

COMMUNICATIONS

THE COST OF PITT'S CARIBBEAN CAMPAIGNS, 1793–1798

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In October 1796, it was claimed in the house of commons that almost every person in the country knew someone who had died in the military campaigns then being fought out in the Caribbean.¹ In less than four years, the government of William Pitt had sent well over 60,000 soldiers to the West Indies to reinforce the 6,000 already stationed there. While fearing the threat to Britain's slave colonies of France's proselytizing revolutionaries, the ministry more particularly had hoped to profit from the political chaos in the French West Indies and to conquer these extremely valuable possessions for the British empire.² The great influx of unacclimatized troops, however, fuelled a massive pandemic of yellow fever which raged throughout the Caribbean and decimated each wave of reinforcements.³

As early as August 1794, the level of mortalities in the West Indies had aroused public alarm, and by 1796 rumours of the numbers dead and of the great costs incurred 'were topics of general conversation and complaint'.⁴ The Foxite whigs accused the government of weakening the country's defences in the greedy pursuit of overseas gains and of allowing troops to suffer through incompetence and neglect. A 'violent debate' took place in the commons in April but the ministry managed to avoid producing any mortality statistics.⁵ During the autumn, however, public disquiet increased. Rumours seeped back to Britain of huge losses suffered by the troops who had sailed with Sir Ralph Abercromby only nine months before in what was the greatest expedition ever to have left Great Britain. A correspondent of Edmund Burke informed him that, according to undisclosed official returns, 10,000 men had perished in just fifty-two days. It was at this time that Burke added to the later printings of his *Regicide peace* the famous line about fighting to conquer a cemetery.⁶ The names of officers who had died of yellow fever now appeared frequently in the obituary columns.

In the October debates, British losses in the French colony of Saint Domingue (modern Haiti) were singled out for condemnation,⁷ for it was there that British policy had most signally failed. The following May, the whigs compelled the ministry

¹ *Annual Register*, 1797, p. 128.

² D. Geggus, 'The British government and the Saint Domingue slave revolt, 1793–1798', *English Historical Review*, xcvi (1981), 285–305.

³ D. Geggus, 'Yellow fever in the 1790s: the British army in occupied Saint Domingue', *Medical History*, xxiii (1979), 38–58.

⁴ *The Times*, 15 Aug. 1794; *Annual Register*, 1796, p. 66ff.

⁵ *Annual Register*, 1796, p. 66ff.; *Parliamentary history*, xxxii, 902–18.

⁶ However, Burke actually made this addition to his *Regicide peace* a few weeks before he received Dr Lawrence's letter of 24 November: Charles William, Earl Fitzwilliam, and Sir Richard Bourke (eds.), *Correspondence of the Rt. Hon. Edmund Burke* (4 vols., London, 1844), iv, 366–7; T. W. Copeland (ed.), *The correspondence of Edmund Burke* (10 vols., Cambridge, 1958–78), ix, 97 n. 1.

⁷ *Annual Register*, 1797, p. 128.

to inform parliament of the costs of Saint Domingue's occupation, and then forced a debate demanding the colony's immediate evacuation. Operations there had been 'more calamitous' than anywhere else, it was claimed.⁸ Although the commons voted overwhelmingly against withdrawal, fearing for the safety of Jamaica, it was observed at this time that 'the name of St Domingo is dreaded and execrated by all descriptions'. The numbers who had died there 'filled the minds of everyone with terror and astonishment'. So much so, in fact, that at this crucial hour of the European war, recruitment for the army was being hindered, as men were afraid of being sent to the West Indies.⁹ Under pressure from the black general Toussaint Louverture, the British forces finally evacuated Saint Domingue in September 1798, and the Caribbean then ceased to be a major theatre of operations. Nevertheless, Saint Domingue remained a sore memory for the British public and when, in December 1801, a naval squadron was ordered there from Ireland, its crews mutinied.¹⁰

What then, was the cost of these Caribbean campaigns? In 1796 the ministry laid before parliament a mass of accounts relating to operations in the south Caribbean (Windward and Leeward Islands) but which revealed nothing regarding mortalities.¹¹ In May 1797 it was officially stated that in Saint Domingue 7,530 British troops had perished by the end of September 1796, and that total losses among the foreign troops in British pay who were sent there amounted to 1,067, dead, discharged and deserted.¹² This, however, was only 'so far as could be ascertained' and covered merely the first three years of the occupation. When Bryan Edwards published in 1801 a second edition of his *Historical survey of Saint Domingue*, he claimed that about 20,000 troops and seamen had died in the colony.¹³ More extravagant estimates were soon to follow,¹⁴ though no contemporary seems to have looked at British losses elsewhere in the Caribbean.

The best known account of the West India campaigns is that found in J. W. Fortescue's *History of the British army*. He estimated Britain's losses in the West Indies during the period 1793–98 at nearly 100,000 British soldiers and seamen, about half of them mortalities, the remainder 'permanently unfitted for service'.¹⁵ Like Bryan Edwards before him,¹⁶ he implied that losses were concentrated in Saint Domingue. 'The secret of England's impotence for the first six years of the war', he wrote, 'may be said to lie in the two fatal words, St Domingo.'¹⁷ Fortescue's

⁸ *Parliamentary history*, xxxiii, 575–94.

⁹ Hector McLean, *An enquiry into the nature and causes of the great mortality among the troops at St Domingo* (London, 1797), preface, p. 80. Cf. *Annual Register*, 1797, pp. 121–6; D. Geggus, 'British opinion and the emergence of Haiti, 1791–1805', in J. Walvin (ed.), *Slavery and British society, 1776–1846* (London, 1982).

¹⁰ *Annual Register*, 1802, p. 74. Fourteen seamen were executed.

¹¹ *Parliamentary papers, house of commons, 1795–6*, xlii (840).

¹² *Parliamentary papers, house of commons, 1796–7*, xliii (867).

¹³ Bryan Edwards, *Historical survey of the island of St Domingo* (London, 1801), p. 399.

¹⁴ Figures of 30,000 and 45,000 are given in P. de Lacroix, *Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de la révolution de Saint-Domingue* (Paris, 1819) and in C. Malenfant, *Des colonies et particulièrement de celle de Saint-Domingue* (Paris, 1814). In May, 1802, Richard Brinsley Sheridan claimed that the whole war had cost nearly 200,000 British lives: *Parliamentary history*, xxxvi, 819.

¹⁵ J. W. Fortescue, *History of the British army* (13 vols., London, 1899–1930), vi, 565.

¹⁶ Edwards, *Survey*, p. 402.

¹⁷ Fortescue, *History*, iv, 325. Cf. R. Augier, *The making of the West Indies* (London, 1974), p. 115: 'Between 1794 and 1798, nearly 100,000 British soldiers and sailors were lost in the West Indies, the greater part in St. Domingue.'

calculations, however, although they have been widely quoted, are rather perplexing and have been the subject of considerable confusion. It is not always clear whether they take account of officers and NCOs or of foreign troops in British pay, and they are a little vague as to which figures apply to which periods. Fortescue acknowledged that guesswork played no small part in his arithmetic, and his reputation is not that of a careful historian.¹⁸ He approached the subject, moreover, with something less than impartiality.¹⁹

Recently, Dr Roger Buckley has noted that Fortescue's computation of the number of troops discharged unfit is 'simply not supported by the records', though he has endorsed his mortality estimates.²⁰ Or rather, what he believed were his mortality estimates. For when Fortescue, half way through his account of the campaigns, wrote of 40,000 soldiers dead and as many again 'lost to the service',²¹ Buckley assumes he was referring to losses in the West Indies during the whole period 1793–98, whereas other historians, such as J. H. Plumb and J. Steven Watson, thought that only the years up to 1796 were in question.²² Buckley criticizes them for 'misreading Fortescue's tallies'.²³ I have replied, arguing that Fortescue's figures are misleading and contain inconsistencies that have inevitably confused his readers.²⁴ Yet on further examination, it seems that probably all of us have been mistaken and, out of sheer carelessness, have misread Fortescue's intention. The passage referring to '80,000 soldiers lost to the service, including 40,000 actually dead' indeed concerns only the years 1793–96, but it applies to the entire British army 'in all quarters'. No historian who quotes these figures appears to have realized this.²⁵

Nevertheless, if Fortescue's calculations are not in fact inconsistent,²⁶ they clearly do need revising, if only because he does not seem to have had access to all the relevant documentation now available in the P.R.O. and Scottish Record Office. I have already attempted a detailed examination of British losses in Saint

¹⁸ Witness his editing of *The correspondence of King George III* (6 vols., London, 1927–8).

¹⁹ In addition to a general antipathy towards the West Indies, which almost involved him in a libel suit with the West India Committee, Fortescue was peculiarly critical of the Saint Domingue venture, displaying towards its chief proponent, Henry Dundas, a hostility reminiscent of that of his forbear, the foreign secretary, Grenville.

²⁰ R. N. Buckley, 'The destruction of the British Army in the West Indies, 1793–1815: a medical history', *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, LVI (1978), 85 n. 30; R. N. Buckley, *Slaves in red coats: the British West India regiments, 1795–1815* (New Haven, 1979), p. 99.

²¹ *History*, IV, 496.

²² J. H. Plumb, *England in the eighteenth century* (Harmondsworth, 1963), p. 198; J. Steven Watson, *The reign of George III* (Oxford, 1964), p. 370.

²³ Buckley, 'Destruction', p. 79 n. 3.

²⁴ D. Geggus, 'The destruction of the British army in the West Indies, 1793–1815: some further comments', *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, LVI (1978), 238–40; D. Geggus, *Slavery, war and revolution: the British occupation of Saint Domingue, 1793–1798* (Oxford, 1982), pp. 362, 383. In addition to the two estimates mentioned, Fortescue also wrote (p. 496) of 25,000 soldiers and 10,000 seamen dying in the West Indies in the period 1794–6.

²⁵ In addition to Plumb, Steven Watson, Buckley and myself, see also Sir K. G. Feiling, *A history of England from the coming of the English to 1918* (London, 1950), p. 746; G. Williams, *The expansion of Europe in the eighteenth century* (London, 1966), p. 243; Sir A. Bryant, *The years of endurance, 1793–1802* (London, 1944), p. 151. Plumb and Bryant actually refer only to the years 1794–6.

²⁶ However, there are obvious inconsistencies between Fortescue's *History*, (IV, 565) and the calculations in his later work, *British statesmen of the Great War, 1793–1814* (Oxford, 1911), pp. 129–30.

Domingue²⁷ and offered a rough estimate of military losses elsewhere in the West Indies.²⁸ What is now needed is a thorough investigation of Britain's losses in the south Caribbean, where most of the soldiers served and where most of the fighting took place.

This can be done using the series of general monthly returns of the Windward and Leeward Islands command, which show the numbers of rank and file dead, discharged and deserted for each regiment and which are far more complete than the returns for Saint Domingue.²⁹ Only five are missing for the period 1793–98. The gaps can be filled by extrapolation with reference to changes in total strength, or by straight-line extrapolation where losses are obscured by large-scale arrivals or departures of troops. However, there are some difficulties. It appears that the losses of sergeants and drummers were rarely recorded, and there is reason to suspect that officers' deaths were also under-recorded. For these, one has to rely heavily on extrapolation. In addition, some regimental returns were not made up in time for the general return, and where the regiments were drafted, extrapolation from adjacent returns is not possible and reference has to be made to average regimental losses. The lacunae, moreover, tend to come from periods and places of high mortality, so the scope for error is all the greater. Nonetheless, all things considered, the margin of error in the overall calculation is unlikely to exceed 1,000. The results, in rounded figures, are summarized in Table 1.

When we compare the losses of the British garrisons in Jamaica³⁰ and Saint Domingue with those in the south Caribbean (Table 2), it becomes apparent that about 35,000 British troops died in the West Indies during the years 1793–98.³¹ It is ironic that, if we include the losses of the foreign troops in British pay (Table 3), the red herring figure of 40,000 dead soldiers is seemingly confirmed, although, as we have noted, it really applies to a different grouping, a different area and a different period.³² Whether or not foreign troops are counted, it is clear that only about one-third of Britain's losses in the Caribbean took place in Saint Domingue. Far more men died on St Lucia, Grenada and Martinique. Moreover, during the first two years of the war, while Britain had an army on the continent, as many men were lost in Europe as they were in the West Indies.³³

The losses of the navy are far more difficult to estimate. Bryan Edwards put the number of deaths of seamen in Saint Domingue at 5,000, though I have suggested, using naval hospital statistics, that 2,500 is a more accurate guess.³⁴ In Jamaica's

²⁷ Geggus, *Slavery, war and revolution*, ch. 13, pt 2.

²⁸ Geggus, 'Further comments'.

²⁹ Public Records Office, WO 17/2484–90.

³⁰ P.R.O., WO 17/1986–90. I have revised upwards the figure previously given in 'Further comments', p. 239. A gap of several months in the Jamaican records makes any estimate uncertain.

³¹ Some allowance needs to be made for the small detachments which served in the Bahamas and the Honduras settlement.

³² That Fortescue included only British troops in his calculations is shown, I think, when he refers (*History*, p. 565) to the official estimate of losses in Saint Domingue and omits from it the losses of European troops in British pay.

³³ Here I rely on Fortescue, *History*, iv, 324, 496. On 3 Feb. 1795 an account was presented to the house of commons of military losses distinguishing the different theatres of war but it was not printed and no details of it seem to have survived: *Commons journals*, L, 121.

³⁴ Geggus, *Slavery, war and revolution*, p. 362. In April 1797, it was demanded in the house of commons that statements be provided of the mortalities in the royal navy and transport service. Only the latter were produced, however, and these were not printed.

Table 1. *Losses of British troops, Windward/Leeward Islands Command, 1793-98*

	Dead	Discharged	Deserted	Total
1793	670	785	30	1,485
1794	4,110	320	65	4,495
1795	3,545	1,010	115	4,670
1796	6,630	735	160	7,525
1797	2,515	930	100	3,545
1798	1,585	320	75	1,980
Total	19,055	4,100	545	23,700

Note: This includes the Royal Artillery and Engineers, detachments from Saint Domingue, the Hospital Corps and the 60th Foot, which was a line regiment composed of foreigners. I have excluded the black West India Regiments excepting their officers, who were all whites, though not all British. The loss of British subjects is therefore overstated. I have estimated the deaths of officers, NCOs and drummers at 530, and the unrecorded deaths in Berville camp, Guadeloupe, captured in October, 1794, at 150. Troops discharged and transferred into other corps in the West Indies have not been counted; nor have men on furlough, though they doubtless included some invalids who died while convalescing in Europe. On the other hand, some discharged men remained in the West Indies unofficially attached to the army, and many deserters were probably recaptured and reincorporated into their regiments. The area covered is the whole south Caribbean, including Demerara.

Table 2. *Losses of British troops in the West Indies, 1793-98*

	Dead	Discharged	Deserted	Total
South Caribbean	19,055	4,100	545	23,700
Jamaica	2,990	1,395	680	5,065
Saint Domingue	12,695	1,410	300	14,405
Total	34,740	6,905	1,525	43,170

Note: The losses of small detachments stationed in the Bahamas and Honduras settlement are not included.

Table 3. *Losses of foreign regiments in British pay, 1793-98*

	Dead	Discharged	Deserted	Total
South Caribbean	3,240	155	140	3,535
Saint Domingue	2,500	100?	200?	2,800?
Total	5,740	255	340	6,335

Note: These were troops sent from Europe, mainly German, with some French and Dutch. I have not included the locally-raised colonial corps, whose losses were anyway relatively light. Officers' deaths are estimated at 180. As the returns for Saint Domingue are very incomplete, the estimates given are merely informed guesses.

naval hospital, 1,920 seamen died between 1793 and 1798,³⁵ but for the south Caribbean one can offer only the crudest of guesses. Supposing that on the royal navy's two stations in the Caribbean mortalities were roughly equal, then one might guess that around 10,000 British seamen perished in this period (though by no means all of them British subjects, of course). If the ratio of dead to discharged and deserted resembled that of the army, the overall losses of the royal navy and transport service would be in the region of 12,500. That they can have exceeded 20,000 seems very unlikely.

Given the amount of uncertainty that remains, one might conclude that Fortescue's estimate of mortalities was not grossly wide of the mark. He appears to have overstated the death toll in the Windward Isles in 1794³⁶ and evidently exaggerated British losses in Saint Domingue. Yet his global figure of about 50,000 British soldiers and seamen dead was probably only slightly exaggerated, perhaps by 5,000. However, his estimate of total losses seems to have been greatly in error. The magic number of 100,000 must be reduced by at least a third, and probably should have been no more than 56,000.

As for the financial cost of the Caribbean campaigns, estimates have ranged from the 'several hundreds of thousands of pounds' mentioned by a biographer of Henry Dundas³⁷ to the £30,000,000 estimated for the occupation of Saint Domingue alone by Marcus Rainsford.³⁸ While both of these figures can be shown to be hugely erroneous, it is difficult to arrive at an accurate substitute. Calculations are assisted, however, thanks to Pitt having streamlined at the prompting of the commissioners for public accounts the system of financing the army.³⁹ In each theatre of war most military expenditure was centralized in the hands of a commissary-general, who drew bills of exchange on the treasury at the request of the previously independent quarter-masters and barrack-masters general, commanding engineers, inspectors of hospitals, etc. The pay of the rank and file white troops remained the responsibility of the deputy paymasters-general, however, and during the first years of the war they also handled the expenses of the commissariat in the absence of a commissary.

Between December 1792 and December 1800 the expenditure of the pay department in the West Indies amounted to £2,065,000.⁴⁰ Of this, perhaps £1,750,000 fell in the period 1793–98. In Saint Domingue commissariat expenditure came to a staggering £5,765,000,⁴¹ but in the Windward/Leeward Islands it was approximately £2,668,000 to judge from the printed statements of the 'army extraordinaries'.⁴² To these sums, however, must be added about £400,000 'for provisions supplied to the army in the Caribbean by the navy commissioners, some £117,000 for wine sent out by the paymaster-general and £28,000 for medicines supplied in 1794 by the apothecary-general. The pay and contingent expenses of the black West India regiments totalled £183,000, the purchase of horses in the United States £72,000 and another £126,000 was expended separately by the

³⁵ P.R.O., ADM 102/426–7.

³⁶ See *History*, IV, 385.

³⁷ Holden Furber, *Henry Dundas, first Viscount Melville* (London, 1931), p. 100.

³⁸ M. Rainsford, *An historical account of the black empire of Hayti* (London, 1805), p. 412.

³⁹ *Parliamentary papers, house of commons, 1809*, v (141), 278–9, 292; P.R.O., 30/8/242, 97–216. The initiative in the matter derived from the 7th report of the committee for public accounts, 18 June 1782.

⁴⁰ *Parliamentary papers, house of commons, 1809*, v (141), 277.

⁴¹ P.R.O., AO 3/200 and 265.

⁴² *Commons journals*, 49–54. Unless otherwise stated, the *Commons journals* are the source of all subsequent figures.

barrack-master general on the provision and equipping of barracks. The two great expeditions of 1794 and 1796 carried with them £342,000 of ordnance and ordnance stores (including £91,000 worth for Saint Domingue), while a further £119,000 was paid out by the ordnance department for the artillery captured in the French islands (£28,000 worth in Saint Domingue). The ordnance department's periodic expenditure in the West Indies, mainly on pay and stores, amounted to another £605,000. To these sums should be added around £100,000 for miscellaneous items such as officers' claims for lost baggage, officials' pay, etc.

The value of the stores sent out by the army victualling department is not readily ascertainable, and I can only suggest that a guess of £1,000,000 might be an overestimate. The cost of transporting the troops to the West Indies is also elusive but can be calculated with a little more confidence. In 1794–5 the total expenditure of the transport service on Caribbean operations amounted to £860,000.⁴³ Figures for the following years do not seem to be available, but shipping was hired at thirteen shillings per ton and the Abercromby expedition, Dundas claimed, involved 100,000 tons.⁴⁴ As this might well be an exaggeration,⁴⁵ one might risk ignoring the additional costs for conversions, bedding, indemnity for loss, etc. If the ships were used for an average of six months in 1796, that year's expenditure would have totalled £390,000. Given that few troops were sent out in 1797–98, one might hazard a guess that overall shipping costs would have been approximately £1,500,000. This can be compared to Rainsford's estimate that the cost of equipping a soldier and sending him to the West Indies was £30.⁴⁶ For a total of 65,000 soldiers, this would produce a figure of £1,950,000. Finally, the governors of the British West India colonies drew during these six years some £1,038,000 'for Public Services'. However, this sum included civil expenditure, as well as at least £250,000 already counted, being spent in Saint Domingue by the governor of Jamaica.

The list is undoubtedly not exhaustive and can claim at best only a crude sort of accuracy. It provides a basis, nonetheless, for placing the military costs of Pitt's Caribbean campaigns in the region of £16,000,000. This may be an underestimate, as the amount of bills drawn in the West Indies on the treasury in the years 1793 and 1795–97 totalled £10,151,000,⁴⁷ which might suggest a figure closer to £20,000,000 but not very much more.

Of course, a large part of this sum would have been expended, whether the government had mounted a Caribbean offensive or not. The West India colonies still had to be defended. The troops raised still had to be fed and supplied. The only additional expenditure deriving from an offensive strategy was that of shipping to the West Indies the extra troops required, together with some allowance for the region's high cost of living. The costs of the royal navy in the Caribbean were probably not greatly affected by the strategy adopted. All things being equal, warfare in the West Indies was considerably more expensive than campaigning on the continent. This was mainly because of logistic problems, but official corruption also seems to have flourished in the region, despite Pitt's reforms of the financial

⁴³ *Parliamentary papers, house of commons, 1795–6*, XLII (840), 231.

⁴⁴ *Facts relative to the conduct of the war in the West Indies*... (London, 1796), 32–53.

⁴⁵ The tonnage of the troopships was only 50,000 tons; that of the ordnance ships, about 4,000 tons: P.R.O., WO 1/798.

⁴⁶ See above, n. 38.

⁴⁷ *Commons journals*, XLIX, 81, LI, 287, LII, 271, LIII, 257.

machinery.⁴⁸ However, because of the ministry's greater commitment of troops to the continent during the early years of the war, the actual difference in financial outlay between the continental and Caribbean campaigns undertaken was probably not very great. Whereas commissariat expenditure in the West Indies totalled about £9,500,000, that of the British army in Flanders came to £6,574,000 for just the period March 1793–March 1796, with about £1,213,000 being spent in 1796–97.⁴⁹

It should be noted, furthermore, that a sizeable part of the expenditure in the Caribbean was recouped directly in taxation. Even the benighted British administration in Saint Domingue managed to raise almost £500,000 in local taxation⁵⁰ and doubtless rather more was raised in Martinique and Demerara, which were occupied in 1794 and 1796. While the economic importance of Demerara, seized from Holland, has been already stressed by others, the trade of the occupied French islands ought not to be underrated. In the years 1794–98, imports into Great Britain from Martinique and Saint Domingue alone paid over £760,000 in customs duty.⁵¹ During the same period, their imports from Britain amounted to £3,461,000, more than one-fifth as much as those of the entire British West Indies.⁵²

The British colonies meanwhile flourished. In 1793 customs duty paid on brown sugar imported into Britain amounted to £1,473,000; in 1798 it was £2,070,000.⁵³ The proportion of British shipping engaged in the West India trade also rose considerably, along with the British islands' share of total British trade.⁵⁴ Whether it was necessary, however, to occupy enemy colonies in order to protect these increasingly valuable assets is open to question. As regards Jamaica, I have argued elsewhere that a defensive strategy would have been more effective.⁵⁵ In the south Caribbean, however, where revolutionary forces from Guadeloupe came close to destroying two British colonies, the situation was rather different and the argument from necessity, put forward by the ministry,⁵⁶ was far more plausible.

Neither the Caribbean nor the continental campaigns of the 1790s contributed anything towards ending the war with France, and in human and financial terms both were extremely costly. West India operations, however, possessed a fiscal and economic rationale those in Europe did not,⁵⁷ and their cost was considerably less than has usually been supposed.

⁴⁸ Treasury investigators later unearthed 'such a mass of public corruption, fraud and abuse', they declared, 'as has never, probably, been equalled in the history of the country'. The main offenders were commissaries and paymasters who falsified the rates at which bills were negotiated, with the collusion of merchant friends, and who charged for stores that were never actually supplied. Abuses were concentrated, it seems, not in Saint Domingue but in the south Caribbean. When reforms were implemented in 1806, average expenditure was cut by 18 per cent, *Parliamentary papers, house of commons, 1809*, v (141), 273, 361 and passim.

⁴⁹ P.R.O., 30/8/239, 141–2; above, n. 47.

⁵⁰ Above, n. 41.

⁵¹ P.R.O., CUST 17/16–20.

⁵² Geggus, *Slavery, war and revolution*, p. 377 (Customs House values).

⁵³ *Commons journals*, XLIX, 111; *Parliamentary papers, house of commons, 1798–9*, XLVIII (970).

⁵⁴ *Cambridge history of the British Empire*, vol. 2 (Cambridge, 1940), p. 66; S. Drescher, *Econocide. British slavery in the era of abolition* (Pittsburgh, 1977), p. 67.

⁵⁵ Geggus, *Slavery, war and revolution*, pp. 384–5.

⁵⁶ *Parliamentary history*, xxxii, 752 and xxxiii, 584.

⁵⁷ In this period, the exclusion of British goods from Europe was not yet a danger.