Habana, September 23, 1957-5 p.m.

172. Had two-hour cordial informal conversation with Batista last night my request. Foreign Minister Guell present. Campa failed to point out delivery of tanks was deferred not cancelled.

I explained fully reasons for deferring delivery tanks and pointed out that State and Defense Departments had made decision only after carefully weighing advantages against possible disadvantages to both US and GOC. I explained existing and possible future criticism of US Government from public, press and Congress and reiterated decision was the only proper action to take to preserve the good relationship between our two governments. Another incident such as Cienfuegos might cause grave embarrassment to both governments if tanks were prepared for delivery at this time. Batista intimated he understood our position. However he said GOC would cancel order for tanks to avoid any adverse psychological effect and would explain locally to Cuban military that decision was taken because tanks were not needed and disproportionately costly for slight benefit derived. He added future deliveries of arms under MAAG are needed and GOC concerned with general over-all future policy of US regarding shipments under MAAG program. I told him so far as I knew decision on tanks covered only that particular case. Batista mentioned in passing that Cuba could purchase from other sources but did not pursue subject possibly since I pointed out Cuba had no outside enemies and reminded him of consultation provision of MAAG agreement.

Batista's main concern in relations with US at present is unquestionably activities of Carlos Prio. Batista convinced Cienfuegos revolt instigated and financed by Prio. He expressed deep concern over what he described as our continued toleration Prio's activities which permits Prio to supply arms, bombs and money from US soil for attempted overthrow present GOC. He maintained GOC has concrete evidence including serial numbers weapons with which to prove his charges concerning Prio's activities. I said US would be interested such evidence and he agreed submit same. Batista said we should not refuse to sell him military equipment and yet permit Prio to ship arms to revolutionaries. I mentioned in general terms heavy criticism US Government from various sources for its military dealings with allegedly dictatorial governments in Latin America and GOC's recent use such equipment in Cienfuegos incident.

I assured him visit to Department by Prio and deferment sale tanks had no relation or significance. He was appreciative of this point but most unhappy over what he considers our laxity in connection activities Prio and associates.

I assured Batista primary interest of US was to have a stable government in Cuba which would maintain law and order and live up to its domestic and international obligations. I added US Government fully aware of imponderables which might ensue were there to be a change in present GOC and also aware of Communist activities.

My reactions to conversation are that: (a) Batista is convinced of correctness his position regarding Prio activities, (b) intends hold free and open elections but plans assure continuity of government by transfer to safe hands, (c) his present thinking is to woo me away from present impartial attitude, toward pro-Batista attitude.

Smith
 
 

NOTES:

[1]Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/9-2357. Confidential.