[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]
Mr. [Allen] Dulles then turned to Cuba, characterizing the situation there as one of continued deterioration. The Government had reinforced Santiago after a series of Castro victories in the vicinity. The Intelligence Community believed that Batista would be unable to muster enough strength to save himself and that Castro would probably emerge the victor in what had now become Civil war. Batista is considering turning over power to a successor, but the latter would also probably lose to Castro. A military junta assuming power under a guarantee of early elections might change the trend toward the rebels. In view of unrest in the Army, the desertion of Batista by business, and rebel victories, the situation is critical.
The President said that at a diplomatic dinner [2] his Latin American friends had told him that as soon as Castro achieved power, another Castro would probably come along; and that Cuba would become a problem with Castro in control. The President suggested that perhaps Batista should be induced to turn power over to his successor. Mr. Dulles said such a move should be made to look like a coup against Batista. The President agreed.
Secretary Herter said it was difficult to convince Batista that he could not achieve a military victory. Our Ambassador has been trying to see him but has been stalled off. [3] The President remarked that he found it difficult to understand how the rebel forces gained strength so rapidly. Mr. McCone reported that during his recent trip to Cuba he was told 95% of the people supported Castro.
[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]
S. Everett Gleason
NOTES:
1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Gleason.
2. Reference is presumably to the White House dinner the previous evening attended by various members of the Diplomatic Corps, including the Ambassadors of Nicaragua, E1 Salvador, Panama, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, Argentina, Paraguay, Venezuela, and Bolivia. (Ibid., President's Daily Appointments)
3. Apparently Smith's report of his conversation with Batista the previous evening (see supra) had not yet reached Washington