. In June, Spain declared her neutrality. Yet, the South never recognized the North's blockade although unofficially Europe did. This created a situation whereby numerous Southern vessels visited Spanish ports both in Europe and in the New World. Richmond and Washington cited international law to justify their maritime programs while Europe found itself in the uncomfortable position of being in the middle of a diplomatic quarrel which could have serious implications since naval questions affected their foreign policies.

Northern diplomats noticed that Confederate vessels entered Spanish ports with great ease. The Union interpreted this as proof of Spain's intention to recognize and aid the Confederacy. Consequently, as they had to Great Britain and France, American diplomats protested to Spain about each instance of a ship using a harbor. Union officials also had the problem of preventing this by use of their naval forces since the United States viewed the Civil War as a domestic crisis. Like the rest of Europe, Spain faced a series of maritime incidents which violated Spanish rights while calling into question the sincerity of her assurances of neutrality. This situation forced Spanish authorities to formulate policies which took into consideration humanitarian principles, Cuba's welfare, and tenets of international law as reflected by common practice and the 1856 Declaration of Paris. Visibly then, maritime problems were the most time consuming, frustrating, and potentially dangerous international issues emerging from the Civil War to be shared by the United States and Spain.

Both countries dealt with two types of ships. The first consisted of vessels carrying supplies in and out of the Confederacy in violation of the Union blockade. The second were Confederate warships which preyed on Northern shipping. The commercial vessels usually shuttled back and forth between the Confederacy and Havana or Europe. Often they would be chased by Union warships which in the process violated Cuban territorial waters or actually damaged Spanish property. Such incidents elicited Spanish protests which the United States responded to politely but with no real change in naval policy. Although Confederate ships would on occasion use Spanish ports for restocking supplies and making repairs, more often they attempted to berth at Cuban ports, thereby continually leading to a myriad of problems.

[50] Crampton to Min. of St., May 22, 1865, Sp/pol/USA/2405; Perry to Min. of St., June 2, 1865, Sp/pol/USA/2404; Crampton to Min. of St., June 3, 1865, *Ibid.*; *FRUS(1865)* 2: p. 540.

[51] *Daily National Intelligencer*, March 22, 1866, p. 1.

The question of war vessels indicates the seriousness with which Washington studied Spanish policy. Besides destroying ships, these raiders scared traders from sailing across the Atlantic and consequently trade with Spain suffered. More important than the decline in commerce to Washington was the destruction of Northern vessels which she wanted to prevent. The reduction in traffic indicated the extent of the problem. Using the Spanish port of Málaga, for which records exist, as an example, American shipping declined. Between 1856 and 1861 an average of about fifty-five American ships called at Málaga each year. In 1861 this dropped to forty. Although it went up to forty-six in the following year, in 1863, only twenty-six called and in 1864, twenty-two. James E. Harvey, American minister to Portugal, provided another example. He reported in January, 1862, that "the Mediterranean is fast being cleared of American ships, as 250 passed Gibraltar within a very short time." While the threat of war with Great Britain at the moment might have accounted for some of these departures, Harvey admitted that Confederate ships found good hunting in the Mediterranean.[1]

García Tassara closely watched Washington's maritime attitudes in the spring of 1861, sending his government voluminous details about Lincoln's blockade policies. He received instructions to conform to what the British and French envoys did in Washington. Since, in practice, this meant determining the legality of the blockade and its effectiveness, García Tassara asked Seward for details and was told that "the blockade will be strictly enforced." The Secretary indicated that Spanish warships could enter Southern ports for such usual purposes as collecting diplomatic mail and communicating with consular personnel. Moreover, Spanish trading vessels currently in such harbors would "be allowed a reasonable time for their departure." García Tassara reported that most European diplomats interpreted the blockade announcement as "the intention of establishing the blockade," commenting on how Washington planned to assemble a large fleet for that purpose. In line with this attitude he instructed his consul at Charleston to make Spanish ships leave Southern ports quickly. By the end of May, Spanish officials in the United States reported that the blockade was being enforced. However, García Tassara notified Madrid in early June that "at the moment the blockade of various ports is not established in a permanent manner." [2]

The problem of departing Spanish traders did not decrease. A considerable number of European vessels were still trying to leave the Mississippi River for open sea in mid-June. García Tassara worried that they might be seized by the Union Navy, as could happen along the Atlantic seaboard. As it turned out, they were allowed to pass by New Orleans without incident. Calderon Collantes instructed Captain General Serrano "that the government of Her Majesty has recognized the blockade," further adding that Cubans must observe "the most strict neutrality on events that take place in the United States." [3] Spain had, in effect, respected the blockade, paper or real.

In Spain that spring, a Confederate ship, C.S.S. *Sumter*, was reported off the Spanish coast. She sailed into Cádiz for repairs and Perry reluctantly accepted Spain's explanation that fixing the ship would be the quickest way of making her leave Spanish waters. He also received assurances that she would not be supplied with military hardware. By late May, Spain knew about Lincoln's blockade orders but because of the problem of distance and slow communications, it was not until early June that officials could publicize its details in all Spanish ports. In fact, Spaniards in Havana reported the arrival and departure of several Confederate vessels by the time Spain had determined what policy to follow. Perry notified the Foreign Office in June of another case which developed during that twilight period. He discovered that letters of marque were being issued by Spanish businessmen in Barcelona for the Confederacy and asked that this be stopped. Perry wrote Seward that the royal decree forbade this sort of activity and authorities in Madrid wasted no time in remedying this situation.[4]

This did little to prevent Seward from worrying that Spain might allow other Confederates to outfit in her territory. Washington did not know, however, that orders had been sent to Spanish officials in the United States and in the Caribbean to observe neutrality as closely as possible. American diplomats kept reporting more ships, flying Confederate flags, appearing in Spanish and Cuban ports that summer. The Spanish released all the prisoners held by Southern raiders brought to their harbors but no explanation for these American-claimed violations was ever given by Madrid.[5]

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[1] George to Seward, No. 5, April 16, 1864, US/desp/Malaga/8; Harvey to Seward, No. 58, January 8, 1862, US/desp/Portugal/19; Trent Affair was just ending when Harvey wrote this report.

[2] Seward to García Tassara, May 2, 1861, US/notes to foreign legations/86; García Tassara to Min. of St., May 6, 1861, Sp/pol/USA/2404; García Tassara to Moncada, May 13, 1861, CCP; on blockade enforcement, Moncada to Min. of St., Mo. 10, May 15, 1861, Sp/pol/USA/2404; García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 71, May 19, 1861, *Ibid.*; Perés to Min. of St., No. 7, May 30, 1861, *Ibid.*; García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 81, June 4 1861, *Ibid.*

[3] García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 187, June 15, 1861, *Ibid.*; Min. of St. to Serrano, June 20, 1861, *Ibid.*

[4] *FRUS (1862)* 1: pp. 244, 490–491; Savage to Seward, No. 21, April 27, 1861, US/desp/Havana/41; Shufeld to Seward, No. 38, June 18, 1861, *Ibid.*; Perry to Calderon Collantes, June 6, 1861, US/desp/Sp/43; Perry to Seward, No. 6, June 17, 1861, *Ibid.*

In August, García Tassara reported the blockade was not "effective," but Calderon Collantes wrote back asking when did a blockade become so, implying Spain would recognize it as such whether or not Union ships patrolled every Southern port. On August 27, the Cuban captain general issued an order that "all merchant vessels wearing the flag of the southern confederacy, employed in legitimate commerce, will be admitted in all the ports of entry of the island," further adding that these ships would "be under the safeguard of the neutrality" proclaimed by Spain. The United States, although disturbed by this order, raised no formal objections since President Lincoln determined not to create any more problems than he already had. More important, the decree provided a Spanish interpretation of their neutrality. It certainly distinguished between Confederate warships and commercial vessels; the former were not covered by the captain general's decree. For this reason, Lincoln could have concluded that the military threat from the declaration was not great. But because Confederate maritime traffic continued to increase near Cuba, the United States decided to station navy ships in the area to reduce it.[6]

By September, the American consulate in Havana had sent to Washington numerous reports to the effect that Cuban officials freely allowed Confederate ships into port. Complaining about this situation did nothing to slow the traffic. García Tassara suggested to Calderon Collantes that, in order to reduce friction, the captain general's decree would have to be rewritten. He believed that the current draft might have been too broad because it implied a form of recognition of the Confederacy that Madrid did not intend. Seward realized, however, that Confederate ships would continue entering Cuba to trade and make repairs. He instructed Schurz that despite this traffic, the Confederate flag must not be recognized by Spain. Schurz later raised this point with Calderon Collantes who told him that the United States had the responsibility of patrolling Southern ships. If a commercial vessel from the South came into a port without official American papers she should not be denied trading privileges just because Washington would not issue the appropriate documents. Seward had been boxed in by this line of reasoning because he maintained that the Civil War was only a domestic problem.[7]

[5] Seward to Welles, June 25, 1861, US/DL/54; Min. of St. to Moncada, June 25, 1861, CCP; these reports are in US/desp/Havana/41, US/desp/San Juan/8, US/notes/Sp/16A.

[6] English text, *FRUS (1861)* **1**: p. 260, Spanish, US/desp/Havana/41; Seward to Welles, August 27, 1861, US/DL/54.

[7] *FRUS (1861)* **1**: pp. 261–262; Savage to Seward, No. 56, September 6, 1861, US/desp/Havana/41; Serrano added, "Spain never could have bound herself to discontinue her commercial transactions with the South, whatever may be the state of its internal relations with the North," *FRUS (1861)* **1**: p 266; García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 152, September 16, 1861, Sp/pol/USA/2404; Seward's orders, *FRUS (1861)* **1**: pp. 257–259, 270–271.

In October Seward complained that Confederate ships were being treated with respect as if Spain recognized their government. García Tassara denied such was the case. He suggested to Calderon Collantes, however, that the best way to solve this delicate problem would be to bar both American and Confederate ships from Cuba. The Foreign Minister never responded to this proposal, apparently not finding it very practical. Officials in Washington continued to mistrust Spain, especially since Consul Shufeld in Havana reported how pro-Southern local Spaniards were. By early November Spain began devoting more attention to the growing maritime problem in Cuba. Serrano defended his position by saying that Spain could not give in to every Northern demand which might twist the Spanish neutrality decree out of legal shape. García Tassara tried to support him in front of Seward even though he privately questioned the sincerity of Serrano's claim to being "strictly" neutral.[8]

Yet conditions in Cuba continued to disturb relations. An American consular official in Havana reported in November, "the arrivals here from blockaded ports are so frequent that it is becoming difficult to keep the run of them." In what now had become a pattern, Seward complained about these cases to García Tassara, arguing that Spain violated her neutrality and international law while at the same time Confederate traffic and trade with Cuba continued. In January, Helm reported over 400 Southern ships had run the blockade and that some of these arrived in Cuba.[9]

Quite another case was that of the C.S.S. *Sumter* which again drew American attention. She docked at Cádiz in January for repairs. Local officials told the ship's captain, Rafael Semmes, to leave within twenty-four hours. He refused on the grounds that the ship was not seaworthy. Madrid investigated his claim, found this to be so, and allowed him to make repairs and discharge prisoners. Perry immediately asked friends of his who were journalists to write critical articles about Spain's action. He also complained to Calderon Collantes. The Spanish government, embarrassed by the ship's presence, could do little. Calderon Collantes, furious that the ship selected to dock at a Spanish port, wanted to remain neutral. The Foreign Minister put up a brave front to Perry claiming that repairing the ship did not violate Spanish neutrality.

[8] Seward to García Tassara, October 4, 1861, US/notes to foreign legations/86; García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 162, October 4, 1861, Sp/pol/USA/2404; Shufeld to Seward in a series, No. 73, October 24, 1861, No. 74, October 25, 1861, No. 86, November 5, 1861, US/desp/Havana/42; Serrano to Min. of St., No. 64, November 6, 1861, Sp/pol/USA/2405; García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 189, November 10, 1861, *Ibid.*

[9] Savage to Seward, No. 81, November 15, 1861, US/desp/Havana/41; James D. Richardson (ed.), *A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Confederacy Including the Diplomatic Correspondence, 1861–1865* (Nashville, 1906), **2**: p. 150.

Spain, he said, would not sell Captain Semmes arms or ammunition. During these discussions, officials in Cádiz pressured the Confederates to finish their work quickly. On January 18, Perry recorded that the vessel had left port the day before on orders from local authorities.[10]

Throughout the spring of 1862, while Europe waited to see which side would gain the upper hand in the Civil War, maritime incidents continued to occur off Cuba, Spain, and even North Africa where Confederate sailors were found living in Morocco. Shufeld reported in January that he counted dozens of Confederate ships in Cuban ports. A few Spanish vessels were seized by Union warships. Finally in the late spring, European complaints against American naval abuses forced Lincoln to order the navy to stop violating territorial waters or disrespecting international customs.[11]

Spain's irritation with the Union navy's high-handed manner eventually caused García Tassara to to write Seward a lengthy note on the subject rather than his usual short complaints. He noted, "the cruisers of the United States not only frequently come close to those (Cuba's) shores, but also chase vessels within the territorial waters of the Island." As usual, Seward replied that the particular navy ships involved never had authorization to violate international law. García Tassara then notified his foreign minister in June "that this government," in its enthusiasm to conquer the South "and make the blockade effective, has authorized the conduct of its cruisers on the coast of Cuba." Seward tried to put him off a week later by telling the envoy that Washington "cannot consider itself accountable" for ships justifiably seized for violating the blockade. However, García Tassara's complaints helped lead to another order in August curbing the navy's efforts off Cuba.[12]

At the same time that officials worried about Cuban shipping problems, Americans in Spain reported that a Confederate vessel, the C.S.S. *Mary Scaife*, had arrived in Barcelona with five hundred bales of cotton. Local officials allowed her to discharge her cargo but forbade her to fly the Confederate flag. Further, the captain general of Catalonia told Consul John Little that he could not seize the ship since it was American. He also said that Spain did not imply recognition of the Confederacy by welcoming her in port. The Spaniard's reasoning simply grew out of Seward's argument that the Civil War was a domestic problem of no concern to Spain. Since Consul Little could not answer these comments he kept quiet. The ship finally left Barcelona in September, thus ending the most difficult problem Little faced during the Civil War while serving in Catalonia.[13]

During September the C.S.S. *Florida* stopped in Cuba where local officials answered Americans by calling it a problem to be settled by Madrid and Washington. By this time a large number of Spanish claims had accumulated as a result of the Civil War. Seward suggested that a mixed claims commission solve this growing problem and believed that the Spanish would thereby be delayed for awhile in pressing their demands by studying the suggestion, weighing it against American claims dating back many years, and then drawing up a unified plea if they agreed.[14] As if Madrid and Washington did not have enough concerns, an incident interrupted in the fall which overshadowed these current maritime cases while accenting the problems and dangers involved for both countries.

On October 7, 1862, the U.S.S. *Montgomery* chased a ship flying the British flag, the *Blanche*, to within three hundred yards off the Cuban coast. A colonial official boarded her and flew the Spanish flag to indicate to the Americans that she enjoyed the protection of Spain's authorities. Sailors from the *Montgomery* approached her anyway in row boats, the *Blanche's* captain ran his ship aground, and the Americans boarded her. A fire soon started that totally destroyed the ship. No one has adequately explained who started it or why, but, be that as it may, the captain general exploded when he heard of this gross violation of Cuba's territorial waters and dispatched Spanish warships to hunt down the *Montgomery*, which by then had already left the area. A week later high-ranking American naval officers met with the captain general to assure him that the act would be disavowed and the guilty punished. The incident, indeed, contradicted Washington's orders to all naval personnel to respect international law. Al-

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[10] Spanish officials watched the *Sumter*, Sp/pol/USA/2404; *La Correspondencia*, January 11, 1862, p. 1; *La Discusión*, January 12, 1862, p. 1; *El Contemporaneo*, January 12, 1862, p. 1; Perry to Calderon Collantes, January 4, 1862 and January 8, 1862, US/desp/Sp/43; Perry to Seward, No. 21, January 8, 1862, *Ibid.*; Barrot to Thouvenel, No. 4, January 12, 1862, Fr/pol/Esp/860; Calderon Collantes to Perry, January 13, 1862, US/desp/Sp/43; Perry to Seward, No. 23, January 18, 1862, US/desp/Sp/43.

[11] *FRUS(1862)* **1**: pp. 859–861, 865; Shufeld to Seward No. 3, January 13, 1862, US/desp/Havana/45; Crawford to Russell in a series, No. 11, March 14, 1862, No. 15, April 12, 1862, No. 16, April 18, 1862, F072/1041.

[12] García Tassara to Seward, May 28, 1862, US/notes/Sp/16A; Seward to García Tassara, June 2, 1862, *Ibid.*; García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 118, June 3, 1862, Sp/pol/USA/2408; Seward to García Tassara, June 11, 1862, US/notes to foreign legations/86; Seward to Welles, August 8, 1862, US/DL/58.

[13] Perry to Seward, No. 66, July 6, 1862, US/desp/Sp/44; *FRUS(1862)* **1**: pp. 511–513.

[14] Shufeld to Seward, No. 86, September 1, 1862, US/desp/Havana/45; Herbert H. Todd, "The Building of the Confederate States Navy in Europe" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Vanderbilt University, 1940), pp. 250–263; Seward to García Tassara, September 15, 1862, US/notes to foreign legations/86.

though the *Blanche* had been suspected of being the Confederate blockade runner, *General Rusk*, this rationale did not calm Spanish officials or legally justify the action.[15]

Serrano reported the incident to Madrid on October 15, calling it "grave." His office took testimony from witnesses and crew of the *Blanche* and forwarded this material on to Madrid during October and November. On October 20, García Tassara submitted a formal complaint to Seward asking for reparation to cover damages and insults, cessation of such incidents in the future, and punishment for the naval officer responsible. Seward only promised an investigation. In reporting his conversation with the secretary of state, García Tassara showed his irritation with the way Union warships constantly violated Cuban waters but said Secretary Seward would really study the question of claims.[16]

Meanwhile Gustave Koerner, newly appointed minister to Madrid, set sail for Spain. Just before leaving, Seward learned of the incident and told him to inform the Spanish that a full investigation would be conducted and those guilty of violating the law punished. Word of the affair arrived in Spain just before him. Spanish warships were dispatched to Cuba while Perry tried to reassure the government that the United States would act properly in the case. Koerner presented his credentials after Perry's assurances, and both governments settled down to involve investigations. Koerner told Calderon Collantes on November 8 that guilty officers could expect punishment. The Foreign Minister asked that the American consul in Havana be replaced since he believed Shufeld had cooperated with the *Montgomery*. He also requested Koerner to have American warships avoid incidents of this sort in Cuban waters.[17]

The Foreign Minister's irritation matched that of the Spanish nation as a whole. Usually the press hardly commented on such maritime incidents but this case received coverage. *La España*, conservative in its opinions of the United States, said Washington violated Cuban waters. *La Epoca*, representing the government's views, reported the story in highly critical language. Calderon Collantes's paper, *La Correspondencia*, stated that the *Montgomery* acted under orders from Washington. Even the democratic *La Discusión* criticized the United States. *Las Novedades* editorialized that "Spain has been insulted." *El Diario Español* mentioned the attack against "national dignity" which had been committed, yet *La Iberia* predicted the crisis could be settled in favor of Spain. *La Regeneración* ran lengthy articles accusing the United States of violating international law. Koerner felt many of the ministerial press comments were designed to attract support to the regime a few weeks before the Cortes was to meet; therefore, he paid little attention to them. But the bipartisan irritation with the case was real since newspapers of all political views agreed that the *Montgomery* had violated Spanish territorial waters. The Spanish minister to London suggested another reason as well for Spain's open criticisms of the United States. Leaving aside the obvious question of international law, António González believed that "the defense and security of our interests, the navigation of our ships and the commerce of Cuba, Puerto Rico, and Santo Domingo will be restrained if the Northern ships repeat such aggressions." [18]

American naval officials at first were delighted with what happened. They believed the ship had been a Confederate vessel and until Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles expressed other views, most navy officials paid little attention to questions of international law. The Confederacy, pleased with Washington's embarrassment, hoped Spain would be angry enough to recognize its government. Furious since the ship sailed under their flag, the British decided to protest and cooperated with the Spanish in obtaining punishment, compensation, and an apology.[19]

Since Calderon Collantes ordered García Tassara to ask that navy ships respect Spanish waters, the envoy bombarded the State Department with reports, testimony of investigations, and notes showing how wrong the United States had been. Spain's anger with Washington reflected Madrid's irritation with the literally dozens of violations of their maritime rights. Soon the Spanish in London began working closely with the British in gaining redress. By early December, Welles had relieved Captain Charles Hunter, commander of the *Montgomery*, from active duty while the navy conducted its investigation. Calderon Collantes expressed to García Tassara his belief that Washington would satisfy Spain because Hunter obviously had been in the wrong.[20]

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[15] Albert Gleaves, "The Affair of the Blanche, October 7, 1862," *United States Naval Institute Proceedings* **48** (October, 1922): pp. 1661–1676.

[16] Serrano to Min. of St., No. 216, October 15, 1862, Sp/pol/USA/2406; García Tassara to Seward, October 20, 1862 and enclosures, US/notes/Sp/18; Seward to Welles, October 23, 1862, US/DL/58; García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 206, October 21, 1862, Sp/pol/USA/2406.

[17] Memorandum of conversation, November 8, 1862, US/desp/Sp/45.

[18] *La España*, November 6, 1862, p. 1; *La Epoca*, November 5, 1862, p. 1; *La Correspondencia*, November 5, 1862, p. 1; *La Discusión*, November 7, 1862, p. 1; *Las Novedades*, November 6, 1862, p. 1; *El Diario Español*, November 6, 1862, p. 1; *La Iberia*, November 7, 1862, p. 1; *La Regeneración*, November 7, 1862, p. 1; McCormack, *Memoirs of Gustave Koerner* **2**: pp. 270–271; González to Min. of St., No. 287, November 14, 1862, Sp/pol/USA/2407.

[19] Gleaves, "The Affair of the Blanche," pp. 1670–1676.

[20] Min. of St. to García Tassara, November 28, 1862, Sp/pol/USA/2407; García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 238, Decem-

The investigation resulted in the American government ordering the trial of Captain Hunter. García Tassara wasted no time in expressing his pleasure. Held in February, 1863, a military court found Hunter guilty of violating Cuba's waters against orders and sentenced him to dismissal from the navy.[21] With that Spanish demand settled, the only remaining questions involved compensation and apologies for the incident, which also were difficult to resolve.

During the winter months of February and March, García Tassara corresponded with Seward about claims, but this led nowhere. The reason may have been that Spain asked for $300,000. The Foreign Office became nervous about this unsettled business since the Liberal Union was already feeling the pressures of political criticisms on other topics and wanted to avoid giving its opposition more ammunition. In April García Tassara received instructions to press for a settlement before the Cortes met. Seward told García Tassara that the ship in question had been Confederate property rather than English, registered under the name *General Rusk,* and had been seized from American owners. He denied that Hunter burned the vessel, arguing that her captain had done this in an attempt to destroy the ship's papers. Hunter and his crew also did not insult the Spanish flag. Therefore, he rejected Spanish claims for compensation. The State Department essentially employed the same argument in May when rejecting British claims. Seward delayed further in July by telling Spain that her claims were not being considered any further because talks with the British about the incident had not yet ended.[22]

The case dragged on into 1863. In October Crampton went to the Spanish Foreign Office to propose that Madrid join London in protesting to Seward about the lack of American action. In hopes of forcing President Lincoln to curb the Union navy and pay compensation, Crampton formally suggested "it would be expedient that the governments of Great Britain, Spain, and France should prepare and promulgate some joint declaration to the effect that Neutral States will not accord to the United States government the 'status' of a Belligerent" unless Washington "recognized the usual obligations, which according to international law accompany and balance those rights," and also "concedes to its enemy the status of a belligerent for all international purposes." Foreign Minister Miraflores chose to ignore this proposal and did not respond.[23].

The British suggestion is unique because it was the only documentary evidence that could be found to indicate that the British and French governments tried to coordinate policy regarding the Civil War with Spain. American historians have generally believed that the three governments worked together on problems emerging from the domestic struggles. Although they proved this to a degree between London and Paris, Madrid was never shown to be included. This small piece of evidence suggested some potential cooperation; but, Spain ignored the proposal, electing to continue viewing her relationship with the United States as different from that between London, Paris, and Washington.

The death of the *Blanche* as an issue did nôt stop other maritime incidents from occurring. Quite to the contrary, American officials kept reporting the arrival of Confederate ships in Spanish ports. For example, the famed C.S.S. *Florida* docked at Havana in late January, 1863, and, as usual, the consul general protested to Cuban authorities. According to the United States Consulate, the new captain general, Domingo Dulce, appeared to be more friendly towards Confederate ships than his predecessor. The C.S.S. *Alabama,* also a notorious Confederate raider, used Dominican port facilities in January. Consul John Jay Hyde at San Juan, Puerto Rico, complained of blockade runners continually using this Spanish colony as well. García Tassara defended Spanish hospitality toward the Confederates and argued the correctness of Spain's position in legal terms. He did, however, want to "cultivate and bind together" Spain's relations with the United States in friendlier terms, saying it appeared that the North would win the war. Dulce in Havana affirmed his strict adherence to the neutrality decree of June, 1861, despite American statements to the contrary.[24]

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ber 2, 1862, *Ibid.*; much of this correspondence appeared in Department of State, *Correspondence relative to the Steamer General Rusk, Alias Blanche, to which is appended the Proceedings of a Court Martial in the case of Commander Hunter* (Washington, 1863); González to Min. of St., No. 300, December 1, 1862, Sp/pol/USA/2407; *ORN*, Ser. 1, **19**: pp. 266–287; Min. of St. to García Tassara, December 10, 1862, Sp/pol/USA/2406.

[21] Seward to García Tassara, December 17, 1862, US/notes to foreign legations/86; Seward to García Tassara, December 22, 1862, *Ibid.*; Stuart L. Bernath, *Squall Across the Atlantic: American Civil War Prize Cases and Diplomacy* (Berkeley, 1970), p. 104.

[22] For García Tassara's notes on the *Blanche*, Sp/pol/USA/2407; García Tassara to Seward, April 16, 1863, US/notes/Sp/19; Min. of St. to García Tassara, April 5, 1863, Sp/pol/USA/2407; Seward to García Tassara, May 21, 1863, US/notes to foreign legations/86; Seward to García Tassara, July 21, 1863, *Ibid.*

[23] Crampton to Miraflores, October 15, 1863, Sp/pol/USA/2407.

[24] The ship's log, Records of and Relating to the C.S.S. *Florida*, 1862–1864, RG76, vol. II, National Archives, Washington, D.C.; Shufeld to Seward, No. 6, January 21, 1863, US/desp/Havana/46; Shufeld to Seward, No. 7, 1863, *Ibid.*; Raphael Semmes, *The Confederate Raider Alabama* (Greenwich, 1962), 190; Hyde to Seward, No. 3, January 31, 1863, US/desp/San Juan/8; Hyde to Seward, No. 5, February 28, 1863, *Ibid.*; García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 16, February 2,

In Madrid, Koerner complained about the admittance of the C.S.S. *Florida* into Havana. Miraflores told him on several occasions that Southern and Northern ships would be equally admitted into Cuba. Koerner argued that Cuban officials exceeded their authority as stipulated by the neutrality decree while Miraflores defended them. In the spring, the captain general issued an order forbidding ships of the Northern navy from communicating with the American Consulate in Havana without formally docking in port because of what happened to the *Blanche*. According to international law, this move obligated a warship to wait twenty-four hours after an enemy vessel left the same port before pursuing it. Obviously aimed at preventing the Union navy from circumventing this rule, the Americans protested and in July the Spanish government rescinded the order.[25]

The number of complaints about Confederate and American shipping in Cuban waters increased in the first half of 1863. Because of this, Cuba again became a crisis point. Both Madrid and Washington found the problem annoying, yet Spain believed she was following international law correctly while the United States thought otherwise. Miraflores told the British that his country would try to be as neutral as possible despite the ever growing number of incidents. By 1864 the Union blockade began to reduce drastically Confederate traffic. Vice-Consul Savage in Havana reported in February that Cuban merchants "have realized the fact that the blockade is very stringent and becoming still more so every day." Yet during that year more reports flowed into Washington about Confederate ships using Spanish ports. Both Dulce and García Tassara kept watch over naval activities and reported their attempts to maintain a correct neutral position.[26]

Discussion soon began about the extent of Cuba's territorial waters because as early as 1862 the United States had lodged numerous complaints about Spanish violations of her own declaration of neutrality in Cuba. Another reason grew out of Spanish accusations of the United States illegally penetrating Cuban territorial waters to pursue blockade runners and Confederate ships. Madrid claimed control over a belt six miles wide around the island while the United States wanted to recognize only three. García Tassara, in August, 1862, told Seward that Spain could not accept the American view of a three-mile jurisdictional band around Cuba. A Spanish diplomat noted on the back of one of García Tassara's dispatches that Spain would not retire its six-mile claim to satisfy the United States. In June Madrid had issued a royal decree reaffirming its six-mile control around Cuba in order to remind the United States not to violate her waters.[27] Spain claimed an area as wide as a cannon shot could go which averaged about six miles, predicating this position on previous international practice. And this was carefully explained to the United States in 1862 by reference to various legal works, past experiences, and lengthy briefs.[28]

Before Seward decided to press the Spanish on the issue he asked officials in the Navy Department to study the question and determine what they wanted in order to be effective in patrolling Florida's coast. Secretary of the Navy Welles opposed the Spanish position but felt Seward might bow to García Tassara's arguments since Spain appeared friendlier at the moment than either France or Great Britain. Welles also objected to a six-mile limit because it would restrict the activities of his navy. García Tassara meanwhile reminded Seward of Spain's ancient practice of determining her own maritime limits.[29]

In October, 1862, García Tassara wrote to his foreign office that the *Blanche* case caused Seward to discuss the six-mile limit problem in great detail. But Spain did not want to curtail her territorial jurisdiction; the loss of support at home for the Liberal Union as a result might have been fatal. Madrid sent García Tassara background data to show Spain had long adhered to the six-mile limit. Seward responded that unless altered by treaty, the international practice of recognizing only three miles would be followed. Furthermore, the secretary argued that claiming the distance of a cannon shot was absurd since Spain's belt would grow wider with each new development in artillery. Seward assured García Tassara that the United States had no designs on Cuba and only wanted free seas. In late December, the envoy asked him again to observe the six-mile limit in order to reduce the number of maritime incidents that were proving so disruptive to both nations. He completely

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1863, Sp/pol/USA/2405; Dulce to Min. of St., No. 3, February 23, 1863, *Ibid.*

[25] *FRUS(1863)*, pp. 894–899; Koerner to Miraflores, April 17, 1863, *Ibid.*; Koerner to Seward, No. 49, June 12, 1863, *Ibid.*; Perry to Seward, No. 96, July 11, 1863, *Ibid.*

[26] Miraflores to Edwards, June 9, 1863, Sp/pol/USA/2404; Savage to Seward, No. 120, February 3, 1864, US/desp/Havana/47; *FRUS(1864)* 4: pp. 11–14, 17–18; Little to Seward, No. 11, March 31, 1864, US/desp/Barcelona/6; Evans to Seward, April 1, 1864, US/desp/Bilbao/1; Savage to Seward, No. 147, May 7, 1864, US/desp/Havana/47; García Tassara to Dulce, No. 42, December 23, 1864, Sp/pol/USA/2408; Dulce to García Tassara, No. 2, January 5, 1865, *Ibid.*; Dulce to Min. of St., No. 3, January 30, 1865, *Ibid.*

[27] García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 164, August 14, 1862 and José Magallon's (Subsecretary at the Foreign Office) comments on the back of this dispatch, Sp/pol/USA/2408; decree dated June 2, 1862, *Ibid.*

[28] García Tassara to Min. of St. in a series, No. 121, June 3, 1862, No. 125, June 12, 1862, No. 145, July 18, 1862, No. 154, August 1, 1862, No. 160, August 12, 1862, *Ibid.*

[29] Seward to Welles, October 10, 1862, US/DL/58; Welles, *Diary* 1: p. 170; García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 203, October 13, 1862, Sp/pol/USA/2408.

ignored the American's comments on relating artillery technology to international law.[30]

In January, García Tassara rejected Seward's proposal that an international commission study Spain's right to claim six miles. Yet pressure to solve the problem continued in Madrid because Dulce complained about increased American violations of his waters. He asked that the two governments settle once and for all the limits so that he could control Cuban territory properly. During April and May, García Tassara and Seward continued to discuss the problem but made no progress toward a solution.[31] The Spanish foreign minister ordered García Tassara to settle the issue in the spring before more maritime incidents provoked even greater problems, no doubt, recalling the *Blanche.* By mid-1863 tensions reached another high level because no resolution could be reached while at the same time complaints about maritime violations continued to flow into both capitals at an increased level.[32]

Seward wrote Welles in July asking that orders be issued to the Navy to exercise "the utmost prudence" near Cuba even though the United States did not recognize any six-mile limit around the colony. Then on August 9, García Tassara addressed a note to Seward announcing "that after the lapse of the term of two months after the date of this note, orders shall be given to Her Majesty's ships to enforce respect for the six miles," concluding this message with an expression of hope for a settlement and hinted about a "convention" to define mutual maritime jurisdictions. In short, Spain now wavered from her previous stubborn and uncompromising position. The next day Seward responded that Washington only recognized a three-mile limit, arguing that no change in this could occur "without the consent or acquiescence of other powers." Seward wrote to Perry that talks would begin in Washington on a convention and ordered him to start them also in Madrid. He wanted Perry to indicate to the Spanish that the source of their problems—the Civil War—would soon be over, leading to friendlier relations. It would, therefore, be a shame if the two countries "drifted into a naval conflict by any of the cross currents that this insurrection may set in motion." A few days later Seward wrote Perry again that he would hold firm against what he considered as sloppy Spanish handling of the six-mile problem.[33]

In September García Tassara and Seward discussed possible arbitration of their problem by Belgium. The envoy believed that Seward wanted to settle the question quickly and amicably. Perry covered similar ground with Miraflores and in mid-month two governments had agreed to arbitration. The American proposal received formal approval by Miraflores on September 14, in friendly terms, although he reiterated Spain's determination to defend her six-mile position. The draft of a convention, drawn up in October, stipulated that Belgium would determine if Spain could claim six or only three miles. Furthermore, both parties would "abide by the decision" of the Belgian government. García Tassara then told Secretary Seward that Cuban authorities would not enforce the previously issued orders to patrol six miles out until the arbitration had been completed. Welles worried lest the decision went against the United States but Seward felt confident it would not.[34]

Seward reminded García Tassara that the Senate had to approve the convention first before arbitration could take place. The position papers, however, were drafted and by the end of the month Belgium agreed to cooperate. In December, President Lincoln mentioned the arbitration in his annual address to the Congress. But the Senate never received the convention that year because Spain and the United States still haggled over the wording of each other's complaints which were to be presented to Belgium.[35]

Nothing new developed with the problem during the winter of 1863–1864. In March García Tassara commented that if the issue was going to be settled, it had better be done before the Civil War ended or the Senate would not approve any such treaty of arbitration. García Tassara urged speed before the Senate adjourned as otherwise months would be lost. In June Koerner reported that Miraflores had forgotten to send García Tassara instructions to sign the convention, hence the delay on the part of Spain. By this time Seward told Koerner not to press the issue.

[30] García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 214, October 31, 1862, Sp/pol/USA/2407; Magallon to García Tassara, December 1, 1862, *Ibid.*; Seward to García Tassara, December 16, 1862, US/notes to foreign legations/86; García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 258, December 30, 1862, Sp/pol/USA/2408; García Tassara to Seward, December 30, 1862, US/notes/Sp/18.

[31] García Tassara to Seward, January 27, 1863, US/notes/Sp/18; Dulce to Min. of St., No. 22, April 30, 1863, Sp/pol/USA/2408; Min. of St. to García Tassara, June 24, 1863, *Ibid.*; García Tassara to Seward, May 14, 1863, US/notes/Sp/19.

[32] Min. of St. to García Tassara, April 4, 1863, Sp/pol/USA/2408.

[33] Seward to Welles, July 6, 1863, US/DL/61; García Tassara to Seward, August 9, 1863, US/notes/Sp/19; Seward to García Tassara, August 10, 1863, US/notes to foreign legations/86; *FRUS (1863)* **2**: pp. 904–905.

[34] García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 183, September 4, 1863, Sp/pol/USA/2408; Miraflores to García Tassara, September 14, 1863, *Ibid.*; Miraflores to Perry, September 17, 1863, US/desp/Sp/45; copy of convention, *FRUS (1864)* **4**: pp. 2–3; García Tassara to Seward, October 8, 1863, US/notes/Sp/19; Welles, *Diary* **1**: pp. 467–468.

[35] García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 210, October 16, 1863, Sp/pol/USA/2408; Min. of St. to Belgian Min. of St., September 19, 1863, *Ibid.*; Basler, *Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln* **5**: p. 37.

The negotiations died a quiet death because the number of maritime incidents began to decline as the blockade became more effective, thereby eliminating the cause for arbitration. Moreover, the United States and Spain did not want to take the chance of Belgium ruling against them; each believed that it was better to leave well enough alone. Therefore, they did not sign a convention and Belgium never arbitrated the question. Maritime jurisdictional limits remained conveniently unsolved for the rest of the Civil War.[36]

However, one last incident in early 1865 caused further friction between the two governments. Although as late as May Confederate ships still used Cuban ports, the activities of one Southern ship, the C.S.S. *Stonewall*, created the greatest amount of interest. Jerónimo Becker, in his study of nineteenth-century Spanish diplomacy, called this the most important maritime case to come up for Spain during the Civil War. Lynn M. Case and Warren F. Spencer in their book on Franco-American relations during the Civil War more accurately stated that the diplomatic activity sparked by the case could not be justified since the war was almost over.[37] But the ship generated a mountain of documentary remains while raising some interesting points in international law.

Briefly told, the C.S.S. *Stonewall* entered El Ferrol harbor in mid-February for repairs to make her fit to sail. Immediately American diplomats in France and Spain registered protests since the ship came from French waters and into Spain's. The Spanish initially took the position that repairs could be made under the terms of their neutrality in order to make her ready to leave Spain's territory. Refusing to repair the vessel meant she could be lost at sea or would remain in port indefinitely, thereby violating international law. Spain would not permit repairs to be made that could increase her military power. Seward protested the aid given this ship and argued that none of this would have happened if Spain had canceled her decree of neutrality as he had recommended. Throughout February and early March, Perry, local Spanish officials at El Ferrol, and diplomats in Madrid, watched as the ship made repairs, went to sea, returned for more work, and again set sail.[38]

Seward complained to Perry in mid-March that Spain, like Great Britain, gave belligerent status to "piratical" ships. He ordered the legation's staff to tell Spanish officials that Spain could not justify its conduct since the Confederacy virtually lay defeated. Moreover, to allow the C.S.S. *Stonewall* freedom of the seas discouraged American commerce. García Tassara noted that Seward kept raising the belligerency issue during March, questioning Spain's need to be neutral any longer. He noted that the State Department fed the American press a great deal of information about the case and he sent to Spain press clippings hostile to Madrid's policy. García Tassara also reminded his foreign office that the Civil War was almost over. He suggested that perhaps the time had arrived for a reassessment of Spain's policy toward the conflict. On the back of García Tassara's dispatch dated March 27, José Magallon, Subsecretary of the Foreign Office, scribbled that before Spain could alter her policy, those of France and Great Britain would need to be determined. Both countries meanwhile kept silent about the *Stonewall*.[39]

This ship finally left Spain in April for Nassau and Havana. The State Department notified García Tassara that the United States hoped the captain general of Cuba would not help the vessel. In mid-May she arrived in Havana and her captain notified Dulce that several Union warships stood off harbor waiting to destroy her when she reappeared at sea. Dulce thought that he could not let the ship leave port in order to avoid the carnage which would otherwise occur. He suggested that with the war nearly ended, the vessel should surrender to the United States. On May 19, the crew of the *Stonewall* turned the raider over to Cuban authorities for release to American officials. Dulce told consular personnel of the United States that he would hold her until Madrid and Washington determined what to do with her. Before the State Department knew what had happened in Havana, García Tassara protested on May 22 an order issued by the United States forbidding any foreign warship from using American ports if that country helped a Confederate ship. The harsh American note announcing this policy further stated that the navy would destroy by all available means any vessel sailing under the Confederate flag. Then word came of the C.S.S. *Stonewall's* surrender and García Tassara's uncomfortable position changed.[40]

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[36] García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 30, March 8, 1864, Sp/pol/USA/2408; Koerner to Seward, No. 106, June 27, 1864, US/desp/Sp/46.

[37] Becker, *relaciones exteriores* 2: p. 617; Case and Spencer, *The United States and France*, p. 479.

[38] Benavides to García Tassara, February 11, 1865, US/notes/Sp/19; Mon to Min. of St., No. 46, February 8, 1865, Sp/pol/USA/2408; García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 40, April 10, 1865, *Ibid.*; *FRUS (1865)* 2: pp. 474–521; Spanish telegrams on the ship's condition from El Ferrol in Sp/pol/USA/2408, confirm contention of Case and Spencer that she was in poor shape. *The United States and France*, pp. 471–478.

[39] *FRUS (1865)* 2: p. 516; García Tassara to Min. of St. in a series, No. 41, March 10, 1865, No. 27, March 13, 1865, No. 60, March 27, 1865, Sp/pol/USA/2408; García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 59, March 27, 1965, Sp/pol/USA/2409.

[40] Hunter to García Tassara, May 17, 1865, US/notes to foreign legations/87; Dulce to Min. of St., No. 24, May 19, 1865, Sp/pol/USA/2408; Minor to Hunter, No. 89, May 20, 1865, US/desp/Havana/47; García Tassara to F. W. Seward, May 22, 1865, US/notes/Sp/21; Hunter to Seward, May 22, 1865, US/notes to foreign legations/87.

The United States asked that the ship be turned over to American authorities in Havana to be brought back under the Union flag. Spain agreed provided Washington covered the costs of maintaining her in the Cuban port, which amounted to about $16,000. By August, the final settlement and transfer of the ship had been accomplished. No other problems developed because, by early July, colonial authorities in Cuba published Madrid's order canceling the neutrality decree of June, 1861.[41]

The various maritime incidents of the Civil War were unlike those which normally existed between nations at peace. Throughout the nineteenth century there had been numerous instances when Spanish or American officials violated the rights of ships but usually these were isolated events separated from any connection with the fundamental policies of their governments. Even incidents in Cuban waters in the 1840s and 1850s, for example, while contributing to the generally unfriendly relations existing between Spain and the United States, never took on the same importance as those of the Civil War. But a fundamental change came in 1861 because in that year several things happened. The number of cases increased dramatically from several each year to dozens. European governments, in their neutrality, essentially were exercising naval policies. Spain's proclaimed neutral stance, for example, concentrated on what Madrid's attitude would be regarding harbors, ships, and blockades while Washington's early diplomatic statements on the war also emphasized similar points. This was partly due to the emphasis on naval diplomacy in the Declaration of Paris but also to the nature of Europe's geo-political communications with America. Not having contiguous territory, Spain came into contact with the United States and the Confederacy by ship, especially over economic and political matters regarding the island of Cuba. The emphasis on naval diplomacy, therefore, linked maritime incidents to fundamental national foreign policies.

The importance of naval incidents coupled with a tradition of diplomatic conflicts virtually insured that these would be difficult years irrespective of each nation's policies and intentions. The evidence available suggests that Spain wanted to avoid maritime incidents as much as possible in order not to disturb her activities in Santo Domingo, Mexico, and Cuba. The Confederacy, needing port facilities both in Cuba and in the Mediterranean and knowing that such incidents might help bring her recognition from an irritated European government, took advantage of her belligerency to help fight for national survival. This development created numerous unwanted and embarrassing situations for Spain which, because of poor communications or less than competent officials, augmented the problems Madrid had with Washington. One had only to think about the debate over the C.S.S. *Sumter* or the C.S.S. *Stonewall* to appreciate this situation.

The United States could not help but look at what appeared to her as Spanish aid and friendliness toward the Confederacy as indicative of Spain's intention of helping to defeat the United States. Given their traditional hostility, conflicts of interests in the New World, and potential influence of France and Great Britain on the Iberian nation, it was only natural that the United States would distrust the Spanish and even consider them potentially their most dangerous European enemy at the start of the war. By midseason Seward had concluded that Spain would not be as great a threat as he had originally thought because Spain evacuated Mexico, could not last long in Santo Domingo, and was attempting to reduce Confederate use of their port facilities.

Several clear lines of policy, therefore, are discernible. Spain wanted to avoid naval incidents and attempted to maintain a correct attitude of neutrality which, by international law, required her to admit both Confederate and American ships into her ports. However, Madrid did not want any further involvement in the Civil War. The *Trent* case exemplified Spain's desire to avoid adding to her problems. The United States understandably linked Spanish motives with maritime incidents and accordingly pressured Spain throughout the war to maintain strict neutrality and not help the South. Even in the last few weeks of the war, this policy was maintained, for example, with the C.S.S. *Stonewall*.

Several other observations can be made. In practice, Spain found the abuses of the American navy very irritating. The violations of Cuban waters proved nerve-racking to Spaniards who always feared that Washington wanted to seize the island and threatened to disrupt the island's economy. There is no question but that the Union navy did exceed its authority on many occasions in order to capture Confederate raiders and blockade runners. It is also easy to understand why it would do so. Both Captains General Serrano and Dulce perhaps interpreted their country's neutrality obligations too loosely and thereby created a situation conducive to excesses by the Union navy. Not aware of all the fine points of international law, they clearly saw it as their duty to continue economic relations with both halves of the United States and to curry favor with pro-Southern sympathizers among Cuba's conservative agricultural and industrial leadership. Each side had grounds for complaints against the other, which for two nervous governments added to their growing list of problems.

[41] Hunter to García Tassara, May 30, 1865, US/notes to foreign legations/87; Seward to García Tassara, July 17, 1865, *Ibid.*; García Tassara, to Min. of St., No. 94, May 25, 1865, Sp/pol/USA/2408; García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 135, July 17, 1865; *Ibid.*; Min. of St. to García Tassara, August 21, 1865, *Ibid.; Gaceta de la Habana*, July 6, 1865, p. 1.

VIII. COMPLAINTS, CRIME, AND COMMERCE

Civil wars inevitably cause unforeseen disturbances among nations. Property and rights of foreign nationals are usually damaged in local combat; individuals take advantage of unique conditions for their own profit; and normal trade patterns are disturbed, radically altered, or nearly destroyed. The American Civil War proved to be no exception. Although less vexing than recognition and maritime problems, other war-oriented situations generated much diplomatic discussion illustrating Spanish-American attitudes and policies. The most important issues centered around alleged violations of Spanish rights in New Orleans by occupying Union troops, the Arguelles case involving slave trade in Cuba, and commercial relations between the two countries.

In April, 1862, Union forces attacked the city of New Orleans and immediately occupied it. General Benjamin F. Butler commanded these troops and, therefore, it was this general's administration and the incidents growing out of his policies which caused a diplomatic controversy with Spain. New Orleans had long been a key Southern port in international trade to which lumber, cotton, and flour, gathered along both sides of the Mississippi River, were brought for delivery to Cuba, Spain, and Europe in general. Over the years Spanish merchants established export firms in the city and Madrid maintained a consulate there. By the time of the Civil War, Isabel's government considered New Orleans economically as important as Charleston, South Carolina, Boston, Massachusetts, and New York City. For this reason, General Butler's occupation of this Louisiana port concerned Spanish officials.

Almost from the first day of his arrival, General Butler discovered that European consular personnel sympathized with the South and he was convinced they would not hesitate to help Confederates living in the area. This also applied to European businessmen in the city. On May 10, a Southern blockade runner, the *Fox*, was captured with a cargo of arms, ammunition, and medical supplies valued at $300,000. Papers on the ship indicated that an old trading firm in New Orleans, owned by Spanish citizens, called the Avendano Brothers, appeared involved in the vessel's business. This incident confirmed General Butler's fear about the European community. He consequently ordered both brothers fined for this breach of their country's neutrality and the Union's laws. In June the General went one step further by issuing instructions that all neutral citizens had to take an oath not to "act or consent that any (thing) be done, or conceal any that has been (or) is about to be done, that shall aid or comfort any of the enemies" of the United States. The European consuls immediately protested to him that this could not be done without violating their neutrality laws.[1]

García Tassara soon heard of the Avendano's case and about Butler's oath. He then initiated a spirited correspondence with the State Department protesting Butler's high-handed treatment of Spanish citizens while complaining that his order could not be accepted by his government. To complicate matters, on June 4, a Spanish ship, the *Cardenas*, arrived in New Orleans (now an open port) from Havana. City officials quarantined the ship without explaining how long this would last, costing her owners a great deal of money and lost time. Butler explained to local Spanish merchants that Havana had yellow fever, hence the quarantine. Meanwhile, an American vessel called the *Roanoke* wanted to sail for Cuba but could not obtain a clean bill of health from the Spanish consulate in New Orleans. The Spanish consul refused to clear her in retaliation for the unlimited quarantine of the *Cardenas*. Butler then threatened to expel the Spanish consul from the city if the *Roanoke* did not receive the needed papers. While his manner may have been curt, the general believed yellow fever currently existed in Cuba. He also felt that if the owners of the *Roanoke* wanted her to go to the colony despite the possibility of disease there, then the Spanish Consul had no right to stop her.[2]

García Tassara complained to Seward about these incidents: "The conduct of General Butler, whose inconsiderations is [*sic*] more and more shown up by despatches recently received from the Island of Cuba," could not be justified since yellow fever was not reported in the colony. In early August the envoy noted that the *Cardenas* remained in quarantine for nearly a month, far longer than was necessary. Consul Juan Callijon commented that this proved expensive to the ship's owners since the cargo included fresh fruits. Butler later admitted that he pressured the consul into giving the *Roanoke* its papers because New Orleans had no disease while Havana usually did.[3]

García Tassara did not forget about the Avendanos. In late August he informed Seward that a Confederate ship coming from Havana and captured by Union forces had on board "invoices of goods sent in consignment" to Avendano Brothers "but not for account of said house." García Tassara reported that General Butler asked one of the brothers to pay him the amount listed on these captured bills, amounting to 1,900

[1] *OR*, Ser. 1, **15**: p. 484.

[2] *FRUS(1862)* **1**: pp. 520–522, 524–526, 528–531; García Tassara to Seward, June 28, 1862, US/notes/Sp/16A; n.a., *Private and Official Correspondence of General Benjamin F. Butler during the Period of the Civil War* (n.c., 1917), **1**: p. 595 (hereafter cited *Butler Correspondence*).

[3] García Tassara to Seward, July 19, 1862, US/notes/Sp/16A; García Tassara to Seward, August 7, 1862, *Ibid.*; *Butler Correspondence* **2**: pp. 204–205.

pounds sterling, and because Avendano would not, the general threatened to throw him in jail. The brothers sent their lawyer to Butler who then acknowledged that the bills were not the property of the Avendanos but that "the gains they must have made by the exportation of cotton and importation of arms must have been so much augmented that they may consider themselves very fortunate if they are not compelled to pay a larger sum." García Tassara further added that, having no other choice, the two Spaniards paid Butler $9,000. One brother then left for Cuba convinced he no longer could do business in New Orleans. García Tassara wanted the sum returned. He skillfully apologized to Seward for having to complain about Butler again, no doubt, hoping to win the secretary over to his demands. He also reminded Seward that the *Cardenas* suffered $16,347 in damages which he believed the United States should pay.[4]

Washington initially reacted to Garcia Tassara's protests in a non-committal manner. However, Seward responded with a promise to investigate Butler's activities, at the same time proposing that a joint commission be formed to solve this problem along with those arising out of maritime incidents. Behind the scenes, however, things proved different. Butler received orders from his commander saying "oaths are not to be prescribed by us to aliens." Seward communicated with Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton about the complaints, commenting he did not doubt the general was "acting with perfect justice and impartiality. But it is fair to acknowledge that the Spanish government seems to be acting in a very conciliatory and liberal spirit, toward the United States." He asked that Butler's activities be investigated and suggested the general be more conciliatory toward the Spanish.[5]

On September 24, the United States provost marshal in New Orleans, Jonas H. French, reported to Butler that two Spanish warships attempted to leave port without allowing city officials to examine passports. He, therefore, prohibited the ships from leaving the city. Butler wrote to the captain of the *Blasco de Garay*, the principal vessel involved, that he suspected several prisoners had attempted to leave the city on his ship and he further requested permission "to examine the passengers on board." Captain José Manuel Dias de Herrera granted this request. Suspecting Confederates had taken refuge on board and irritated by investigations of his activities in the area by agents from the War and State Departments, Butler addressed a note to Stanton on October 1 defending his actions. He said that these and other Spanish ships helped Confederates to escape the city on several occasions and always traded with them. Quarantine orders were issued in an attempt to clean up the city while at the same time preventing the introduction of suspected yellow fever. He complained that the Spanish consul continually thwarted his efforts. "When, therefore, I find a Consul aiding the rebels, I must treat him as a rebel, and the exceptions are very few indeed among the Consuls here. Bound up with the rebels by marriage, commercial and social relations," Butler argued, "most of the consular offices are only asylums where rebels are harbored and rebellion fostered." For this reason all Spanish activities were considered suspect.[6]

In early October yet another incident occurred in New Orleans. Having heard that the Spanish firm of Puig Brothers had sold arms and ammunition to the Confederates, General Butler ordered the seizure of their office, books, and papers. One of the brothers took refuge on the *Blasco de Garay*, which already had a history of difficulties with General Butler. After the consul came to the general's office to ask for details, Butler told him to send the Puig brother then on board the Spanish vessel to settle the issue. Butler told him that if the man was innocent he should step on shore; if guilty Puig would be afraid to leave the ship. The general informed Callijon that his officers possessed evidence of the illicit trade in the form of receipts for sale of munitions and upon this proof he had acted. García Tassara soon learned of the case but Seward reminded him that warships were prohibited from carrying persons not employed by the government of that ship or unofficial correspondence. García Tassara denied that the *Blasco de Garay* violated these rules and continued to blame Butler for all these troubles. Captain General Serrano in Cuba wrote to Spain that Captain Dias de Herrera had indeed taken on board about eighty individuals for humanitarian reasons since they were being treated cruelly in "an absolute tyrannical domination." [7]

Butler wrote to Stanton in late October again defending his actions. He accused the Avendano brothers of trading with the enemy and reported they had not denied this. He noted that they also delayed three months before lodging a formal complaint, waiting, Butler said, until he quarantined the *Cardenas*. They then used this case as an excuse to express theirs, no doubt, to give the effect of a rash of incidents occurring at once. Butler's comments seemed reasonable enough but since he had accused these merchants of being Jewish, as if their faith determined their

[4] García Tassara to Seward, August 26, 1862, US/notes/Sp/18; García Tassara to Seward, August 26, 1862, *Ibid.*

[5] *FRUS (1862)* **1**: p. 527; *OR*, Ser. 1, **15**: pp. 497, 557; Seward to Stanton, September 9, 1862, US/DL/58.

[6] *Butler Correspondence* **2**: pp. 325, 339–348.

[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 368–370; Seward to García Tassara, October 4, 1861, Sp/pol/USA/2405; García Tassara to Min. of St. in a series, No. 163, October 5, 1861, No. 167, August 22, 1862, No. 245, December 5, 1862, No. 126, June 8 1863, *Ibid.*; Serrano to Min. of St., No. 214, October 15, 1862, Sp/pol/USA/2407.

political sympathies, his defense melted. At about the same time, an investigator for the State Department recommended to Seward that the general's actions be censured.[8]

García Tassara instructed the consul in New Orleans that warships could not take on board people without correct passports. Further, he reminded him that the passengers on the *Blasco de Garay* did not even possess them. The envoy prohibited him from admitting any Americans on Spanish warships in the future. García Tassara complained to Madrid that the consul failed to keep the legation fully informed about these incidents, saying that it was quicker to obtain details from the Department of State than from his consul. Objecting to the captain's failure to check with him first before accepting passengers, he commented that "this situation is every day more exposed to grave dangers." Although angry at the poor handling of affairs in New Orleans by Spanish officials, García Tassara continued protesting Butler's activities which he believed also were incorrect. In reaching for an excuse to complain, he objected to the general's order prohibiting Spanish warships from docking at New Orleans. García Tassara at the same time assured Seward that anyone violating neutrality laws would be stopped by Spanish officials. The compulsion of both governments to appear in the right and save face, when both violated laws or acted in impractical ways, made these exchanges almost superfluous; yet, they were taken seriously at the time.[9]

On December 10, Seward commented to García Tassara in a formal reply to previous complaints that the commander of the *Blasco de Garay* had taken on board political exiles and refugees in violation of published military orders. He warned García Tassara that such practices could lead to instructions prohibiting Spain's use of all American ports for her warships. Informally, Seward then asked the envoy to avoid such incidents in the future. García Tassara appropriately chose not to contest this polite note.[10]

Seward wrote Stanton a few days later saying that President Lincoln decided to issue an order forbidding anyone from leaving New Orleans on a foreign warship without written permission of the local military commander. Two days before writing this note, Seward had called García Tassara into his office to show him Butler's various dispatches which indicated criminals boarded the ship as political refugees. Seward hinted that Spain should stop this sort of activity at once, implying that the same thing could take place in Cuba during some future revolt with American warships offering refuge to Cuban revolutionaries. Embarrassed, García Tassara criticized his consul in another dispatch to Madrid in February, 1863. He said the consul put Spain in an awkward position at a time when serious questions about neutrality worried Madrid and Washington. The American press reported that the warship had on board a Confederate general and a diplomat, drawing parallels with the *Trent* case. García Tassara also noted that Confederate funds for Southern agents in Europe were on the vessel.[11]

In May García Tassara received from the Foreign Office a statement to the effect that Spain recognized in principle the right of a warship to carry political refugees; however, orders were issued to naval personnel to observe neutrality laws. The foreign minister, moreover, promised to reprimand the consul. But Miraflores disagreed with García Tassara's position that Spain should not help political refugees. He said it would be cruel to ignore their pleas for help. García Tassara's report about Seward's Cuban comment, made in December, also drew a response from the foreign minister because he wrote that "the possession of our Antilles, causes an interest in curtailing the rights of asylum." Further, "the United States has the same right to block Spanish ships of war as we do to block Anglo-American ships of war from the ports of our Antilles." Obviously, Spain wanted no precedents established which might someday hinder her ability to control revolutionary activities in Cuba. He condemned the captain for taking Confederate funds on his ship and ended the report with a renewed promise to criticize the consul. In fact, his reprimand went out with the same mail warning Callijon to keep García Tassara better informed and to observe the prescriptions of neutrality.[12]

The envoy, armed with his new instructions, wrote Seward in June that ships of war could carry political refugees; defending this position with a long discourse on humanitarian principles. He promised an investigation of the charge that such incidents would be avoided in the future. A few more complaints and rebuttals continued back and forth between the Spanish legation and the State Department during the summer and early fall. García Tassara complained to Madrid about Washington's strict control of refugee traffic but the Foreign Office instructed him that the United

[8] *Butler Correspondence* 2: pp. 387–391; Hans L. Trefousse, *Ben Butler: The South Called Him Beast!* (New York, 1967), pp. 125–127, 130.

[9] García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 235, November 28, 1862, Sp/pol/USA/2407; García Tassara to Seward, November 26, 1862, US/notes/Sp/18.

[10] Seward to García Tassara, December 10, 1862, US/notes to foreign legations/86; García Tassara to Seward, December 18, 1862, US/notes/Sp/18.

[11] Seward to Stanton, December 18, 1862, US/DL/59; García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 249, December 16, 1862, Sp/pol/USA/2407; García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 29, February 13, 1863, *Ibid.*

[12] Min. of St. to García Tassara, May 8, 1863, Sp/pol/USA/2407; Min. of St. to Callíjon, May 8, 1863, *Ibid.*

States was perfectly within her rights in order to "assure tranquility in her territory." This principle had to be respected, otherwise a precedent would be established which might weaken Spanish control over Cuba.[13]

In 1863, damage to Spanish property by Union soldiers in New Orleans resulted in further complaints and requests for compensation as happened in other parts of the South occupied by Northern troops. As late as December, 1865, García Tassara continued to write about claims asking that they be satisfied or rejected. One of the important cases was that of the Avendano brothers, but Washington would not act upon these since other war claims were being lodged by various governments; all of which had to be studied and a policy formulated toward them. The events in New Orleans proved irritating to both governments since each violated neutrality laws or international customs. While of lesser significance than the maritime cases, the events in New Orleans indicated the desire of both governments to avoid further problems while at the same time, defending their self-defined rights. Moreover, the cases occurring in New Orleans only represented some of the claims emerging from the Civil War. Like other governments, Spain's heard complaints from its citizens and attempted to gain redress, sometimes successfully while at other times not. And, as with Europe's regimens in general, Spain worked with claims, including some from New Orleans, for years. In fact, notes were exchanged by both Madrid and Washington on some of these as late as 1888.[14]

Another interesting episode soon attracting the attention of the two administrations and coming on the heels of the problems in New Orleans, which had been given wide publicity in the United States (although little in Spain), was the Arguelles case. The development of this issue proved of minor importance in Spain but of some public significance in the United States while reflecting the general attitudes of both governments toward the issue of slavery.

Lieutenant Colonel José Agustin Arguelles, Lieutenant Governor of Colon District, Cuba, seized a slave ship on November 20, 1863, in line with the colonial government's policy of reducing this traffic. For having carried out his orders efficiently, Arguelles received an award of $15,000 from the captain general's office as stipulated by Spanish regulations governing prize cases. In the spring of 1864, Arguelles asked for a twenty-day leave of absence to visit New York in order to purchase a Spanish language newspaper, *La Cronica*. He received permission and went to the United States in March. While away, Cuban officials discovered to their horror that Arguelles and several of his colleagues had sold the Africans he rescued in November and some others into slavery at his end of the island. A court of inquiry determined that under Spanish law, the slaves could not be freed without the presence of Arguelles in court to certify what had happened. Therefore, the Audiencía de la Habana asked Captain General Dulce to effect Arguelles's return to Cuba for this purpose and to be prosecuted.[15]

Dulce asked Vice-Consul Savage on March 27 for the man's extradition from New York after explaining the circumstances involved. He stated that one hundred and forty-one Africans had been sold into bondage. Savage pointed out to him that no extradition treaty existed between Spain and the United States but that he would write Seward for instructions. García Tassara, soon after, also learned of the case and made a similar request to Seward. In mid-April, the State Department notified Savage that Dulce could send an officer to New York to pick up Arguelles for return to Havana. In the meanwhile, the police in New York arrested the colonial official. Dulce wasted no time in agreeing to this procedure, quickly writing García Tassara to thank Seward for his cooperation. On May 19, Arguelles arrived in Havana in the custody of one Cuban official and two United States marshals. At the same time, political opponents of Lincoln's administration in the United States, having learned of the story, began criticizing the government for violating the law since no extradition treaty existed. The case received sufficient publicity that, by the end of the month, the Senate felt it necessary to ask for the correspondence regarding the case. In complying, Seward suggested to Lincoln that the justification for the return should be the nation's duty not to provide asylum for "offenders against the human race." [16]

Under Congressional pressure, Seward decided publicly to justify the action rather than hide it. He wrote to James F. Wilson, chairman of the House committee on the judiciary, in late June, that as a result of the return of Arguelles, eighty-six slaves already had been freed. Seward went on to defend the return in humanitarian terms. Along with this note went a lengthy legal brief submitted to the Congress. This stated that both Spain and the United States realized no extradition treaty existed but that the return represented standard procedure in such circumstances. Instances since the founding of the

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[13] García Tassara to Seward, June 5, 1863, US/notes/Sp/19; *FRUS (1863)* **2**: pp. 907–909, 915–917; Min. of St. to García Tassara, September 9, 1863, Sp/pol/USA/2407.

[14] García Tassara to Seward in a series, September 24, 1863, August 6, 1864, December 15, 1865, US/notes/Sp/19, 20, 21; other complaints emerged from Pensacola, Florida, *Ibid.*/19; for later notes, Sp/pol/USA/2412, 2413.

[15] Joaquín Boxo de Abaigar, *Domingo Dulce, general isabelino, vida y epoca* (Barcelona, 1962), pp. 396–399.

[16] Savage to Seward, No. 136, March 27, 1864, US/desp/Havana/47; Savage to Seward, No. 142, April 28, 1864, *Ibid.*; *FRUS (1864)* **4**: pp. 69–72, quote on pp. 68–69.

republic had set precedents for extradition in criminal cases. After citing numerous British and American examples, Seward argued that Dulce asked for extradition as a favor rather than as a right although quite aware that the experience with the *Blasco de Garay* in New Orleans had recently reinforced Spanish and American beliefs that "asylum ought not to serve to give impunity to those guilty of ordinary crimes." The decision, therefore, rested "upon the conscience of the nation."[17] Soon after, congressional protests subsided as quickly as they had grown.

In 1865, a Cuban court found Arguelles guilty of "stealing negroes" and falsifying reports. The court sentenced him to nineteen years on the chain and imposed a heavy fine. His co-conspirators received lesser sentences at the same time. The evidence clearly proved Arguelles sold slaves. More important, his crime provided Seward with an opportunity to make a friendly gesture to Spain at a time when relations were still rather stiff because of war-oriented problems. The manner in which both governments treated the Arguelles case also indicated that the tensions created by the war were at last declining even if only to a small degree.

The disruption of trade relations between the two nations provided the third and by far the most significant of the non-military or diplomatic problems to develop during the Civil War. Although not usually a topic of concern to diplomats and soldiers during a civil war, economic conditions were profoundly affected by foreign policies and military affairs. Blockades, naval incidents, and neutrality laws discouraged trade by confusing and frightening merchants. Opening the port of New Orleans in 1862 only hinted at the complex influence of the Civil War on commerce.

Historians agree that the Civil War profoundly influenced Spain's economy as it did in France and Britain. Juan Sardá blamed the rise in Spanish prices for all products largely on the conflict since the quantity of basic imports, such as grains and cotton from the United States, declined. Another scholar repeated this argument, explaining that with a decline in trade, unemployment and prices increased; this led to political agitation, especially in Catalonia, which in turn helped create the domestic unrest experienced by Spain in 1866. Some Spaniards foresaw this trend of events in 1861. For example, *La Epoca* predicted at the start of the Civil War that the United States would divide into approximately three governments, forcing Europeans to restructure their trade relations with the North Americans.[18]

Commerce between the two countries had been healthy before the Civil War despite international crises in 1857 and 1859. In 1861, Spain purchased goods and produce from the United States valued at over 145 million reales. In 1862 this volume dropped by two-thirds and only slightly increased in 1863 and 1864. Exports to the United States proved more stable because these sales were mainly to the North in Spanish bottoms where ports were not closed. Also Confederates did not prey on Spanish shipping. The cut in imports to Spain can be largely attributed to the decline in the supplies of cotton, grain, and lumber either because these came from the South (cotton and lumber) or were needed for the Union's war effort (grains). Spain purchased cotton, tobacco, staves, grains, and wood products as well as some machinery from the United States. In return, she sold wines, iron, fruits, vegetables, licorice, and cork. The nature of these sales suggested the Civil War's impact. Spain sold nonessential items to the United States which, if cut off, would not profoundly affect the American economy or more specifically, employment. The reverse, however, was not true because cotton and wood sales provided jobs in Spain for workers in the textile and wine industries.[19]

The reduced trade caused by the Civil War can also be measured by the products themselves. Through the 1850s, tobacco exports to Spain increased steadily. In fact, between 1855 and 1861, these sales tripled in volume. In 1861, they declined by fifty per cent, stabilizing at a value of about thirty-five million reales for the entire period of the war. Cotton showed a similar pattern of decline. By 1860, over 127 million reales' worth came to Spain. In 1861, this dropped by over twenty-seven million. In 1862, Spanish purchases from all world-wide sources amounted to only one per cent of the previous year's and in 1863, to two per cent of 1861's sales. Only slight increases came in 1864 and 1865. Staves for wine barrels averaged at over five million reales per year in the 1850s while in the 1860s sales increased, proving to be the only major exception to an otherwise dismal trade pattern. No accurate figures exist for grain sales; however, cereal business had been better before the Civil War.[20]

The reverse traffic indicated a more complex and less uniform story. Spanish wine sales to the United States in the 1850s fluctuated from over thirteen million reales' worth in 1855 to eleven million in 1860. In 1861, a sharp decline brought sales down to little over two and a half million, which then rose to five million reales, far below figures for the 1850s despite price increases. Fruit and vegetable sales were cut

[17] *Frus(1864)* 4: pp. 35–36, brief reprinted in pp. 73–86, quotes from p. 83.

[18] Juan Sardá, *La política monetaria y las fluctuaciones de la economía española en el siglo XIX* (Barcelona, 1970), pp. 144–145, 311, 320; Herr, *Spain*, p. 104; *La Epoca*, March 7, 1861, p. 3.

[19] Data drawn from the annual *Cuadro general del comercio exterior de España* for the years 1855–1868, *passim*.

[20] *Ibid.*

almost in half during the same years. Licorice exports fluctuated drastically in the 1850s with sales almost disappearing in 1861 and only achieving about half that of the 1850s in the period 1862–1865.[21]

The economic policies of both nations also were influential. In the United States, tariffs went up during the Civil War because the government needed extra revenues to finance military operations. Hence the Morrill Tariff of 1861 soon became only one of many revenue acts adopted by the Congress—all of which tended to discourage reciprocal trade. Imports reflected the influence of these tax laws. For example, all imports in 1860 generated over $73 million despite almost monthly increases in the tariff rate. The American consul at Málaga did not exaggerate, then, when he commented in 1862 that commerce declined "owing to the unsettled state of affairs in the United States." [22]

The war economy in the United States did not reflect Spain's situation where different conditions prevailed. An important Spanish economic historian, Jaime Vicens Vives, called the 1850s and early 1860s boom years. Characterized by an increase in money, credit, and investments in Spanish trade and industry, the nation's foreign trade increased during these years. From 1855 to 1860 the volume index was 66.54 while in the next five years it rose to 83.63. In terms of reales, Spanish exports in the 1850s generally averaged over one million and throughout the Civil War, continued to increase. Imports for the same years remained fairly consistent in value and always greater than exports with the exception of the crisis year 1857. Spanish tariffs also remained high on American products, reflecting the same problems the United States faced in the 1850s in attempting to expand trade relations with Cuba while protecting home industries.[23]

Dispatches from the American minister and his consuls in Spain preserved the specific details of how the Civil War influenced the foreign and domestic sides of Spain's economy. Seward wanted to prevent the reduction of trade that he anticipated the Civil War would cause by instructing Schurz to pick up negotiations on a commercial treaty begun by the Pierce administration. The secretary believed this was also necessary since Spain would respect the blockade at an expense to her foreign trade. Schurz visited Calderon Collantes on September 4 to renew these talks. The foreign minister, however, preferred to leave the subject in abeyance for the time being; no doubt, waiting to see how the Civil War would progress. Even Spanish press reports concerning the negative influence of the fighting on the nation's economy did not deter Calderon Collantes from his position.[24]

One of the Confederacy's diplomatic objectives in 1862 involved the negotiation of commercial treaties with Great Britain, France, and Spain as a means of eliminating the current blockade. This goal failed to influence Spain since she refused to have formal relations with the Confederacy. The blockade and military engagements on the land interrupted trade between Spain and the South. Seward told García Tassara in the fall of 1861 that the United States could not allow Europeans to collect goods purchased from the South prior to the start of the Civil War. However, as southern ports were opened later in the war, Spanish merchants could again do business with this part of the United States.[25]

By 1863 the decline in trade became obvious to officials in the legation. Koerner wrote Seward that "our trade is falling off somewhat" and "were it not for our troubles at home, and our own somewhat high tariff, there is no doubt, that we might conclude a favorable treaty now." To increase commerce Perry suggested that building materials might be exported to Spain since a great demand for these existed. Yet Koerner continued attributing a loss of trade to fears of Confederate raiders.[26]

The American consul in Santander reported a sharp decline in ship arrivals from the United States during the war years. The amount of cotton decreased while the price for what little existed doubled by 1862. In October he noted that one local factory employing about three hundred people working with American cotton now used linen in order to allow its employees to continue earning their livelihood. He reported in 1863 and again in 1864 that no American ships called at this port.[27]

The Bilbao consular records provided more details about this economically active area than the files on Santander did on its own region. Consul Evans recommended in 1862, for example, that Americans

[21] *Ibid.*

[22] John D. Goss, *The History of Tariff Administration in the United States* (New York, 1968), pp. 56–63; F. W. Taussig, *The Tariff History of the United States* (New York, 1964), pp. 155–160; Edward Stanwood, *American Tariff Controversies in the Nineteenth Century* (New York, 1967), 2: p. 132; Hancock to Seward, No. 2, undated (1862), US/desp/Malaga/7; same message in his No. 8, June 30, 1862, No. 22, September 30, 1862, No. 5, January 10, 1863, *Ibid.*

[23] Jaime Vicens Vives, *An Economic History of Spain* (Princeton, 1969), pp. 742–743; figures from *Cuadro general del comercio exterior de España*, pp. 1855–1865, *passim*; Volger to Cass, February 27, 1860, US/desp/Barcelona/5.

[24] Seward to Schurz, No. 20, August 14, 1861, US/inst/Sp/15; Schurz to Seward, No. 14, September 5, 1861, US/desp/Sp/43; *La Correspondencia*, September 26, 1861, p. 1.

[25] Seward to García Tassara, September 2, 1861, US/notes to foreign legations/86; Seward to García Tassara, August 9, 1862, *Ibid.*

[26] Koerner to Seward, No. 42, May 18, 1863, US/desp/Sp/45; Perry to Seward, No. 107, August 11, 1863, *Ibid.*; Koerner to Seward, February 15, 1863, *Ibid.*/46.

[27] Hannah to Seward in a series, June 30, 1862, October 25, 1862, December 22, 1862, November 7, 1864, US/desp/ Santander/1.

sell agricultural implements in Spain rather than compete with the Scandinavians in fish sales as in the past because fewer hulls would be needed for transporting agricultural equipment for the same amount of profit that the displaced fishing would have provided while reducing the risk of Confederate raiders seizing ships. From July 1 through September, 1863, not one American vessel called at Bilbao where before the war many would have come. He noted that by 1863, Bilbao's trade with most European countries steadily increased while that with the United States declined. In that year Bilbao's commerce with the Union only amounted to $33,200. Hams and petroleum accounted for the bulk of this sum. In 1864 traffic from the United States consisted of one ship. This state of affairs prevailed even though a demand existed for unavailable cotton.[28]

Cádiz, always considered an important port in commercial relations with the United States, experienced a similar decline in trade. In 1857 the United States provided the city with more business than any other country except France. Bread-stuffs dominated this pre-war trade while staves constituted another major item. Cotton hardly ever came to Cádiz since it could not be cheaply transported by land across to the textile mills in Catalonia. "Consequently flour and staves have been the basis of our trade with the district of Cádiz." A decline in this became noticeable by the fall of 1861 "owing to the rebellion in the Southern States." What commerce existed only involved the North. However, by the end of the Civil War trade relations with the city continued to be low. The Consul noted that no American citizen conducted business in his district. Before the Civil War several owned trading companies there. He reported that the large demand for staves continued and by the end of the year commented on the introduction and popularity of the American sewing machine.[29]

Barcelona had always been a major port of call for American traders throughout the nineteenth century because of its size, industrialized economy, and need for cotton. In pre-Civil War days American trade with this city reached considerable proportions because Barcelona dominated the cotton commerce. For example, in 1858 about 89,000 bales of the American fiber arrived at this city. In the same year a total of 104,058 bales came to all Spanish ports. Other items, including breadstuffs and tobacco, when combined with cotton, amounted to a twelve and a half million dollar business.[30]

The number of American trading vessels calling at the port also indicated the quantity of business. During the late 1850s about forty ships arrived from the North and South each year. By the fall of 1861 only Northern vessels traded with the city. Occasionally a Confederate ship would bring in a few bales of cotton; otherwise vessels from Boston and New York dominated by carrying coal, staves, planks, and manufactured products. In 1862 maritime traffic dropped dramatically. For example, between November and December, 1861, fourteen ships docked while in the following three months only eight came. This pattern continued unabated because between April and July only three visited and through September, 1862, an additional six. Despite local sympathies for the North, trade declined more than half by early 1862.[31] Barcelona, in other words, felt the economic impact of the Civil War like other Spanish cities. How much the city and its surrounding area suffered can best be measured by what happened to cotton.

Historians on both sides of the Atlantic have studied the effects of the lack of cotton on the economies and political life of Britain and France, suggesting a profound influence reflected in widespread unemployment and in political unrest. The cotton shortage, due to the blockade, caused serious economic problems in the Catalan region of Spain with the same effects as in other countries. Local labor unrest increased as cotton supplies dwindled. Among the key factors contributing to Catalan instability (which in turn created conditions conducive to revolts in 1866 and again in 1868) was rising unemployment in part due to the shortage of cotton. Therefore, the role cotton played in Spain significantly paralleled the Anglo-French experiences.

Cotton textile manufacturing in Catalonia dominated Spanish industrial development in the first half of the nineteenth century. As early as 1760 over ten thousand workers earned their living by processing cotton in the northeastern corner of Spain. This figure remained about the same until the 1840s when the Catalan textile industry began to expand with the installation of new steam-operated equipment. By the start of the Civil War, over 125,000 Spaniards depended on cotton for their livelihood. Spain by then had become the world's fourth largest producer of cotton products following Britain, France, and the United States. Cotton represented Spain's most important industry as well. The major supply of raw cotton for Spain came from the United States.

[28] Evans to Seward, October 1, 1862, US/desp/Bilbao/1; Quarterly Statement of Fees Received at the U.S. Consulate from the First Day of July to the 30th Day of September Inclusive, 1863, *Ibid.*; Annual Report of Trade, January–December, 1862, *Ibid.*; Annual Report of Trade, September 30, 1864, *Ibid.*; Evans to Seward, September 30, 1864, *Ibid.*; Commercial Report, September 30, 1865, *Ibid.*

[29] Tunstall to Cass, No. 14, November 7, 1857, US/desp/Cadiz/10; Smith to Seward, No. 3, October 2, 1861, *Ibid.*; Arrivals and Departures, October-December, 1861, *Ibid.*; Farrel to Seward, No. 32, June 6, 1866, *Ibid.*/11.

[30] Volger to Cass, February 2, 1855, US/desp/Barcelona/5.

[31] Extracted from quarterly reports of ship arrivals to Barcelona, *Ibid.*

Therefore, when the Civil War began, Catalonia's economy faced a serious threat. Prices for cotton went up, unemployment increased as supplies became short, smuggling from the South began, and government officials complained of increased insecurity experienced in the four Catalan provinces of Barcelona, Tarragona, Gerona, and Lérida.[32]

The quantity and price levels of cotton further indicated the industry's importance. Spain's imports fluctuated during the 1850s from a low of 17.1 thousand kilograms to 27.5 thousand per year. Starting in 1860 this figure dropped to 23.9 and in 1861, in anticipation of a shortage, purchases of available stocks increased to 26.5. Spanish cotton buyers in 1862 shared similar experiences with other merchants in Europe because purchases only amounted to a low 12.7 thousand kilograms. For the rest of the war years quantities were disappointingly low. Overall national purchases of cotton revealed a similar pattern, with 1862 representing the low year because of the blockade. The price index also indicated a steady rise in prices for available quantities throughout the period. Since a great deal of cotton was sold in 1861, a slight decline in prices occurred, but a sharp increase came in 1862. The price index showed specifically that in 1860 the figure was 94.2; in 1861, 92.2. The hard year following saw an upward swing to 100.2 and in 1863 a further rise to 179.2. The sharpest increase, however, came in 1864 with a jump to 303.1 and in 1865 to 351.8. Prices remained high for the last five years of the decade as well.[33]

Spanish consular records for the southern part of the United States confirmed the massive cotton trade with Spain. The ports of New Orleans, Charleston, Mobile, and Savannah were the debarkation points for cotton bound for Spain. Between the four of these cities, over 100,000 bales of cotton left for Spain each year before the Civil War. This traffic virtually came to a halt in all these ports during 1861–1865. New Orleans proved to be the one exception when in 1863 a few bales of cotton left for Europe but the quantities were so small that records were hardly kept. Recorded Southern cotton sales to Spain did not climb over the 100,000 mark again until 1870–1871 and then immediately dipped, indicating that, like in France and Britain, Spanish dealers already had begun finding alternative sources of cotton.[34]

The United States had encouraged cotton sales in the 1850s. For example, in 1858 the cotton tariff amounted to 20 per cent of value and in the next two years this went down to 19 per cent and in 1861 to 18.1 per cent. With the coming of the Civil War, more tariffs, and the blockade, the rate went up, virtually ending all sales for military rather than economic reasons. This pattern can be traced in dollar terms as well. The American counsel in Barcelona reported that cotton sales in 1856 in his district amounted to over $4,150,000. Consul Volger noted in 1860 that although Spanish tariffs on cotton brought to Spain in American hulls continued high (57 per cent as compared to 15.80 per cent in Spanish bottoms), textile manufacturers found a ready market for their expensive products made from the New World cotton. He also commented that this trade provided supplies for 1,075,414 cotton spindles and 37,600 looms.[35]

The Congressional act of July, 1861, forbidding all trade with the South significantly influenced Barcelona's supply. What little cotton came from the South had to be smuggled out. Consul Little commented in January, 1862, "since the general severity of cotton the duties charged upon that article have been discontinued." This attempt by the Spanish government to ease the shortage failed to prevent some factories from closing down while the Consul noted that others were "working on short time." Despite this shortage, French officials in 1861–1862 became jealous of Spain's ability to find some supplies which they believed came from Cuba. Consul Little noticed that Catalan buyers began to purchase cotton from Liverpool and Marseilles but only a small quantity from Havana. He discovered by the spring of 1862 that, despite the reduction in tariffs, suppliers were having difficulty finding cotton even when tapping world-wide sources. Cotton came to Barcelona during 1862 in quantities that reflected a fifty per cent reduction in comparison to previous years since the year's total amounted to about 50,000 bales. By the last months of 1862 all forms of American traffic had declined. The general diminution in commerce was reflected by the fact that only three ships came from the United States. For the whole year eighteen vessels called at the port—a sharp fall from pre-war days.[36]

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[32] José M. Tallada Pauli, *Historia de las finanzas españolas en el siglo XIX* (Madrid, 1946), p. 121; José M. Tallada Pauli, *Barcelona económica y financiera en el siglo XIX* (Barcelona, 1944), p. 36; Jaime Carrera Pujal, *La economía de Cataluña en el siglo XIX* (Barcelona, 1961), **1**: pp. 353–357; **3**: pp. 134–135.

[33] Catalan cotton figures listed in Juan Sardá, *La política monetaría y las fluctuaciones de la ecónomia española en el siglo XIX* (Madrid, 1948), pp. 347–349; national figures from *Cuadro general del comercio exterior de España*, 1855–1865; *passim*; Sardá, *La política monetaría* (1970 ed.), pp. 302–305.

[34] West Indies Import Export Account Book, manuscript collection No. 731, University of Georgia.

[35] Davis R. Dewey, *Financial History of the United States* (New York, 1939), pp. 262–263; Volger to Marcy, January 4, 1856, US/desp/Barcelona/4; Volger to Marcy, No. 17, July 28, 1860, *Ibid.*/5.

[36] Little to Seward, No. 6, January 6, 1862, US/desp/Barcelona/5; Lynn M. Case, *French Opinion on the United States and Mexico, 1860–1867. Extracts from the Reports of the Procureurs Generaux* (New York, 1936), pp. 53, 63–64, 127, 188, 206; Little to Seward, No. 16, April 5, 1862, US/desp/

In the first three months of 1863, no cotton came directly from the United States. Catalans purchased 23,569 bales from Liverpool, Marseilles, and Havana. In the second quarter, out of 27,025 bales coming into Barcelona, 391 arrived from Havana and again none from the United States. The consul reported that because the supply had slightly increased, unemployment correspondingly declined. In the period following a similar amount came to Barcelona of which 2,148 bales originated from Havana. Yet unemployment in the cotton industry continued and the small although steady supply which trickled in during the rest of the year from Havana, Liverpool, and Marseilles did little to improve the situation.[37]

As in previous years, cotton supplies were low in 1864. The quarterly trade reports from the consulate indicated that the amount of cotton, while not completely exhausted, did not meet local demands by any means. The American consulate at Port Mahon similarly reported that their "cotton mills are languishing." A new set of factors became apparent by 1864 as well because Little wrote Seward in August commenting that "the monetary and financial crisis from which the whole of Spain has been suffering during the last six months, together with the increase in smuggling, has again forced most of the cotton factories of Catalonia to cease work." He estimated that several thousand unemployed workers were growing politically militant. Local officials were apprehensive also, since these people probably would express their resentment against the government in some violent fashion.[38]

Jaime Vicens Vives wrote in his *Economic History of Spain* that the lack of American cotton by 1864 had caused a series of problems because it affected "other industrial groups: iron and steel, railways." He argued that by 1866 this economic unrest became converted into political turmoil. The government tried to avert this situation by granting the textile industry monopoly rights on sales to Cuba and Puerto Rico. This did little to change the fact that with no cotton to work with, cloth could not be produced in the quantities necessary to reduce unemployment. Consul Little reported a slight increase in supplies during the last six months of 1864, bringing the total quantity for the year from the United States to 84,746. Overall trade with the North remained low due to Confederate raiders and the economic crisis then affecting Catalonia.[39]

In recent years considerable historical debate has taken place regarding the role of cotton in labor problems in Britain and in France. This dialogue has led to several comments worth comparing briefly to the Spanish situation. In France and Britain, a lack of cotton was not as great a problem as its rise in cost, and people were encouraged to use less expensive wool and linen. In Spain, we saw that there was generally less cotton available which, with the rise in its price, created similar labor problems as in England and France. The high cost of bread in 1862 (poor wheat harvests in Europe during 1861) meant less money for clothes, so demand softened for cotton.[40]

The British and French governments faced more serious problems with labor and cotton than did Spain. The latter had fewer workers in the textile industry as a per cent of the total workforce than did either France or Britain. Second, the textile industry was concentrated in Barcelona, not in numerous locations. The French, for example, had major textile centers at Lille, Roubaix, Tourcoing, Normandy, and Alsace with nearly four times as many people dependent on cotton. Thus, unlike France or Britain, the Spanish government did not perceive the cotton famine to be as great a problem or influence on its diplomacy. The concern existed but to a lesser degree.

Workers in the textile industry in Barcelona and in surrounding towns, like their brethren in other countries, were painfully aware of the relationship of the Civil War to cotton and to their jobs. What little we know suggests that they desired an end of the conflict as soon as possible, yet placed a great deal of blame for the lack of cotton on the central government in Madrid. Already made militant by trade union activity and local Catalan nationalism, textile workers saw more to blame on Madrid than on problems in the New World. Issues involving favoritism to one side or another in the Civil War had little influence. The one exception was emancipation, however, which the ideologues of the labor movement strongly supported. Thus when President Lincoln publicly declared his intention to emancipate the slaves, the Union received much support from Spanish workers, blessings that cut across all industrial groups.[41]

Barcelona/5; Little to Seward, No. 26, July 28, 1862, *Ibid.*; Little to Seward, No. 34, October 11, 1862, *Ibid.*; Little to Seward, January 16, 1863, *Ibid.*; *Diario de Barcelona* confirmed increased unemployment due to cotton shortage, October 10, 1862, p. 1.

[37] Little to Seward in a series, No. 18, April 10, 1863, No. 27, July 13, 1863, October 13, 1863, No. 4, January 30, 1864, US/desp/Barcelona/5.

[38] Little to Seward, No. 60, April 11, 1864, and No. 69, October 1, 1864, *Ibid.*/6; Robinson to Seward, No. 44, May 31, 1864, US/desp/Port Mahon/4; Little to Seward, No. 65, August 16, 1864, US/desp/Barcelona/6.

[39] Vicens Vives, *An Economic History of Spain*, p. 742; Little to Seward, No. 78, January 16, 1865, US/desp/Barcelona/6.

[40] Case, *The United States and France*, pp. 56–57, 127–130, 158–189, 288–289; 295–296, 374–382.

[41] On labor see Josep Termes, *Anarquismo y sindicalismo en España: La primera International (1864–1881)* (Barcelona, 1972), *passim*; James W. Cortada, "Spanish Views on Abraham Lincoln, 1861–1865," *Lincoln Herald* **76**, No. 2 (1974): pp. 63–69.

One economic consideration during these years continued to be Spain's colonies, which affected the lives of all classes of Spanish citizens. Both Cuba and Puerto Rico served as channels for produce and goods to and from Europe from 1861 to 1865, as they did prior to the Civil War. In 1861 and 1862, the Spanish government lowered tariffs on breadstuffs entering into Cuba and Puerto Rico because of shortages there and in Spain. However, Schurz interpreted this as "the apparent disposition of the Spanish government to listen favorably to any dispositions for a change in the restrictive system of duties upon our commerce with their colonies." Spain wanted to continue Cuba's role as a market for Spanish goods and as a source of revenues. Perry predicted that Spain would be inclined to allow American trade with the colonies as a result. And as noted in the previous chapter, Confederate commerce with Cuba and Puerto Rico remained a factor in the South's economy.[42]

Some Confederate cotton, smuggled out through the blockade, went to Europe by way of Cuba, but without precise records it is next to impossible to determine how much of this was Confederate cotton and not Cuban grown. Along with cotton, large quantities of lumber from the North went to the colonies. Prior to the war, southern traders, especially from Mississippi and Kentucky, sold wood products to Cuba. As with other merchandise, trade drastically fell off at the start of the Civil War by almost half and remained at about that rate until after the fighting ended.[43] Although Cuba continued as Spain's most important colony, Puerto Rico also played an economic role in the Civil War.

Prior to 1861, lumber, food, and manufactured goods dominated American exports to Puerto Rico while the colonials sold sugar to the United States. Trade at no time approached the volume handled by Cuba; however, this commerce proved important to Puerto Rico. One consular official wrote prior to the Civil War that "a large proportion of the provisions consumed in the island" came "directly from the United States." The volume of this trade in the mid-1850s averaged from about $350,000 to $500,000 and by the start of the war this figure had increased to over two million dollars. In short, the United States dominated Puerto Rico's import/export business, outselling and outbuying the Spanish who enjoyed tariff protection.[44]

Charles DeRonceray, the American consul at San Juan, reported a decline in business in early 1861, attributing it to the uncertainty about events in the United States rather than to any local problem. He also provided an interesting analysis of the island's economy:

> It has been well said that Spain, the mother country, might sink to the bottom of the sea without its affecting the prosperity or business of this island; but the large trade which has grown up between the United States and the West Indies, disturbs, from center to circumference, in a crisis like the present, all relations of a commercial character pending with these islands.[45]

However in 1862 and 1863, trade decreased for the same reasons as elsewhere—blockades and Confederate raiders. With the conclusion of the Civil War the colonies, Spain, and the United States unsuccessfully attempted to restore their old trade patterns. The decline in cotton cultivation in the United States which led to production in other parts of the world, the further industrialization of the North, the economic difficulties in Spain, and political unrest both in the mother country and in the colonies early suggested that new patterns would have to develop in the late 1860s.

The problem of war-oriented abuses of Spanish rights and properties, unscrupulous individuals taking advantage of unusual circumstances to turn profits, and disrupted trade relations all contributed important economic consequences to both Spain and the United States. Separate incidents such as General Butler's treatment of Spanish citizens or the Arguelles case individually were of relative unimportance despite the attention they received. When combined as parts of larger problems—economic and social disturbances—into a single issue, one is faced with the conclusion that along with neutrality diplomacy and maritime incidents, economic questions drew the attention of Spanish and American officials.

Unlike the first two problems of the Civil War, commercial factors had a wider circle of influence involving, among others, hundreds of ship owners and their suppliers, customers on two continents, and the thousands of workers left unemployed in Spain by a lack of healthy trade relations between their country and the United States. More than just adding to a tradition of diplomatic conflict, such problems significantly influenced the course of domestic history in Spain, Cuba, and, to a lesser degree, the United States. Events sped up in Cuba and Spain to the point where, as Professor Raymond Carr wrote, "a nucleus of enthusiasts" was "ready to make a revolution."[46] It is the Cuban facet of this crisis and the roles of the United States and Spain that must next be examined.

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[42] *FRUS(1861)* 1: pp. 253–254, 248–249.

[43] Shufeld to Seward, No. 26, February 24, 1862, US/desp/Havana/45; James E. Defebaugh, *History of the Lumber Industry of America* (Chicago, 1906–1907), 1, pp. 543–544.

[44] Arrival and Departure reports, 1855, US/desp/San Juan/6; Latimer to Marcy, No. 135, April 8, 1856, *Ibid.*; DeRonceray to Cass in a series, No. 17, July 29, 1859, No. 7, January 16, 1860, *Ibid.*; *Balanza mercantil de la isla de Puerto Rico correspondente al año de 1860* (San Juan, 1861), *passim.*

[45] DeRonceray to Black, No. 1, January 1, 1961, US/desp/San Juán/8.

[46] Carr, *Spain*, p. 295.

IX. CUBA IN TRANSITION

During the 1860s relations between Spain and the United States became more complex. The Civil War, political instability in Spain, the slave crises in the colonies and in the United States, combined with internal Cuban problems, made the island's history difficult to understand. Despite the widely held belief that these two nations concentrated their attentions on other matters, such as Santo Domingo, Mexico, and the Civil War, to the virtual exclusion of Cuban issues, the colony continued to be a point of contention between them. Maritime incidents, some sympathy for the South, the economic impact of the Civil War, emancipation and, after 1865, the old geo-political issues of manifest destiny and Cuban independence all contributed toward making Spanish and American concern for Cuba even more pronounced than had been the case in the closing years of the previous decade. Thus the role of Cuba in Spanish-American relations during the Civil War must be put into context.

Americans held emphatic views on Cuba at the start of the Civil War. For example, in 1858 when debating with Stephen A. Douglas, Lincoln raised the issue by acknowledging that Cuba someday would become part of the Union. He explained that when this occurred, the island should have the right to determine its own destiny. In the period following as Lincoln moved closer toward his presidential campaign, it became obvious that the Republicans would not include Cuba's acquisition as a party plank. The division of the Union into two halves led many people to think that if acquired now as a slave state, Cuba could be used to preserve the Union. Lincoln disagreed, arguing that this was no solution, since the South would then make other demands.[1]

When he assumed the presidency in the spring of 1861, Lincoln determined not to push for the seizure of Cuba. As long as Spain prevented anyone from using the island as a base of operations against the United States, he saw no reason to concern himself with taking it. While the president wanted the abolition of Cuban slavery (especially after he issued his emancipation proclamation) he could do nothing directly to force such a move since all the resources of the Union were needed for the Civil War. Further, it was not vital to the security of the United States for slavery to end or that Spain give up Cuba at that moment.[2]

Lincoln's representatives in Madrid and most of the public in the North agreed with his position. Schurz, for example, wrote in July, 1861, congratulating the administration for not advocating acquisition at that time. He took the opportunity, however, to predict that the island would eventually fall into American hands. In order to improve relations with Spain, he recommended that the Spaniards be told the United States did not entertain annexationist ideas. In 1862 Koerner arrived in Madrid reflecting the same views. He knew, after studying the legation's files, that Spain would not give up Cuba without a fight; consequently, while serving in Madrid, he never suggested the island be acquired. Americans, always critical of Spain's administration of the island, did not discuss annexation to the extent that they had in the 1850s. Instead, vague remarks about the island's poor conditions would be published in the press, but without any suggestions for new policies. For instance, Charles Creighton Hazewell, a widely read commentator on Spanish affairs, wrote in March, 1862, that "Spain walks in a circle, and she repeats the follies of her past with a pertinacity that would seem to indicate, that, while she has forgotten everything, she has learned nothing."[3] Such views failed to stir any sense of urgency for acquiring the island.

García Tassara, although always apprehensive about Washington's Cuban policy, soon concluded that Lincoln and Seward would not seize the island. In fact, while the various maritime incidents took place, the envoy hardly mentioned American imperialism in Cuba when writing to his foreign office. What little concern existed was always though of as an abstract possibility, never a reality. Also, the State Department told García Tassara and Schurz on many occasions that "This government neither has now, nor is likely to have, any schemes of conquest." García Tassara knew that no such plans would surface unless Cuba threatened the Union's security. If anything, he and officials in Madrid worried more about the economic impact of the Civil War since colonial administrators reported the steady withdrawal of American capital from the island in anticipation of problems growing out of a civil war. They believed economic complications might in turn increase unrest on the island. But the government could only wait and see how the Civil War would develop, study its effects on the colony, and act appropriately to counteract negative influences.[4]

In Cuba, the start of the Civil War caught the attention of all residents, for each knew he would be affected by this event. Also Cuba's relationship with Spain was changing. The Civil War increased the speed of this metamorphosis and even its nature because it encouraged Cuban revolutionaries to work harder for independence and influenced the island's

[1] Basler, *The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln* **3**: p. 115; **4**: p. 172.

[2] Langley, *The Cuban Policy of the United States*, pp. 54–55.

[3] Schurz to Seward, No. 3, July 18, 1861, US/desp/Sp/43; McCormack, *Memoirs of Gustave Koerner*, **2**: p. 287; quoted in Williams, *The Spanish Background of American Literature* **1**: p. 116.

[4] *FRUS (1861)*, **1**: p. 273; *La Iberia*, February 21, 1861, p. 3.

economy. The most significant factor to emerge from the Civil War was the slave question. The economic, political, and moral ramifications of this issue kept growing as a consequence of emancipation in the United States until it became the major topic of discussion relative to Cuba.

In most cases, economic considerations were the primary factors in determining an individual's attitude. Creole upper-class Cubans, abolitionists, and merchants importing manufactured goods, generally supported the North. The basis for their endorsement grew out of economic self-interests, from a realization that slavery no longer proved practical, or because of moral convictions. More conservative elements supported the South. This group was generally composed of *peninsularos* among whom were Spaniards, businessmen with close ties to Spain, and colonial officials who identified with and supported Spanish rule in Cuba. They believed that the South's independence would insure the continuance of slavery in Cuba while preventing the erosion of Spanish authority on the island. Many sugar planters wanted a Northern victory, however, in order to expand their trade at the expense of the South since the Union would initiate free trade—something sugar states like Louisiana long opposed. The decline of slavery in the United States would also strengthen arguments calling for its elimination in the colony and replacement with more efficient cheap labor. The captain general, Domingo Dulce, supposedly a member of the *peninsularo* camp, believed the time had arrived for a free labor market.[5] Cuban opinions, therefore, cut across all social and economic lines.

The Civil War obviously affected Cuba's economy. Normal trade relations with the South were disrupted and reduced despite Seward's torrent of protests to the contrary. In fact, Southern trade never reached pre-war levels. Seward complained about it, however, since he viewed this commerce as symbolic of Spain's attitude toward the United States. He felt that if Spain encouraged this trade, she might next consider recognizing the Confederacy. The withdrawal of American capital from investments in Cuba also signaled a decline in trade even with the North. The lack of these investment funds, for example, caused some Cuban railroads to merge in an attempt to lower operating costs. Southern maritime traffic declined as well. And although the American consulate in Havana reported that only Northern ships continued to come in any significant numbers by the spring of 1861, even this diminished as Confederate raiders began cruising off Cuba. The island's monetary system provided another instance of how the Civil War affected Cuba's economy. Closely linked to that of the United States, the colony's money supply and its purchasing power suffered with the suspension of specie payments by the North in late 1861, causing a small financial panic in Cuba by the start of 1862.[6]

Americans, Spaniards, and colonials watched with great interest as Cuba was affected by the Civil War. What they saw was often colored by confusion, mistrust, and the results of conflicts. *The National Intelligencer*, for instance, complained about Cuban assistance to the Confederacy in the fall of 1861. At the end of the year Archbishop Hughes, then in Europe, told Spanish bishops that the Confederates would try to seize Cuba if they won the war. In May, 1861, a Spanish naval officer ordered Union navy ships out of Cuban territory. The Americans said they had a right to patrol in the region. As a result, tensions increased in these waters. Both in Spain and Cuba, battle reports made popular reading along with accounts about the maritime cases. Savage wrote to the Department of State in May, 1862, that recent Union victories increased sympathy for the North in Havana, indicating local interest in the fighting.[7]

Concern about the Civil War continued to grow in 1862. One Spanish writer, Miguel Rodríguez Ferrer, published a book in which he cataloged various problems stemming from Spanish colonial policy. He mentioned the United States as a primary factor in Cuba warning that no matter who won the war, the United States (meaning both halves) could not resist annexing Cuba. He admitted that the island already was under the cultural and economic sway of the mainland. He also suggested that since the well-educated Cuban often went to school in the United States, American culture would seriously threaten Spain's in Cuban society. Rodríguez Ferrer blamed Madrid for this situation, lamenting the lack of better educational facilities on the island.[8]

Admiral Francis Dupont, of the Union navy, raised another issue in a letter to his wife by complaining about British aid to the Confederacy in Cuba. He specifically charged Joseph T. Crawford, the British consul general during the war years, of helping people like Charles Helm, the Confederate agent. At the same time that Dupont commented on Cuba, others were thinking about how to neutralize the island politically. Minister Harvey in Portugal, for example, suggested Spain be promised that Cuba would be left alone by the Union. Seward offered more practical

[5] Knight, *Slave Society in Cuba*, pp. 146–148.

[6] Arrivals and Departures, April-June, 1861, US/desp/Havana/41; Richardson, *Messages and Papers of the Confederacy* **2**: p. 152.

[7] *Daily National Intelligencer*, November 1, 1861, p. 3; Rena M. Andrews, "Archbishop Hughes and the Civil War" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1935), p. 166; *ORN*, Ser. 1, **20**: pp. 246–249; Savage to Seward, No. 60, May 16, 1862, US/desp/Havana/45.

[8] Miguel Rodríguez Ferrer, *Los nuevos peligros de Cuba* (Madrid, 1862), pp. 112–118, 303–304.

advice when he wrote Secretary Welles asking that he study the jurisdictional problem of Cuban waters in order to increase Union naval efficiency off Florida.[9]

By the end of 1862, the Civil War had become part of Cuban life. The island's economy suffered although sugar planters still anticipated increased sales, since Louisiana, their largest competitor, could not market her crop in the North. But this optimism did not hide the fact that Spanish government would need to restructure her economic policies in the colony. In fact, *La Iberia* bluntly suggested this in January, citing previous monetary crises between Cuba and the United States.[10]

Seward worried about Confederate affairs in Cuba which in turn caused increased tensions with Spain while irritating Captain General Dulce. The British were always apprehensive about what might happen in Cuba. The South's activities in the Caribbean significantly affected the island's role in the Civil War since her Cuban policies concerned so many governments. Cuba served as a source of supplies and information for the South. The island became a way station for mail and agents bound to and from Europe. Indicative of the extent of Southern usage of Cuban facilities in the early days of the Civil War, over one hundred ships of Confederate registry docked in the colony's port during 1862. Shufeld reported in April, 1862, "that the Confederate Government or some of its leaders, are shipping cotton to this port." He complained that Charles Helm, their local agent and an ex-consul of the United States in Havana, moved about freely among his many Cuban friends. Shufeld also said that Helm had accumulated over 4,000 bales of cotton in Havana by April for an emergency Confederate fund. In June Americans discovered that Cuban businessmen were buying shares in blockade runners. At the end of the year the *New York Times* reported that Pierre Soulé visited Cuba where the public warmly greeted him as Don Pedro.[11]

This pattern of communication between the South and Cuba continued throughout the war years. Captain General Dulce permitted it despite the maritime incidents that consequently occurred. Americans kept observing the sale of war supplies to the South, usually in exchange for small quantities of cotton. Helm wrote in June, 1863, that "the trade between this and the Confederate States has greatly increased of late, and with two exceptions our steamers have been successful." In fact, one group of merchants considered starting regular steamer communications between Mobile and Havana in October. The British also reported an increase in their trade with Cuba due to reduced Northern commerce and to the potential Southern market. Although between July and November, 1864, only 193 bales of cotton arrived in Cuba from the South, British merchants hoped to increase this commerce.[12] Yet if the cotton traffic had been heavy in the first two years of the war, the blockade obviously reduced it by mid-1864. Contradictory evidence makes it difficult to determine exactly how extensive this trade became or its impact on the Cuban economy. One could safely conclude, however, that American consular personnel probably exaggerated the volume of commerce with the South since the Civil War had a negative effect on the Cuban economy.

The possibility of one side or the other seizing Cuba from Spain at some future date never escaped American or Spanish officials. Although Madrid allowed Cuban facilities to be used by the Confederacy in order to develop a tradition of friendly relations in case Richmond won the Civil War, authorities remained concerned. *La Regeneración* spoke for many in 1864 by editorializing, "it is known that the South desires to seize Cuba and will do everything to increase the spirit of sedition." Unofficial Southern expressions confirmed this view. For example, in 1863 a pamphleteer said Cuba someday would be the "key" to a Confederate empire. Both Southern and Northern diplomats realized Cuba served as a bargaining tool. It would be possible, hypothetically, for Seward to advocate its seizure to prevent the expansion of slavery while the South could occupy the island for its extension. Either way, Spain's hold on the colony appeared threatened. Therefore, she decided to strike a balance between both factions with a friendly policy characterized by uncommitted inertia.[13]

In an attempt to instill confidence in the Spanish regarding Cuba, Seward proposed sending Perry to Havana as consul general in 1863. Shufeld would be removed since the Spanish government suspected him of being partially responsible for the *Blanche* affair. They felt he had encouraged Captain Hunter to seize

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[9] Samuel F. Dupont, *Samuel Francis Dupont, A Selection of His Civil War Letters* (Ithaca, 1969), **2**: p. 47; Harvey to Seward, "Private," May 26, 1862, US/desp/Portugal/20; *ORN*, Ser. 1, **20**: p. 250.

[10] *New York Times*, December 24, 1862, p. 2; *La Iberia*, January 31, 1863, p. 3.

[11] Lawrence L. Shenfield, *Confederate States of America; The Special Postal Routes* (New York, 1961), pp. 51–62; Owsley, *King Cotton Diplomacy*, pp. 259–261, 276–277, 279–282; Shufeld to Seward, No. 54, April 21, 1862, US/desp/Havana/45; *ORN*, Ser. 1, **2**: pp. 254–256; *New York Times*, December 24, 1862, p. 2; James W. Cortada, "Charles J. Helm, Cuba and the Confederacy," *The Journal of the Southern Confederacy* **2**, No. 2 (1972): pp. 12–32.

[12] *OR*, Ser. 4, **2**: pp. 980–981; Crawford to Russell, No. 64, December 31, 1863, F072/1071.

[13] *La Regeneración*, March 10, 1864, p. 3; Henry St. Paul, *Our Home and Foreign Policy* (Mobile, November, 1863), p. 34; Crampton reported that Spanish officials believed the U.S. was helping to foment unrest in the colonies, Crampton to Russell, No. 142, October 19, 1863, F072/1062.

the ship, thereby totally disrespecting their rights. Furthermore, he constantly criticized the captain general, proving to be an irritant to the colonial government. On the other hand, Perry was believed to be friendly toward Spain and respected her right to control Cuba. He had a Spanish wife and officials remembered how he tried to thwart Soulé's efforts to seize the colony. Perry's appointment never went through because he chose not to accept it. However, since the Union began to win a series of victories on the battlefield by this time, the consulate in Havana declined in importance.[14]

The question of Cuba's role in world politics continued to receive attention. Thinking of the day when the Civil War would end, the Spanish suggested to the British in October that a multi-national guarantee be made for each other's possessions in the New World against possible American aggression. The arguments used were the same ones employed in the 1850s. Miraflores still believed the United States wanted to dominate all of Latin America and he hoped to prevent this by means of a written guarantee. As usual, the British avoided such a commitment.[15]

By mid-1863 tensions increased in Cuba itself. The captain general's staff received conflicting stories about Cuban revolutionary activity allegedly sponsored by Dominican agents. Dulce held back in Cuba 5,000 troops destined for use in Santo Domingo just in case these reports were true. Another reason for keeping the men was the persistent suspicion that the United States might be involved in clandestine affairs on the island. Signs of anti-American hostility within the government soon appeared. In July, 1864, colonial authorities temporarily shut down a pro-American newspaper, *El Siglo*, although within weeks its owners were publishing again. Since the paper represented both anti-Spanish and pro-Union sentiments, its seizure caused the American consulate to worry about other possible moves. Then in August came the order forbidding American warships from communicating with the consulate without first docking in port. With both governments nervous about Cuban affairs, Savage accused the British consul of helping the South again. Sensitive about this criticism, since the Americans always found fault with him, Crawford denied the charge.[16]

With the end of the Civil War, both governments faced problems such as escaping Confederates and the handling of their property in Cuba. Judah P. Benjamin arrived in Havana for a short visit before going to London. In April rumors spread that President Davis and his cabinet would come to Cuba. Many lesser known Confederates came and were warmly greeted by Cuban officials. For example, the Captain General sent a special train to pick up Breckinridge, and the ex-Confederate Secretary of State, Robert Toombs, also visited before going on to France. The new American consul general, William T. Minor, who arrived in December, 1864, worried about Southern property. He began legal proceedings to take possession of ships, goods, houses, and some money belonging to Confederates. For legal reasons this proved difficult since a few Cubans registered debt claims against the properties. Some question also arose about the consulate's right to seize such property under international law. In August, 1865, Seward asked García Tassara to begin legal action for its condemnation in Cuba, which eventually led to the confiscation of many of these assets and their release to Union officials.[17]

In April, 1865, Lincoln's private secretary, John G. Nicolay, visited Cuba for a vacation, his trip causing more than just idle curiosity since he was expected, no doubt, to report his impressions to the American government. Shortly thereafter, García Tassara went to see Seward about Cuba and he was assured that the United States did not plan to free Cuba's slaves or seize the colony. But García Tassara was doubtful because he had recently heard from the captain general that his officers had uncovered a conspiracy originating out of New York—shades of the 1850s! [18]

Trade relations between Cuba and the United States also increased concern at the end of the war. García Tassara, for example, received numerous requests for permission to build telegraph lines between the island and the United States. In August, 1866, the Spanish government issued a decree reducing all duties on American products going to Cuba in order to expand the importation of food and consumer products into the colony. The Spanish hoped to increase their popularity on the island while eliminating a possible point of friction with the United States—one which in the 1850s led some Americans to advocate Cuba's annexation. The Spanish foreign office pressured Perry on the possibility of a reciprocal tariff agreement leading to a general reduction in all such fees. Perry

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[14] Seward to Perry, April 24, 1863, US/inst/Sp/15.

[15] Crampton to Russell, No. 143, October 19, 1863, F072/1062.

[16] Savage to Seward in a series, No. 131, March 12, 1864, No. 177, July 2, 1864, No. 191, August 1, 1864, US/desp/Havana/47; Crawford to Russell, No. 26, September 24, 1864, F072/1088.

[17] *ORN*, Ser. 1, **16**: p. 324; Minor to Seward, No. 1, December 9, 1864, US/desp/Havana/47; Savage to Seward in a series, No. 110, June 28, 1865, No. 111, July 3, 1865, No. 133, August 26, 1865, No. 135, September 1, 1865, *Ibid.*/48; Seward to García Tassara, August 21, 1865, US/notes to foreign legations/87; García Tassara to Seward, August 22, 1865, US/notes/Sp/21; García Tassara to Seward, November 3, 1865, *Ibid.*

[18] Helen Nicolay, *Lincoln's Secretary: A Biography of John G. Nicolay* (New York, 1949), pp. 228–231; García Tassara to Min. of St. in a series, No. 98, May 30, 1865, No. 103, June 12, 1865, No. 104, June 12, 1865, Sp/pol/USA/2408.

generally supported such measures and did so this time, but Seward preferred to wait since the United States, Spain, and Cuba were in political flux at the moment.[19]

In July, 1866, O'Donnell had formed a new ministry, and American officials were anxious to see what he would do next about Cuba. The reduction in duties appeared to be his first move toward improving relations. Perry reported that many members of his new cabinet acknowledged that the United States now dominated the New World militarily and politically. He said that in recognition of this fact, the government would soon begin an economic and administrative reform program for her colonies in order to reduce the chance of the United States finding excuses for seizing them.[20]

Seward's trip to Cuba at the start of 1866 may have eventually encouraged the Spanish to take a hard look at their colonial policies. García Tassara reported on December 28, 1865, that Seward briefly mentioned taking a cruise in the Caribbean, possibly stopping at Havana, for reasons of health. García Tassara commented that Seward would probably also visit the area to signal the French that Washington had not lost interest in Mexican affairs. The Foreign Office agreed with him arguing that the United States probably intended no connection between the trip and Cuban affairs. The Foreign Office knew Seward had been wounded when John Wilkes Booth assassinated Lincoln so that there was a legitimate reason for the voyage. Spanish diplomats also believed that with the end of the Civil War, Washington would pay more immediate attention to the French involvement in Mexico.[21]

Seward and his son Frederick (also an employee of the State Department) arrived in Havana on January 20 for a three-day visit. Captain General Dulce called on the Secretary of State while Cuban citizens turned out to see him. In short, the trip to Havana ran smoothly and free of incident. Seward also had visited Puerto Rico a few days earlier; however, the secretary's son found the Cuban portion of the trip more interesting. His account of the trip and the records of the Department of State did not suggest any Machiavellian motive for the voyage. Since the Spaniards also believed the trip had no political motive to Cuba, their interest in it soon subsided as domestic Spanish events became more important.[22]

Political developments in Spain began to influence Cuba directly during 1866. The failure of the Liberal Union to remain in power after February, 1863, led to a period during which governments changed in rapid succession. By 1863 the economy also began to run into trouble. It was marked by a decline in government revenues, an increase in the national debt, reduced investments, rising prices, and unemployment. The progressives could not participate in national politics (*retraimiento*) since the queen, fearing talk of revolution, refused to allow such a liberal element to take positions in the cabinet. General Prim soon began to plot with the *progresistas* against the monarchy. During 1865 the general worked in and out of Spain with his democratic and progressive allies and in June, 1866, attempted a military rebellion against the government which failed. He again left the country to organize another revolution which, in 1868, proved successful.[23]

The United States carefully watched Prim's activities. Not an unfamiliar figure to Americans since he led the Spanish expedition to Mexico in 1861 and briefly visited the North during the following year, he praised Union military might on numerous occasions. Prim found much in the American political system that pleased him. The *New York Times*, by now accustomed to reporting on the political instability in Spain, editorialized about Prim's latest revolutionary effort, hoping "that we shall not have to record the beginning of another era of confusion and disaster." By November, the paper predicted the *grand denouêment* of the monarchy followed by a period of confusion possibly leading to a brighter one under democracy.[24]

But Prim had left Spain to prepare for another revolution. John Bigelow, the American minister to Paris, wrote in a book during the 1880s that on October 1, 1866, at Biarritz, France, he talked to the Spanish Infante, who "proposed darkly to make Cuba the price to us for such assistance as the United States might render to the Spanish *emigrès* to overthrow the government." No mention had been made of this to Perry by Bigelow or the exiles because the Infante believed the wife of the legation's secretary would tell

[19] García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 109, June 20, 1866, *Ibid.*; García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 132, March 30, 1866, Sp/corr/USA/1472; Seward to Hale, No. 24, May 7, 1866, US/inst/Sp/15; Perry to Seward, September 4, 1866, US/desp/Sp/49.

[20] Perry to Seward, September 24, 1866, US/desp/Sp/49.

[21] García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 266, December 28, 1865, Sp/pol/USA/2409; Min. of St. to García Tassara, January 18, 1866, *Ibid.*

[22] Minor to Hunter, No. 161, January 25, 1866, US/desp/Havana/48; Frederick W. Seward, *Reminiscences of a War-Time Statesman and Diplomat, 1830–1915* (New York, 1916), pp. 278–283, 328–343; Min. of St. to García Tassara, March 3, 1866, Sp/pol/USA/2409.

[23] Carr, *Spain*, 290–299; Clara E. Lida, *Anarquismo y revolución en la España del XIX* (Madrid, 1972), pp. 82–109, 127–136.

[24] *New York Times*, January 28, 1866, p. 4, November 18, 1866, p. 4. For more details on Prim, see James W. Cortada, "A Spanish General and the Civil War," *Lincoln Herald* (Winter, 1977): pp. 142–146.

her close friend the queen. Bigelow suspected the Infante and Prim had discussed such a sale to the United States for about $3.5 million. In the same book he reported that he received a letter on October 25 from some unidentified Spaniard, postmarked Caronage, near Geneva, where Prim stayed, indicating that the general might be willing to sell the Spanish Antilles; but the minister did not believe such a deal could be concluded.[25]

Several other pieces of contradictory evidence exist to confuse the issue. If the story were true, Prim's patriotism could be questioned on the basis of Spanish standards, since most self-respecting individuals would never dream of selling their country's prize possession. The same applied to the Infante. Perhaps their need for money was such that they had considered such a drastic measure. The Spanish regime believed Bigelow maintained close ties with these revolutionaries. The French kept watch on Prim's activities outside of Spain because the secret police filed numerous reports on his correspondence and business. Yet, they failed to uncover any sale plot. Neither did the usually well-informed British ever receive a hint of such talks. Had either London or Paris heard about these negotiations, no doubt they would have become involved since such a sale could affect their position in the New World in the 1860s as it might have in the previous decade. None of Prim's biographers mentioned Bigelow or the proposed sale either. Also, Bigelow's dispatches to Seward never contained any comments about the island.[26]

Yet, there was one small piece of evidence to support Bigelow's story. The Spanish legation in Paris sent a report to their Foreign Office in August, 1866, stating that Bigelow had been mentioned in a letter from an unidentified source as negotiating during the same month with Prim. The dispatch from Paris could have pinned the date down more precisely than Bigelow since it was written closer in time to the supposed events. Faulty memory on Bigelow's part as to when he negotiated on Cuba cannot be accepted as an excuse for the discrepancies in dates, since, in fact, he visited Biarritz during October. This little French town also served as the traditional refugee center for ousted Spanish politicians. The Spanish letter, therefore, suggested the possibility that the American met with Prim at least once or with one of his agents. Be that as it may, the report stated that "the General needs money. If things go well in Spain, he promises to deliver (*entregar*) the island of Cuba to the American government."[27] This, no doubt, would have worried Madrid but for the fact that Cuba's delivery to the United States was predicated on Prim's attaining power—something no practical American diplomat could have gambled on when formulating policy.

Yet, these intrigues took place against a background of uncertainty. With the Civil War over, Spain did not know if the United States would turn away from her traditional desire for Cuba. There were also revolutionary movements in the colony to contend with. In April a Cuban group formed in New York, reminiscent to those of previous decades, for the purpose of fomenting revolution on the island. Within a few months some Americans were anticipating that a Cuban revolt would successfully shear the colony from Spain.[28] Therefore, rumors about Prim's Cuban moves were taken seriously by the Spanish along with reports of filibustering.

Madrid documented its concern for Cuban affairs when it transferred García Tassara back to Spain. His replacement, Fecundo Goñi, who served as minister from March 15, 1867, to March 19, 1869, could boast of considerable diplomatic experience in Costa Rica, Chile, Honduras, and El Salvador. As one of the government's most skillful mediators, he had resolved many Latin American and European problems during his active diplomatic career. The Foreign Office selected him for the post in Washington because Spain anticipated negotiating an end to her difficulties with Chile and Peru. As with previous envoys, the minister of state ordered him to observe Cuban developments and especially Washington's Caribbean policy, warning him about American filibusters. Goñi also was told that the United States would always take an anti-Spanish view in all controversies between Spain and Latin America.[29]

The government in Madrid decided to counteract anticipated American criticisms, of Spanish economic policies in Cuba by making foreign access to the colony's markets easier. Early in 1867, Foreign Minister Manuel Bermúdez de Castro promised Perry that Spain would cooperate in negotiating a trade agreement with the United States. In October, the Spanish unilaterally reduced tariffs on non-Spanish wheat brought into Puerto Rico. Earlier, Cuban ports had been thrown open to such commerce. In June, 1868, Spain issued another decree further expanding trading privileges in her colonies. Authorities, meanwhile, expressed hope that with each new law, the United States would reciprocate by reducing her duties on Spanish produce.[30]

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[25] John Bigelow, *France and the Confederate Navy 1862–1868. An International Episode* (New York, 1888), pp. 191–193.

[26] Villalba Hervás, *Recuerdos de cinco lustros*, p. 270; for the reports of the Ministère de l'Intérier, Fr/pol/Esp/868.

[27] Lema to Min. of St., No. 621, August 9, 1866, Isabel II Papers, legajo X, Real Academia de Historia.

[28] *New York Times*, July 10, 1866, p. 4.

[29] For biographical data on Goñi see *Daily National Intelligencer*, March 13, 1867, p. 2; Min. of St. to Goñi, February 8, 1867, Sp/corr/USA/1472.

[30] Bermúdez de Castro to Perry, February 26, 1867, Sumner Papers; *FRUS(1867)* 1: p. 540; Goñi to Seward, August 11, 1868, US/notes/Sp/23.

American diplomats knew Spain's government suffered from a growing debt and declining revenues. Madrid wanted to borrow $500 million which the United States could not agree to lend in 1867. Madrid then turned to France to negotiate this loan, offering future Cuban revenues as collateral. Perry worried over this turn of events yet remained confident that the United States would not let this situation slip by unnoticed. In a formal dispatch to the State Department, the American minister also reported that Spain wanted to borrow money, citing a figure of $57 million. He noted that negotiations were in progress with the French Credit Mobilier with Cuban revenues being offered as payment. However, he believed the loan was in trouble since war talk between France and Prussia made financiers cautious. Several weeks later Perry wrote "I am glad to inform you that the project on a mortgage of the revenues of the island of Cuba has been blocked for the present." But a change in government, he warned, could also mean renewed negotiations at another money market.[31]

In May Seward talked with the Spanish envoy about Cuba. He said that the colony would, "by means of constant gravitation, fall into the United States." Seward announced that his government had no objections to Cuba remaining under Spanish rule but that the president could not tolerate any other power obtaining her, commenting further that a Spanish move to pledge the island's income to France would not be acceptable to the American people. He added that should Spain need to consider such a move, prior discussions on the matter should take place with the State Department. Although his tone remained friendly, his message was clear.[32]

Soon after, Seward raised the subject of buying two small islands in the Caribbean for use as naval bases. The secretary asked George Bancroft, newly appointed minister to Prussia, to stop off in Madrid and discuss the issue. After arriving in Spain, the legation and Bancroft concluded Spaniards would be so hostile to such a proposal that they decided not even to raise the question. Spanish officials worried when they heard of these various American activities and plans since they directly threatened their interests in Cuba. Between Seward's comments about how the island inevitably would gravitate toward the United States and rumors of bases in the Caribbean, it appeared that the Americans still wanted to acquire the colony. Spaniards believed the United States would be willing to flex her strong military muscles and use diplomacy since, as *La Regeneración* pointed out, army officers now dominated American politics! Also Spain received evidence of American citizens quietly helping revolutionaries in Cuba and in Puerto Rico, possibly with Washington's blessings. Obviously then, Seward's plans were poorly coordinated and indicated that he failed to understand the mistrust Spain nurtured for his motives.[33]

Throughout the decade the subject which drew the greatest attention in Spain, Cuba, and the United States in regard to Spanish-American relations was not trade, maritime incidents, of the South's selected popularity in Havana. Rather, the most basic issue growing in importance as the decade became older, influencing views, policies, and actions was slavery. The Civil War obviously affected the issue. Abolitionist feelings on both sides of the Atlantic and in the realities of Cuban economics made the question an emotionally charged one. Discussed in political, economic, and moral terms, slavery became almost a greater issue than Spain's control of Cuba by the late 1860s. Indeed, the two questions were inseparable in influencing relations between the United States and Spain.

It would be difficult to understand the impact of the events of the Civil War on abolition or its timing without appreciating the fact that an antislavery movement had developed in Spain and in Cuba prior to 1861. Throughout the early decades of the 1800s the British had pressured Spain to curb the slave trade. This effort finally led to the passage in 1845 of a Spanish law detailing how the trade was to be reduced: captures, punishment of offenders, return of Africans to their homes. Although the law was not comprehensive, it did signal that the Spanish government was willing to reduce the trade. Opinions in Spain and Cuba on the subject of slavery simultaneously grew in political importance and increased during the 1850s. Planters and merchants usually supported slavery since the sugar industry depended on it. Intellectuals argued just as strongly for abolition. Such writers as José Antonio Saco (a Cuban Creole) and Ramón de la Sagra (Spanish *peninsularo*) argued that slavery was a social disgrace or economically an unproductive use of manpower.[34]

The decline of available slaves during subsequent years, as a direct result of the law and of vigorous efforts by some Spanish officials, intensified debate over abolition. Planters wanted access to more slaves while abolitionists pushed for a total ban. Various options for replenishing manpower by encouraging white immigration to Cuba, or discussion of importing blacks from Brazil or labor from Asia, did little to satisfy either camp. Illicit trade increased during the 1850s, generating stronger protests on the part of Cuban and Spanish liberals and abolitionists. The

[31] Perry to Weed, April 7, 1867, Seward Papers; *FRUS (1867)*, 1: pp. 525–526; Perry to Sumner, May 2, 1867, Sumner Papers.

[32] Portell Vilá, *Historia de Cuba en sus relaciones con los Estados Unidos y España* 2: pp. 190–191.

[33] Hale to Seward, No. 100, July 13, 1867, US/desp/Sp/50; *La Regeneración*, February 10, 1868, p. 2.

[34] Knight, *Slave Society in Cuba*, pp. 138–141; Corwin, *Spain and the Abolition of Slavery in Cuba*, pp. 80–90.

debate reached into the highest levels of politics and government administration during the two decades following 1845.

Tied to the anti-slavery movement was the delicate issue of the role of the United States and later of the Civil War. Abolitionists in the United States praised and encouraged the movement in Spain, Cuba, and Puerto Rico. The Spanish government always was convinced that the United States might use the issue to seize Cuba. While usually wishing to diffuse the issue, the government in Madrid was reluctant to appear as if compelled to act due to British or American threats, hence the slow pace with which it acted. Furthermore, there was always to be considered the obvious desire not to harm the economy of the colonies. Keep in mind that Spanish and Cuban abolitionists were not interested in becoming subjects of the United States because of the issue. In fact, for example, José Antonio Saco made it clear that he did not favor annexation to the United States. Thus earlier ideals of the 1840s on the part of some abolitionists in Cuba, that annexation to the United States would cause the abolition of slavery, had long gone by the board, particularly after they noted the suppression of Hispanic ways in Texas and California after the Mexican-American War. Annexation to the United States would simply have killed local nationalism and the Hispanic culture. Thus by the early 1850s, the movement in Spain and Cuba drew little nurture from the United States.[35] The occurrence of the Civil War in the United States came at a time when the anti-slavery movement had its own velocity. As we shall see below, the war simply encouraged a movement that was already active in the Hispanic community.

When Serrano became captain general of Cuba on November 24, 1859, he brought with him orders to consider reforms for the island, among which had to be the reduction and eventual elimination of slavery. His instructions specifically required him to reduce the flow of slaves into Cuba while increasing the supply of cheap, free labor. He also had to gain the approval and cooperation of the local Creoles for his administrative and economic reforms. Dulce, who became captain general in December, 1862, continued to slow this traffic although not too successfully, since an economy based on slavery could not be changed quickly. By the time the Civil War started, Cubans were discussing what forms abolition might take. As the fighting progressed and the effects of Lincoln's emancipation became better known, Cubans concluded that abolition by degrees spread over many years with compensation for the owners seemed preferable to the president's quick measures. Economics then, influenced Cuban thinking to the point where the majority believed in gradual abolition.[36]

The colonial government's intentions and events in the United States did not stop the slave trade. Anticipating a lack of slaves, should the North win the Civil War, some Cuban planters bought extra Africans. Even Arguelles found a ready market for the rapid sale of over a hundred of them. Planters also used their considerable influence in Spain to slow the government's plans for abolition. They did not hesitate to thwart the efforts of the captain generals either. Officials in Madrid suffered from pressures exerted by their representatives in Cuba as well. Serrano, for example, wrote to his government on June 30, 1862, warning that the Civil War had already caused such an increase in agitation for abolition that it could become another point of criticism against Spain's administration of the island. He recommended, therefore, that Madrid adopt some abolition plan quickly. He made an impression on the regime because when Dulce came to Havana he brought further instructions from Madrid to reduce slavery. Spain thought a Union victory would lead to increased abolitionism on the island and, hence, it would be better to take the initiative in such a delicate situation. If slavery continued, Washington would have a good excuse for intervening in Cuba. Consequently, more orders arrived in Havana in 1864 and 1865 to stop all trafficking in slaves and to increase the supply of free labor. By this time the colonial administration had started to do this by encouraging Oriental coolie-class laborers to live in Cuba.[37]

Similar thinking applied to policies in Spain and in Europe. Slavery provided some Spanish liberals with an excuse to call for reforms in Cuba, while others worried about the home government. Most politicians thought about the impact the Civil War might have on the island's security. For instance, the Spanish Foreign Office in 1862 expressed some interest in signing a slave treaty with Washington and London to create the image that Spain also urgently wanted abolition. Seward instructed Perry to assure the Spanish that Washington would not crush slavery all over the world. Yet during 1863 and 1864 the British and Americans continued to talk to the Spanish about a treaty to reduce slavery in Cuba; therefore, officials in Madrid did not believe Perry when he assured them that his government would not push for world-wide

[35] Foner, *A History of Cuba* **2**: pp. 14–19; Kinley J. Brauer, "The Slavery Problem in the Diplomacy of the American Civil War," *Pacific Historical Review* **46** (August, 1977): pp. 439–469.

[36] Corwin, *Spain and the Abolition of Slavery in Cuba*, pp. 129–151; Knight, *Slave Society in Cuba*, pp. 148–150.

[37] Serrano to O'Donnell, June 20, 1862, AHN/Ultramar/3547; Min. of War to Min. of the Colonies, July 11, 1865, *Ibid.*; Min. of War to Min. of the Colonies, July 11, 1865, *Ibid.*

abolition when in reality it appeared that this was exactly what Seward intended to do.[38]

Such discussions hardly included Puerto Rico specifically, although slavery existed there in smaller numbers than in Cuba. Moreover, the slave trade was unpopular in that colony. Authorities in San Juan enjoyed greater public support in reducing the slave trade in Puerto Rico than in Cuba. After about 1835 the island's demand for slaves declined sharply because her plantation economy could not compete with Cuba's where more money was available for the purchase of Africans. In fact, Cuba imported slaves from Puerto Rico in the 1850s. In 1864, the American consul at San Juan reported that no slaves had arrived on the island since 1859, subsequently commenting on several occasions that Captain General Felix M. de Messina totally prohibited the traffic into Puerto Rico.[39] Consequently, the Civil War hardly influenced Puerto Rico's abolition movement, which could survive without American help.

One might well ask at this point what were the role of the black abolitionists in the colonies and the effects of the Civil War on their thinking and activities. Less is known of their views and actions than for the Spanish, colonial, and Creole abolitionists. What is certain is that news of events in the United States slowly reached slaves in Cuba. Details about Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation and later total abolition, became available to various groups of slaves in Cuba, who, like their masters, clearly saw that slavery could not last for long on their island. Lincoln became a symbol of hope and freedom, possibly their actual liberator in their minds. His assassination in 1865 caused widespread sadness among Cuban and Puerto Rican slaves who felt that freedom was now farther away. One other comment can be made about the role of black abolitionism. Unlike the white abolitionists who were concerned with Cuban nationalism, black slaves in Cuba during the early 1860s showed less interest in the issue. It would not be until the second half of the decade and later during the 1870s that blacks would express significant concern regarding such issues as independence from Spain, the establishment of a Cuban government, or even about its political or social character.[40]

When the fighting ended in the United States, Cuba and Spain could no longer delay facing the issue of freedom for the slaves. A member of the Spanish Cortes explained that "the war in the United States is finished, and being finished, slavery in the whole American continent can be taken as finished. Is it possible to hold onto Spanish provinces while keeping this institution in the dominion?" He said no. Dulce wrote about the same time that "I do not think it is possible to continue slavery." He realized that in order to keep the United States out of the island, reforms had to be made soon. How to achieve abolition also concerned Spaniards. One Cuban expressed a widely held view: "Look at the example of the United States, a disastrous civil war was not necessary. A plan of gradual emancipation with compensation was possible and more intelligent." [41] Because Spaniards and Cubans alike generally wanted gradual abolition, discussion continued for many years. Also liberals generally believed only primitive countries continued to use slaves and with serious domestic problems facing Spain, the nation could not afford to be backward any longer.

Debates started again that spring in the Cortes. Serrano called for drastic changes in the colonial administration. José Modet said the question should be settled or Spain would face a disaster similar to what happened in the United States. Many abolition plans were then aired. In Cuba, the colonial government allowed open discussion of the issue. Besides the moral ramifications of the question, pro-American Cubans wanted abolition in order to draw closer to the United States while revamping Cuba's economy. Nationalists saw the controversy as an opportunity to push forward their claims for Cuban independence.[42]

In 1865, Antonio González de Mendoza, a Cuban lawyer, formed an abolition society which soon claimed a mixed membership of Creoles, *peninsularos*, reformers, and nationalists. Representing the moderate position, they advocated gradual abolition over a twenty-five year period. Cuban slave owners worried about their future as such organizations grew in strength. In 1866 another club formed in New York, named the Republican Society of Cuba and Puerto Rico, calling for independence from Spain. Pitted against these organizations were those conservatives who supported slavery and Spanish rule. Using one of Havana's largest newspapers, *El Diario de la Marina*, they ran a propaganda campaign against the abolitionists.[43]

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[38] For a brief survey of the movement in Spain, Corwin, *Spain and the Abolition of Slavery in Cuba*, pp. 153–171; *FRUS (1862)*, **1**: pp. 509–510; Seward to Perry, No. 7, September 3, 1863, US/inst/Sp/75; for this correspondence, *FRUS (1864)* **4**: pp. 4, 9–10, 60–65, 708.

[39] DeRonceray to Black, No. 33, August 22, 1860, US/desp/San Juan/7; Hyde to Seward in a series, No. 44, August 22, 1864, February 22, 1865, August 15, 1865, US/desp/San Juan/9.

[40] Portell Vilá, *Historia de Cuba en sus relaciones con los Estados Unidos y España* **2**: p. 171.

[41] Quote reprinted in Corwin, *Spain and the Abolition of Slavery in Cuba*, p. 153; Dulce's comment, Buxo de Abaigar, *Domingo Dulce*, p. 393; Cuban quote, Corwin, *Spain and the Abolition of Slavery in Cuba*, p. 149.

[42] *Diario, Congreso (1864–1865)* **3**: p. 1700; Portell Vilá, *Historia de Cuba en sus relaciones con los Estados Unidos y España*, **2**: pp. 175–177.

[43] Knight, *Slave Society in Cuba*, pp. 150–151.

García Tassara became irritated with Cuban activists in the United States and mainly with those Americans who busied themselves with Spain's colonial affairs. Although recognizing the urgency for reforming colonial administration, he publicly defended his country. For example, on February 23, 1865, Charles Sumner spoke in the Senate criticizing Spanish slavery. García Tassara objected to his comments but a year later the senator again made similar statements adding that Southern slaves were being sent to Cuba. García Tassara denied this, but informed Seward that the captain general would investigate these charges. Progress toward a resolution of slave issues seemed closer now because on November 25, 1865, the Spanish government had created a commission to recommend all types of colonial reforms.[44]

Soon after, O'Donnell again left office along with Cánovas del Castillo, who had also been interested in reforms while minister of the colonies. Narváez assumed power as the queen's chief minister and quickly appointed members to the commission who would support his views. Since he had serious doubts about many of the current reform proposals being aired in Madrid, nothing much came from the commission's efforts except an order to register slaves. The government decided not to abolish slavery fearing the damage such a move might have on the colonies. Instead, officials decided to wait. The Cortes passed a law in July, 1866, incorporating the commission's suggestion for registering slaves and adding stiffer punishments for trading in Africans. Done in part to please outspoken Cuban advocates of the measure, the regime also hoped to reduce the intense pressure that the British and Americans had put on Spain to begin abolition.[45]

But many problems remained. For example, in the spring of 1866, reports reached Washington about a ship having left New Orleans to pick up slaves at Pensacola, Florida, for delivery to Cuban planters. Spanish authorities in Havana and in Florida were alerted about this. The American government at the same time suggested to Spain that abolition be seriously considered, reassuring Madrid that the United States did not intend to interfere in Cuban affairs. Seward speculated that if Spain refused to abolish slavery then Latin America would use this as another excuse to band together against Madrid at a time when Spain was having difficulties with Chile and Peru. Spain responded to the effect that a commission was studying that possibility.[46]

By the following year, most Cubans and Spaniards believed emancipation should be gradual. The American legation reported that "although the government of Her Catholic Majesty may and undoubtedly will turn a deaf ear to all the representations of the colonies," Madrid knew "that the holders of slaves themselves in the islands are exceedingly sensitive in regard to everything coming from the United States on the subject." Many Spaniards had concluded then by the time of the Spanish revolution in 1868 that their slaves would inevitably be freed even though the abolition movement closely linked itself to political events in Cuba and in the mother country.[47]

The revolution in Spain during the fall of 1868 and the almost simultaneous outbreaks in the colonies temporarily eclipsed concern about slavery both in Europe and in the United States. The revolts drew Washington's attention because of their possible effects on relations with Spain and the colonies. While the legation in Madrid sent Seward data about the revolution which resulted in Isabel's overthrow, consular personnel in Puerto Rico and in Cuba also reported on unrest, no doubt giving some officials in Washington the impression that Spain and her empire were falling apart. In October, for example, a small group of Puerto Ricans attempted to establish a republic but authorities suppressed the movement by capturing most of its members. The colonial government then arrested about seven hundred people to prevent further troubles. By December Washington received news that Puerto Rico would enjoy the same privileges which the new government might extend to Spanish citizens. And some rumors about immediate emancipation circulated. Yet these disturbances in Puerto Rico never reached the serious proportions that they did in the other colony or in Spain.[48]

The Cuban situation became more volatile since the revolutionary forces were bigger, better organized, and cherished stronger feelings of nationalism than did the Puerto Ricans. Early in October, the consulate reported that the situation remained tense but quiet. The consul expected the captain general to remain loyal to Isabel but suspected that many members of his staff favored Prim's faction. The consul wrote on October 10 that "the slightest encouragement

[44] Charles Sumner, *Charles Sumner. His Complete Works* (New York, 1969), **12**: pp. 171–173; García Tassara to Seward, February 11, 1866, US/notes/Sp/21; Dulce to García Tassara, January 20, 1866, *Ibid.*; García Tassara to Seward, May 9, 1866, *Ibid.*; García Tassara to Seward, October 29, 1866, *Ibid.*

[45] Chadwick summarized the Commission's work, *The Relations of the United States and Spain*, pp. 276–284; for British policy, Christine Bolt, *The Anti-Slavery Movement and Reconstruction: A Study in Anglo-American Co-operation 1833–77* (London, 1969), pp. 54–141.

[46] *FRUS(1866)* **1**: pp. 574–575, 579–580, 615–617, 624; García Tassara to Pons, May 11, 1866, CCP.

[47] Quote in *FRUS(1867)* **1**: p. 527; Comas, *El mundo pintoresco*, pp. 354–365.

[48] Jourdon to Seward in a series, No. 91, October 4, 1868, No. 92, October 10, 1868, No. 96, October 19, 1868, No. 101, October 30, 1868, US/desp/San Juan/11; first official announcement of change in Spanish government, *Gazeta de Puerto Rico*, October 20, 1868, p. 1.

from our government to the people of Cuba at this juncture, would, in my opinion, forever sever its connection from Spain." A few days later, however, armed outbreaks marred the uncertain quiet despite pleas to the people from the captain general, Francisco Lersund, to remain peaceful. Ten days later the consul asked for instructions on how to deal with the anticipated declaration of independence. Local Americans feared for their safety and requested that a navy ship be sent to Havana. On November 6, the U.S.S. *Penobscot* arrived in case of trouble.[49]

What significance did the events of early and mid-October have on Spanish-American relations at the end of 1868? Consul Reintrie suggested that "the revolutionary movement in this island is not the result of the change which has taken place in Spain, it has been preparing for some time previous to that event," adding that it "quickened into life before its organizers could fully mature their plans." This fact suggested to some Spaniards that the United States might have been involved. The consul suggested later "that a very large majority of the people of Cuba are in favor of separation from Spain and would welcome annexation to the United States." But not all Americans hungered for annexation. The *New York Times* suggested, for example, that its readers should wish the new Spanish government success in reforming Cuba and in eliminating slavery.[50] With the formation of a new regime and in the anticipation of new policies for Cuba, Americans and Spaniards alike believed a new period in Spanish-American relations might begin. While historians consider 1868 a landmark date in Spanish history, it was also for Cuba's relationship with the United States and Spain.

The last few years of the 1860s saw yet another problem involving Spanish and American diplomats, namely Madrid's difficulties with Peru and Chile. This dragged on through the decade, threatening to destroy any good will that Spain had in Latin America. The possible consequences for Cuba were immense and well appreciated by Madrid and Washington. The emergence of these other Spanish difficulties, however, came too late to prevent the Cuban friction shared by Spain and the United States in the 1860s. Cuba, therefore, added in no small way to their continued mutual mistrust. The complexities arising out of their problems can also be seen in the way both nations viewed each other's attitudes toward Spain's war with Peru and Chile.

[49] Reintrie to Seward in a series, No. 100, October 6, 1868, quote in No. 102, October 10, 1868, No. 103, October 14, 1868, No. 107, October 24, 1868, No. 108, October 27, 1868 No. 110, November 7, 1868, US/desp/Havana/51.

[50] Reintrie to Seward, No. 110, November 7, 1868, *Ibid.*; Reintrie to Seward, No. 111, November 14, 1868, *Ibid.*; *New York Times*, November 18, 1868, p. 4.

X. WAR IN THE PACIFIC

Between 1864 and 1871, Spain was at war with Chile and Peru and had broken diplomatic relations with nine other Latin American governments. The episode proved to be the last major Spanish military intervention into Latin American affairs with the sole exception of the Spanish-American War in 1898. The war in the Pacific is of little consequence from a military point of view since no clear cut victor emerged from it. Rather, the significance of this conflict lies in its diplomacy since it illustrated the types of problems Spain faced in the New World with the United States., It offered a unique opportunity to switch their diplomatic conflict from the Caribbean solidly into South America, thereby exposing even further some of the basic elements of Spanish and American policies in that part of the world.

The first protagonists were Peru and Spain. They had never recognized each other diplomatically throughout the years following the Latin American revolutions against Spain. Both Peru and Spain were fiercely proud and politically unstable countries with mutual animosity for each other. Therefore, what informal contacts they had were generally unfriendly. Tensions increased in the late 1850s when Spanish settlers arrived in Peru with the original blessings of the government at Lima. Then came Spain's intervention into Santo Domingo and Mexico which irked the Peruvian public, making them suspect, like most South Americans, that Madrid might again expand her empire into their continent. Peru felt especially insecure about her freedom, since Spain had never officially recognized her independence.

At the same time that Spain's image as an aggressor spread in the New World (1861–1862), the Spanish government sent a scientific expedition to Latin America to study plants, animals, and geological formations. These scientists were following in a long line of such Spanish excursions into the New World and probably in more settled times they would not have caused any American concern. Madrid hoped this mission would actually increase good will in Latin America. Although the scientists successfully carried on their work, Peru believed they were scouting for new colonies. Peruvian authorities feared Spain wanted to seize their Chincha Islands, which provided Peru with a valuable income from the sale of guano. This tragic misunderstanding set the stage for more serious problems.[1]

Spain soon heard of anti-Spanish articles appearing in the Peruvian press, of Lima's rearmament, and of her efforts to form an anti-Spanish alliance with other American governments in 1862. Spain decided that

[1] Robert Ryal Miller, *For Science and National Glory: The Spanish Scientific Expedition to America, 1862–1866* (Norman, 1968), pp. 3, 11.

her dignity and position in Latin America dictated that a show of naval force be made in the Pacific. Spain hoped this would cause the Peruvians to respect Spanish power and stop the damage being done to her image in South America. Her diplomats did not intend any hostile actions and certainly wanted no war with Peru. However, after the small fleet's arrival in the Pacific, other events in America caused further deterioration in Spanish-Peruvian relations leading Peruvians, at least, to believe that these ships were in the Pacific for hostile purposes.[2]

Contributing to this attitude was a fight between Spanish emigrants and some Peruvians at a farm called Talambo in northern Peru in August, 1863, resulting in the death of one Spaniard and injuries to others. The incident received wide publicity in Madrid where Peru's anti-Spanish feelings were described in highly exaggerated forms. Meanwhile, the few ships from the Spanish navy then in the Pacific, under the command of Admiral Luis H. Pinzón, sailed for Peru to investigate. At the same time, a *progresista*, Eusevio de Salazar y Mazarredo, convinced officials in Madrid to take a hard line with the Peruvians who had been the leading advocates of anti-Spanish politics in Latin America. Appointed commissioner to Peru to gain satisfaction for the Talambo incident, he presented his credentials to the Peruvian government in March, 1864. His manner soon offended the Latin Americans, whereupon he asked Pinzón to act. The admiral occupied the Chincha Islands as hostages for gaining redress on Spanish claims. Since his occupation violated the spirit of the instructions sent by Madrid calling for a peaceful settlement, Salazar's performance was criticized by the Spanish foreign office. The regime, however, felt it could not back down without loss of face; therefore, it demanded that Peru apologize and make restitution to the victims at Talambo in return for the islands.[3]

Spain's situation in Latin America quickly deteriorated. In the fall Bolivia, Chile, Peru, and even Britain, objected to Spain's gunboat diplomacy. A South American conference, held in late 1864 at Lima, led to protests from Argentina, Ecuador, Colombia, and Venezuela. These governments recommended that the Chinchas be returned immediately to Peru. Meanwhile in September, Narváez returned to power in Madrid. Having resolved that the Peruvian affair had gone far enough, he commissioned José Manuel Pareja, an ex-minister of the navy, to negotiate a settlement while taking over Pinzón's command. Pareja arrived in Peru early in 1865, just after the conference at Lima, and quickly negotiated a tentative agreement which at first appeared acceptable to both parties. By its terms, relations were to be normalized on a friendly basis, an indemnity paid to Spain, and the Chinchas returned to Peru. The Spanish and Peruvian press, however, strongly condemned the treaty—each calling it insulting to their country. This reaction made it difficult, if not impossible, for the two governments to approve their negotiators' work.[4]

Throughout the early days of the Peruvian crisis the United States quietly observed the situation to make sure Spain did not violate the Monroe Doctrine. Seward offered to mediate the problem. In Lima, Americans attempted to work with local French diplomats early in 1864 to determine if the Peruvians would be interested in outside mediation. Pacheco, the Spanish foreign minister, rejected the American offer in April, preferring to settle the situation peacefully without Washington's assistance. In May, Peru's protest on the occupation of the Chinchas indicated to Spain and the United States that Peru felt insulted and would also be firm in its dealings with the Spanish. To complicate matters, reports from Chile indicated that Peru might soon have an ally in her quarrel with Spain.[5]

Seward asked Lord Russell to pressure both the Peruvians and the Spanish into a negotiated settlement. The secretary of state knew that it was in London's interest to cooperate since British trade with Peru would otherwise be damaged; possibly by as much as $20 million per year. On May 19, Seward warned that American public opinion might force the government of the United States to abandon its neutral attitude. But again Spain gently rejected the American mediatory offer because molders of Spanish public opinion would not tolerate it. Many would have seen this as a retreat on the part of their government. Having won a war in North Africa, reabsorbed Santo Domingo, and believing their nation's influence in the European councils of state on the rise, such an offer could not even be considered. Knowing this, Pacheco informed the American legation that he would not ask the cabinet to accept American aid.[6]

Seward tried another tack by asking the Russians to pressure Spain into accepting mediation. But, by early June, Madrid and Washington realized war would erupt. The French, unwilling to see a close ally waste her efforts on far away Peru when she needed

[2] Becker, *relaciones exteriores* 2: p. 707.

[3] William C. Davis, *The Last Conquistadores: The Spanish Intervention in Peru and Chile, 1863–1866* (Athens, 1950), pp. 21–33.

[4] Becker, *relaciones exteriores* 2; pp. 730–736.

[5] *Archives Diplomatiques 1865 Recueil de diplomatie et d' histoire* (Paris, 1865), 1: p. 234; *FRUS (1864)* 4: pp. 18–19, 149–181; Latin Americans voiced anger toward Spain by fall, Nathan L. Ferris, "The Relations of the United States with South America during the American Civil War," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 21 (February, 1941): p. 75.

[6] *FRUS (1864)* 1: p. 896; 4: pp. 23–24, 26–28; *El Diario Español*, June 4, 1864, p. 2.

Spanish support for her Mexican and Italian programs, decided to use their influence to bring about peace. Like the French, the British became concerned by June. They worried about the possibility of Spain seizing land in Latin America, thereby disturbing the delicate balance of power in the New Word. The British also knew they would have to help since Madrid felt dubious about Washington's impartiality when it came to Latin American affairs.[7]

By this point a stalemate existed which made solution of the crisis difficult. Spain refused to leave the Chinchas since the January treaty proved unacceptable while Peru would not agree to a settlement until the Spanish left their islands. Pacheco explained to the British envoy the sensitive nature of the situation, assuring him that Spain had no desire to conquer any land. The Spanish repeated the same message to American diplomats in Britain. Seward also received similar statements, finally concluding that Spain wanted to settle outstanding claims in a manner not injurious to her honor. Pacheco decided to reinforce this view through Koerner in late June, 1864, by adding that American mediation might be acceptable at some unspecified future date.[8]

At the end of the month, Pacheco concluded treaties of peace, recognition, and commerce with Guatemala and Argentina, which had been pending for some time, as a hint to Latin America that Spain had no imperialist designs on them. Yet, Americans felt uncomfortable because, as Koerner reported, Pacheco was a weak-willed administrator easily pressured into positions he did not fully support either by the Spanish press or his colleagues in Madrid who were less concerned with American policy than with how Peru would react to their call for apologies, punishment of the Peruvians at Talambo, and suggestions for renewed diplomatic relations.[9]

In July, the Americans and the French felt optimistic about reaching a settlement. Diplomats in Paris further believed Spain deserved apologies while Peru had a right to regain control of the Chinchas. The press, expressing various administration views, remarked on Washington's kindness in offering to mediate. Yet by the end of the month, Americans, at least, received reports from Lima to the effect that Peru remained irritated and stubborn. Although this dampened their optimism, diplomats continued to explore the Spanish and Peruvian positions.[10]

After Narváez came to power, Perry suggested the general would try to find a way out of his Peruvian difficulties. He predicted that pride would cause him to solve his problem without Washington's help. The new foreign minister, Alexandro Llorente, told Perry that Spain respected the Monroe Doctrine, keeping it in mind when considering the Peruvian crisis. On October 2, Perry wrote to Seward that Spain had some concern about Washington's neutrality, adding that "the exigencies of Spanish honor seemed exaggerated to Peru, and those of Peruvian honor seemed unreasonable to Spain." Perry, therefore, suggested that some third power mediate. The French quickly confirmed Perry's analysis and, along with the British, offered their services in October, but to no avail.[11] Llorente told Perry in December that Spain would not accept Washington's mediation because Peru appeared reluctant to negotiate. The situation continued to deteriorate rapidly because the Chileans showed signs of moving closer to armed conflict with the Spanish. Coupled with the serious revolution in Santo Domingo, the Peruvian crisis compelled Llorente to suggest that the United States pressure Peru into negotiating a settlement. The State Department found itself in an uncomfortable position because, on the one hand, the Spaniards felt Washington was biased in favor of the Latin Americans, while on the other, the Peruvians expected their northern neighbor to aid her against Spain, not mediate.[12]

The history of Spain's relations with South America became more complex during 1865. The year opened optimistically enough since Spanish and Peruvian officials had negotiated their January settlement. Yet in February, Spanish sailors became involved in a brawl in Peru over the refusal of a Peruvian to light a Spaniard's cigarette. The incident did not reflect either government's policies; only the indiscretions of a few people. Admiral Pareja lodged a formal protest with the Peruvians because a second street fight occurred with obvious anti-Spanish tones.[13]

When the Peruvians read about the treaty with Spain and later of the incidents in their newspapers, anti-Spanish feelings rose and became a serious political problem for Peru. In fact, it created sufficient unrest to permit Peruvian Colonel Mariano Ignacio Prado to start a revolt against the national government in February. The uprising spread to all parts of the country during March and April. Although

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[7] *FRUS (1864)* **3**: pp. 94, 298; **4**: pp. 25–26, 30–31; Adams to Seward, No. 716, June 11, 1864, US/desp/GB/87.

[8] *FRUS (1864)* **4**: pp. 31–35; Crampton to Russell, No. 154, "Confidential," June 15, 1864, F072/1080; Adams to Seward, No. 719, June 16, 1864, US/desp/GB/87.

[9] *FRUS (1864)* **4**: pp. 86–89; *El Diario Español*, July 5, 1864, p. 1.

[10] Dayton to Seward, No. 506, July 8, 1864, US/desp/Fr/55; *FRUS (1864)* **4**: pp. 90–91, 94, 96.

[11] Perry to Seward, "Confidential," September 3, 1864, Egan, "An American Diplomat in Spain," pp. 71–72; *FRUS (1864)* **4**: pp. 100–101, quote 101; Barrot to Drouyn de Lhuys, No. 66, October 6, 1864, Fr/pol/Esp/866; Barrot to Drouyn de Lhuys, No. 70, October 17, 1864, *Ibid.*; Crampton to Russell, No. 253, November 4, 1864, F072/1082.

[12] Barrot to Drouyn de Lhuys, No. 6, December 23, 1864, Fr/pol/Esp/866; *FRUS (1865)* **2**: pp. 468–469.

[13] Davis, *The Last Conquistadores*, pp. 145–171.

the regime defeated Prado's faction, other Peruvian elements continued the struggle. President Juan Antonio Pezet, finding his position untenable, left the country in late October. An ex-vice president, Pedro Diez Canseco, then took over and on November 8, the diplomatic corps extended recognition to his government. However, the Peruvian army still backed Prado, forcing Canseco out of power and the colonel into the presidency on November 28. Since Prado disliked the Spanish, he refused to compromise with them.[14]

Although this development spelled danger for Spain, even worse problems grew in Chile. Salvador de Tavira, the Spanish envoy in Santiago, had witnessed anti-Spanish incidents as early as 1864. Notes protesting these shuffled back and forth from his legation to the Chilean foreign office. Tavira, meanwhile, asked Madrid to send him some warships to show Chile that Spain wanted respect. In June, Chile refused to allow Pinzón's fleet to refuel in their territory. Tavira believed friendly relations with Chile could be restored especially after news arrived of the Spanish-Peruvian treaty. The Spanish admiral, however, felt that Chile should apologize for the previous year's insults to Spain. Tavira advised him simply to forget the past. In fact, Pareja, who by this time had replaced Pinzón as commander of the fleet, found little support in the Spanish foreign office for his hard line. Since the Spanish press screamed for satisfaction the regime could not support Tavira's position while Pareja gained full power to negotiate a settlement both with Chile and Peru by July. With the end of the Civil War in the United States, Madrid wanted to settle affairs quickly before Washington could re-exert its influence in Latin American politics and believed Pareja capable of achieving this goal more quickly than Tavira.[15]

In September, Pareja demanded apologies and compensation for the fleet, since he was denied coal. He argued that the occupation of the Peruvian Chinchas had no bearing on Spanish-Chilean relations. When the Chileans refused, Pareja established a naval blockade on their coast. In the few hours before the admiral's blockade went into effect on September 24, Thomas H. Nelson, Washington's envoy to Chile, attempted to work out a compromise but found both sides too stubborn to consider negotiating.[16]

Throughout 1864 and 1865, Washington continued to observe apprehensively the deteriorating relations between Peru and Chile on one side and Spain on the other. Perry visited the Foreign Office in July to urge a peaceful resolution, but the Spaniards refused to budge. In fact, while reporting the interview to García Tassara, the Spanish foreign minister told him that Spain must be vindicated even if, as regrettable as it might be, force had to be used. Spain still wanted friendly relations "with the others in the American continent," but not at the expense of her rights. Perry commented in September that "Spain is willing to abandon every point of her demands against Chile except one only: she insists that the Spanish flag shall be saluted." Chile refused this on a point of honor. Perry reported that Spanish officials felt insulted by Chile, recommending that the Chileans salute the Spanish flag; otherwise restoring friendly relations would be impossible.[17]

Perry managed to convince the Spanish to send Pareja instructions delaying any planned hostilities for two weeks in order to give the United States a chance to negotiate a settlement. He commented that due to slow communications, Spain did not even know if she were already at war with Chile. Seward realized in September that because of Spain's Dominican and Mexican adventures, Latin America would take a tough stand against Madrid. Despite this, Bermúdez de Castro wrote García Tassara that Spain would not accept Washington's mediation since Chile did not seriously want to resolve their quarrel. Moreover, Spain demanded satisfaction since the government could not sacrifice the "nation's decorum." [18]

Communications continued to be a problem for Madrid. García Tassara wrote to his foreign office in early October predicting Chile would do nothing until the outcome of the Peruvian revolution became known. However, he stated that no matter what happened, "the possibility of new complications with Spain" could not be avoided. Almost three weeks later, Pareja repeated to Madrid that Nelson still tried to work out a settlement. Therefore, Spain's information upon which to base policy regarding Latin America remained disjointed and uneven. Spain did not even know what Chile's feelings were at the moment. At the time, the Chilean government expressed some interest in mediation providing the Spanish fleet would leave its coast. Pareja rejected this, citing Chile's insult to Spanish honor. Throughout the rest of the month and into November, Nelson struggled to find

[14] Pedro de Novo y Colson, *Historia de la guerra de España en el Pacífico* (Madrid, 1882), pp. 227–269.

[15] Ministerio de Estado, *Documentos diplomáticos presentados a las Cortes, 1865* (Madrid, 1865), pp. 29, 68, 82–83; *FRUS(1865)* 2: pp. 545–547; Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, *Memoria que el Ministro de estado en el departamento de relaciones exteriores presenta al Congreso nacional de 1866* (Santiago, 1866), pp. 8–9.

[16] Becker, *relaciones exteriores* 2: pp. 739–748; Ministerio de Estado, *Documentos diplomáticos*, p. 237.

[17] Min. of St. to García Tassara, July 26, 1865, Sp/negociaciones/256 (hereafter cited /neg/); *FRUS(1865)* 2: pp. 555–556.

[18] *FRUS(1865)* 2: pp. 557–562; Min. of St. to García Tassara, September 18, 1865, Sp/neg/256.

some common ground but both sides remained stubborn.[19]

By the fall the British and the French began to increase their efforts at resolving the crisis. Britain feared damage to her extensive commercial relations with Chile, which amounted to over eight million pounds each year. The English told the French and Americans that they would offer to mediate. On November 19, the French agreed to work with the British on all fronts. France was irritated with the way Spain handled her Chilean-Peruvian problem and blamed Pareja for much of the difficulty. Although critical of the admiral, when the French received notice of his blockade, they quietly notified their naval forces to respect it. In a dispatch dated November 21, the French foreign minister, Édouard Drouyn de Lhuys, told his minister in Madrid that France also worried about the economic impact of the blockade. For these various reasons, then, he ordered French diplomats in Latin America to work for a peaceful solution.[20]

Throughout November, O'Donnell indicated to the British and French envoys his willingness to negotiate a settlement. Yet, the Spanish press called for a tough policy toward Chile on the one hand while demanding a resolution on the other. Therefore, he began to consider Anglo-French offers of mediation as a means of extricating himself out of an uncomfortable situation. The Spanish foreign office realized that its approval of Pareja's blockade could be retracted if the public's demand for some immediate resolution grew loud enough. Pressure on O'Donnell increased when Chile formally declared war against Spain. The near absurdity of this bothered O'Donnell and other authorities both in Madrid and in Washington. Seward commented to García Tassara what Spaniards knew but would not publicly admit, namely that the war could "have been averted since the issue joined involves nothing more than the question whether one of the parties ought to pay the other the courtesy of an artillery salute." [21]

While reports of armed clashes with the Spaniards were posted to Madrid, the British and French continued to work toward peace. On December 2 they issued a joint statement suggesting that Chile acknowledge she meant no insult to Spanish honor and ask for peaceful relations; that Spain disavow any intention of seeking territory in Latin America while stating she desired friendly relations with Chile; and after the exchange of such declarations, each party should salute the flag of the other. At first, Bermúdez de Castro said he would study these proposals. But Spanish officials by this time realized that most Europeans were critical of Spain's attitude; the United States and other American countries might soon support Chile, and the public at home wanted a settlement. Thus within days the Spanish accepted the Anglo-French proposal "without alteration." [22]

Although the year ended on an optimistic note from Spain's point of view, events marched on in Latin America almost oblivious to Europe. In the fall naval clashes between Chile and Spain increased tensions in South America. Admiral Pareja could not negotiate with the Chileans whom he insulted repeatedly. Many of his sailors complained since they had been at sea for nearly four years. The admiral also knew that some officials in Madrid criticized his performance and in the New World, Tavira constantly found fault with him. Then in late November, the Chileans captured one of his ships, the *Covadonga.* The result of these failures probably accounted for Pareja's decision to commit suicide on November 28. When the Spanish heard about the ship's capture and his suicide in January, officials tried unsuccessfully to hide the news but the press soon had as many details as they and demanded revenge. Next, rumors spread that Chilean warships were cruising near Cádiz and Valencia. Moreover, O'Donnell's critics could not resist commenting on the state of affairs. Some called for the reoccupation of the Chinchas while others demanded that Spain's honor, tarnished by the loss of the *Covadonga,* be vindicated by force. With no practical option left, the regime decided to initiate military action.[23]

Meanwhile, a small naval engagement resulting in the ship's capture coupled with the news of Pareja's death emboldened Latin Americans against the Spanish. On January 20, 1866, Peru announced an alliance with Chile. She also formally declared war on Spain. Apparently Madrid anticipated such a move even before this news arrived in Europe because the Foreign Office had notified García Tassara that the regime could no longer accept mediation, citing Latin American insults as the primary reason for this decision. By the end of the month, the conflict expanded because Ecuador also signed the anti-Spanish alliance. This,

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[19] García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 185, October 5, 1865, Sp/neg/256; Pareja to Min. of St., No. 67, October 20, 1865, *Ibid.*; *FRUS(1866)* 2: pp. 342–347; Nelson's correspondence reprinted in *Ibid.*, pp. 334–363.

[20] Great Britain, Foreign Office, *Correspondence respecting the War between Chile and Spain* (London, 1866), pp. 44–46; *FRUS(1866)* 1: pp. 267–268; *Archives Diplomatiques 1865,* pp. 103–110.

[21] Davis, *The Last Conquistadores,* pp. 239–240; some of the regime's supporters complained about Pareja's activities, Robinson to Seward, No. 90, November 30, 1865, US/desp/Port Mahon/4; Seward to García Tassara, November 21, 1865, US/notes to foreign legations/87.

[22] Text reprinted in Davis, *The Last Conquistadores,* pp. 241–242; *Archives Diplomatiques 1865,* pp. 111–112; Crampton to Clarendon, No. 47, December 7, 1865, F072/1103; Crampton to Clarendon, No. 50, December 9, 1865, *Ibid.*; Min. of St. to García Tassara, December 20, 1865, Sp/neg/256.

[23] Davis, *The Last Conquistadores,* pp. 255–259.

too, came as no surprise to Spaniards who expected other Latin Americans to align against them.[24]

No less than Madrid, Washington felt swept along by events. The State Department wanted to prevent a war but discovered that complicating domestic factors restricted her diplomatic mobility. Chilean agents were buying military supplies in the United States. On January 6, at the Cooper Institute in New York, a large pro-Chilean rally was held where William Cullen Bryant spoke against Spain and letters by congressmen and senators were read in favor of the Chilean cause. Fearing that the Monroe Doctrine would not be respected, celebrities such as James A. Garfield, Benjamin F. Wade, Daniel E. Sickles, Schuyler Colfax, and James H. Lane criticized the Spanish. García Tassara found it necessary to protest these manifestations by calling to Seward's attention the illegality of American citizens helping the Chileans. *La Epoca* stated that bandying the Monroe Doctrine about in public rallies only confused the real issue since Spain intended to respect this American policy while vindicating her honor. The American consul at Málaga noted that the "Chilean difficulty has a tendency I fear to threaten the kindly feelings of the Spaniards in this part of the Peninsula towards Americans." García Tassara warned his consuls to stay alert for Chileans swaying public opinion in their districts. In fact, such agents distributed pamphlets, masterminded the rally at the Cooper Institute, and in general exploited latent anti-Spanish feelings in the United States.[25]

Meanwhile, Nelson continued to negotiate with the Chileans and the Spanish but they stubbornly refused to change their positions. By mid-February both parties formally protested unneutral American behavior. The Chileans complained about two Spanish warships in New York. García Tassara believed the Wells Fargo freight company planned to send torpedoes to Chile. Seward announced that the United States would remain neutral but found it difficult to make the various governments believe him.[26] However, he continued as before, because the American minister to Spain, John P. Hale,[27] received further instructions in March to negotiate a settlement. Seward explained that if too excited, Latin America might combine into one super alliance against the Spanish which might be used against the United States, at some future date.[28]

García Tassara also found his position quite delicate by March since, on the one hand, Spain accepted Anglo-French mediation while rejecting Washington's and, on the other, protested no desire to conquer Chile yet refused to compromise. He publicly put up a brave front by finding fault with Washington's attitude. For instance, he requested that Seward prohibit American citizens from aiding the Latin Americans. Some newspapers in the United States, like the *Daily National Intelligencer*, attempted to report the news fairly (not an easy task under the circumstances) but predicted Spain would fight to preserve her "honor." Such reporting made it difficult for the Spaniard to justify his country's action when Americans remembered Santo Domingo and Mexico.[29]

During the spring, the Spanish announced that, because of the attack on the *Covadonga*, they would remain adamant in their demands on Peru and Chile. In order to rally support, silence domestic opposition, and respond to press inquiries, Foreign Minister Bermúdez de Castro spoke in the Cortes on March 9, summarizing the entire Peruvian-Chilean problem. After stating that the government would defend Spain's honor and punish her enemies, he directed his remarks to the United States, saying Spain "does not aspire to any exclusive privilege or influence" in Latin America. In his instructions to García Tassara soon after his speech, the Foreign Minister called the attack on the *Covadonga* "criminal" and dated Spain's hardening position from late January when news arrived of the vessel's fate. Bermúdez de Castro also expressed concern about the possible role Washington might have because, as *La Epoca* put it, "the United States signified a very hostile attitude towards our country."[30]

Calm mediation efforts continued in sharp contrast to the excited noises attributable to public opinion. Spain requested more details about Washington's proposal to mediate. In Chile, American officials met with the new Spanish commander and negotiator, Castro Ménendez Núñez. The admiral stated that in order to end all differences, Chile would have to acknowledge no prior intention of insulting Spain and

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[24] *FRUS (1866)* 2: pp. 458–459.

[25] Daniel J. Hunter (pseud. for its Chilean organizer, Benjamín Vicuna Mackenna), *A Sketch of Chile, expressly prepared for the Use of Emigrants from the United States and Europe to that Country* (New York, 1866), pp. 24–47, 56–83; *FRUS (1866)* 1: pp. 589–591, 598; *La Epoca*, January 20, 1866, p. 2; Hancock to Seward, No. 33, January 23, 1866, US/desp/Malaga/8; García Tassara to Pons, February 14, 1866, CCP.

[26] *FRUS (1866)* 1: pp. 602, 604; 2: pp. 370–372, 420, 662–663; Seward to García Tassara, February 28, 1866, US/notes to foreign legations/87.

[27] Appointed March, 1865. He opposed Cuban annexation so García Tassara dismissed any threat to Cuba from him, García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 48, March 13, 1865, Sp/pol/USA/2409; for biographical data, Richard H. Sewell, *John P. Hale and the Politics of Abolition* (Cambridge, Mass., 1965).

[28] *FRUS (1866)* 1: p. 568.

[29] García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 84, March 3, 1866, Sp/neg/256; *FRUS (1866)* 1: pp. 605–606; *Daily National Intelligencer*, March 13, 1866, p. 1.

[30] *FRUS (1866)* 1: pp. 569–574, quote from 573; Min. of St. to García Tassara, March 23, 1866, Sp/neg/256; *La Epoca*, March 23, 1866, p. 3.

in return, Madrid would then recognize her "ancient friendships." Following these two announcements, Chile would have to salute Spain with a twenty-one gun salvo. Subsequently, relations would be normalized. Spain, of course, would reciprocate with her salute, but after Chile had fired first. Chilean officials rejected his offer without a hint of possible alternatives.[31]

In an attempt to force them into a settlement, the Spanish admiral bombarded Valparaiso on March 31, despite last minute mediation efforts by most of the European and North American diplomats in the area. After damaging the city, injuring and killing a few people, and causing $10 million destruction to neutral property, the Spanish fleet left the port. The minister of the United States to Chile complained that the bombardment caused serious damage to the property of American citizens while angering Latin Americans.[32]

Europe and the United States did not know at the time, because of slow communications, that diplomats had continued to mediate as if the bombardment had never taken place. For instance, in mid-April, Spain formally declined Anglo-French offers to mediate. The government of the United States received discouraging news from its diplomats to the effect that the Chileans considered Washington pro-Spanish since Seward had refused to help them against Madrid. García Tassara did not comment on this point; rather, he now attempted to discourage Seward from making any formal proposals on April 16. He met again with Seward three days later but failed to reduce his interest in negotiating a settlement. The Spanish Foreign Office rejected Seward's proposals as currently worded, asking instead for more "concrete" suggestions before any mediation could seriously be considered.[33]

Then Spain, Latin America, Europe, and the United States began to receive details of the bombardment. The British and the French envoys were furious. Most European newspapers and governments condemned it as an act of "barbarism." The French foreign office expressed its regret. The Spanish foreign minister wrote García Tassara to say that since Spain decided to justify the act, American mediation would not be acceptable in any form. In the Cortes on May 22, Bermúdez de Castro said the bombardment "could not have been avoided unless the government had consented to sacrifice entirely the dignity and honor of the nation." [34]

In South America, members of the anti-Spanish alliance disapproved of the admiral's action. Rallies were held, Spaniards were insulted, and governments protested. Even Argentina, which still maintained amicable relations with Spain, filed a formal protest. Because the United States failed to help the Chileans defend their city with the few American warships in the area, many Latin Americans felt bitter. Officials in Washington also deplored the bombardment. Secretary Welles noted in his diary that the Spaniards had committed "a brutal and semibarbarous" act. Seward quietly termed it "tragic." [35]

In light of the numerous and strongly worded Chilean criticisms leveled against President Andrew Johnson's neutrality, Seward drafted a statement on his government's policy. Basically, he reiterated Washington's moral support for all American republics, yet acknowledged the right of all nations to make war. He said the United States wanted to maintain her neutrality, and therefore all Chilean and Spanish complaints regarding violations of that policy would be investigated. He reminded Chile that the United States had offered to mediate differences on numerous occasions but that these generous promptings had always been rejected.[36] This statement had little effect on either side because things went from bad to worse.

Admiral Ménendez Núñez lifted the blockade on the Chilean coast after the bombardment since he could not really enforce it and sailed into Peruvian waters to punish the latter because Peru and Spain were officially at war with each other. Some Spanish residents here were under arrest and the fleet's commander knew Prado's government was preparing for an anticipated armed conflict with him. The admiral arrived at Callao, declared his right to avenge Spanish honor, warned the neutrals to leave, and then on May 2, bombarded the city causing considerable destruction. Because the Peruvians had a few cannon which they used against the Spanish, the admiral's ships sustained some damage and a few sailors were killed or wounded. These vessels, however, had no difficulty in calmly sailing away.[37]

The Peruvians claimed a major victory since the Spaniards had suffered, although nothing in comparison to what the residents of Callao went through.

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[31] *FRUS (1866)* **1**: pp. 568–569; **2**: pp. 387–393.

[32] *Ibid.*, **2**: p. 393.

[33] Mercier to Drouyn de Lhuys, No. 22, April 13, 1866, Fr/pol/Esp/868; *FRUS (1866)*, **2**: pp. 407–408; García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 157, April 16, 1866, Sp/neg/256; García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 162, April 20, 1866, *Ibid.*; Min. of St. to García Tassara, May 7 and May 17. 1866, *Ibid.*

[34] Drouyn de Lhuys to Mercier, No. 7, May 1, 1866, Fr/pol/Esp/866; Min. of St. to García Tassara, May 17, 1866, Sp/neg/256; quoted in Davis, *The Last Conquistadores*, p. 305.

[35] Davis, *The Last Conquistadores*, pp. 306–308; Francisco Centeno, "La diplomacía Argentina en el Pacífico," *Revista de Derecho y Letras* **57** (May–August, 1917): pp. 368–390; Welles, *Diary* **I**: p. 495; *FRUS (1866)* **2**: pp. 411–412.

[36] *FRUS (1866)* **2**: pp. 413–414.

[37] Davis, *The Last Conquistadores*, pp. 311–321.

Yet Peru overlooked that fact. Even today, the country celebrates May 2 as a national holiday. Most Latin Americans and Spaniards in the New World did not believe the war was over; consequently, Peru and Chile prepared for more combat. They attempted to convince other American governments to join their anti-Spanish alliance but failed because of inter-American rivalries. García Tassara reacted by writing that "the bombardment of Callao, so highly noble as it has been for our arms, nevertheless seems to have complicated more than simplified the question," virtually killing any chance for a peaceful settlement. García Tassara noted that Latin Americans could now confidently go on the offensive and if the war lasted very long, there would be serious repercussions for Spain in Europe.[38]

News arrived in Spain about the bombardment of Callao in early June, 1866. The Spanish government decided to use the event to its advantage by quickly announcing the end of the expedition. By this means, officials hoped to back out of their Latin American problem gracefully while at the same time claiming that the nation's honor had been vindicated. They also wanted public support which the regime currently lacked. Diplomatically, Madrid's announcement clearly served to end a futile, costly episode in an unhumiliating fashion. The Foreign Office also realized that bombarding Callao would turn even more Latin Americans against Spain while forcing the United States to be more critical of her. And under no circumstances could Washington's overt dislike of Spain be allowed to fester since Cuba could always be lost. Yet, the Spanish public generally approved of the second bombardment, compelling the government to announce that further reinforcements might be sent to Latin America. García Tassara informed Seward of these developments while reassuring him Spain would not conquer Peruvian or Chilean territory. Seward in turn warned the envoy not to let his government impose new regimes on the two Latin American nations.[39]

Callao proved to be a turning point in the war because Spain more than ever wanted to liquidate the entire affair but how to do so proved to be the stumbling block. Crampton wrote to the British foreign office in July: "Were it possible to procure the concurrence of the United States and that of France to a proposal of reasonable terms of accommodation between Spain and those Republics," then "the chances of its success would be much increased." Crampton said that if the Latin Americans refused to negotiate, it would be out of a false expectation of Washington's support. Russia offered to mediate but she too could not find a formula. In August, the French and British ministers again offered their assistance—this time finding the Spaniards very receptive to such a proposal.[40]

When in July Narváez replaced O'Donnell as chief minister, the French and British felt mediation seemed closer. In fact, Narváez informed Perry that Spain wanted to end the war and the secretary of legation believed him. Although Spain expressed interest in Anglo-French mediation, Narváez thought the United States should offer her services since Washington's influence in Latin America was greater. This came at a time when Madrid and Washington knew Peru and Chile remained reluctant to negotiate a settlement. Despite news about Chile preparing for renewed warfare, Seward drew up a mediation proposal in December. Congress supported him by passing a resolution on December 17 asking the United States to offer its assistance. On December 20, he sent a draft to Hale calling for a conference in Washington on April 1, 1867, with Spain, Chile, Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, and the United States to settle on a "permanent peace." These governments would ratify any settlement reached. If agreement could not be reached, President Andrew Johnson would appoint another party to arbitrate. An armistice would be declared when all the governments had accepted these conditions.[41]

Both Seward and the American legation in Madrid pushed for this mediation. The secretary mentioned to García Tassara that although Peru and Chile had earlier rejected Anglo-French proposals, he would ignore that and extend an invitation to them for the conference. Seward never liked the idea of European intervention anyway since it threatened his country's influence in the New World. García Tassara speculated that by holding the talks in Washington, this would add to the American government's image as a major power in Latin America. Hale seemed just as eager as Seward for the conference because he wasted no time in raising the issue with officials who informally told him that the secretary of state's offer could not immediately be accepted since the Anglo-French proposition had been made first. They also complained that Chile wanted more war. Hale knew that the government disliked the slow progress that the British and the French were making in ending the war. He wrote Seward that Spain would not accept

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[38] *Ibid.*, p. 321; Robert N. Burr, *By Reason or Force: Chile and the Balancing of Power in South America, 1830–1905* (Berkeley, 1965), pp. 99–104; García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 250, June 4, 1866, Sp/neg/256.

[39] Davis, *The Last Conquistadores*, pp. 323–326.

[40] Crampton to Stanley, No. 190, July 26, 1866, F072/1125; García Tassara to Min. of St. in a series, No. 350, August 3, 1866, No. 428, October 6, 1866, No. 440, October 26, 1866, Sp/neg/256; Mercier to Drouyn de Lhuys, No. 50, August 25, 1866, Fr/pol/Esp/868.

[41] Perry to Seward, September 24, 1866, US/desp/Sp/49; congressional resolution reprinted in *FRUS (1866)* 1: p. 517; Seward's proposal, *Ibid.*, pp. 517–518.

aid until, first, Chile's attitude changed and, second, Paris and London agreed to mediation.[42]

The Spanish legation in London reported that the British would be delighted if Spain accepted United States help. However, this information arrived in Madrid after Hale's offer had been rejected. French officials, also wishing to back out of a thankless task, gave their approval to Washington's assistance in mid-January. A few days later, Hale formally submitted a written copy of Seward's proposals for Spain's consideration. With freedom to act, the Spanish foreign minister accepted mediation in principles reserving for Spain the right to modify the proposal. At the moment he wanted "some restrictions in regard to the person or State to be selected as umpire or arbitrator," since no Spaniard wanted a Latin American government to be chosen by Washington.[43]

By the end of January, 1867, Seward believed the conference could be held since Spain appeared quite receptive to his suggestions. The secretary was still irritated by the reluctance of the Peruvian and Chilean governments to cooperate. American diplomats found that officials in Lima were checking with other Latin Americans on what they thought of Seward's ideas and, like the Spanish, wanted further details about the arbitration clause. The United States claimed sole responsibility for selecting an arbitrator; otherwise Washington would not mediate. Seward stated the Spanish could count on his good judgment in selecting such a government, hinting that no Latin American regime would be chosen.[44]

By March, all the parties involved had accepted his invitation with the exception of Peru which Madrid, at least, expected would agree. Goñi found Seward amusing and cheerful because the United States had become a center of diplomatic attention. Spain, all the Latin American powers, France, and Great Britain approved of Seward's efforts and he felt especially pleased that the talks would be held in Washington. Yet, not every detail had been worked out. Spain, for instance, asked for more information regarding arbitration and time limits on the talks in April.[45]

Then on May 1, the American minister in Santiago reported that the Chileans, after studying Seward's proposals, which earlier they had tentatively accepted, now found objections which amounted "to a rejection of the proposed conference." Chile asked for several things. The arbitration clause disturbed her as much as it did Spain; therefore, she wanted more specifics on this point. Chile requested that Spain acknowledge, prior to the conference, that the queen's government regretted the bombardment of Valparaiso. Santiago claimed the privilege of branding Spain the aggressor at the peace talks yet also wanted all the parties to agree in advance not to discuss her seizure of the *Covadonga*. Finally, the Chileans and their allies insisted on discussing claims against Spain which had accumulated over many years and grew in number as a result of the war. Chile stated that if these conditions were agreeable to all parties concerned, she would attend. A disappointed American minister predicted that only outside arbitration could end this war.[46]

Of course, the conference did not meet in April. In June, Peru officially reminded Washington that a state of war with Spain still continued. More depressing news arrived when Ecuador rejected Seward's mediation. A change of foreign ministers in Santiago at the end of September made some Spaniards and Americans hopeful of a new Chilean policy. In early November, Seward wrote Perry that the Chileans might soon accept mediation. The Spanish still wanted to end the war and continued discussing the conference through its legation in Washington. Seward tried a new stratagem in March, 1868, by suggesting that all the governments first agree to an armistice then later meet in Washington to settle differences. This put life back into his mediation efforts because Peru informed the United States that since no fighting had occurred for two years, a *de facto* state of war did not exist. Spain readily agreed to Seward's new proposal providing the Latin Americans did also. The members of the alliance met in Lima during August, 1868, and voted to accept his proposal.[47]

Just as things began to look cheerful another problem arose: Spain's revolution. This caused a temporary halt in the talks but on April 11, 1871, an armistice was finally signed in Washington. Peace negotiations continued between Spain and the Latin American powers over the next few years with little involvement by the United States. On April 14, 1879, Spain and Peru concluded their peace treaty. Others were signed with Bolivia (August 21, 1879), Chile (June 12, 1883), and Ecuador (January 28, 1885).[48]

The war in the Pacific exemplified some of the issues faced by Spain and the United States in the

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[42] García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 6, January 3, 1867, Sp/neg/256; *FRUS (1867)* **1**: pp. 518–519.

[43] Telegram, January 18, 1867, Sp/neg/256; Mon to Min. of St., January 17, 1867, *Ibid.*; Hale to Min. of St., January 27, 1867, *Ibid.*; *FRUS (1867)* **1**: p. 520–522.

[44] García Tassara to Min. of St., No. 44, February 1, 1867, Sp/neg/256; *FRUS (1867)* **2**: pp. 264, 523–524.

[45] Goñi to Min. of St., No. 109, April 1, 1867, Sp/neg/256; Min. of St. to Goñi, April 12, 1867, *Ibid.*

[46] *FRUS (1867)* **2**: pp. 266–267.

[47] *Ibid.*, **1**: p. 541; Min. of St. to García Tassara, December 10, 1867, Sp/neg/256; Goñi to Min. of St., No. 9, January 17, 1868, *Ibid.*; *FRUS (1868)* **2**: pp. 6–8, 898–899, 910–911.

[48] López Roberts to Min. of St., No. 48, April 29, 1871, Sp/neg/256; Olivart, *Tratados de España* **6**: pp. 289–290; **7**: pp. 435–438; **8**: pp. 339–340; **9**: pp. 25–26.

1860s. Madrid, for example, became deeply involved in Peruvian-Chilean difficulties out of a sense of outraged honor and by the actions of individuals who sometimes acted beyond the pale of their orders. In a limited sense for instance, Pareja's hostility toward Peru exceeded Spanish objectives almost to the extent that Serrano's activities brought Santo Domingo under Spanish control. These two factors—overemphasis on national dignity and the independence of some Spanish officials—dictated to a large extent Spain's unfortunate role in the Pacific. With no major political or economic interests to be won, Madrid risked and lost any moral leadership she might have had prior to the early 1860s in Latin America. Since Spain always considered *hispanismo* as an integral part of her South American policy, its damage was a disaster. Moreover, Spain's loss of cultural hegemony encouraged Cubans to consider their ties to Spain less relevant than ever before.

Madrid's inability to control events, which were influenced by many countries, cost O'Donnell's government prestige at home. Aware that Europe and America often criticized its policies in the Pacific, the regime suffered a credibility gap compelling such individuals as Bermúdez de Castro to justify the government's policies on nationalistic grounds. Narváez could not escape the same consequences of Spain's exposed situation either. Although difficult to document direct linkage, one could assume that in conjunction with domestic economic and political problems, the war in the Pacific contributed to the general crisis facing Isabeline Spain in the late 1860s. The expedition cost money that the government could ill afford; Spain's political influence in America declined; Europe's disrespect for Spanish diplomacy increased; and, the luster Spain achieved as a result of its Moroccan war dimmed.

Officials in Washington faced the dual problem of European encroachment into American affairs and damage to her economic interests. Seward clearly saw, as did his representatives in Chile and Peru, that London, Paris, and Madrid could unsettle Washington's growing influence in Latin America. The Monroe Doctrine, certainly as important to the United States as *hispanismo* proved to Spain, was theatened. But the Pacific also created domestic problems. For example, Chilean agents attempted to sway public opinion in their favor, therefore creating pressure on the administration to support the Latin Americans. Realizing that the role of a mediator, although a thankless one, provided him with an excellent opportunity to block further European involvement in Latin America, Seward found his work even more difficult when public opinion became a factor.[49]

Spanish-American competition and mistrust emerged as an obvious issue. The United States certainly did not want Spain to acquire territory, dictate peace terms, control economies, or create new governments. Repeatedly, Seward's agents bluntly told Spanish authorities about the secretary's concerns. Spain, although usually more willing than the Chileans or Peruvians to settle the crisis in the Pacific, never impressed Washington with her sincerity. Mistrust led, for example, to Madrid's concern over arbitration and possible American favoritism toward Chile. Spaniards never forgot the opportunity the United States might have used to acquire Cuba. Such distrust colored Goñi's initial instructions and led to numerous protests about Washington's proclaimed neutrality and to mediation diplomacy between Spain, France, and Britain.

As with previous crises involving Cuba, Santo Domingo, Mexico, and the Civil War, problems in the Pacific followed a familiar pattern. Both governments mistrusted and misunderstood each other. Uncontrolled events, slow communications, and even poorly informed publics contributed to uncomfortable relations between Spain and the United States. When one added those factors in international relations which inevitably emerge during periods of political instability, as both Spain and the United States experienced in this decade, it was obvious that the tradition of diplomatic conflict could only continue. Sincere wishes to the contrary flew in the face of geopolitical realities.

XI. OF POLICIES AND MEN

In previous chapters diplomatic relations between Spain and the United States were studied as a series of problems shared by both governments. From their relationship can be gleaned insights into the way midcentury diplomats implemented policies, permitting a test of certain accepted interpretations of their diplomacy while indicating some of the political and cultural forces which influenced Madrid and Washington. Since no diplomatic history would be complete without at least some fleeting comments on the role of key individuals, their experiences deserve reexamination as a further means of studying relations between Spain and the United States.

Madrid's attitudes toward the New World can be conveniently exposed by analyzing relations with the United States. Spanish diplomats considered Hispanic America only second to Europe in importance. They funneled concern for this area and implemented policies through their analysis of Washington's Latin American programs. It could be no other way. Span-

[49] Donald C. Henderson, Jr., "A Comparative Study of the Application of the Monroe Doctrine in Two Selected Instances" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University, 1964, pp. 17–79.

iards worried about Cuba and even Puerto Rico to some extent, nurtured *hispanismo,* and faced problems growing out of economic, political, and military issues in Santo Domingo, Mexico, Peru, and Chile. Such a cornucopia of concerns pushed Spain into conflict with the other major power in the New World: the United States. Some historians have argued that Spanish diplomacy in these years rested on the need to divert the army's attention from domestic politics, on national pride, or on thirst for empire. Another theory held that politicians initiated colorful diplomatic activities merely as a means of distracting the Spanish public from domestic problems.[1] But these interpretations implied a political innocence in Spain and even a trait of irresponsibility. If relations between Madrid and Washington indicated more accurately the true basis of Spanish foreign policies, then the picture proved to be far more complex.

Certain primary interests existed for Spain which hardly changed throughout these years irrespective of who dominated Spanish politics. One of the most obvious included preserving the last vestiges of Spanish colonialism against the growing threat of a vigorous United States. Even the Civil War, which temporarily reduced this type of pressure on Cuba, did not deter Spaniards from realizing that the island remained a constant factor in their American policy. Cuban problems may have changed in the 1860s from what they had been earlier, but competition remained, nonetheless. A second primary interest involved Spain's role as cultural or spiritual leader in the New World as embodied in the concept of *raza* (racial bond)—and this in the face of further growth by the Anglo-Saxon nation to the north. Throughout the two decades in question *hispanismo* remained on Spanish minds as they worried about Santo Domingo, Mexico, Peru, and Chile. Spain's concern that this vital phase of her impact on Latin America might suffer repeatedly appeared in dispatches regardless of what faction held power in Madrid or who represented Spain in the United States. Because of these two factors, considerations about trade and economics in general played a secondary role.

It could be argued that Spain had in relationship to the United States no clearly established lines of diplomatic approaches and policies. In fact, the opposite would be more accurate. Whether O'Donnell, Narváez, or someone else ruled, all were subject to the same geo-political realities of the New World: Cuba's security problems, interests in Latin America, and the growing influence of the United States. As the previous chapters have suggested, increased diplomatic and military activity in these years were poorly conceived and often uncoordinated attempts to preserve Spain's primary interests in Latin America. For example, she worried about Washington's penetration into Santo Domingo because of the danger it represented to Cuba. Uncontrollable events militated against any argument for an organized Spanish policy. Although one could criticize O'Donnell for encouraging President Santana, once done he could do little to prevent Santo Domingo from falling into Spanish hands.

Earlier historians failed to study the implication that Spanish diplomats operated within the framework of short term perspective. And yet it would seem reasonable to assume that diplomacy could not be carried on in any other way. Governments in Spain, for example, changed often, requiring new ministers to familiarize themselves with current business. This situation created various opinions and caused delays. Their positions were too tenuous, therefore, to allow for long-range planning. Moreover, relations between the throne and the cabinet, always volatile, institutionalized ministerial instability by creating a diversity of political opinions. Other conditions influenced the environment in which Spanish diplomats worked. Press censorship, for instance, did not stop political factions from using diplomatic issues as a means for criticizing whichever regime happened to be in power. The problem of inadequate communications suggested another reason for a nearly myopic approach to diplomacy. When a dispatch from Spain to Peru and its return answer took several months, tight control over events proved impossible. Even the mail service between Madrid and Washington took several weeks.

If Spanish interests in the New World remained consistent yet the policies for the preservation of these fluctuated and defied any coherent pattern, what else contributed to this situation? A large part of the answer lay in Europe since, relative to this area, Hispanic America remained second in Spain's view of her self-interests. Spanish officials considered it imperative to remain cordial with Paris which, for example, complicated Spain's Mexican problems and later influenced relations with Peru and Chile. But this could not be helped. France had tremendous leverage with Spain. She could allow Madrid's political enemies to use her territory for launching attacks on Spain; French businessmen could cripple Spain's economy by withdrawing their investments; and Napoleon III could deny Isabel diplomatic support in defending Cuba.[2] And these were years of diplo-

[1] Jaime Vicens Vives, *Approaches to the History of Spain* (Berkeley, 1967), p. 134; C. A. M. Hennessy, *The Federal Republic in Spain: Pi y Margall and the Federal Republican Movement, 1868–1874* (Oxford, 1962), p. 13; María Carmen García-Nieto, *et al., Moderados y progresistas, 1833–1868* (Madrid, 1971), p. 21.

[2] Williard A. Smith, "Napoleon III and the Spanish Revolution of 1868," *The Journal of Modern History* **25** (September, 1953): p. 211.

matic flux when Metternich's order finally disintegrated and a new balance of power emerged with the dawn of the Bismarckian era. Spanish diplomats realized that fundamental changes were occurring in Europe and they wanted to insure that Spain's best interests would not be damaged as a result.[3] Therefore, they believed bold policies were dangerous. This attitude went far to explain the hesitancy officials experienced when news arrived of the Dominican annexation or of their anxiety about the European impact of Prim's withdrawal from Mexico.

The primary interests of the United States also shed light on her diplomatic activity. Washington considered the New World the number one area of its concern and relegated Europe to second place. As a result of conflicting interests in Hispanic America, Spain and the United States competed with each other. Yet for the Americans as with the Spanish, certain factors remained consistent throughout these years. For example, most Americans in the United States believed they would someday inherit Cuba. While Pierce and Buchanan worked hard to bring that inevitable day closer, Lincoln and Johnson disagreed with these tactics but not with their belief. A second source of primary considerations lay in the conviction that the influence of the United States in Latin America increased continuously both politically and economically. Moreover, North Americans found Spain's interference in their southward expansion a nuisance since they believed South America and the Caribbean belonged in their sphere of influence, not in Spain's. The clash of interests with Madrid explained to a large degree their concern for Santo Domingo and Mexico. The implications of Spain's problems with Peru and Chile were also not lost on American diplomats who knew that Madrid's difficulties might eventually lead to a setback in Washington's own influence in the area.

Spanish-American rivalry obviously accented many characteristics of Washington's foreign policy. In the nineteenth century the United States may not have wanted to sign entangling alliances with European powers but this did not prevent her from remaining very concerned about Europe's affairs. Aware that their influence on European governments was small, Americans nonetheless could, for example, play the British off against the French or pit one power against Spain in the New World. This became quite evident in much of the Cuban diplomacy of the mid-1850s and again during the Peruvian and Chilean crises. As with Spain, American diplomatic tactics were subject to daily revisions which never reflected any master plan. Buchanan's Cuban policies grew out of his vision of what the United States should do while the Civil War restricted Lincoln's alternatives. Existing problems with Peru and Chile required stop-gap measures. In short, like Spain, the primary interests of the United States were protected by a myriad of hurried efforts. In both cases, the activities of one government influenced the tactics of the other, making any search for a coherent pattern difficult if not impossible.

Poor communications also played havoc with Washington's stratagems, delaying the arrival of information and sometimes making reactions outdated. Seward had to wait at least six weeks for a written response from Perry to any of his dispatches. Although the mail ran quicker to and from the Caribbean the problem remained the same. This meant that diplomats in the field could operate with considerable freedom. Aware of this situation, both the Spanish and American foreign offices issued instructions written in generalized language which often left to their representatives the choice of how to implement basic guidelines. Availability of telegraphic communications with Europe and parts of the Gulf of Mexico by the mid-1860s did not alleviate the situation because facilities were few, expensive, and not very private.

Spanish and American self-interest, therefore, proved to be the yard stick by which officials in Madrid, Washington, and in the field determined which policies to follow. While this in itself caused confusion, since officials differed in interpretations of their country's best interests, no other viable means for guiding diplomatic activity was found. Foreign offices armed their representatives with voluminous position papers, but in the final analysis most diplomats had to act on their own instincts and hope for the best. This created fluctuations in the implementation of policies but did not represent basic changes in the primary concerns of any nation on how its interests should be protected. O'Donnell thought Spain's cause would be best served by a hard line with Peru and Chile; Narváez thought otherwise. Buchanan believed acquiring Cuba served his nation's interests while Lincoln did not. Obviously officials in both countries had to draw their motives from what they considered to be the well of self-interest.

Value systems consequently influenced diplomacy. Diplomatic conflicts were partly due to cultural misunderstanding. Examples of different values at work abound. One important one involved Spain's genuine concern for her role as cultural leader in Latin America. American diplomats virtually ignored the ideology of *hispanismo,* choosing instead to worry about its political and economic manifestations. Washington's representatives never read Ferrer de Couto's writings, yet to this Spaniard and many others questions of *raza* were important. North Americans simply dismissed such notions as rhetorical nonsense.

Neither government paid sufficient attention to cultural differences in implementing policies. García

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[3] Conte, *Recuerdos de un diplomatico,* 2: passim.

Tassara, Dodge, Preston, Schurz, Koerner, Hale, and Goñi hardly mentioned this in their dispatches. About the only exception was Perry, who occasionally attempted to make some comments useful to officials in Washington. He found it convenient to make simplistic comparisons in order to indicate to less sensitive officials the delicacy with which Spanish diplomats had to be handled:

> You must treat Spain as you would a pretty woman with a bad temper. Firm and constant and unyielding in your purpose, but flexible and always flattering in form—watching her moods—taking advantages of her prejudices and passions to modify her conduct towards you . . . logic and sound policy will not guide her unless you take good care of the region of her sentiments first.[4]

Although amusing, this passage indicates the real problems posed when two separate societies try to understand each other. In Perry's comments, at least, is the recognition that Spain and the United States differed in more than political ways.

The Civil War caused Spaniards both in and out of government to study the United States because of her potential impact on Spain's interests in Latin America. They took an obvious interest in the technological advances made in warfare and, like other countries, their observers came to America to gather information.[5] But it went beyond this point. A few books appeared on the United States in which writers analyzed the United States searching for a possible model to use in solving Spanish problems. Some American practices were adopted. For instance, Spain's constitution of 1869 incorporated features from Washington's. Americans, on the other hand, appeared to take little interest in finding applicable features in Spanish society.[6]

Diplomatic relations between the two governments were conducted by people who influenced events with their own views. One can quickly point to Buchanan's interest in Cuba, Serrano's role in Santo Domingo, Prim's withdrawal from Mexico, or to Spain's admirals in the Pacific. To better understand the nature of Spanish-American relations and their influence in continuing the tradition of diplomatic conflict while reflecting the manner in which their governments implemented policies, a few comments about the major figures are in order.

The four presidents who enter into this study—Pierce, Buchanan, Lincoln, and Johnson—held different views on Spain and how to deal with her. The first two played active roles in formulating policies and considered Cuba their primary international problem. They thought of Isabel's government in competitive terms and made no attempt to hide their opinions. Each wanted to acquire Cuba, block Spanish expansion into Santo Domingo and Mexico, while using this rivalry for domestic political purposes. More than Pierce, Buchanan nurtured Cuban annexation almost as a private crusade which strained his relations with García Tassara and the Spanish government. He dominated the State Department, virtually taking over the job as secretary of state.

In sharp contrast were Lincoln and Johnson. After studying Franco-American relations, Lynn M. Case and Warren F. Spencer concluded that Lincoln played a minor role in American foreign relations, emerging only on rare occasions whenever Seward threatened to complicate matters—as in his note of April, 1861, and later during the Trent Affair. In Spain, as in France, Lincoln's reputation as a statesman grew with time. His speeches, magnanimity, and the Emancipation Proclamation clearly set him apart from many other national leaders. When he died in 1865, Spaniards from all walks of life realized that a great man had gone. *La Iberia* caught the spirit of his reputation by calling him the "patriarch of liberty." Lincoln's good image may well have been enhanced by having Seward conduct the daily diplomacy with Spain, thereby isolating himself from the Spanish government.[7]

Spaniards knew little about President Johnson and naturally felt concerned about his views on foreign affairs. However, since by 1865 Seward had become entrenched in the Department of State and enjoyed a reputation as a skilled diplomat, Johnson chose to allow him to carry on the brunt of American diplomacy. In fact, the president took little interest in international relations and only on occasion would pressure Seward to work harder for a solution to the war in the Pacific.

On the other side of the Atlantic, Isabel II usually left the problems of administering Spanish-American relations to her cabinet even though she held strong views about the New World. She was not willing to give up Cuba. The queen also thought the United States wanted to destroy all Spanish credit—political, economic, and cultural—in Hispanic America. Isabel believed that it would be possible to increase Spanish influence in the area, but left to the Foreign Office the task of blocking Washington's growing power to the south. Interested in acquiring Santo Domingo, providing Mexico with a king, and humbling Peru and Chile, she allowed her ministers considerable leeway in formulating policies. On occasion Isabel asserted

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[4] Perry to Sumner, May 15, 1863, Egan, "An American Diplomat in Spain," p. 66.

[5] Lt. Col. Caballeria, "La guerra civil en los Estados Unidos de América," manuscript No. 19524, Biblioteca Nacional; Goñi to Seward, April 24, 1868, US/notes/Sp/23.

[6] Emilio Jonveaux, *Los Estados Unidos de America del Norte. Estudio histórico actual* (Madrid, 1871), p. 1; Comas, *El mundo pintoresco*, p. 496; Oltra, *La influencía norteamericana en la constitución española de 1869*, pp. 37–38.

[7] Case and Spencer, *The United States and France*, pp. 601–602; *La Iberia*, April 28, 1865, p. 1.

her views when it appeared Spanish interests in the New World seemed threatened. Usually O'Donnell and Narváez could gain her approval for her Latin American programs. Only once did she stubbornly resist Narváez in the 1860s and that came in 1864 when he proposed withdrawing from Santo Domingo; but when he threatened to resign over the issue, Isabel relented and let him have his way. The queen displayed an incredible lack of interest in the details of Latin American diplomacy. As a rule she ignored international problems with the exceptions of the Vatican's situation in Italy and Spain's role in North Africa. In fact, one might argue that Isabel was naïve because, for example, she believed the Dominicans wanted to live under Spanish control. Fortunately for Spain, her ineptitude did not prevent more competent officials from dealing with the United States.

At the next descending echelon of responsibility for Spanish and American foreign policies were the prime ministers, foreign ministers, and secretaries of state. Because of the rapid turnover in Spanish cabinets, more than twice as many men headed Spain's foreign office as in the United States. Yet only several significantly influenced the course of Spanish-American relations. The dominant prime minister, who served in 1856, 1858 to 1863, and again from 1865 into 1866, was O'Donnell. A difficult man to judge on the basis of studying Spanish-American relations, he left much of the diplomatic homework to his subordinates much in the same manner as did Lincoln and Johnson. However, his views filtered down through the ranks of the Spanish Foreign Office.

Clearly a nationalist as concerned about Spain's image in the New World as with her influence, O'Donnell knew more about the area than most members of his cabinets. He had served as captain general in Cuba during the 1840s and as a military man appreciated most of the logistical and tactical issues relative to their political implications for Santo Domingo, Mexico, and the Pacific. Very much aware of the strategic importance of the United States in the Caribbean in relation to Cuba's security, he knew that Spain's primary threat in Latin America came from Washington. Yet O'Donnell either lacked vision or confidence or both. For example, he wanted to increase Spanish responsibility for annexation, hesitating to carry it through until forced to do so by the flow of events and political necessity. A similar pattern emerged in his handling of the Mexican affair, when again he wanted to solve a major problem even with the use of force but either failed to realize the possible consequences or did not want to accept them. O'Donnell's behavior went far, for example, to explain his fluctuating approval and disapproval of Prim's withdrawal during the closing months of 1862. O'Donnell respected the opinions of Calderon Collantes regarding the New World, leaving him to carry on diplomacy. In short, Spanish-American relations indicated the general held strong views yet felt unsure how best to act on them.

His major rival, General Narváez, proved to be an interesting contrast. Politically more experienced than O'Donnell, he served as prime minister for the fifth time in 1856–1857 and again in 1864–1865 and 1866–1868. If one failed to study how Spain became involved in Santo Domingo, Mexico, and the Pacific, it would be easy to conclude that O'Donnell led his country into military escapades and Narváez dismantled them. But this would be unfair to the truth. Perhaps Schurz should have called Narváez "a military man of cold reticent demeanor" instead of O'Donnell [8] because Narváez, no less than his rival, was proud, nationalistic, and sensitive to Spain's image in the New World. Yet he proved to be a more practical politician who enjoyed greater confidence in his abilities. For instance, he saw more clearly than O'Donnell that Spain had little to gain by remaining in Santo Domingo and although he loved political power, he risked it with the queen in order to pull out. Again more obviously than O'Donnell, he realized Spain could only lose by an extended conflict in the Pacific. Narváez worked for a solution while hoping to preserve intact Spain's honor. He also became more personally involved in the necessary diplomacy than O'Donnell, frequently meeting with British, French, and American diplomats.

The other prime ministers between the mid-1850s and 1868 were relatively less significant because their short terms prevented them from influencing international affairs. The one exception was Baldomero Espartero, who ruled between 1854 and 1856. As a general, liberal politician, and ardent nationalist, he worried about American annexationist attempts on Cuba, essentially reflecting O'Donnell's views on the problem. Francisco Javier Istúriz, who ruled briefly in 1858, was a professional diplomat and might have been expected to work easily with the Americans but did not remain in office long enough to initiate any important diplomatic effort. Miraflores served for a short period in 1863 and 1864. Already an old conservative by 1863 with years of diplomatic experience, he mistrusted republicanism and believed Washington would waste no opportunity to seize Cuba. Miraflores wanted to shore up Spain's position in the New World by being wary of the United States. Yet he proved to be such a cautious minister that Koerner wrote that the Marqués "would be the last man I

[8] Schurz, *Reminiscences* **2**: p. 266.

should think in Spain to enter upon anything like a cold and dangerous policy." [9]

One of the most influential men in implementing Spanish diplomacy during these years and one of the least understood by historians, was Calderon Collantes. No one has written a biography on him, which is discomforting since each American diplomat in Madrid acknowledged his importance to Spain's international relations and attempted to describe him. They told of his experience in the Cortes and how O'Donnell and Narváez found his counsel useful. Preston though him ceremonious. Schurz commented on him on numerous occasions and later in his memoirs. In 1861, he wrote that Calderon Collantes was "vain and bombastic" but "possess (*sic*) the courage commonly falling to the lot of those who have not strength and clearness of mind to measure the difficulties of what they are undertaking." He accused him of making numerous administrative blunders in the Foreign Office and harshly said, "he will eagerly grasp at anything that bids fair to relieve him of his embarrassments." The envoy proved to be kinder in his memoirs, likening the Spaniard to a "schoolmaster" with a bad French accent.[10] Schurz may well have been too hard on Calderon Collantes since he generally disliked all Spaniards.

Perry and Koerner thought better of him. Like Schurz, however, Koerner compared him to "an old professor" of philosophy of archaeology, noting that "there was nothing Spanish about him but his French, which he spoke with the strongest Spanish accent." Koerner "found him the most pleasant of all foreign ministers to deal with." He called him "frank and straight," and said he "spoke to the point." And like Perry, the envoy admired the foreign minister's sense of humor.[11] Calderon Collantes added a note of professionalism to the Foreign Office, despite what his critics charged. Not always popular with his colleagues, he attempted to place in perspective Spanish diplomatic activity in Europe with Latin American affairs, viewing Spain's international problems in global terms. He believed the United States was a growing power in the New World and appreciated the significance of the American Civil War on Spanish relations with the ex-colonies. Yet Calderon Collantes had his weaknesses. For instance, he did not know quite how to handle the French in 1862 and, like O'Donnell, struggled with the problem of maintaining friendly relations with Paris while trying to save face by approving Prim's withdrawal. Augusto Conte, a gifted Spanish diplomat of the period, called him a hard worker but thought he "did not understand the French." [12] Despite such criticisms, Calderon Collantes recognized Spain's primary interests and worked to protect them.

He took great interest in the French since they were Spain's neighbors and chief ally in European councils. Since he focused his main concern on European affairs, American problems, although irritants to be dealt with, were of secondary importance. He viewed Washington's form of government with suspicion and, like most Spaniards, worried about Cuba's security. He disliked Prim intensely but for practical purposes supported the general on Mexico. Yet he tried to offset this by praising the French in public and supported Napoleon III's Italian policies. His practicality and concern for detail became most evident in his dealings with Washington. The minister's patient preoccupation with diplomatic procedures and concern for Cuban affairs emerged in the way he ran his ministry. The machinery of the Spanish foreign office ran far smoother, as a consequence, than Schurz would admit.

In the United States the equivalents to Spain's foreign ministers were Marcy, Cass, Black, and Seward. During Pierce's administration, Marcy proved to be a cautious, practical man who often disapproved of the overt attempts to acquire Cuba by force. He counseled prudence, calling for a negotiated sale of the island, although probably believing Spain would not surrender her prize willingly. Foreign envoys in Washington found him predictable and responsible. Cass and Black can be dismissed quickly since, in practice, Buchanan served as his own secretary of state. Spanish-American diplomacy confirmed this while indicating that Cass, in particular, rarely volunteered advice regarding Spain. In fact, his role might be likened to that of two other foreign ministers, Llorente and Bermúdez de Castro. Since Black served as secretary of state for less than three months, he hardly had an opportunity to influence diplomacy.

Secretary Seward became the most important diplomatic official in the government of the United States during the 1860s. His significance is greater to Washington's diplomacy than Calderon Collantes's to Madrid because he remained in office from 1861 to 1869 serving under presidents who allowed him much leeway in conducting foreign policy. His threat of war over Santo Domingo and preoccupation with recognition of the Confederacy made García Tassara worry about him. Calderon Collantes also felt concerned about the possibility of Seward's acting brashly. But as the years passed, Seward's diplo-

[9] Koerner to Seward, No. 54, September 20, 1863, US/desp/Sp/45.

[10] Preston to Cass, No. 2, March 9, 1859, US/desp/Sp/42; Schurz to Seward, No. 22, September 27, 1861, *Ibid.*/43; Schurz, *Reminiscences* 2: p. 252.

[11] McCormack, *Memoirs of Gustave Koerner* 2: pp. 262, 306–307.

[12] Conte, *Recuerdos de un diplomatico* 2: p. 521.

matic skills improved and he gained a reputation for being a responsible diplomat.

The characters and personalities of Spanish and American envoys are also worth exploring. Little is known about the five Spanish ministers to the United States relative to their political views. Leopoldo Cueto, Calderon de la Barca, and Escalante feared Cuba would be seized by the United States while they served in Washington. Madrid's instructions, their dispatches, and the politics of the 1850s indicated that their tours of duty were unpleasant. They disliked Washington's Latin American policies and personally thought little of Pierce and Buchanan. And they never tried to understand Americans whom they considered their nation's enemies. Historically more interesting then these three men was García Tassara.

It is unfortunate that none of the published accounts of diplomatic life in Washington included useful comments on García Tassara's personality. No analysis of his character could be found in the State Department's records and the only published biography of García Tassara hardly proved useful. This laudatory account simply praised his diplomatic efforts while criticizing the United States.[13] Yet several general conclusions can be drawn about him. He came to the United States expecting to repeat Escalante's experiences and, like his predecessor, never fully understood American society let alone the many tenets of its foreign policy. He worried about Cuba at first and again toward the end of his tour of duty. García Tassara never quite appreciated the significance of military events to the degree that the British and French envoys did; therefore, it is easy to understand why Madrid often received faulty analysis of American affairs.

His personal relations with Seward, members of Congress, and the diplomatic corps grew almost intimate and, as his senority increased, he sometimes acted as spokesman for the other envoys. He exaggerated conditions and became overly excited in his interpretations of events. His reports frequently read like essays on Spain's international mission with little concrete data. The envoy would often storm into the State Department to complain about some condition without having sufficient facts to warrant his explosions. This became evident during Butler's activities in New Orleans and later when Chilean privateers were rumored to be near the United States. The Civil War fascinated him and his numerous accounts of the battles reflected a concern for the minutiae of war—all of relative unimportance to the Foreign Office since he usually failed to provide accurate predictions about future developments.

His successor, Fecundo Goñi, proved more difficult to analyze. Although he served in Washington almost four years to the day, the documentary remains created the image of a quiet, unobtrusive professional diplomat who avoided the limelight. Goñi believed the time had come for Spain to negotiate a settlement with Chile and Peru. He resented the uncooperative nature of the Latin Americans but proved to be a patient envoy. In sharp contrast to García Tassara, his dispatches were dispassionate essays on international relations grounded in cautious speculations and confirmed information. Less flamboyant than his predecessor, Goñi's reputation as a skilled diplomat gave him an advantage García Tassara never enjoyed in the New World. He accepted the competitive nature of Spanish-American relations which García Tassara resented. Beyond these simple observations, Goñi remains a mystery to be solved by some future biography. Interestingly, his tenure represented the only period in which Spanish-American relations were almost cordial and one cannot help but think that he was partially responsible.

Across the Atlantic, Isabel's government saw a parade of American ministers. In general, these men were unpopular and, like their counterpart in Washington, either disliked the country in which they served or misunderstood it. Soulé, Dodge, and Preston hardly improved relations with Spain. Soulé nearly caused a military clash between the two since his behavior in Madrid was anything but diplomatic. Dodge had no experience in international affairs and the records hardly supply any insights into his functions as a diplomat since his duties were few.

Because Preston served at the end of a critical period in Spanish-American relations and at the dawn of new problems, his position proved critical and indeed his influence was measurable. Perry and Schurz accused him of providing Madrid with a pro-Spanish view of American politics, and no doubt he did. Yet perhaps Perry and Schurz were too harsh with him. Preston's dispatches and the responses from Washington suggested that while the minister probably could not help but give Spanish officials his view of American events, he clearly attempted to represent Washington in Madrid. In contrast to Soulé, Dodge, and some of his successors, Preston's personal relations with the *Madrileños* remained cordial enough for him to feel comfortable in Spanish society.

No American minister since Soulé came more unwelcome to Madrid than Carl Schurz. Yet if the Spaniards disliked him, he despised them even more. Schurz wrote to a friend in October, 1861, that "Spain, in all respects, fails to come up to my expectations," calling it "a desert land and an uncultivated people." He believed Spanish officials were drawn from "a group of stiff aristocrats inflated by the sense of their authority."[14] He expressed his views too

[13] Menendez Bejarano, *Tassara*, pp. 87–139.

[14] Schafer, *Intimate Letters of Carl Schurz*, pp. 263–264.

bluntly and constantly offered unrequested opinions. While in Spain he advised Lincoln on military and diplomatic matters, of bypassing Seward. Almost from the day he arrived in Madrid he devoted his enormous reserve of energy to returning home where he could advance his political career much faster.

Schurz never disguised from Spaniards his disappointment with their country. He found them so difficult to work with that usually Perry would manage many of his duties. Yet Schurz took some interest in the political affairs of the *democraticos* and *republicanos* and met with their leaders. This in turn made the Spanish government even more resentful of his presence. Fortunately for historians he left some fleeting comments on a few politicians worth reproducing. He thought Emilio Castelar spoke well and modestly. Moreover, "he made me feel his poetic enthusiasm for the great American republic, and the fervor of his wish that the champions of liberty would triumph over the uprising of the slave-holders." He called Salustiano de Olózaga a statesman and believed Nicolás María Rivero a "well-bred but easy-going man of the people." [15]

Koerner, who replaced Schurz as minister, tried to perform his duties enthusiastically. He learned a great deal about Spain from Perry and acquired a speaking knowledge of Spanish which he used in nurturing close relations with officials. Koerner commented on them in his memoirs in complimentary language, unlike Schurz. He even made favorable remarks about Adolph Barrot, the French minister, whom he and Perry believed worked against their interests, noting that the "handsome and portly" Frenchman was always personally kind to him and his family.[16] In short, the available evidence suggested that he became the most competent American minister sent to Spain during 1850s and 1860s.

After Soulé, the least competent of Washington's envoys was John P. Hale. His biographer argued that Hale had little to do in Madrid, but failed to explain why, in light of the fact that Spain and the United States were involved in complicated negotiations over the war in the Pacific.[17] In explanation, the Spanish officials would have little to do with the envoy because they believed Hale violated their laws several times by bringing furniture and rugs into Spain without paying duty on them. Moreover, the Spanish customs office kept supplying the cabinet with evidence that he sold these items to a merchant in Madrid. Since diplomats could only bring into the country duty-free items for their own personal use, Spanish authorities found little to respect in Hale. The envoy's biographer did not explore these serious charges sufficiently, since a reading of the Spanish or American diplomatic records indicated Hale had indeed violated several Spanish laws.[18]

Hale also committed a tactical error in 1867 when he visited Paris without officially naming a chargé for his legation. The Spanish Foreign Office did not know if his absence represented a hardening of American policy toward Madrid because of the Latin American war or the start of a new drive for Cuba. In fact, one official believed Spain could justly look "with offense on the manner in which Mr. Hale left for Paris." Perry tried to cover up Hale's blunder but with little success.[19] Between the Parisian episode and his problems with Spanish customs, Hale virtually became a *persona non grata*. Hale's impropriety led Spanish diplomats to communicate with the United States through their legation in Washington, which slowed negotiations on Seward's various mediation proposals.

As if his two indiscretions were not enough, Hale and Perry clashed and, in fact, each spent several years writing to the State Department criticizing the other. This obviously crippled the legation's effectiveness. In 1869, President Ulysses S. Grant settled their quarrel by simply replacing them with new employees. Although in his biography of Hale Professor Sewell defended the envoy, the evidence indicated that Hale should bear responsibility for most of his difficulties in Madrid.[20] Despite a personality clash with Perry, he could not do without his services and should not have violated Spanish laws. The Parisian incident also could have been averted by checking with Perry or someone else on the correct procedure to follow before leaving Madrid. In short, Hale's incompetence contributed to continuing friction between the United States and Spain.

Perry's role in Spanish-American relations compared with García Tassara's. He served in Spain from the late 1840s until shortly after Soulé's return to the United States. Reappointed in 1861, he worked as secretary of the legation and, when need be, as chargé d'affaires until 1869. Perry was perhaps the only American diplomat besides Koerner dealing with Spain in this period who wanted friendlier relations between Madrid and Washington. Although an impossible dream, he worked hard to achieve it. Perry married a Spaniard and as one British diplomat

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[15] Schurz, *Reminiscences*, pp. 266–267.

[16] McCormack, *Memoirs of Gustave Koerner*, 2: p. 295, quote 263.

[17] Sewell, *John P. Hale*, p. 266.

[18] Min. of Finance to Min. of St., February 21, 1867, Sp/Hale personnel file/legajo 1313, file 6272. The same file has voluminous papers on this problem.

[19] Min. of St. to Goñi, November 26, 1867, *Ibid.*; Perry to Rafael Gabot, October 9, 1867, *Ibid.*

[20] Sewell, *John P. Hale*, pp. 266 ff. For an analysis of Hale's misbehavior, see James W. Cortada, "The Undiplomatic Mission to Spain of John P. Hale, 1865–1869," *Lincoln Herald* (Fall, 1977): pp. 109–115.

noted, he "acquired more sympathy than is met with in the generality of his countrymen."[21] Most of Spain's leading politicians liked him and Narváez counted Perry among his personal friends.[22]

Perry usually enjoyed good working relations with American ministers. Soulé and Hale were the exceptions to an otherwise unbroken chain of friendships. He remained in Madrid throughout the 1850s while Dodge and Preston served in Spain, even developing friendships with them. Schurz praised Perry's knowledge of Spanish society and respected his professional competence. Koerner noted that Perry knew "the country and parties and the court intrigues" although he found that the secretary occasionally let "his imagination" outrun reality.[23] Files of the Department of State abound with self-serving letters by Perry to Seward and others suggesting that he tried to be named minister to Spain. Yet his long tenure in Madrid, like García Tassara's in Washington, gave the legation the kind of administrative continuity necessary for the smooth execution of daily diplomatic duties. Unlike García Tassara, he understood better the country in which he served and consequently his evaluations were more often correct. In fact, Perry's position in Spain made him privy to information that even some influential Spaniards were denied. These factors, no doubt, made him feel eminently qualified to serve as minister.

What influence did the experiences of these diplomats and the events of the 1850s and 1860s have on future relations? In other words, were the two governments able to reconcile their differences and co-exist peacefully in the New World? The answer to these difficult questions ultimately gives meaning to any study of Spanish-American relations in mid-century. In late 1868 and early 1869 it appeared that perhaps the two nations would quarrel less. The Spanish revolution in the fall convinced many Americans that Spain would adopt a republican form of government. The *New York Times*, for example, editorialized that "whatever the result of the rising, a return to the old system of misgovernment and repression will be impossible." The American legation in London reported Spain would install a republican government. When the Spanish revolt erupted, many liberals in Spain expressed confidence that their country could reform Cuba and maintain peaceful relations with the United States.[24] However, hopes for more amicable conditions ignored the realities of international relations.

Just because the United States elected a new president or Spain had a revolution did not mean that basic conflicts could readily be resolved. Both still competed for dominance in the New World and each wanted to govern Cuba. Neither believed the other capable of ignoring a tradition of hostility. But Cuba proved to be the testing ground since problems in the colony suggested the real course of Spanish-American relations for the rest of the century. Her own revolution gave hope to those Americans who wanted the island free of Spanish control, while causing Spaniards to suspect the United States of encouraging the rebels. The Ten Years War (1868–1878) in Cuba ended with the reassertion of Spanish authority, thereby insuring that Spain and the United States would continue to compete in the Caribbean.

Spanish diplomatic dispatches for the period 1879 to the late 1890s indicated that nothing really changed. Madrid still suspected the United States of sponsoring filibustering expeditions to Cuba. And as before, Washington denied such accusations although Americans believed Cuba would eventually be theirs.[25] The United States also continued her interest in Latin America. In 1886 the Spanish Foreign Office felt compelled to warn its representatives of American expansion into South America in language reminiscent of the 1850s.[26] Officials watched Secretary of State James G. Blaine's efforts to hold a Latin American congress since they felt he would undermine Spain's influence in the New World. In this particular instance, the Spanish notified participating Hispanic governments that they viewed any conference sponsored by the United States as harmful to "the natural influence of Europe in nations of the Latin race that occupy Central and South America."[27] Rumors of the United States planning to negotiate a customs union in Latin America also drew heated response from the Spanish in 1886.[28]

No less concerned than the Spaniards were the Americans. While historians in the United States documented the increased economic penetration by Americans into Cuba in the 1880s and 1890s, they failed to indicate that the nature of this competition had not changed since the 1840s. In fact, dispatches from Madrid in the second half of the century read

[21] Howden to Clarendon, November 17, 1857, F072/921.

[22] Based on a raft of personal notes between the two families, Narváez Papers, Real Academia de la Historia.

[23] Schurz, *Reminiscences* 2: pp. 254–255; McCormack, *Memoirs of Gustave Koerner*, 2: pp. 258–259.

[24] *New York Times*, September 27, 1868, p. 4; Johnson to Seward, No. 21, September 26, 1868, US/desp/GB/47; Olivar Bertrand, *España y los españoles cien años atras*, pp. 182–185.

[25] For two examples out of many, Valera to Min. of St., No. 89, April 16, 1884, Sp/corr/USA/1478; Valera to Min. of St., No. 187, July 27, 1884, *Ibid.*

[26] Draft of note by Min. of St., March 15, 1886, Sp/corr/USA/1479.

[27] Min. of St. to all ministers in Latin America, undated (1882), Sp/pol/USA/2412.

[28] Min. of St. to all ministers in Latin America, May 31, 1886, Sp/pol/USA/2413.

much like those written prior to the Civil War.[29] If anything changed it was the level of friction over Cuba which actually increased to the point of war by 1898.

It is hard to escape the conclusion that diplomatic relations in the 1850s and 1860s hardly changed those of later years. Rather, they contributed to a tradition of conflict. This proved almost inevitable since the balance of power in the New World was changing. The United States grew in importance there while Spanish influence declined. Reflecting the general phenomena affecting both sides of the Atlantic during these years, new powers emerged and crises in national identities affected everyone. As with European diplomacy, relations between the United States and Spain in mid-century proved to be the seedbed of future problems.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

The bibliography presented below represents the majority of the materials consulted for this monograph. Since this is one of the few published books to make extensive use of a variety of Spanish archival sources to describe Spain's diplomacy of the mid-nineteenth century, careful attention has been paid to provide a detailed list of manuscripts used. Several comments must be made about the documentary material as it applies to the study of Spanish diplomacy in general. First, the files of the Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores for the past century are very complete, organized, and easy to use. They are divided into country files, groups (*legajos*) dealing with political matters, general correspondence, treaty negotiations, consular reports, and personnel records. Second, papers on a particular subject are filed by topic rather than by nation. Third, these papers are extremely voluminous for any major country. Following a time-honored tradition, Spanish diplomats generated vast quantities of material describing diplomatic events, political and economic conditions of the countries to which they were assigned, and others detailing what they considered to be issues deserving special consideration by Madrid. The personnel files are often the only source of information about a diplomat and thus are also an important reference tool.

The diplomatic papers at this foreign office are extremely rich in material on every major diplomatic issue of the nineteenth century. Spain's diplomats were generally well connected to the governments they called on and thus their papers represent a major virtually untapped source of data on the diplomacy of the world. When combined with the useful collections of private papers at the Royal Academy of History, the National Library and Archive, and the scattered collections to be found in libraries of universities and institutes in Madrid, a large body of material is available for writing either diplomatic or domestic Spanish history. Many of Spain's diplomats of the past century were also leading political and literary figures of their day and as a consequence their diplomatic files are crowded with items concerning domestic Spanish affairs. In comparison with the better known files of American diplomats, I am convinced that the Spanish collections are more varied, voluminous, and informative about diplomacy and domestic national events for the nineteenth century. Moreover, they usually included large collections of newspaper clippings (all dated and identified), pamphlets, broadsides, petitions, and other forms of paper memorabilia.

The archive of the Foreign Office, along with those of other archives in Madrid, keep detailed indexes and cross-referenced lists of existing materials for the entire nineteenth century. Card files at the Foreign Office for each country and file sub-group are large. The papers themselves, however, are kept in bundles tied with red ribbons, not in bound volumes as do the British, French, and Americans. They are also so unused that many of them are extremely dusty and contain dispatches that have never been removed from their envelopes—something that should influence our interpretation of a particular document's importance!

The papers found at the Public Records Office and at the French Foreign Ministry are extremely useful in examining the opinions of particular individuals in the United States and Spain regarding diplomacy. The French papers are quite similar to the Spanish in offering detailed analyses of events and what they mean while the British papers provide more factual data with less interpretation. In this sense they are much like the better organized American papers except more voluminous and detailed.

Researchers working in the area of Spanish diplomatic history will find that there are not as many collections of private papers as they would consult in Britain, France, or the United States. For historians of American foreign policy examining Spanish collections, a similar problem exists with the one exception of certain private collections of leading political figures—the queen for example, who, it would appear, wrote opinions about many people in her memorandum.

Newspapers from Spain were heavily used in this project, more so than similar publications in Britain, France, or the United States. Papers from countries other than Spain have already been studied by historians for the period in question but almost no work has been done with Spain's. Therefore, an attempt has been made to measure Spanish public opinion through the study of its highly politicized press which

[29] For two examples out of many, *FRUS (1883)*, pp. 796–797; *FRUS (1888)*, Part II, pp. 1435–1438.

reflected every major point of view in the country. For factual data about events, researchers should rely on manuscript material since the newspapers are all organs of various interest groups bent on interpreting events in their own way. More work needs to be done by historians of Spanish and American diplomacy using Spain's newspapers because not much of the historical literature on the subject of Spanish-American relations accounts for the impact of Spanish domestic events on diplomacy. As an incentive, the reader should know that most Spanish cities have complete bound sets of all newspapers published locally since the late 1700s in special newspaper archives.

A further word should be said about contemporary printed materials. While the items listed below were consulted for this book, researchers should be aware that there is a large body of polemical literature on American and Spanish diplomacy, and issues concerning international affairs, that have not been effectively studied in assessing various points of view. They represent an extension of the journalistic activities of the age but are more informative since they are lengthier publications. Often they were written by people who continually studied particular issues, such as problems in Santo Domingo, Mexico, and Cuba. The finest collections of these pamphlets can be found in the New York Public Library and in the *legajos* of the Spanish Foreign Office's archives.

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