286. Telegram From the Ambassador in Cuba (Gardner) to the Secretary of State[1]

Habana, October 16, 1956, 8 p.m.

177. Following submitted to assist in evaluating situation outlined Department's 219.[2]

Government and opposition circles and press continue predict insurrectionary attempt before year-end probably next few weeks. Government maintains publicly plans call for uprisings and coordinated invasions from Central America and Dominican Republic and that all elements opposition involved. Privately, government apparently discounts possibility assistance from Dominican Republic, but insists Carlos Prio deeply involved.[3] Evidence this point inconclusive.

Principal opposition elements involved appear Fidel Castro movement,[4] remnants Sanchez Arango organization, so-called Revolutionary Directorate Federation University Students under leadership Jose Antonio Echevarria,[5] and small miscellaneous groups. They now reportedly engaged efforts promote general strike near future. Reports from various sources indicate Communist Party preparing take advantage general strike and accompanying disorders if possibility success assured apparently acting independently and not on basis prior agreement with other opposition elements. Secretary General Mujal of Cuban Confederation Workers[6] has stated publicly his organization non-political, will not participate general strike for political purposes. Mujal recently emphatically reaffirmed this position private conversation Embassy officers adding general strike has no chance success without sponsorship Confederation Workers. Castro and Echevarria may be sponsoring general strike, knowing it cannot succeed, as means avoid charge failure comply their public commitment undertake insurrectionary attempt this year.

Some reports from civilian opposition groups indicate they expect assistance armed forces. Some discontent of undetermined extent exists within armed forces, and persons closely associated with these elements speak very confidently. However they deny collaborating any way with civilian groups.

People enjoying high-level prosperity for Cuba and in general politically apathetic. Opposition disunited, and there no evidence insurrectionary groups have large following within country. Government displays utmost confidence and proceeding methodically with plans for elections 1957 and 1958.

Embassy considers some disturbance fomented by opposition likely near future, possibly along line assaults military garrisons Santiago 1953[7] and Matanzas April this year associated with call for general strike and attendant disorders. Any invasion attempt without support from military would be at best token gesture, and Embassy has no indications such coordinated support could be developed. A small and efficiently led group within armed forces could with reasonable luck manage garrison revolt similar to Batista's 1952 coup.[8] Discontented elements within army apparently planning along such lines, but Embassy has only one unconfirmed report to indicate they have sufficient cohesion and strength to warrant undertaking or achieve success. Key government military figures and government intelligence sources insist to Embassy contacts they confident loyalty armed forces, maintaining that with discovery Barquin conspiracy and imprisonment leaders April this year no significant group dissatisfied personnel remains.

Assassination attempt on Batista of course constant threat.

Regionally, Batista shows no signs any desire improve relations with Dominican Republic, apparently feeling present situation useful in domestic politics and gives added pretext for limits and controls on opposition activities. Embassy has no evidence Cuban Government encouraging or assisting activities of opposition groups or exiles from Dominican Republic or any other country.

Representatives interested agencies concur.

Gardner

NOTES:

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/10-1656. Secret. Repeated to Cuidad Trujillo. Copies were passed to Department of Defense, CIA, and FBI.

[2] In telegram 219, October 13, Hoover expressed the Department's concern with the signs of political ferment throughout Central America and the Caribbean and requested information on the political climate in these countries and on relations with neighbors. (Ibid., 713.00/10-1356)

[3] See infra.

[4]Reference is to the followers of Fidel Castro Ruz, the Cuban attorney and activist.

[5] Reference is to the president of the Federation of University Students, a small anti-Batista group composed largely of students from Habana University. Echevarria was killed on March 13, 1957, when he and a group of about 100 men assaulted the Presidential Palace in an attempt to kill Batista.

[6] Eusebio Mujal Bamiol, labor leader and head of the Confederation of Cuban Workers.

[7] On July 26, 1953, in an effort to provoke a general uprising against the Batista government, Fidel Castro led an unsuccessful attack on the Moncada military barracks in Santiago. After this, Castro's followers were referred to as "the 26th of July club."

[8]Batista's coup d'etat against the regime of President Carlos Prio Soccaras took place on March 10, 1952, and led to his assumption of the Presidency on April 4, 1952.