With Sampson through the War
BY W. A. M. GOODE

Being an Account of the Naval Operations of the North Atlantic Squadron during the Spanish American War of 1898

With Contributed Chapters by
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By Way of Dedication

With apologies for its shortcomings, I dedicate this book to my friends in the United States Navy, who treated me with such kindness while on board the flagship New York as correspondent for The Associated Press.
NOTE

Those naval officers good enough to contribute chapters are in no way responsible for or even cognizant of anything contained in this book except their own individual chapters.
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WITH SAMPSON THROUGH THE WAR

CHAPTER I.

ANTE-BELLUM MATTERS.

In the beginning of 1898 the United States Navy was, practically, in two divisions: one on the Pacific and one on the Atlantic. The Atlantic contingent was by far the more powerful, and it is to the doings of these ships, their officers, and crews, that this book is confined. In the month of January a detachment of the North Atlantic Squadron—which then consisted of all the battleships except the Oregon, all the armored cruisers, all the monitors except the Monadnock and Monterey, the majority of the second-class cruisers and gunboats—had been sent to the Gulf of Florida to exercise. The South Atlantic Squadron, consisting of the cruiser Cincinnati and the gunboats Castine and Wilmington, were cruising north along the coast of South America; the European Squadron, consisting of the Helena and Bancroft, were at Lisbon, Portugal; while in harbors and dockyards along our Eastern coast were cruisers and monitors out of commission or undergoing repairs. Several cruisers of the North Atlantic Squadron were already in the vicinity of the Gulf of Florida on watch for filibusters with arms and men for Cuban insurgents.

For two years the Gulf of Florida had not been utilized as exercising grounds for the squadron, because it was feared that Spain might construe the peaceful evolutions as a naval demonstration. But now the feeling between the two countries was more amicable than it had been for some time, and to cap this climax of amity the second-class...
battleship *Maine* was sent to Havana on a long-delayed visit of courtesy.

The telegraph operator at Key West, Fla., was sitting idly at his key on the night of February 15. Havana called him. He mechanically answered, expecting some personal message from his friend at the other end of the wire. Instead came quick, sharp ticks saying: "There has been a big explosion somewhere in the harbor." A few moments later the operator in Havana said: "The *Maine* has been blown up, and hundreds of sailors have been killed." Commander Forsyth, the commandant of the naval station at Key West, was asleep in his house a few blocks from the telegraph office. He was awakened, and at once sent a torpedo-boat with the startling news to Rear-Admiral Montgomery Sicard, commander-in-chief of the North Atlantic Squadron, who, with the *New York*, *Iowa*, *Texas*, *Massachusetts*, and *Indiana*, was at Dry Tortugas, the headquarters of the squadron. Dry Tortugas is an island sixty miles west of Key West, possessing an antiquated fort, and was then used as a base of operations for the manoeuvres. Admiral Sicard at once moved with the *New York* to Key West, so as to be in close touch with the Navy Department in case his ships were wanted to move hurriedly. The other ships were ordered to be ready to start day or night.

For not sending or taking two or three of his battleships that night to the scene of the disaster, without waiting for instructions from Washington, Admiral Sicard has been somewhat criticised by various naval officers. They maintain that a show of force by the United States Navy in Havana harbor on the morning after the *Maine* was blown up would have averted many of the unpleasant incidents which occurred subsequently, while some aver that it might have prevented the war itself, their idea being that once in Havana harbor the battleships, after investigation, could have demanded and secured satisfaction that would have paralyzed the hands of Spain. Instead, however, the small tender *Fern* went to Havana to bring the wounded
to Key West, and the people of that city actually believed that this boat was a fair type of the United States Navy. To the least-versed in naval matters it must be evident that there is much to be said on both sides of this question, and I am not prepared to say whether the place of the battleships was by the side of their destroyed sister, with her dead and wounded, or at Key West, in home waters and in close touch with Washington. A few weeks later the cruiser *Montgomery* was sent to Havana, and the risk she ran of being blown up in that harbor is taken by Admiral Sicard's critics as a justification of their theory. The whole question is interesting only because it opens up such endless possibilities, and the mention of it is not intended as a criticism by the author, implied or otherwise, upon Rear-Admiral Sicard or the McKinley administration.

At the head of the Navy Department at this time was John D. Long, a conservative, level-headed Republican from Massachusetts. Theodore Roosevelt was his Assistant Secretary. What the Secretary of the Navy lacked in aggressiveness—he was quite unjustly derided for peace proclivities—was more than atoned for by the radical activity of Mr. Roosevelt. For months the Assistant Secretary had been ferreting among the few musty anachronisms which still pervaded the United States Navy. He had done much good work and had several innovations in view when the *Maine* disaster brought into play all the energies of the Department. Then it was that the general public first realized Mr. Roosevelt's usefulness, and then it was that these two men, Roosevelt and Long, backed up by the President, put their shoulders to the wheel. But though they worked with unfailing zeal during the period which elapsed between the blowing up of the *Maine* and the declaration of war, their energies would have been useless drops in a bucket of confusion had not the navy itself been in good condition previous to the crisis. The Spanish naval administrators, probably, worked just as hard as did Long and
Roosevelt during the two ante-bellum months, but the Spaniards wasted their labors, because they dealt with a service without system, with crews that were not drilled, and with ships that were not cared for. It was not the "sprint" at the end, the feverish purchase of new ships or the repair of old ones, that enabled the United States Navy to meet all emergencies without hitch. No; it was the "hammer, hammer" on the hard road of routine; the result of the gradual building up, by recent administrations, of a new navy based on modern lines, whose officers were men of intelligence and training, always eager to keep in touch with European innovations, and who were probably hampered less by politics than any other body of public servants in the United States. Secretary Long and Mr. Roosevelt did much to foster and perfect this system of up-to-date activity; but they were not creators, though excellent manipulators. They deserve all praise for their work, especially for the addition of those finishing touches that the best of engines require before steam is turned on.

The whole world gave free expression to horror and to sympathy over the Maine disaster. Intermingled with the national grief over the loss of those 260 brave men, there rose up, in the United States, fierce denunciations of the Power that owned the harbor in which the Maine met her fate. Swayed by a natural, though then premature, desire for revenge, the less conservative nigh went mad. Newspapers of the lower order fed national vindictiveness with the fuel of flaring headlines, and politicians of the baser stamp ranted without ceasing. Amid this pandemonium, President McKinley did not budge one iota from the course plainly laid down by prudence and justice. But while the President turned a deaf ear to the clamors for war at any price, his Navy Department worked swiftly. The blowing up of the Maine had touched a mechanical spring in the

1 There is still some doubt as to the exact number lost on the Maine. In his report Secretary Long places the loss at 266; in the report of the Bureau of Navigation only 260 names are given.
naval organization far more powerful and more lasting than the sentimental flood it loosed among the people. The machinery, already well oiled, was set in motion. The Navy's answer to the popular cry, "Revenge yourselves," was an organized, far-reaching mobilization, a grim preparation for anything that might be required of it: reparation, retaliation, or defence.

The work of fixing the responsibility for the Maine disaster, as a matter of course, was delegated to the navy. The court of inquiry, appointed on February 17, consisted of Capt. W. T. Sampson, Capt. F. E. Chadwick, Lieut.-Commander W. P. Potter, with Lieut.-Commander A. T. Marix as judge-advocate. They commenced their sessions in Havana on February 21. The international crisis waited upon their verdict. Had this court found that the Maine was blown up by internal agency, through carelessness of her own crew, there is good ground for saying that there would have been no Spanish-American War,—at any rate, not until other developments had ripened the old-time friction to fighting point. Of the Maine court and its labors, which continued until the latter part of March, it is impossible to speak in too high terms. The service its members rendered practically involved the nation in war, but no truer, more disinterested, and trying work was ever performed by servants of the United States. In aiming at conclusions the court was ultra-conservative. From the day the keel of the Maine was found to be turned upward, there was little or no doubt that the explosion was external. By that time enough evidence had been gathered, pointing to that solution of the question, to make ninety-nine men out of a hundred aggressively positive of their grounds; but this court plodded on, hunting for some possible details that would prove carelessness on the part of their own service, or that would reveal a new theory of explosives, rather than for evidence that would confirm the unavoidable impressions drawn from the quickly-discovered essential features. The people of the United States grew importunate and
urged a quick verdict; but a court that was not influenced by national prejudice was not likely to be budged by popular clamor. Its members delved into intricate details, were deluged with letters from Cubans and others alleging to give even the name of the man who blew up the Maine (invariably each correspondent had a new candidate for the court’s consideration), journeyed to and from Havana, worked day and night on diagrams and evidence, and finally, on March 21, submitted a report, which was universally admitted to be a model of its kind, and which declared that the Maine must have been blown up by external agency, believed to be a submarine mine. The officers and crew of the Maine were completely exonerated from all blame. There was much circumstantial evidence, tending to prove the court’s finding; that was not included in its report to Congress, because Sampson and his fellows did not wish to submit anything to which the most critical could take exception. Sampson’s remarkable judgment and conservatism were first brought before the public by his able presidency over this court. The contrary report of the Spanish Commission, which declared that the Maine was blown up from internal causes, cannot even be considered, as the Spanish divers and commissioners did not take the trouble to make any examination—worth calling such—of the wreck, or any pains to elicit testimony from important witnesses. Even had they devoted the same amount of time and energy to the investigation as did the American commissioners, their findings could not have had the same weight, as the personnel of the Spanish court did not compare, from the point of view of naval intelligence, with that of the body appointed by the United States. All doubts that may have existed as to the equity of the American court’s findings were set at rest by an examination, at a later date, of the wrecked Spanish ships of Admiral Cervera’s squadron, which, though of inferior construction to the Maine, were submitted to far greater internal explosions than could have occurred within the American ship, and
yet showed none of that complete destruction and disintegration which made the *Maine* such a pitiful mark in the waters of Havana harbor.

On March 9 a fifty-million-dollar national defense measure was passed by Congress. The sum of $29,973,274.22 was allotted to the Navy Department, which at once began a vigorous purchase of ships for the increase of the navy. Before the war was over one hundred and two vessels had been purchased, at a total cost of $17,938,840, the majority of these being added to the navy list before the end of April. In addition to the ships bought outright the American liners *St. Paul*, *St. Louis*, *New York*, and *Paris* were chartered at a cost of $2,500 a day each for the first two and $2,000 a day each for the last two vessels. The *New York* was renamed the *Harvard* and the *Paris* became the *Yale*. Later in the war these vessels were turned over to the War Department to be used as troop-ships. Besides these one hundred and seven ships, two yachts were loaned to the Government—the *Free Lance*, by Augustus Schermerhorn, and the *Buccaneer*, by W. R. Hearst, making a total of one hundred and nine additional ships in the navy. These purchases were superintended by the Naval Auxiliary Cruiser Board, appointed on March 12. Captain Frederick Rogers, U.S.N., was its president. His efforts, and those of his fellow-members, resulted in much good. The most important purchases made were the four passenger steamers in the service of the Southern Pacific Company—*El Norte*, *El Rio*, *El Sol*, and *El Sud*—which were converted into the heavily armed cruisers *Yankee*, *Dixie*, *Prairie*, and *Yosemite*; the yacht *Mayflower*, which belonged to M. C. Borden, and was converted into what might be called a serviceable torpedo gunboat; and the yachts *Wasp*, *Hornet*, *Eagle*, *Hawk*, *Vixen*, *Scorpio*, *Hist*, *Restless*, *Yankton*, *Gloucester*, *Frolic*, which, with their light batteries, proved invaluable for blockade

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1 For a complete list of ships in the United States Navy, July 1, see Appendix, page 1.
duty. The balance of the board’s purchases consisted chiefly of powerful tugs, which in many cases proved just as useful as the yachts, and in colliers and supply vessels, to say nothing of one hospital, one repair, and one refrigerating ship. In the work of purchasing colliers the Naval Bureau of Equipment took a large share, and for the excellent and full coal supply which marked naval operations all credit is due Captain R. B. Bradford, chief of this bureau. During the period before war was declared Captain Bradford, acting independently of the purchasing board, directed especial attention to securing coaling stations and vessels for the transportation of this “sinew of war.” Large quantities were stored at St. Thomas, D. W. I., and other places. The bureau received many tenders for coal transportation from home shipping firms, and that part of the problem seemed solved; but when war actually was declared only one of these firms was able to live up to its bids, the others failing to do so on account of the excessive war insurance risks. Captain Bradford was thus left with only a few schooners to rely upon. In this emergency, and in conjunction with the Auxiliary Board, he was obliged to secure some ships without a moment’s loss of time. In its dire necessity the Government was taken advantage of by various ship-owners, and several steam colliers had to be bought at more than their real value. For instance, the Merrimac cost the Government $342,000. After that, mostly foreign colliers were purchased, and at fair prices. Eventually the navy became possessed of a collier fleet with a carrying capacity of 50,000 tons.

By far the most important individual additions to the navy, from a fighting-strength point of view, were made more or less independently of the Auxiliary Board. On March 16, Lieutenant Colwell, naval attaché to the United States Embassy in London, purchased for his Government the protected cruisers Amazonas and Almirante Abrú, the gunboat Diogenes, and the torpedo-boat Somers. The Almirante Abrú and Somers took no part in the war, the
former because she was not completed in time, and the latter because war was declared before she could sail from an English port for the United States, and the neutrality laws held her a prisoner in foreign water until peace was declared. The Almirante Abrú, like the New Orleans, was purchased from the Brazilian Government, and was afterward renamed the Albany. The price paid for the former was $1,205,000, and for the latter $1,429,215. The New Orleans, a steel-sheathed cruiser of 3,600 tons, took an active part in the war and proved thoroughly worth the price paid for her. She had just been completed at the Elswick shipping yards in England, had a speed of twenty knots, with a main battery of six 6-inch guns, a secondary battery of four 4.7-inch, ten 6-pounders, one 3-pounder, and two 1-pounders. She was the most important single purchase made, and proved satisfactory in every respect. Her Armstrong guns did much execution. During the campaign there was some trouble with the gun-mounts of the New Orleans, but this was nothing of a serious nature, and not remarkable in a new ship put to such severe firing tests. The Diogenes was renamed the Topeka, and also took part in the war. She was purchased from the Thames Iron Works, London, and proved a useful 1,800-ton gun-boat. She was built in 1883 for Peru, but was never paid for by that government. She came within an ace of taking part in the China-Japan war, having been actually bought and fitted by Japan, but being kept in English waters under the same conditions that caused the Somers to be held captive. The Somers was bought from the Schichau Iron Works, Elbing, Germany, and is a torpedo-boat about the same class as the Winslow.

The Nictheroy, a former merchant vessel of United States register, sold several years before as a dynamite cruiser to Brazil, was purchased by the Navy Department from that government and renamed the Buffalo. She cost $575,000, and during the war, owing to poor machinery, did nothing to prove herself worth the purchase. At the time of pur-
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chase the *Buffalo* was at Rio de Janeiro, from which port she made her way north.

Besides the addition of these one hundred and nine vessels the navy was strengthened by the accession of the nineteen cutters of the light-house and revenue service, which were loaned by the Treasury Department. These craft and the smaller of those obtained by purchase were quickly transformed, by the mounting of a few rapid-fire small-calibre guns, into useful gunboats.

Thus during the greater part of the war the effective fighting force of the navy, augmented by the one hundred and twenty-eight vessels secured by the efforts just recounted, consisted in detail as follows: Four battleships of the first class, one battleship of the second class, two armored cruisers, six coast-defence monitors, one armored ram, twelve protected cruisers, three unprotected cruisers, eighteen gunboats, one dynamite cruiser, eleven torpedo boats, ten monitors built for the Civil War, eleven auxiliary cruisers, twenty-eight converted yachts, twenty-seven converted tugs, nineteen converted colliers, fifteen revenue cutters, seven light-house tenders, and nineteen miscellaneous vessels, with a maximum strength of 24,133 enlisted men. Of all the one hundred and ninety-five effective vessels of the navy only eighteen were on the Pacific, leaving one hundred and seventy-seven on the North Atlantic. The force on the Pacific consisted of two monitors, four protected cruisers, five gunboats, three former revenue cutters, one wooden frigate, one wooden corvette, and two colliers. The great preponderance in number and strength of the Atlantic over the Pacific section of the United States navy is worthy of note.

The division of the one hundred and seventy-seven vessels on the North Atlantic resulted in the formation of four distinct squadrons, though later in the war these changed several times in character and command. The North Atlantic, which included the main fighting force of the navy, with headquarters at Key West, was weakened by the withdrawal
of the armored cruiser *Brooklyn* and the battleships *Texas* and *Massachusetts*, which vessels, with the fast protected cruisers *Columbia* and *Minneapolis*, were formed into the Flying Squadron and kept at Hampton Roads for coast defence purposes. The command of this squadron was given to Commodore Winfield Scott Schley. Later this Flying Squadron, which was credited with a sustained speed of fourteen knots, was in turn weakened by the withdrawal of the *Columbia* and *Minneapolis*, which were assigned to the Northern Patrol Squadron, formed April 20, and commanded by Commodore J. A. Howell. In addition to the *Columbia* and *Minneapolis* this squadron included the protected cruiser *San Francisco* (flagship) and the converted or auxiliary cruisers *Yankee, Dixie, Prairie,* and *Yosemite,* converted gunboat *Badger,* and collier *Soutbary.* The duties of this squadron were to patrol well out to sea and keep close watch on all shipping between the capes of Delaware and Bar Harbor, Maine. The fourth squadron, generally known as the "Mosquito Fleet," and manned almost entirely by the Naval Militia, as were the *Yankee, Dixie, Prairie,* and *Yosemite,* consisted at its zenith of forty-one vessels, chiefly converted yachts and tugs, and the ten monitors of the old navy. The command was given to Commander Horace Elmer, but he died, and Rear-Admiral Erben (re­tired) was appointed in his stead. The squadron, if such it may be called, was employed in coast defence, protection of mine fields, and maintaining quarantine regulations. The vessels made frequent cruises from port to port and had much target practice. The force was known as the United States Auxiliary Navy Force, and consisted of about four thousand enlisted men slightly trained in naval matters by service in the Naval Militia, who volunteered either as State organizations or as individuals. In connection with coast­defence work it may be mentioned that extra signal stations were established, manned by the Naval Militia, and that with this aid and that of the Life-Saving Service, the Light-House Service, and the Signal Service, there were
2,326 men constantly on watch for the appearance of any hostile ship off the North Atlantic Coast. The work of mining harbors and strengthening fortifications is the duty of the army, and was carried on more or less vigorously by the War Department prior to the outbreak of hostilities. Upon the work of the "Mosquito Fleet" and its complement of Naval Militia much might be written, but as the fleet had no opportunity to prove its positive usefulness I shall refrain from comment, except to observe that the precaution of establishing a close coast patrol was carried out in good season.

While the relations between Spain and the United States remained at fever heat, pending the report of the Maine Court, all the bureaus of the Navy Department worked unceasingly and piled arms, ammunition, stores, and men into ships. Every dockyard buzzed with activity. The battleship Oregon, then at San Francisco, was ordered to come around the Horn and join the North Atlantic Squadron. The bulk of Spain's naval force was in the Atlantic, and it was therefore necessary, both for offensive and defensive purposes, that the United States run no risks of encountering a superior naval force in those waters. The Atlantic force had been weakened by the loss of the Maine; the Oregon would more than supply the deficiency. It was palpable, also, that the Atlantic would be the seat of the principal naval operations in case of war.

Key West, in those ante-bellum days, was the centre of excitement, for there were to be seen the outward and visible signs of naval preparations for war, and that island, it was generally admitted, would be the starting-point for hostilities, besides being the base for operations against Cuba. For the latter purpose Key West from a geographical standpoint was unrivalled, but it was sadly lacking in nearly all the essentials of a modern coaling and supply station. Dry Tortugas had been quickly abandoned, and all the energies of the Department were concentrated upon Key West. The waters of its harbor were too shallow to
admit the entrance of the New York, Iowa, and Indiana, so they lay from February until April 22 seven miles out, practically at sea, constantly coaling and taking ammunition from lighters. The harbor itself was poorly protected, and it was not until after war had been declared that the army got guns mounted and submarine mines laid in sufficient quantity to render the island in a fair state of defence. As the war-vessels came in from north and south to this headquarters of the North Atlantic Squadron, the work of coaling and watering became more and more difficult. A distilling plant and coaling shed were built, and the harbor was dredged, but though Commander Forsyth and Assistant Paymaster Mohun worked night and day they were constantly unable to meet the demands of the ever-increasing fleet. It was not until the end of July that Key West proved satisfactory as a naval base. By that time a sufficient clerical and manual force had been granted to handle the vast amount of details which the coaling, watering, feeding, arming, and repairing of a large fleet entail. In no respect were its initial defects due to inefficiency on the part of the naval officers, who, before and during the war, were stationed there; nor indeed is this intended as a reflection upon the usefulness of Key West as a base. It is simply an illustration of the truism that a naval station, to serve its purpose in war, must be kept thoroughly equipped in times of peace.

To those who "drowsed the long tides idle" at Key West in the days before war was declared, the scenes enacted on and around that island have become inseparably connected with the war itself. Correspondents and officers of both arms crowded into the little island until there were no rooms vacant, and the local extortioner laughed and grew fat. The strain of those weeks of waiting was more trying than the effect of actual hostilities. After a time there was little for anyone to do except to sit down and wait. Almost every day there came rumors of a massacre of Americans in Havana, of the slaughtering of the Maine
Commission, of the assassination of Consul-General Lee, or of some other thing which never happened. Crews were not allowed shore liberty. Target practice was carried on without ceasing, and at night precautions against possible attack by Spanish torpedo-boats transformed the usually easy port watches into trying ordeals. Every insignificant detail of naval preparation was telegraphed north by the ubiquitous war correspondent, and quite frequently the general public first saw the workings of Washington through a practical illustration from Key West.

Naval officers, on the whole, had no particular desire for war, despite their traditional toast: "A bloody war and a sickly year." They were not influenced to any great extent by the desire for revenge, because they knew their revenge would have to be taken out of the Spanish navy, and between all navies there is a bon camaraderie, which utterly prevented American naval officers from harboring the suspicion that the Spanish navy had anything at all to do with the blowing up of the Maine. Naval officers were anxious to show the country what they could do, if the country wished to go to war, but they knew, as a general rule, too much about Cubans to feel enthusiasm at the prospect of taking up their cause. I well remember young Ensign Bagley saying: "If we're going to war, let's go to war about the Maine; hang the Cubans! and above all, let's begin right away." These sentiments were echoed by the majority of Bagley's seniors. The navy seemed quite prepared to begin hostilities on a scale large enough to cope with Spain, and all hoped that Spain would not be granted time to make herself more formidable.

Shortly before the recall of Consul-General Lee from Cuba the command of the North Atlantic Squadron changed hands. Rear-Admiral Sicard had been in poor health for some months. He had served his country long and well, and was due to retire the following September. Realizing that he was scarcely in fit physical condition to take command of a trying campaign, Secretary Long ordered Sicard
to convene a Board of Survey to examine himself as to his fitness for sea duty. In doing this Secretary Long, contrary to custom, went so far as to specify the personnel of the board. As Sicard thought he was well enough for all duty, this tried his temper to its utmost, and when the board decided that he was temporarily unfit for active service, the rear-admiral felt that he had been roughly ousted from his command at the very time when he most wished to retain it. I remember no more pathetic scene than the hurried departure from Key West of this white-haired old man. The general impression then was that the admiral had relinquished the coveted command of his own volition, and men and women grasped his hand as they said farewell, congratulating him upon his wise determination and wishing him a speedy recovery. He did not undeceive them, but went out with a grave, worn face, thinking bitterly of the years of hard service and of this last chance for fame and professional glory, slipping away when almost within his grasp. But it was all for the best, and when he was later appointed as a member of the Strategic Board, Rear-Admiral Sicard probably realized that what he first looked upon as national ingratitude was, in reality, the most beneficial both for himself and for his country. Certainly he did not harbor any ill-feeling against his successor, Captain William T. Sampson, then in command of the Iowa, who had just completed his labors as president of the Maine Court of Inquiry.

During the latter part of the war so many false statements were published about Sampson’s appointment, that I cannot lay too much stress upon the actual facts of the case. When Sicard was relieved, Sampson, by right of rank among the officers then on duty with the North Atlantic Squadron, was ordered to assume command. This was on March 26. With so many of his seniors ready for sea service it was scarcely supposed that a captain would be allowed to retain such an important post, and current public opinion was that one of the rear-ad-
mirals, notably Walker, or perhaps one of the commodores, would supersede Sampson before the outbreak of hostilities. With the exception of his service on the Maine Commission, Sampson was scarcely known outside the service. Strong political and other influences were brought to bear in behalf of some of his seniors. There was absolutely no pressure brought to bear in his behalf. In Washington Sampson had few friends; his residence at the capital, while Chief of Ordnance, had scarcely been more than productive of a few acquaintances, because at that period he was too engrossed in bureau work to break through his habitual reserve for the sake of making friends, political or otherwise. Secretary Long knew practically nothing of Sampson's personality. He had no idea what his politics might be, for the good reason that Sampson has none. Inspection of Sampson's record revealed no extraordinary feats. He had been blown up on the Patapsco during the Civil War, and had made an excellent Chief of Ordnance. Beyond this, his career had been one of ordinary naval routine, carefully and honorably discharged. Before bending to political pressure and before following the usual course of giving high rank its rights, Secretary Long made inquiries among the practical men: Sampson's seniors and juniors in the service. He ascertained that they had implicit confidence in Sampson as a man of ability, integrity, and sound judgment. This opinion they had gained by intimate association and by knowledge of detail not sensational enough to come before the public eye, but all-important in the formation of character analysis. So, trusting to the common sense of the best men in the navy rather than to the rules of rank and to the voice of influence, Secretary Long decided to put Sampson in charge of the aggressive naval campaign. The "jump" over his seniors was not so great as might be supposed, because Sampson was then almost the ranking captain, and the difference between his length of service and that of the ranking rear-admiral was comparatively slight. Toward the close of the
war, Secretary Long, in an open letter, replied to a criticism of the selection of Sampson as follows:

"Admiral Sampson was selected for the command of the North Atlantic Squadron because the Department, in the exercise of its best judgment, with an eye single to public interest, believed that he was specially fitted for the place. Admiral Sicard, who held the command, having become incapacitated for duty by reason of sickness, was necessarily withdrawn by order of the Department, and Sampson was next in command. These two are especially accomplished ordnance officers, having been each at the head of the Ordnance Bureau, and having devoted themselves to that branch of naval science. Sampson is a man of the very highest professional attainments, solely devoted to his duty. He never pushes himself forward, and when you accuse him of anything of that sort you do most cruel injustice to a man who has never sought favor or applause in any other way than by the simple discharge of his duty."

How thoroughly the men most concerned—the captains of the ships of the North Atlantic Squadron—agreed with Secretary Long can be judged by the following extract from a magazine article by Captain Chadwick, who commanded the New York:

"The selection was wisely made, as no one has more fully the confidence and affection of the service. The appointment came to him [Sampson] unsought and absolutely unexpectedly, and, the most modest, least self-seeking, and the most single-minded of men, he could not quite comprehend the falling to himself of this great responsibility, which was at the same time, as it turned out, so great a good fortune to the country."

I know this tribute to be perfectly honest, and it was echoed by every captain in the fleet at Key West. In short, Sampson was appointed because he was believed to be the best man for the place. The national emergency demanded this method of selection, regardless of regulation procedure.
In naval warfare it is a postulate that you conceal from the enemy, as far as possible, the location of your own ships, and that you take every precaution to make them difficult targets for the enemy’s gunners. Sampson’s first act, as commander-in-chief, was to suggest lead color instead of black for war-paint. On orders from the Department several of the vessels at Key West had already changed their glistening white sides for a coat of dead black. Sampson believed that a hue closely resembling water and sky would render the ships less prominent targets than the clear-marked contrast of black. The Department accepted the suggestion, and in a few weeks the United States navy lost its picturesque whiteness in a pall of gray, officially termed “lead color.” In the twilight, such as it is in the tropics, and especially in the early morning hours, it was exceedingly difficult to distinguish United States vessels, so well did their gray, shadowy outlines harmonize with atmosphere and sea. Even in bright sunlight the new color showed less vividly than white. While the batteries were in action, the smoke from the guns cast an additional pall over the ships, until it was hard to make out where hull began and smoke ended. So it is only fair to infer that with these advantages the lead color made the task of the Spanish gunners harder than it otherwise would have been. At night the benefits from the gray hue were slight, if any, because then everything afloat, regardless of color, looms up black.

When Sampson assumed the command of the North Atlantic Squadron, active preparations for war were carried on in accordance with a memorandum issued by Secretary Long on March 23. This was one of the most important communications that ever emanated from the Navy Department. “In time of war,” the memorandum stated, “the commander-in-chief must, to a very great extent, control his own vessels and act on his own responsibility; but the Department deems it worth while to lay before him certain suggestions for his consideration in con-
THINKING OF HOME.

CLEARING UP THE DECK.

LIFE ABOARD THE FLAGSHIP "NEW YORK."
connection with the probable uses to which the fleet will be put in the event of war with Spain. Until it is possible to concentrate the fleet and strike a telling blow at the Spanish fleet, it is probable that much of its work will be in blockading Cuba. The Department will endeavor to furnish the commander-in-chief with a sufficient number of vessels to establish a strict blockade, particularly of the western half of the island, and of the ports of Havana and Matanzas in special. Off much of the coast and off the smaller harbors a single vessel cruising to and fro may be all that is needed. Off an important port, and notably off the port of Havana, in the event of torpedo vessels being within it, there should probably be three lines of blockade." Then followed a suggested plan of blockade.' The memorandum strongly exhorted the commanders of the smaller craft, converted yachts, tugs, and so forth, who were to form the inner line of the blockade, to unhesitatingly attack torpedo-boats against all odds, "for even if sunk," wrote Secretary Long, "they [the inner blockaders] will have achieved a most useful end if they cripple a torpedo-boat. . . . The Department will give ample recognition to gallantry and efficiency displayed by the commanders of these craft, and the men in command of them will be expected to run risks and take chances. Each man engaged in the work of the inshore squadron should have in him the stuff out of which to make a possible Cushing; and if the man wins, the recognition given him shall be as great as that given to Cushing, so far as the Department can bring this about."

Secretary Long further wrote Sampson: "This memorandum is based largely on certain suggestions made by Captain Mahan. In case of a blockade the Department expects you to follow out only such details as in your judgment you deem proper."

This exhortation to bravery was duly published to the fleet. Then Sampson set to work to formulate his plans.

1 See Appendix, page 288. Circular in full.
The conditions he faced were rather complicated. The Spanish navy, or at least the bulk of it, was known to be out of immediate striking distance. The armored cruisers *Viscaya* and *Almirante Oquendo* had sailed eastward from Havana subsequent to the *Maine* disaster. (These two ships arrived at St. Vincent, Cape de Verde Islands, on April 19.) The *Maria Teresa* and *Cristobal Colon* had sailed westward from Cadiz on April 8. (They arrived at St. Vincent, Cape de Verde Islands, on April 14.) With the Cape de Verde fleet were three excellent torpedo-boat destroyers, the *Furor*, *Pluton*, and *Terror*. The battleship *Pelayo* was still in Cadiz, and at this and other Spanish ports were the strong *Carlos V.* and various unarmored cruisers, gunboats, and torpedo-boats. In Cuban and Porto Rican harbors it was calculated Spain had about forty gunboats, none powerful enough to be considered a bar to any projected operation. The main strength opposed to the United States was the fleet gathering at the Cape de Verde Islands. The four armored cruisers of the *Viscaya* type were practically second-class battleships, with 11-inch guns and a speed of twenty knots. In their speed lay their strength. Sampson, in common with most naval experts, believed that the fleet at Cape de Verde would not move until joined by the *Pelayo*, Spain’s best battleship, and the *Carlos V.*, and perhaps several of the smaller cruisers, such as the *Alphonso XIII*. These vessels, with the torpedo-boat destroyers, constituted a fleet more powerful on paper than the Flying Squadron at Hampton Roads, and more mobile than any fleet Sampson could collect from the vessels of the North Atlantic Squadron. Still, as the Cape de Verde Islands are about two thousand miles distant from the United States it was evidently futile for Sampson to form any specific plan for coping with this Spanish fleet until it moved from its far-away base; besides, the Flying Squadron and the Mosquito Fleet were being held in readiness to patrol and guard our eastern coast should the Span-

1 A full list of Spain’s navy will be found on page 284, Appendix.
ish fleet make that its objective, though Sampson and the majority of naval experts believed that the eastern coast was absolutely secure on account of the difficulties the enemy’s fleet would have to encounter in those waters to obtain its coal supply. So the only plan which could be made previous to a move by the Cape de Verde fleet was one of aggression against Spain’s colonies, Cuba or Porto Rico, or both. This aggression, whether it took the form of blockade, bombardment, or capture, would, it was calculated, draw upon it the entire Spanish naval force. Therefore, no movement against Cuba or Porto Rico could be undertaken, except on the premises that, whether successful or not, the naval force must be prepared to cope at any time with the Cape de Verde fleet, which was assumed to include the *Pelayo* and *Carlos V*. All considerations pointed to the advisability of making Havana the central point of this aggression, for there lay Spain’s greatest commercial and political influences, apart from the fact that Havana was within such easy distance of Key West, and therefore favorable for operations, but for the same reason unfavorable to the naval diversion which, it was thought, the enemy would attempt.

So, taking all these and many far finer points of naval warfare under deliberation, Sampson, after consultation with his captains, notably Evans, Taylor, and Chadwick, decided that in the event of war he would, immediately upon its declaration, endeavor to reduce the forts of Havana with the battleships *Iowa* and *Indiana*, the monitors *Amphitrite*, *Terror*, and *Puritan*; the armored cruiser *New York*, the unarmored cruisers *Cincinnati*, *Nashville*, *Detroit*, *Marblehead*, and *Montgomery*; the gunboats *Wilmington*, *Castine*, *Machias*, *Newport*, and *Helena*; and the torpedo-boats *Cushing*, *Porter*, *Dupont*, *Ericsson*, *Foote*, and *Winslow*. All these vessels were then at Key West under Sampson’s command. Battle orders for the bombardment were issued. Sampson was to fly his flag on the *Iowa*, and she was to lead the column. The approach on Havana was
With Sampson Through the War

to be made from the westward; the range to be eight hundred to one thousand yards; short enough, in all truth. Each ship was to open fire on the nearest battery as soon as her guns would bear. The distance between the attacking ships was placed at three hundred yards, and the speed of the column at eight knots. The vessels in the rear were instructed to go still closer inshore, if the smoke from their leaders interfered with their aim. If the resistance from the shore batteries was not great, the column was to return along the battery front. "If the attack on the batteries prove satisfactory," read the battle order, "a demand under flag of truce will be made for the city to surrender or suffer bombardment in twenty-four hours. Should the attack on the batteries be unsatisfactory owing to their power of resistance or to too few ships, it will be temporarily abandoned for a close blockade of Havana, which will gradually be extended both east and west."

The batteries of Havana were known to be exceptionally strong. On all sides the plan was admitted to be daring; almost Nelson-like in its fearless aggressiveness. Of course, its definite adoption was contingent upon the subsequent whereabouts of the Cape de Verde fleet, but granting that this fleet remained two thousand miles away, the majority of those who knew of Sampson's intended coup believed that the value of striking the first blow, and striking fearlessly, more than compensated for the risks run. There was good ground for believing that if Havana capitulated within twenty-four hours of the declaration of war, it would mean that the war was won. The Spanish garrison might evacuate before such surrender, and an American force of occupation might not be immediately forthcoming, but the moral and actual effect of the speedy capitulation of the city of Havana was regarded almost as important as the fall of Madrid, and so sweeping an accomplishment as to effectually overwhelm the consideration of all minor untoward possibilities that might ensue. Moreover, the supporters of the projected coup reasoned,
though the strength of the Havana batteries was conceded, it was an open secret that to the westward they formed but slight opposition to an armored fleet desirous of shelling the city; so even if the batteries could not be reduced, the city could be shelled, and rather than see their ancient capital destroyed the Spaniards would at least, it was believed, execute a civic surrender. The plan of action against Havana was sent on to Washington, and the North Atlantic Squadron, pleased with the immediate prospect of a brilliant and vigorous engagement, waited impatiently for war, which, from the first of April, had seemed to be inevitable.

Upon receipt of this plan of attack upon Havana, Secretary Long, on April 6, wrote Sampson in part as follows:

“The Department does not wish the vessels of your squadron to be exposed to the fire of the batteries at Havana, Santiago de Cuba, or other strongly fortified ports in Cuba, unless the more formidable Spanish vessels should take refuge within those harbors. Even in this case the Department would suggest that a rigid blockade and employment of our torpedo-boats might accomplish the desired object, viz., the destruction of the enemy’s vessels, without subjecting unnecessarily our own men-of-war to the fire of the land batteries. There are two reasons for this:

“First, There may be no United States troops to occupy any captured stronghold, or to protect from riot and arson, until after the dry season begins, about the 1st of October.

“Second, The lack of docking facilities makes it particularly desirable that our vessels should not be crippled before the capture or destruction of Spain’s most formidable vessels.

“The Department need not impress upon you the necessity for stringent sanitary regulations. It leaves this matter, as well as the details in regard to conducting opera-
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tions, to the commander-in-chief, in whose judgment it has the greatest confidence.”

But Sampson was nothing daunted by the cold water thrown by the Department upon his plan. On April 9 he replied to the foregoing with the following letter, only the more important paragraphs of which are quoted:

“I sympathize with all you say about guarding our big ships against a possible serious loss while the enemy’s fleet is still intact. At the same time I regard it as very important to strike quickly and strike hard as soon as hostilities commence. Havana is well defended by three or four batteries to the eastward of the entrance, mounting guns from 6- to 12-inch calibre. On the western side of the entrance there are three batteries, the guns varying in calibre from 8- to 12-inch, and two mortar batteries. All the batteries face seaward, and those to the west of the entrance are quite near the shore. All are open batteries, with heavy traverses between the guns. The guns and people who serve them are quite unprotected.

“These batteries are well calculated to keep off a fleet from seaward, which approaches to within a moderate distance of a few thousand yards. I do not think they are well placed to resist an attack (for instance, the western batteries) from the westward and close in shore, where the batteries would be exposed to a flank fire, or to the fire of our big ships at short range, where the secondary batteries would have full effect. Even under these circumstances the ships must have such a heavy fire that the men in the batteries would be overwhelmed by its volume. Before the Puritan and Amphitrite arrived I was not entirely sanguine of the success of such an attack. Since their arrival yesterday I have little doubt of its success.

“Although the monitors are weak in secondary fire, I expected to put a cruiser with heavy secondary fire in the interval between each two of them. In this way I do not think the Spaniards would be able to fire. They would be driven away from their guns and kept away, while the fire
of the ships would so injure the guns or mounts that they would be unserviceable. Although the defences west of the entrance are stronger than those east, the first has the advantage for us that all the projectiles which miss the batteries will fall in the city and furnish an additional inducement for the surrender of the city.

"In the memorandum which I furnished to the commanding officers of ships I provided that if our ships were not numerous enough, or the Spaniards proved better than I expected, we were at once to haul off and substitute for the direct attack a close blockade of the port, which was to be extended east and west to adjoining ports as quickly as possible. Having silenced the western batteries, it would be quite practicable to shell the city, which I would do only after warning given twenty-four hours in advance.

"I see the force of your reasoning that we would have no troops to occupy the city if it did surrender, yet, Mr. Secretary, it will be very unfortunate, besides a great loss of time, if we must delay until the rainy season is over. Probably a close blockade would terminate the trouble before October.

"I shall do my utmost to carry out your wishes as set forth in your letter. At the same time I hope you will consider the plan I have here outlined. I have discussed the matter freely with Captains Evans, Taylor, and Chadwick, and all unite with me that the direct attack is sufficiently promising to warrant its trial."

After sending this letter Sampson waited for a reply that would definitely approve or condemn his suggested method of attack. None came, and the impression gained ground on all sides that the bombardment of Havana would mark the opening of hostilities.

When, on April 19, Congress passed resolutions authorizing armed intervention by the United States in Cuba, the North Atlantic Squadron practically entered into a state of war. Two cruisers and a torpedo-boat nightly patrolled
the waters around Key West; all lights on warships were extinguished; woodwork was torn out, boats sent ashore, and the men slept at their guns. On that day the first accident occurred. The torpedo-boat Ericsson collided with a pilot-boat while entering Key West harbor after patrol duty. She was not very badly damaged, but Ensign Bostwick’s leg was broken, and he was incapacitated from duty for several weeks.

A few days before this I had boarded the flagship New York with the request that I be allowed to remain on board during the threatened war, as correspondent for the Associated Press. Captain Sampson remarked: “So you want to come and get your head blown off, do you? It's foolish.” This was not encouraging, but I was allowed to remain.

On April 20, President McKinley sent his ultimatum to Spain, and the following day Spain gave United States Minister Woodford his passports. Every ship of the United States Navy in commission, whose engines were even half-way good, had steam up. The United States Army was drilling its volunteers in various camps and endeavoring to mobilize a fit invading force at Tampa, Fla. The battleship Oregon was in the Straits of Magellan, coming into the home stretch of her long race. Many feared that she might be intercepted and, perhaps, captured before she could reach home or before reinforcements could reach her, should the Spanish try to head her off. The capabilities of the Oregon had not then become historical. The Flying Squadron was having target practice at Hampton Roads. Work on the gunboat Princeton and other warships in the course of construction was hurried more than ever. The State Department issued a statement, declaring that in the event of hostilities the United States would not resort to privateering; that a neutral flag covered enemies’ goods, except contraband of war; that neutral goods not contraband of war were not liable to confiscation under enemies’ flags, and that blockades must be binding to be effective, or, in other words, the United States announced its adher-
ence to the doctrines formulated by the Congress of Paris in 1856. The hospital-ship *Solace* made ready to sail for Key West, Cuban pilots came aboard ships of Sampson's command, and the inanimate steel hulls strained at their anchor chains as if eager to leave the scenes of peace and suspense for the throbbing realities of war.
CHAPTER II.

WAR IN EARNEST.

At six o’clock on the afternoon of April 21, Captain Sampson received this dispatch:

“Blockade coast of Cuba immediately from Cardenas to Bahia Honda. Blockade Cienfuegos if it is considered advisable. Issue a proclamation of blockade covering blockaded ports. Do not bombard according to terms contained in my letter of April 6. Permit neutrals now loading to come out. Allow all neutral ships the latest possible hour in which to leave Cuba. Give every assistance and facility to foreign representatives that desire to leave Cuba.

LONG.”

This short message set the war machinery of the United States in action. The dignified proclamation of President McKinley, declaring a blockade of all the ports on the north coast of Cuba between Cardenas and Bahia Honda, and of Cienfuegos on the south side, did not reach the navy until several days later. Secretary Long’s order was all the navy had to work upon. His refusal to allow bombardment caused keen disappointment, but as the duty of a naval officer is to carry out orders and not to criticise, the North Atlantic Squadron prepared to fulfil the wishes of the American people. At this period the squadron was the only agent of the United States capable of aggression in the Western Hemisphere; the Flying Squadron was held for home defence, and the army was utterly unprepared. Thus, upon the command of Captain Sampson, by virtue of necessity, devolved the responsibility of waging the war single-handed until such time as other forces could be gath-
erred or spared from the alleged necessities of defence duty.

All night long after the reception of Secretary Long's order, the masts of the vessels were vivid with winking signals, flashing orders from the flagship to the vessels in the inner harbor of Key West. Slowly the inner harbor grew deserted, and black shadows of monitors and cruisers crept out, past the forts, along the tortuous channel until, when dawn broke, the New York was surrounded by a powerful, though mixed and slow, fleet. At half-past four o'clock on the morning of April 22 anchors were weighed and the North Atlantic Squadron steamed toward the shores of Cuba.

Cruising formation was taken. The ships slid through a calm sea on S. S. W. course in the following order: New York, Iowa, Indiana, Amphitrite, Cincinnati, Mayflower, in column, with the Wilmington, Castine, Newport, Nashville, and Machias on the starboard hand. The torpedo-boats Porter, Dupont, Foote, and Winslow scouted. The morning was glorious. The sun shone brightly, and all hearts were light. At 7:20 A.M. the Nashville was signalled to leave the column in order to heave-to a strange steamer which was rapidly bearing right down upon the squadron. The little cruiser, a few minutes later, fired the first shot of the Spanish-American War, for the stranger proved to be the Spanish merchant steamer Buena Ventura. A prize crew was put aboard, and the Nashville convoyed the steamer back to Key West. This success, so soon after starting, though comparatively unimportant, was taken to be a good omen. At eight o'clock the flag of a rear-admiral was broken on the New York, and was saluted with thirteen guns. The acting rank of rear-admiral had been conferred on Captain Sampson through one of the telegrams received from Washington the day previous. The honor was customary to a squadron commander and most essential in this case. As Rear-Admiral Sampson stood on the deck of the New York at morning quarters, while the guns
boomed out in his honor, the Iowa, after asking permission to salute and being refused, crept up out of position until almost abeam of the flagship, and, led by Capt. Robley D. Evans, the crew of that battleship yelled and cheered for the pale-faced man who stood unmoved on the New York. It was a spontaneous tribute to their old commander, who now controlled not only their destiny, but that of the whole fleet, and whose every action the whole world was watching. Beyond this incident there were no outbursts of enthusiasm, no ebullition of perfervid patriotism or blood-thirstiness, no "slopping over," no melodramatic signals. Everything was done decently and in good order. The North Atlantic Squadron might have been bent on a morning's target practice. The calm deliberation of the man Sampson seemed infectious: and after events showed this spirit to be good, for it is a steady hand, mathematical head, and clear eye that is needed to make war successfully on the sea. The days when rum-gotten courage and fierce lust of blood nerved for the wielding of cutlasses or the hauling of gun-tackles have gone by, and will not return.

Before leaving Key West Sampson received a dispatch from Secretary Long stating that the Spanish fleet had banked fires at the Cape de Verde Islands, and that Spanish vessels were reported off Port au Prince, Hayti. This latter part of the message was regarded of little or no importance. At three o'clock on the afternoon of April 22 Cuba was sighted. The squadron went into battle formation of double column. Just as the evolution was completed smoke was sighted to the eastward. "Disregard movements of commander-in-chief," fluttered from the New York's signal yard, and away went the flagship on her first chase. The main body of the squadron held off to the southwest toward Havana. The New York was evidently the only vessel fast enough to overtake the stranger. Smoke poured from the three funnels of the flagship, covering decks, that trembled from the vibrations of the screws, with dust and ashes. Every glass was trained on the
stranger, that lay well inshore, about twenty miles east of Havana. "Is it a Spaniard? Is it a man-of-war? Can we head her off?" These and countless other questions passed from man to man. On the bridge, with his staff,—which consisted of chief of staff, Captain Chadwick; assistant chief of staff, Lieutenant Staunton; flag lieutenant, Ensign Bennett; flag secretary, Lieutenant Marsh; and aide, Ensign Mustin,—Sampson paced to and fro, intently watching the curling smoke of the chase as it moved eastward, looking white against the gray, irregular coast-line. Several tugboats belonging to newspapers, with war correspondents aboard, which had followed the fleet from Key West, now endeavored to keep up with the New York, but rapidly fell behind, as the armored cruiser was making seventeen knots and throwing up the water till she was wet amidships. Down in the engine-room the fire force worked like beavers. As the New York lessened her distance from the shore it was seen that the pursued vessel was apparently a merchant steamer, heading hard toward the eastward and still far ahead of the New York. Going diagonally to the coast, the flagship pressed every pound of steam into service. "We're gaining!" was the cry. Then, a moment later: "We're losing! She'll get away!" There was time for play of all the emotions. No smoke hindered the view; no violent action prevented the pursuers from leisurely gloating over their prospective prey or being swayed by fears of its escape. The chase combined the refined brutality of a bull-fight with the true sporting features of a close race. On this occasion, too, the engines were having their first crucial test. Would they be equal to the emergency? Slowly the New York gained until almost abeam of the steamer, though still three or four miles distant. The flagship shook from stem to stern; a roar echoed out, as if the sea had risen up, Vesuvius-like, in a huge explosion; white smoke drifted over the ship and hid the water, churned foaming astern. The forward eight-inch gun had been fired. Just before this the keen
eyes of a quartermaster had made out the Spanish flag at the stranger's stern. The projectile was seen to ricochet several times over the water, ahead of the chase. What would the result be? Would there come an answering shot from hidden batteries aboard the steamer or on shore? Hearts beat quicker, excitement gave way for the second to suspense. The cruiser ploughed her way onward. Then a chorus of exclamations that nigh rose to a shout came from the watchers on the flagship deck, "She's stopped!"

The quarry was run to earth, the race won, and right under the Cuban hills a Spanish prize had been captured.

The prize was the valuable Spanish merchant steamer *Pedro*. A prize crew, commanded by Lieutenant Capehart, with Ensign Brumby second in command, was quickly taken over to the *Pedro*. She was ordered to follow the *New York*, and the incident ended. As far as the war was concerned, the whole affair was unimportant; but as it was the first and one of the most exciting of many chases I have described it. On subsequent occasions lack of novelty and frequent disappointments prevented such keen anticipation as was expressed when the *New York* pursued the *Pedro*; nevertheless, the prospect of a possible prize and the race to run it down never failed to produce among those aboard the pursuing ships exhilaration that is, I believe, entirely peculiar to the experience, and which no amount of familiarity can altogether pall. The *Pedro* was scarcely captured before another stranger was hove-to. She proved to be the *Remus*, a German tramp steamer, bound out from Havana. She was allowed to proceed. After this work the *New York* steamed westward toward Havana. The sun had set, and, with all lights extinguished, the flagship cruised around slowly, about eight miles off Havana. The night was dark, and not a vestige could be seen of the other ships of the squadron. The flagship repeatedly flashed the "night letter"—the recognition signal—from her mast; but no answer came. The guns on the shore batteries boomed out, and it was found that the flagship
had drifted to within four miles of Morro Castle. She retreated. It was then thought that the Spanish batteries had opened on her, but the Spaniards claim the reports heard that night were from signal guns. Not until nearly midnight did the New York discover the location of the rest of the fleet, each vessel cautiously answering the electric-light signal. The fleet was strung around Havana harbor.

The inconvenience of newspaper dispatch-boats in war times was first felt that night, when several of the little craft lay with their lights blazing near the darkened American warships, and thus defeated all the elaborate efforts to hide from the enemy's fire. The dispatch-boats were ordered, after considerable difficulty, to extinguish all their lights. This they did, but even then the situation was scarcely improved, because it became almost impossible to see the tugs, and the ships of the fleet were in constant danger of running them down. The New York Journal boat Anita, with a large crew and several correspondents aboard, was only saved from being cut in two by the coolness of Ensign John R. Edie. The Anita suddenly changed her course and headed across the bows of the New York. Edie, who was officer of the watch, with great presence of mind and in less time than it takes to tell, reversed the flagship's engines, put his helm hard over, blew the collision call to quarters, which shuts all watertight bulkheads, and had the satisfaction of seeing the cruiser stop just in time to allow the Anita to scrape over her ram. Later in the war regulations for newspaper dispatch-boats were adopted, and though they afterward proved useful to the fleet in carrying Government messages, bringing provisions, and doing countless personal and official services with unvarying courtesy, they were unceasing sources of anxiety to the ship commanders.

Before leaving the details of the first day of actual warfare, as carried on by the North Atlantic Squadron, and recounted so minutely on account of their historical interest
rather than importance, the question of the bombardment of Havana must be again referred to. It is known definitely that upon the appearance of Sampson's squadron, on the afternoon of April 22, a small-sized panic reigned in Havana. Spanish officers had difficulty in keeping their men at the batteries, and the imposing appearance of the fleet produced qualms in the hearts of the large land-owners and wealthy citizens. Many naval officers to-day believe that if Sampson had been allowed to carry out his plan of bombardment the city would have fallen. They hold this opinion in spite of the difficulties, subsequently discovered, in the reduction of land batteries by naval forces. They believe a bombardment would have scared Havana that afternoon into at least civic surrender. On the other hand, the reasons against the bombardment are tersely told by Capt. A. T. Mahan, who, in an article in *McClure's Magazine*, wrote:

"It was clearly recognized that war cannot be made without running risks; but it was also held, unwaveringly, that no merely possible success justified risk, unless it gave a fair promise of diminishing the enemy's naval force, and so of deciding the control of the sea, upon which the issue of the war depended. This single idea, and concentration of purpose upon it, underlay and dictated every step of the Navy Department from first to last."

As Captain Mahan was the most prominent member of the Strategic Board, which throughout supervised the naval campaign and advised Secretary Long, the authenticity of his statement is unimpeachable. The recognition of Captain Mahan as one of the ablest theoretical, if not practical, naval strategists of the world is so universal as to prevent any conclusion being drawn by the lay mind in this case where Mahan differed from Sampson and other naval officers, who were at the scene of action. This question, with all its intensely interesting possibilities that so nearly became great factors in the war, must therefore be relegated to the long list of "matters of opinion." It is only fair to
say that Sampson's plan of bombardment was merely a suggestion, and that when the Navy Department refused to indorse it he expressed no irritation, feeling sure that with their wide facilities for obtaining information and expert advice, the Washington authorities must have been enabled to obtain a view of the situation more lucid than his own, and that their refusal was based on good grounds, though he was ignorant of their nature.

On the morning of April 23, the blockade of Cuba practically began. The *Detroit, Marblehead, Puritan, Nashville*, torpedo-boat *Ericsson*, and tug *Algonquin* joined the squadron. The *Puritan, Marblehead, Cincinnati, Wilmington, Foote*, and *Winslow* were ordered to the eastward of Havana to blockade Matanzas and Cardenas, and to patrol the coast between the latter place and Havana. The *Nashville, Machias, Castine, and Newport* were sent to the westward to blockade the small but important harbors of Mariel and Cabanas, and to patrol the coast-line between Bahia Honda and Havana. The remaining ships of the squadron took up specified blockading positions, forming almost a semicircle around Havana, at distances from shore ranging from six to ten miles. From that day until the end of the war Havana was closely and zealously blockaded, and, as far as ascertainable, only three small ships evaded the vigilance of the blockaders. This evasion occurred during the first few nights, before the vessels had become accustomed to their new duties.

The amount of energy spent upon the pacific blockade of the northern Cuban coast, and the large number of vessels employed throughout the war in this duty, do not seem, at first sight, to have been justified by the results accomplished. Havana never really felt the pinch of starvation, although the price of food did rise, and the poorer classes suffered to a slight degree. The city was easily able to withstand a year's blockade, without any danger of being compelled to surrender on account of lack of food. This applies equally to Cardenas, Matanzas, Mariel, and Bahia
Honda, because they were within railroad communication of Havana. There is little doubt that the Navy Department overestimated the immediate effects of a blockade, and probably was influenced by Cuban reports belittling the resources of the Spaniards in Cuba,—which reports, almost invariably, proved untrue. It must be frankly admitted that the blockade of Northern Cuba, so far as it achieved the usually accepted purpose of a pacific blockade,—i.e., cutting off food supplies and ruining commerce,—did practically nothing toward ending the war. But it is important to remember that, apart from the desirability of at least endeavoring to starve out Havana, it was essential that a powerful naval force be constantly kept near that harbor to prevent the ingress of Spain's war-vessels or transports. To have been able to use Havana as a base for its Cape de Verde fleet would have been an inestimable advantage to Spain. This she was unable to do, owing to the blockade. While the smaller blockaded harbors would scarcely have been of use to Spain's fleet, they would have been invaluable for her transports debarking troops, and it was to Spain's advantage to pour into Cuba all the troops she could spare. This resource also was cut off from Spain by the presence of the blockaders. Thus it will be seen that though the positive effect of the blockade of northern Cuba was no appreciable factor in the war, its negative results were great. Also, it must be remembered that in the beginning of the war the Washington administration contemplated the landing of troops at Matanzas on the northern coast; and with this plan in view there was absolutely no question as to the advisability of first establishing a blockade. Added to these reasons was the fact that the concentration of American men-of-war around Cuba would compel Spain's vessels to come to the island's relief: a most desirable result from the American point of view.

The first day of the blockade after the force had been distributed along the coast was uneventful save for an incident which came near creating an international compli-
cation. The *Marblehead* and *Wilmington* were almost out of sight on the eastern horizon, steaming to their station at Matanzas, when they were seen to turn in suddenly toward the coast. A closer inspection revealed the presence of smoke in the direction where the *Marblehead* and *Wilmington* were now moving, evidently at full speed. Assuming that the two vessels would not both pursue a merchant steamer, Admiral Sampson headed the *New York* in toward the coast to cut off the stranger, who was plainly trying to make Havana. A few minutes later, when the *New York* was well away from the main body of the fleet, the vessel was made out to be a man-of-war. The *New York* was put straight for her, and as the two ships quickly came nearer to each other, those on the flagship soon saw that the object of their interest was a large and apparently powerful cruiser or second-class battleship. The crew of the flagship went to "general quarters," with all the careful preparations which are only taken for an expected tussle with another ship. Excitement and suspense were at their zenith. The *Marblehead* and *Wilmington*, making splendid time, bore down from the eastward on the stranger's starboard quarter, while the *New York* was on her starboard bow. She was uncommonly like the *Viscaya*, or a ship of that class. Her ensign hung in folds, looking for all the world like the Spanish flag. All hands believed she was one of the Cape de Verde fleet trying to make Havana with troops and supplies. Every gun was trained on her, and the gun captains itched to try their toys. About two miles separated the vessels. A few seconds more, and a challenging gun would have been fired from the *New York*, but just then the wind took the stranger's ensign, and it was seen to be the flag of Italy. Almost simultaneously the approaching warship hoisted the American flag at the fore, and a puff of smoke rolled from her side. The sight of the latter caused some to think that the other reassuring signs had been Spanish subterfuge, and they waited for a shell to strike. But in a second it was realized that the
Italian was only firing a salute to the admiral's flag. She turned out to be the *Giovanni Bausan* and was allowed to enter Havana harbor. Thus the incident ended in smoke, but, until the denouement, created more excitement than any other occurrence of the first month of war.

The same afternoon an incident occurred showing the value of torpedo-boats in other fields than those for which they are constructed. A small vessel was sighted almost on the beach, well to the eastward of Havana. The torpedo-boat *Porter* was sent into the shallow water to effect a capture, and she soon returned towing with her the *Mathilde*, a small, rum-laden schooner, with her crew aboard. This incident also illustrates the usefulness of newspaper dispatch-boats, for the *Mathilde* was towed into Key West by the Associated Press tug *Dauntless*, which was able to perform this service fully as well as a naval vessel, and so saved a reduction of the blockading force and a useless trip to Key West. The *Porter* repeated her performance the next morning, and the *Dupont* also caught a schooner within twelve hours of this event. In addition to their usefulness in this connection, the torpedo-boats were kept constantly running between Havana and the cable station at Key West with dispatches from Sampson to the Navy Department. The constant service in the performance of this duty was terribly hard on the delicately constructed boats and upon their crews, but there was no alternative, for at that time, and until late in the war, Sampson had no small craft he could spare from blockade duty for dispatch work. There was also no possible opportunity while off Havana for the torpedo-boats to exercise their aggressive powers. So these costly engines of destruction plunged through the heavy seas on the prosaic errand of mail carrier, or rolled the livelong night on the inner blockade line within easy range of the enemy's guns. There was no rest and no sleep for their officers and crews; and in time this work wore out both the men and their boats. It was a harsh expedient, but there was no help for it, and the
enormous amount of work done by the torpedo-boats more than made up for their cost in repairs. Had there been, at any time during the war, an indisputable opportunity for one of these torpedo-boats to blow up a Spanish vessel, and had all the torpedo-boats been unavailable for such opportunity on account of disability incurred by dispatch and blockade work, it would naturally have suggested grave doubts as to the advisability of using the boats, even in the greatest exigency, for any service except that for which they were built; but as no such opportunity occurred, the Spanish-American War may be said to have proved the temporary usefulness of torpedo-boats as swift dispatch-boats and excellent pickets, without adding one scintilla of evidence as to their effectiveness when opposed to ships. The mosquito is made to sting; the torpedo-boat to torpedo ships; take away the opportunity to carry out the aim of the creator and you destroy the cause for existence. If anything is useful in ways that it was not created to be useful, so much the better; but you cannot expect this, and you must be prepared for the consequences of subversion.

The first night of organized blockade illustrated the dangers and difficulty of manœuvring ships without any lights. The navigation of the same number of merchant vessels (carrying side and head and cabin lights) as there were warships in the limited area off Havana would have proved no light task, and when it is remembered that these cumbersome war-vessels are far harder to handle, under the best circumstances, than merchant vessels; that they were obliged to keep constantly moving, yet in close touch with one another; that every looming hull they saw was to them, until identified by night signal, a vessel of the enemy ready to ram or torpedo them, and that these conditions continued for four months, on pitch-dark as well as moon-light nights, on rough as well as smooth seas, it is almost miraculous that there was only one collision, and that a slight one. The difficulty of recognition being so great at night and the possibility of attack so constant, there was
always the probability that one American vessel would mistake another for a ship of the enemy and engage her. The disaster which such an encounter would have brought about and its moral effect can scarcely be overestimated. Thanks to the great caution exhibited by commanding officers no occurrence of this nature marred the campaign, though several ships of the North Atlantic Squadron had hair-breadth escapes from being sunk by their fellow-countrymen. The likelihood of a collision or mistaken attack at night always weighed upon Admiral Sampson, and especially so at first. Indeed, the difficulties of night manœuvring without lights proved so stupendous that many wondered whether the risk run was worth the advantage gained by invisibility. The main object of the extinguishing of all lights was to make attack by hostile torpedo-boats as difficult as possible. As there was never any attack of this nature, the merits of the main object were never proved.

The searchlight on Morro Castle played constantly at night, sweeping the water with its beams, every now and again showing to the blockaders the location of their own ships. That was about all the searchlight accomplished, for the distance from Morro, seven miles or so, was too great to enable the Spaniards on shore to distinguish the presence of the ships. They apparently realized this and after a while ceased their searchlight operations.

On the morning of the 24th—a fine Sunday—the Detroit captured the Spanish merchant steamer Catalina, 3,491 tons, bound from New Orleans to Barcelona, via Havana. Ignorant of the blockade, the Catalina had tried to make the Morro light, and the Detroit, which was well to the westward, made a rich capture after a short chase. The Catalina was taken to Key West, and the same day the Spanish steamer Miguel Jover was also taken into that port. She had been captured by the gunboat Helena the previous day. The Helena had sailed from Key West after the main body of the squadron, and on her way to Havana had come across and promptly captured the Miguel Jover,
which was bound from New Orleans to Barcelona, via Havana. The Jover had a cargo worth $150,000 aboard. Off Mobile the former revenue cutter Winona captured the Spanish steamer Saturnina (1,826 tons), with lumber, from Sagua to Ship Island, Zuclaga. The Saturnina was afterward released as not being a legitimate prize.

That Sunday afternoon came the first fire from the Spaniards, admitting that the previous firing from Morro was for signals, as stated by Spanish sources. The torpedo-boat Foote won the distinction of being the first American vessel to be attacked. She was taking soundings close to the shore at Matanzas, when a masked battery opened on her. Three shots were observed. They went wide of the mark, and were not returned.

The squadron off Havana was now reinforced by the monitor Terror, the dispatch-boat Dolphin, converted yachts Hornet and Eagle, and the former lighthouse tender Mangrove, fitted up with cable repair and grappling tackle and 6-pounders. On the evening of the 25th the Mangrove, whose best speed was eight knots, captured the fast Spanish liner Panama, the richest prize of the war, and one for which all ships on the blockade, at Sampson's orders, had been keeping a sharp lookout. The Mangrove was standing well off Havana to the southwest when she made the capture, and though the battleship Indiana was within signal distance, the little lighthouse tender did her work single-handed. The Panama was about four times the size of the Mangrove, and could have escaped with ease from her; she was also armed with two 14-pounders, but three shots from Lieutenant-Commander Everett's vessel frightened the Spaniard into quick submission. The prize belonged to the Transatlantica Company of Barcelona, and was bound from New York to Havana with passengers and a large quantity of provisions.

Shortly before the Mangrove made her coup the first ship to leave Havana since the establishment of the blockade was hove to by the New York outside the harbor. She
proved to be the British steamer *Lucilene*, bound for Bermuda and Philadelphia. Her captain, by his refusal to stop for two warning guns, nearly got a solid shot put through his ship. The *Lucilene* was laden with molasses and sugar, and carried a large number of Cubans and Spaniards only too glad to get out of Havana. The first entry of the establishment of a blockade was made in the *Lucilene*’s log, and she was allowed to proceed. An accident to the torpedo-boat *Cushing’s* machinery, while on her way with dispatches to Key West that night, disabled her, and she was temporarily laid up for repairs. On the 25th also the *Marblehead, Nashville*, and converted yacht *Eagle* were sent from the northern coast to blockade Cienfuegos.

The first prisoner of war to be captured by the United States was taken the next day, the 26th of April. The name of this first prisoner was Lieutenant Juan del Pino, of the Spanish infantry. With him was taken his orderly, Private Manuel Martinez. Their capture came about this way. The *Wilmington* was cruising well to the eastward of Havana, when a small schooner was seen hugging the shore. A little later a prize crew was rowed over from the American gunboat. They found on board the schooner, besides the small crew, two men in Spanish military uniform. Both were armed. Visions of an attempted torpedo attack or some daring motive on the part of the enemy at once transformed the schooner from an uninteresting and almost worthless capture into an object of deep suspicion. The uniformed prisoners were quickly transferred to the *New York*. As they confronted Admiral Sampson on the quarter-deck and met the inquiring gaze of the crew that had gathered on the superstructure, these first human trophies of the war looked for nothing less than instant death. They were swarthy and dirty, and, besides being very frightened, were unmistakably miserable in a way that does not trouble men of the sea. Lieutenant del Pino was disarmed and taken into the admiral’s cabin, to tell his story through an interpreter. Private Martinez remained on deck and be-
came the centre of a curious group, many of whom had never before seen a Spanish soldier. And while the Jackies of the New York tenderly handled the orderly’s machete, stole his cartridges, and tried to talk to him in peculiar Spanish, Lieutenant del Pino talked to Admiral Sampson. He was on his way, so he said, from Havana to Matanzas, where his wife lived. He had secured leave of absence from his superior officers, and the object of his visit was to see, for the first time, the baby boy that his wife, a few weeks previous, had borne to him. This tale, with all its simple pathos, Lieutenant del Pino told over and over again, and he bewailed his foolishness in trusting his fortunes to the sea. No amount of cross-examination shook the story. His orderly and the crew of the schooner confirmed it in every particular. Both prisoners of war admitted that they understood the Americans would kill, do violent injury, or at least confine in dark dungeons their Spanish prisoners. Admiral Sampson believed that the truth was in del Pino, and decided to release them both on parole. When del Pino realized that not only had he escaped death and imprisonment, but that he would also be allowed to see his first-born, he became almost ludicrous in his joy and gratitude. He was taken to breakfast in the ward-room of the New York, given good food, which he needed, and with his orderly was put aboard the tug Algonquin. With an old handkerchief flying for want of a better flag of truce, that little boat made for Santa Cruz, a small town twenty-four miles east of Havana, and there landed del Pino and his orderly, Martinez, who had solemnly promised never again to fight against the United States.

Frequent chases of suspected smoke became matters of blockade routine. More often than not the smoke proved to be from a friendly vessel. This was not so in the case of the Terror, however, for on the 26th she captured, off Cardenas, the small Spanish coasting steamer Ambrosio Bolivar, with $70,000 in specie on board. The Bolivar was bound for Havana from Port Limon, Costa Rica. The
previous day the *Terror* had captured the small Spanish schooner *Tres Hermanas*, laden with sugar for Havana. Paymaster Simpson and a prize crew of three men from the *Terror* were put aboard and ordered to take the schooner into Key West, where all the prizes were sent. The *Tres Hermanas* should have made Key West within two days, but first she encountered a calm and then came a gale, during which the chart was lost overboard, and it was only after five days of hardship and exposure that Paymaster Simpson triumphantly sailed his little prize into Key West, with her crew aboard, all safe and well. The routine of blockade was broken on April 27 by the first action of the war, though, strictly speaking, it was only a reconnaissance.

The first engagement which marked the history of the United States Navy in thirty years was due to the determination of Rear-Admiral Sampson to inspect the blockade east of Havana. He had not yet become personally cognizant of the conditions at Matanzas, which is a fair-sized town fifty-two miles east of Havana, and so, early on the morning of the 27th, the flagship *New York* steamed away from its station on a tour of inspection. Sampson had no intention of bombarding Matanzas, though his original instructions had been slightly modified by this message from Long: “While the Department does not wish a bombardment of forts protected by heavy cannon, it is within your discretion to destroy light batteries which may protect vessels you desire to attack, if you can do so without exposure to heavy guns.” At the entrance to Matanzas harbor the monitor *Puritan* and the cruiser *Cincinnati* were found on guard. A fairly stiff breeze was blowing, and the sunlit sea broke over the monitor’s decks as it might have broken on a breakwater. Captain Harrington, of the *Puritan*, senior officer present, reported to the rear-admiral that all had been quiet, but that he believed the enemy was working on a land battery on the western arm of the blockaded harbor. To ascertain more about this suspected activity the *New York* steamed closer inshore. The *Puritan* and *Cincinnati* fol-
allowed about a mile distant from the flagship. Sampson and Captain Chadwick stood on the forward bridge, sweeping the low-lying land with their glasses for traces of the reported batteries. Suddenly Chadwick sang out, "They're firing at us!" The rear-admiral thought his chief of staff was mistaken, but had scarcely time to say so before a small puff of smoke was seen curling up from a thin ridge of newly turned earth on the extremity of the western arm of the harbor over two miles away. The shell was neither seen nor heard, but the sight of the smoke was enough for Chadwick. His fighting blood—and it is no mere hackneyed figure of speech in his case—was up. "Can't I open on them, sir?" he asked Sampson, eagerly. "They fired on the Foote the other day. I'd like to teach them a lesson." The permission was granted, "general quarters" was sounded, and at 12:56 p.m. Naval Cadet Boone fired the New York's eight-inch amidships gun, and the first projectile launched by the United States against Spain's possessions went whizzing toward the shores of Cuba. A cloud of earth rose to the right of the earthworks, showing where the shell landed. Before the roar of the first shot had ceased echoing all the eight and four-inch guns on the flagship's port side were banging away at the yellow ridge of earth. Now and again men could be seen retreating under the fire; huge clouds of earth rose on shore, and gaps began to appear in the earthworks. Only one small gun was seen, the enemy apparently being in the midst of construction and their batteries not yet mounted. As soon as the first gun was fired from the New York, the Puritan and Cincinnati commenced to signal vigorously for permission to join in. When this was reported to Sampson, he said, "All right, tell them to go ahead," and so the Puritan drew up on the New York's port quarter and the Cincinnati on the starboard quarter. All three vessels were soon enveloped in drifting clouds of smoke, and the mouth of Matanzas harbor was dotted with geyser-like clouds, that each told of an exploding shell. From the eastern arm of
the harbor, about seven thousand yards distant from the *New York*, puffs of smoke were seen to issue from a shore battery that was marked on the chart as the Quintas da Recreo Battery, and as having 8-inch guns. The *Puritan* devoted her entire attention to this newcomer, firing slowly and only using her 12-inch guns, while the *New York* also sent a broadside in this direction. A shell from the uncompleted land battery to the westward whizzed over the deck of the flagship, and before men had time to compare notes upon the sensation it caused, there came another, which burst in the sea not far astern. They were small, silly things to send against an armored cruiser, but, all the same, it was essential that the uncompleted battery be taught a lesson. So the *New York* poured broadside after broadside into it, while the *Cincinnati*, whose starboard side was one constant mass of smoke cut by livid, vicious jets of fire, concentrated her rapid-fire battery on the same spot and gave one of the prettiest exhibitions of quick firing seen during the entire war. At fifteen minutes past one, just nineteen minutes after the opening gun, "Cease firing" was sounded and signalled. No more shots were coming from the enemy, and not a soul could be seen around the uncompleted shore battery, which now presented a jagged outline. Work on the battery had been abandoned, and it was evident that it had been considerably damaged by the attack; besides, the Spaniards had been shown that a shot from them would bring a dozen from the blockading ships, and the gunners of three vessels had been given good target practice. As there were no further objects to be attained, there was no sense in throwing away more ammunition, though after the firing ceased the vessels lay near by, waiting for a possible shot which did not come. None of the ships was struck. It was impossible to tell the exact amount of damage and loss of life, if any, inflicted upon the enemy; no officer of authority even ventured a prediction. Some correspondents, whose fervor and patriotism ran away with their judgment, indulged in glowing suppositions regarding
the effect of the nineteen minutes' firing, and when Governor-General Blanco cabled to Madrid that a mule was the sum total of the Spanish loss, the reconnoissance suffered and was made foolish in the eyes of the world by reason of the contrast of the real with the glowing but unjustifiable reports of some American correspondents. Whether the Spaniards lost only a mule or whether they lost a number of men is immaterial, because the object of the reconnoissance was to stop work on and destroy a land battery, and to teach the Spaniards a moral lesson, which was done. After the first shot the battery which stood the brunt of the attack was deserted, save for a few men, who with great pluck handled a field-piece until the clouds of flying earth from exploding shells drove them to follow their leaders down the far side of the slight hill on whose eminence the battery was being built. At a range of three miles, with an 8- or 4-inch shell, it is only possible to hit a man by the best marksmanship, under the best conditions, and with the greatest luck. The other battery attacked was so far away, and subjected to fire for such a short period, that the most sanguine could scarcely expect to kill all or any of the few men who manned it. Hence, it is little wonder that the enemy's casualties at Matanzas were small, if any. About three hundred shells were fired by the ships on this occasion, at an approximate cost of $3,500. According to General Blanco, the Spaniards fired fourteen shots.

Far more important than the real reason for this reconnoissance and its immediate results was the lesson which it taught, or rather which it began to teach, for it was at Matanzas that naval officers first appreciated the difficulties of attacking land fortifications with ships' guns. The reconnoissance was so short, the opposing batteries so small and unimportant, and the distances so great, that no deduction could then be drawn from Matanzas strong enough to overturn, in the minds of conservative men, theories they had imbibed for years. From this first action they gained
impressions, and many entertained strong doubts regarding the capabilities of sea as opposed to land batteries, but though the matter was deeply discussed, few were willing to concede that Matanzas could be taken as a criterion. They argued that the excitement and circumstances surrounding ships and crews in action for the first time were apt to lead to erroneous conclusions; they maintained that with larger batteries for targets at shorter distances the effects of naval fire would be greater; but, all the same, every man who aimed a gun against the fortifications of Matanzas knew that he had encountered difficulties in sighting that were entirely unexpected. All previous target practice had been taken against objects on the water. When it became necessary to plant a shot on what, to the naked eye, was only a light blur on a long stretch of land, and when it was necessary not only to hit this blur, but also, in order to have any effect, actually to hit one of the enemy’s guns, which were only black spots visible through glasses, then the gun captains realized what a bombardment of fortifications signified. They found, also, that they could not tell where their shells were falling, so thick were the dirt clouds from other shells exploding ashore, and so heavy the smoke from the other guns of their own batteries. The whole affair was different from shooting at a ship, in which case you had a good background and, at least, could ascertain what damage you had done, or sink in the attempt. Though the more experienced officers knew of these things, the majority were loath to draw conclusions so quickly. They believed that the great advance in naval armament and marksmanship during the last ten years had completely altered conditions which existed during the Civil War, when tons of iron were poured by ships into forts without compensating effect. This idea was good enough in theory, but after more experience there were few officers in the United States Navy who did not realize that the impressions of Matanzas formed one of the best-based lessons of the war: that delicately constructed
high-power guns are no more able to hit a needle in a hay­
stack than were old smooth-bores in 1862; and that, except
for moral effect, or for some purpose other than the dis­
mounting of guns, a naval force of the best calibre is next
to useless when opposed to modern fortifications. This
deduction, it must be carefully observed, does not apply
to the bombardment of a city by a naval force, nor does it
affect the value of a naval bombardment undertaken for
the purpose of temporarily silencing the enemy's fire, driv­
ing the gunners from their batteries, covering a landing
party, or creating—by the very number of shells and their
force of explosion—panic among the enemy's men. In the
light of the bombardments which followed Matanzas, it is
easy and safe enough to lay down definitely these prin­
ciples, but it was not until almost the end of the war that
any recognized authority on such matters would unhesitat­
ingly declare that he agreed with them. All waited for
thorough experience before formulating new theories.

As there was so little opposition, so little danger, and so
short a period of action at Matanzas, I shall refrain from a
detailed description of the scenes enacted aboard the ships
themselves, even though it was the first encounter of the
war. Not long afterward there occurred an action in
which all the excitement of battle was at its height, and in
describing this I shall endeavor to give the reader a clear
idea of what transpires on a war-vessel when she is in a
fight. However, there is one incident connected with
Matanzas that can scarcely be passed over. In the sick
bay of the *New York* lay half a dozen enlisted men. When
the firing commenced, their excitement and suspense knew
no bounds. They could not see what their ship was firing
at; they knew nothing, except that they were in action,
and for the first time. As if moved by common impulse,
four of these Jackies sprang from their cots. One had
malaria, two had grippe, and the fourth had a high fever.
They sped along the darkened gun-deck until they reached
their stations at their guns. And there they stood, trem
bling with excitement, weak from exhaustion, half dressed, ghost-like, but deadly eager to do their share against the enemy, whatever or whoever he might be. Their officers ordered them back to the sick bay. The men begged to be let stay and “fight.” Again they were ordered back, this time gruffly, because an officer in action has no time to give orders twice, even if his heart beats quicker with patriotic pride than it ever did before, and even if there is a “lump in his throat.” So back to the sick bay went these four good specimens of the “man behind the gun”; and though their names are forgotten, and though they may themselves have forgotten what they did at the unimportant reconnoissance of Matanzas, their act will live as an historical instance of the pluck that won the war with Spain.

Rear-Admiral Sampson returned to Havana the same afternoon, leaving instructions with the Puritan and Cincinnati to watch the batteries and to prevent fortification work being carried on. Midway to Havana the United States tug Tecumseh, from Key West, came alongside and bumped against the flagship in a heavy sea. The commander of the Tecumseh reported that she was leaking. Two of the New York’s boats were instantly lowered, and preparations were made to take the crew off, as it was feared the tug was about to founder. Assistant Naval Constructor Hobson, who was attached to the New York, was sent over. He discovered the leak, stopped it, and the Tecumseh went back to Key West for repairs, convoyed by the New York Journal dispatch-boat Anita, which had promised to stand by the injured tug all the way over: another instance of the good uses of the newspaper fleet.

The same day the monitor Terror bagged one more prize, the Spanish merchant steamer Guido (3,133 tons), bound from Corunna to Havana with provisions. The Terror was assisted by the gunboat Machias in making the capture, which occurred off Cardenas. The Spaniard was sighted just before dawn. Her answer to a warning shot from the Terror was to put out all her lights and start on a desperate
effort to escape. Four solid shots from the monitor's secondary battery and one from the *Machias* quickly effected her surrender. Three 6-pounder shells from the *Terror* struck her upper-works, slightly wounding her captain and severely wounding one of her crew.

The following day on the blockade was uneventful, save for the capture of the small Spanish sloop *Engracias* by the gunboat *Newport* off Havana. The unarmored Spanish cruiser *Alfonso XII.* and the two small torpedo gunboats thought to be inside Havana harbor were reported as trying to escape or to be making a night attack upon the fleet, but though these reports were made on several occasions they lacked confirmation.

On the 29th the *Dolphin* captured the fishing-smack *Lola,* while trying to make Havana, and the *New York* made an inspection trip of the western blockade, visiting Mariel and Cabanas. The *Castine* was on guard at the former place, twenty-five miles west of Havana. Two small Spanish gunboats were seen inside the harbor, which was practically unprotected by fortifications, though mines were believed to be laid in the channel. As it was impossible to shell the vessels without destroying the town, nothing was done. At Cabanas, a few miles further westward, a troop of dismounted cavalry opened fire on the *New York* while she lay about two miles from shore. This was about six o'clock in the evening. The flagship band was playing and the officers were at dinner. From the peaceful-looking shore, with no forts protecting the well-wooded harbor banks, came the sound of volley firing, and in the brushwood near a ruined hacienda could be seen through glasses the flitting forms of Spanish soldiers. The novelty of attacking an armored cruiser with Mauser bullets at two miles' range appealed to all on board. Just to convince the Spaniards that their originality was appreciated, Captain Chadwick sent fifteen 4-inch shells pounding into the shore. The cavalrymen scrambled over to the other side of a fortunately situated ridge, and the firing ceased by mutual consent, having only
succeeded in annoying the New York's band-master, who refused to stop his music for a paltry 4-inch fusillade. The flagship then returned to her station off Havana, and a newspaper dispatch-boat rushed to Key West, with correspondents sitting on the safety-valves and writing blood-curdling accounts of the "battle of Cabanas."

On the morning of the day of the "battle of Cabanas" the Marblehead, Nashville, and Eagle did good work at Cienfuegos, on the south side, where they had arrived the day previous. The Nashville captured the Spanish steamer Argonauta with a Spanish colonel, lieutenant-colonel, surgeon-major, seven lieutenants, and ten enlisted men on board. The steamer was bound from Batabano to Cienfuegos. The soldiers she carried were made prisoners of war and taken to Key West on the Nashville, while her women and children passengers were put ashore under flag of truce. Valuable information was also secured from papers seized aboard the Argonauta. The capture occurred close to the harbor mouth, and the forts opened on the Eagle, commanded by Lieutenant Southerland. That plucky little converted yacht paid the Spaniards back in their own coin. Three Spanish gunboats came to the mouth of the harbor, and it looked as if an exciting engagement was about to take place. The Marblehead steamed up, her splendid rapid-fire batteries blazing away at forts and ships. The Spaniards quickly turned tail and sought the shelter of the inner harbor, and after a few compliments to the forts the Eagle and Marblehead withdrew. The Galicia, one of the Spanish torpedo gunboats, was seriously injured during this short engagement. As no injury or casualty was inflicted upon the American ships, that morning's work at Cienfuegos was most satisfactory.

The two following days were uneventful on the blockade save for the arrival of the cruiser Montgomery, after being thoroughly overhauled in dockyard. At noon on Sunday, May 1, after a long consultation with the commanding officers of the vessels off Havana, Rear-Admiral Sampson
sailed for Key West for coal and instructions, arriving there shortly before midnight, after an absence of nine eventful days. It was on this day that Commodore Dewey destroyed the Spanish fleet in Manila harbor. On May 2 the Iowa and Indiana arrived from the blockade, having followed Sampson, at his orders. The two battleships and the flagship immediately commenced coaling, and it was soon noised abroad that they were now bent on other mission than mere blockade work.

Key West harbor at this time was full of shipping. The masts of the Spanish prizes rose like a forest. The war-vessels then at the island were the cruisers Detroit, Marblehead, Cincinnati (with disabled machinery and on her way north for repairs), and Mayflower, monitor Puritan, gunboats Vicksburg, Blake, Hawk, and Morrill, and tugs Tecumseh, Sioux, Samoset, Algonquin, and Wompatuck.

While Rear-Admiral Sampson’s command had been establishing the blockade of northern Cuba, events of great interest had been occurring in other parts of the world. Commodore Dewey’s victory over the Spanish fleet at Manila Bay has already been referred to. This achievement, or, more professionally speaking, its accomplishment without any appreciable loss of life or damage to vessels, inspired every American naval officer with additional confidence in the morale of his own men as compared with those of Spain. Dewey’s victory also fired enthusiasm among the crews and made officers and men justly proud of the service, while it created a certain dash of emulation; all good sentiments and not to be despised in their material effect. But what most concerned the North Atlantic Squadron was Cervera’s fleet, that powerful aggregation of modern vessels which sooner or later they hoped to meet.

In the first chapter it was stated that the Viscaya and Almirante Oquendo arrived from Havana at St. Vincent on April 19. They found there the Cristobal Colon and Maria Teresa, the latter being the flagship of Admiral Cervera, the torpedo-boat destroyers Furor, Pluton, and
Terror, which had arrived from Cadiz on April 14, the first-class torpedo-boats Ariete, Azor, and Rayo, and three transports. Until April 29 this fleet remained at St. Vincent. The time was spent in taking on coal and in target practice. On the morning of the 29th, seven days after Sampson sailed from Key West for Havana, Admiral Cervera led his fleet out and headed on a southwest course. The cruisers took the torpedo-boat destroyers in tow. The torpedo-boats and transports were left behind.

A few hours after Cervera had effected his tardy departure Sampson was informed of the fact. The possibilities which then presented themselves were summed up in an interesting and able letter from Secretary Long to Sampson, under date of April 29. After informing the rear-admiral that the St. Louis and Harvard had been sent scouting off Guadaloupe and Martinique, Long wrote: "Though this Spanish squadron is reported . . . as being bound for Cuba, it seems very doubtful whether it would proceed immediately to your neighborhood, but it might possibly go into San Juan, Porto Rico, or to some other port of that island, or to the eastern part of Cuba. It is presumed that if they do take refuge in a port as above mentioned, that movement would be favorable to your operations against them." Brief mention followed of the "frequent suggestion" that Cervera might try to intercept the Oregon and Marietta; that he might attack the Atlantic coast cities and shipping, in which case Long said it might be considered necessary for Sampson to detach one of his battle-ships to reinforce the Flying Squadron; or that after feinting upon the Northern coast Cervera might slip down to the West Indies to join a second Spanish squadron, which might include the Pelayo and Carlos V. "Of course, the above is mostly speculation, and is given to you for what it may be worth," concluded the Secretary.

Sampson himself believed that Cervera would try to get into the harbor of San Juan, Porto Rico, though he admitted that the possible objective of the fleet might be Santiago.
de Cuba or Cienfuegos, on the south side of Cuba. That Cervera contemplated an attack upon the eastern coast of the United States was a contingency that Sampson did not consider possible, though the general public, when it heard of the Spanish admiral’s departure, had terrible misgivings regarding the safety of its eastern seaboard cities. After consultation with Secretary Long, and with the full approval of the latter, Sampson decided to withdraw a strong force from the blockade and go into the Windward Passage, the strait between Cuba and Haiti, and there to cruise “for the purpose of observation, with a view to going further east if thought advisable.” Cape Haitien, a cable station on the north coast of Haiti, was to be used as a place of call for further instructions and information. It was in preparation for this trip that the New York and the other armored vessels were coaling so vigorously at Key West.

Though Sampson’s stated objective was the Windward Passage, he was all the time under the impression that he would eventually be compelled to go to San Juan, or “further east,” as he guardedly expressed it. But the situation, from the American point of view, was too replete with possibilities to definitely decide upon any fixed objective, while Cervera was only two days out from Cape de Verde, and while there was no reliable information as to where he intended to go. With only one fleet available to cover these three points, and with the urgent necessity of maintaining the blockade of Havana against possible, though not probable, attack by Cervera, the Windward Passage suggested itself to Sampson as the best rendezvous for forces. From there he could quickly reach the south coast of Cuba or the eastern end of Porto Rico, while he was in the best position possible to head off Cervera should the Spanish admiral attempt to reach Havana either in a direct course or from the southward. So Sampson gathered his forces and made ready for a cruise that he knew would take him at least as far as Cape Haitien.

While the rear-admiral’s training and judgment enabled
him to regard the probable objective of Cervera with comparative single-mindedness, the world in general indulged in the widest speculation. Many affirmed that Cervera had left Cape de Verde Islands merely to go to the Canaries, and that he would not think of starting for West Indian or American waters before being reinforced. This supposition was strengthened by the published report from Madrid that the *Pelayo, Numancia, Vitória*, and *Alfonso XIII.*, with three torpedo-boat destroyers and three torpedo-boats, were being made ready for sea and would sail in a few days, presumably to reinforce Cervera. Incidentally it may be mentioned that the *Oregon* at this period was a source of considerable anxiety to the public. The little Spanish torpedo cruiser *Temerario*, which lay disabled at Ensenada, Argentina, was constantly credited with the intention of dashes out of the La Plata River and sinking the American battleship. Then, when Cervera left St. Vincent for parts unknown, the public had visions of the *Oregon* engaging the Spanish fleet single-handed, and being overwhelmed. The public also had qualms regarding the safety of the American liner *Paris*, afterward the auxiliary cruiser *Yale*, which made her last trip from England as a passenger steamer after the commencement of hostilities. In the harbor of Queenstown, Ireland, was the Spanish torpedo-boat destroyer *Audaz*, which had been brought there for repairs, having been seriously injured in March while on her way to Spain. The *Audaz* was credited with the same motives against the *Paris* that the *Temerario* was supposed to harbor against the *Oregon*. The torpedo-boat, however, proved quite harmless, for the *Paris* arrived safely, having only sustained a newspaper capture, and the *Audaz* sailed for Spain on April 25.

Cervera's stay of seven days in the Portuguese harbor of St. Vincent after the commencement of hostilities caused some protest in the United States; but Portugal insisted that no breach of neutrality had been intended, explaining that the official notice that a state of war existed between
the United States and Spain was only received in Lisbon on April 26, and that the subsequent declaration of neutrality was signed on April 28 by the King of Portugal. Considering the formalities that attended such issuance, the Portuguese Government maintained that they exhibited considerable promptness, and pointed to the fact that Cervera left St. Vincent early on the day after the king's signature had been affixed to Portugal's declaration. The privileges Cervera thus attained mattered little in view of after events, but the fact that he coaled and supplied his ships as late as April 28 in what was practically a neutral harbor was held by many to be a breach in spirit, if not in fact, that should be made to cost Portugal dear. All the great nations had issued proclamations of neutrality by May 1.

At home naval work, apart from the actual waging of war, progressed well. The construction of the battleships Alabama, Kearsarge, and Kentucky was vigorously accelerated, while the auxiliary cruisers and converted yachts were turned out quickly and put into active service. The cruiser San Francisco, which had been undergoing alterations, was ready on May 1, and the New Orleans, with all the finishing touches completed, put to sea a day later. On May 1 the purchased gunboat Topeka arrived from England at New York, after a long and hard passage. The Flying Squadron remained at Hampton Roads for alleged coast-defence purposes and had much target practice. The Columbia and Minneapolis, then detached from this command, took scouting trips along the northeastern coast. The Panther, carrying six hundred and forty-seven marines, sailed from Hampton Roads for Key West on April 23. The marines waited patiently aboard, and to good purpose, for their opportunity. Commodore Remey was appointed to command the naval base at Key West.

At Washington the Naval War Board worked incessantly upon the problems which, owing to the uncertainty of Cervera's whereabouts, arose without ceasing. They had to grapple with such difficulties as frequent reports of
Spanish war-vessels off Newfoundland or Haiti, always, apparently, well authenticated. The board acted in advisory capacity to Secretary Long. Perhaps its greatest virtue lay in the fact that it trusted to men on the scene of action, and did not succumb to the temptation to be arbitrary or to meddle with details that are so often mistaken for strategy.

The War Board several times changed in composition, but during the greater part of the war consisted of the following: Rear-Admiral Montgomery Sicard; Capt. A. S. Crowninshield, chief of the Bureau of Navigation; and Capt. A. T. Mahan (retired). Capt. A. S. Barker retained a membership until May 20, and Assistant Secretary Roosevelt until May 7.

Even to the lay observer of the campaign at this stage it was evident that the great handicap of the navy was lack of information regarding the enemy’s intentions. What the United States was doing or intended to do was, thanks to some newspapers, common gossip for the whole world, but what Spain had done or intended to do was as a closed book, not only to the general public, but to a great extent to the officials in charge of the American campaign. To secure such information as would naturally have been expected from a well-organized secret service or even from a few capable spies, two gallant young naval officers volunteered to undertake a task that was more deliberately daring and more delicately difficult of execution than any feat of the war. Ensigns W. H. Buck and H. H. Ward left the United States April 30, travelled over Europe in disguise and succeeded in obtaining information that proved most valuable to our Navy Department. Ward went to Cadiz and remained in that city some time, running every kind of risk in his desire to ascertain the naval details so much in demand at Washington. Had he been detected, nothing could have saved him from the ignominious death of a spy. He afterward went to San Juan, Porto Rico, where he was actually arrested by the Spanish authorities, who had their suspicions. By the exercise of great coolness
young Ward cleared himself, was released, and continued to glean information in San Juan.

In Cuba the insurgents made small progress, despite their many promises. The Spanish cruiser *Reina Mercedes* was reported to be crippled in the harbor of Santiago de Cuba, where, up to April 21, no submarine mines had been laid. The boilers of the *Reina Mercedes* were practically worthless. Captain-General Blanco sent daily from Havana to Madrid optimistic messages and glowing accounts of battles that never happened, in which the Spaniards were invariably victorious. One report from Blanco created great enthusiasm in Spain and happened to be true. It told of the safe arrival at Cienfuegos of the Spanish steamer *Montserrat*, which sailed from Cadiz on April 10, with arms, ammunition, and supplies. The *Montserrat*'s escape from capture was unfortunate, and occurred because Commander McCalla was delayed twelve hours on his way to Cienfuegos, by the grounding on April 26 of the *Marblehead* and *Eagle* (this was due to deflection of the standard compass). Neither ship was injured. At San Juan, Porto Rico, supplies and arms were landed between April 21 and May 1 without let or hindrance on the part of the United States.

These were the general conditions on May 3, when Sampson lay coaling his picked ships at Key West preparatory to commencing the naval campaign proper.
CHAPTER III.

THE ATTACK UPON SAN JUAN.

At midnight of May 3 the signal was flashed from the New York for the Indiana, Iowa, and Detroit to proceed to a point near Cardenas, where the flagship would overtake them. Sampson and his ship had to wait at Key West for further advices, and it was not until 5:45 on the morning of May 4 that he started on his cruise to the Windward Passage, "with a view to going further east, if thought advisable." He had received this dispatch from Secretary Long: "No large army movement can take place for a fortnight, and no small one will until after we know the whereabouts of the four Spanish armored cruisers and destroyers. If their objective is Porto Rico, they should arrive [there] about May 8, and immediate action against them and San Juan is then authorized. In such case the Flying Squadron would reinforce you."

About noon the blockading ships off Havana were met. After taking a final look at the blockade of the Cuban capital Sampson sailed off to the eastward, and by seven o'clock that evening had overtaken the Indiana, Iowa, Terror, Amphitrite, Detroit, Montgomery, torpedo-boat Porter, tug Wompatuck, and steam collier Niagara. Two hours later double column was formed, with the Iowa towing the monitor Amphitrite, to save the latter's scant coal supply, and the Montgomery towing the Porter. Several newspaper tugs, scarcely knowing whither they went, followed the fleet. It was a goodly but slow array that pounded its way silently along the shores of Cuba.

During the day I had a long talk with the rear-admiral, of which, until now, I have not felt at liberty to speak. It is not only interesting as showing accurately his own
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surmises at this critical and uncertain stage of the naval campaign, but also important as a lucid answer to many questions which have since arisen. I copy from my memorandum of the conversation.

"If we can catch the Spanish fleet in San Juan," said Sampson, "we shall, I think, win an easy victory. San Juan does not appear to be strongly fortified, although I hear they have been working hard there during last month [April]. If we meet the Spaniards at sea, our position will not be so advantageous. Their ships are faster than ours, and they will be able to engage or run away at pleasure. Should they risk an engagement, we should, with any kind of luck, be able to defeat them. If they run away, we can do next to nothing. If I had the Texas or Massachusetts or Brooklyn, or even the Columbia and Minneapolis, down here, they could probably engage the fleet and enable the slower battleships to get near enough to get in their work. I cannot rely to any great extent upon the Terror and Amphitrite. Monitors are practically useless in rough weather, and one cannot count upon having calm seas for an engagement. If we meet the Spanish fleet at sea, it will be the first time monitors have been tested so far from home waters.

"However, it is quite problematical whether or not we see anything at all of Spain's fleet. Should it go in the direction of our own coast—which is unlikely—the Flying Squadron will attend to it. In the latter possibility I have promised to send a battleship to strengthen the Flying Squadron, and they have agreed to send a battleship to me when it seems morally certain that Cervera will be met with in the West Indies. But it is too late now for such an arrangement to be of much use."

I asked the rear-admiral if it were not possible for the Spanish fleet to avoid him and, going direct to northern Cuba, break up the blockade. Sampson thought for a moment, and then said, slowly:

"Yes, they might slip past us easily enough, and if they
got to northern Cuba would be likely to break up the blockade. But I hardly think they would dare do that. They must be in want of coal, and though they might have enough to get to Cuba they would scarcely risk an engagement on a limited supply of fuel."

Then Sampson touched on the difficulties confronting the comparatively light squadron left on the blockade line. He hoped they would be able to keep the blockade tight, but they had "their hands full." He expected little trouble with Spain's torpedo-boat destroyers, which were then proving a nightmare to many a naval officer and authority. "They will be dangerous only at night," he added, almost unconsciously enunciating in seven simple words the whole theory of torpedo-boat warfare, "and with proper precaution I think they can be rendered useless even then." He spoke of the great superiority of the 13-inch over the 12-inch gun, and when I suggested, in view of the wiping out of Spain's naval force in the Pacific by Dewey, that the American fleet in those waters might be sent around to reinforce the North Atlantic force, he said: "It is most improbable, unless we sustained a severe defeat in the North Atlantic, which," very quietly, "I think is unlikely."

What was said on this occasion stands the tests of comparison with after events so well that I may refer to the interview as a slight example of the remarkable foresight exhibited by Sampson throughout the war, so much admired by the officers who served under him and so little known to the general public.

With the dawn of the second morning of this cruise a brigantine was seen bearing down on the squadron with all sail set. The Montgomery was signalled to go after her, and Commander Converse of that vessel soon had a prize crew aboard, for she was the Spanish brigantine Frasquito, bound from Montevideo to Havana, with a cargo of jerked beef. The prize crew took the Frasquito into Key West, and the Montgomery hurried on after the squadron but
A BIRD'S-EYE OF THE NEW YORK'S FORECASTLE WHILE CHUSONG.
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not before capturing another Spaniard, the bark *Lorenzo*, also bound for Havana with jerked beef. An accident to the *Indiana*’s intermediate cylinder valve-stem caused that battleship to lag behind, though the squadron was barely making ten knots, and before noon the *Indiana* was not in sight of the *New York*. The flagship took the monitor *Terror* in tow with two steel hawser. An attempt had been made to do this the previous evening, but had failed, owing to the breaking of the hawser. That it is no easy thing to tow a 4,000-ton monitor will be gleaned from the chapter of accidents which followed.

By Friday morning, the 6th, the *Indiana* had made repairs, and was again nearly in her right position. A conference was held between the rear-admiral and Captains Chadwick, Evans, Taylor, and Commander Converse, which resulted in sending the fast *Montgomery* ahead of the fleet to Cape Haitien, where she could receive cable instructions from Washington and rejoin the command by the time it was off that point. At five o’clock that evening, after the *Montgomery* was well on her way, the *Indiana* signalled that the crown sheets of one of her boilers were coming down, and that she could only make eight knots. So the speed of the squadron was reduced to that limit. Then the hawser between the *Iowa* and *Amphitrite* broke, and for an hour the squadron stopped, so that another hawser could be passed to the monitor. The *Terror* cast a line to the torpedo-boat *Porter*, and the squadron went ahead slowly, presenting the curious sight of the armored cruiser *New York* towing both the bulky *Terror* and the tiny *Porter*. The delays caused by these accidents were intensely irritating, in view of the fact that Long had specified the 8th as the day Cervera should arrive at Porto Rico. But the worst was yet to come. The next morning, between four and five o’clock, the *Iowa*’s hawser to the *Amphitrite* again parted, and the squadron slowed down to five knots. At one o’clock in the afternoon the *Terror*’s steering-gear got out of order, and once more the warships
scarcely moved through the water, waiting for the monitor to make repairs. After nearly two hours' delay a fresh start was made. Forty minutes later I happened to be in the rear-admiral's cabin, discussing these various accidents. They worried him greatly, and he deplored the necessity that compelled him to take monitors so far from home. Suddenly there was a report like the firing of a 4-inch gun just above our heads. The flagship shook as if she had been jerked out of water. Before the deck steadied there was another loud report. I jumped up, thinking, though it was broad daylight, that we must have discovered an enemy. "I am afraid she's gone," said Sampson in a tone of resignation. "Who's gone?" I asked, impatiently. "The Terror," he replied, and taking his cap went up on deck. And so it turned out. The Terror's steering-gear had broken down again, and she had taken a rank shear to starboard, carrying both hawsers with her and just missing the New York's stern in her mad career. After stopping for an hour and thirty minutes new hawsers were passed to the monitor, and just before midnight the squadron lay motionless twenty miles north of Cape Haitien.

In all fairness to the officers and men of the monitors, it must be stated that they cannot be blamed for these many accidents. All this time they were enduring great hardships, sweltering in terrible heat in their cabins below water line, while their low decks were scarcely ever dry. Under any circumstances a monitor is a hard ship to handle, and it is more especially so when in tow of another vessel. The monitor commanders were ordered to go with their vessels, and they went; their vessels had to be taken, because there were no others available; they had to be towed, so as to save their coal supply, and the irritating delays they caused must be blamed to the conditions that made their presence unavoidable, and not to the ships themselves, which were altogether out of their legitimate sphere, nor to the officers and crews, who worked nobly under disadvantages.
The Montgomery was waiting at the rendezvous, and Commander Converse came on board the New York with telegrams from Washington. He had entered Cape Haitien under the pretext of coaling. Shortly after midnight Captains Chadwick, Evans, Taylor, Ludlow, and Barclay, and Commanders Converse and Dayton were closeted with the rear-admiral. After they had been in conference for four hours I sent in a note to Sampson suggesting that if further communication with the shore was desired he could avail himself of the Associated Press tug Dauntless, which had followed us from Key West, and which lay within hail. It occurred to me that the reappearance of the Montgomery at Cape Haitien might lead to suspicions as to the whereabouts of the squadron itself, and possibly to protest by Spain. The conference was long, for this cablegram had been received:

"WASHINGTON, May 6th.

"Do not risk or cripple your vessels against fortifications as to prevent soon afterwards successfully fighting Spanish fleet composed of Pelayo, Carlos V., Oquendo, Viscaya, Maria Teresa, Cristobal Colon, four deep-sea torpedo-boats, if they should appear on this side."

So Sampson had to contemplate meeting a much stronger fleet than, in reality, Spain ever mobilized. Not a word was said of the whereabouts of the fleet that Sampson knew had sailed from Cape de Verde Islands nine days previous, except what gave the impression that it included the battleships Pelayo and Carlos V.

At five o'clock that morning the rear-admiral called me into the cabin and said he would avail himself of my offer and send me into Cape Haitien with dispatches, and ask me to wait for a reply. A few hours later I was in that picturesque little harbor, and this message was on its way to Secretary Long:

1 This telegram was sent: "Do not risk so crippling your vessels," etc., but was read by Sampson as given in the text.
"Have received no information of the Spanish armored vessels. I request upon arrival of the three American line steamers to [they] be ordered to report by telegraph or otherwise at St. Thomas. Lacking the services of these vessels, I will have to return to the West immediately. I shall await answer to this request at Cape Haitien, and if granted, I will proceed to San Juan, probably destroying fortifications, establishing a temporary base at Culebra Island, to the east of Porto Rico, as entrance to San Juan is obstructed. Upon the arrival of the Spanish squadron in the West Indies, I request the Massachusetts and Texas. "SAMPSON."

That the scouting liners should report personally to Sampson was regarded as being very important, for unless in close touch with them he might be obliged to cruise hundreds of miles to no purpose. Why Culebra Island was not taken, the reader will discover later.

United States Consul Livingston, a colored appointee from Key West, helped the accomplishment of the various errands I had been sent to perform, and allayed the suspicions of the Haitian officials, who had been stirred up by vigorous protests from the Spanish consul. The latter cabled to his Government against the use of the harbor and cable by the United States, but this only benefited the coffers of the cable company. In addition to sending the rear-admiral’s cipher message to Washington, I wired, in Livingston’s name, to the American consuls in Martinique, St. Thomas, and other West Indian places for news of the Spanish fleet, and duplicated these messages to the Associated Press correspondents in parts of the world where Cervera was likely to be sighted. The replies dribbled in slowly. All were unsatisfactory. The next morning, May 9, I returned to the New York with Long’s reply to Sampson, which was no more satisfactory, except that it said the Pelayo, Carlos V., and one deep-sea torpedo-boat could not leave Cadiz for at least two weeks. However, it did say that the
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Oquendo, Maria Teresa, Colon, and two torpedo-boat destroyers had, according to the newspapers, been seen on the night of the 7th off Martinique. This, without any confirmation from Long himself, was too indefinite to work upon and had to be dismissed as worthless. By a coincidence, not very curious, the newspapers were wrong, because on the evening of the 7th of May the Spanish fleet was about seven hundred miles from Martinique. Long's reply to Sampson concluded as follows:

"Blockade of Cuba and Key West will be endangered if stripped by you. You should be quick in your operation at Porto Rico. In everything the Department has utmost confidence in your discretion, and the Department does not wish to hamper you."

When I handed the admiral this dispatch, I told him that, despite his precaution of lying twenty miles out, his squadron had been sighted and reported from a mountain top ashore. Asking me to go in again to Cape Haitien and wait for still later information, he headed the squadron to the westward, to lead any possible watcher ashore into the belief that he was returning to Key West. When well out of possible ken of land, he doubled once more and made for San Juan; not, however, before the Amphitrite broke down, and for several hours kept the speed of the squadron at about two knots while she made repairs. Ships were coaled from the Niagara during this wait off Cape Haitien.

The Dauntless took me back to Cape Haitien, whence I sent many more cablegrams to various parts of the earth asking for information of that elusive Spanish fleet. The replies were hopelessly indefinite. At midnight, in a blinding squall and utterly regardless of the terrible threat of being fired on by the lonely gun that stood at the mouth of the harbor, the Dauntless headed out to sea after the squadron, sticking her nose skyward in defiance of harbor regulations that forbid ingress and egress between 6 P.M. and 6 A.M. At half-past three o'clock the following afternoon, May 10, we caught up with the squadron. When I
told the rear-admiral that up to midnight of the 9th nothing had been seen or heard of Cervera, he gave up all thoughts of changing his plans and determined to go on to San Juan, where, in his judgment, we were as likely as not to find the Spanish fleet. The following day the monitors proceeded under their own steam, and late in the afternoon Rear-Admiral Sampson, Lieutenant Staunton, assistant chief of staff; Lieutenant Marsh, flag secretary; Ensign E. L. Bennett, flag lieutenant, and myself, rowed over to the rear-admiral's old ship, the *Iowa*, where his flag was hoisted. This change was made in view of the expected battle in the morning. The plan of attack upon the Spanish fleet, should it be found at San Juan, provided for the *Iowa*—the best battleship available—to lead the line, and Sampson wished to be first in the fray and thought that from her he could best direct the action. The night was spent in getting out extra supplies of ammunition, and at half-past three o'clock on the morning of May 12 the lights of San Juan were sighted.

All hands had been piped to breakfast half an hour before. The rear-admiral was on the bridge, and the *Iowa*, leading the squadron, was scarcely moving through the water. A big hill, which makes the eastern arm of San Juan harbor, loomed up black against the lightening sky. Along the hillside ran a semi-circle of twinkling lights. They were the lamps of the promenade. Everything took on a gray hue. From the decks of the *Iowa* one could scarcely see the lead-colored vessels that followed. Then dawn came creeping up over Porto Rico, blotting out with its light the faint rays of the twinkling lamps of the promenade, showing up the sharp outlines of the column of ships, and revealing the detail of the shore, about three miles distant. Crowning the hill was Morro Castle, a counterpart of that at Havana; beside it long, yellow, low buildings that we knew were forts and barracks. Behind this, out of sight, lay the sleeping town. At the narrow mouth of the harbor we could see the masts of a sunken ship stick-
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ing up out of the water. There was no sign of the Spanish fleet. From the chart of the harbor we were tolerably certain that the Spanish men-of-war would have to anchor so that we could see them, because the hidden gunboat anchorage behind the hill was not deep enough for their draught. On the chart the eastern hill was credited with a few batteries scattered along its side, in addition to the one by Morro. On the western arm of the harbor, low-lying land, there was a hospital and another battery, that was not thought strong. The rich vegetation took on its hues with daylight, and the bare spots of brown rock showed up vividly against this background. Not a sign of life could be seen ashore. It was one of the most entirely peaceful panoramas that ever beautified a May morning.

About half-past four the little tug *Wompatuck* steamed ahead of the *Iowa*. She had received her orders the night before, when Lieutenant Jungen, her commander, one of the survivors of the *Maine*, had been entrusted with a task that many thought would be his last. Watched by hundreds of eyes, the *Wompatuck* sped on until about a mile from the shore and a little to the westward of the harbor mouth. In plain sight, and within easy range of the forts, she moored a rowboat, which was to mark the starting-point of the ships as they passed in front of the harbor. To those who watched the *Wompatuck* the suspense was intense. One ordinary-sized shell would be enough to sink her. Every moment the batteries were expected to open on her. But not a shot came, and the tug steamed back in safety. If everything had not been so ominously still and so eminently peaceful, the *Wompatuck* would have been cheered till throats were hoarse, but, as it was, men felt glad the thing was over and simply breathed easier, as children do after the conjurer has returned the sword he swallowed. The *Detroit* went over to the eastward until she was within about five hundred yards of the shore in a position where it was then believed the enemy had no guns that could be trained upon her. Her duty was to watch
for possible torpedo-boats. The *Montgomery* took up a similar position to the westward. The *Iowa* rolled in the heavy ground-swell, and the monitors simply lurched around. It was the first time since war was declared that the *Iowa* had not been steady as a rock, and it was unfortunate. There was scarcely any wind. The Spaniards still slept sound. "Almost a pity to wake them," was the comment that passed around the quarter-deck, and we marvelled at gunners who could be so patient, or so blind. The *Iowa* steamed slowly ahead toward the moored rowboat, followed in order by the *Indiana, New York, Terror,* and *Amphitrite.*

"General quarters" rang out on the bugle at five o’clock, and men rushed to their stations. All guns on the starboard batteries were trained on Morro. Fifteen minutes later the rear-admiral, who was standing beside the conning tower—he never went inside—told Captain Evans he could begin. The bugler sounded "Commence firing," and the forward 12-inch turret of the *Iowa* bellowed out its awakening call to San Juan. A second later the whole starboard side of the battleship was enveloped in smoke and vivid with jets of fire. The range varied from 2,300 to 1,100 yards. At a speed of about five knots the *Iowa* passed the harbor mouth, followed by the other ships, whose batteries opened as soon as the guns could be brought to bear. The dark hillside was dotted with the geyser-like earth-clouds of exploding shells, most of them rising around Morro and the barracks. After we once passed the harbor mouth we were certain that Cervera was not inside.

The *Iowa* had almost completed her course of two miles, and still there was no sign of an enemy. The shore seemed deserted. Men stood out on the fo’castle and, gazing through glasses, wondered whether the Spaniards could sleep through the din that our guns created. Then there came a puff of smoke and a little tongue of flame from a fissure in the hillside rocks, a shriek that made men duck their heads and some grow pale, a dull splash, and turning
around we could see the ricochet of a shell, looking for all the world like a monster flying-fish dotting the water, and ending in a spout that marked explosion. After that they came often. From the scattered and frequent flashes of flame issuing from the eastern hillside it was evident that the strength of the fortifications had been underestimated in the charts furnished to Sampson. The enemy had batteries all along the sea-front. Around the little Detroit shells fell fast and furious, but Commander Dayton did not budge from his position, and at a range of five hundred yards replied with an incessant cannonade from his rapid-fire guns. The Iowa swung around and ceased firing as she headed back for the stake-boat, going outside the firing line. As the other vessels passed the furthermost eastward battery they followed in the Iowa's wake, forming a moving oval. Before the Amphitrite, the last vessel, finished her course the Iowa again reached the stake-boat and was ready to pass once more before the forts. Smoke from her own guns hung thick over everything. At times it was impossible to see even the outlines of the shore. Accurate aim was almost out of the question, and the keeping of distances between ships became a matter of great difficulty, and hence made collisions hard to avoid. Sampson quickly decided that the secondary batteries were not inflicting enough damage to compensate for the smoke they were creating, so he ordered "Use only large guns" run up at the Iowa's signal yard. The Detroit and Montgomery were signalled to withdraw out of range, because these two vessels are only furnished with small guns. The Montgomery saw the signal and went outside the line to join the Wompatuck, Porter, and Niagara, but the Detroit was so busy banging away that it was fifteen minutes before she hoisted the answering pennant and withdrew, still spitting vicious fire at the forts. That the Detroit was not hit during her close-range fighting is a mystery that even the notorious inefficiency of Spanish marksmanship fails to explain. She was continually surrounded by the water-jets of exploding
shells that sometimes wet her decks, missiles flew between her smokestacks, between her masts, through her rigging, and yet the gallant little cruiser steamed out unscathed, her crew grumbling at the hard luck that deprived them of further share in the fight.

When the second round of the battle started, at nine minutes past six, there was less smoke, and the boom of the guns came slowly. "Don't fire till you're sure you see your target," shouted Sampson to Lieutenant Van Duzer, who had bobbed up for a moment through the manhole of the Iowa's forward turret. Only 8-inch or larger guns were being used by the fleet, and the improvement in marksman ship was apparent. On the first passage before the forts many shells burst low down on the cliff and went wild. The monitors were especially erratic in their fire, the heavy swell causing them to become wretched gun-platforms. The enemy was now thoroughly awakened, and kept pounding away merrily at the moving fleet. Shells fell everywhere but on the ships themselves. At one time from the Iowa's decks, the shriek of a passing shell could be heard, on an average, every thirty seconds, and when that weird sound came the great majority instinctively ducked their heads and held their breath till the splash close aboard told that danger was over for the time being. The secondary and port batteries not being engaged, and the speed required from the engines being so small, put about two hundred men on the Iowa practically in the position of non-combatants. They availed themselves of their rest by crowding up on the superstructure and around the great turrets, watching the shore with eager interest. As the big projectiles threw up clouds of dirt around Morro Castle, or near some battery, there passed from mouth to mouth some such ejaculations as, "That's a good 'un!" "That warmed 'em!" or, "By God, look at that!" The fear that might naturally have been expected, especially during inaction, was not evident except in a few isolated cases. The failure of the Spaniards to hit their targets had bred contempt in the hearts of the
Jackies, and whatever lurking instinct of self-preservation still remained was temporarily overcome by intense curiosity to see what was going on. Two Jackies stood out on the fo’castle of the *Iowa* heaving the lead. They had absolutely no protection. Time and again shells passed close to them. Pausing for a moment with the lead line in his hands and pointing to a jet of water from an exploding shell that almost sprayed the deck, one of these Jackies shouted derisively to a messmate: "*They* can’t hit us, George!" A few seconds later, when the *Iowa* was turning out from her second round, there was a sound of crashing woodwork, and some one shouted, "*We’re* hit!" A 6-inch shell had struck the second whaleboat which was just forward of the after bridge. Burning splinters were scattered in every direction. The shell exploded on the skid frames, its fragments making about twenty holes in the copper tops of handy ventilators. The largest fragment passed diagonally across the beam of the ship and landed on the starboard side of the spar deck just under the forward bridge. G. Merkle, a marine private, was standing there, watching the course of events ashore. A flying fragment shattered his right arm at the elbow. John Mitchell, a seaman, and Raymond C. Hill, an apprentice, who were standing beside Merkle, were also hit by splinters, but only received flesh wounds. Almost before the men had time to realize what had happened they were taken below and bandaged. A hose was quickly brought to bear on the blazing splinters, and in about two minutes fire and blood had been washed away. Men grabbed bits of the exploded shell and put them away in their jumpers as souvenirs. But the casualty had a good effect, for it made those on deck more careful to keep under cover. Rear-Admiral Sampson, Captain Evans, and Lieutenant-Commander Rodgers, the executive officer of the *Iowa*, were standing just above where Merkle was hit, and that no splinters came their way was merely a matter of good luck.

Almost at the same time that the *Iowa* was hit, a similar
shell struck the New York, at exactly the same spot. It burst on a stanchion on the port side just forward of the after bridge. Its fragments plunged into the fourth cutter, completely wrecking it, then scattered in all directions, shattering the port searchlight, knocking great holes through the smokestacks and ventilators, and finally reaching the cutter forward on the starboard side, where a few spent fragments buried themselves. Other fragments took a downward course toward the 8-inch gun amidships on the port side, around which stood the disengaged crew. One bit of steel flew into the neck of Seaman Frank Wide- mark, and he dropped dead. Other fragments inflicted nasty wounds on two seamen, Samuel Feltman and Michael Murphy. They were quickly taken down to the wardroom, where doctors dressed their wounds. Slight flesh wounds were also inflicted upon several others of the amidships gun crew, which was in charge of Naval Cadet Boone.

Under a steady, heavy fire the Iowa started on her third passage before the forts. By this time the sea was thick with empty ammunition boxes floating jauntily on the swell; the woodwork, brasswork, and decks of the warships were greasy and grimed with saltpetre, that smarts in your eyes and is worse than alkali in your mouth; the guns were burning hot, and the men were tired, for they had been up since half-past two, and had been under great strain. The constant roar of your own guns and the occasional shriek of an enemy's shell are not calculated to steady the hand or improve the eye. At twelve minutes past seven a signal boy from the top of one of the Amphitrite's turrets wigwagged that the monitor's after turret was disabled for the day. This was due to a break in its machinery. The Amphitrite still kept up the attack with her forward turret. The rear-admiral watched the shore intently, trying to glean some idea of the damage done by the shells from the fleet, but with the exception of a few breaches in the old walls around Morro, and some smoke from a fire that apparently had started in the barracks, there were no signs that the enemy
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had in any way suffered from the hail of steel rained ashore. So at a quarter of eight o’clock, when the *Iowa* had fired the last gun she could bring to bear on her third round, the admiral ordered “Form column heading west” to be hoisted, and the *Iowa* bore straight out from shore and did not turn back toward the stake-boat. The other vessels followed, with the exception of the *Terror*. That monitor was possessed, for the occasion, of Nelson’s blind eye, and for half an hour longer she lay close in shore engaging the forts single-handed. The batteries concentrated on her, but though they came close they could not hit this plucky, squatty monitor, that rolled like a ferry-boat in the surf and banged away, first with one turret and then with another, at the hillside batteries. At quarter-past eight the *Terror* saw the recall signal. She steamed after the other ships, and the engagement ended. It had lasted three hours, during which time the United States Navy in the North Atlantic encountered a longer sustained fire than on any occasion during the Spanish-American war.

Sampson came within an ace of returning to the attack. After the *Terror* had ceased firing he and Captain Evans went down into the latter’s cabin. I followed, because I had promised to send the rear-admiral’s official report to the cable station at St. Thomas by the tug *Dauntless*, which now lay within hail, and I was anxious to know whether the *Dauntless* was wanted at once or later on. The rear-admiral said he had not made up his mind about going in again. He was rather inclined to give the men something to eat, and then, like Dewey, return to the attack. The sun was up, and it was very hot. Captain Evans argued against another bombardment. “You have punished the forts, sir,” said Evans, “and you have taught them a lesson. You have no force of occupation. You did not intend to take the city. You may have to meet the Spanish fleet this evening. You are far from your base of supplies. I should think, sir, that the punishment you have adminis-
tered is sufficient for the present, unless you are anxious to take the city."

After further conversation Sampson came to the same conclusion. As he said afterward in his official report:

"It was soon seen that Admiral Cervera was not in the port. It was clear to my own mind that the squadron would not have any great difficulty in forcing the surrender of the place, but the facts that we should be held several days in completing arrangements for holding it; that part of our force would have to be left to await the arrival of troops to garrison it; that the movements of the Spanish Squadron, our main objective, were still unknown; that the Flying Squadron was still north and not in a position to render any aid; that Havana, Cervera's natural objective, was then open to entry by such a force as his, while we were a thousand miles distant, made our immediate movement toward Havana imperative. I thus reluctantly gave up the project against San Juan and stood westward for Havana."

The withdrawal of the fleet from San Juan has been claimed by the Spanish as a victory for their forces. This is incorrect. In the first place, the Spaniards' own list of casualties admitted to eight killed and thirty wounded, besides considerable damage to forts, in comparison with one killed, seven wounded, and no damage on the American side. I cannot too forcibly emphasize the fact that the bombardment of the forts was not primarily undertaken with a view to capturing the city. To be certain that the Spanish fleet was not in San Juan harbor Sampson had to pass very close to the harbor mouth; to do this in safety he had to attack the forts, on the well-known principle that the best defence is the weight of your own fire. Once certain that the Spanish fleet was not hiding behind the hill, the capture of the city became a secondary object, dependent upon the strength developed by the batteries. Had these batteries been as weak as indicated in the charts, upon which Sampson had to depend absolutely, why then it is
possible that in the order of things they would have succumbed to the continued fire of the ships. But they developed unexpected strength, and the second and third passage of the ships at San Juan had no other primary object than the administering of punishment to these forts, and from a strictly professional point of view the affair then resolved itself into a mere reconnaissance in force, which resulted in no injury to the ships and left a good balance in their favor as regards casualties. I recall a conversation I had with Sampson the evening before arriving at San Juan that forms an exceedingly simple explanation of this somewhat misunderstood bombardment.

"If you don’t find the Spanish fleet at San Juan," I asked, "will you take the city?"

"Well," he replied, "if they want to give us the city, I suppose we can’t refuse it."

Personally, of course, Sampson could perfectly justify his withdrawal by referring to his orders not to risk in action against fortifications any of his armored ships; but the attack upon San Juan should be looked upon in a much broader light, and certainly seems, in its inception and conclusion, thoroughly justified by conditions as they then existed, and also by after events, and in no sense can it be recorded as a reversal or defeat.

Some criticism was later expressed regarding Sampson’s failure to notify the inhabitants of the city that he was about to bombard. It appears that several shells from the ships passed over the crest of the hill and landed in the city, causing some damage to property and several casualties. This was totally opposed to Sampson’s desire and expectations, and would not have occurred but for the heavy swell that made accurate aim so hard. Had he thought for a moment that non-combatants would be endangered by his fire, he would have afforded them time and opportunity to get away. From his battle order,\(^1\) drawn up primarily to cope with the Spanish fleet, his intentions in this respect are

\(^1\) See Appendix, page 288.
evident, for in it he provided for the sending of a flag of truce before opening on the naval enemy should any neutral shipping be in the line of fire. The falling of the shells in the city of San Juan was an entirely unforeseen misfortune, regretted by no one more than by Sampson himself, who thoroughly believed that the height of the eastern hill effectually protected the city from his attack. The French cruiser *Amiral Rigault de Genouilly* was in the harbor during the bombardment, and part of her rigging was shot away. She left immediately after Sampson had withdrawn his ships. A gunner's mate, John Erickson, on the *Amphitrite* died from extreme heat in the after turret during the action. This can hardly be included in the list of casualties. His body and that of Widemark were buried at sea that afternoon, and the squadron hurried back toward Havana.

The following morning the hospital-ship *Solace* was met. She had just come from Key West, and reported that a reliable dispatch had been received there, stating that Cervera's squadron had returned to Cadiz. This seemed incredible to Sampson, but it was confirmed by a dispatch-boat just arrived from St. Thomas. Even then Sampson would not believe it, and adhered to his single purpose of reaching Havana. However, to be on the safe side, he sent the *Porter* into Porto Plata, a cable station near the eastern end of San Domingo, with this dispatch to Secretary Long:

"Is it true Spanish ships are at Cadiz, Spain? If so, send to San Juan, Porto Rico, collier from Key West or elsewhere."

Sampson also asked Commodore Remey, in charge of the naval base at Key West, to send the *Vesuvius* to San Juan, in case Long confirmed the report of Cervera being at Cadiz. These messages naturally had in view the return to and capture of San Juan: eminently good strategy and justifiable if Cervera's ships were in Spain. Sampson did not wait for Long's answer, but kept his fleet going toward
Havana, despite the assurances regarding Cervera's whereabouts. He simply could not conceive that the Spanish admiral had returned to Spain, and his foresight, instinct, or what you will, proved truer than the information, which, by the way, had been cabled to the State Department by one of its officials and confirmed in London by Lieutenant Colwell, the United States naval attaché.

The men wounded at San Juan were transferred to the Solace, and the squadron proceeded. At 3:30 A.M. on May 15 the Porter returned from Porto Plata, bringing a dispatch from Long, dated May 14, saying that the Spanish fleet was off Curaçao. As the information was somewhat late in reaching him, and was vague, both as to the definite location of the enemy and their strength, Sampson, a few hours later, sent the Porter back to Porto Plata for definite and later news. A Spanish fleet "off Curaçao" on May 14 might be a few hundred miles nearer Cuba twenty-four hours later. The Porter was ordered to go from Porto Plata to Cape Haitien, a distance of sixty miles, and to rejoin the New York off that place. After going aground in Cape Haitien harbor the Porter, at midnight of the 15th, brought Sampson a batch of accumulated dispatches from the Navy Department, and then it was that the rear-admiral received the first definite news of the hostile fleet. The dispatches he now received stated that the Maria Teresa and Viscaya had entered the port of Curaçao for coal on May 14, while the Colon, Oquendo, Furor, and Pluton were outside the harbor. They were to leave, so Long cabled, at 6 P.M. on May 15, "destination unknown." They were "short of coal and provisions," and had foul bottoms. The torpedo-boat destroyer Terror had been left for repairs at Fort de France, Martinique, where the fleet had first been sighted. Further, Long cabled that the Flying Squadron had sailed from Hampton Roads on the 13th for Key West, to which place he ordered Sampson to proceed "with all possible dispatch."

In less than an hour Sampson had thoroughly grasped
the situation in its new light. He cabled to Commodore Remey:

"Inform at once vessels blockading at Cienfuegos the Spanish fleet may appear at any time on south coast of Cuba."

With keen perception he at once foresaw the probable objective of Cervera, and at the same time realized the weak spot in his own forces. How remarkably near Sampson came to foretelling the exact movement of his antagonist may be judged from a cablegram he sent that night to Captain Cotton, of the auxiliary cruiser *Harvard*. The *Harvard* was known to be cruising off Martinique. Sampson warned Captain Cotton of Cervera's presence at Curaçao, and, quoting Long, wrote "destination unknown," but added on his own account, and to help Captain Cotton:

"Probably Santiago de Cuba or San Juan, Porto Rico."

The placing of Santiago as the first probable objective of Cervera can only be compared to the remarkable foresight exhibited so often by Nelson. It was no lucky guess on Sampson's part; it was the result of his excellent judgment and professional breadth and acumen. It was an opinion based on information somewhat vague regarding the existing conditions and which contained absolutely no hint of the future; it was an assumption formed in less than an hour. Not until seven days later was it found that Sampson, when it had seemed necessary to him to surmise, had been absolutely correct.

To Secretary Long, Sampson cabled:

"Auxiliary cruisers are ordered to cruise as follows: *Yale* to assist *St. Paul* between Morant Point, Jamaica, Nicholas Mole, and Cuba; *Harvard*, Mona Passage and on north side of Porto Rico Island; *St. Louis*, cutting cables at Santiago and at Guantánamo, Cuba, then at Porto Rico, thence to St. Thomas about May 19 to await orders. United States squadron proceeding at best speed, seven knots, to Key West, and will arrive early May 19."

All these dispatches were sent by the *Porter* to Cape
Haitien. The *St. Louis*, which had joined Sampson on the 15th, after reporting that she had cut a cable between St. Thomas and San Juan, was sent to Santiago with the *Wompatuck* to cut the cable there. The importance of at once isolating that city was very apparent to Sampson. After deciding upon these vigorous measures covering the entire situation, Sampson headed on after the main body of the fleet, which by this time had passed him on its way to Havana.

Although it is somewhat of a digression, I must now leave Sampson for a moment, and take you to Martinique. From the day Cervera left the Cape de Verde Islands the whole world went to guessing where he was bound. It was thought that some passing steamers before long would surely sight the Spanish fleet and prove the guesses right or wrong. But the days went by, and no word came of the missing fleet. Phantom-like, it seemed to have vanished off the face of the earth, and the longer it remained unheard of the greater became the world-wide interest in its whereabouts, and the greater grew the anxiety in the United States regarding the intentions of the Spanish admiral. False reports flourished like green bay trees. On the morning of May 11, the auxiliary cruiser *Harvard* entered the port of St. Pierre, Martinique. She had been scouting. Most naval officers thought that if Cervera were coming to the West Indies he certainly ought to have been there before then, considering the speed of his fleet.

Late on the afternoon of May 11, George L. Darte, the United States consul at St. Pierre, received private information that a Spanish vessel had put in at Fort de France, a harbor of the island, sixteen miles from St. Pierre. Mr. Darte immediately informed Captain Cotton of the *Harvard*, and they decided to investigate without delay. The only communication between St. Pierre and Fort de France, other than by telephone and cable, which it was deemed imprudent to use, was by a rough country road of thirty miles, or by boat along the coast. So Mr. Darte and First
Lieutenant of Marines Theodore P. Kane, then on the *Harvard*, got a canoe, hired four native oarsmen, and put out to sea at nine o'clock that night. They had tried to get horses, but failed. A wind and rain storm came on, and it looked as if the canoe would be swamped. Lieutenant Kane and Mr. Darte took their boots off, and stood by to swim. For five hours the little craft was buffeted by the waves, but finally arrived safe and sound at Fort de France. There were no signs of the Spanish fleet. The Spanish hospital-ship *Alicante* was in the harbor, but she had been there some time. Disheartened, Kane and Darte went to a hotel. At five o'clock that morning, by which time they had partly dried their soaked clothing, they started out for the beach. Half an hour later they saw in the mist what they thought was a vessel standing to the eastward. A few minutes later they were rewarded by the sight of five ships which they took to be the long-expected Spanish fleet. At first they could scarcely believe their eyes, but as the mist lifted all doubt vanished. The torpedo-boat destroyer *Furor* left the fleet, and came into the harbor. An officer landed and visited the Spanish consul. Soon after the *Furor* steamed back to the larger vessels, and the torpedo-boat destroyer *Terror* came limping into the harbor, badly in need of repairs. (The *Terror* remained at Fort de France until May 25.) By nine o'clock the same morning Mr. Darte and Lieutenant Kane were back at St. Pierre. Consul Darte at once sent a cipher message to the Department of State, and Captain Cotton notified the Navy Department. The consul's message is said to have been received in Washington before Captain Cotton's, and Mr. Darte claims the honor, with apparent reason, of giving to his government the first official information of Cervera's whereabouts. This, it will be remembered, was on the morning of May 12, fourteen days after Cervera sailed from the Cape de Verde Islands, two days before he was reported at Curaçao, and just about the time that Sampson was bombarding San Juan.
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To return to Sampson, whom we left on the early morning of May 16, bound for Key West. The following day the rear-admiral started ahead of the main body of the fleet, because he was in a hurry to reach his destination. The New York bore him away at about fifteen knots an hour, while the battleships and monitors followed at the rate of seven or eight. No sooner was the New York out of sight of her heavier comrades than she captured the Spanish bark Carlos F. Rozes. Ensign Brumby, with a prize crew, was put aboard to take the prize into Key West. A few hours later the New York met the torpedo-boat Dupont. Lieutenant Wood, her commander, had a small cargo of dispatches for Sampson. He also brought the news of an affair at Cardenas, on May 11, in which the torpedo-boat Winslow was disabled, and Ensign Bagley, her second officer, and four men were killed. The names of the killed were John Deneefe, George B. Meek, firemen; Elijah B. Tunnell, cabin cook; and John Varveres, oiler. Lieutenant John B. Bernadou, commanding the Winslow, was wounded, as were three enlisted men of the torpedo-boat's crew, though not seriously. Worth Bagley—a dear friend of mine, and as noble and brave a man as ever stepped aboard a ship—was the first and only line officer of the United States Navy to lose his life during action throughout the war with Spain. The news of this disaster had a depressing effect upon the men and officers of the flagship. Commander Todd, who was in command of the Cardenas affair in which the Winslow suffered, has written a minute account of it which will be found in the next chapter.

Another engagement involving loss of life to the United States Navy occurred the same day as the Winslow affair, when Commander McCalla endeavored to cut the three cables which connected Cienfuegos with the outer world. Early on the morning of May 11, he brought his own vessel, the Marblehead, close in to land, and was followed by the gunboat Nashville. Two steam cutters and sailing launches were lowered from the Marblehead and Nashville. They
were manned by volunteer crews of sailors and marines, and carried grappling tackle. The men were armed with the Lee rifle, the regulation navy small-arm, and the steam cutters carried 1-pounder guns. The command of the expedition was entrusted to Lieut. Cameron McR. Winslow, of the Nashville, assisted by Lieut. Edwin A. Anderson, of the Marblehead, and Ensign T. P. Magruder of the Nashville. Led by these officers, the little boats pulled in shore. The Marblehead and Nashville opened fire on the cable house, chapparal, hills, and rifle-pits. The cable house was soon demolished, and the slight return fire from infantry and cavalry almost ceased. The two sailing launches cast off from the steam cutters, and advanced to within three hundred yards of the beach. In one launch was Lieutenant Winslow, in the other Lieutenant Anderson, while Ensign Magruder remained in charge of the steam cutters, slightly in the rear, and with his one-pounders kept raking the shore.

After hard work, Winslow and Anderson grappled and cut two cables, going within thirty yards of the beach. The enemy's sharpshooters fired every now and again, but were kept from making any determined attack by the constant fusilade from the Marblehead and Nashville. Nearly two hours were occupied in grappling these two cables, and then Winslow unexpectedly discovered a third strand. Just as he caught this a terrific fire opened from the beach. The enemy had been reinforced. A perfect hail of bullets was poured upon the small boats, and Maxim guns now added their deadly shower to the "ping" of the Mausers. The Marblehead and Nashville opened again on the shore with all their batteries, but the enemy was sheltered by gullies and ravines. Shot and shell flew over the heads of Winslow's men; behind them their own guns, in front of them the fire of the Spaniards. They hung to the third cable like grim death, but it was heavy and came up slowly. Now and again there was a cry and a groan as a man fell back wounded, and his oar went floating away or
his rifle fell from powerless hands—for those not grappling returned the enemy's fire with a desperate vigor. Finally Winslow ordered the third cable dropped, and it slid down in the bullet-dotted water. Winslow believed they had cut the two important cables, and he did not think it advisable to remain longer under such heavy fire. So the sailing launches pulled out from the beach, the steam cutters took them in tow, and after over three hours of gallant work the four bullet-riddled boats made for their smoke-covered ships, still pursued by the enemy's fire. The revenue cutter Windom came up and fired at the lighthouse, where Spanish troops were hiding. She quickly demolished it. Commander McCalla then withdrew.

Of the gallant crews that manned the small boats, two were killed and twelve wounded. The men who lost their lives were Patrick Reagan, private marine, and Ernest Suntzenich, apprentice. The latter died subsequently from the effects of his wounds. Both men were from the Marblehead. Lieutenant Winslow was shot in the left hand; Commander Maynard, who was directing the Nashville's fire, was hit over the heart by a bullet, which luckily was spent and only temporarily incapacitated him from fighting his ship. Those seriously wounded were Herman W. Kuchneister, private marine; Harry Henrickson, seaman; John T. Doran, boatswain's mate; John Davis, gunner's mate; William Levery, apprentice, all of the Marblehead; and Robert Voltz, seaman, of the Nashville. With the exception of Reagan (killed) and Kuchneister (very severely wounded), both in the Marblehead's steam cutter, all the casualties occurred in the sailing launches, and it can be judged what an ordeal they underwent. Without excellent medical care the list of dead would have been materially increased.

For their gallant work that morning, Lieutenants Winslow and Anderson were advanced five numbers on the navy list, and several of their men were promoted to higher grades. Commander McCalla, in his report to the Secre-
tary of the Navy, wrote: "I cannot speak in too high terms of the officers and men engaged in the four boats in cutting the cables. Their work was performed with the utmost coolness and intrepidity under most trying circumstances."

What casualties were sustained by the Spaniards ashore I have not been able to ascertain; but Captain-General Blanco admitted to two killed and fourteen wounded, and as he was notoriously reticent regarding Spanish losses, it is only a fair presumption that the Spanish loss on the occasion of Cienfuegos was considerably heavier than admitted by the governor-general.

Before touching on the suggested and actual movements which immediately preceded and followed Sampson's arrival at Key West, I must bring out just one more point connected with the cruise to San Juan. It may be that there is still in the mind of the reader a lurking suspicion that the San Juan expedition savored of the "Duke of York's men," or, in other words, that Sampson took his ships on a thousand-mile run and brought them back again without accomplishing one single thing and without having good reason for making the trip. What he accomplished I have endeavored to show, but as a matter of fact, whatever the incidental results of the cruise might have been, good or bad, they could never be held to justify or condemn Sampson's movement toward San Juan, because the strategic motive of that cruise was paramount to everything. That it was the right move to take, although it did not at the time bring about a meeting of the fleets, was conclusively proven when it was afterward learned that San Juan was Cervera's real first objective. He would have taken his ships from Martinique or Curaçao to San Juan, had it not been for fear of Sampson's presence there. The Porto Rican capital was Cervera's natural base and the one best adapted to his needs; that he did not go there was due to the fact that while at Martinique he heard of Sampson's bombardment on the 12th of May. Cervera had no means of telling
that Sampson would not return to the attack, and the Spanish admiral, rather than risk an engagement, changed his plans and eventually entered a harbor that sealed his doom. Thus, though the positive results of Sampson’s cruise to Porto Rico were slight and incidental, its negative results altered the whole phase of the naval campaign.

To go back to the dispatches which the Dupont brought to Sampson while on his way to Key West. Under the date of May 17, Secretary Long had cabled to Commodore Remey that the Flying Squadron, reinforced by four vessels of the Marblehead type, was to proceed at once to Cienfuegos, and that the remainder of the ships were to remain on the northern blockade, maintaining a close watch on Havana. Sampson was to have the choice of commanding either the Havana or Cienfuegos division. In case he selected the latter, Schley was to accompany him in the capacity of second in command. “In general,” cabled Long, “the object is to engage and capture the enemy off Cienfuegos if possible, or otherwise blockade him in that port.” The reason for concentrating at Cienfuegos was explained by this cablegram: “The Department has just heard that the Spanish fleet has munitions of war essential to Havana, and the order of the Spanish fleet is imperative to reach Havana, Cienfuegos, or a railroad port connected with Havana at all hazards; and as Cienfuegos appears to be the only port fulfilling the conditions, Schley will be sent,” and so on. In view of the many private sources of information accessible to the Navy Department and its superior facilities for judging the general situation, Sampson quite naturally adopted the Department’s view of the situation and went to work upon the basis that Cienfuegos was Cervera’s objective. He did not, however, correct the cablegram sent to Captain Cotton, in which he mentioned Santiago de Cuba as the first place Cervera was likely to make for. What opinions he may have had on this subject Sampson kept to himself—for the time being. Among the other cablegrams from the Department were
orders changing the routes of the big scouts. The *St. Paul* was ordered to Venezuela Gulf, "where," wrote Long, "it is considered the Spanish fleet will coal." Sampson, it will be remembered, had ordered the *St. Paul* to cruise between Jamaica and Haiti, and his instructions, as it was afterward proved, put Captain Sigsbee's ship in exactly the most desirable path. Finally, Sampson was authorized to make such changes of detail in the general plan as he thought advisable.

Armed with all this information, Sampson arrived at Key West at four o'clock on the afternoon of May 18. There he found Schley with the *Brooklyn*, *Texas*, *Massachusetts*, and *St. Paul*. There were telegraphic orders for the *St. Paul* to proceed immediately to Cape Haitien, there to receive further orders, so after a conference with Schley Sampson sent the auxiliary cruiser to her destination. A cablegram for Schley came shortly after Sampson's arrival. It ordered Schley to proceed at once to Havana with his squadron, and that the monitors *Puritan* and *Miantonomoh* be left to defend Key West. On top of this dispatch came another for Sampson, written under the impression that Schley had already left for Havana, ordering Sampson to coal and proceed with the utmost possible speed to Cienfuegos. Sampson realized that the authorities at Washington were astray, and taking matters into his own hands straightened out the situation by this characteristically terse cable to Secretary Long:

"Schley will leave Thursday morning, 19th, for Cienfuegos with *Brooklyn*, *Massachusetts*, *Texas*, and two cruisers and two torpedo-boats. *Iowa* will leave as soon as coaled."

This disposed of all the lengthy messages from Washington. Sampson would have sent Schley that afternoon, but the latter's vessels were not fully coaled. The *Iowa* arrived in the evening. The next morning, May 19, at 9 A.M., Commodore Schley sailed with the *Brooklyn*, *Texas*, *Massachusetts*, and converted yacht *Scorpion*, for Cienfuegos. The *Iowa* and *Marblehead* were being prepared
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with all expedition to follow him. Sampson remained at Key West. All appearances pointed to the fact that Schley was to have the longed-for opportunity of meeting and destroying the Spanish fleet. Sampson thoroughly believed that Schley would catch Cervera.

Do not let it be forgotten that Sampson's instructions fully authorized him to assume the command of this expedition himself and to supersede Schley if he so desired. Few men would have willingly let such a chance for glory slip through their fingers; most admirals would have personally conducted the Cienfuegos expedition, if only on the ground of the tactical advisability of their presence at the most important move of the campaign. But Sampson, with a regard for Schley's feelings that was a prominent feature throughout the war, declined to supersede the man who, in actual rank, was his superior, for at that time, though Sampson was an acting rear-admiral, his pay and actual rank was only that of captain, while that of Schley was commodore. It may be said that the New York was not ready to sail, but that had no effect upon Sampson's decision, because he could have transferred his flag to one of the vessels of the Flying Squadron without any difficulty. And in the parlance of the mess-room, Schley, who had "loafed," though through no fault of his own, at the delightful resort of Hampton Roads, was sent off to "take the plum," while the men who had been in action, who had maintained the blockade, to say nothing of sweltering in the tropics through the vigil months of war, were left behind to pursue the prosaic tasks of a pacific blockade. That, of course, was only one way of looking at the case: the human way, tempered with the sting of professional disappointment. Still, the whole incident serves to bring out a point that, in view of after events, is important, and that is that Sampson had none but the kindliest feelings toward Schley and the utmost confidence in his ability, coupled with a continual carefulness not to hurt the feelings of the man whom, by the circumstance of war, he now superseded.
With him Schley took these written instructions from Sampson:

"It is unnecessary for me to say that you should establish a blockade at Cienfuegos with the least possible delay, and that it should be maintained as close as possible. Should the Spanish vessels show themselves in that vicinity, and, finding you on the lookout, attempt to come around the island, either east or west, please send me notice by the best vessel you have for that purpose, as to their direction, that I may be prepared for them at Havana.

"I will try and increase the number of light vessels at your disposal, in order that you may have them to send with messages to me in case you desire to do so.

"After I have the situation more in hand, I will write you and give you any information that suggests itself."

In the sixteen days that elapsed during Sampson's absence from Key West, much had happened ashore and in other parts than off Porto Rico. The affairs of Cardenas and Cienfuegos have already been mentioned. On May 2 the British cruiser *Talbot* entered Havana, leaving nine days later with British subjects aboard. On May 4 the United States tug *Leyden*, with Captain J. H. Dorst, of the army, aboard, landed ammunition for the Cuban insurgents near Mariel. Spanish cavalry that attempted to prevent Captain Dorst's plucky landing were dispersed by a few shells from the *Wilmington*. The following day the former revenue cutter *Hamilton* landed in the province of Porto Principe several members of the Cuban Junta, who carried important dispatches to the insurgent general. Incidentally, it may be stated that the insurgents continued their intermittent so-called war upon the Spaniards, but achieved none of those successes which their supporters in the United States predicted would attend the insurgent arms after being strengthened by the moral force of the declaration of war against Spain.

Encouraged by his recent achievement, Captain Dorst
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chartered the old side-wheel steamer *Gussie*, and, with two companies of the First Infantry aboard, attempted to land ammunition and supplies for the Cubans near Cabanas on May 12. There he encountered a Spanish force which drove him back. James Archibald, the correspondent for the *San Francisco Post*, who accompanied the expedition, was slightly wounded. The troops under Dorst’s command suffered no loss, though there were several casualties on the Spanish side. Dorst proceeded to a point near Matanzas, and two days later made another attempt to land his ammunition, but again encountered Spanish troops, who now kept a close patrol along the northern coast. He was eventually compelled to return to Key West with the ammunition still aboard the *Gussie*. During both attempts to land the former revenue cutter *Manning* and the converted yacht *Wasp* stood by and shelled the beach. The expedition was undertaken without first securing the organized co-operation of the navy; a mistake that in the main was responsible for Captain Dorst’s failure.

On May 4 the Spanish fishing-smack *Quatro de Setiembre* was brought into Key West. She had been captured in the Yucatan by the *Helena*, and the prize crew put aboard from that vessel had spent eight unpleasant days trying to make Key West, their chart having been washed overboard. The following day the French steamer *Lafayette* was captured while off Havana. The taking of this vessel created some controversy. She was observed apparently trying to run the blockade, and the *Annapolis* stopped her and warned her that neutral vessels were not allowed to enter Havana. The *Lafayette* had 161 passengers aboard, a crew of 156, and a rich cargo of provisions and clothing. Later that day the *Lafayette* made another attempt to enter, and she was captured by the *Wilmington*, *Newport*, and *Morrill*, and sent in as a prize to Key West. There she was quickly released on orders from Washington. It appears the *Lafayette* had sailed from Corunna, Spain, on April 23, and had received special permission to enter
Havana through the representations of the French ambassador at Washington. She was given free entry.

Commodore John C. Watson was sent to command the blockading force during Sampson's absence at San Juan. He hoisted his flag on the *Cincinnati* on May 5, and when, five days later, that vessel was sent North for repairs to her boilers the commodore transferred his flag to the former dispatch-boat *Dolphin*, which was fitted with comfortable quarters. On May 6 the Spanish blockade-runner *Montserrat* slipped out of Cienfuegos and got safely away to Spain. This vessel, which, it will be remembered, had already run the blockade in entering Cienfuegos, seemed from these and her later adventures to have a charmed life. The *Newport* captured two fish-laden schooners, the *España* and *Poder de Dios*, off Havana on May 7, while the *Dolphin* bagged the schooner *Severito*. That day the gunboat *Vicksburg* and the little *Morrill*, while chasing a schooner, got close to the shore, and the batteries of Havana opened on them. The lightly armed boats replied, but retired quickly, discretion being pre-eminently the better part of valor in this case. Neither vessel was struck, but they had close shaves. On the 9th the French sloop-of-war *Fulton*, which entered Havana, sailed from there with refugees aboard; the Norwegian steamer *Bratsberg* was captured off Havana by the *Newport*, but afterward released, because there was not sufficient to show that she was endeavoring to break the law of blockade; and the fishing-smack *Fernandito* was captured by the *Vicksburg*. On the 8th the *Yale* captured the Spanish steamer *Rita* off Port-au-Prince. On the 14th two Spanish gunboats, said to be *Conde de Venadito* and the *Nueva España*, poked their noses out of Havana harbor, as if meditating a dash for freedom or an attack upon the now slim American force on guard outside. The gunboats *Vicksburg* and *Annapolis*, the converted yacht *Wasp*, and the tugs *Tecumseh* and *Osceola* immediately got into battle formation, and, advancing toward the shore, opened on the
Spaniards. Both the batteries and the ships replied, but the latter quickly retreated, having only appeared as a ruse to draw the American ships within range of the shore batteries. Seeing that no naval attack was contemplated, the blockaders stood back to their usual stations, and sustained no damage from the fire of the Spanish guns. These were the only incidents that enlivened existence on the blockade. The duty was trying; the weather was very hot, and the work was well done, as may be judged from the constant capture of small prizes, which are far harder to discover than larger blockade-runners. These small craft would sneak along the coast at night, or in the mists of early morning, with fish or rum or meat for Havana; but few of them ever got the price of their cargo, except in board and lodging provided by the United States Government. The work of the blockading force on the north coast of Cuba was made more trying at this time by the constant apprehension of the arrival of Cervera's ships, which on paper should have been able to defeat our forces then guarding Havana. However, as I have explained, Sampson took chances in this matter, and his judgment proved right, though it did not relieve the officers left on the blockade from the strain of the situation, nor did it relax the extra precautions entailed. And all these weeks the seven hundred or so marines remained bottled up on the transport Panther, in Key West, living in sweltering quarters and in the hope of action. The Spaniards were busy strengthening their fortifications; new batteries sprang up near and around Havana. The United States army of invasion was still mobilizing at Tampa, and by no means ready for service. Other events at home on land included the return of Captain Mahan from Europe, on May 7, to take his place on the Naval War Board; the dissolution of the Auxiliary Naval Board, May 14; the tardy establishment, on May 16, by Brigadier-General Greely, Chief of the Signal Service, of a cable censorship that was of any real service, and which, to some extent, made it difficult for
Spain to obtain minute details of our projected military movements; the successful launching of the battleship *Alabama* at Cramps' shipyards, and the authorization by Congress of the construction of three first-class battleships and twenty-eight torpedo-boats.

A much-needed innovation occurred when, on May 6, the former American liner *Illinois*, now renamed the *Supply*, sailed from Philadelphia with twenty-five hundred tons of fresh meat and provisions for the ships of Sampson's squadron. This precaution was one of the few the Navy Department had neglected to take prior to the declaration of war. The *Supply* met with a warm welcome, but she would have been just as useful had she joined the fleet a few days instead of a few weeks after the declaration of war. Incidentally, the *Supply* was met with at Cape Haitiien, when Flag-Lieutenant Bennett with dispatches entered that harbor in the *Porter* on May 15. The *Supply* was then sent out, and she joined the fleet.

The *St. Louis* and tug *Wompatuck*, detached from the fleet during the return trip from San Juan to cut cables at Santiago de Cuba, arrived off that port May 16. Captain Goodrich, Lieutenant of Marines Catlin (a *Maine* survivor), and Chief Officer Segrave, a cable expert, all of the *St. Louis*, boarded Lieutenant Jungen's little craft. Grappling tackle was installed, and that night the *Wompatuck* steamed close inshore. She had caught one cable when a patrol boat was seen, and the *Wompatuck* let go the cable and retreated, not wishing to risk an encounter while so near to the shore batteries. The following morning at daybreak the *St. Louis* went in herself to grapple for the cable. About noon, and when close to shore, a cable was caught. The shore batteries then opened fire, which was returned by the *St. Louis* and the *Wompatuck*. The *St. Louis* remained stationary, fearing movement might cost the loss of the cable, which it was as yet impossible to cut. The *Wompatuck*'s heaviest gun was a 3-pounder, while the *St. Louis* was only armed
with 6-pounders. Nevertheless, for about three-quarters of an hour they blazed away at the forts, and though submitted to brisk return fire were not hit. One shot in the *St. Louis* might have done incalculable harm, on account of her intensely inflammable construction and utter lack of protection. The latter feature makes the work of her officers and men, and also of those of the *Wompatuck*, praiseworthy for its pluck. After cutting the cable, which, after all, was only a "dummy," the *St. Louis* got out of range, and before daybreak of May 19 steamed to the eastward to cut the cable at Guantanamo Bay. Had the *St. Louis* delayed her departure for an hour, she would have sighted Cervera's fleet, for by 8 A.M. on May 19 the Spanish admiral had anchored in Santiago harbor. If the *St. Louis* had escaped with this news, a tremendous saving in time, money, and anxiety would have been effected. Her early departure was one of the most unlucky chances that ever snatched fame from a ship. At Guantanamo the *Wompatuck* steamed into the bay, but encountered the Spanish gunboat *Sandoval*. The *Wompatuck* and *St. Louis*, which lay farther out, both opened on the *Sandoval*, but their small guns did not seem to carry far enough, while the *Sandoval* though she is only credited with an armament of one 6-pounder and one 1-pounder was landing shells uncomfortably close to the *Wompatuck* and the big liner. Captain Goodrich signalled to the *Wompatuck* to withdraw, and Lieutenant Jungen reluctantly obeyed orders, leaving the cable uncut. The next day, however, the same cable was cut near its other extremity, off Mole St. Nicholas, Haiti. The cutting was done by the *St. Louis* outside the three-mile limit, and on this occasion there was no enemy for miles around and the cable was a genuine strand connecting Cuba with Haiti, and thence with all parts of the world. Cable communication between Santiago and Jamaica still existed.
CHAPTER IV.

THE AFFAIR AT CARDENAS.¹


On May 9, 1898, while at Key West, Fla., I received orders from the commodore commanding the blockading force [Watson] to convey and land near Cayo Frances, north coast of Cuba, Señor Juan Jova, aide to General Maximo Gomez, commanding the Cuban army. Upon the completion of this duty, the Wilmington was to return to Cardenas and relieve the Machias.

Señor Jova and his pilot having been successfully landed at the designated place, the Wilmington steered for the blockading station off Cardenas, and arrived five miles off Piedras Key lighthouse at daylight on the 11th instant, when the Machias was sighted. I went on board the Machias to report to my senior, Commander Merry, and showed him the orders relieving him from charge of the Cardenas blockade. The Machias then proceeded to her daylight anchorage inside the lighthouse, or in the outer

¹ The Spanish gunboats encountered on this occasion were reported to be the Ligera, Antonio Lopez, and Alerta. Captain-General Blanco admitted that the Ligera and Lopez were “disabled” by the attack; that two men were killed on the Lopez, and twelve wounded on shore. This list of casualties is probably diminutive. The captain of the Lopez is said to have sent word to the captain of the port that he had ammunition for only six minutes more, and to have received the reply: “Use it, and sink your ship rather than submit to capture.” The last shot from the Lopez is the one credited with killing Ensign Bagley and the four American sailors. (The Lopez is not found in Spain’s navy list.) Commander Todd has omitted to state that in connection with this expedition the first American flag to be raised by American forces in Cuba was hoisted by Ensign Arthur L. Willard, of the Machias. He was sent in under fire of the Machias to take possession of the signal station on Diana Key, which had been deserted by the Spaniards upon the approach
anchorage to Cardenas Bay, where deep-draft vessels trading with that port were obliged to lighter their cargoes. The *Wilmington* followed the *Machias* to the anchorage. As the Piedras Key lighthouse was rounded, three Spanish gunboats, the two larger ones each having a schooner in tow, were observed lying near the signal station on Diana Key, apparently observing our movements. Soon afterward they disappeared, moving in the direction of the city of Cardenas.

It was the presence of these gunboats that made the outer anchorage unsafe at night for the blockading vessels; for the former, being of light draft, could move through almost every channel between the many keys, and in the darkness make a dash and possibly sink a vessel at anchor. The two principal channels were believed to be mined with torpedoes, to keep the American vessels from entering and damaging the city of Cardenas by bombardment. The general depth of water in the inner bay, or Cardenas Bay proper, was about twelve feet, and as the *Machias* drew thirteen and a half, she could do nothing to destroy these gunboats which remained in the inner bay. The advisability of their destruction was discussed between Commander Merry and myself. He expressed his regret that he had been unable to move into the bay in pursuit. As the *Wilmington* was a light-draft gunboat, and drew only ten feet, I at once expressed my willingness to make the attempt if a channel, not mined, could be found.

of the American vessels. A curious circumstance in connection with this engagement is that the *Winslow* was not finally accepted by the Navy Department until two days after her experience at Cardenas, her trial trip having been postponed to allow her to go into immediate service. The only trial trip she eventually had was this one at Cardenas. For meritorious service in this engagement Lieutenant Bernadou was advanced ten numbers in the list of lieutenants (for his official report of the action, see Appendix, page 289). Lieut. Frank H. Newcomb, of the Revenue Service, who commanded the *Hudson*, was awarded the thanks of Congress and a gold medal for his gallantry in hauling off the *Winslow* (see President's message, page 292, Appendix). For Lieutenant Newcomb's report of the engagement, see page 291, Appendix.
The revenue cutter *Hudson*, one of the blockading vessels, had anchored inside somewhat sooner than the *Machias* and *Wilmington*, and soon afterward the torpedo-boat *Winslow* came in and anchored. I suggested that these two vessels accompany the *Wilmington*, in order to prevent the Spanish gunboats from escaping over the shoal places where the *Wilmington* could not go. To this Commander Merry assented, but cautioned me against the imprudence of the commanding officer of the *Winslow*, Lieutenant Bernadou, stating that a few days previously the *Winslow* had, without authority, entered the inner bay, and had come very near being captured by the Spanish gunboats which were lying in wait for her, secreted behind the keys. Only the quick work of the *Machias* with her 4-inch guns had saved the *Winslow*.

The anchorage at Piedras Key was the only one along the entire line of blockade from Bahia Honda to Cardenas where our ships could lie and coal with safety or make temporary repairs; hence its importance to the blockading fleet. And to make it of much greater value, so the blockading vessels could lie in security during the night, it was essential that this menacing force of gunboats should be destroyed.

Returning on board the *Wilmington*, I consulted the chart and the Cuban pilot, a native of Cardenas. A close inspection disclosed a possible channel between Romero Key and Cayo Blanco. The pilot was dubious; in fact, admitted he had never been through that channel. The commanding officers of the *Winslow* and *Hudson* were signalled to repair on board the *Wilmington* about 10 A.M. On their arrival the plan of entering the inner bay in quest of the Spanish gunboats was explained, and both expressed a desire to accompany the *Wilmington* with their vessels. They were then told to sound through the proposed passage and report the depth of water found. At about 11 A.M. the *Winslow* reported the channel possible, and the *Wilmington* got under way and proceeded carefully in that
direction. By noon the doubtful channel had been suc­cessfully passed through, and the three vessels headed across Cardenas Bay in the direction of the city.

The bay of Cardenas is, in a general way, about circular, and the diameter about ten miles. The distance to be travelled by the vessels, avoiding shoal spots, was about twelve miles. To prevent the Spanish gunboats escaping over shoal water in this large expanse, the Winslow and Hudson were thrown out as flankers on each side of the Wilmington, the Winslow to the left, the Hudson to the right. The former kept her proper distance, but the Hudson spread out more than was intended, quite two and a half miles. This general disposition of the vessels was maintained until the town was two miles distant, when signal was made to close in on the Wilmington. The weather was hazy but not thick, with a light breeze from the eastward. As the city was approached, the crews of two Spanish merchant vessels, anchored in the bay, were seen to desert them and pull ashore. These vessels could, of course, have been destroyed. The object of the expedi­tion, however, was not the unnecessary destruction of pri­vate property, but the destruction of Spanish government vessels. At this time two of the gunboats were out of sight, while the other, the smallest of the three, was observed to run up a shallow channel and disappear behind a wooded key. A forest of masts of small sailing-vessels could now be seen along and among the wharves fronting the city, and it was believed that the two larger gunboats would be found among them. The shoal water in Carde­nas Bay compelled the Wilmington to proceed at slow speed, and two hours were required to reach the city after passing through Romero channel. Our vessels closed in on the shipping in front of Cardenas at about 2 P.M. At this time the Winslow was close to the Wilmington, the Hudson about one mile distant, but closing in rapidly.

When abreast the wharves the Wilmington was turned to bring her broadside to bear, in eleven feet of water.
She was then up against a bank formed off the city front, extending about one mile (2,000 yards) from the shore. Her engines were turning ahead as slowly as possible, and every spyglass in the ship and on board the *Winslow* turned to discover the whereabouts of the gunboats in hiding. As they could not be made out, I ordered the *Winslow*, which drew six feet of water, to close in and see if she could locate them. The *Winslow* turned at once and steered toward the wharves. She had not proceeded more than three or four hundred yards when she was fired at by a gunboat moored bows out to the wharf. The shot fell two hundred yards short. Immediately the *Wilmington* and *Winslow* returned the fire, and the engagement became general. As the smoke from the enemy's guns fixed their location, the object of the *Winslow*'s closing in was attained, and her commanding officer should have at once returned to the *Wilmington*. The *Hudson* soon came up and joined in the fray with her 6-pounders. When the first gun was fired the *Winslow*'s engines were stopped, but her headway carried her two hundred yards further toward the batteries on shore. Her commanding officer was not ordered to engage the gunboats, but to locate them, just as a scout is sent to locate an enemy's land force. But in his anxiety to get into the engagement Lieutenant Bernadou allowed his vessel to run into the range buoys of the Spaniards (as stated by himself later on board the *Wilmington*). A hot fire was kept up by all three of the vessels for about fifteen minutes, when the *Winslow* backed out of range and signalled that her steering-gear had been cut. The *Wilmington* and *Hudson* continued to keep up a rapid fire on the gunboats. With the light wind blowing, dense clouds of smoke hung around the vessels, greatly impeding rapidity of fire. Both the *Wilmington* and *Hudson* were kept moving slowly to prevent the Spaniards getting their range. After lying clear of the guns on shore for some time, the *Winslow* was observed to be steaming again in the direction of the wharves. She
UNITED STATES TORPEDO-BOAT WINDLOW.
(Badly crippled in the attack upon Carthag.)

UNITED STATES LIGHTHOUSE TENDER MANGROVE.
(which captured the Steamer Paquema.)
The Affair at Cardenas

finally stopped, not in the same spot as at first, but in about the same general locality. The enemy’s projectiles were falling around her. Once the batteries and gunboats stopped firing, but the Wilmington and Hudson continued. The enemy resumed firing soon after the Winslow steamed in a second time. About 3 p.m. the Winslow signalled to the Hudson to tow her out of action, as she was completely disabled. She had, by working one engine, managed to get back a considerable distance from where she was last struck, but Lieutenant Bernadou felt he could do no more. The last shot fired at the Winslow killed Ensign Bagley and four men near him. The shell struck a hose-reel standard and exploded in their midst. The Hudson managed to get a line to the Winslow and worked her out toward the Wilmington, but there was no firing from ashore after the line was attached. The Wilmington, however, kept her guns going fifteen minutes after all firing from shore had ceased.

While a large number of projectiles were fired at both the Wilmington and Hudson, the fact that these vessels were kept moving and clear of the enemy’s range buoys prevented them from being struck or having any casualties.

The commanding officer of the Winslow erred in judgment in not keeping his vessel clear of the range buoys, and greatly so in again steaming into practically the same spot, after once getting clear, and with his steering-gear disabled. The casualties on board the Winslow occurred after she had steamed in the second time. This error of judgment undoubtedly arose from Lieutenant Bernadou’s intense anxiety to be in the fight, but the small calibre of his guns, the vulnerability of his vessel, the impossibility of his using his torpedoes, as evidenced by his removing the primers from the war-heads, should have led him to take extra care in exposing the Winslow to the gun-fire he knew the Spanish gunboats to possess. He was not ordered to attack, but to locate the gunboats. To rely upon his feeble gun-fire to damage a superior enemy cannot
be called good professional judgment, no matter how gallantly attempted.

The surgeon of the Wilmington was sent on board the Winslow to attend the wounded who, as soon as possible, were removed to my ship. The Hudson took the Winslow in tow, and the three vessels proceeded to the outer anchorage near the Machias, arriving just before sunset. The killed and wounded were transferred to the Hudson for transportation to Key West, and work was begun on the temporary repairs needed to send the Winslow to the same place under her own steam. This was completed, and, in charge of one of the Wilmington’s officers (Ensign Bailey), the Winslow steamed at a ten-knot speed to Key West on the morning of the 12th of May.

The amount of damage from the guns of the three American vessels engaged could not be determined at the time, apart from the burning of two or three buildings near the location of the gunboats; but a few days later there came on board a Cuban pacifico, who was in Cardenas at the time of the engagement, and who visited the locality where the gunboats were lying the day following the engagement. He brought the information that both of the large gunboats were riddled and practically destroyed. They could not sink, as they were lying in only six feet of water. This information was undoubtedly correct.

The net results of this attack on Cardenas may be stated as:

1st. The destruction of two Spanish gunboats.

2d. It was the first severe blow struck, which had great effect upon the swarms of Spanish gunboats surrounding the island of Cuba, rendering their attacks by night much less probable, as shown by experience.

3d. It made feasible the anchorage at Piedras lighthouse for coaling purposes, and it was so used.

4th. It made the Spaniards feel they were not free from attack even though the channels were mined, and forever destroyed their sense of security, no matter how well de-
fended they might be. They now knew that American ships-of-war would take and hold the offensive during the war.

5th. Here was made evident the great advantage of smokeless powder over the ordinary brown powder used by the American ships. The only gun used by the Spaniards burning brown powder was the one that fired from the bow of the gunboat moored bows out at the wharf. The others, including field guns observed on the shore and the machine guns on both gunboats, used only smokeless powder, thus making a very poor target for a vessel surrounded, as were the American ships, by clouds of overhanging smoke.
CHAPTER V.

THE FINDING OF CERVERA.

No sooner had Schley sailed for Cienfuegos than Sampson, still at Key West, received word from Long that the United States Minister to Venezuela had reported that the Spanish fleet was seen, on May 11, apparently heading for the French West Indies. This was indefinite information, and only resulted in adding perplexity to the situation. Up to this time, it must be borne in mind, the only definite information Sampson or the Navy Department had to work upon was that the Spanish fleet had left Curacao on the evening of May 15, four days previous to this. That it was bound for Cienfuegos was only the supposition of the Department, based, as Sampson believed from the tone of Long's dispatches, upon secret and reliable news.

On the morning of May 20, twenty-four hours after Schley's sailing, the battleship Iowa, gunboat Castine, and collier Merrimac left Key West with orders to join Schley off Cienfuegos as quickly as their engines could get them there. Work on coaling the vessels remaining at Key West was hurried, as Sampson was anxious to proceed to the blockade; but the facilities were poor and bunkers filled slowly. While awaiting the completion of coaling, Sampson cabled to Long, urgently requesting that "for the difficult task of holding both sides of Cuba against Spanish squadron you should put at my disposal all your fighting force," and adding an especial request for the New Orleans. What Sampson implied by this was the concentration at Key West of the larger vessels still remaining off our eastern coast.

The newspapers of the 20th published Associated Press dispatches from Madrid, definitely announcing the arrival
of Cervera at Santiago de Cuba, and also Kingston dispatches containing the information that the steamer Adula had passed seven ships heading toward Santiago on the night of May 17, and that these answered the description of Cervera's fleet. The same day, the 20th, the Navy Department posted this bulletin in Washington:

"The Department has information, which is believed to be authentic, that the Spanish squadron is at Santiago de Cuba."

That afternoon Sampson received a cable from Long, in which the latter said the Santiago report "might very well be correct, so the Department advises that you send immediately by the Iowa to Schley to proceed off Santiago de Cuba, with his whole command, leaving one small vessel off Cienfuegos. And meanwhile the Department will send the Minneapolis, now at St. Thomas, to join Schley." This sudden change by the Department, in making Santiago the objective instead of Cienfuegos, was somewhat alarming, and certainly did not seem justified on the mere strength of the fact that the Santiago report "might very well be correct." In view of the Department's previous positive utterances regarding Cienfuegos, Sampson decided to adhere to the Cienfuegos plan until something more definite than a report that "might very well be correct" could be obtained as a basis for action. Throughout he maintained the belief, expressed on the 15th to Captain Cotton, that Cervera would make first for Santiago, but he subordinated this belief to the force of facts presented by the Department. Had Sampson, after hearing of Cervera's arrival at Curacao, been cut off from all communication with Washington, I believe he would have concentrated his strongest available force at Santiago two days after Cervera's arrival at that harbor; but he was in close touch with Washington and had to base his strategy upon its advices. So, believing that on the face of it the Secretary's cablegram did not contain reasons strong enough to justify a change of plan that had been instituted by the Secretary
himself, Sampson replied: "I have decided to follow the plan already adopted, to hold position at Cienfuegos with Brooklyn, Massachusetts, Texas, and Iowa, Marblehead, Castine, Dupont, and two auxiliaries. Have directed Schley to communicate with auxiliaries at Santiago, and direct one of them to report to Department from Mole St. Nicholas or Cape Haitien, then to return to Santiago and further report at Cienfuegos or Havana, as he thinks best. Plans may be changed when it becomes certain that Spanish ships are at Santiago." It will be remembered that on the 15th Sampson had sent orders to the St. Paul, Harvard, and St. Louis, which provided for a constant scouting in the vicinity of Santiago.

Regarding the forces for the north side of Cuba, Sampson cabled that the only armored ships he now had were the New York, the Indiana, and the monitors, "the latter," he added, "very inefficient and should not be sent from base." This was in furtherance of his plea for all available vessels. The Dupont was sent after Schley, carrying information regarding the fortifications of Cienfuegos. Another cable from Long announced that the army expected to leave Tampa "within a few days," in about thirty transports, and Sampson was asked to take measures for guarding the troop-ships. That evening Sampson wrote to Commodore Remey that he could wait no longer for the other ships, and must get back to the blockade. He asked that all vessels, as soon as repaired and coaled, be sent to him off Havana. Commodore Remey was told he could have the monitor Terror for protecting Key West, while "that vessel was under repairs." Sampson had no fear of an attack upon Key West, and had no intention of dividing his forces for the alleged necessities of naval coast defence.

During the night of the 20th Sampson received more definite information regarding Cervera's reported arrival at Santiago. Having now some tangible reason for a change of plans, he at once wrote to Schley, but with char-
acteristic conservatism still subordinated his own ideas to the actual facts as he had them from the Department. This letter to Schley was marked "No. 8," and should be read carefully. It was as follows:

"(No. 8)

"Sir: Spanish squadron probably at Santiago de Cuba, four ships and three torpedo-boat destroyers. If you are satisfied that they are not at Cienfuegos, proceed with all dispatch, but cautiously, to Santiago de Cuba, and, if the enemy is there, blockade him in port. You will probably find it necessary to establish communication with some of the inhabitants—fishermen or others—to learn definitely that the ships are in port, it being impossible to see into it from the outside."

This was put aboard the Marblehead at three o'clock on the morning of May 21, and that vessel, in company with the Vixen and Eagle, was dispatched to Schley under "hurry" orders. To the Yale at Cape Haitien Sampson then cabled: "Spanish squadron is reported at Santiago. Flying Squadron will be at Santiago, May 24. Cruise in Bahama Channel and join Schley at Santiago, May 24." The italics are my own. It is evident from this message that if Sampson at the time had thought there was any doubt of Schley at once moving to Santiago, he would have peremptorily ordered him there. But Sampson believed that his former senior officer possessed all the ability necessary to cope with the situation, and, though letter "No. 8" plainly indicated the course expected of Schley, it was so couched that the Flying Squadron commander could not construe it as any reflection upon his own ability or powers of observation. Schley was on the scene of action; Sampson was away from it. Schley would certainly know, reasoned Sampson, whether or not Cervera had entered Cienfuegos. Sampson himself felt positive that Cervera had not entered that harbor, and so he ordered the
With Sampson Through the War

Yale to meet Schley off Santiago on the 24th, feeling certain that, in view of Schley's intelligence, letter "No. 8" would bring about the desired result as surely as would have a peremptory order. And, as I have said, Sampson was particularly loath to adopt any measures when dealing with Schley that could possibly be taken as needless usurpation of authority. He then looked upon Schley more in the light of a joint commander than as a subordinate, and, in fact, it was not until May 24 that he received a cablegram from Long saying that orders had been issued putting Schley, while in the West Indies, under his command. The fact that Schley at this period actually ranked Sampson and also commanded a squadron of his own made the situation somewhat delicate.

An hour after dispatching the Marblehead Sampson himself left Key West, arriving at Havana by 11 A.M., May 21. To insure the delivery of letter "No. 8," Sampson sent a duplicate to Schley by the Hawk, and added to the text already given the following, which really amounted to a definite order for Schley to proceed to Santiago:

"It is thought the inclosed instructions will reach you by two o'clock A.M., May 23. This will enable you to leave before daylight (regarded very important), so that your direction may not be noticed, and be at Santiago, A.M., May 24.

"It is thought that the Spanish squadron would probably be still at Santiago, as they must have some repairs to make and coal to take.

"The St. Paul and Minneapolis have been telegraphed to scout off Santiago, and if the Spanish squadron goes westward, one is to keep in touch, and one is to go west and attempt to meet you; if the Spanish squadron goes east, one will keep in touch, and the other go to St. Nicholas Mole, to telegraph me at Key West. I shall be off Cayo Frances, two hundred miles east of Havana. If you arrive off Santiago and no scout meets you, send a vessel
to call at St. Nicholas Mole and get information to be left there by scout as to direction taken by Spanish in case they may have left Santiago de Cuba."

Then followed more details about the scouts, and the letter concluded with this forcible injunction: "Follow the Spanish squadron whichever direction they take."

After sending the Hawk Sampson cabled to Long: "Schley has been ordered to Santiago."

Sure that Cervera was in Santiago on the 22d, and that Schley would be there by the 24th, but not quite sure that Cervera would remain in port until Schley arrived, Sampson organized a powerful cruising squadron. The blockade then became of secondary importance, and was stripped of its armored vessels. On the morning of May 23, the New York, Indiana, Miantonomoh, Puritan, New Orleans, Detroit, Montgomery, Wilmington, Machias, Newport, Mayflower, Vicksburg, and Wasp steamed slowly eastward. Each commander was provided with battle orders, and all preparations had been made for a meeting at any minute with the Spanish fleet. The orders Sampson issued at this time are models of their kind (see Appendix, page 293). The heavy squadron's object was to cruise eastward so as to temporarily occupy the St. Nicholas Channel, between Cuba and Haiti, in case Cervera made a dash to Havana from Santiago, by rounding the eastern end of Cuba. But Sampson did not wish to go so far to the eastward as to make it impossible to fall back on Havana, should Cervera evade Schley and get around the western end of Cuba; so he only took his ships to Cayo Frances, about two hundred miles east of Havana, and then cruised back again, throwing out scouts and keeping touch with the few ships in front of the Cuban capital, which, according to later dispatches from the Department, was Cervera's real objective. Sampson's task was not easy. His only chance of intercepting Cervera was in the St. Nicholas Channel to the eastward or in the Yucatan Channel to the westward. If he missed him there, he would have to meet him at Ha-
vana, if he could move his slow squadron in time to catch him before he entered that port.

The 24th and 25th of May found the squadron still cruising slowly between Cayo Frances and Matanzas. Many false alarms of strange vessels kept excitement at fever heat. On the 25th the Amphitrite, Vesuvius, Cincinnati, and collier Sterling joined the fleet. The Hornet also came from Key West with a dispatch from Long, telling Sampson to be prepared to convoy 30,000 troops, and that he would be expected to furnish armored vessels to cover their landing. How Sampson was to do this was not very apparent, and he answered, saying that he could not dispatch armored vessels until the movements of the Spanish fleet were known. The single purpose of Sampson was to destroy Cervera's ships, and I only repeat the maxim of all authorities when I say that singleness of purpose is absolutely essential to success in naval warfare. If you will bear this in mind, and observe how Sampson at later stages exhibited his single-mindedness, despite internal and external circumstances that tended to divert, you may perhaps be able to understand why Sampson's admiralship is so much commended by the officers who served under him and by such an authority as Captain Mahan. With the expression of his inability to provide convoy for troops until the situation cleared, Sampson also sent word to Long, using the Hornet as a dispatch boat, explaining his own movements and telling the Secretary that though he had not yet received any word from Schley, he fully expected a message from that commodore by the 26th, and stating definitely, for Long's information: "Schley ought to have arrived at Santiago, May 24."

Trying to guard two passages with one fleet and stripping the blockade to do it was no easy task; lack of all information regarding Cervera's movements subsequent to May 22 increased the difficulties—for the Spanish admiral might have put nearly nine hundred miles between himself and Santiago in that time—and the monitors,
which constituted the chief fighting force of Sampson's squadron, hampered him by their slowness; but above all the drawbacks of this complex situation rose the reassuring feeling that Schley was at Santiago ere this, and that what could be done on purely aggressive lines would be done quickly and efficiently by him. As for Sampson and his ships, their duty was to assume the defensive, to wait—the hardest naval task—and to employ their limited mobility in the purely precautionary measure of covering as much dangerous area as was possible. Though the actions of this large squadron had no positive effect upon the naval campaign, they were conducted upon a basis that was perhaps more purely naval than any other operation of the North Atlantic campaign—excepting, of course, the battle of July 3—and were marked by a period of anxiety and suspense that justifies detailed recording.

The day following the departure of the *Hornet* with Sampson's dispatches, the *Vesuvius* returned from a trip to Key West and brought with her the first news from Schley that Sampson had received since the Flying Squadron left Key West. This was at 11 A.M., on May 26, and this was what Schley wrote:

"Arrived May 21 off Cienfuegos, Cuba. Standing in to-day (this morning), May 22, within four thousand yards entrance. Found them (enemy) busily mining. Cannot say whether Spanish fleet in port or not. The anchorage not visible from entrance. *Iowa* and torpedo-boat *Dupont* arrived to-day. Expect difficulty here will be to coal from colliers in the constant heavy swell. Other problem easy compared with this one, so far from base.

"Schley."

The consternation which this message caused needs no explanation. Sampson’s advices from Washington and elsewhere were positive in the statement that from May 19 to at least May 22 Cervera had remained in Santiago,
and all indications and reports pointed to the fact that he was still there on the 25th. There were those among Sampson’s advisers who counselled an immediate descent upon Santiago with the conglomerate fleet he then had at his disposal. But the rear-admiral remained firm in his faith in Schley. He was sure that officer would quickly discover that Cervera was not at Cienfuegos, and he still maintained that Schley would be at Santiago by the 24th or at the latest by the 25th. As to whether or not Schley’s delay would afford Cervera time to coal, provision, repair, and leave Santiago, Sampson could not surmise with any degree of accuracy; but he himself had calculated that Cervera’s stay in Santiago would be a minimum of five days, with an unlimited maximum. It was to guard against this minimum, timed by professional experience regarding such work as he calculated Cervera would have to do, that Sampson laid so much stress upon the importance of Schley’s arrival at Santiago by the 24th.

To add to the anxiety, Captain Cotton, of the Harvard, cabled, under date of May 25, that the Yale, Captain Wise, had reconnoitred at Santiago on May 21, and had seen nothing of the Spanish fleet. Captain Cotton said he had left the St. Paul off Santiago on May 24. Captain Cotton himself had seen nothing of the Spanish fleet. (In view of after events, it seems a matter of small surprise that the consensus of opinion among naval officers is that the chartered American liners were not conspicuously efficient while acting as scouts.)

At one o’clock on the afternoon of May 26, Sampson sent the Vesuvius flying back to Key West bearing this dispatch, addressed to the commanders of the Yale, Minneapolis and St. Paul:

“Spanish squadron is at Santiago. If Schley has not arrived there, go to Cienfuegos and inform him.”

At half-past nine that night—still the 26th—the Dolphin, from Havana, came toward the flagship, and when within hail the Dolphin’s commander shouted through the mega-
phone: "Schley has the Spaniards bottled at Cienfuegos!"

Officers and men, crowded on the dark decks of the New York, when they heard this, cheered till they were hoarse, and the quiet night rang with genuine, generous tributes to Schley, unmarred by the slightest trace of jealousy. But the men who cheered did not know. The men who did know, heard the news with the unwelcome appreciation of the fact that their worst fears regarding Schley's movements were confirmed, or that all reliable sources of information were hopelessly astray—an alternative that seemed impossible even to the most optimistic. The dispatches the Dolphin brought from Schley were eagerly opened. They were dated, "Off Cienfuegos, May 23," and read as follows:

"Sir:—1. In reply to your letter No. 8, I would state that I am by no means satisfied that the Spanish squadron is not at Cienfuegos. The large amount of smoke seen in the harbor would indicate the presence of a number of vessels, and under such circumstances it would seem to be extremely unwise to chase up a probability at Santiago de Cuba, reported via Havana, no doubt as a ruse.

"2. I shall therefore remain off this port, with this squadron, availing myself of every opportunity for coaling and keeping it ready for any emergency.

"3. Regarding the enclosed information from Commander McCalla, I would state that I went twice yesterday close in to the mouth of the harbor—the first time about 2,000 yards, and the second time within about 1,400 yards—but saw no evidence of any masked batteries near the entrance. Well up the river, across their torpedo-mine fields, now laid across the mouth of the harbor, there is a new battery constructed, hardly within range from the mouth of the river.

"4. The Castine, Merrimac, and Hawk arrived this morning, and I send the Hawk back with these dispatches.

"5. Last night I sent the Scorpion east to Santiago de
Cuba to communicate with the scouts off that port, with instructions, if they were not there, to return at once to me here, and I expect her back day after to-morrow.

"6. I am further satisfied that the destination of the Spanish squadron is either Cienfuegos or Havana. This point (Cienfuegos), being in communication with Havana, would be better for their purposes, if it was left exposed, and I think that we ought to be very careful how we receive information from Havana, which is no doubt sent out for the purpose of misleading us.

"7. The Iowa is coaling to-day, having reached this station with only about half of her coal supply.

"Very respectfully,

"W. S. SCHLEY, Comdn. U. S. N.,

"Commander-in-Chief, Flying Squadron."

A careful perusal of this letter will convince even the most inexperienced layman that if Schley had any adequate reason for believing Cervera to be in Cienfuegos harbor he did not state it. Sampson and his commanding officers and his staff read this letter over and over again, searching for some intelligent reason for Schley's action. All they found was the smoke seen by Schley in the harbor. Comparing this with the definite information regarding Cervera's arrival at Santiago, it was only too evident that Schley had allowed himself to be cruelly deceived. Even this mistake might have been understood had it not been for the fact that, before writing this remarkable letter, Schley had in his possession not only Sampson's letter "No. 8," but also the additional definite information sent by Sampson on the Hawk, and which, as I have noted, was in the nature of a direct order for Schley to proceed instantly to Santiago. What made it worse was that Schley dismissed advice, orders, and carefully-weighed and arduously-obtained information, with the comment that "we ought to be very careful how we receive information from Havana." All this was bad enough, but an additional let-
The Finding of Cervera

ter from Schley accompanying his other communication effectually dissipated all hopes that still lingered regarding the soundness of his conclusions as to Cervera's whereabouts. It was as follows:

"OFF CIENFUEGOS, May 23, 1898.

"SIR:—1. Steamer Adula, chartered by Consul Dent, with proper papers from United States State Department, to carry neutrals from Cienfuegos, was stopped off this port this morning. She had no cargo, and was permitted to enter.

"2. She reports that she left Santiago de Cuba at 4:30 P.M., May 18, and that night she saw the lights of seven vessels, seventy miles to the southward of Santiago. Next day, Thursday, May 19, at Kingston, cable reported Spanish fleet at Santiago. Friday, May 20, the fleet was reported to have left Santiago.

"3. Now, on Saturday, May 21, when about forty miles southwest of this port, I heard, from the bridge of this vessel, firing of guns toward Cienfuegos, which I interpreted as a welcome to the Spanish fleet, and the news this morning by the Adula convinces me that the fleet is here [Cienfuegos].

"4. Latest [news] was Bulletin (a Kingston newspaper) from Jamaica, received this morning, asserts that the fleet had left Santiago. I think I have them here [Cienfuegos] almost to a certainty.

"Very respectfully,

"W. S. SCHLEY,
"Commodore U. S. N."

That any naval officer could draw conclusions that justified him in forming a plan of action from hearing the sound of guns firing at the remarkable distance of forty miles was past all comprehension. That he could cite the same phenomenon as a cause for the disregard of such important instructions created still more amazement. Had
Schley mentioned one reasonable circumstance bearing out his statement that he had the Spanish fleet in Cienfuegos "almost to a certainty," his delay at that port would not have been considered with such alarm, though the definite news from Santiago left no alternative but to stigmatize his belief as seriously mistaken. What created consternation both in Washington and among the higher officers of Sampson's squadron, was that it was impossible to tell what Schley would do next. If he felt justified in remaining off Cienfuegos on account of smoke and the report of guns at forty miles, what step might he not be prompted to take upon the strength of similar delusions? Even the fact of hearing the guns was open to criticism, because Cienfuegos was known to possess no very large guns, and only an exceptionally large gun, under the most favorable conditions, has ever been known to be heard, even faintly, at a distance of forty miles. So, added to all the other difficulties and uncertainties surrounding the squadron on the north coast, came the crushing blow that the man relied upon to do the aggressive work—who, through the self-abnegation of Sampson, held the fate of Cervera in the hollow of his hand—was disregarding all advice and basing his plan of campaign upon doubtful trifles. This unfortunate mistake, and the unreasonable deductions adduced to justify it, caused those in charge of the naval campaign to lose confidence in Schley's judgment and professional ability, though, let it be distinctly understood, without the infliction of any stain upon his courage or good intentions.

An official memorandum from the Dolphin, dated May 25, accompanying the remarkable dispatches from Schley, stated:

"The Hawk has just reported from Cienfuegos, with dispatches from Commodore Schley. Hood (commander of the Hawk) says a good number of officers do not believe the Spaniards are there at all, although they can only surmise."

The Hawk transferred these dispatches to the Dolphin,
while off Havana, at 10 A.M., May 25, and the *Dolphin* took them eastward to the rear-admiral.

Curious as it may seem, in view of many statements that were published later, Sampson was one of the few who held that Schley would quickly rectify his mistake. However, as a matter of precaution, he sent the speedy little *Wasp* off to Cienfuegos with the following orders for Schley:

"ST. NICHOLAS CHANNEL, May 27, 1898.

"SIR:—1. Every report, and particularly confidential reports, state Spanish squadron has been in Santiago de Cuba from the 19th to the 25th inst. inclusive, the 25th being the date of the last report received.

"2. You will please proceed with all possible dispatch to Santiago to blockade that port. If, on arrival there, you receive positive information of the Spanish ships having left, you will follow them in pursuit.

"Very respectfully,

"W. T. SAMPSON."

Simultaneous with this, the rear-admiral sent a dispatch to Secretary Long, saying: "Have received information from Schley dated May 23 stating: 'Am not satisfied, the Spanish is not in Cienfuegos.' He has no apparent good reasons for his opinions and states he will remain off Cienfuegos, keeping a squadron ready for all emergency. He reports the steamer *Adula* entered into Cienfuegos May 23; he probably learned from her as she left if the Spanish squadron was in port. *I think he has probably gone to Santiago.* To assure this I sent the *Wasp* to Cienfuegos to-night. If he has not left, this will enable him to reach Santiago before I could do so."

And Sampson continued to cruise along the Cuban coast, waiting for Cervera, should he have dashed out from Santiago.

At one o'clock on the same afternoon the *Vesuvius* arrived with the copy of a dispatch from Schley to Long.
It was dated May 24, and still “Off Cienfuegos.” In it Schley said he had ascertained that Cervera was not at Cienfuegos, and that he would move eastward the following day. He added: “On account of short coal supply in ships, cannot blockade them [Spanish fleet] if in Santiago.”

The fact that Schley had finally found out that Cervera was not at Cienfuegos considerably relieved the tension, though his admission of inability to blockade and the hourly-increasing unlikelihood of his catching Cervera in time were disturbing factors. In another dispatch of the same day Schley said: “I shall not be able to remain off Santiago on account of general short coal supply of squadron, so will proceed to St. Nicholas Mole (Haiti), where the water is smooth and I can coal.”

Upon reading this, Sampson at once decided to go to Key West, and, if authorized by the Navy Department, go to Santiago himself. To further rely upon Schley to effect anything definite, except through a chance engagement, from the latter’s own statements was taken by most to be evidently impossible. Before leaving the coast of Cuba, Sampson sent the collier Sterling, under convoy of the New Orleans, to join Schley at Santiago or wherever he might be found. The following orders were issued to Captain Folger, of the New Orleans:

“St. Nicholas Channel, May 27, 1898.

“Sir:—1. You will proceed to Santiago de Cuba to convoy the collier Sterling.

“2. You will communicate with Commodore Schley and direct him to remain on the blockade of Santiago at all hazards, assuming that the Spanish vessels are in that port.

“3. Tell him that I desire that he should use the collier Sterling to obstruct the channel at its narrowest part leading into this harbor. Inform him that I believe it would be perfectly practicable to steam this vessel (Sterling) into position and drop all her anchors, allow her to swing across
the channel, then sink her, either by opening the valves or whatever means may be best in his judgment.

"4. Inform Commodore Schley that the details of this plan are left to his judgment. In the mean time, he must exercise the utmost care that none of the vessels already in the port are allowed to escape; and say to the commodore that I have the utmost confidence in his ability to carry this plan to a successful conclusion, and earnestly wish him good luck.

W. T. Sampson."

Thus Sampson originated the plan which, when afterward carried out, thrilled the world. In the original of this letter, where the word Sterling occurs in the third paragraph, the name Merrimac has been erased and Sterling substituted. This was through a clerical error, and for long afterward Sampson thought he had on this occasion specifically ordered the Merrimac to be sunk in the harbor of Santiago, as she was far better fitted by length and other qualifications than the Sterling to bring about the blocking of the channel. Another noticeable point about these orders is the insistent and almost singular belief Sampson himself retained that Schley would not only get to Santiago, but would overcome the difficulties in coaling which the commodore made so much of in his message to Secretary Long.

Slow to criticise, ultra-conservative in judgment, and allowing broad scope for conditions that he was not absolutely and accurately informed of, Sampson refrained not only from strictures upon Schley, but even from expressing any opinion upon the latter's movements before Cienfuegos. Mean time, a report, based upon the megaphone message from the Dolphin, went broadcast over all the earth that Schley had "bottled" Cervera, but the report said it was at Santiago he had done this, and not, as Schley said himself, at Cienfuegos. And this came about through one of those slight and curious mistakes that in creating first impressions often make men great.
Immediately after dispatching the *New Orleans*, Sampson left his squadron and arrived at Key West on the *New York* at two o’clock on the morning of May 28. The *Oregon* was found lying at anchor, safe and sound, after her record-breaking trip; but of her, more anon. Sampson at once sent Schley a cable message to Mole St. Nicholas, the point that Schley said he would make for. The rear-admiral told him of the departure of the *New Orleans*, and added: “The Spanish squadron must be blockaded at all hazards. Immediate communication with persons ashore must be entered upon. You must be sure of the Spanish squadron being in port,” concluding with the injunction, “If Spanish squadron has left Santiago, immediate pursuit must be made.” The latter was added to dispel any ideas Schley might still have about withdrawing to coal his ships, which Sampson thoroughly believed could be coaled with little risk, and no risk was too great with such an object in view.

Scarcely had Sampson notified Long of his arrival at Key West, before he received detailed instructions regarding the convoy of the army. Long said it was the intention to make an immediate descent upon Santiago with 10,000 men as soon as it was sure Cervera was still in that port. The question of the United States army not being ready was not mooted; in fact, all doubts as to the army’s readiness had been dispelled from Sampson’s mind by Long’s previous dispatch regarding the convoy of troops. Sampson was to go in person, taking the *New York, Indiana, Oregon*, and as many smaller vessels as he could gather, so Long cabled, and land the troops at Santiago. Without allowing the question of troops to divert him from his single purpose, Sampson replied, reporting the orders he had sent to Schley and his plan to block the harbor with the *Sterling*, and stated that he believed Cervera was still in Santiago. “Schley undoubtedly has sufficient coal aboard ships to still keep the sea some time,” Sampson added, “as all except *Iowa* left here full.” The rear-admiral’s view of the situation was clearly enunciated by the last sentence.
of this message, which read: “The importance of absolutely preventing the escape of the Spanish squadron is so paramount that promptness and efficient use of every means is demanded.”

Previous to Sampson’s arrival Commodore Remey had received this message from Long:

“Telegram of May 24 from Schley conveys no information. What vessel brought it? What vessel took orders from Sampson to Schley on night of May 20 or morning of May 21, directing him to proceed to Santiago? Direct commander of vessel that brought telegram just received to report intentions of Schley so far as known, stating definitely whether Schley had gone to Santiago de Cuba or intended to go there, and when.”

The message from Schley which Long referred to was that received by Sampson while at sea, in which Schley spoke of the difficulties in coaling, of his inability to blockade, and of his intention to go to Mole St. Nicholas. The anxiety Schley’s actions caused at Washington can be faintly gleaned from the Secretary’s wellnigh frantic questions, which Remey had answered as follows:

“Vessel referred to is Dupont in both cases. The commander was not informed of the intentions of Schley. From a letter of Schley’s of May 24 I am informed that Schley would proceed from Cienfuegos to Santiago de Cuba on May 25. He would not be able to remain off that port, on account of the general short coal supply. Would proceed to vicinity of Mole, Haiti, to coal in smooth water and communicate.”

At midnight of the 28th Sampson received a message from Long, commencing with this startling statement:

“Schley telegraphs from Santiago he goes to Key West with his squadron for coal, though he has 4,000 tons of coal with him in a broken-down collier.”

This was an altogether unlooked-for development. At the worst, it had been thought that Schley would withdraw to Haiti to coal, but that he should come all the way
back to Key West seemed incredible. In desperation, the Secretary followed up this information with the appeal to Sampson: "How soon after the arrival of Schley at Key West could you reach Santiago with New York and Oregon and Indiana, and how long could you blockade there? Schley has not ascertained whether Spanish division is at Santiago. All information here seems to show it is there."

In answer to this, Sampson, an hour or so later, replied laconically: "I can blockade indefinitely." He said nothing about coaling, because he was sure that it was feasible. He told the Secretary he could reach Santiago three days after Schley's arrival at Key West, but he did not quite understand the necessity of waiting for Schley before setting out himself. "Would like to start at once," he cabled, "with New York and Oregon, arriving in two days." By leaving the slow Indiana behind, Sampson calculated on saving a day, which then was more precious than an extra battleship. "Would purpose meeting Schley," continued Sampson, "and turning back the principal part of the force under his command if he has left." The rear-admiral could still scarcely believe that Schley had committed this egregious blunder. No answer came for several hours, and Sampson cabled again, urging an immediate answer, and saying: "Failure of Schley to continue blockade must be remedied at once if possible. There can be no doubt of presence of Spanish squadron at Santiago." And while he waited for a reply from Washington, news came from Schley. The commodore stated that he was off Santiago, and had succeeded in coaling the Marblehead and Texas while twenty-five miles west of Santiago. Regarding the Spanish fleet, Schley said not a word, but the crumb of comfort afforded by the knowledge that he was at least making an effort to stay near Santiago was indeed welcome. And Sampson still had no word of criticism for Schley, but at once sent him this encouraging message:

"Congratulate you on success. Maintain close blockade
at all hazards, especially at night. Very little to fear from torpedo-boat destroyers. Coal in open sea whenever conditions permit. Send a ship to examine Guantanamo, with view to occupying it as a base, coaling one heavy ship at a time.”

Then there came from Long that evening, the 29th of May, the eagerly awaited reply to Sampson’s request. The Secretary cabled as follows:

“You carry out recommendations to go yourself with two ships to Santiago de Cuba. Act at your discretion, with the object of blockading Spanish division as soon as possible. Goodrich reports Guantanamo very weak. The seizure of it immediately is recommended.”

So an hour before midnight Sampson sailed from Key West. That great ship, the Oregon, had already been sent to Havana. The following morning, May 30, the New York, Oregon, Mayflower, and torpedo-boat Porter started from Havana bound for Santiago. Whether they would find Cervera there and Schley gone, or vice versa, was a matter of pure supposition. Schley’s own messages were too vague for those on the north coast to form any intelligent idea of the situation. But whatever happened, this little quartette, pounding through the sea at over thirteen knots an hour, was equal to the emergency. If they met the Spanish fleet, they would engage them; if they found Cervera in Santiago, they would blockade him. They would be glad enough of the assistance of Schley’s vessels, but they were prepared to meet all emergencies in their own strength. The uncertainty of the situation, owing to lack of definite information and to the peculiar movements of Schley, caused Sampson tremendous anxiety. Never during the whole campaign was he so harassed.

The suspense was somewhat allayed at seven o’clock that night, when the St. Paul and Yale were met on their way to Key West for coal. Captain Sigsbee, of the St. Paul, had a copy of a dispatch sent from Mole St. Nicholas to Long, as follows:
“Enemy in port. Recognized Cristobal Colon and Infanta Maria Teresa and two torpedo-boats moored inside Morro, behind point. Doubtless the others are here. We are short of coal. Using every effort to get coal in. Have about 3,000 tons of coal in collier, but not easy to get on board here. If no engagement next two or three days, Sampson’s squadron could relieve this one to coal at Gonaives or vicinity of Port-au-Prince. Brooklyn, Iowa, Massachusetts, Texas, Marblehead, Vixen, and collier compose squadron here.

SCHLEY.”

This was the first word Sampson had received since Schley left Key West, eleven days previous, which showed that the commodore had any justifiable idea of Cervera’s whereabouts. On the face of things this was certainly encouraging, because it now became sure that Schley and Cervera were both at Santiago—or, at any rate, were there the previous evening. The remembrance of all the wearisome delays, the anxious days and nights, and the great waste of time and force caused during Schley’s period of uncertainty vanished at the first hearing of the news. But the feeling of security was short-lived, for it was learned from the St. Paul and the Yale that Schley, instead of keeping a close blockade of Santiago, according to imperative instructions, was cruising around eleven to forty miles distant from that harbor. Under such conditions it was evident that at night Schley’s blockade was no blockade at all, and that, despite the discovery of Cervera’s ships, the Flying Squadron might as well have been back at Key West, for all the good it could accomplish should Cervera choose to start out under cover of darkness. The question at once arose, had Cervera done this since Schley wrote his dispatch? And so, once more in a state of almost hopeless doubt as to what he would find at Santiago, Sampson hurried on with his four vessels. He was then about one hundred miles from his destina-
tion, and at this stage, on the night of May 31, I shall leave him, digressing for a moment to recount the actual movements of the Flying Squadron in its attempt to locate Cervera.

As I have stated, the Flying Squadron left Key West on the morning of May 19. Almost simultaneous with the hour of its departure, Cervera, having taken a fairly straight course from Curacao, entered Santiago unhindered. Schley took his ships around the western end of Cuba, skirting very wide of the coast. On the morning of May 21 he arrived off Cienfuegos. That day he heard the firing of guns, and on the 23d he saw smoke in the harbor, so he remained off Cienfuegos. At 7:30 o'clock on the morning of May 23 Schley received, from the Hawk, Sampson's letter "No. 8," with the additional instructions telling him to be at Santiago without fail by the 24th. After deliberating over these instructions for four hours Schley signalled to his ships: "Situation unchanged; rumor Spanish fleet is at Santiago, but not believed." The Marblehead joined Schley at eight o'clock on the morning of May 24. Commander McCalla suggested the idea of communicating with the shore, in order to find out something definite about Cervera. Though the flying squadron had been off Cienfuegos thirty hours Schley had made no attempt to do this himself. Schley granted him permission to do so, and the Marblehead by noon had established communication with friendly Cubans. Within four hours of his arrival Commander McCalla had definitely ascertained that Cervera was not in Cienfuegos and had not been there. Shortly after two o'clock that afternoon Schley signalled: "News from Jamaica reports the Spanish fleet arrived at Santiago and left Friday. Think they are at Cienfuegos now, as I heard heavy guns firing on Saturday about half-past four o'clock, thirty miles west from here. I interpreted it as a welcome to the fleet." An hour later Commander McCalla made his report, and, at last convinced of his mistake, Schley, four hours later, at seven o'clock on the even-
ing of May 24, signalled to his fleet: “We are bound to Santiago.”

At six o’clock on the evening of May 26 Schley was about twenty miles from Santiago. His collier, the Merrimac, broke down and the squadron waited while she made repairs. At 7:50 p.m. Schley signalled: “Destination Key West via south side of Cuba and Yucatan Channel as soon as collier is ready; speed, nine knots.” About nine o’clock the squadron got under way and steamed off to Key West, leaving Cervera to follow his own sweet will in Santiago. Then, fortunately, the Yale broke down, and at 11:20 p.m. Schley stopped to make repairs.

The following morning, May 27, the Harvard, post haste from Mole St. Nicholas, caught Schley with this dispatch:

“WASHINGTON, May 25, 1898.

“All Department’s information indicates Spanish division is still at Santiago. The Department looks to you to ascertain facts and that the enemy, if therein, does not leave without a decisive action. Cubans familiar with Santiago say that there are landing-places five or six nautical miles west from the mouth of harbor, and that there insurgents probably will be found and not the Spanish. From the surrounding heights can see every vessel in port. As soon as ascertained, notify the Department whether enemy is there. Could not squadron and also the Harvard coal from Merrimac leeward off Cape Cruz, Gonaives Channel, or Mole, Haiti? The Department will send coal immediately to Mole. Report without delay situation at Santiago de Cuba. LONG.”

Two hours after receiving this dispatch, Schley signalled to his ships: “Can you fetch into the port of Key West with coal remaining?” At noon, while the ships lay twenty-four miles south-southwest of Morro Castle, Santiago, Schley sent the Harvard back with this reply to Long’s message:
The Finding of Cervera

"Merrimac engines disabled; is heavy; am obliged to have towed to Key West. Have been unable absolutely to coal the Texas, Marblehead, Vixen, Brooklyn from collier, all owing to very rough sea. Bad weather since leaving Key West. The Brooklyn alone has more than sufficient coal to proceed to Key West; cannot remain off Santiago present state squadron coal account. Impossible to coal leeward Cape Cruz in the summer, all owing to southwesterly winds. Much to be regretted, cannot obey orders of Department. Have striven earnestly; forced to proceed for coal to Key West by way of Yucatan Passage. Cannot ascertain anything respecting enemy position. Very difficult to tow collier to get cable to hold."

That same afternoon the Texas and Marblehead coaled from the Merrimac, and Schley cruised around. At noon on May 28, Schley was thirty-nine miles or more away from Morro Castle, and out of all sight of land. He drew closer toward nightfall, but the tightness of his blockade can be judged from the fact that on the 28th he signalled: "While off Santiago the general meeting-place will be twenty-five miles south of that place." A cablegram for Schley was received at Mole St. Nicholas, from Washington, on May 27, and was at once taken to him. In this Long wrote:

"The most absolutely urgent thing now is to know positively whether the Spanish division is in Santiago de Cuba harbor; as, if so, immediate movement will be made against it by the navy and division of about ten thousand men of American troops which are ready to embark. You must surmount difficulties regarding coaling by your ingenuity and perseverance. This is a crucial time, and the Department relies upon you to give information quickly as to the presence of Cervera, and to be all ready for concerted action with the army. Two colliers have been ordered Mole, Haiti. Your vessels may coal singly there or in Gonaives, Haiti Channel, or leeward of Cape Cruz,
With Sampson Through the War

Cuba. . . . Sampson coming around Windward Passage. Cervera must not be allowed to escape. Long.

And on the 29th this significant dispatch for Schley was received at Mole St. Nicholas, and read by the commodore a day later:

"It is your duty to ascertain immediately the Spanish fleet, if they be at Santiago de Cuba, and report. Would be discreditable to the navy if that fact was not ascertained immediately. All naval and military movements depend on that point. Long."

The previous day Long had cabled Schley:

"Unless it is unsafe for your squadron Department wishes you to remain off Santiago, so cannot you take possession of Guantanamo, occupy as a coaling station? If you must leave, are authorized 'to sink collier in mouth of harbor.' . . . You must not leave vicinity of Santiago de Cuba unless it is unsafe [for] your squadron, or unless Spanish division is not there."

On the 29th also Long had cabled to the commodore:

"Hold on at all hazards. New York, Oregon and New Orleans are on their way."

From the forcible language in the foregoing can be judged the anxiety existing in Washington. But before Schley received this last message he had, on the morning of May 29, discovered that the Spanish fleet was at Santiago. Up to that time he had been ignorant of this, and had failed to carry out the orders he had received six days previous from Sampson. Though Schley saw the Spanish vessels in clear sight on the 29th, he did not attempt to attack them until May 31. The engagement which then ensued is ably described by Captain Evans in the following chapter. That distinguished officer has also been kind enough to write a general account of the trip from Key West to Santiago, and the foregoing remarks I have made
SOME OFFICERS OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC SQUADRON.
are simply matters of official detail upon which he has not
touched. The blockade proper of Santiago did not com­
mence until June 1, and until that date Cervera had fre­
quently and palpable opportunities to leave Santiago unmo­
ested had he been prepared or anxious to do so. That he
failed to take advantage of his opportunities was merely a
piece of naval luck for the United States.

Thus it will be seen that the expression “bottling of
Cervera” is eminently incorrect, as used in connection with
any operations prior to June 1. To explode popular falla­
cies on this subject, and to explain fully how trying and
extraordinary was the period in the naval situation be­
tween May 19 and June 1, I have been obliged to lay bare
the mistakes of a naval officer, who, up to this time, pos­
sessed the confidence and esteem of his superiors and
subordinates. It is unfortunate, but it is very necessary.
History demands truth; truth spares no one.

In a report to the Senate, Secretary Long at a later date
stated that Schley’s actions at this period did not meet the
approval of the President or of the Department “by reason
of his [Schley’s] unsteadiness in purpose and in push and
failure to obey orders.” In such strong terms is the matter
officially described. Moreover, it is on record in the De­
partment that Schley’s ships had ample coal to remain off
Santiago until assistance reached them.

Schley’s mistakes are not told of here or elsewhere either
by the wishes or with the consent of Sampson.

To my mind, both from perusal of the dispatches of this
period and from intimate personal knowledge, if one thing
above all others is brought out regarding the much-dis­
cussed and much-misunderstood personal relations between
the two commanders, it is that at the most trying times in
this irritating search for Cervera Sampson exhibited to­
ward Schley, his subordinate, a spirit of forbearance so
generous as to merit being called gentle.

That personal motives and personal relations should have
any place in an account of naval operations is an unfortu-
nate occurrence; but that it is necessary is only too pain­fully evident by a perusal of speeches made in Congress subsequent to the war, to say nothing of the widely pub­lished slanders upon both Sampson and Schley, especially upon the former.

The arrival of the Oregon at Key West has already been noted, but as her trip from ocean to ocean is unparalleled in the records of battleships, it certainly deserves more than passing mention. When the Maine was blown up, the Oregon was in dry dock at Puget Sound. On March 6 she sailed for San Francisco, covering 826 knots in 72 hours. On March 19 she steamed out of the Golden Gate, bound for Key West. By the 4th of April she had arrived at Callao, Peru, after making 4,112 knots at the hourly average of 10.96. For three days she coaled at this port, and then, in company with the United States gunboat Marietta, which had been sent ahead from San José, Guate­mala, made for the far South. From the torrid regions the two vessels passed into the icy winds of Magellan, ar­riving at Tamar, Patagonia, on April 16. On this run, 2,550 knots, the Oregon’s average speed had increased to 11.9 an hour. Only a day’s stay was made at Tamar, and the Oregon and Marietta went on to Sandy Point, where they coaled. The day war commenced, April 21, the big battleship and her small companion sailed from Sandy Point, but without the knowledge that hostilities had been ordered to begin. Day in and night out they forged to­ward their goal. As they sped past the coast of South America with clock-like precision, they knew nothing of the eager thousands awaiting news of them; of the timid hearts that feared their capture by the Spanish; of the fierce excitement that swayed their country in its throes of war. They kept incessant watch, because that is the duty of a sailor.

On April 30 they arrived at Rio de Janeiro, after making 2,148 knots at the rate of 10.16 an hour. Then Capt. Charles Edgar Clark, as fine a skipper as ever sailed or
fought a ship, and who commanded the *Oregon*, was told by Secretary Long that war had been declared, and that Cervera had sailed from the Cape de Verde Islands. He was also warned that the Spanish torpedo-gunboat *Temerario* had sailed from Montevideo. "You can go when and where you desire," cabled Long; but Captain Clark had only one desire, and he was going to fulfill that, Spanish fleet or no Spanish fleet. So while he coaled he notified the Brazilian admiral in the harbor of Rio that if the *Temerario* arrived there and approached the *Oregon* with hostile purpose he would destroy her without awaiting Brazil's permission. Then, privately, to Commander Symonds, of the *Marietta*, Captain Clark sent word that if the *Temerario* appeared, a steam launch from the *Marietta* was to go to the Spaniard and tell him that if he approached within half a mile of the *Oregon* he would be sunk, hostile purpose or otherwise. The Brazilian cruiser *Nictheroy*, bought by the United States and renamed the *Buffalo*, had been waiting at Rio for the two vessels. She was attached to this record-breaking command, and on May 5 the three vessels steamed out of Rio.

When the *Oregon* arrived at Bahia on May 8 she was alone. What had happened to her consorts is best described by the message that Captain Clark then sent to the Navy Department:

"Much delayed by the *Marietta* and the *Nictheroy*. Left them near Cape Frio, with orders to come home or beach, if necessity compels it, to avoid capture. The *Oregon* could steam fourteen knots for hours, and in a running fight might beat off and even cripple the Spanish fleet."

And Secretary Long replied:

"Proceed at once to West Indies without further stop in Brazil. No authentic news of the Spanish fleet. Avoid if possible. We believe that you will defeat it if met."

Those were grand dispatches. The run from Rio to Bahia had been made at the hourly average of 10.09 knots. On May 17 the *Oregon* reached Barbadoes, after averaging
a speed of 11.54 for 2,228 knots. With the full knowledge that he might encounter the entire Spanish fleet any moment, without any definite knowledge as to their exact whereabouts, but with a thorough confidence that his ship was equal to all emergencies, Captain Clark sailed from Barbadoes May 19, and five days later, May 24, without sighting any Spanish vessel, he reported off Jupiter Inlet, Fla., having covered 16,701 miles in seventy-nine days, including stops for coal, the longest continuous voyage ever made by a vessel of the Oregon class. During the entire trip not a single accident occurred to the machinery, and, with Captain Clark, Chief Engineer Robert W. Milligan shares the enviable distinction for the honor of this voyage. Not that these two monopolize all the credit, for had not every department of the Oregon been working in perfect harmony, and had not every officer and man done his level best to bring the Oregon to her goal, the end would never have been accomplished. There were times during the voyage that the Oregon made 15 knots an hour, her contract speed. The trip from Tamar to Sandy Point, 131 knots, was made at the average of 14.6 knots an hour. And the beauty of the whole performance is that the Oregon was just as trim and just as fit and fast when she touched Florida as when she left Puget Sound. When Captain Clark reported his arrival at Jupiter Inlet, Secretary Long wired that if he was ready for service he was to go to Key West, and if he needed repairs to go to Norfolk. Clark’s answer to this was to steam off to Key West at the rate of 13 knots. He arrived there on the 26th of May. Three days later he was steaming with Sampson to Santiago, on which occasion he expressed regret that the Mayflower kept the speed of the little squadron down to 13 knots. On a later occasion, and before securing any rest for overhauling, the Oregon surpassed all her previous speed and other records. And while the world still marvelled, she doubled on her now historic tracks, and, as I write, is back once more in the Pacific. She was, and is,
and ever will be, a great credit to her country, to her officers and crew, and to her builders.

The Oregon was launched in October, 1894, from the Union Iron Works yards, San Francisco; is 10,288 tons displacement, with indicated horsepower of 11,111; twin screws; and mounts sixteen guns in her main battery. During the voyage from Puget Sound to Florida she consumed 3,908 tons of coal.

The Marietta arrived at Key West on June 4.

While the work of finding Cervera was in progress, the blockade proper was unenlivened by any incident worth recording. The small ships left on this duty kept constant watch, but their vigilance was not rewarded even by prizes. On May 27 the former lighthouse tender Maple, under flag of truce, took from Havana, Charles Thrall and Haydon Jones, American newspaper correspondents, who had been captured by the Spanish and imprisoned in Fort Cabanas. They were exchanged for Spanish officers captured on the Argonauta.

The United States District Court at Key West, on May 27, adjudged the Catalina, captured by the Detroit, April 24, and the Miguel Jover, captured by the Helena on the same date, not lawful prizes. The St. Paul brought into Key West the British steam collier Restormel, which she had captured on May 25, under the guns of Santiago. The Restormel was believed to be carrying coal intended for Cervera, but she was afterward released. The Restormel's log showed that she was originally to meet Cervera at San Juan, Porto Rico, but that this harbor was deemed unsafe on account of Sampson's presence, and Curacao was selected. At the latter place the Restormel just missed Cervera, and when in sight of the harbor where the Spanish admiral lay she was captured by the St. Paul. On May 27 the Spanish torpedo-boat destroyer Terror arrived at San Juan, Porto Rico, having made the trip from Fort de France, Martinique, without encountering any opposition.
An accident in home waters temporarily deprived the United States navy of one of its fastest vessels. On May 28, while entering the harbor of New York in a thick fog, the protected cruiser *Columbia*, Captain Sands, came into collision with the British tramp steamer *Foscolia*. The latter sank, and the *Columbia* was badly damaged and laid up for repairs at the Navy Yard, Brooklyn. No lives were lost in this accident. While speaking of matters occurring outside of the actual seat of war, I must mention that the first class of cadets at the Naval Academy, Annapolis, had been prematurely graduated and sent to sea to fight. The second class was also sent to serve on ships, and eventually the Academy was temporarily closed for lack of cadets and instructors.

The selection by Cervera of Santiago as a harbor of refuge was a coincidence that recalls the *Virginius* affair. In 1873 the ship *Virginius*, flying the American flag, was captured off Santiago by the Spanish man-of-war *Tornado*, on the ground that she was carrying arms and men to the assistance of the Cuban insurgents. On November 7, 1873, Captain Fry and thirty-six of the crew of the *Virginius* were shot in Santiago by the orders of the Captain-General of Cuba, De Rodas, and the following day twelve passengers of the *Virginius* were also killed. President Grant at once put the navy of the United States on a war footing, and hostilities between the two countries seemed unavoidable. However, on November 29 a protocol between Secretary Fish and Admiral Polo was signed, by which Spain agreed to surrender the *Virginius* and her survivors and to salute on Christmas Day the American flag. The first part of the agreement was carried out, but three days before Christmas Secretary Fish announced that the *Virginius* had no right to fly the American flag, and the incident ended. The *Virginius* sank during a gale on her way home.

Upon Cervera's arrival at Santiago, according to apparently reliable translations of secret messages printed in the
New York *Journal*, General Linares, in command of the military forces of that city, wired, on May 19, to Captain-General Blanco as follows:

“Cervera’s squadron arrived here at seven o’clock this morning, the *Maria Teresa* flying the flag of the admiral. The *Colon* brings neither her forward nor stern guns, not having been able to mount them. The squadron is composed of the cruisers *Teresa, Oquendo, Viscaya*, and *Colon*, the torpedo-boat destroyers *Pluton* and *Furor*, and two steamers of the Transatlantic Line. The *Terror* remained in Martinique, repairing the damages sustained on the voyage. The *Alicante* is with the *Terror*. They both need coal and provisions. By reason of the increase in consumption caused by the arrival of the squadron, the provisions of this place will only hold out until the end of June.”

Upon the receipt of this, Blanco cabled General Correa, the Minister of War at Madrid:

“The squadron comes without provisions or coal, which it will take on there, but it will not be able to remain a long time, since it would expose itself to be blockaded, thus shutting itself off completely and limiting itself to the scant resources of the city. If it had brought the *Pelayo* and the *Carlos Quinto* and a flotilla of torpedo-boats, it would be able to attempt something important and to contribute powerfully to the defence of the island. Reduced as it is, however, it will be obliged to avoid a combat as much as possible, limiting itself to manœuvres which will not expose it to dangers, but which, on the other hand, cannot produce great results. The squadron has not brought with it any transport, either with coal or provisions, which would have been as advantageous for us as arms and ammunition. The question of provisions threatens to be very serious, for hardly enough remains for one month. The efforts which I have been making to obtain supplies have thus far been without success. The only thing that can be done is to arm some fast Transatlantic steamers and send them to run the blockade, advising me
of the probable date of their arrival, so that we may distract the attention of the enemy. I consider it indispensable that the squadron of Cervera be reinforced as much as possible, and that the torpedo-boat destroyers be sent here to increase our strength. I am assured on good authority that the enemy plans an invasion with 28,000 men next week."

On May 20 Linares again cabled Blanco, commenting upon the hopelessness of expecting Cervera to accomplish aggressive work. Said Linares of the fleet: "It will have to limit itself to maneuvering cleverly in order not to compromise any portion of our naval power. If it remains here long enough, it will be blockaded and thus completely shut off from communication, and [will be] reduced to the scant resources of this place." Linares said he had furnished Cervera with 2,400 tons of coal. Cervera apparently made up his mind to sail from Santiago on May 23, but he later changed his plans, according to this cable from General Linares to Blanco:

"SANTIAGO, May 24, 1898.

"Cervera, after having consulted with the commanders of his various ships, has been to see me. He has decided to remain here until assured that he will not be pursued by the Americans when he endeavors to leave the port. He will wait until they make a move on Porto Rico. He thinks it will be best to go to Curaçoa. Unless the future movements of the enemy should change the situation, he does not think it would be well to go to Cienfuegos, a point which is connected with Havana and other places with resources and provisions. A few ships could close the narrow mouth of this port and render difficult for an indefinite time a departure from it. Thus the American forces would be permitted to resume without embarrassment the attack on Havana, with the moral advantage of having rendered our squadron useless."

Had Cervera sailed from Santiago on May 23, how different would have been the entire campaign!
CHAPTER VI.

WITH SCHLEY TO SANTIAGO.


The *Iowa*, fresh from the battle of San Juan, on May 18, arrived at San Key anchorage, off Key West. She had steamed from the entrance of the Old Bahama Channel with all possible dispatch, because Cervera and his cruisers had left Curaçao, headed for the island of Cuba, and Commodore Schley was lying off Key West awaiting reinforcements to attack and destroy him with the Flying Squadron. The air was full of rumors and a feeling of uneasiness pervaded all classes. On the morning of May 19, Commodore Schley sailed with the *Brooklyn*, the *Massachusetts*, and the *Texas*, bound for Cienfuegos. A few hours after the commodore’s departure, Admiral Sampson informed me that at the earliest practicable moment I should leave to join the Flying Squadron, giving as a reason for sending his best battleship that he wanted Schley to be so strong that there could be no question as to the outcome of an engagement between the two fleets. Provisions, coal, and ammunition were dumped onto the upper deck of the *Iowa*, until she looked like a freight-house of some transportation line on the East River.

All night of the 19th, under electric lights, the *Iowa*’s officers and crew worked with unflagging energy. At 11 A.M. on the 20th, Sampson signalled: “You must go now. Show yourself off Havana before sundown, and proceed with all possible dispatch to join Commodore Schley off Cienfuegos.”

At 6:45 P.M. of May 20, the *Iowa* ran close to the bat-
teries at Havana, steamed slowly across the entrance of the harbor, and passed out to the westward, sighting a number of Commodore Watson’s vessels that were vigilantly tightening their starvation grip upon the throats of Blanco and his one hundred and thirty-five thousand soldiers.

At noon on May 22 the Iowa arrived off Cienfuegos and sighted the Flying Squadron under Commodore Schley. It was a beautiful, clear day; the magnificent ships looked very fit, and one could not help a feeling of pity for the gallant Spanish admiral if he ever came under the fire of this outfit. After saluting the commodore the Iowa became one of the Flying Squadron, and proceeded to drift leisurely with it off and on, Micawber-like, waiting for something—we hoped the Spanish squadron—to turn up.

Whether or not the Spaniards were in Cienfuegos was unknown, as far as we could learn; but we all felt certain that they were either there or at Santiago, unless they had passed around Cape San Antonio and were on their way to the coast of Texas. It was a matter of some surprise to us when we arrived to find that the Flying Squadron had only beaten us six hours from Key West, and it was surmised that they had met with thick weather off Cape San Antonio, and thus been forced to slow or make a wide detour. It now appears that they made a wide detour.

On May 23 three vessels were sighted coming in, supposed to be the Marblehead, Commander McCalla, and two auxiliaries. The Flying Squadron was promptly cleared for action and stood out, guns loaded and everything in readiness to capture or destroy the enemy. We were relieved to find that they were friends.* The Marblehead arrived the next day. After promptly communicating with the insurgent forces, twelve miles to the westward, Commander McCalla reported that the Spanish fleet was not in Cienfuegos. That afternoon, May 24, the squadron was formed in column, cleared for action, prepared for battle, and stood in, led by the Brooklyn, making a graceful curve close past the entrance of the harbor, so that the commo-
dore might be assured from his own observations that the elusive Cervera was really somewhere else.

A half-finished battery, mounting one gun, on an eminence to the left of the entrance, was crowded with workmen and soldiers watching our evolutions and apparently having little fear of our tremendous batteries. On the right of the entrance as we passed out to sea could be seen the remains of the lighthouse partly demolished by the force under Commander McCalla about a month previous. The magnificent gallantry of this force, under a most gall- ing fire, while cutting the cable, had reflected great credit upon the American navy.

At 7:55 P.M., May 24, the squadron left the vicinity of Cienfuegos and started for Santiago. During that night and the following day a fresh breeze and a heavy sea from the southwest reduced the speed of the Eagle, one of the auxiliaries in company, to seven knots, and at that speed we hurried on to blockade Cervera at Santiago, where we believed him to be. Later the Eagle was sent to Jamaica, and the squadron resumed its speed—ten knots. On May 26, in lat. 19.27° N., long. 75.40° W., we sighted the land about Santiago, distant thirty-two miles. The dim outlines of the mountains back of the city could be seen, and nothing more. What were thought to be the Minneapolis, Harvard, and Yale, were made out; but the signal flew from the flagship (Brooklyn), “Clear ship for action; speed 12 knots, close action,” and thus for the second time we started for the supposed Spaniards.

Our mistake was soon discovered, and our friends seemed little worried over our threatening manoeuvres. After communicating with these vessels and taking in tow the collier Merrimac, which had disabled her machinery, the squadron was turned about, headed to the westward, and the commodore by signal announced that our destination was Key West. Some surprise was created on board the Iowa by this announcement, for we were in the dark as to the whereabouts of Admiral Cervera’s fleet. The only
inference we could draw was that Cervera had left Santiago and that we were to search for him somewhere else. During the night of the 26th and the day of the 27th, we steamed slowly to the westward, the flagship meanwhile repairing the broken parts of the machinery of the Merri-mac, the Texas and the Marblehead getting coal from her at the same time.

Late on the 27th of May the Merrimac signalled that she could make eight knots with her own steam. The squadron was again turned about and steered to the eastward, the commodore announcing that in case of separation or bad weather our rendezvous would be Gonaives Bay at the southwestern end of Haiti. On May 28, between 4 and 6 P.M., we again arrived off Santiago, where we laid off and on, until daylight of the 29th, when we stood in, in column, across the entrance of the harbor. This latest manoeuvre of standing to the eastward instead of continuing on our way to Key West gave many of us the impression that Admiral Cervera had departed by way of the Windward Passage, and was bound, for all we knew, to San Juan, Porto Rico. It was therefore a great surprise to us, as we slowly opened the entrance to Santiago harbor, to make out the Spanish cruiser Cristobal Colon moored across the channel, clearly outlined by the dark-green background of Punta Gorda.

We signalled to the flagship, “Spanish cruiser Cristobal Colon in the harbor”; and the answer came promptly: “I understand.” A moment later a second Spanish cruiser, supposed to be the Maria Teresa, was discovered to the left of Cayo Smith, and still later the spars of a third were seen over the land. The Iowa was at once cleared for action and everything was made ready for battle, as we felt sure the Spaniards meant to fight. If they had wanted to escape, they certainly had had every opportunity to do so. Later on it was found that Admiral Cervera had entered the harbor of Santiago, May 19, the day and almost the hour the Flying Squadron left Key West for Cienfuegos.
It is therefore evident that the manœuvring of the Flying Squadron had nothing to do either with forcing Cervera into Santiago or preventing his escape therefrom up to 7:45 A.M., May 29.

As no signal was made to engage the enemy, at 10 A.M. the battery of the Iowa was secured, and the commanding officers of all the ships went aboard the Brooklyn in obedience to a signal from the commodore.

After a conference with him they returned to their vessels and the squadron cruised off the harbor at distances varying from five to ten miles until May 31, when the commodore announced by signal that at 2 P.M. he proposed to transfer his flag to the Massachusetts, and, with that vessel, the New Orleans and the Iowa, to open fire on the Cristobal Colon, which was still moored in front of the Punta Gorda battery. Shortly after 2 P.M. that day we stood in, prepared for battle, the Massachusetts leading with the commodore’s flag, then the New Orleans, a new ship, with a new crew, just arrived from the North, and the Iowa bringing up the rear. The flagship Brooklyn and the second-class battleship Texas were left off shore coaling, where their crews, no doubt, felt bitter disappointment at being left out of what they must have supposed would be the destruction of a portion of the Spanish fleet.

Our instructions were that we would open fire at a range of about seven thousand yards; that we would pass across the entrance of the harbor from west to east at a speed of ten knots; that we would then turn with port helm, away from the land and from the enemy, recross from east to west, and maintain a slow and deliberate fire upon the Colon. The first shot from the Massachusetts, a 13-inch shell, struck the water outside of the Morro, and as the Colon was moored about fifteen hundred yards inside of that point, the Iowa opened fire at a range of 9,000 yards. Finding her projectiles falling short, the Iowa’s range was increased to 10,000 yards and to 10,500 on the run from west to east. As the turn was made with port helm, the
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distance from the *Colon* was materially increased; on the run to the westward the sights were therefore set at 11,000 yards, and the last 12-inch shell was fired at a range of 11,500 yards, or about six miles and a half.

As the *Colon* passed out of view the action ceased, and the commodore returned to the *Brooklyn*. During all this time the shore batteries were firing, as nearly as we could determine, four guns—two to the left of the entrance, and two to the right. The *Colon* returned our fire smartly, and just as we ceased firing threw a shell fairly over the *Iowa*, which burst between the *New Orleans* and the *Massachusetts*.

Not a projectile struck the *Colon*, and the *Iowa* found herself with strained elevating gear, caused by high-angle fire.¹

On June 1 Admiral Sampson arrived on the *New York*, and the *Iowa* ceased to be a vessel of the Flying Squadron. The admiral’s plan of blockade was substituted for that of Commodore Schley, and the beginning of the end was in sight.

¹ Commodore Schley, in his cabled report to Secretary Long regarding this action, wrote:

“Made reconnaissance this afternoon, May 31, to develop fortifications, with their character. The range was 7,000 yards. The reconnaissance was intended principally to injure or destroy *Colon*. Fire was returned without delay by heavy batteries to the east and to the west of entrance. Large calibre, long range [guns]. Reconnaissance developed satisfactorily the presence of the Spanish squadron lying behind island, near inner fort, as they fired over the hill at random. Quite satisfied the Spanish fleet is here.”

In the log of the *Cristobal Colon* the following entry regarding the engagement is found:

“Our shot falling short on account of the enemy keeping at too great distance... Soon afterward ceased firing on account of the silence and withdrawal of the enemy.” A shell exploded near the *Colon*, fragments of which made “dents in her side and cracked some bowls in the roundhouse.”
CHAPTER VII.

THE BLOCKADE OF SANTIAGO.

CAPTAIN EVANS has said that the "beginning of the end was in sight" when Rear-Admiral Sampson arrived at Santiago. This occurred at six o'clock on the morning of June 1. The reader will remember that we left Sampson on the night of May 31, coming from Key West, and then about one hundred miles from Santiago, with the New York, Oregon, Mayflower and Porter. From the reports he had just received from the St. Paul and Yale he felt some anxiety as to the effectiveness of the measures Schley had taken to prevent Cervera's escape. In fact, no one on Sampson's ships was sure that Cervera had not slipped out of Santiago until the small squadron from Key West actually arrived off that harbor. A thick haze hung over land and sea. Schley's vessels were seen standing about ten miles out from the shore, bunched rather than in blockade formation. Without waiting to communicate, Sampson headed the New York close to the harbor. All doubts were quickly set at rest by a shot fired from a vessel lying in undisturbed possession of the harbor mouth. Even from the New York's comparative proximity she was hard to distinguish in the mist of dawn, and before the shot could be replied to the Spanish man-of-war passed out of sight behind Smith Cay, an island that completely hides the inner harbor from the view of those outside. The shot was welcome, for it signified that at least one of Cervera's ships was in Santiago, and, if one, probably all.

After assuring himself that the period of utter uncertainty no longer existed, Sampson called together all his commanders, including Schley, for a conference. The commodore had not found opportunity to put into execu-
tion Sampson’s instructions, sent by the New Orleans, which had already arrived, regarding the sinking of the collier Sterling, or, as it should have been, the Merrimac. After ordering the ships to lie close in, Sampson at once went to work to prepare the Merrimac, so that she could be taken in and sunk in an endeavor to block the narrow channel. Sampson was fully convinced that she would form only a temporary obstruction, but he relied upon her to constitute an additional safeguard. The main object was to prevent, at all hazards, the escape of Cervera. From Commodore Schley’s dispatches (footnote of Chapter VI.) it can be seen that he considered the land batteries formidable, and this after drawing their fire. Taking the commodore’s view of the case, Sampson at first glance was not over-confident that he could maintain the close blockade essential to absolute success, and demanded by the peculiar topography of the harbor. To eliminate any possible doubt the Merrimac plan was resorted to. If successful, it undoubtedly would prevent Sampson’s own ingress to the harbor. This drawback to a possible aggressive movement, however, was only regarded as being temporary, for it was thought that before any plan for entering the harbor could become likely of fulfilment the army of the United States would have taken possession of the forts at the harbor mouth, and thus put the disposition of the sunken Merrimac entirely at the wishes of the allied land and sea forces. The thorough expectation of the army’s early arrival, based upon the frequent messages from Secretary Long that I have already quoted, was a feature that had no little influence upon the decision to adopt the Merrimac plan. The collier was not sent in with any idea of averting a naval engagement; her mission was to avert an escape. Scarcely any one believed that Cervera would be foolhardy enough to attempt to fight the now overpowering fleet opposed to him. Had there been any probability that the Spanish admiral would give fight, the Merrimac would have been the last plan to be adopted; but, as
it was evidently to Cervera's advantage to sneak out without fighting, then it was essential that every means should be taken to prevent his doing so, whether or not those means temporarily shut out all possibility of destructive action by the blockading fleet. I am of the impression that if Sampson himself had previously engaged the batteries and discovered, as he afterward did, their weakness, he would not have decided upon an attempt to block the channel, but would have been content to hold Cervera prisoner by means of close blockade alone, which later proved perfectly feasible.

An attempt to steam into the harbor, as Dewey did at Manila, was altogether debarred from Sampson for many reasons. Before he could reach Cervera in the inner harbor he must needs expose his ships to point-blank fire of the shore batteries, then presumed to be strong, and after that, would have to take them over submarine mine-fields known to exist in the channel, and, like the batteries, over-estimated in the reports upon which Sampson was forced to rely. Even without the opposition of mines—Sampson would not have stopped for any batteries in Cuba—the harbor of Santiago is a hard one to enter with a big ship: its channel phenomenally narrow, shallow, unbuoyed, and tortuous. At night, undoubtedly the best period for a fighting entrance, navigation with vessels like the Iowa, Indiana, or New York was dangerous in the extreme, if not impossible. Allowing the supposition that, against all these disadvantages—none of which existed to the same extent at Manila—Sampson had tried to force an entrance to the harbor, he could have advanced only in single column, or, to put it more plainly, in single file. His leading ship, probably the Iowa, would have passed through the fire of the batteries perhaps with casualties, but intact; that was admitted. But before coming in sight of the Spanish fleet, hidden behind Smith Cay, she must pass over a field of submarine mines laid close together in water where she had not room to turn. One of these mines was
able, in the theory of naval warfare, and especially judging from the recent Maine disaster, to cripple if not to destroy her. It was against all probabilities that she could pass in safety over them all. So every sign pointed to the likelihood of the leading ship being sunk in the channel, an easy mark for any batteries still in action, a tomb for hundreds of men, a grievous loss in naval strength, and, above all this, a complete obstruction to the further progress of the vessels that followed. And this before the hostile fleet had ever been seen. The great probability of the leading vessel being sunk by mines, and the terrible effects that would follow, far more grievous in their consequences than the actual loss of one battle-ship, were so palpable that the idea of forcing the harbor was not entertained by Sampson or by the commanding officers who joined in his councils.

I cannot lay too much stress upon the fact that it was the mines, and the mines alone, that prevented Sampson at this time, and later on, from forcing the entrance of the harbor. The situation was rendered more difficult by the fact that the mines, in the main, were not contact mines, but were exploded by means of electrical connection with the shore, and the control of this connection could not be obtained until the forts had been captured; otherwise, countermining might have been attempted, and with possible success. What Sampson then believed was that the army would soon be on hand and would, under the fire of his guns, quickly capture the forts, destroy the mine connections, and so allow him to enter with his ships and get at Cervera and destroy him. Meantime he resorted to the Merrimac as a temporary expedient.

To Commander Converse, of the Montgomery, is due, I believe, the credit for the original suggestion of the Merrimac plan. Converse, weeks before this, was in Sampson's cabin at a conference, and while discussing Cervera's probable entry into Santiago, Cienfuegos, or some other narrow-necked port, said, "Why not sink a collier in the harbor?" The idea had been mooted, but I believe this was its first
official expression. On the way from Key West to Santiago Sampson sent for Assistant Naval Constructor Richmond Pearson Hobson, who had been attached to the flagship New York since the outbreak of war. Hobson, at San Juan, had suggested a plan to the admiral which the latter had dismissed as being quite impracticable. The present contemplated work, however, was well within this bright young constructor's sphere. Hobson devoted himself eagerly to the idea, and before the New York arrived at Santiago had submitted numerous plans for sinking a ship. The one Sampson adopted, when he found the Sterling had not already been sunk, was the stringing of torpedoes along the ship's sides. Hobson was sent over to the Merrimac to supervise the instalment of its apparatus, and the big, costly collier was stripped of everything useful. During the afternoon of June 1, she lay alongside the Massachusetts. About two hundred Jackies worked aboard of her, "dressing" her for the grave. Now and again Hobson would come back to the flagship, grimy, enthusiastic and tireless in his demands for some bit of electrical or other apparatus that had not been forthcoming.

Sampson signalled to the ships, asking for volunteers to take the Merrimac in. The reply to that signal was as noble and as characteristic of the United States Navy as the eventual sinking of the Merrimac itself. Several hundred officers and men not only volunteered to go in on the Merrimac, but almost fought among each other for the honor. It was the chance they longed for, though it proffered death. Hobson himself pleaded for the command. He pointed out that he was acquainted with all the details connected with blowing up the ship, and that no one else was, to an equal extent. And he needed only seven men. There was no necessity to risk the life of any officer besides his own. Sampson concluded that it would be wise to let Hobson have charge of the expedition. Line officers urged their claims to the command, and Sampson was begged to let a line officer accompany Hobson, if only to con the ship.
But Sampson was adamant. Commander Miller, who was in command of the *Merrimac*, when he learned that he was to be deprived of his ship at the moment when she was about to become a famous nonentity, begged the admiral, with tears in his eyes, to let him stay aboard. The admiral was sorry for him, and gloried in his spirit and that of all the would-be volunteers; but he had made up his mind, and that settled it. So out of those hundreds one officer and seven men, before sunset, had been chosen. They were:

Richmond Pearson Hobson, assistant naval constructor; D. Montague, chief master-at-arms, G. Charette, gunners' mate, third class, R. Clausen, coxswain, all from the flagship *New York*; J. E. Murphy, coxswain, from the *Iowa*; G. F. Phillips, machinist, first class; F. Kelly, water-tender; and O. Deiguan, coxswain, the last-mentioned trio being members of the *Merrimac*’s original crew. They were brave, but not one bit braver than the hundreds of disappointed messmates they left behind.

All night long the men worked on the *Merrimac*. She lay close to the *New York*. At three o’clock on the morning of June 2 Sampson went over in a launch to inspect the collier before she started on her perilous errand. Sampson himself believed that the men had a fair chance for their lives; but his opinion was shared by few. He looked carefully at every detail. The ten torpedoes were strung by “hogging” lines outside the ship, and were connected with the bridge, from which spot Hobson intended to explode them. The inspection took a long time, but finally the admiral was satisfied. He shook hands with Hobson, wished him luck, feeling the wishes more than a man of his reserved disposition could ever put in words, and went over the side. The few persistent volunteers who had stowed away on this “death ship” were driven from their hiding-places into the launch. But the launch had broken down, and this delayed matters so much that the streaks of dawn were already showing when the *Merrimac*
headed in toward the harbor. On she went to her destruction, watched by hundreds on the decks of the blockading vessels. Hobson had been given discretionary powers as to the time and method of accomplishing his ends; but to the onlookers it certainly seemed that it was now too light to attempt the task with the faintest hope of success. This was Sampson’s opinion, and by the torpedo-boat Porter he sent word to Hobson to return. On went the Merrimac, and after her the Porter. For a few minutes it looked as if the Porter would fail to catch her in time. Not until within range of the shore batteries was the Merrimac overtaken. But instead of returning she lay motionless, and only the Porter came back. It was then after five o’clock, and almost quite light. Sampson could not understand the Merrimac’s delay, until Lieutenant Fremont, commanding the Porter, as that torpedo-boat ran up alongside the flagship, shouted out:

“Lieutenant Hobson asks permission to continue on his course. He thinks he can do it!”

But the admiral sent an imperative order for the Merrimac to return at once. Back she came, Hobson walking the lonely bridge. Then it was seen that another officer was with him, for a man in an undershirt and little else appeared at the engine-room hatchway, and was recognized as Assistant Engineer Robert K. Crank, who had served aboard the Merrimac, and was determined to stick to her to the last. Boatswain Mullen, of the New York, was also aboard, but neither of these accompanied the Merrimac on her final trip.

Hobson was a very busy and much envied individual all that day. More finishing touches were put to the Merrimac. When night fell, farewells were said once more, and the Merrimac bore off to the eastward. She was followed by a steam launch from the New York, in charge of Naval Cadet Powell, who had orders to wait off the mouth of the harbor for the Merrimac’s men, for it was Hobson’s plan, after sinking the ship, to get out on a catamaran he
took with him. There was little or no moonlight, and before the collier was four hundred yards away from the New York she was completely out of sight.

For two hours we waited for some sign of her existence. A few minutes past three o’clock—this was the morning of June 3—the flash of a gun streamed out from Morro. Then came another, and in a few seconds the mouth of Santiago harbor was livid with flames that shot viciously from both banks, and then we knew that the Merrimac had been discovered. The dull sound of the cannonade and its fiery light were unmistakable evidences of the fierce attack that was being waged upon Hobson’s gallant crew. We were powerless to help them, because we were as likely to hit the Merrimac as to hurt the batteries. Whether that vessel had been sunk before she gained the entrance of the harbor, or whether she had been successful, were questions we were utterly unable to answer. Uppermost in all minds was the thought, “What has happened to the gallant crew?” None slept that night, and dawn never seemed so tardy. When five o’clock came there was no sign of the Merrimac or of Powell’s launch. The firing ashore had ceased. Over the harbor a haze still hung. That Powell’s launch had not returned was inexplicable. It was feared that he, too, had met the fate that most of us now assigned to Hobson and his men. A quarter of an hour later a little streak of smoke curled up, close inshore, to the westward of the harbor mouth. It moved, and out of the haze came the faint outline of the New York’s launch. “They’re saved!” shouted some one on the flagship’s quarter-deck. But it was by no means sure that the Merrimac’s men were on the launch, and it was still less certain that in the growing daylight the launch would be able to steam out of the close, hostile range in which she now lay. The Spaniards must soon see her; and the thought had scarcely passed through our minds before the Socapa battery began to blaze away at Powell’s launch. Hugging the shore the tiny craft pitched along, the smoke
pouring from her stack and the shells bursting in the water astern and ahead of her. For fifteen minutes the enemy kept firing away, but the launch sped out in safety. As soon as Powell was near the *New York* every glass was turned on the launch, and every man of her little crew closely scrutinized. We found that none was from the *Merrimac*. And when Powell came aboard he told us that of Hobson and of his men he had seen nothing. Powell had stayed—and very pluckily—within rifle-shot of the harbor mouth till daylight, but beyond the masts of the *Merrimac* sticking up out of the water, well inside the harbor, Powell knew no more than we did of the fate of the men who had sunk her. We thought that they were dead.

It was long afterward that we heard all the details. Hobson was almost in the harbor before the Spaniards saw him. The *Merrimac*, amidst a cross-fire of heavy guns and machine guns and infantry volleys, and bows on to a raking fire from the ships inside, was taken slowly up the channel, with her rudder shot away, and gaping shell-holes in her hull. Hobson, from his station on the bridge, touched off the torpedoes, but only a few answered to his electric touch. The men in the engine-room severed the sea connections, and the water rushed in and joined the floods that already poured through great apertures made by a bursting submarine mine and a torpedo from the *Pluton*. First the *Merrimac* swung athwart the channel as though, in a last effort, about to fulfil her purpose, but in her death-throes she swung back and lay lengthwise in her grave, thus defeating the object of those who had risked so much. She sank slowly. On her stern, getting nearer every moment to the water lay Hobson and his men. Their light was the flashing of the fusillade that still sent shrieking shell and whistling bullet above their heads. Now and again the crash of a projectile as it entered and passed through the battered hull made the deck shiver beneath their bodies, pressed closely to it. Water came
trickling over the decks. The catamaran was still made fast to the ship, and it floated. The men wanted to swim out, but Hobson said, “No, not yet.” When the deck no longer afforded a resting-place they grasped the edge of the raft, and hung on, their heads only out of water. The firing ceased and day dawned. Still these men bided their time. A launch came puffing toward them. “Now,” said Hobson, turning to the seven other heads that stuck out of water, “we will capture this launch and get out.” And just as he was about to spring up from the water on to the catamaran a dozen rifles were levelled at him from the launch. “Don’t shoot!” shouted Hobson. “Is there any one there to receive the surrender of an American naval officer?” He saw that further resistance was hopeless. A hand was waved at him from out of the hanging folds of the launch awning. The rifles were lowered, and a few minutes later Admiral Cervera, for he was the owner of the hand, helped Hobson into the launch. The men were taken to the cruiser Reina Mercedes, and were clothed, fed, and made much of by the Spanish naval officers, who marvelled greatly at their bravery and miraculous escape. They were then handed over to the civil authorities, who promptly put them in prison in Morro Castle, which was right at the mouth of the harbor and surrounded by the batteries.

That day, while we, out at sea, still feared that Hobson and his men were dead, Admiral Cervera taught us a beautiful lesson in chivalry by sending out his chief of staff, under flag of truce, to say to Admiral Sampson that the Merrimac men were safe and well. Efforts for their exchange were at once instituted. It was curious to see Captain Bustamente, Cervera’s envoy, sitting chatting with Sampson on the quarter-deck of the New York. And it was hard to believe that the forts he glanced at were his own, and that the ship he was on and those that lay alongside were ready any moment to bombard them. The mission of Bustamente and the spirit that prompted it
made us proud of our enemies. It was a fitting sequel to a deed that proved the bold spirit of Cushing, of Perry, of Decatur, of Farragut, and of other naval heroes still burned brightly in the United States Navy. And the Merrimac’s failure to fulfil her purpose does not in the slightest dim the glory that must ever cling to the men who took her in.

While the Merrimac expedition was under way Sampson had put into force a plan of blockade, which embodied all the features of modern naval tactics. From the moment of its institution the fate of Cervera was sealed. Lieutenant Jose Müller y Tejeiro, second in command of naval forces of the province of Santiago de Cuba, in his account of the war, has written regarding Sampson’s arrival and the effect it produced:

“On June 1 the enemy appeared before the Morro with thirteen ships. From that time on the hostile ships, which were afterwards increased in number, established day and night a constant watch, without withdrawing at nightfall as they used to do.”

Previous remarks of Lieutenant Müller state that before June 1, the day Sampson arrived, our ships disappeared to the southward just before nightfall. Lieutenant Müller rather ingenuously infers that Sampson had “discovered” that for “want of provisions Cervera would before very long be compelled to go out.”

The plan of blockade was formulated in an order issued on June 2. By this document Sampson divided the vessels off Santiago into two squadrons, the first under his own personal command, and the second under the command of Commodore Schley, although, of course, Sampson was in supreme charge of both. The first squadron consisted of the New York, Iowa, Oregon, New Orleans, Mayflower, and Porter. These ships lay in the arc of a segment of a circle blockading the eastern side of the harbor. The second squadron was composed of the Brooklyn, Massachusetts, Texas, Marblehead, and Vixen, and these lay in the arc of a segment of a circle blockading the western ap-
proaches to Santiago. Thus a semi-circle of ships was formed around Cervera's only outlet. In the first order the daytime distance for the ships was specified at about six miles from Morro Castle, closing in at night. The ships were ordered to coal in smooth weather, without withdrawing from position, and they did so.

On the same day, June 2, Sampson in his orders wrote: "If the enemy tries to escape, the ships must close and engage as soon as possible, and endeavor to sink his [the enemy's] vessels or force them to run ashore in the channel." This was perhaps the most terse and the most simple battle order ever issued by a commander-in-chief. That it contained all the instructions necessary was fully proved a month later.

The main object was to place and keep the vessels in such position that they would be best fitted to cope with Cervera should he attempt to escape; this accomplished, the result of such an attempt by Cervera was a foregone victory for the American ships. To insure the means to this end Sampson was tireless in his efforts, and issued countless orders. Though somewhat unchronological, I shall trace the blockade to what may be called its height of efficiency.

On June 5 steam launches, armed with one-pounders, were assigned to duty as an inner picket line. After that, three picket launches tossed around every night in front of the harbor within about a mile, and often less, of the shore, frequently under fire, but always keeping a close watch for possible torpedo-boats, and ready any moment to give warning, by means of colored lights, to the big ships. The hard, quiet work done by the men and officers, mostly young naval cadets, on this duty cannot be praised too highly. In addition to these launches, the night blockade, on June 7, was made even tighter by stationing a second picket line, composed of the Vixen, Suwanee, and Dolphin. The Vixen lay to westward of the harbor mouth, about three-quarters of a mile from the shore; the Suwanee to
the south, right in front, two miles distant, and the Dolphin to eastward, about three-quarters of a mile from the shore. All these vessels were supposed to be on a semicircle drawn around Morro, with a radius of two miles. Inside of them, it must be remembered, were the steam launches, while outside, four miles from the shore, lay the armored vessels. Such close-range blockading would probably have been impossible but for the bombardments to which Sampson subjected the forts; but of that more anon.

To make doubly sure of his captive Sampson brought his searchlights into play, and after various experiments issued, on June 11, an order which not only made Cervera's detection at night positively certain, but, as it was afterward ascertained, absolutely prevented the Spanish admiral from making his sortie under any other conditions than daylight. This order provided for the Iowa, Oregon, and Massachusetts to go within two miles of Morro, and from 7:30 P.M. until daylight to play their searchlight steadily upon the mouth of the harbor. The battle-ships took turns of two hours each at this duty, and after the night of June 11 the steady glare of the searchlight never moved from Morro, trying the souls of the Spanish soldiers and sailors, who were so blinded that neither from the castle top nor from the harbor below could they see even the shadows of the ships. On June 12, the distance from Morro during the daytime was reduced for all vessels to four miles, and the blockaders were ordered to keep headed toward the land, so that no time would be wasted in needless turning should Cervera make a dash out. On June 15, by an order, and frequently before and after by signal, Sampson drew sharp attention to slight disregard of these instructions on the part of various vessels. His enforcement of the blockade orders was severe; had it not been so the fleet of Admiral Cervera might still be extant. Though countless conditions tending to divert and comparatively of great importance arose after Sampson's arrival at Santiago, he never allowed them, one instant of
the day or night, to detract him from his overwhelming singleness of purpose—the destruction of Cervera’s fleet. John Foster wrote of Howard, the philanthropist: “The law which carries water down a declivity was not more unconquerable and invariable than the determination of his feelings toward the main object.” And so it was with Sampson.

In addition to this perfect plan of blockade, signals were prepared and issued to commanding officers which provided for meeting every move of the hostile fleet should it appear. The youngest cadet on watch, should he see the fleet coming out, had only to hoist one of these signals, indicating the direction of the enemy, and the vessels would at once close in and engage. Everything was provided for, and the battle could have been fought with Sampson dead or living, with Sampson a thousand miles or only one mile from the harbor; it made little difference which. But it must never be forgotten whose hand skilfully, tirelessly, shaped the means toward the end, and once the means attained the perfection that they reached on June 15, the end was a foregone conclusion.

With the successful initiation of this blockade, interest among the ships naturally turned upon the American army, and the absorbing question was, When will troops be here to help us? It was apparent that without troops Sampson could do little in the way of important aggression. That he could not enter the harbor, and that he thought the army was ready, has already been minutely explained. On May 31 Long had further cabled that the army was embarking at Tampa, 25,000 strong, and would proceed to Santiago as soon as it was known that the whole Spanish fleet was in the harbor. “The Department,” wrote Long, “expects that you will assist, of course, landing the army to the utmost of your power, but desires you shall not risk by operations on shore, or in landing, crews of the armored vessels or those needed in case of a naval engagement.” The latter order, though eminently advisable, made co-
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operation with the army at a later date somewhat difficult. On June 2, Assistant Secretary of the Navy Charles H. Allen, who succeeded Mr. Roosevelt after the latter took the lieutenant-colonelcy of the Rough Riders, cabled Sampson that General Shafter had wired he expected to start from Tampa on the 4th. On June 3 Sampson replied, saying positively that four Spanish armored vessels and two torpedo-destroyers were in the harbor, “unable to avoid being captured or destroyed.” This Sampson ascertained by means of communicating immediately upon his arrival with the insurgents. “Beg troops move with all possible celerity,” added Sampson, “of paramount importance.” On June 5 he notified Commodore Remey to send to Santiago the marine battalion, then at Key West on the Panther.

The long wait off Santiago proved tedious, trying work. On June 6, however, the monotony was broken by a bombardment of the forts. This, and the following bombardments, were more in the nature of reconnaissances than anything else, as there was no ulterior intention of forcing the entrance to the harbor. They afforded good target practice for the men, and made them utterly impervious to the enemy's fire. They also inflicted loss of life upon the foe, and, though not productive of any great injury to the forts themselves, created no little damage; but, what was more important, they put the fear of American gunnery into the hearts of the Spaniards. Without the latter moral effect it is doubtful if the close blockade could have been so admirably sustained.

In the bombardment of June 6 the attacking forces were divided into two columns; upon signal they formed in this order:

Eastern column: New York, Yankee, New Orleans, Oregon and Iowa.

Western column: Brooklyn, Marblehead, Texas and Massachusetts.

About half-past six o'clock in the morning the columns
moved slowly toward the shore. A printed battle order had been sent to all commanding officers the previous day. Each ship knew its position and what it was expected to do. Nevertheless, there was considerable delay. Both columns headed in toward Morro Castle, then changed direction, one to the eastward and one to the westward. This brought the vessels once more into a semi-circle around the harbor mouth, but with a radius of only 3,000 yards from Morro. The distance between ships was 400 yards. The *Dolphin* lay outside this semi-circle well to the eastward, and the *Suwanee* and *Vixen* to the westward, ready to pepper any troops that might be in sight. The battle order said: "The fire will be deliberate and continued until the batteries are silenced, or an order to cease firing has been made."

A nasty drizzle made the decks wet. All hands had breakfasted at 5:30, and at 6:40 "general quarters" was sounded. Still the vessels were not in position. Now, let it be known that there is no more disagreeable thing in all the world than a man-of-war which is at "general quarters" and awaiting action. Below, everything is dark and comfortless; above, all is swept and garnished; you cannot smoke, because if you did you might blow up a magazine; you cannot eat or drink, because the galley fires are out and all eatables and drinkables are safely locked away; you cannot even sit down, because you have to keep a constant eye upon the guns that any moment are likely to fire, and if you are found sitting on the side of the ship that happens, without previous warning, to engage, you will either suffer the indignity of being blown overboard or you will be horribly deafened. This, of course, is in the nature of advice to non-combatants. But to the officers and men themselves the suspense and the waiting are trying, so you can imagine that after being at "general quarters" for an hour, the tempers of all on board that morning were not improved by the delay in the completion of the formation. It was not until 7:41 A.M., that the *New York*
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opened fire on the batteries, at a range of 6,000 yards, and in a few seconds the semi-circle of ships became a crescent of smoke. Earth-clouds rose on shore as the shells exploded. The New York, leading the eastern column, drew closer to land, until she was firing at 1,900 yards’ range, which is quite close enough for the average non-combatant. However, the enemy only replied feebly, and only a few shells passed over the flagship. By 8:15 I was unable to observe any firing from the batteries, but against the rocks at the base of Morro and on the hill-tops where the hostile guns peeped over, our shells kept exploding with marvelous dirt and fire effects. Sampson ordered the firing to be more deliberate, and once or twice we thought we saw a gun dismounted. But it was uncertain guessing, and the lack of resistance made those who had been at San Juan look upon this bombardment as “tame.” There were frequent lulls in the firing so that the smoke of the guns could drift away.

Speaking personally, I lost interest in the affair after finding that when only a little over a mile away it was still utterly impossible to tell what your own guns were effecting. My interest then centred in the scenes that were occurring on the flagship itself. Once we thought we had been struck. Flag-Lieutenant Bennett—he always had his flag-bags made fast by a rope running around the forward turret to prevent their being shot or blown overboard—Ensign Mustin, and myself were standing below the forward bridge, along which, open to all fire, paced the admiral. The turret gun was fired—you never quite know your own name for a second after that happens—and our bodies were swaying with the recoil, when a shower of glass and wood came crashing down on our heads. We looked up, half expecting to see the admiral and the bridge gone forever. Instead, we saw Sampson leaning over the rail and looking down at us. “Was that a shell?” he asked, in about the same tone that he would have said “love—fifteen” had he been playing his favorite game of tennis.
We did not know at first whether it was or not; but we quickly discovered that it was only part of the chart-house that had been knocked off by the concussion of our own guns.

Another incident in connection with the admiral occurred that morning. While the smoke hung thick, Captain Chadwick, who was standing outside the conning tower just under the bridge, shouted, with his head turned upward, "Admiral!" He received no reply. "Where is the admiral?" shouted Chadwick once more. Lieutenant Roller, the New York's navigating officer, who was also on the bridge, did not know. No one seemed to know. The admiral had vanished. For a moment the suspense was intense, for a passing shell oftentimes will take a man with it, and leave no traces of him behind. Then up spoke an orderly, in the most serious voice,—"I think, sir," said the orderly, "the admiral's gone below to change his shoes." A minute later the admiral reappeared on the bridge. He had gone to put on his rain-coat, not to change his shoes; for by nine o'clock it was raining hard, and nearly all hands on deck, except the admiral, had already changed their uniforms. To one whose impressions of naval warfare were based upon pictures of Nelson or Farragut fighting in their magnificent uniforms, the sight of Admiral Sampson with an old sou'wester pulled over his head, and a black rain-coat hanging loosely over his tall figure, was somewhat of a shock, for he looked far more like a schooner-skipper than the brilliant commander-in-chief of America's most powerful fleet. Such are the realities of war!

Among the men there was little excitement during this and later bombardments. Only one side of the flagship being engaged, the officers and crews of the disengaged batteries had much opportunity for watching the shore. This they did, with comments. And, as Jackies in the American navy "don't grow into plaster saints" when they go into action, it can be imagined that any attempt to re-
produce their comments would result in considerable loss of adjectival strength. Generally, the Jackies were quite convinced that they were completely demolishing both guns and earthworks, while, as a matter of fact, and as a rule, only the earthworks and their vicinity suffered. The men on duty in the fire-rooms had hard, hot times of it during these bombardments. Occasionally one of them would "skin" up a big ventilator and take a look out through its open top. Then down he would go with the news that we were "knocking them forts to bits," wherein there would likely be a cheer from the other firemen. The large number of men not actually engaged in fighting during such bombardments as we experienced is hardly appreciated by the landsman. In addition to all the disengaged guns' crews are the gangs of men scattered throughout the ship, waiting for fires to start, machinery to break, pipes to burst, and a hundred other possible accidents, in which emergencies they have plenty to do. All the portholes are closed tight and covered with the steel "battle-ports," so that these gangs can see nothing of what is going on outside, and have more or less to grope their way along the berth deck by aid of the light of "battle-lanterns." Their work was wearisome and hot. On the New York they never had a fire to put out, and the satisfaction of an engagement to them was slight. Perhaps the hardest work of all during action falls to the lot of the men in the magazines. On the New York nearly a hundred were employed in this duty. The minute "general quarters" was sounded they went down, below the water line, into the entrails of the ship, where the magazines are. Stripped to the waist, barefooted, many with towels tied around their necks, these men sat on eight-inch or smaller shells and waited patiently for the battle to begin. Their only light was the carefully enclosed battle-lantern, casting weird shadows. Looking up through the ammunition tube one could see a faint glimmer of daylight that had struggled into the turret into which the tube opened.
When the firing actually commenced these men in the magazines became human machines, their bare, white backs bent double and their sinewy arms swinging the ponderous shells into the ammunition hoist that went groaning and creaking to the turret many feet above. Through the tube instead of daylight there now came smoke, cough-provoking, blinding, biting with the saltpetre of the booming guns. Until told to stop these men, with never a rest of their own seeking, kept the guns supplied with ammunition. In this hard service their only hope of distinction was to be blown up. When you remember that the thermometer on deck generally registered considerably over a hundred degrees of heat, you can, perhaps, imagine the thermal conditions that existed in the magazines.

This bombardment lasted for two hours and a half. At 10:15 A.M. the New York ceased firing, after expending fifty-four 8-inch, forty-two 4-inch, forty-two 6-pounder, and thirty-nine 1-pounder shells, and steamed over to the westward column, leaving the New Orleans, Yankee, and Dolphin to take some slow, careful practice at the Morro batteries, which they did until 10:50 A.M. The vessels to the westward had been almost completely hidden from our view by their own smoke, and we knew not how it had fared with them. However, no ship was struck that morning and there were no casualties on the American side.

The perfectly truthful account I have endeavored to write of this undramatic bombardment as I saw it from the New York naturally gives no idea of its effect. How different it all looked to the Spaniards can be judged from the following account written by Lieutenant Müller, whose work on the war I have already quoted:

"When the American fleet opened fire, it was so intense and the shots followed each other in such quick succession that it might have seemed like a fusillade if the mighty thunder of guns can be compared with the crackling of small arms. By nine o'clock it became somewhat slower, shortly after reaching again the same intensity, then
A BOMBARDMENT OFF SANTIAGO.

ON THE AFTER TURRET OF THE SLOWLY JULY 1898.
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decreasing once more at 10:15, and again becoming terribly intense at 10:30. At 11:02 it ceased. Punta Gorda battery fired only seven shots. During the first moments the firing was so intense that it resembled one prolonged thunder. In fact, I had no idea that any firing could be so terrific as that of those ten ships. Much has been said of the bombardments of Sebastopol and Alexandria, but I do not believe that they could have been as terrible as the bombardment we suffered that 6th day of June—a day which the inhabitants of Santiago will never forget.”

Lieutenant Müller records that the Reina Mercedes, lying nearest of all the vessels to the harbor mouth, but out of our sight, was struck in her rigging and hull by thirty-five shells, which caused the death of her second in command, Commander Emilio de Acosta y Eyermann, and five sailors, besides wounding more than eleven sailors and starting two extensive fires. The actual damage done to the forts I have no record of, though I understand that one old-fashioned gun was dismounted and the earth-works badly cut up. In addition to the loss on the Mercedes there were killed in the shore batteries three men, while five officers and forty-six men were wounded.

Upon the conclusion of this engagement Sampson briefly notified Long of what he had done, without mentioning any possible damage inflicted, and added: “If ten thousand men were here the city and fleet would be ours within forty-eight hours. Every consideration demands immediate army movement; if delayed city will be defended more strongly by guns taken from fleet.” At first sight this dispatch may seem to be inexcusably optimistic, in view of the length of time it eventually took the army to capture Santiago. In fact Sampson has been criticised for this message on the ground that it was owing to it that the army was hurried off in an unprepared condition. The reader will clearly understand that the dispatch could hardly be held responsible for the army’s premature departure, because for weeks before this Sampson, as I
have stated, had been receiving dispatches indicating that
the army was perfectly ready and only waited on the navy.
An especially good instance of this is General Shafter's
message of June 2,—five days before Sampson's urgent
cablegram was received,—in which it was stated that the
army would probably sail on June 4th. So Sampson cannot
be said to have had any hand in forcing the army to leave
before it wished to do so. The apparent optimism of the
message itself, that victory could be achieved in forty-eight
hours, is a matter for no definite criticism, because when
Sampson set such a short time limit upon the period of
joint operations he contemplated no other method of attack
than by assault of the forts at the harbor mouth, their
occupation by United States troops under cover of the
ships' guns, the subsequent speedy destruction of the mines,
and the immediate entry of the American squadron into
the harbor, which would leave both fleet and city entirely
at his mercy. As this plan of attack was never tried, it
is by no means safe to say that Sampson was altogether
too optimistic or even optimistic at all, for even in the
light of after-events it is held by many naval officers that
had the army adopted those tactics the campaign of San-
tiago would have been over in considerably less than
a week. Sampson's surmise that the forts would be
strengthened by guns from the Spanish ships proved, like
nearly all his surmises, absolutely correct.

At midnight of June 6 the Marblehead and Yankee were
sent to Guantanamo, sixty miles east of Santiago, and the
next day took possession of the outer harbor without any
difficulty. The small Spanish gunboat Sandoval, which
had previously attacked the St. Louis and Wompatuck,
now retreated, after firing a few shots, and took refuge in
the shallow waters of the inner harbor, where she lay out
of sight and safe from pursuit by heavy-draught vessels.
The St. Louis then cut the cable. Captain M. C. Goodrell,
in command of the New York's marine guard, went with
the Marblehead, and with forty marines from the Oregon
and twenty from the *Marblehead* reconnoitred ashore. In conjunction with Commander McCalla he designated the landing-place for the marines expected from Key West. The few huts at Playa del Este, the cable station at the mouth of the bay, were burned, the Spanish soldiers having quickly evacuated under fire from the ships.

On June 10 Sampson was chagrined to receive a cablegram from Assistant Secretary Allen, saying that two Spanish cruisers and a torpedo-boat destroyer had been sighted by the *Eagle* and *Resolute* in St. Nicholas Channel, and that in consequence the army expedition was temporarily stopped. "Send two of your fastest armored vessels," ordered Allen, "to scour the strait and reinforce the convoy. . . . Are you sure all of the four Spanish armored cruisers are in Santiago?"

Sampson, for various good and sufficient reasons, believed that the *Eagle* and *Resolute* were utterly mistaken. He promptly cabled to Secretary Long: "[I] have no confidence in the report of *Eagle* as to nationality or character of the vessels, and consider it very unwise to suspend operations on this account; but even if it is found correct, there is sufficient force to convoy. . . . Delay seems to me most unfortunate." Once more Sampson was correct, for it transpired that the *Eagle* and *Resolute* had sighted, instead of Spanish cruisers, the American vessels *Yosemite*, *Panther*, *Armeria*, *Scorpion*, and *Supply*, bound from Key West to Santiago. The mistake was unfortunate and caused delay to the army expedition, despite Sampson's urgent protests.

Before committing himself to a definite reply to the question as to the presence of Cervera's ships in Santiago, although it was morally certain that they were all there, Sampson asked Lieutenant-Commander Delehanty, of the *Suwanee*, to obtain up-to-date information by communicating with the insurgents. It must be remembered that Sampson, since his arrival at Santiago, had been in constant communication with insurgent officers, and they had all specifically stated that Cervera and his fleet were safely
bottled in the harbor, and Sampson himself was morally sure they had not escaped up to the 10th; but with the desire to be absolutely sure of his ground—one of his most noticeable characteristics—he again endeavored to secure verification. Delehanty detailed Lieutenant Victor Blue, of the Suwanee, to get the desired information. Blue went ashore at Asseraderos, where the Cuban General Rabí had his camp. This is fifteen miles to the westward of Santiago. At 10:30 A.M. on June 11, Blue, in uniform, accompanied by Cuban guides and mounted on a mule, started out on his adventurous trip. He passed through the Spanish lines, and on the morning of June 12 was within three miles of the harbor. From that point he saw Cervera's ships, and returned to the Suwanee on the morning of June 13, after riding seventy miles—as gallant a ride as any ever taken by a naval officer. On the 25th of June, Lieutenant Blue repeated this performance, and on this occasion not only got a good view of the harbor, but was able to plot the exact positions of Cervera's ships. For this splendid work he was warmly commended by Sampson, who recommended that he be advanced ten numbers. Secretary Long also took official notice of Blue's bravery.

While Sampson lay off Santiago holding Cervera prisoner and awaiting the arrival of the army, the first invasion of Cuba by United States forces was in progress at Guantanamo. The Panther with her 23 officers of the marine corps, one surgeon of the navy, and 623 enlisted men, all under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel R. W. Huntington, reported to Sampson on the morning of June 10. He at once sent them to Guantanamo Bay with instructions to there establish a base. Commander McCalla was entrusted with general charge of the naval operations, as Sampson himself was unwilling to leave Santiago for any cause. The battalion landed on June 10 at the site chosen by Captain Goodrell, and encamped on top of a hill near the beach, encountering no opposition. However, the next afternoon the Spanish troops, of whom there were in that vicinity about
three thousand, attacked an outpost of the marines, killing James McColgan and William Dumphy, both privates. The brush was thick around the camp, and though it had been cut away for some distance it was impossible to remove it altogether. Efforts to burn it proved futile. From the shelter of this brush the Spaniards peppered the camp all night long. Frequent sorties by the marines were of little avail, and though the Marblehead and Dolphin shelled the surrounding territory they were unable to drive the Spaniards from cover. Assistant Surgeon John Blair Gibbs, U. S. N., was shot and killed beside his tent. The next morning, June 12, Sergeant C. H. Smith met a similar fate, and several men were badly wounded. The camp site was moved and strengthened. The Spaniards were harassing the marines, and on the night of the 12th, while repelling one of these frequent attacks, Sergeant-Major Henry Good was shot down. That day sixty Cubans, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas, joined the marines. Of these Colonel Huntington said in his report: "They, being acquainted with the country and excellent woodsmen, and fearless, were of the greatest assistance." Other Cubans joined forces with the marines at a later date, and they seem to have done more satisfactory service at Guantanamo than in any other place where they co-operated with our land forces. It may be said that the Cubans at Guantanamo were well treated, and that great tact was exercised in all dealings with them. Commander McCalla was, perhaps, more than any other single individual, responsible for the perfect entente cordiale which prevailed between the Cubans and the American forces.

Until the morning of June 14 the marines were continually harassed by the Spanish attack. At times it was feared that they would have to abandon their position on the hill-top. The death list was swelled to six when Private Goode Taurman fell off the cliff and was killed. The list of wounded reached a total of twenty-two. The Spanish forces were divided, the greater part being at
Caimanera, a small garrison town about ten miles from the shore and out of reach of the ships; but around Playa del Este, which is on the eastern arm of the harbor, there was always a Spanish force numerically strong enough to have driven off the marines, had they only been possessed of military knowledge. Doubtless the presence of the ships and Commander McCalla’s evident willingness to shell the land upon the slightest provocation had much to do with the Spanish guerilla method of attack. On the morning of the 14th, tired at the perpetual sorties of the Spanish, which not only inflicted loss but kept his men in continual suspense and wore them out, Colonel Huntington despatched companies C and D, together with the sixty Cubans, to destroy a well, which lay in the hills about six miles distant from the camp. This well was said to be the only available fresh-water supply within nine miles, and without it the Spaniards would inevitably be compelled to retire to Caimanera. The expedition was suggested by the Cuban Colonel Laborde, and was in general command of the Cuban Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas. These two hundred and eleven men were soon engaged in a pitched battle with over five hundred Spaniards. From about 11 A.M. until 3 P.M. they fought their way over ridges and through brush. When the Spaniards fled in disorder they had lost about sixty, including two officers, with about one hundred and fifty wounded. One Spanish lieutenant and seventeen privates were captured. The senior officer of the marines, Captain G. F. Elliott, distinguished himself by his bravery and excellent judgment, and the men under him, though many of them were recruits, fought as only the “soldier and sailor too” can fight. Three marines were wounded, and two Cubans were killed and two wounded. Captain Elliott’s report of this fight is so interesting that I have produced it elsewhere. After the 14th of June the Spaniards ceased to harass the marines, though constant vigilance against possible attack was always maintained.

1 See Appendix, page 294.
The work done by this handful of men in a strange, brushwood country, cheek by jowl with far superior numbers of the enemy, cannot be too highly praised. That not a single death occurred from sickness during the long occupation of Playa del Este by the marines, is perhaps even more remarkable than the actual fighting they waged against the heavy odds. In short, it was a model campaign, and I am only sorry I cannot devote more space to it. The marines fought and labored with equal zeal, uncomplainingly, in the heat of the Cuban summer, in mosquito-ridden marshes, on ridges hard to climb. They were men who had never been under fire before. They often went hungry and thirsty, but never a murmur came to Sampson from these men that held the hill at Playa del Este. To my mind nothing in the naval campaign brought more credit to Sampson than this marine contingent. The London Standard at the time described the seizure of Playa del Este as a “master-stroke,” and I may add that its management in the months that followed was a “masterpiece.” The prompt seizure of the cable house and subsequent mending of the cable, by which means the navy had its own wire to Washington, was one of the many benefits secured from this occupation. To make the harbor tenable for all ships to coal and repair, Sampson, on June 15, sent the Texas and Suwanee to shell a small fort on the western arm of the harbor, the opposite side to the marine camp, and several miles inland. From this fort the Spaniards had been occasionally firing, and to complete the work of the marines it was necessary to thoroughly clear the ground of the enemy and drive them back into Caimanera. The fort was insignificant, but the attack was rendered dangerous by the knowledge that submarine mines had been laid down. With the assistance of the Marblehead, which remained at Guantanamo throughout, the Texas and Suwanee destroyed the fort. In going through the narrow channel the Marblehead picked up a contact submarine mine on her propeller, and the Texas
knocked one adrift. These instruments of destruction contained about one hundred pounds of guncotton, and were supposed to burst upon being subjected to any serious pressure. If they had fulfilled the purpose of their construction there would have been little left of the Texas and Marblehead. Why they did not burst is inexplicable, unless indeed it be as Captain Philip, of the Texas, in his report to Sampson, reverently wrote: "But owing to Divine care neither of them exploded."

After the reduction of this fort the vessels of Sampson's squadron coaled regularly at Guantanamo, and lay there whenever it was necessary to make repairs. No better spot for a base could have been desired. The depth of the outer harbor, which was well sheltered, allowed the entrance of the deepest-draught vessels; the climate was comparatively healthy, and the Spaniards never bothered any one, remaining ten miles away in Caimanera. It was useless to try to oust them without a larger force of occupation than the marines. The little gunboat Sandoval also remained at Caimanera or out of range. Commander McCalla, in view of possible attack upon the town, worked incessantly removing torpedoes from the inner channel, and great pluck was shown by the young officers of the Marblehead entrusted with this task, done in steam cutters and often under fire, for in order to reach the mines they had to go some distance inland. A constant patrol was kept for the Sandoval in case she ventured to make a night torpedo attack or an escape, but the vigilance of the young officers in the picket launches was only rewarded by an occasional opportunity of firing their one-pounders at doubtful ranges.

Let us now hark back to the operations in front of Santiago, which we left to go to Guantanamo, on June 10. That day the St. Louis arrived with the British ship Twickenham under convoy as a prize. The Twickenham had coal for Cervera, and had been hunting for the Spanish admiral all over the West Indies, when the St. Louis caught her. The Twickenham was sent into Key West as a prize.
Lieutenant Müller states that on June 9 a log boom, made of stout planks, fastened together with a steel cable, was strung across the channel of the harbor. This was to prevent the entrance of torpedo-boats or of floating torpedoes. The existence of this boom was not known to Sampson until some time later.

On the night of June 14, the dynamite cruiser Vesuvius, which had arrived off Santiago the previous day, stole close up to Morro Castle and fired three shells. The reader probably knows that a shell from the Vesuvius contains over one hundred pounds of gun-cotton which is expelled by pneumatic pressure through one of three tubes fixed in her bow. These tubes are stationary and cannot be trained, so the aiming is done by the man at the wheel, who brings the Vesuvius' head in the direction where it is desired to send the shell. Then there is a little cough, and the gun-cotton goes through the air for about a mile—the range of the vessel does not extend further than a mile and a half—drops down and explodes with terrific force. It can be imagined that any degree of accuracy in aim is almost unattainable by this method, and unless the sea be calm: the Vesuvius is practically useless. Lieutenant-Commander Pillsbury, who commanded the dynamite boat, went to no end of risk and trouble to make his awful weapons effective, but though the Vesuvius crept in several nights and coughed her three little coughs under the noses of the Spanish gunners, she accomplished practically nothing—that is to say, as far as I have been able to ascertain. Nearly all the shells exploded, and did so with deafening effect, but they do not seem to have dropped in the right places. They certainly terrified the enemy, for, after the Vesuvius first fired, the garrison in Morro never slept soundly until they had heard the explosion of her three shells, and then they knew that the remainder of the night might be spent in comparative safety, for after firing three shells it takes considerable time and trouble to recharge. No adjectives can be too strong to describe the terrific force
With Sampson Through the War

of the explosion of the amount of gun-cotton which the Vesuvius can throw. Night after night, lying four miles out, we would see the Vesuvius passing us on her way to the inner blockade. Soon her low lines—she is built like a torpedo-boat destroyer—would disappear in the darkness, and we would hear nothing more until a roar ashore, and perhaps a flash and a great earth-cloud rising up black against the blackest night, told us that the Vesuvius had fired her first shell. Then followed two more roars, and generally clouds. A few minutes later the Vesuvius would be backing around the New York—she is so built that she has hard work to turn inside of half a mile, and finds it easier to back—and the cheery voice of Pillsbury would be heard asking, through the megaphone, if there was anything more for him to do that night. Against a town, or against huge fortifications that cover a large area, the Vesuvius would be invaluable, but her effectiveness against a few scattered guns or hidden ships is very problematical, at any rate until some better device of aiming is attained. Her short range is also a great drawback. Her shells frequently fell near the guns and made huge excavations in the earth, but to dismount the gun itself they had to fall nearer than they did.

On the occasion of her first test in actual warfare, this night of June 14, the Vesuvius “tried her luck” at firing over the hill into the channel, on the chance of hitting one of the torpedo-boat destroyers or the Reina Mercedes, known to be lying near the harbor mouth. How near she came to doing this, is told in the diary of the late Frederick W. Ramsden, then British consul at Santiago, who wrote: "An officer of the Pluton [torpedo-boat destroyer] told me last night that a big shell, which looked like a comet as it came, somewhat slowly, through the air, fell near them between Smith Cay and then came travelling in the water by means of a screw, and burst just in front of their ship. He says had theirs been a heavy ship it would have burst it up, but the little Pluton, which only draws seven and a
half feet, was just lifted out of the water, and every one on board was thrown off his feet, but no one really hurt. The water round was strewn with dead fish, and the concussion was also felt by the *Mercedes*, which was behind the *Pluton*. He says it was a dynamite shell from the pneumatic gun of the *Vesuvius*.” One officer and six men were wounded in the Socapa battery by this first attempt of the *Vesuvius*.

On the morning of June 15, the *New Orleans* was sent in to attack the eastern batteries. She fired with apparently excellent aim, as well as one could judge from the earth-clouds. After about twenty minutes she was signalled to return to her blockading station.

The following morning, June 16, there was another general bombardment of the forts. The ships assumed the same semi-circular formation that they took on June 6, and steamed in to within three thousand yards of the shore. Sampson had ordered that in all guns of 8-inch and larger calibre reduced charges should be used. By reducing the velocity it was expected to increase the angle of fall of the projectiles. Sampson also said in this battle order that the Spaniards had apparently been adding to the defences and that to discourage this was the object of the bombardment. The eastern column was composed on this occasion of the *New York, New Orleans, Oregon*, and *Iowa*, and the western column of the *Brooklyn, Texas*, and *Massachusetts*. The *Vixen* and *Scorpion* were detailed to keep a lookout for musketry fire from the shore on the west and east flanks respectively. The *Vesuvius* and *Porter* remained to the eastward out of range. The engagement commenced at 5:24 A.M. and only lasted about an hour, the last shot being fired about half-past six o’clock. The return fire from the enemy was slight, and when the fleet drew off there were no shots coming from the batteries. This bombardment was in nearly all respects similar to one I have described on June 6, except that it was shorter and perhaps less exciting. No ships were struck, and there were no casualties. The
admiral, on this occasion, was particularly anxious to have slow and accurate firing. Frequently he leaned over the bridge and asked, “Can the men see the guns?” meaning that he wished the gun captains to fire, not at the batteries, but at the guns themselves. As the New York that morning went within two hundred yards of the shore and within about fifteen hundred yards from Morro Castle the men had every chance to aim. The New Orleans, with her smokeless powder and heavy rapid-fire guns, did some excellent shooting, and Sampson signalled, “Well done, New Orleans,” which evoked a wild cheer from the crew of that ship. Several vessels continued firing in a desultory way after 6:30, and a shot from the Texas seemed to create a large explosion ashore, but as to what the bombardment of the 16th effected I quote from Lieutenant Müller, who writes:

“At 6:15 Punta Gorda commenced firing, but stopped shortly after. The greater part of the projectiles dropped close to the Spanish fleet. . . . It was afterward learned that a fragment of a shell had caused a slight injury to the starboard gallery (of the Maria Teresa). . . . At 6:40 Punta Gorda again opened fire; ten shots. . . . At the Morro battery a gunner had been killed and an officer and five soldiers wounded; at Socapa (battery) two sailors had been killed and four sailors and Ensign Broquetas wounded . . . and one of the Hontoria guns had been put out of action by débris obstructing it, but the enemy had not succeeded in dismounting a single gun. . . . The débris was removed from the Hontoria gun, which was again made ready for firing.” (The official Spanish list of casualties gives three killed, and two officers and sixteen men wounded.)

Of the conditions that then existed in the city of Santiago, Lieutenant Müller writes: “Horses and dogs were dying before our eyes. Carriages stopped going about for want of horses, which the scavenger carried off at night, and gradually the city acquired that stamp of sadness and
The Blockade of Santiago

absence of life which is seen in places into which cholera and plagues carry sorrow and death. The situation became more serious every day, and the discouragement general, for every one knew that, if the blockade should continue, the ruin of the city was imminent."

On the afternoon of the 16th, after the bombardment, divers were lowered over the side of the New York, while she lay on her blockade station. They leisurely set to work cleaning the "strainer," an outlet from the cylinder, that had become somewhat choked with sea-growth. As Captain Paget, the British naval attaché, remarked regarding the entire blockade, "What d—d impertinence!" Against any other European power than Spain it would have been, but when opposed by Sampson's aggression the Spaniards seemed to lose all power of assuming the initiative, and the "impertinence" was simply based upon a careful estimate of their desire to fight, or rather their lack of ability and desire not to do so.

On the morning of June 11 two steam cutters, one from the New York in charge of Naval Cadet Powell, the other from the Massachusetts in charge of Naval Cadet Hart, and both under command of Lieutenant Charles H. Harlow, of the Vixen, proceeded, about five o'clock, to Cabanas Bay, west of the harbor, to examine the facilities there for landing troops. After passing in Spanish infantrymen from the fort and brush opened fire on them at short range. The launches gallantly replied with their one-pounders and rifles, but the fire was so hot and so close that they had to beat a hasty retreat. The Texas and Vixen came steaming up, and with their heavier guns covered the retreat of the reconnoitring party and quickly dispersed the Spanish. That no one was killed on this occasion was almost a miracle, for the launches were full of bullet-holes and the Spaniards fired at a range of about fifty yards.

During all this long wait off Santiago constant communication was maintained with the Cubans at Asseraderos. The Suwance did excellent work landing arms and
ammunition for the insurgents, and Sampson was kept thoroughly informed of the enemy's condition. On June 19 Calixto Garcia, the late Cuban general, then in command of the insurgent forces in eastern Cuba, and who had marched from Holguin, on the north side, to Asseraderos, with four thousand troops, visited Sampson on the New York. A conference regarding projected co-operation with the army was held. Garcia created a most favorable impression upon Sampson.

The weather at this time and until the end of the campaign was good. No storms occurred, and the sea was generally smooth enough to allow coaling from one of the several steam colliers that now lay around Santiago. However, the work of coaling was usually performed after this at Guantanamo. On the 18th Sampson left the blockade for the better part of the day to inspect the new base, and there found the marines in excellent condition. In the bay the Iowa and Yankee lay coaling placidly, while the other vessels at Guantanamo were the Marblehead, Dolphin, Panther, Armeria, hospital ship Solace, and three colliers, all as comfortable as if at Hampton Roads.

On June 20 the long-expected arrival of United States troops occurred. There were about sixteen thousand under command of Major-General W. R. Shafter. They had sailed from Port Tampa, Fla., on June 14, in thirty-seven transport vessels, specially chartered for that purpose, and which ranged in description from old side-wheelers to comfortable West Indian liners. They were convoyed by the Indiana, Detroit, Annapolis, Wilmington, Castine, Helena, Bancroft, Manning, Osceola, Wasp, Hornet, Eagle, Wompatuck, and torpedo-boats Rodgers, Ericsson and Dupont. Captain H. O. Taylor, commanding the Indiana, was in charge of the convoy, and brought his large and mixed fleet around, in excellent order, at about six knots an hour and without especial incident, though the transports, with their merchant skippers, were hard to keep in line and a somewhat difficult proposition for the well-trained naval
mind to master. Captain Chadwick, in his capacity of chief of staff to Sampson—and he was unremitting in his labors, and invaluable as an adviser—went out in the Gloucester and greeted General Shafter. A few hours later, Sampson and Lieutenant Staunton joined Chadwick on the Segurança, Shafter’s headquarters ship, and a long conference was held. The Segurança then steamed to Asseraderos, and there General Garcia was met on shore.

This conference has an important and somewhat disputed bearing upon the subsequent co-operation of the Navy and Army, and I would direct the reader’s careful attention to what actually transpired. The conference was held in General Garcia’s tent. Those who took part in it were Major-General Shafter and several members of his staff, including General Ludlow and Lieutenant Miley, representing the army; Rear-Admiral Sampson and Lieutenant Staunton, representing the navy, and Major-Generals Garcia and Rabi and Brigadier-General Castillo, representing the Cuban insurgents. The conference lasted about an hour and a half. The conversation at first was chiefly devoted to the details of landing the troops. It was decided that Daiquiri, a small harbor about twelve miles to the eastward of the Morro, should be the place of debarkation. As the conference was drawing to a close, General Shafter, with the map of Santiago stretched across his knees, speaking impressively, said to General Garcia:

“My object, General, is to land my troops and occupy these forts at the entrance to the harbor, in order that the navy boats can lift the mines and let their ships get in and attack Cervera’s squadron.”

The italics are my own. General Shafter said this as if summing up clearly and concisely the result of the conference. He made the statement without qualification or alternative. Enunciation of his plan of campaign at the time created no comment; because the capture of the forts at the mouth of the harbor and the subsequent entry by the navy was presumed, by all naval officers, to be the
only conceivable reason for Shafter’s presence at Santiago. To Captain Chadwick, while on the Segurancía previous to the Garcia-Sampson conference, General Shafter had emphasized to even greater extent his intention of attacking the forts. Everything naval officers heard General Shafter say convinced them in their belief that he would at once proceed to capture the forts. The object was to destroy Cervera; the city was a secondary object; its capture of doubtful value, and practically impossible, so long as Cervera’s fleet remained in the harbor.

I cannot lay too much stress upon these facts, because they subsequently caused a lamentable lack of co-operation between the navy and army, and came within an ace of bringing upon our gallant soldiers a most serious reverse, the effects of which can scarcely be estimated. The mere fact that the Santiago campaign on land eventually ended satisfactorily by no means justifies the omission of this remarkable blunder from an account of the military operations; and, that the campaign did so terminate in such a short space of time is due, in my opinion, first to the mistake of the Spaniards in sending Cervera’s ships out of the harbor, and secondly to the indomitable courage displayed by the rank and file of the American army, who, despite generalship, surmounted all obstacles.

After peace was declared I asked General Shafter to explain why he had not followed out his original plan of campaign, or, at the least, why he had not informed the navy of his change of intentions. He replied that his plans were never changed; that he did not contemplate taking the forts, and that during the conferences on June 20 he had fully discussed the capture of the city by the army. He expressed surprise at hearing that for days the ships of Sampson’s squadron had expected him to appear on the coast and attack the forts, and declared that such a mode of procedure had never been agreed upon between himself and Sampson. General Shafter further said that a memorandum taken for the benefit of the navy during
the conference in Garcia’s tent would fully prove his assertions.

The memorandum referred to flatly contradicts General Shafter. If he said anything regarding an inland campaign and the capture of the city by the army, as a main objective, his remarks were not heard by any naval officers.

Sampson and his staff returned to the New York, and the transports lay well off the harbor. A remarkably able order for the naval part in the debarking of troops was drawn up, and to Captain Goodrich, of the St. Louis, was delegated the full charge of the operations. From frequent conversations with Sampson and his staff at this period, when it must be remembered that absolutely no question had arisen as to Shafter’s intentions, I know positively that they never for a moment doubted that Shafter was to attack the harbor-mouth forts. They discussed the probable assistance required from the navy in this task, and all movements of the many vessels now under Sampson’s control were regulated upon the implicit, unquestioned expectation of a speedy capture of the forts. The only inference I can draw is that in the excitement of after events General Shafter must have forgotten the unequivocal and categorical statements he was understood to make in Garcia’s tent and elsewhere.

On June 21 cable communication with the United States was established at Playa del Este. On June 22 the army was landed by the navy. Sampson received a short note from Shafter, saying, “It is my intention to proceed from Daiquiri to Santiago as rapidly as I can.” This was taken to mean the forts of Santiago, not only on account of the previous conversations and impressions, but because Shafter, in this note, added: “I request you to keep in touch during the advance, and be prepared to receive any message I may wish to transmit from along the bluffs,” and it was along these bluffs that lead along the shore to the forts that the navy thoroughly expected to see the army advance under cover of the heavy fire from a strong fleet.
The landing of the sixteen thousand troops was an operation that really deserves more mention than I can afford. To mislead the enemy Sampson had ordered feints to be made all along the coast. About six o'clock in the morning the *Texas* and *Vixen* opened fire upon the small fort at Cabanas, to the westward of Santiago harbor. Several transports had been ordered to come up in the rear, as if waiting to land, but they failed to put in an appearance. The Socapa battery opened on the *Texas*, while that vessel lay feinting off Cabanas. The *Texas* immediately engaged the more worthy antagonist, and there followed the most spectacular duel of the war. With wonderful accuracy, and while at rather an awkward angle the *Texas*, dropped shell after shell from her 12-inch guns on to the thin red line of dirt that alone marked the Socapa battery. The enemy's shells dropped wildly in the water until, by bad luck, one struck the *Texas*. Frank J. Blakeley, an apprentice, was killed and eight men were wounded. These were the only casualties that occurred on the American side during any bombardment off Santiago.

While the *Texas* engaged the enemy's attention to the westward there were three busy bombardments in progress to the eastward of the harbor. At Aguadores, where there were a blockhouse and railroad bridge, the *Eagle* and *Gloucester* banged away at the shore; at Siboney, between Aguadores and Daiquiri, the *Annapolis*, *Hornet*, *Helena*, and *Bancroft* peppered the hills and drove the Spaniards into the brush, while at Daiquiri itself the *Detroit*, *Cassine*, *Wasp*, *New Orleans*, *Scorpion*, *Wompatuck*, and *Suwanee* cleared the projected landing-place of all signs of life and with their shells started fires blazing in the little village. During all these minor actions, except that of the *Texas*, the enemy made scarcely any resistance. The vessels went so close into shore and poured such a hot fire into any sign of troops, that after firing a few volleys the Spaniards were glad to retreat to the cover of the hills. The surprise subsequently expressed by some army officers
at finding no Spaniards to oppose their landing is somewhat ingenuous when it is remembered that for about three hours that morning the navy attacked the Spanish in four different places, and drove them back into the hills. The Spanish official list of casualties gives one killed and thirteen wounded by these bombardments.

By nine o’clock it was considered safe for the army to land, and the transports were brought nearer to the beach. This was done after great persuasion and often by threats, the merchant skippers disliking the supposed risks. Fifty-two boats of all descriptions and a number of officers, mostly ensigns and cadets, had been detailed from the fleet to help the army ashore. A heavy swell and a nasty surf made the work difficult, but by 6 P.M. six thousand troops had been put on the beach without accident. This number might have been considerably increased had it been feasible to get the transports within reasonable distance of the shore. On the 23d troops were also landed at Siboney, and by the evening of the 26th the army was all ashore, with a large quantity of ammunition and supplies. In the report of these operations, Captain Goodrich warmly commends Lieutenant F. K. Hill, of the Iowa, who was beachmaster, Ensign Charles L. Hussey, of the Oregon, Ensign Fred R. Payne, of the St. Louis, Naval Cadet O. G. Murfin, of the Iowa, and Naval Cadet Thomas C. Hart, of the Vixen. These and other officers worked day and night, ever on the go, living and sleeping on the restless, tossing launches, and eating where and what they could. In a report, dated June 27, Sampson wrote to Long as follows: "General Shafter has been most kind in his recognition of the aid afforded by the fleet, all of our boats, with several hundred officers and men, assisting during this period in the work. General Shafter, in his telegram to the War Department, states that the aid given him by the navy was enthusiastic, and also that he thinks he could not have effected the landing without its aid in ten days, if at all."
The following communication to Secretary Long thus becomes absurdly interesting in this connection:

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C., May 31, 1898.

Sir: In answer to your inquiry of this date as to what means are to be employed by the War Department for landing troops, etc., I beg to reply that the major-general commanding the expedition will land his own troops. All that is required of the Navy is to convoy and protect with the guns of the convoy while the military forces are landed.

Very respectfully,

R. A. ALGER,
Secretary of War.

The especial point about this debarkation is that while the army was utterly unprepared with sufficient or effective boats, and utterly inexperienced in all matters connected with the sea, they were technically supposed to land themselves, and, officially speaking, did so, because that is military regulations. There is not the slightest doubt that the transportation, embarkation, and disembarkation of troops should be entrusted to the Navy Department, instead of being, as it is at present, in the hands of the War Department. The British navy has for years successfully managed all such operations. The United States Navy will always have to do the work, as it was at Santiago, and the sooner the control is given into its hands the better it will be for both navy and army.

As soon as the safe landing of the army was assured, Sampson distributed the convoy vessels, retaining the Indiana and the torpedo-boats. The strong guard required by the transports had greatly weakened the blockade of north and southwestern Cuba. The Detroit, Helena, Yankton, and Eagle were sent to Cienfuegos to join the Yankee and Hist; the Hornet and Osceola to join the Dixie, off Cape Cruz, and the Dolphin, Castine, Manning, Annapolis, Wasp, and Bancroft to reinforce the blockade.
of Havana. Thus there were left off Santiago on watch for Cervera, and to help the army, the New York, Brooklyn, Iowa, Indiana, Oregon, Massachusetts, Texas, New Orleans, Scorpion, Gloucester, Vixen, Suwanee, Vesuvius, and Wompatuck. The New Orleans shortly afterward went to Key West for repairs. Besides the vessels mentioned as being at Cape Cruz and Cienfuegos there were about thirty considered available for the blockade of the north coast, the most powerful of which were the monitors Puritan, Terror, Miantonomoh, and Amphitrite, the cruisers Montgomery, Mayflower, Nashville, Annapolis, and similar ships, with a number of converted yachts and tugs. At San Juan, Porto Rico, were the St. Paul and Yosemite. Sampson cabled Long that the blockade, even with all these vessels on their stations, was weak, considering the large territory to be guarded; and when Sampson received a message on June 24, telling him to prepare to convoy twenty-five thousand troops to Porto Rico, he failed to see how it could be done without almost nullifying the efficiency of the blockade at some points. On top of this came a despatch telling Sampson to immediately prepare the Iowa, Oregon, Newark, Dixie, Yankee and Yosemite for a trip to the East, via Spain. The Eastern squadron’s inception was due to the fact that on June 15 the Spanish Admiral Camara, with the Carlos V. and Pelayo, and several cruisers and torpedo-boats, sailed from Cadiz. This second Spanish fleet arrived at Port Said on June 26 and was apparently bound for Manila, where it might have caused Rear-Admiral Dewey some annoyance. It was for the purpose of following Camara that the Navy Department ordered the formation of the Eastern squadron.

Sampson, fearing that despite all protests he might be compelled to weaken his forces off Santiago and thus leave the result of the main objective a matter of doubt instead of certainty, prepared to attack Cervera with torpedo-boats. In this connection he cabled Long on June 26:

“Channel was not obstructed by Merrimac, and we must
be prepared to meet the Spanish fleet if they attempt to escape. I am preparing torpedo attack in order to hasten their destruction. Regret to resort to this method because of its difficulties and small chance of success, torpedo-boats being subject to small arms and rapid-fire guns from the shore for a long distance. I should not do this were present force to be kept here, as it now insures a capture which I believe will terminate the war."

Once more the Navy Department showed its splendid judgment by granting Sampson's request and allowing him to retain the Oregon and Iowa for the time being. Had not Sampson's protest been listened to, what a chapter in naval history would have been lost, and how different might have been the conclusion of the campaign! The torpedo-boat plan was thus laid aside, not only because the force was not to be diminished, but because the torpedo-boat commanders, whom Sampson consulted in the matter, discovered the existence of the log boom across the harbor mouth and came to the conclusion that their boats would not be able to get past this obstruction. The Navy Department's intense desire to hurry a fleet to the Philippines was mentioned in one or two subsequent despatches, prior to the coming out of Cervera, and it was only Sampson's indomitable singleness of purpose that enabled him to overcome the pressure of his superiors and to keep the Santiago fleet intact.

While speaking of the disposition of the blockading vessels it may be well to note that on June 21 the Navy Department had effected various changes. The North Atlantic squadron had already become the North Atlantic fleet, with acting Rear-Admiral Sampson as commander-in-chief. His actual rank was still only that of captain. His second in command was Commodore J. A. Howell, who on July 1 was transferred from the defunct Patrol Squadron and assumed the command of the first North Atlantic squadron, relieving Commodore J. C. Watson (junior to Howell), who had been detached to take com-
mand of the Eastern squadron, which Long was so anxious to get started after Camara. Watson’s previous squadron had been termed the blockading squadron, and its duties—the blockade of northern Cuba—were assumed by the first North Atlantic. Fourth in command, being ranked by Howell and Watson, came Commodore Schley, whose Flying Squadron went out of official existence June 21 and who was then assigned to the second North Atlantic squadron. As all his vessels were under the personal supervision of the commander-in-chief, he had practically no duties to perform, and his retention at Santiago by the Navy Department has been somewhat criticised. He was, as a matter of fact, little more than an extra captain of his flagship, the Brooklyn. During the month in front of Santiago the relations between Sampson and Schley were of a cordial nature. Whenever a conference was held Schley came over to the New York, and once or twice visited the admiral when there was no conference; but he took no more active or important part in the councils than did the captains of the vessels. Through ignorance regarding naval matters some writers in the newspapers gave to the public the impression that Schley was in joint command with Sampson, using frequently the term, “the squadrons of Sampson and Schley.” This, of course, was wrong. At the naval base in Key West Commodore Remey was still in command. Thus four commodores were placed under the command of a captain, a curious order of things, but one which I believe the commodores themselves had no objection to, and which the country and the Navy Department never had occasion to regret.

The operations carried on by the vessels on the south-western coast of Cuba have been described for me in another chapter by Commander Todd, who during a considerable period was the senior officer present. While the heavier vessels lay off Santiago and Havana, the smaller vessels were scattered around Cuba, performing, especially off the southwest, hard and often brilliant service, and
though there was less said about it, and though it was less important in results, it was just as gallant as the work upon which the attention of the world was centred.

The death of a naval officer and the illness of another occurred in June. Lieutenant-Commander Edward W. Sturdy died at Key West on June 6 from apoplexy, on board the tug he commanded, the *Pompey*. Commander Miller, formerly of the *Merrimac*, succeeded Sturdy. Captain P. F. Harrington, who up to the beginning of June commanded the monitor *Puritan*, was worn out by sickness and strain and had to go North. Captain Frederick Rodgers succeeded him, resigning the presidency of the Naval Auxiliary Cruiser Board to do so. Captain Rodgers was succeeded in this office by Lieutenant-Commander J. D. Kelley. This board was dissolved June 30. Another death, not absolutely in action, occurred when Gustav Weineck, a landsman, of the *New York*, was killed on June 26. The flagship was coaling on her blockade station off Santiago from the collier *Alexander*. Weineck, who had been with a gang aboard that vessel, tried to jump back to his own ship. The flagship lurched, and Weineck, instead of landing on the deck, fell between the two vessels. His body was not recovered.

Off San Juan, Porto Rico, the *St. Paul* on June 22 had an exciting brush with the Spanish torpedo-boat *Terror*. The former American liner was blockading the port as well as one ship could do so, when, early in the afternoon, in fair, bright weather, the *Terror*, which had gone from Martinique to San Juan, was seen coming out toward Captain Sigsbee's big vessel. The *St. Paul* opened fire when the *Terror* was 5,400 yards away, to which the *Terror* replied, but as her guns are not calculated to carry much more than half that distance, it is hardly surprising that the *St. Paul* was not hit. A short exchange of shots followed, and the *Terror*, after her insane attempt, limped back into the harbor. She had been hit once, and the shell had wrecked her starboard engine, killing the chief and
assistant engineer and three men, and wounding seven. She was only saved from sinking by being run on a shoal in the harbor. The small Spanish cruiser *Isabel II.* hovered around the harbor mouth while the *Terror* attacked the *St. Paul,* but did not join in the fray.

From June 22, the day the army commenced landing, until July 1, the powerful fleet, that could have cleared the hills of Spanish forces several miles in the army's advance, lay practically idle off Santiago, waiting patiently for something to turn up. The *Vesuvius* fired a few shells, and, according to Lieutenant Müller, on the night of June 25 damaged Morro Castle, wrecked the lighthouse keeper's dwelling, and wounded three sailors and one soldier. The *Vesuvius* again did damage, for, according to Consul Ramsden, in the early morning of the 27th one of her shells wounded three more men. But this was not her object. The *Gloucester* and *Scorpion* intermittently bombarded Aguadores, firing at a head whenever they saw it, under the impression that the army would advance through Aguadores. Of the army the navy knew little, except that they were fighting inland. However, all supposed that this advance upon the city of Santiago was merely a clever feint by Shafter, and that any day his flank might be thrown out on the coast and the attack made on the batteries, or possibly be made from the rear. As Shafter failed to say anything to Sampson regarding a change of plans, the latter naturally took this view of the situation, and, though he regretted the delay, waited patiently until Shafter needed his assistance. Not much light was thrown upon the co-operation when on June 30 Sampson received a note from Shafter, in which the latter said he was going to attack Santiago the following day, and asked Sampson to bombard Aguadores in support of a regiment of infantry and to make a demonstration at the mouth of the harbor, so as to keep as many as possible of the enemy there. Then it began to dawn upon the navy that Shafter was not feinting inland, but was going to try to capture the city.
How he was going to do so under the guns of Cervera was past all understanding. However, on July 1, at six o'clock in the morning, the New York, Suwanee, and Gloucester bombarded Aguadores, and Brigadier-General Duffield and a Michigan regiment apparently attempted to cross the inlet at Aguadores, but after losing two men returned to Siboney by the railroad train in which they had arrived. The Spaniards had only a small force in that vicinity, and it was rather discouraging, after pouring so many shells into the gully, to see the troops retire. It was learned afterward, however, to have been merely a feint on the part of General Duffield, and he was not really desired to occupy the hill on the other side of the gully. On this occasion the Suwanee performed the most remarkable bit of target practice witnessed during the naval campaign. After “cease firing” had been signalled, the Suwanee asked permission to knock down a Spanish flag that floated from the tower of an old, picturesque castellated fort, which had been almost knocked to bits by frequent bombardment, and was now deserted by the Spanish. Many gunners had tried to hit that flag, but it still flew proudly in the breeze. In answer to Lieutenant-Commander Delehanty’s request Sampson signalled: “You can have three shots.” The Suwanee was 1,300 yards from the shore. Lieutenant Blue sighted a 4-inch gun, and fired. When the smoke cleared away it was seen that the shell had passed through the bunting and torn out the yellow strip. The watching crews yelled with delight. The flagstaff was bent forward, but had not fallen. Delehanty was not satisfied, and Blue fired another shot. It struck at the base of the flag-pole, and made it droop still more. Amid intense excitement Blue fired his last shot. A cloud of earth and stone and dust rose on the old castle, and when it cleared away the flag of Spain had fallen. It was a glorious moment for the Suwanee, for all hands on the other ships cheered her till the cliffs rang again. I know of no more breathless excitement during the whole war.
The Blockade of Santiago

than was experienced while waiting for the smoke of that last shot to clear away; it was better than the best finish to any race ever run.

After this unsatisfactory co-operation with the army at Aguadores the New York and Oregon fired a number of 8-inch shells over the bluff at Aguadores in the direction of the hidden city. The vessels fired by the compass, and were quite unable to tell how the shells fell, but it was afterward learned that they did considerable damage to property, though causing no loss of life.

On the morning of the following day, that is, on July 2, the forts of Santiago were once more bombarded by Sampson's ships. This was done at Shafter's request. He said he would assault the city at daylight, and asked for the bombardment as a diversion, stating as an additional reason that 6-inch guns from the forts were annoying his troops. Sampson knew that none of the guns in the forts would bear inland, and told General Shafter that he was mistaken. However, the bombardment took place. The assault on the city did not. The bombardment lasted from 5:49 A.M. until 7:45 A.M., and was like the previous actions against the forts in most particulars. The enemy's gunners were soon driven from the batteries, and the squadron drew closer than ever before. Morro Castle was punished severely. Hitherto this historic pile had escaped, because Hobson and his men were known to be within its walls, but now they had been taken up to the city. A heavy fire was also directed against the Punta Gorda battery. The vessels taking part in this engagement were the New York, Brooklyn, Iowa, Oregon, Indiana, Massachusetts, Texas, Newark, Gloucester, Vixen, and Suwanee, the strongest force yet gathered in front of Santiago. None of the ships was hit. One man was killed in the Morro battery, thirty-two were wounded, and two Hontoria guns were dismounted.

Sampson then received this message from Shafter:

"Terrible fight yesterday, but my line is now strongly
entrenched about three-quarters mile from town. I urge that you make effort immediately to force the entrance, to avoid future losses among my men, which are already very heavy. You can now operate with less loss of life than I can. Please telephone answer.”

Lieutenant Staunton went ashore after the bombardment and telephoned this message from Sampson to Shafter:

“Admiral Sampson has this morning bombarded the forts at the entrance of Santiago and also Punta Gorda battery inside, silencing their fire. Do you wish further firing on his part? He began at 5:30, finished at 7:30. Impossible to force entrance until we can clear channel of mines—a work of some time—after forts are taken possession of by your troops. Nothing in this direction accomplished yesterday by the advance on Aguadores.”

General Shafter replied as follows:

“It is impossible for me to say when I can take batteries at entrance to harbor. If they are as difficult to take as those which we have been pitted against, it will be some time and a great loss of life. I am at a loss to see why the navy cannot work as well under a destructive fire as well as the army. My loss yesterday was over five hundred men. By all means keep up fire on everything in sight of you until demolished. I expect, however, in time, and sufficient men, to capture the forts along the bay.”

Thus it was at last discovered that Shafter, without saying anything in explanation, had changed all the plans of attack as he himself enunciated them to Sampson and his staff. And having done so he found himself confronted with terrible difficulties, and, in fact, had asked his superiors in Washington for permission to temporarily withdraw his forces, which had been promptly refused. Now, General Shafter appealed for the co-operation he had deliberately put out of his reach by going inland, and in the same breath cast an implied slur upon the navy. Not only had he got the army into a serious predicament, but he had not furthered one iota the main object of his presence in Cuba,
The Blockade of Santiago

i.e., the destruction of Cervera's fleet. From his messages he had evidently forgotten all about that, and now the navy was to be turned from an aggressive force into a defensive, rescuing agent for our own troops. It was only that morning, July 2, through these messages from Shafter that Sampson realized the seriousness of the situation: that the arrival of the army had added to his difficulties instead of aiding him in the destruction of the enemy, and that he now had to wage the campaign against Cervera upon the premises that we had no troops in Cuba. He wrote Shafter this calm, masterly letter:

July 2, 1898.

"My Dear General:—I have your note of this morning; just received at 11:30.

2. An officer of my staff has already reported to you the firing which we did this morning; but I must say, in addition to what he told you, that the forts which we silenced were not the forts which would give you any inconvenience in capturing the city, as they cannot fire except to seaward. They cannot even prevent our entrance into the harbor of Santiago. Our trouble from the first has been that the channel to the harbor is well strewn with observation mines, which would certainly result in the sinking of one or more of our ships if we attempted to enter the harbor; and by the sinking of a ship the object of the attempt to enter the harbor would be defeated, by the prevention of further progress on our part.

3. It is my hope that an attack, on your part, on these shore batteries from the rear would leave us at liberty to drag the channel for torpedoes.

4. If it is your earnest desire that we should force our entrance, I will at once prepare to undertake it. I think, however, that our position and yours would be made more difficult, if, as is possible, we fail in our attempt.

5. We have in our outfit at Guantanamo forty countermine mines, which I will bring here with as little
delay as possible, and if we can succeed in freeing the entrance of mines by their use, I will enter the harbor.

"6. This work, which is unfamiliar to us, will require considerable time.

"7. It is not so much the loss of men as it is the loss of ships, which has, until now, deterred me from making a direct attack upon the ships within the port.

"Very truly,

"W. T. Sampson."

Countermines were ordered and plans were drawn up for a daring assault against the land batteries by the handful of marines and sailors that could be recruited from the ships. These were the conditions that confronted the fleet off Santiago on the night of July 2.
CHAPTER VIII.

THE BATTLE OF JULY THIRD.

SUNDAY morning, July 3, d awned clear and hot. A fair, light, northwest breeze rippled a smooth sea. The blockading vessels lay idly off the harbor of Santiago, waiting patiently, as they had waited thirty-three days, for the coming of the Spanish fleet, penned up within. No signs but those of peaceful inaction marked shore and sea.

Day by day the hope that Cervera would dash out had been growing fainter and fainter. And this morning the consensus of opinion was that the end of all this weary waiting would only come when Cervera, desperate, should blow up his own ships inside the harbor, and thus to some extent cheat the blockaders of their prey. The American army, in its now precarious position, was a matter of more anxiety than the doomed Spanish fleet. To discuss the best way the navy could help the army in its plight Sampson had agreed to a personal conference with General Shafter at the latter's headquarters, several miles inland. Captain Chadwick had visited Shafter the previous day; but the situation, as I have shown in the preceding chapter, was so serious that Sampson must needs talk with Shafter personally. Shafter could not go to Sampson—he was laid up with the fever—so Sampson, though he disliked to do so, decided to leave his forces and go to Shafter.

At ten minutes to nine o'clock that morning the signal "Disregard movements of commander-in-chief," was run up and the New York steamed slowly to the eastward, for Sampson was to land at Siboney. This signal did not mean that Sampson in any way relinquished his command; it
merely signified that the movements of his flagship, the *New York*, were not to be taken by the other vessels as indicating any projected squadron operation.

Rear-Admiral Sampson stood on the quarterdeck of the *New York* as that vessel neared the brown hills of Siboney, wearing his leggings, and all ready for the long, hot ride that lay before him. He was not in very good health, and was well-nigh worn out with the tremendous strain of the past month. He held himself personally responsible for the destruction of every ship inside that harbor, and the Navy Department appeared to take a similar view. Night after night the commander-in-chief had paced up and down the heated deck peering through the darkness at the illuminated Morro, watching intently and often correcting the movements of his blockading vessels, almost invisible to the landsman—no quartermaster had a keener eye than Sampson. The physical and mental strain of that tremendous responsibility had confined him once or twice to his bed, much against his will. The intensity of his single purpose can hardly be described in words, and the benefits the fleet

1 The “disregard” signal on this, and on the numerous other occasions that it was made, never, either in fact or theory, prevented the commander-in-chief from following it up, either soon afterward or long afterward, with other signalled orders. While Sampson was on his way to Siboney, and after he had sent the “disregard” signal, he might have signalled for the *Brooklyn* to follow the *New York*, and that vessel would have done so without affecting the movements of the ships still left on the blockade line and without affecting the status of command.

The advisability of taking the *New York*, a strong armored cruiser, from the specified blockade line simply for the purpose of landing Sampson at Siboney has been somewhat discussed. As a matter of fact, though the *New York* left her fixed position on the line she was never withdrawn from the blockade, and had Cervera gone eastward instead of westward the *New York*, by her moving, would have been in far better position to fight than when on her regular station. The fixed blockade line was only a theoretical disposition of vessels by which it was hoped that the greatest force could be most quickly concentrated in any direction, and as Sampson himself later wrote: “No distribution of the fleet could completely predict and provide against every variation of such a sortie as Cervera’s.”

I may add, though not in any way as palliation, that the trip in question was too long to take in a steam launch. However, even if the flagship had
The Battle of July Third

derived from it can never be overestimated, but the physi­
que of the man himself had to pay dearly for it.

Sampson took his long spyglass and glanced at the sun­
lit blockade. There lay, nearest the New York, and to
the westward of the harbor, the little Gloucester, then
came the Indiana and the Oregon, while in the centre of
the semi-circle was the Iowa, directly facing the entrance.
Along the eastern arc were the Texas, Brooklyn, and the
small Vixen. The Massachusetts and Suwanee had gone
to Guantanamo before dawn to coal. Lying near the In­
diana was the unprotected auxiliary Resolute. Aboard
her was the countermining outfit, including 24,000 pounds
of guncotton, intended to be used in the projected attempt
to force the harbor entrance. She lay waiting further
orders. Near the flagship, now about seven miles from
Morro Castle, were the Hist, a converted yacht, and the
torpedo-boat Ericsson. Away to eastward, almost out of
sight, lay the fleet of empty transports. A few minutes
before half-past nine o’clock, long, white lines trailed along
the quarter-decks of the battle-ships. Soon a steady white
line capped their gray sterns, for all crews were at Sunday
inspection quarters, and executive officers were passing
between these rows of white-clad men, carefully examin-

been surrounded by suitable vessels for making the trip, their presence would
have created no change. It had long since been found that the commander­
in-chief of such a fleet must make frequent inspections, attacks, and pursuits,
and must make these, as a general rule, without premeditation—suddenly.
On the whole, the importance attached to these duties and the results that
accrued from them were held to be greater than any weakness that might be
inflicted by the withdrawal of the New York, and long before July 3 it had
been found impracticable and inadvisable to transfer the admiral’s flag for
any reason whatsoever. These conditions naturally brought up the question
if it would not have been better to have as flagship a vessel like the Mayflower,
or, at any rate, one less powerful than the New York. This question opens
up a wide field of surmise and professional theorizing. In the Spanish­
American campaign it was decided, both on the Atlantic and Pacific, in favor
of having such a vessel as the New York for flagship, and, though that ship
missed the fighting on July 3, I think the selection was thoroughly justi­
fied, and I believe that like theories of selection will govern future naval
wars.
ing appearance and uniforms. While Sampson took a parting glance at all these details, there stood beside him on the quarter-deck of the New York Naval Cadet Needham Jones. He also wore leggings, for he was going ashore. A few days previous Cadet Jones had told Sampson that his brother, a captain in the regular army, lay wounded at Siboney. So that he might see his brother, Jones asked Sampson for permission to accompany him the first time he went ashore. Sampson had remembered the request, and now Jones, in the capacity of acting aide, was waiting to get into the launch with his commander-in-chief and, on the way inland, to see his wounded brother.

"Smoke in the harbor!" sung out a man on the New York's signal bridge. Sampson turned his glass on Morro. Hearts beat quicker, and in a second the port side of the flagship was crowded with anxious men, who gazed, as if for dear life, at the faint, brown hill which Morro marked.

"The fleet's coming out!" yelled a man from the signal bridge. And those who heard that cry will never forget it. Sampson took his glass down, and, without a trace of excitement, said to his assistant chief of staff:

"Yes; they're coming out. Hoist two-fifty." (This signal meant, "Close in toward harbor entrance and attack vessels." ) And then seeing Jones, the naval cadet, standing there in his leggings, scarcely knowing what to do in this tremendous crisis, Sampson turned to him and said, very quietly:

"Mr. Jones, I'm afraid you won't see your brother today."

Then this man, who, at the supreme moment of his life, could feel for the sorrows of a boy-officer, passed quickly through the rushing, shouting throng that went madly to their battle stations, and gained the bridge, whence he watched the fulfilment of his every plan. I may be doing the rear-admiral an injustice, and I never heard him actually say anything that would justify the opinion, but my own impression is that if Cervera's ships had escaped
SOME OF THE OFFICERS OF THE SPANISH FLEET.
The Battle of July. Third

beyond hope of capture Sampson would have committed suicide.

Every man of the hundreds that saw the battle that day saw it in a different light. I have yet to meet two men who agree absolutely as to its details. Kipling has written:

"And each in his separate star,
Shall draw the Thing as he sees It."

And before trying to give you such an account of the battle as must necessarily have been compiled from both sides and from different points of view, I shall tell you how it looked to me, standing under the forward bridge of the New York. In addition to vivid recollection of the dramatic scenes, I am able to refer to notes that I wrote at the time.

When Sampson said, "Yes; they're coming out," it was between 9:35 and 9:40 A.M. The inspection lines broke in a second, "general quarters" was sounded, fires were started under all boilers, the helm was put over, and the New York swung around and headed for the enemy. But before this was done we saw the white lines vanish, as ours had vanished, from the quarter-decks of the ships that lay in front of the harbor, seven miles away. Puffs of smoke from the shore batteries and the water-jets of exploding shells were the first signs of hostilities. Then, suddenly, out from the harbor mouth came the fighting-tops of the Maria Teresa, the flagship of the Spanish admiral. Her hull was quite hidden by the curling rolls of her own gun-smoke, and the fighting-tops sailed gracefully, swiftly to sea on a bed of clouds. But from those clouds, rifted every few seconds by the flash of a bigger gun, we knew were coming a hail of shells, for around our own ships the water was alive with geysers. Before the Maria Teresa was well out of the shadow of Morro every vessel on the blockade line, except the Vixen, was closing in toward the shore and firing away as fast as the batteries could be manned.

Though the moment that we on the New York waited
for the sight of the first Spanish ship was one of intense excitement and suspense, it was as nothing compared to the seconds that we watched and waited to see what direction the first Spanish ship would take. To us it meant more than to any one. If she turned to the eastward, we would, in a few minutes, be in the thick of the fight, and on us and upon the little Gloucester would then devolve the duty of heading off the whole Spanish fleet. If she turned to the westward we had small chance of getting into the hard fighting. And when the Maria Teresa was seen hugging the western shore and running hard away from our direction, I believe there was not a man on the New York who would not willingly have given up his life for the power to drag the Spanish flagship from her course and head her eastward.

Out they came, gallantly, these fine cruisers, the pride of Spain's navy, round the hill of Morro, pushing their gun-smoke before them in thick, tumbling clouds like the chariot of Vulcan. Shells from the Iowa, Oregon, Brooklyn, Indiana, Texas, and Gloucester fell all around them. One, two, three, four—we counted them as they came and could place them fairly well in their right order—the Maria Teresa, Viscaya, Colon, and Oquendo. They lost no time in their desperate effort, swinging around the western point with only about five hundred yards between ships. They sped swiftly in the direction of the Brooklyn. Against the dull background of the western shore and amid the drifting smoke we could scarcely follow their movements. When the fourth ship had headed off after her sisters, and when it was clear that none of them was coming our way, to our amazement there came flying out from the harbor first one and then another torpedo-boat destroyer. We had scarcely hoped that these fragile craft would dare give battle in daytime, and we had never dreamed that they would tempt fate by themselves instead, as they should have been, in the lee of one of the big vessels. With a curious, almost pitiful bravado these small boats banged
away at the fleet with their 14- and 6-pounders. It was as if marionettes now occupied the stage where a few minutes before great actors had played tragedy.

A few minutes before we saw the last of the Spanish fleet take the sea the Resolute had dashed past us, going for safety to the eastward. Commander Eaton, of that vessel, sang out: "The Spanish fleet is escaping to the westward!" The answer to this was an order to the Resolute to telegraph the news to Guantanamo and to tell the Massachusetts to return at once to her blockading station. The New York was now ploughing through the water at about twelve knots. Smoke was pouring from her funnels, and in the firerooms men worked as they never worked before to get full steam into the boilers. The honor of the ship, it seemed to most of us, was at stake. With frantic energy men poured fuel into cold furnaces and cursed the black coals that would not glow. When a fireman appeared anywhere on deck a hundred eager Jackies would surround him. "For God's sake," they shouted, "get those engines going. Make us move. Burn any old damn thing. Get us there! get us there!" The spoken and unspoken cry from all hands was "Steam! More steam!" And the engines and their force answered nobly.

When we were abreast the harbor mouth the forts opened on us. Shells came flying over us, and for about fifteen minutes kept whizzing by us, but we never made reply. "Shall we answer them?" asked Chadwick. "No," said Sampson, never taking his glass from his eye, "let us get on—on after the fleet! Not one must get away!" Ahead, still about seven miles away, the battle, panorama-like, was stretched before us. The four Spanish cruisers had clung to the outward curve of the western shore, and our battle-ships had headed in toward them. This manœuvring had brought the fleets to within about a mile of each other. At first it seemed as if our ships and the Spaniards were all mixed up, engaging each other at short ranges; fighting terrible duels, and all formation gone. Then, as the smoke
momentarily lifted from first one and then another vessel—we saw all this through good glasses—we made them out, slowly and doubtfully, and saw they were in two lines, running on parallel courses. The ships inshore were the Spaniards; those outside our own. The Spaniards were ahead. The roar of the cannonade could only be heard faintly. Beyond the terrific smoke and flame that belched forth from every ship and the spouting of the water as the shells exploded, there was nothing to show that a battle was in progress; still less was there anything to show how the day was going. Though a long way off, we had a better view than the ships closely engaged, because we had none of our own smoke to contend against. The Spanish ships were bunched together. Masses of flame frequently burst out from them, but whether it was an American shell exploding aboard them or merely the fire of their own guns we knew not.

"The Brooklyn's gone!" shouted a man beside me. A smoky mass headed out from our ships. At first I thought it must be a Spanish ship that had broken through our line and was escaping to the southward. Then the three smoke-stacks of Schley's flagship showed up clearly. Our hopes fell, for the Brooklyn was the only ship we had beside the New York that in point of supposed speed could cope with the enemy. Now it looked as if she had been disabled. We watched her closely. After going out from the shore she again headed after the Spaniards, though now further away and to the southward of the enemy. We took hope again, for it was evident that she would not continue on the chase if badly hurt.

From the scene directly ahead of us our eyes now turned to a fight that we were close approaching on our starboard bow. Out of the trailing smoke clouds of the four Spanish cruisers there appeared, as suddenly and as unexpectedly as if dropped from the sky, the little Gloucester. How she ever escaped from the mêlée no one to this day can quite understand. She was headed for the destroyers, and blaz-
ing away at them as if she possessed the battery of a battleship, instead of being of inferior armament to either the Pluton or Furor. The battle-ships, especially the Indiana and Iowa, had already directed a heavy fire against these boats, but both were steaming after the fleet when we first noticed the Gloucester. Regardless of the parting shots from our own ships, regardless of the rapid fire kept up from the destroyers themselves or of the danger of torpedoes, Lieutenant-Commander Wainwright, the plucky captain of the Gloucester, and formerly executive officer of the Maine, made straight for his two antagonists. In a few minutes we saw that the leading boat was on the beach—it was the Pluton—about four miles west of Morro. An explosion broke her in two. The other destroyer, the Furor, still kept going, though apparently in distress and as if trying to reach the beach. The New York closed in toward the shore, and the Scapa battery landed several shells close aboard. To insure the destruction of the Furor, we fired three shots from one of the forward 4-inch guns. One struck, but the fate of the Furor had already been sealed by the Gloucester. The smoke from our guns had scarcely cleared away before we saw that the Furor was burning, and that a boat from the Gloucester was being lowered to go over and take possession of the helpless craft. As the flagship passed, Captain Chadwick, standing on the fo’castle, waving his cap, led the crew in wild cheers for the plucky little Gloucester.

I have related what we saw of the destruction of the destroyers connectedly; but during that period our attention was divided between this phase of the fight and things of even greater import that were happening ahead. The first intimation we had of how the battle went was when we saw flames shooting out of the stern of one of Spain’s ships. A shout went up: “She’s on fire!” Scarcely had we realized this, before the now blazing vessel slowly turned. Was she going to come around and face us in a desperate effort to regain Santiago harbor? Our excitement
during those few moments was intense. Then we saw her cease firing and head for the beach. She passed behind a slight promontory out of our sight, but the smoke from her burning hull mounted above the hill and marked her grave. It was the *Maria Teresa*. Scarcely had our shouts died away before great red flames and black smoke curled up from the stern of another Spanish ship, and she, too, turned toward the Cuban hills, a blazing, helpless mass. It was the *Oquendo*. This was between 10:15 and 10:30, or less than an hour after we had left Siboney.

On we went, now making about sixteen knots an hour, on after our own gallant ships and after the two Spanish vessels that still forged ahead and still returned the terrible fire. The water around us was strewn with floating wreckage and ammunition boxes. Now and again we passed Spanish sailors struggling in the water, selling their lives dear. We threw them life-buoys, but we had no time to pick them up, for it was now evident that one of the Spanish ships was getting well away and was in advance of any of our ships. We might be needed yet. One of the swimmers we passed I shall never forget. He was a black-headed, fine, swarthy Spaniard, and as he swam his great broad shoulders stuck out of water like the sides of a boat. The *New York*’s course was changed so as not to run him down, and as we flew past him he threw up one arm and cried despairingly, “Amerigo! Amerigo! Auxilio! Auxilio!” Some of the crew standing near me laughed at this “lingo.” “Damn you, shut up!” came in strident tones from an officer that overheard the jeers, and there was silence. A life-buoy almost hit the swimmer, and we left him struggling in our wake to take his fortunes of war.

As we rounded the smoking promontory we came in full sight of the *Maria Teresa* and *Oquendo*. They were only about half a mile apart and were so near the beach that the surf broke around their bows. From the after part of both ships smoke and flames leaped out, licking up the masts and circling round the smokestacks. On their
fo'castles were gathered the white-clad crews. At the bows of the Maria Teresa was a long, white line. Another look showed it was composed of men sliding down a rope and dropping, one after the other, into the water. Many of them had already reached the beach and stood there in pitiful groups. The sight of these burning ships was inexpressibly sad. The awfulness of it killed, for the time being, the exaltation of victory, and as the New York sped by not a shout or a cheer came from her crowded decks. Men simply gazed in silence.

Gradually we gained on the enemy ahead, making seventeen knots despite our foul bottom. About eleven o'clock flames burst out from the Viscaya and she turned for the beach. That left but one Spanish ship, the Colon. On after her went the Oregon, the Texas and the Vixen, while outside and ahead of them was the Brooklyn. The Colon must have been over ten miles ahead of the New York at this time, and all we could see of her was her smoke. The Iowa followed the Viscaya. Sampson signalled to the Indiana to resume her blockading station, as she had no chance of overhauling the Colon. Three terrific explosions occurred on the burning Viscaya, sending columns of smoke and débris as high as the Cuban hills, and descending in thousands of white streaks like a pyrotechnic waterfall. At 11:30 we were abeam of the Iowa, passing between her and the Viscaya. At the stern of the Iowa stood Captain Evans. Behind him, massed over turrets, superstructure, and decks, were his officers and crew, dirty, grimy, and many half-naked. As they saw Sampson these men yelled and yelled again for their old captain. It reminded one of the first day of the war, when Sampson had refused to let the Iowa fire a salute in his honor, and the men, not to be denied, had cheered him instead. Several times Captain Evans waved to his men to keep still. At last they were quiet, and through the megaphone Evans shouted, "Nobody hurt." To us this message was a revelation. That a ship having so much to do with the utter destruction of
those three splendid vessels should escape without any casualties seemed almost impossible. It was more than a repetition of Manila. But even then no one dreamed that the other ships would have fared equally as well as the Iowa.

With the three smoking beacons of victory behind us, and leaving the Ericsson to help the Iowa in caring for the Viscaya's wounded, we pressed on after the last of Cer- vera's fleet. The decks of the flagship trembled with the screws' vibrations. The Colon was supposed to have a speed of twenty knots. We knew the Oregon and the Texas and the Vixen could not make that, and we doubted if the Brooklyn could, with her foul bottom. We were making our level best, and it was more than we had dared to hope after our long wait in the warm waters of the South. Knot after knot we covered, and the outlines of the Colon grew plainer. At first we thought this was imagination; it seemed impossible. But there was no mistake; we were surely gaining, both on our own ships and upon the enemy. Soon after noon we could clearly make out the positions of the pursuing ships. The Colon was well inland, as close as we were to the shore, and dead ahead of us. On our port bow were the Vixen and the Texas. Well ahead of them was the Oregon, apparently keeping pace with the Colon, and at this we marvelled, for the Oregon is a battle-ship with a maximum speed of sixteen knots, and she had travelled many miles since she last saw dry-dock. Away outside the Oregon, whether ahead or abeam we could not tell, was the Brooklyn. Now and again Schley's flagship fired and now and again the Colon replied, but the shells fell more than a mile short. The Oregon, with her big 13-inch guns, blazed away. It seemed ten minutes, though it was really only about ten seconds, before a big splash near the Colon showed us that the Pacific-coast battle-ship still had the enemy within range. Twenty miles further on, the coast formed a great promon- tory. To pass this the Colon must come out within good
range of the Brooklyn and the Oregon. Should she double on her tracks she had to count with the Texas and ourselves. So by one o’clock we knew that unless some unforeseen accident occurred the entire Spanish fleet was ours.

On we sped, with guns trained on that black ship that was making her desperate run to freedom. Again the Oregon fired and again the shells fell near the Colon. The crack Spanish cruiser was evidently unable to make anything like her estimated speed. About a quarter-past one the Colon turned. A minute later she was broadside on to our bow. There was a chance she meant to double. Our forward turret guns swung a little to starboard to prepare for any emergency. But there was nothing needed, for with the smoke pouring from her stacks the last of Cervera’s ill-fated fleet headed hard and fast for the beach. The battle was won, and every Spanish ship was ours.

I have no recollection of what any one said at this moment, when we saw the Colon turn shoreward. All I know is that there was a great deal of handshaking and cheering and shouting, and that everybody felt very proud of the American Navy. The Brooklyn and Oregon turned in after the big Spaniard, and the Texas and Vixen converged toward her. For her grave she had sought a little inlet under the shadow of a great, green mountain—Rio Tarquino, we afterward found it was called. Fifteen minutes after the Colon went ashore we had caught up with the Texas and Vixen. Their crews cheered, and ours answered. We saw a boat being lowered from the Brooklyn and rowed over to the Colon. We had one ready for the same purpose. From the Brooklyn, which stopped a few minutes before ourselves, then fluttered the signal: “We have won a great victory; details later.” Personally, having already taken copious notes of the victory referred to, I thought that this signal, however well meant, was somewhat superfluous. Then somebody on the Brooklyn shouted through the megaphone a message that was twice repeated and was understood to be, “Commodore Schley
claims the honor of the capture of the *Cristobal Colon.*" This, I believe, was not what the commodore said, but that is the way it was reported to Sampson and understood on the *New York.* And it was a message that could not very well be answered, for at that moment no thought of division of spoils and honors entered Sampson's mind. What he wanted to know, and what we all wanted to know, was how many brave men had lost their lives in securing this great victory. So, from the *New York's* signal-yard there was run the hoist: "Report your casualties." And to our amazement there came a negative from every ship, except the *Brooklyn,* and she reported only one killed. It was past all understanding.

Thinking that the *Colon* might need immediate assistance and that perhaps she could be hauled off uninjured, the *New York* had run close up to her before stopping, taking a closer position than any of the other vessels. There we lay in the little bay waiting for Captain Cook, of the *Brooklyn,* to return from the grounded Spanish cruiser. Presently he came alongside and Captain Chadwick welcomed him warmly. He reported the surrender of the *Colon.*

Chadwick, acting as chief-of-staff to the commander-in-chief, immediately went over to the surrendered ship, taking with him the fleet surgeon, Assistant Engineer Cook, and the *New York*’s carpenter, to examine into the *Colon*’s condition and to see if she could not be saved. Meanwhile a member of the rear-admiral’s staff wrote out a dispatch to Secretary Long which afterward became an object for some criticism. It read as follows:

"The fleet under my command offers the nation as a 4th of July present the whole of Cervera's fleet. It attempted to escape at 9:30 this morning. At two the last ship, the *Cristobal Colon,* had run ashore seventy-five miles west of Santiago and hauled down her colors. The *Infanta Maria Teresa, Oquendo,* and *Viscaya* were forced ashore, burned, and blown up within twenty miles of Santiago. The *Furor*
and Pluton were destroyed within four miles of that port.”

Sampson signed this. Had he personally written this dispatch it is probable that with his love of terseness it would only have occurred to him to say: “Spanish fleet destroyed; details later,” or some such unexplatory telegram. It was, however, the proper duty of his staff to prepare such routine messages, and Sampson, unless it happened to be some stringent protest, or some intense effort on behalf of his single purpose, such as I have had occasion to quote, and which he always wrote himself, rarely bothered his head with the wording of his dispatches. After signing this particular dispatch, Sampson signalled to Captain Clark, of the Oregon, to repair aboard. Commodore Schley was already on his way over from the Brooklyn, and Sampson wished to know from which of these ships the prize crew for the Colon should be selected.

As I am still relating the events of the battle exactly as I saw them, I shall have to take you into the history of the now famous dispatch, and leave until later the events that immediately followed the capture of the Colon. Assistant Chief-of-Staff Staunton and myself boarded the Vixen as Schley boarded the New York. Staunton carried with him the dispatch, and the Vixen was to bear us to Siboney, the nearest cable office. Before heading for our destination we took aboard from the Brooklyn Mr. Graham, the Associated Press correspondent on board Schley’s flagship. Then the little Vixen sped eastward.

We were nearing the still burning Viscaya when Lieutenant Sharp, commanding our craft, sighted a big white cruiser or battleship bearing right down on us. She flew colors that he took to be Spanish. Lieutenant Staunton also believed it to be a hostile vessel. Visions of a second Spanish fleet, composed of the Pelayo, Carlos V., and other vessels, were instantly conjured by this menacing ship. Cervera, it was almost believed, had run out that morning, not out of mere reckless daring, but to make a juncture
with a second fleet. As the *Vixen* is only a converted yacht, she discreetly turned tail and fled back toward the mountain of Rio Tarquino. On the way we met the *Brooklyn* headed back for her blockade station at Santiago. "There is a Spanish battle-ship ahead!" shouted Lieutenant Sharp. "We'll fix her!" was megaphoned back from the *Brooklyn*, and the crew of the *Vixen* cheered lustily for the commodore, and the commodore's crew cheered lustily for the *Vixen*.

Shortly after six o'clock the *Vixen* was once more alongside the *New York* in Tarquino Bay. Lieutenant Staunton and myself returned to the flagship, and Staunton told his story.

"Are you sure," asked the rear-admiral, "that she was a Spaniard?"

"Well," said Staunton, "I'm never sure of anything in this world, but Sharp and the other officers of the *Vixen* and myself saw the Spanish colors flying, and they looked like a battle-flag."

"Couldn't she have been an Austrian?" asked Sampson, half smiling.

Staunton thought a moment. Then he said:

"Yes, she might have been. The similarity in flags never occurred to me."

"It was the *Kaiserin Maria Teresa*, the Austrian cruiser," said Sampson. And he added: "I only wish it had been a Spanish battle-ship. I should have liked to finish up the day with something like that."

It is needless to say, though he had not seen this vessel as we had, that Sampson was right. I never knew him to make a definite statement and be wrong. His intense accuracy and remarkable judgment, as on this occasion, were sometimes almost irritating. The *Resolute*, we learned, had previously arrived, post haste, with the same alarming intelligence that the *Vixen* brought, and to Commander Eaton's fears Sampson had made the same reply that he made to Staunton. This scare may seem trivial
compared with the events of the day, but it was very real to those who experienced it.

Then came one of the most picturesque and daring incidents that marked this anniversary of the third day of Gettysburg. The Colon, thanks to Spanish treachery in opening sea-valves after hauling down their flag, was slowly settling. Sampson, after talking with Schley and Clark, had decided that the Oregon had more to do with the Colon's capture than any other vessel, and so a prize crew from the Pacific-Coast battle-ship had been put aboard the Spanish cruiser. But they were powerless to stem the flood that rushed in through the capless valves that opened below the water-line. The Colon was half on and half off a ledge, and as she filled with water her stern sank and she threatened to break in two. The only hope of saving her lay in getting her fairly and squarely on the ledge. Captain Chadwick asked Sampson's permission to ram the Colon into comparative safety. It was granted.

Through the darkness the New York slowly approached the stranded Spaniard. The flagship's searchlight shot up into the sky, then descended quickly, revealing as it sought its focus every nook and crevice in Tarquino Mountain. The glaring beam rested upon the Colon, with her white-clad American prize crew standing on the quarter-deck, a rather ghastly contrast to the dark woodwork. Scarcely more than moving, the New York drew near. The surf beat loudly on the shore. Not to crash into and fatally wound the captured cruiser the impact had to be as delicate as the touch of a surgeon. To miss such a small target as the stern of the Colon was an easy thing with such a huge, unwieldy projectile as the New York. And to miss meant to go aground, for nothing but the impact could stop the New York from going on the ledge. Our fo'castle was thick with jackies holding great fenders over the ram. Then, when our bows loomed right over the stern of the Colon, and when the surf seemed breaking against our sides, there was a bump. "Full speed astern,"
went the New York's engines, and she backed away when less than fifty feet from a ledge that to hit would have meant destruction.

Three times this was done, and when the searchlight finally shot up the mountain side and the flagship backed out of the surf the Colon was well on the ledge, on her side like a tired giant, but in no danger of breaking in two, though the sea washed through her gun-ports. It was the most daring piece of seamanship ever attempted with a modern ship like the costly New York. And it took a man like Chadwick to do it.

After this, and while Spanish prisoners from the Colon were being put aboard the Resolute, Lieutenant Staunton started once again for Siboney with Sampson's dispatch. I accompanied him, and we left about 9:30 P.M. on the torpedo-boat Dupont, which had come at full speed from Guantanamo, just too late to be of use except in the capacity of dispatch-boat. We scurried through the darkness. The Viscaya, Oquendo, and Teresa were still burning, and their flames marked the coast line like ghastly funeral pyres. About two o'clock on the morning of July 4 we arrived at Siboney, and Staunton and myself rowed ashore. The first man we met was Lieutenant Sears, flag-lieutenant to Commodore Schley. I wondered what he was doing there, because the Brooklyn was some miles out on her blockade station, where she had been ordered. However, Sears said nothing in the way of explanation, and the three of us stumbled over land-crabs and past sleepy sentries to the cable station. Once in that tumbledown Cuban cabin we awakened the soldier operator. Staunton took Sampson's dispatch out of his pocket, made a copy of it, and read this aloud to me to compare it with the original. The land-crabs crackled outside, and from surrounding huts came the heavy breathing of tired men who slept. The operator clicked at the key. He had hard work getting the wire open. Then Sears, who had said nothing, pulled out a piece of paper. "I have a dispatch here from the com-
modore,” said he. “Of course he didn’t know you were going to send anything just yet. He’d like it to go. He has won a great victory to-day and it would please him if this went. Don’t you think it might go?” and he handed to Staunton a dispatch addressed to the Secretary of the Navy, signed by Commodore Schley and giving an account of the victory.

Staunton read it over. The operator still pounded viciously at the cable key.

“Well,” said Staunton, “you know, Sears, I’ve got nothing to do with this going or not going, but you know regulations as well as I do.”

All communications to the Secretary of the Navy must go through the senior officer present. Sampson undoubtedly held that position. Naval regulations apply as strictly in this respect to a commodore as they do to a cadet.

For a few moments Sears seemed undecided. Then he said:

“Will you put in the name of the man killed?”

“That’s a good idea,” said Staunton, and he added to Sampson’s message that George H. Ellis, chief yeoman, was the name of the only man killed in this great victory. Then Sears put Schley’s dispatch back in his pocket, and the operator slowly ticked out the famous message, signed by Sampson. In view of some mistaken statements as to Sampson’s anxiety to “get to the cable and report the victory,” it is, perhaps, a pity that Lieutenant Sears did not send the commodore’s dispatch. A different impression might have been created.

Then Staunton and I went back to the Dupont, and Sears went out to the Brooklyn. And that ended my personal experience of the battle. But before I tell you what I learned afterward from our own and Spanish officers, let me add a few words regarding that famous dispatch. The term, “The fleet under my command,” is purely technical and absolutely correct. It might have been more politic to word this differently, but policy, or the approbation of
the public, has nothing to do with the compilation of a dispatch from a commander-in-chief to the Navy Department. Sampson has been criticized for not mentioning the name of Schley in this dispatch. Had he mentioned Schley alone, he would have done a gross injustice to Captains Evans and Clark and the other captains, for expert naval opinion has declared that the battle was a captains’ battle. If the dispatch had been written for the public it might have contained many things. It was neither a diplomatic nor characteristic dispatch, but it was entirely just and absolutely correct.

From the official reports of the battle, from conversation with officers who were in the thick of the fight, and from other data, I have compiled a brief account which, perhaps, may be found more comprehensive than the personal impressions I have written and which, necessarily, are somewhat disjointed.

At 9:35 A.M.—this is official time—the Maria Teresa was seen heading out of the harbor. Almost simultaneously the Iowa and Texas hoisted the signal: “Enemy’s ships coming out,” and the Iowa fired a gun to attract attention to the fluttering hoist. A trifle later, perhaps a minute, the Brooklyn also hoisted the signal: “Enemy coming out—action.” On every ship steam was ordered on all boilers. With the exception of the Oregon none of the blockading vessels had fires under more than two boilers. The Oregon happened to be changing fires, so she was able quickly to resuscitate the life in those fires that were being raked out. Every vessel, except the Vixen, commenced firing at the harbor mouth, and closed in toward the shore, taking westerly directions. The Vixen, to avoid getting in line of fire of our own and the superior Spanish vessels, stood more to the southwest. The Gloucester also swerved to the southward, and waited to see if the torpedo-boat destroyers were coming out. Shells from the Spanish ships and forts rained over the fleet.
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Before the *Maria Teresa* was well clear of the harbor mouth she was thought to have been hit by a large shell. As a matter of fact, however, even on the ships most closely engaged, it was found impossible to tell what damage their own gun-fire had inflicted until the Spanish vessels began to blaze up. As Cervera's vessels passed along the coast it was evident to each American captain that he would be unable to head the enemy off or to ram them on account of their superior speed. So all vessels, except the *Brooklyn*, changed direction so as to come in a course parallel with the shore and with the enemy. The *Oregon* crossed the bows of the *Texas* and passed by the stern of the *Iowa* as she forged ahead. The *Iowa, Texas, and Indiana* in this order followed, keeping up a terrific fire upon the escaping ships. The *Indiana*, having a blockade station farthest to the eastward, was naturally handicapped, and was last in the race. However, she was able to devote considerable attention to the torpedo-boat destroyers. Captain Evans described the *Oregon* as an "express train rushing past the *Iowa*, which sight alone was worth the price of admission." The manœuvre which brought our vessels abeam with the shore instead of heading toward it was executed without any signal.

The *Brooklyn*, unlike the other ships, turned away from the shore and headed off from the enemy. However, she turned back and headed more to the southward, thus increasing her distance, and bringing herself more into the zone of the enemy's fire; for all this time the Spaniards were shooting high. This manœuvre of Schley's was afterward severely criticised. In conversation he has stated that he turned from the enemy to avoid being rammed.

(For important note on this point see Appendix, page 305.) The official chart, here produced, and compiled by the navigating officers of every ship engaged, does not show that the *Brooklyn* was in any immediate danger of being rammed. However, I take the liberty of differing from Schley's critics, as it seems to me that even if the possibil-
ity of being rammed was only a hallucination, the use-
fulness of the *Brooklyn* was so apparent and she was so
well able to keep up with the enemy that her handling is
not open to criticism. Had the Spanish ships been capable
of their full speed, or had more than one of the cruisers
escaped from our bunch of battle-ships, it might have been
different, for Sampson relied upon the *Brooklyn* and the
western wing of the blockade not to let one Spanish vessel
pass beyond an imaginary line drawn from the bow of the
westernmost blockader to the shore. In this plan ram-
ming was quite within probability. It is, of course, a coin-
cidence, and nothing more, that the *Brooklyn* was the only
vessel of the fleet to have a man killed or wounded aboard
of her.

At 10:15 A.M. the *Maria Teresa* turned to run ashore.
At 10:20 the *Oquendo* followed her example. At 10:30
the *Furor* blew up and the *Pluton* turned shoreward. At
11:05 the *Viscaya* turned, and at 1:15 P.M. the *Colon* was
beached. A careful survey of the chart and a perusal of
what has already been written should now give the reader
a fair idea of the battle as it took place, from the Ameri-
can point of view.

To further help the careful student of this action I have
included the official reports of Sampson and Schley (see
Appendix, pages 296–305). They will be found intensely in-
teresting. Schley’s report is not the one he originally sub-
mitted. His first report, like his dispatch that was never
sent, might have created a different impression. In his
original report of the battle, presumably misled by over-
zealous friends, Schley exhibited a tendency to forget the
existence of a commander-in-chief, and his account of the
battle contradicted in various details those sent in by the
battle-ship captains. Somebody was evidently mistaken,
and it was judged unwise to forward reports from Evans,
Taylor, Philip, and Clark, that contradicted the statements
of the second-in-command. The attention of Sampson was
drawn to the discrepancies.
PORT SIDE OF THE MAJIK JETSUKI AS SHE LAY ON THE SHOALS THE DAY AFTER THE BATTLE.

From a photograph taken on the morning of July 1, by J. C. Henshaw; copyrighted, 1906, by W. R. Hearst.
“Oh, well,” he said, “what does it matter? The battle was won. So what’s the use of bothering?”

However, the discrepancies were so glaring that Sampson finally decided to send for Schley, and, rather against his inclination, ask him about them. The result was that Schley withdrew his original report and submitted the one I include in the Appendix, which contains this paragraph:

“I congratulate you most sincerely upon this great victory to the squadron under your command, and I am glad that I had an opportunity to contribute in the least to a victory that seems big enough for all of us.”

There was, as far as I know, absolutely no ill feeling between the two officers on this or any other occasion. I believe that Schley frequently expressed the greatest admiration for Sampson and for his abilities. Schley suffered far more at the hands of his friends than from any action of his own. I may say that the substitution of Schley’s reports was common talk among the ships connected with the command. However, to this day, Sampson has not the slightest inkling that I know of the incident.

At a later date Sampson was asked for his recommendations regarding the promotion of the officers who took part in this battle. He recommended that Captains Philip, Higginson, Evans, Taylor, Cook, Clark, and Chadwick be advanced five numbers; Lieutenant-Commander Wainwright, ten numbers; Lieutenant-Commanders R. Rodgers, Cogswell, Schroeder, J. A. Rodgers, Potter, Harber, Mason, and Lieutenants Staunton and Sharp, five numbers. Captain Higginson and Lieutenant-Commander Schroeder, of the Massachusetts, were recommended for promotion because, although that battle-ship had unluckily left for coal a few hours before the battle, she was held by Sampson to have taken great part in the victory by reason of her long and excellent blockade work. Lieutenant Staunton was recommended on account of his work on the staff. Regarding the promotion of Schley, Sampson wrote:

“With regard to Commodore Schley I much prefer that
the Department should decide his case. I am unwilling to fully express my own opinion. His conduct when he first assumed command on the south coast of Cuba I assume to be as well known to the Department as to myself. Had the commodore left his station off Santiago at that time, he probably would have been court-martialled, so plain was his duty. Were I alone in this opinion I would certainly doubt my judgment, but so far I know this opinion is confirmed by that of other commanding officers here acquainted with the circumstances. This reprehensible conduct I cannot separate from his subsequent conduct, and for this reason I ask you to do him ample justice on this occasion.”

Sampson was eventually recommended to be advanced eight numbers and Schley six numbers on the navy list. This made both rear-admirals, but with Sampson ranking Schley by one number. The recommended advancement of Sampson over Schley created much discussion in the United States Senate and other places. In reference to this the following dispatch from Schley to Secretary Long is interesting:

“SIBONEY, July 10.

“Feel some mortification that the newspaper accounts on July 6 have attributed victory of July 3 almost entirely to me. Victory was secured by the force under the command of the commander-in-chief North Atlantic station, and to him the honor is due. The end of the line held by the Brooklyn and the Vixen was heavily assailed, and they had the honor, with the Oregon, of being in the battle from the beginning to the end, and I do not doubt for a moment that full and proper credit will be given all persons and all ships in the official report of the combat.

“SCHLEY.”

As Schley very truly said, Sampson was commander-in-chief, and as such was entitled to the honor that victories always bring to that responsible position, both on land
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and sea. Shafter is accredited the victor on land at Santiago, yet he was at sea during the first fighting and continually remained, so I am told, at some distance to the rear while on shore. Sampson, perhaps, was entitled to more than the usual share of victory that falls to the office of commander-in-chief, because his personality and tremendous vigor of single purpose had so much to do with making the victory a foregone conclusion. His orders were carried out by every ship during the engagement, and even allowing that the New York might as well have been a thousand miles away I fail to see how it affects the credit that is due Sampson. Personally, I believe that the New York was in a useful though not active position, as she prevented any Spanish vessel from doubling back into the harbor. Her action against the torpedo-boats and the fire she sustained from the forts must not be forgotten, and though no one claims that she had anything to do with the fighting, it must be remembered that she occupied a position that might any moment have become strategically invaluable, and that she was rapidly overhauling the Colon. Still all that has small bearing upon the credit which the President and the Navy Department and the great majority of naval officers insist is due Sampson, despite ill-advised clamor.

That the credit for the victory of July 3 should go to Schley does not appear to be justified either by the commodore's fighting or by his management; and, by his dispatch, it will be seen that he disclaims any pretence to such false laurels. The battle was practically over before Schley made any signals which were observed. His signal announcing the escape of the enemy was made subsequent to that of the Iowa and Texas, and was not noticed by the other ships. From that time on, he in no way attempted to direct the battle, until when chasing the Colon he signalled several times to the Oregon to fire on the Spanish cruiser, which she did with such good effect that the Colon's officers said they surrendered because they were
afraid of the battle-ship, and not because they feared the *Brooklyn*. All signals directing the disposition of vessels, except one, were made by Sampson himself, as he passed up the line. It might be said, with as much justification, that the credit for the victory belongs to Captain Taylor of the *Indiana*, who signalled, "Gunboats will advance," and thus enabled the *Gloucester* to attack and destroy the *Pluton* and *Furor* without fear of running into the fire of our own battle-ships.

To my mind the credit due Schley is, first, the credit due any man who for country’s sake risks his life, and risks it bravely; and secondly, the credit for fighting the *Brooklyn* and fighting her well against the Spanish fleet, and bringing her into such position that she had a good deal to do with the capture of the *Colon*. Practically Schley had less to do with the victory than did Captain Clark, of the *Oregon*, because the latter had as much speed and more powerful batteries at his command, and did not turn out from the enemy. The performance of the *Oregon* cannot be overpraised. It was a captains’ battle, and as acting captain of the *Brooklyn* Schley deserves the praise and sincere thanks of his country; but no more so than do the captains of the other ships, except that his rank is higher. And no friends of the captains, who fought that battle first of all on prearranged orders and afterward on their own excellent judgment, have yet attempted to wrest from a superb commander-in-chief those honors which all chiefly concerned are only too anxious to pay to him.

After peace was declared, Secretary Long, in a public speech, said:

"It is not to the Navy Department that is due the credit for our grand victory at Santiago, as Admiral Sampson modestly says, but Sampson himself. It is of no more consequence that Admiral Sampson was seven miles away when Admiral Cervera attempted to steal out of Santiago Harbor than it is that Grant was at Chattanooga when the fighting was on at Missionary Ridge."
The Battle of July Third

"Admiral Sampson made his plans with such thoroughness that when the Spanish fleet attempted to escape from the harbor, every American captain knew just what to do. Our ships moved into line like clockwork, and the victory was won."

That so much space should be devoted to such a simple phase of a great battle is deplorable, and all the more so on account of the vindictiveness of those misinformed persons who have seen fit to make the matter one of controversy. I cannot close the question better than by quoting an interview that appeared in the New York Sun with Lieutenant Akijama, the Japanese naval attaché, who witnessed the battle, though at long distance. The attaché was asked: "You think then, Admiral Sampson deserves the credit for the victory?" He replied: "Sincerely I do. The officers of other governments all agree with me that the greatest credit is for the admiral. He made the plans. He gave the orders. He said where each ship should wait for the Spanish. The Spanish came. The result was the most complete victory that ever was known."

To give any adequate idea of the numberless acts of bravery and heroism displayed by American officers and sailors that glorious 3d of July, would be to write a book entirely devoted to the battle. The day was replete with heroism, noble incidents, and great sayings, that defied the recording pen of four men. On the Texas was the New York Sun correspondent, Mr. Diuade. He told how Captain Philip called his men aft when the battle was over, and with the simple pathos of overwhelming thankfulness expressed his belief in an Almighty God. And from Philip came that immortal epigram, "Don't cheer, boys; they're dying," which kept the men of the Texas from yelling as they passed the burning Spanish ships. Mr. Graham, the Associated Press correspondent on the Brooklyn, told how, under a heavy fire, first one marine and then another climbed out to the muzzle of a heated gun and tried to ram back a "stuck" shell. Both dropped to the sea ladder
below, unable to keep their hold on the hot metal. Above them was the terrific blast of the heavy guns. A third marine essayed the daring task, and succeeded. On the New York Mr. Heald, of the New York Sun, and myself had few things to record, except our bird’s-eye view of the battle, all the clearer because we were cut of it. But of all the sayings that arose from that battle I think none is grander than that epigram of Captain Evans, who in his official report, after saying that he could not sufficiently express his “admiration for his magnificent crew,” added:

“So long as the enemy showed his flag they fought like American seamen; but when the flag came down they were as gentle and tender as American women.”

The rescuing work more than proved this. The first Spaniards to be taken off were those from the torpedo-boat destroyers. At the risk of their lives Lieutenants Wood and Norman of the Gloucester boarded the blazing Furor, and dragged mangled bodies off the red-hot decks, beside picking many swimmers up out of the water. Then the Gloucester went to the burning Maria Teresa, and Lieutenant Norman received the surrender of Admiral Cervera, who was stark-naked. He was taken on board the Gloucester, and clad in Lieutenant-Commander Wainwright’s clothes and made as comfortable as possible. Later he was transferred to the Iowa. Many others were rescued under great difficulties, but for the time being had to be put on shore, and to insure against attack by Cubans a United States flag was hoisted over the temporary camp where they stayed until taken off later by the Harvard, Resolute and other vessels. Crews and officers from the Harvard and Indiana also did splendid work around the Oquendo and Teresa. It is said that not one man of the Oquendo’s engineer force escaped alive, as they were unable to get up through the gratings and were either roasted, shot to death or drowned. The survivors of the Viscaya were taken off by boats from the Iowa, the Ericsson and the Hist. Two hundred and fifty dead, wounded and suf-
fanning reached the Iowa, and the living received the best medical attention, and all hospitality. Spanish officers were welcome to anything that an American officer owned, from his blouse to his boots. Many of the prisoners were badly wounded and most of them almost naked. The Viscaya's crew and officers were taken off at the imminent risk of the rescuers' lives, constant explosions continually occurring within the Spanish cruiser.

To show his appreciation of the American kindness and chivalry, Admiral Cervera afterward wrote to Sampson:

"My very dear Sir: The attentions my subordinates as well as myself have received from the American sailors, since we have had the misfortune of being prisoners, place me under the obligation of showing our gratitude, which I do with the greatest pleasure, writing to your Excellency this letter, in which I beg you to accept this expression of gratitude in the name of all."

Seven Spanish prisoners on the Harvard were shot and killed by the marine guard on July 5. No officers were concerned in the affair. The men had gotten into a quarrel among themselves, and this treatment, though harsh, was necessary, and I believe thoroughly sustained by the Spanish officers. All the Spanish prisoners were eventually sent back to Spain.

The results of the battle may be summed up as follows:

American loss: One man killed (George H. Ellis, chief yeoman) and one wounded (J. Burns, fireman), both of the Brooklyn.

Damage done to American ships: Brooklyn—Struck twenty times, smokestacks punctured, halyards cut, other trifling damage. Elevating gear of 5-inch guns strained. Texas—Shell cut hammock nettings and forced-draught ducts, causing other slight damage. From her own gunfire, decks were strained and deck frames bulged. Iowa—Two holes made in starboard side by shells. One entered forward cofferdam and remained there without exploding, after making a hole sixteen by seven inches.
other entered a little further aft, exploded on berth deck, broke water-tank compartment hatch combing and, exploding, perforated chain locker and stanchion with fragments. Small fire started, but was quickly put out.

*Oregon, Indiana, Gloucester, Vixen,* and *New York* were absolutely uninjured.

Spanish loss: Six hundred killed and wounded (estimated by Cervera). Taken prisoner: Ninety-eight officers and sixteen hundred and seventy-five enlisted men.

Damage to Spanish ships: *Maria Teresa, Oquendo,* and *Viscaya* set on fire by our shells, beached and lost. *Colon,* only hit six times, beached and lost.

An idea of the ammunition expended by the American vessels can be gained from the fact that the *Iowa* fired thirty-one 12-inch, thirty-five 8-inch, two hundred and fifty-one 4-inch, ten hundred and fifty-six 6-pounder and one hundred 1-pounder shells.

The effect of the firing in a general way produced conflagration. On the *Maria Teresa* no serious internal explosions seem to have ensued, though she was badly riddled. The greatest damage was done to her by two 8-inch and one 12-inch shells, one of which cut the fire main, and thus helped the conflagration. She was afterward floated, but lost in a storm on November 1, 1898, while on her way to the United States. The *Oquendo* was shot to pieces. A shell exploded her after torpedo tubes, and these in turn killed a number of men and wreaked havoc. The forward magazine was also exploded. One 8-inch shell struck the hood of her forward 11-inch turret, and, exploding, killed every man inside: an argument against open turret hoods. In the *Viscaya* the magazines and torpedoes were all exploded, and left only a wreck of this once splendid vessel. The *Colon* was practically uninjured, but despite Captain Chadwick's efforts got into such position that she had to be abandoned. For weeks after the battle the burned ships were the most pitiful objects, and it was long before all the dead could be taken from the water that swished around
among the huge girders and gnarled frames and reeking débris that was piled up inside the shell-riddled hulls. From an investigation of these vessels an able naval board of examination came to the conclusion that wood should be reduced to a minimum in the equipment of warships; that loaded torpedoes above the water-line are a menace to anything but a torpedo-boat; that all water and steam piping should be below the water-line or the protected deck, and that the value of rapid-fire batteries cannot be too highly estimated.

From the Spanish side I have but meagre reports, and I cull the following extracts from Admiral Cervera’s official account as published in *El Imparcial*, Madrid, on August 23, 1898:

“At 9:35 A.M. the *María Teresa* attacked and opened fire on a hostile battle-ship of the type of the *Indiana*, and on the *Iowa*, then rushing upon the *Brooklyn*, which, on account of her greater speed, offered for us the greatest danger. The American ships coming alongside, the battle became general. There could be no doubt as to the outcome, but I should never have believed that our ships could be destroyed so rapidly. The first injuries the *Infanta María Teresa* had the misfortune to sustain consisted in the bursting of an auxiliary steam pipe and of the water mains. Commander Concas [of the *Teresa*], who was fighting with the greatest bravery, fell wounded. [Cervera then took command of the ship.] The dead and wounded were falling incessantly. In view of the absolute impossibility of defending the ship any longer in that position, she was directed, with the greatest possible speed, toward the beach west of Punta Calvera, where she ran ashore just at the moment when the engines stopped. [Cervera, followed by his son, then jumped into the water.] The third day of July has been one of terrible disaster, as I had foreseen. Nevertheless, the number of dead is less than I had feared. The country has been defended with honor and we have the consciousness of duty well done, but with the bitterness
of knowing the losses suffered and our country’s misfortunes.”

An account of the battle as seen by the paymaster of the *Oquendo* says that on that vessel the ammunition hoists failed to work, that the fires could not be controlled, and only when all guns were out of action did Captain Lazaga give orders to beach the ship, first having discharged all the torpedoes.

Cervera was forced out of Santiago, against his fervent protest, by Governor-General Blanco. That he knew what the result would be is evident from the report I have quoted and from various telegrams that I have no space to produce. The object of his sortie was to reach Havana. All that was accomplished was to give to the American Navy an opportunity to win as remarkable a victory as ever marked the annals of any country. Rear-Admiral Sampson has kindly written for me some of the lessons that his forces learned from the pitiful, mistaken, yet gallant, effort of the Spanish Navy.
CHAPTER IX.

REASONS FOR THE VICTORY.

By Rear-Admiral W. T. Sampson, U. S. N.

Probably no incident of the battle of Santiago on July 3 has excited so much comment as the fact that the Spanish squadron was completely destroyed, while that of the United States escaped almost without injury. The natural inquiry is, "What caused the wide difference in the effects upon the two fleets?" The complete answer to this question would explain a matter in which many are interested. The cause may be ascribed in whole or in part to one or several different causes. The most natural explanation should first be sought in the discrepancy of the forces opposed to each other, and that should be the first point to be carefully examined.

The Spanish fleet and its power of offence and defence were well known to the whole world, and consisted of three armored cruisers—the Infanta Maria Teresa, Almirante Oquendo, and the Viscaya—three sister ships, of about seven thousand tons each. The Cristobal Colon, of about the same tonnage as each of the other three, belonged to the same class, being an armored cruiser protected by lighter armor, which was spread very nearly over the whole surface of the ship. The first three were protected by a heavy belt of armor of about twelve inches in thickness, and also with barbette protection of about the same thickness to their two principal guns. There were also two torpedo-boat destroyers of recent construction, and capable, when in good order, with clean bottoms, of making twenty-nine knots. The three sister ships, when in good order, with clean bottoms, could make twenty knots,
and the *Cristobal Colon* twenty-one knots per hour. The latter vessel had not received her two heavy barbette guns of 10-inch calibre. The *Viscaya*, *Maria Teresa* and the *Almirante Oquendo* each had one 11-inch Hontoria gun in each turret, and ten 5-inch rapid-firing guns, and a secondary battery of 6-pounders and 1-pounders.

The opposing force of the United States consisted of the *Texas*, *Iowa*, *Oregon* and *Indiana*—four battle-ships—with a speed varying from eight to fifteen knots; the *Brooklyn* and the *New York*—two armored cruisers—having a speed, when in good order and with clean bottoms, of twenty knots, and the *Gloucester* and *Vixen*, unprotected cruisers, having a speed of about sixteen knots per hour. The battle-ships had water-line belts varying, in the case of the *Iowa*, from fourteen inches, to that of the other battle-ships of eighteen inches. The protected cruisers *New York* and *Brooklyn* had water-line belts, the former of four inches in thickness and the latter of three inches in thickness. The main battery of the *Iowa* consisted of four 12-inch guns and eight 8-inch guns, and the secondary battery of six 4-inch and twenty 6-pounders. The *Indiana* and the *Oregon* had four 13-inch, eight 8-inch, and four 6-inch guns in the main battery, with rapid-firing batteries of twenty 6-pounders. The *Texas* had two 12-inch and six 6-inch guns in her main battery, with a secondary battery of twelve 6-pounders. The battery of the *Gloucester* consisted of 6-pounders, while the *Vixen* had a battery of four 1-pounder machine guns. The *Brooklyn* had a battery of eight 8-inch guns and an auxiliary of twelve 5-inch rapid-fire guns, and twelve 6-pounders. The *New York* had six 8-inch guns, and a rapid-fire battery of twelve 4-inch guns and eight 6-pounders.

Thus the four Spanish armored cruisers and two torpedo-boat destroyers were opposed by three first-class battle-ships, one second-class battle-ship, two armored cruisers and two improvised torpedo-boat destroyers.

The bottoms of all the ships on both sides were very foul.
The *Iowa* had not been in dock for fifteen months, and scarcely one of the ships on either side could make her maximum speed by three knots.

Therefore the Spaniards were completely outclassed; on the other hand, under the circumstances of the battle, the Spaniards had the great advantage of knowing exactly when it was to take place. From the difference between the offensive and defensive power of the two sides, we would naturally expect that the Americans would win the battle. But the overwhelming difference in the amount of injury to the two squadrons was altogether out of proportion to the difference between the two squadrons.

I think we cannot, therefore, conclude that the destruction of the Spanish squadron is explained on the basis of the discrepancy between the forces opposed.

The destruction of the Spanish squadron has been frequently attributed to the difference in the marksmanship between the American and the Spanish sailors. This difference is very manifest when we consider the number of hits received by the Spanish squadron. The *Oquendo* alone received sixty-four projectiles, while the entire American squadron was scarcely hit as many times.

This difference between the number of hits on each side can only be explained by attributing it to the superior marksmanship of the Americans. Therefore, this cause alone would probably explain the difference in the results: the Americans lost one man, while the Spaniards lost in the neighborhood of three hundred killed and wounded.

But while a large portion of the difference in the results of the gun-fire upon the two squadrons must be attributed to the superior marksmanship of the crews of the American ships, yet much of the terrible destruction of the Spanish fleet is due to the spirit which actuated the officers and men of the two fleets. The Spaniards presumably made
With Sampson Through the War

every preparation possible for their sortie, having steam at a high pressure, and, as soon as they passed the mouth of the entrance, moving with the greatest velocity of which they were capable, yet they were attacked by the United States fleet with a perfect confidence and determination which the Spaniards found it impossible to resist.

Another fact which contributed in no small degree to the defeat of the Spaniards is to be found in the mode of construction of their ships: the use of wood where it was totally unnecessary made them liable to destruction by fire. Their wooden decks over steel decks, the use of wood instead of steel in the lighter construction of bulkheads, wooden doors, and a quantity of the same material used in purely ornamental work, all proved food for the fire from our explosive shells. Not one of the Spanish ships in which fire had once started contained any unburned wood after the fight. It appears that the Spanish did not realize this great source of danger. The fire quickly took possession of the ships and rendered futile the tardy efforts to extinguish the flames. Many of our own ships were open to the same criticism. The battle-ships, excepting the Iowa, had wood entering largely into their construction. The New York and the Texas contained an extraordinary quantity of wood which served no purpose except to endanger the ships. The commanding officers of these vessels, however, ruthlessly tore out much of the wood when the war began, and every preparation was made to extinguish any fire which might occur among the woodwork that remained. If the war teaches a lesson more important than any other, it is to dispense with all wood in the future construction of our ships. Not a particle of it should be permitted where it is possible to avoid its use.

The excellence in marksmanship which the Americans displayed during the battle was not acquired in a day, but was the result of long and arduous labor. Gun captains in
STERN VIEW OF THE FISCA as SHE LAY WRECKED ON THE BEACH.

From a photograph taken on the morning of July 1, by J. C. Hensseng; copyrighted, 1886, by W. R. Hoard.
the navy are selected for their aptitude, experience, judgment and intelligence. It is very difficult for a man to become a good marksman unless he shows a natural aptitude for such work. He must also re-enforce this by constant drills and practice. He must be capable of watching and remembering all the motions of his own ship and those of the enemy. He must judge with accuracy what movement his own ship and the enemy is likely to make next, that he may more certainly be ready to point his gun for the next shot. It is needless to say that only a man of great intelligence can combine all these good qualities. Above all the captain of a gun on board ship must be practised in judging distances. The constantly varying distance of the enemy, from whatever cause, requires the gun-sight to be adjusted accordingly, or shots will be wasted, as the shells of the Spaniards were. It was reported to me that many of the Spanish sights were found after the battle to have been adjusted to a ridiculous range, as if the Spanish gun captains had been given a range by their officers as they came out of the port when they first began to fire, and, in their excitement, had forgotten to keep them adjusted as the distance changed; or, perhaps, the officers had concluded that our ships would give battle at this long range and forgot to rectify their error. This theory receives support from the fact that the majority of the enemies' shells passed over our ships. Again, on the occasion of a target practice by the Spaniards made from shore batteries at Havaña, of which we have careful reports by our officers, it is known that they placed their target at precisely the same distance that they assumed for our ships at Santiago, as if there were some charm in such a distance. Such a blunder would not be made by our officers, or even by a member of a gun's crew.

There is nothing in a target practice that our sailors are taught more carefully to watch than the changing of distance. No inventive genius has yet designed a reliable range-finder which will give trustworthy results in battle.
Although our fleet carried several on this occasion, not one was in any degree reliable.

In connection with the attempted escape of Cervera's squadron, the Spanish admiral is much blamed by some for the method which he adopted in bringing his fleet to sea. When Admiral Cervera was directed by Governor-General Blanco to go out of the harbor of Santiago, and after the attempt had been made and so ignominiously failed, Blanco criticised the hour selected by Admiral Cervera for making the attempt, and in reply to the admiral's report made to Blanco on the 4th of July—stating that in obedience to Blanco's orders the attempt had been made at 9:30 on the morning of the previous day—the Governor-General expressed his deep regret and astonishment at the result, and stated that if Cervera had selected a different hour the result might have been different, and that the overwhelming difference in the number killed on each side seemed incredible. Several causes, it appears, influenced Admiral Cervera to select daylight instead of darkness to make his attempt. While he and his commanding officers differed in opinion as to the time to be selected, which was in the majority vote eventually fixed for daylight, there appears to be no doubt but that with sufficient energy and determination in making the attempt, darkness would have greatly aided their chances of escape. Had it not been for the use of the searchlight by our ships to illuminate the channel by which the Spaniards must necessarily come out, they probably would have selected the darkness. After the destruction of the Spanish fleet many of the captured prisoners freely expressed their opinion that it was impossible to pilot their ships out through the narrow channel, with such a powerful light shining in the eyes of the officers. This reason, perhaps, even more than the fact that the same searchlight enabled us on the outside to discover and point our guns upon the attacking Spaniards, decided them in their vote to adopt daylight rather than darkness in which to make their attempt.
Reasons for the Victory

Had Cervera, in making his plans, directed his ships to follow different courses after getting to sea, the probability that one or more of them might have escaped would have greatly increased; but as all pursued the same course it favored their destruction and rendered their escape impossible. Each ship, as she came out, was subject to the fire of all our ships, whereas, had they followed different courses, the probability is that, owing to the circumstances of position, one or more of our slower ships might have found herself compelled to engage a vessel of the enemy of much higher speed, or the reverse might also easily have happened: that one of our fastest vessels would have been obliged to attack one of Spain’s slower vessels, thus wasting our means of attack upon an inferior vessel, leaving one of greater speed to escape. If this attempt had been made during darkness, it would have enabled one of the Spaniards to have got out of sight of most of our vessels in a few moments. The result would undoubtedly have been different. Therefore, it is my opinion that if the time of escape had been set for the evening the result would have been more successful. The whole night would then have been left the Spaniards to evade their pursuers, and especially had the hour been set to coincide with a passing storm, which would have diminished the intensity of our searchlight and would have generally increased the intensity of the darkness.

It was these general conditions that were anticipated by the blockading squadron, and the preconcerted signals to meet such conditions had been carefully considered.

It is also believed that Cervera might, in a measure, have neutralized the effect of the searchlights from the blockading vessels by resorting to the same means to prevent their efficient use, and there is evidence that he had finally reached this conclusion, because, when the city capitulated, it was found that a searchlight plant was being erected and would have shortly been in operation. Another means of discouraging the use of the searchlights by the
blockading vessels would have been found in opening fire upon the light at any time, as the searchlight vessels were always within easy range of the batteries on either side of the entrance; but the Spaniards seemed to have preconceived ideas upon which they worked without reference to the changes and methods employed by the blockading vessels.
CHAPTER X.

THE BATTLE-SHIP IN AND OUT OF ACTION.

By Captain Robley D. Evans, U. S. N.

The difficulties of handling a battle-ship are not entirely inherent to a vessel of that class. It is not because she is a battle-ship that she is difficult to handle. Every seaman understands the difficulty, under certain conditions, of handling a ship of twelve thousand tons and upwards.

Let us consider first the transatlantic steamer. She is meant for speed and safety at sea. She makes her run across the Atlantic, very often attaining an average speed of twenty knots or more. As soon as she enters port a fleet of tug-boats takes charge of her, and she is berthed by them. A shore gang is rushed on board, and under the direction of engineers, especially employed for the purpose, she is made ready for her next trip. In everything she does she has either plenty of sea-room, or else she is assisted by all the tugs thought necessary.

Now for the battle-ship. She must be berthed by her commanding officer, usually without the assistance of a single tug; she must enter harbors through the most intricate channels without pilots, and she must be manœuvred in squadron at two hundred yards' distance with due consideration for the safety of her neighbors.

The difficulties of handling a battle-ship, which are not common to every ship of the same tonnage, arise from the fact that she is differently shaped from them. Her length must not exceed so many feet, and her draught of water is limited, therefore she must have great breadth of beam, with very flat bottom, and from these conditions one can see that at low speed she is unwieldy and does not answer
her helm with that readiness necessary in fine handling. All these difficulties can be overcome, and have been overcome, but it has been done only by handling battle-ships. No amount of theory, or theorizing, can do it. It must be done by actual practice, and the best practice is in squadron at sea.

For thirty-five nights on the Santiago blockade a battle-ship was lying off the Morro battery every night from dark to daylight, lighting up with her searchlight beams the entire channel as far up as the Punta Gorda battery. For one who has not tried it, this may seem easy work, but for those of us who had the job to do, I feel safe in saying it was the hardest work we ever performed. After the first few nights it was gratifying to see the regularity and precision with which the relief ship came in and took her position, and the one relieved backed out to her blockading station.

Imagine a black, dark night, not a light anywhere to be seen, except the searchlight beam of the ship in position, ugly cross-currents and frequently a heavy swell to contend with, two auxiliaries inshore of you, one on either side of the searchlight beam; inshore of them three picket boats close under the enemy's battery, and, inshore of them still, rapid-fire guns and Mausers without end, ready to open on the first American thing made visible by an unsteady hand at your searchlight. To run in and take up this position, and not to disclose the position of any of your friends, was the work we had to do every night, and there we had to stay, holding our position, frequently within one hundred yards of the beach, for three hours every night for thirty-five nights.

The difficulties of handling battle-ships were overcome only by constant practice, and in my judgment constant practice is the only reliable teacher.

It is frequently asked, "What is the best place from which to fight a battle-ship?" If we consider this question from the standpoint of comfort, it is very easily answered,
and I say without hesitation, after considerable practice, from the upper bridge. From this position the captain has a clear and unrestricted view of his surroundings, while his means of communication are reasonably good. The pleasure of seeing the fight, and what is taking place around him, is a great one, and he enjoys it.

I know of no more devilish place than the conning tower of a battle-ship in action. It has all the discomforts that one can imagine: it is dense with smoke after each discharge of the heavy guns, but the smoke clears away; the captain is stifled by it, but that discomfort also soon passes away. He is frequently knocked off his feet and thrown against the steering wheel, but this is also only a discomfort against which sound condition is a safeguard. With all the discomforts he is comparatively safe, and, considering the tactical value of the captain's life, I say unhesitatingly that every battle-ship should be fought from her conning tower.

The facilities at the captain's hand for communicating with all the important parts of the ship are slowly reaching a stage of great efficiency. One by one the electrical contrivances, speaking-tubes, etc., have been brought to meet our requirements. The efficiency of these has always been doubted, but now, after the actual test of battle, we are prepared to say which of them are good, which promising, and which absolutely bad, and it is not unreasonable to expect that the captain of one of our new battle-ships, fighting her from the conning tower, will readily make himself understood in the remotest part of the ship, and that his orders will be promptly carried out.

In this connection it may not be out of place to consider the effect of smokeless powder, first on the handling of a ship, and, second, on the aim of the gunners and the general efficiency of the fire.

At the bombardment of San Juan in May, by the squadron under command of Admiral Sampson, the smoke in a few moments became so dense that the fire of the entire
battery had to be stopped, and we patiently waited until this smoke lifted before we could fire an effective shot. It was simply impossible to see anything through it, except the occasional flashing of the guns of the ship next astern of us. Had we been provided with smokeless powder, for all classes of guns, the same amount of damage could have been inflicted on the enemy in one-third of the time. Every consideration demands smokeless powder. Ships cannot be handled in close formation in action while using black powder without great danger of collision. Under such conditions gunners cannot see the targets to be fired at, and therefore their fire must be, comparatively speaking, ineffective.

On the 31st of May, when Commodore Schley bombarded the Colon in the entrance of Santiago harbor, the contrast between the fire of the broadside guns of the Massachusetts and the New Orleans, a vessel then recently purchased from England and armed with 6-inch rapid-fire guns and using smokeless powder, was most striking. The cloud effects produced by the Massachusetts were very beautiful, but the rattle of the New Orleans' battery was very businesslike. The gunners on the one ship could occasionally, as the smoke drifted away, see the enemy's batteries, while from the other the batteries were constantly in plain view, and the gunners, unhampered by smoke, were at liberty to hit them as often as they could.

The dangers attendant upon the use of smokeless powder, which have heretofore seemed almost insurmountable, have been gradually overcome, and the able officers of our ordnance department will, no doubt, in the near future, supply this necessary explosive for guns of all classes in the navy.

Can the secondary batteries be properly handled when so close to the main batteries? This depends in a great measure upon how close the secondary batteries are placed to the heavy guns. In ordinary conditions of battle I believe that the secondary batteries of our battle-ships of the Iowa and Indiana classes can be safely used. When the
FIRST-CLASS BATTLESHIP OREGON.

From a photograph taken the day after the battle by J. C. Houen, copyrighted, 1898, by W. R. Houen.
The Battle-ship in and Out of Action

heavy guns have extreme train, forward or aft, as the case may be, it will become necessary to remove for a moment the crews of the rapid-fire guns with which they interfere, but this cannot be used as an argument against the efficiency of the present arrangement, for it will hold against any arrangement of rapid-fire guns when brought under the muzzle-blast of the larger weapons.

In the battle off Santiago, fought July 3, the rapid-fire battery of the battle-ship Iowa was used with great effect against the torpedo-boats and cruisers at moderate range. I found it necessary to station junior officers to call in the crews of these guns, as the heavier guns made their position dangerous. In the heat of the action several men were blown away from the 6-pounders by the blasts from the 12-inch gun. They were back at their stations in a moment, and several were blown away a second time; but the only injury done them was to their ears. If the 6-pounders had not been constantly firing, I suspect that many of the men would have had their heads shot off by the enemy. I therefore say that the secondary batteries can be properly handled in almost any position with reference to the main batteries, and very efficiently handled in the classes of battle-ships now in our service.

Whether or not marines should be employed as guns' crews or gun captains is a question which has caused a great deal of discussion in the navy, and has led, I am afraid, to much misunderstanding and ill feeling. My own view is that the gun crews and the gun captains should be the best men we can get, whether marines, firemen, or sailors. It seems to me only natural that I should prefer sailors, and that I should think firemen more efficient in an engine-room, and marines better at a soldier's job. In saying this I wish it clearly understood that I cast no reflection on the marines, and that I regard them as a most gallant and valuable body of men. If they had been organized, as I have long held they should be, as an expeditionary force, under naval regulations and discipline, and their
numbers increased to, say, twenty thousand, who can doubt that Sampson's fleet would have reduced the batteries of Havana on April 22 or 23, and that this body of marines could have then held the city, despite all the efforts of General Blanco and his volunteers.

To me, the late war with Spain has settled the fate of soft-ended battle-ships. Armor must be carried the whole length, and far enough up the side to give good protection to the secondary batteries. This applies particularly to battle-ships of the Iowa class. When this change has been made, and her ammunition hoists and anchor engines protected by armor, I should consider the Iowa as near an ideal fighting machine as any ship could be without 13-inch guns. The Indiana class are vastly her superior in this respect.

The enormous damage done by secondary battery fire at the battle of Santiago has led many officers to give, I think, undue weight to this part of the armament. We must remember that this was a battle between cruisers on the one side and battle-ships on the other, and we must try to imagine what would have been the effect if it had been two fleets of battle-ships. The sides of the cruisers were just thick enough to explode our common shells with the most disastrous effect to the guns' crews of the Spanish ships. Had they been battle-ships, this would not have been the case, and our secondary and rapid-fire batteries would have been practically useless until the heavy guns had broken up the armor and allowed the lighter projectiles to do their work. I therefore think that many false conclusions are being drawn from the result of this battle, and, while I am a great believer in rapid-fire guns of all classes, I am convinced that a battle-ship, when properly fought, cannot be destroyed by their fire. We must have the heavy guns, and the heavier the better within certain limits, to breach and rack to pieces the armor, in order that the lighter guns may be effective. I think no one now doubts that the way to whip a battle-ship, or in fact any ship, is to destroy her crew; but how is this to be done when the crew can take
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shelter behind fifteen inches of Harveyized steel? Surely not with rapid-fire guns.

The war with Spain has somewhat cleared up the question of fresh water for battle-ships. The Oregon brought her water all the way from San Francisco, using it over and over again in her boilers. Of course this was supplemented by the fresh water that she received at her several stopping-places en route. The general question of fresh water for battle-ships seems to me not a difficult one. We must have the fresh water, and the difficulties in the way of supplying it must be overcome, and can be in either one of two ways. We must either have a distilling ship for, say, each two battle-ships in our fleet, or else, knowing the amount necessary to make up our waste, put in the battle-ship a distilling plant capable of distilling the amount required.

The effect of using salt water in the boilers of our battle-ships during the late war was so injurious that it seems to me it would be criminal to allow it to occur again.

In a general way I may say that from the late war I deduced the following lessons:

First: The absolute necessity for fast, armored cruisers, capable of long sea endurance.

Second: Ample supply of torpedo-boat destroyers.

Third: The absolute necessity for proper colliers and supply vessels.

Fourth: The absolute necessity for smokeless powder.

Fifth: The need of some instrument by which the range can be accurately and rapidly obtained.

Sixth: The necessity for a more perfect system of communication, both as regards the ship herself, and as between different ships of the same squadron.

Seventh: Necessity for smokeless fuel.

Eighth: Inefficiency of fire from ships against earthworks properly constructed.

Ninth: Necessity for two conning towers, one forward and one aft.
CHAPTER XI.

THE SOUTHWESTERN BLOCKADE.


The formal blockade of the entire southern coast of the Island of Cuba was never declared. In the first proclamation issued by the President, dated April 22, 1898, which declared those ports between Cardenas and Bahia Honda, inclusive, in a state of blockade, only one port on the south coast was mentioned, that of Cienfuegos. The reason for selecting this one port must be attributed to its military importance, due to its spacious landlocked harbor with deep-water approach, capable of easy defence, which would afford a refuge for any Spanish fleet; and being in rail communication with Havana added much to its strategic importance. There, too, centred the southern lines of sub-marine cable communication with important Spanish points along the south coast of Cuba as well as with the outside world.

It will be remembered that upon the arrival of the American fleet off Havana the force was so disposed as to effectually blockade the ports included in the President’s proclamation. The Marblehead, Nashville, and Eagle were sent to Cienfuegos, and were joined later by the revenue cutter Morrill.

The peculiar conditions of the war between the Spanish Government and the Cubans, as to military domination over certain districts and the semi-guerilla warfare adopted by the Cuban forces, made difficult inter-communication between the separated Spanish forces. Along the south side of Cuba, especially, no land telegraph could be main-
tained. Hence resort was had to the submarine cable, supplemented by the heliographic system, while columns of smoke were sometimes used as danger signals. The approach of the rainy season modified somewhat the importance of the heliograph, hence the magnified value of the submarine cable, and importance of destroying this very valuable aid in the conduct of military operations.

Commander McCalla, commanding the *Marblehead*, and senior officer present, determined to make an effort to cut the cables at Cienfuegos, using the ship's boats in the absence of a regularly fitted cable steamer. The power necessary to lift a submarine cable even in six fathoms of water (thirty-six feet) is very considerable when the means that can be applied in a small boat is considered. But the needed power increases much more rapidly than that of the depth of water. Subsequent events proved that on this occasion all the cables were not cut, but the wonder is that, under the circumstances and with the means at hand, any could be. It was American daring that overcame the difficulties.

The appearance of the Spanish battle fleet in the vicinity of the Island of Martinique, and later on at the Island of Curaçao, indicated that the vessels would head for Santiago or Cienfuegos, or by a detour attempt to reach Havana. Any approach toward the southern coast of Cuba by this force, in the absence of an equal one to meet it and give battle, would necessarily cause the force blockading Cienfuegos to withdraw, it being wholly inadequate. Hence, the orders were issued to the senior officer off that port to abandon the blockade and retire to the northern coast, or to Key West. Compliance with the order raised the blockade of the port, and the entire south coast became open to trade.

When Admiral Cervera's fleet entered Santiago there remained no Spanish vessels on the high seas, or around the rest of Cuba, capable of any serious offensive work. A

1 An account of this undertaking will be found on page 83.
few armed merchantmen and a swarm of small gunboats from 500 to 50 tons displacement, and which really constituted a kind of coast guard, were all that remained. And these vessels were seeking, or had sought, refuge from the American ships.

The close blockade of the northern ports greatly affected the normal supply of food and provisions usually received by the Spanish troops from Europe. So great was the danger of capture that foreign merchantmen apparently would not actively engage in attempts to run the northern blockade. This caused much suffering among the troops and others in Cuba. The Spanish authorities, by employing small vessels of light draft, were able to bring into the southern ports considerable quantities of food from Mexico and adjacent Central American countries. To cut off this, the remaining source of supply, President McKinley issued a proclamation, dated June 28, placing under blockade all the Cuban coast between Cape Frances on the west and Cape Cruz on the east. With Sampson’s fleet guarding Santiago and having seized Guantanamo as a naval base, all ports would be closed to the enemy’s vessels, or to those wishing to bring in provisions.

A glance at a map of Cuba shows a peculiar conformation of its southern coast. Beginning at the westward end, or Cape San Antonio, the coast line runs nearly east and west for a distance of about forty miles with a bold coast, and no outlying dangers, as far as Cape Frances. Thence it trends in a northeasterly direction to Batabano, thence east to Santa Cruz del Sud; southeast to Manzanillo, then south to Cape Cruz, thus forming a great bight or recess in the coast line drawn from Cape Frances to Cape Cruz. East of Cape Cruz to Cape Maysi the line is almost east and west, very bold, rugged, and free from outlying dangers. The great bight is dotted with keys and shallow banks, and as it has never been thoroughly surveyed, navigation of its waters is confined to vessels of light draft, except in the vicinity of Cienfuegos, and then only with pilots. Situated
within this bight, beginning at the western end, were the following places of importance, held by the Spanish forces: Batabano, Cienfuegos, Casilda (the seaport of Trinidad), Tunas, Jucaro (the southern terminus of the eastern Trocha), Santa Cruz del Sud, and Manzanillo. The first two had rail communication with Havana; the last named was a very important military post in eastern Cuba, with a strong garrison. All were difficult of approach, and capable of perfect defense. From a military point of view, Cienfuegos and Manzanillo were the most important. Along the coast, separated by a few miles, especially at the mouths of rivers, were blockhouses—circular or square, about thirty to forty feet in diameter—erected by the Spanish military authorities, and garrisoned by from twenty to fifty soldiers. The object of these fortifications, for such they were, was to prevent the landing of provisions and arms for the Cubans. They were also used as heliograph stations. A line of similar structures stretched across the island from north to south at the two main trochas. They were built of adobe, with thick walls and a lookout or observation cupola. They were capable of a stout defense, unless attacked by cannon. Here and there along the coast the Cubans retained control of small stretches of the coast line, where it was difficult for the Spanish forces to operate; but these sections were comparatively small in extent. Upon the outbreak of hostilities between the United States and Spain there was concentration of the Spanish forces, and consequent abandonment by them of some minor posts which were promptly seized by the Cubans.

Immediately upon the issuance of the President's proclamation of June 28, extending the blockade from Cape Frances to Cape Cruz, Admiral Sampson dispatched as many of his auxiliary vessels as could be spared to Manzanillo and Cienfuegos. Before this, under international usage, some vessels of the fleet had been cruising in the vicinity of Cape Cruz to capture any Spanish ships trading in the West Indies, or endeavoring to reach Manzanillo.
Small success had attended the American efforts. At the same time that the re-enforcing vessels left Santiago one or two auxiliaries were detached from the northern blockade and were sent to guard the region of the Isle of Pines, south of Batabano.

It was well known that several Spanish gunboats and probably quite a number of merchant steamers were lying in or massing near Manzanillo. As the Spanish troops could not be moved along the south coast except by water, owing to the swampy character of the land and probable attack from the Cubans, Manzanillo was a kind of distributing port, east and west. The Spanish steamer Purissima Concepcion had been particularly active in bringing provisions from Jamaica to the Spanish forces, and she was known to be somewhere near Manzanillo. On the 30th of June the small auxiliary vessels Hist, Hornet, and Wompatuck proceeded from Cape Cruz by the south pass to Manzanillo, a distance of about sixty miles. By means of the heliograph the Spaniards were notified as the American boats proceeded. Upon their arrival off Manzanillo they entered the harbor by the southern channel. There they met much more resistance than was anticipated. After a sharp engagement of about half an hour with gunboats, shore batteries, and infantry, the American vessels were compelled to retire, the Hornet in a temporarily disabled condition, her steam pipe having been cut by an enemy's shot.

On the next day, July 1, two more auxiliary vessels, the Scorpion and Osceola, arrived from Santiago in the vicinity of Manzanillo, having passed through the outlying keys by the Cuatro Riales channel to guard the northern exit from the town. Lieutenant-Commander Marix, of the Scorpion, had expected to find the three vessels engaged the previous day, but they had retired the same way they came, and were not met with. The Scorpion and Osceola, the latter vessel commanded by Lieutenant Purcell, then entered Manzanillo harbor by a new channel between the
keys fronting the town, but were compelled to retire after a brisk engagement of half an hour. All the vessels in the two engagements were converted auxiliaries, small in size, with only secondary batteries, except the *Scorpion* which carried four 5-inch rapid-fire guns. Had the two forces been combined, as was intended, some success would probably have resulted. As it happened, nothing of importance was accomplished, and the Spaniards were much encouraged and made over-confident. The *Hornet* went to Guantanamo for repairs, and the other vessels resumed their blockading stations and effectively closed the port of Manzanillo for entry or exit.

While the operations referred to were going on around Manzanillo, the auxiliary cruisers *Yankee, Dixie, Yankton*, and gunboat *Helena* were closely blockading Cienfuegos and Casilda, the seaport of Trinidad. But apart from shelling some blockhouses and troops along the coast between these two places, nothing of importance occurred. Upon the appearance of the *Yankee* off Cienfuegos, the Spanish gunboat *Galicia* came out and approached the American cruiser, mistaking her for a merchant steamer. The *Yankee* turned, as though to run away, adopting this ruse to draw the Spaniard far enough away from the entrance of the harbor to insure her capture, but turned again too soon and fired, which caused the *Galicia* to make a hasty retreat into the harbor. The *Yankee* had practically an untrained crew, and the escape of the Spaniard is to be attributed to the poor gun practice of a green crew, for the *Galicia* was within range and the *Yankee* carried a 5-inch battery.¹

¹In his report of this affair Commander Brownson, commanding the *Yankee*, reported the serious wounding of landsman Kennedy by a shell from the *Galicia*. He also stated that the batteries and another gunboat fired on the *Yankee*. Commander Brownson attributes the escape of the *Galicia* to the heavy smoke from the brown prismatic powder of the *Yankee*'s own guns. Had it not been for the interference of the heavy smoke and the inefficiency of the powder, Commander Brownson said that "we would have destroyed the larger gunboat, notwithstanding the fire of the batteries." The *Yankee*, it will be remembered, was manned by the Naval Militia.
The region of the Isle of Pines had been extensively used to run in supplies from Mexico and adjacent Central American ports to Batabano, thence by rail to Havana province. The small auxiliary cruiser *Eagle*, Lieutenant Southerland, was very active in this vicinity and soon caused at least a partial suspension of this traffic. But single-handed it was not possible for her to completely cut off the entrance of these supplies. From Jamaica small steamers were entering the many channels between the keys and were reaching Jucaro, Santa Cruz, and Tunas, but up to the middle of July the class of vessels employed on the blockade were neither of suitable draft for inside work along the coast, nor sufficient in number. However, on July 11 the *Hist* and *Wompatuck* entered through Cuatro Roads channel and cut the submarine cable between Santa Cruz and Manzanillo.

The *Wilmington* had proceeded from Key West to Santiago as a convoying vessel for the army. The troops were landed at Siboney, and the *Wilmington* then proceeded to Guantanamo for coal, returning to the vicinity of the flagship *New York* on July 14. I was then sent for by the commander-in-chief [Sampson], who directed me to proceed to Manzanillo and blockade that port and those ports to the westward of it. I was informed that the *Helena* and *Hist* would follow within a day or two, and the revenue cutter *Manning* some time later. At that time the *Detroit* and *Yankton* were blockading Cienfuegos, while the *Scorpion*, *Osceola*, *Hornet*, and *Wompatuck* were in Manzanillo and Cape Cruz waters. In a general discussion of the situation, I expressed to Admiral Sampson the opinion that the most effective way to stop the traffic of the enemy was to destroy his shipping wherever found, beginning with Manzanillo and then proceeding westward to the other ports. While no written instructions were given to me as to the execution of the plan, a tacit approval was given to it, with the instructions not to engage land forts or batteries nor to expose the light vessels unnecessarily.
THE CRISTOBAL COLON LIVING ON THE BEACH NEAR RIO TARQUINO.

From a photograph taken in the afternoon of July 4, by J. C. Heenan: copyrighted, 1868, by W. H. Hare.
The Wilmington reached Cape Cruz on July 15, and I communicated with the Wompatuck, which was blockading at that entrance to Manzanillo. From her I learned that the Scorpion, Osceola, and Hornet were in the vicinity of Guayabal, an anchorage twenty miles west of Manzanillo, and covering the northern channel to that port. I instructed Lieutenant Jungen, commanding the Wompatuck, that upon the arrival of the Helena and Hist off Cape Cruz he should proceed with them and join the Wilmington at Cuatro Roads channel. The Wilmington anchored inside Cuatro Roads on the evening of July 15. On the 16th I proceeded off Santa Cruz, fifteen miles to the northward, to reconnoitre. Through overhauling a fishing-boat, the location of the cable west of the town was ascertained. I proceeded to that point and the cable was grappled for, caught, and cut. I then returned to the anchorage at Cuatro Roads, and sighted the Helena, Hist, and Wompatuck in the offing. On the morning of the 17th, these three vessels entered through the channel in company with the Wilmington, and shaped a course for Guayabal, arriving there at 2 P.M. There we found the Scorpion, Osceola, and Hornet.

The commanding officers of the several vessels were summoned on board the Wilmington. From sketches made, based upon previous observations and recollection, a general sketch was made showing the location, size, number, and armament of the Spanish shipping in the harbor. From the commandant of Guayabal—a Cuban—were learned the number and size of the guns in the forts and the number of army field-pieces around the city. Upon this I formulated a plan of action and explained its details to the assembled officers. The vessels were ordered stripped for hot action, boats were hoisted out, and all preparations were made before dark for the squadron to get under way at three o'clock the following morning—July 18.

The approach to Manzanillo from the westward is through a narrow channel ten miles from the city, through
which even the local vessels will not pass except by daylight. As Guayabal is distant twenty miles, in order to reach this narrow pass at daylight the squadron moved at 3 A.M. on the 18th, and reached the pass an hour and a half later. Then we passed through and steamed at full speed for Manzanillo. One object of the early start was to reach the destination as soon as possible, taking what benefit would accrue from surprise.

The general character of Manzanillo harbor is that of a crescent, with crown to the eastward. A long string of keys, distant about one and one-half miles, fronts the anchorage, forming the western inclosing side. The channel between the wharves and keys is not very wide, but is deep, and as the charts furnished were not reliable, great care had to be exercised in handling such vessels as the Wilmington and Helena, owing to their length. Three large transports and the Ponton, or guard ship, were known to be at or near the northern entrance. The gunboats, it was thought, were likely to be found strung out along the harbor front, close in shore. This estimate proved to be correct.

I had issued instructions that upon arrival of the force in front of the keys opposite the city, the Wilmington and Helena should enter by the northern channel and their guns be turned first on the transports and guardship. The Scorpion and Osceola were to pass through the middle keys by a channel discovered by the latter previously and not shown on the chart. These two vessels were to devote their gun-fire to the gunboats nearest the guardship, and the Scorpion, particularly, with her 5-inch guns was to keep down any fire that might develop from unknown shore batteries. The Hist, Hornet, and Wompatouck were to enter by the southern channel, engage any gunboats found near-by, and prevent any escaping. Deliberation of fire was insisted upon, and care was ordered to be taken not to damage the city; the objective being the shipping of the enemy and not the town itself. As the squadron approached near enough to observe, a large number of
schooners were seen poling and paddling from the city front to in and above the mouth of the Yara River, the north boundary of the town. As they were but small trading schooners no attention was paid to their movements.

At 7:15 A.M. the squadron, in double column, with the Wilmington and Helena leading, arrived off the middle of the keys fronting the city. Signal was made to "take stations," whereupon the Wilmington and Helena turned at half speed to the northward, the Scorpion and Osceola kept on at slow speed, the Hist, Hornet, and Wompatuck proceeded at full speed to the southern entrance. The three latter boats had some two miles further to travel in order to reach their stations than the others. All vessels had been directed to shell the keys as they closed in, in order to develop any masked guns that might probably be located thereon. The whistling and cutting through the light growth of the six-pound shells could be plainly heard as the vessels advanced. The result was that two hostile parties, who had been secreted among the trees, undoubtedly with light guns in place, hastily decamped and pulled for the city. At 7:40 the vessels entered the harbor, and at 7:50 the Wilmington opened on the transports, and was followed immediately by the other ships exactly as directed. The enemy returned the fire from the Ponton, and from six gunboats. Fort Zaragoza and a circular fort back of the city also joined in the attack, but the fire of these forts was ineffective, as they were then at too long a range.

In a half-hour all three transports were burning. I had ordered the Helena's gun-fire divided between the Ponton and the Cuba-Espaňola, observed to be lying a short distance from her. As soon as the transports were fairly burning, the Wilmington joined her gun-fire with that of the Helena. Soon the Cuba-Espaňola was riddled, and the Ponton burning. Shortly afterward the Ponton blew up. The Helena's gun-fire was now added to that of the smaller vessels against the other Spanish gunboats stretched along the shore. The fire from the middle and southern end of
the line began to tell. One gunboat sank, and the remaining three in sight hugged the shore in an endeavor to escape the deadly concentrating fire. Gradually all our vessels closed in on them, and by 10:20 A.M. the remaining three Spanish gunboats were driven ashore and abandoned. One was burning, one was sunk, and the last one was partially submerged on the beach.

As our vessels closed in on the shore the fire from the forts and field guns, placed as near as possible to the water front, had been redoubled. Our vessels had already observed their shells falling close around the enemy ashore. A close watch, however, had been kept to avoid going near anything having the appearance of a range buoy, flag, or stake which the Spaniards invariably used to regulate their range.

The last remaining gunboat of the enemy having been completely disabled and ashore, and as the fire from the shore batteries became hotter, I signalled, at 10:20, to retire. The object of the attack had been attained. The entire force returned by the ways they had entered, meeting outside the keys and anchoring for the day, wholly uninjured and without a casualty.

The result of the operation was the complete destruction by shell and fire of the transports *Purissima Concepcion*, *La Gloria*, *Jose Garcia*, and the *Ponton Maria*; the gunboats *Guantanamo*, *Cuba-Espanola*, *Guardian*, *Parejo Delgeso*, *Estrella*, and *Cantinella*.

After receiving the verbal reports from the various commanding officers, I prepared my report of the engagement and decided to send the *Wompatuck* to Santiago carrying dispatches to Admiral Sampson. The revenue cutter *Manning* had joined the squadron at 1 P.M. The *Hornet* was directed to proceed to Cape Cruz and maintain the blockade at that point. The most direct route for both of these vessels was by the south pass, a little north of the cape proper, but as the channel was intricate a pilot would be needed. The distance was ninety miles, and as daylight was
required to pass so close to the enemy’s coast, a delay was necessary until the next morning, in order to make an early start. The *Hist*, having a pilot, was directed to accompany the *Wompatuck* and *Hornet*, and to rejoin my force off Santa Cruz on the forenoon of the 20th. The vessels were distributed over-night to guard the three entrances; not that there was any vessel to come out, but to prevent any from attempting to run in.

The following forenoon, the *Hist*, *Hornet* and *Wompatuck* having started south, the remaining vessels proceeded to Guyabal, and took on board the boats that had been left there. The next morning the *Wilmington*, *Helena*, *Manning*, *Scorpion*, and *Osceola* got underway and headed for Santa Cruz del Sud, an important point twenty miles to the westward. Upon nearing the town the *Hist* rejoined, having entered by the way of Cuatro Reales channel. There had been a force of 350 Spanish troops stationed at this point, and considerable shipping was reported as making the place a headquarters, thence travelling east and west with supplies and troops. Not even a fishing-boat was visible as the squadron neared the town, and the only sign of life was a party of some twenty soldiers who hastily quitted a blockhouse and disappeared among the trees. A hospital, with the Red Cross flag flying over it showing wounded to be there, was observed near the centre of the place. The ships advanced in column and, using only six-pounders, circled twice in front of the wharves, the fire, by signal, being directed at the blockhouse on the right and the barracks on the left of the town. Except as gun practice, nothing was accomplished by this demonstration, but temporary evacuation was evident, there being no return of our fire, or signs of life anywhere. The garrison and shipping had apparently heard of the approach of our squadron.

The *Scorpion* and *Osceola* were ordered back to Guaya­bal, and at noon the other vessels proceeded to the westward, winding their way through the multitude of keys
toward Jucaro, the next important point. The squadron anchored in Gitana Pass about sunset. Jucaro is the southern terminus of the Moron-Jucaro trocha, the most important trocha in Cuba. Its termini were connected by rail, with blockhouses every mile, the intervening space being filled by abattis of felled trees, barbed wire, and earthworks. It was very formidable to the Cubans, who had only small arms. The Spanish garrisons along the line were largely provisioned by rail from the southern terminus, Jucaro. The approach to this was very shoal both from the east and west, and was protected to the southward by a string of keys. A submarine cable was believed to be located in the western channel. The Wilmington proceeded toward the town to reconnoitre. The other vessels I directed to drag for the cable. The only thing visible in the way of shipping was a sunken schooner of about forty tons. The distance of the Wilmington was about two miles from the wharves. Had there been any shipping at anchor or moored to the wharves it could have been destroyed. The only sign of fortifications was a series of blockhouses surrounding the town. No ammunition was wasted on these blockhouses, and there being no shipping to destroy, the Wilmington rejoined the other vessels, sent out her boats, and was fortunate enough to soon grapple the sought-for cable. It was raised by the Wilmington’s launch, cut, and the ends dragged away by the Hist. It was learned that afternoon that the inhabitants of Jucaro, except a few soldiers, had deserted the town, fearing a bombardment, word having been received by heliograph signal from Manzanillo of the destruction at that place.

The squadron now proceeded west toward Tunas, forty miles distant, but anchored at sunset, having made about half the distance. At daylight of the 22d we got under way, and at seven arrived off Tunas. Had it not been for a blinding rain squall, which set in while we were in front of the town, I would have attacked at long range some vessels observed in a lagoon half a mile behind the
town. The narrow, difficult channel, without any accurate chart of the harbor, rendered this impossible; hence I made signal to proceed, and the whole force kept on to the supposed location of the cable between Tunas and Trinidad. This point was reached by 10 A.M. of the 22d, and all boats put to work dragging. The Wilmington's boat caught, lifted, and cut the cable. This completed the cable cutting on the south side, leaving the Spanish with only the heliographic system to depend upon, and as the rainy season had set in that was not of great value.

The Manning was now sent to Cienfuegos with mail and to communicate with Commodore Schley, who was supposed to be off that port on his flagship Brooklyn. Thence she was to return to Cape Cruz for blockade duty. Returning toward Tunas, the Helena was anchored to the westward and the Wilmington and Hist east of the town, at about two and one-half miles distance. As the vessels returned off that town, hundreds of people were seen camping out on the beach, east of the anchorage, evidently anticipating a bombardment. The lack of a good chart and the consequent danger of attempting to manoeuvre two vessels like the Helena and Wilmington caused me to forego for the present the proposed attack. I directed the Helena to remain and watch the port. After dark the Wilmington and Hist got under way and headed toward Jucaro. When approaching that town, smoke was seen to the eastward. The Hist was sent ahead by a roundabout pass to get behind it, while the Wilmington proceeded slowly and entered Jucaro anchorage to head off any attempt to escape, should the smoke turn out to be a steamer's smoke. The smoke disappeared, and the two vessels wended their way through the keys toward Santa Cruz, anchoring at sunset. On the 24th the Hist was sent to Cuatro Reales anchorage for any instructions that might have been sent there, while the Wilmington appeared off Santa Cruz and threw a few six-pounder shell into the blockhouse and barracks, and then proceeded to Cuatro Reales anchorage.
I had asked instructions of the commander-in-chief whether or not to make a further attack or demonstration against Manzanillo in conjunction with a military force, as reliable information had been received that the Spaniards would offer but feeble resistance. Such a movement would, of course, have required a concentration of the blockading force. Cuatro Reales channel had been provisionally designated as the rendezvous, and the vessels of my squadron had been instructed to move promptly when word was received to proceed to that point.

Instructions not being received as early as expected, I was of opinion the delay was due to awaiting the military force, and proceeded to concentrate the vessels. On the 27th of July I received orders to proceed to Cienfuegos with the Helena, Manning, Yankton, Hornet, and Wompatuck. The commander-in-chief was of the opinion that the eastern end of the blockade, by reason of recent operations, could be sufficiently looked after by the Scorpion, Osceola, and Hist. The bearer of these orders, the torpedo-boat Dupont, had met the Helena and Osceola, and Commander Swinburne of the Helena turned back to Cienfuegos where the Wilmington joined him on July 28, and the Yankton and Manning on July 31.

The Bancroft and Maple had been added to the auxiliary Eagle in the vicinity of the Isle of Pines, but, aside from the capture of some small schooners, nothing of importance had occurred in those waters until July 24, when the large Spanish steamer Santo Domingo was sighted by the Eagle and when chased ran for the entrance north of Cape Frances. Her captain mistook the channel in his excitement, and the vessel grounded heavily, her crew abandoning her. The Eagle boarded the Santo Domingo, set her on fire and destroyed her. She was heavily armed for a merchantman. The Eagle, Bancroft, and Maple continued to closely blockade these waters. As soon as the Yankton and Manning arrived off Cienfuegos, the Helena was also sent over to the vicinity of the Isle of Pines to look after that
end of the Cienfuegos-Batabano blockade, and to gather such information as could be had, with the object of shortly proceeding up to Batabano and destroying any Spanish shipping found there. Nothing of interest occurred for some time off Cienfuegos. Owing to a lack of coal within 300 miles, some few days were occupied in filling the several vessels at Key West. This being done, I arranged to attack Batabano with the *Wilmington*, *Helena*, *Hornet*, and *Eagle*. The *Wilmington* was to have left on August 13 for the Isle of Pines, there to be joined by the *Helena*, *Hornet*, and *Eagle*, preparatory to a projected attack, the following day, but at 10:30 A.M. on the 13th a flag of truce from the shore at Cienfuegos brought me a telegram from Commodore Remey at Key West in which he said that a suspension of hostilities had been proclaimed by the President. On the 15th of August official notice was received that the blockade had been raised, thus closing all efforts in this direction on the south coast of Cuba.
CHAPTER XII.

THE CAMPAIGN CLOSES.

What might well be called a sequel to the battle of July 3 occurred about midnight on July 4, when the Reina Mercedes was sunk in the mouth of Santiago harbor. This vessel had not attempted to join in the sortie of Cervera. By means of the searchlight she was seen coming out, and was riddled with holes in less than fifteen minutes, the Texas and Massachusetts being principally responsible for the shooting. The forts opened, and a shell burst in the wardroom of the Indiana, but did no great damage and caused no casualties. For a few minutes this midnight engagement was hot and exciting, but the forts soon ceased firing, and it was evident that the Reina Mercedes was sunk, whether intentionally or from the effect of our fire we did not then know.

Lieutenant Müller has written the Spanish side of this affair. "As the interior of the harbor," says the Spanish lieutenant, "did no longer have the safeguard of the fleet, as the Bustamente torpedoes (six of them) had been taken up so that the fleet could go out and had not yet been replaced, and as, finally, the first line of mines no longer existed, the commander of marine decided—General Toral also being of his opinion—to sink the Mercedes (the only ship that was suitable for that purpose) in the narrow part of the channel; consequently, the commander of the cruiser received orders to do so. Hurriedly, for time was pressing, the wounded and sick from the lost fleet were transferred to the steamer Mójico. Important papers that had been saved, memoranda, portable arms, beds, and the most necessary things, were taken off the Mercedes, and at 8 P.M.
her commander, Ensign Nardiz, a few engineers, the necessary sailors and pilots started toward the entrance, with her bow anchor and stern spring on the cable ready. At 11:30, as soon as the enemy, who was watching with searchlights, sighted her, he opened a continuous fire on the ship. In spite of this the ship was sunk at the intended place, a very difficult operation under any circumstances and especially under fire, as will be readily understood. Unfortunately the ship did not come to lie across the channel, because it seems a projectile cut the spring on the cable; the sacrifice was useless and the harbor not obstructed. Yet it was not entirely useless, since the enemy could not take possession of her, as she is all riddled by bullets which she received that night, and I do not believe she can ever be used again.” (The Mercedes was successfully raised in Feb., 1899.)

So the second attempt to block the harbor, gallantly tried, failed almost as the Merrimac had. Ensign Nardiz, though not taking as great risks as did Hobson, certainly deserves a niche in the reredos of heroes that the war produced. Incidentally, Lieutenant Müller states that many of the crews of the Spanish torpedo-boat destroyers, who the previous day had swum ashore, were murdered by the insurgent Cubans while trying to get back to Santiago.

The destruction of Cervera’s fleet accomplished the main objective of the Navy: the sole purpose of the fleet’s presence off Santiago. However, the army was now in such condition that the main objective became an effort to assist it. The day after the battle, July 4, Shafter wrote to Sampson saying that he had demanded the surrender of the city and that it had been refused. “Now,” wrote the major-general, “if you will force your way into that harbor the town will surrender without any further sacrifice of life. My present position has cost me one thousand men, and I do not wish to lose any more. With my forces on one side and yours on the other—and they have a great terror of the navy, for they know they cannot hurt you—we shall have them.” In other words, General Shafter,
having failed to accomplish the purpose for which the army was sent, now asked the navy to take risks which Sampson and his superiors and inferiors had declared to be unwise and unjustified even for that tremendously overwhelming objective—the destruction of Cervera's fleet—and to take these risks because, forsooth, General Shafter could not advance and was ordered not to retreat from the position into which he had taken the army, a remarkable one when it is remembered that the objective of both army and navy was the annihilation of Cervera. In no way, directly, was the army responsible for forcing Cervera out of Santiago, and as long as Cervera had stayed in the harbor Shafter could not have captured the city.

On the 6th Sampson received this dispatch from Long:

“You are instructed not to risk loss of any armored vessels by submarine mines unless for the most urgent reasons, as the duration and result of this war will depend chiefly upon the superiority of our navy to that of the enemy. It has always been considered here that if you will batter the Morro, and the United States Army will assail and take, they could hold the bank of the entry, driving away infantry of the enemy from the vicinity of mine fields, thus enabling your boats, supported by fire of the vessels, to clear a channel through which your ships could enter and take the place.”

However, it was no time for quibbling, and it was too late to reorganize the campaign; so on July 6 Captain Chadwick rode inland and had a long conference with Shafter. Sampson was ill, and could not go himself. At this conference it was agreed between the army and navy that the fleet should bombard the city from the sea, firing by compass as the New York did on July 1. If this was not sufficient to bring the enemy to terms, the marines, under fire of the ships, were to be landed and storm the batteries, and some smaller vessels—smaller because, if sunk, they would not obstruct all entrance—were to try to enter the harbor. This plan of attack by marines I
have already referred to. Sampson was loath to adopt it, because he had grave doubts that with such a small force as one thousand he could achieve success where Shafter, with fifteen thousand, had feared to try. It was a last expedient, and a concession against judgment to the pleadings of Shafter. It was, perhaps, justified by the serious plight in which apparently poor generalship had involved our gallant soldiers.

During the conference at which this plan was adopted, Captain Chadwick drew up an ultimatum which was signed by Shafter and sent to the Spanish General Toral. This told the Spanish General of the complete destruction of Cervera's fleet, of the intended naval bombardment of the city at noon on July 9, and suggested, in the interests of humanity, the surrender of the city. When Shafter's own statements regarding the army are considered, it may be surmised that this ultimatum was somewhat in the nature of a "bluff"; but it was ably written and had no little to do with the ultimate surrender.

The days that intervened between July 6 and July 10 were marked by a truce on land, and the warships lay off the mouth of the harbor, waiting to fulfil their share of the agreement. On the 6th Hobson and his seven Merrimac heroes were exchanged for Spaniards captured by the army, and returned aboard the New York, all well and none the worse for their long confinement in Santiago. Shafter notified Sampson that the bombardment set for the 9th would be deferred, so the rear-admiral went off to Guantanamo for coal. At 4 P.M. on July 10, upon the request of General Shafter, wigwagged from the hillside by means of a tardily established signal service, Commodore Schley, with the Brooklyn, Texas, and Indiana, commenced bombarding the city, firing over the hills. This was kept up for about an hour, and at the request of Shafter was stopped. The major-general reported that the shots were falling short. The following morning Sampson, with the New York, Indiana, and Brooklyn, bombarded the city
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from 9:27 A.M. until 1 P.M., throwing 8-inch and larger shells over the hills. The fall of the shots was reported by the army from the hillside. It was slow work, and unsatisfactory to the bombarders. At a later date it was learned that the great shells had caused panic in the city, striking fifty-seven buildings and wrecking and burning the majority. No persons, by good fortune, were killed in this naval bombardment, which evidently, if maintained, would have laid the whole city in ruins, despite the great difficulties experienced by the gunners, utterly unable to see their targets. Sampson made every preparation to continue the bombardment, bringing the Oregon and Massachusetts from Guantanamo, where they were fitting out for the eastern squadron and preparing for their trip to Manila, via Spain, at the urgent mandate of Secretary Long.

From July 11 until July 16 Sampson kept his battleships off Santiago, delaying the eastern squadron and waiting for Shafter to give the word for another bombardment. One day would come the message that a bombardment would be requested shortly, and the next day that the enemy was expected any minute to capitulate. The truce still existed. The Spaniards all this time were considering the ultimatum; the naval mining outfits were arranged for countermining by three expert officers especially appointed by Sampson for that purpose, and the marines were held in readiness. On July 13 Sampson received this cablegram from Long:

"The Commanding General of the Army urges, and Secretary of War urgently requests that Navy force harbor; confer with commander of Army. Wishing to do all that is reasonably possible to insure the surrender of the enemy, I leave the matter to your discretion, except that the United States armored vessels must not be risked."

Thus it will be seen that Secretary Long had not lost sight of the essential principle, as true at the beginning as toward the end of the war, that the result of the conflict depended upon which nation maintained the superiority on
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the sea. On July 14 Sampson cabled to Long in part as follows:

"Published telegrams of General Shafter reflect on the Navy. I wish the Department and the President to understand that the first requisite to opening harbor of Santiago de Cuba is the occupation of forts and entrenchments at its entrance guarding mine fields, and that the general had never made a move to do this, although, before his army landed, he stated that such was the primary object of his operations. If the general chooses to ignore the sea approaches and to attack Santiago to the east and north, that is his affair; but it should be clearly understood that this attack does not influence the situation at the harbor entrance, from which his left flank is distant not less than four miles. I have been ready at any time during the last three weeks to silence works, to clear entrance of mines, and to enter harbor whenever the army will do the part which the proper conduct of war assigns to it. To throw my ships to certain destruction upon mine-fields would be suicidal folly, and I have not the force to form landing party strong enough to insure the capture of the forts."

On July 16 the army wigwagged to the fleet that Santiago had surrendered. On July 13, on which day Major-General Miles, commanding the army, arrived, Sampson had requested to be represented at the negotiations for surrender, as President McKinley had seen fit to especially designate that all operations should be jointly carried on between the army and navy. Not only was the navy not represented at the negotiations for surrender, but Sampson was utterly ignorant of the terms agreed to until Major-General Miles, who was in the somewhat anomalous position of onlooker during these events, kindly sent the rear-admiral, later on the 16th, a copy of the capitulation articles for "his information," but not his signature, and added the generous though just remark: "I am glad the Navy has been able to contribute such an important part [toward the surrender]."
Captain Chadwick, representing the navy, was at once sent to see Shafter, who peremptorily refused to let the navy have anything to do with the matter, stating that nothing had been said about the army in Sampson's report of the naval battle of July 3.

This lamentable lack of co-operation, which was evidenced throughout many other minor details, culminated seriously on the night of July 17. No mention had been made in the terms of capitulation of the shipping in the harbor, though Chadwick had notified Shafter that the navy would consider all shipping as within its province. Having learned by experience how prone were the Spaniards to treacherously blowing up their own and other vessels, Sampson, after destroying the mines in the surrendered harbor, at once sent prize crews to take possession of the small gunboat Alvarado and the five merchant steamers which had been penned in by the blockade. An army officer and a detail of soldiers were found on the Alvarado. The army officer, evidently seeing the absurdity of his position, gracefully made way for the navy, and the Alvarado was taken out of the harbor, not, however, before she was pursued by a tug with army officers aboard, who had been sent off post-haste as soon as Shafter learned of the evacuation of the Alvarado against his orders. On the merchant steamers it was different. They each lay there with two prize "crews," one from the army and one from the navy—co-operation with a vengeance!—and both in absolute control. Shafter ordered the navy crews off, and Sampson ordered them to stay where they were, but told Lieutenant Doyle, the senior prize officer, to use only "passive resistance." Shafter declared he had the authority of Secretary of War Alger for retaining his possession, and Sampson politely replied that he could not recognize Mr. Alger's jurisdiction. The matter was referred to President McKinley and later to the Supreme Court, which promptly decided that the shipping belonged to the navy, and Shafter, under these orders, withdrew his
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prize "crews" on July 20. The incident created some rather stringent correspondence between Shafter and Sampson, but luckily resulted in no serious conflict of forces. The absurd contention of Secretary Alger merely proves how necessary are strict regulations governing army and navy co-operation, and how essential it is that in such operations what is the navy's should be rendered unto it, without having to go to the Supreme Court.

The surrender of Santiago including, as it did, the capitulation of the city, over twenty thousand Spanish troops, and considerable territory, was an eminently creditable performance for American arms, and one in which the navy had no small share. However, the city would have been forced in any case to surrender within two months on account of lack of food, so perfect was the naval blockade. I do not wish to belittle the splendid work done by as fine a lot of troops as ever shouldered rifles, and there is no doubt but that the surrender made to General Shafter had some moral effect in terminating the war; but, as far as Spain in the West Indies was concerned, the war, broadly speaking, was over when Cervera's fleet was destroyed.

The first vessel, not counting launches and rowboats, to be allowed by Sampson to enter the harbor of Santiago was the Red Cross steamer State of Texas, with Miss Clara Barton and about fourteen hundred tons of provisions aboard. She steamed in past the sunken Merrimac and the battered Morro at five o'clock on Sunday afternoon, July 17, and the Red Cross nurses gathered at the bow sang hymns of praise that echoed gladly in the crevices of the cliffs that so long had reverberated with the roar of cannon. Sampson was anxious to relieve quickly the suffering caused by the blockade of the city. He himself followed on the morning of July 18, accompanied by Commodore Schley and other officers. After this formal visit Sampson had no further call for work at Santiago, though one ship remained either in or off the harbor on guard, and at a later date the American liners were turned over to the
army for the transportation of troops from Santiago. Guantanamo, with its spacious harbor, now became the naval headquarters. Wrecking steamers were already at work upon the burned Spanish vessels that lay where they beached. A board of survey had reported that the Colon and Maria Teresa might be saved.

On July 20 Sampson was confronted with hard problems regarding the disposition of his fleet. It was urgent that the blockade of Cuba should be rigidly enforced, and it now stretched along a thousand or more miles of irregular coastline, while the southern portion, as Commander Todd has shown, demanded considerable strength for various independent operations. The army was about to invade Porto Rico, and demanded a strong convoy. In addition to these two movements, requiring many ships, every armored vessel of the fleet, except the monitors, was ordered to Spain. The Navy Department had now organized the eastern movement into two divisions, a convoying and eastern squadron. Sampson was to have complete charge of both. Commodore Watson was to be his second in command. The convoying squadron was to see the eastern squadron safely through the Suez canal, and then return, bombarding or fighting where thought advisable on either trip. The convoying squadron was composed of the New York, Brooklyn, Iowa, Indiana, and New Orleans, and the eastern squadron of the Oregon, Massachusetts, Newark, Yankee, Dixie, Yosemite, Mayflower, Badger, and a fleet of colliers. Commodore Watson was to take these vessels on to Dewey, where the Spanish Admiral Camara was also supposed to be bound, though he had not yet got past Aden. (Camara returned to Cadiz on July 27).

A better idea of the situation may be gained from knowledge of the vessels at Guantanamo on July 20. On that date there were in the harbor the New York, Oregon, Massachusetts, Indiana, Texas, Columbia, Newark, Detroit, Marblehead, Yale, Dixie, Hawk; Gloucester, Dupont, Rodgers, Ericsson, Vesuvius, Samoset, Alvarado,
STARBORD QUARTER VIEW OF THE ALMIRANTE QUEÑO.

From a photograph taken on the morning of the day after the battle, July 6, by J. C. Henriques; copyright, 1908, by W. H. Howes.

(Steam was coming out of the capstan’s hole at the time the picture was taken.)
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*Celtic* (supply ship), *Vulcan* (repair ship), three transports, and three coal-schooners, a remarkable fleet in itself, but small for the uses of diversity. The vessels bound for the East were busy coaling and taking on the large amount of ammunition and supplies that such a trip entailed. Miles was on the *Yale*, with three thousand troops.

The convoy of the army was decided upon when on July 21 Sampson dispatched the *Massachusetts*, *Columbia*, *Yale*, *Dixie*, and *Gloucester* to co-operate with General Miles against Porto Rico. The monitors *Puritan*, *Terror*, and *Amphitrite*, and the *Montgomery*, *Cincinnati*, *Annapolis*, and *Wasp* were already on their way to that island. Sampson protested against sending the *Massachusetts*, and, in fact, objected to dispatching such a strong convoy, because there was nothing now to fear from the enemy's navy, and Gen. Miles was not going to attack any strong forts, and the convoy made it impossible to prepare the eastern squadron. However, Miles insisted on great naval strength and got it. While on this subject I will briefly outline the work of the navy in the Porto Rican campaign.

Captain Higginson, of the *Massachusetts*, was the senior naval officer with the Miles expedition. It had been decided to land near Cape San Juan, about thirty miles from the city of that name, but on July 22, while at sea, Miles told Higginson that he wanted to land on the south coast of Porto Rico, near Guanica, as his intention of landing at Cape San Juan had been exploited in the press of the United States, and that the Spaniards were massing troops there as a result. The convoy arrived off Port Guanica on the morning of July 25, and Higginson allowed Wainwright in the plucky *Gloucester* to go into the harbor. A small force of Spanish infantry commenced firing from the brush, and the *Gloucester* replied. Lieutenant Huse and twenty-eight sailors landed, and after some good firing drove the enemy out and captured Guanica without a casualty. The transports then entered the harbor, and the army landed, and commenced its march inland toward San Juan, meeting
with but slight opposition. On July 27 the *Dixie*, with the *Annapolis* and *Wasp*, were sent by Captain Higginson to take Ponce, preparatory to landing another division of the army. Ponce is only about twenty miles from Guanica. On the evening of the 27th Commander Davis, of the *Dixie*, demanded the surrender of the town, and at six o'clock on the morning of July 28 Lieutenant Haines, of the *Dixie's* marine force, hoisted the United States flag and took formal and actual possession of Ponce, including eighty-nine Spanish schooners and sugar-lighters in the harbor, without firing a shot, and with only a force of nine men. An hour or so later General Miles and the troops arrived, and found, to their surprise, everything ready for them. On July 31 Captain Higginson with the *Massachusetts* and *Dixie* returned to Guantánamo. On August 1 the town of Arroyo, about thirty miles east of Ponce, was taken possession of by the *St. Louis*, *Wasp*, and *Gloucester*. Beyond sending a few shells into the country back of the town, no action marked the capture. Troops were then disembarked without difficulty. Meanwhile the monitors had arrived off Cape San Juan, the rendezvous previously selected by General Miles. The blockade of San Juan itself, then being carried on by the *New Orleans* single-handed, was strengthened by the addition of the *Montgomery*, *Prairie*, and *Amphitrite*. Later the *Cincinnati* relieved the *New Orleans*. On August 1, Captain Rodgers, of the *Puritan*, sent two armed boats inshore at Cape San Juan, and they captured a Spanish sloop. On the night of August 7 a force of twenty-eight sailors and marines, under command of Lieutenant Atwater, was sent by Captain Barclay from his ship, the *Amphitrite*, to occupy the lighthouse at Cape San Juan. They encountered no opposition, but naval cadet W. H. Boardman, who was with the party, was fatally wounded by the accidental discharge of one of the men's revolvers, which fell to the floor and went off, its bullet striking Boardman. He was taken back to the *Amphitrite*, where he died. This little force fortified
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the lighthouse, because, like General Miles, they heard rumors that Spanish troops really were in Porto Rico. The cool daring of occupying the lighthouse at a point so near San Juan itself, and so advantageous, with only twenty-eight men can be realized better from the fact that the powerful army of the United States, over a hundred miles away, was slowly trying to reach this very spot and taking the utmost precaution and strategy in the attempt. On the night of the 7th a sailor scout reported the approach of a body of Spanish mounted infantry, about 120 in number. Simultaneous with this news there flocked to the lighthouse about eight hundred men, women, and children, mostly natives, who feared the Spanish. About sixty women and children were taken into the lighthouse, and the majority of the men took refuge in the hills. Captain Barclay then visited the lighthouse, and saw that everything was ship-shape. The alcalde's folk and several wealthy European women from Fajardo were among those whom the staunch little party protected in that lighthouse. On the night of the 8th the Spaniards attacked. The Amphitrite and Cincinnati spread their searchlights over the hills and on general principles shelled everything in sight, and by mistake sent one 6-pounder crashing into the lighthouse, where it failed, almost by a miracle, to cause any loss of life. In the "citadel" the defenders were having a warm time, the Mausers "pinging" over their heads and the enemy hard to see. For about two hours the fight was kept up. Lieutenant Atwater signalled to the ships that no one was hurt and that he needed no assistance. At daylight the Spaniards departed, having a loss reliably estimated at two killed (one officer) and three wounded. After this plucky holding of the fort through the darkness by twenty-eight sailors against about one hundred and fifty Spanish soldiers, Captain Barclay decided it would be safer to transfer the sixty women and children to the tug Leyden. This was done on the morning of the 9th, and as the holding of the lighthouse was then of small advantage and some risk, Captain Barclay with-
drew his forces. No more gallant, picturesque incident than this holding of the lighthouse by the *Amphitrite*'s men could have creditably ended the naval operations in Porto Rico. The vessels, however, continued to maintain the blockade.

A message sent on August 9 by Sampson to Captain Rodgers of the *Puritan* is interesting, though the fulfilment of its orders was made unnecessary by peace. Sampson instructed Rodgers to notify the officials of San Juan that the city would be bombarded.

"By placing monitors, the *New Orleans*, and the other heavy vessels to the northeast of the city and at a distance of three miles (nautical)," wrote Sampson, "you can easily shell city by each vessel using her largest guns. I would advise this action, after due warning, that women and children may be removed from the city. Do not waste ammunition on any of the batteries."

The injunction not to waste shell on the batteries showed what Sampson had learned during his many bombardments.

While the navy did so well in Porto Rico, the majority of the armored ships waited at Guantanamo. On July 25 the *Texas* was sent north for repairs to her decks, which, it will be remembered, were injured by her own gunfire in the battle of July 3. The day the *Texas* went north the little Spanish gunboat *Sandoval* was found sunk at Caimanera. This was an act of treachery committed by the Spaniards subsequent to the surrender, which included Caimanera and all naval and military forces in eastern Cuba. (The *Sandoval* was eventually raised by the *Marblehead* on September 1 and added to the American Navy.) On August 3 that gallant officer, Captain Clark, had to give up his command of the *Oregon* and go north on account of illness. Captain Barker filled the vacancy, and Captain Goodrich, of the *St. Louis*, succeeded Barker in the command of the *Newark*. On the night of August 4 all was ready, and the powerful fleet was ordered to sail for the East at 7 P.M. the following evening. We thought
that would be our last evening in Cuba for many a long
day, but during the night a dispatch came from Long say­
ing that peace negotiations were pending with Spain, and
that the Eastern fleet must not leave until further orders.
A change in the composition of the fleet was also made by
the retention of the Newark in Cuban waters. This gave
Schley a suitable flagship. By the previous arrangements
of the Department, Schley was going to shift his flag from
the Brooklyn to the Armeria. Upon Sampson’s departure
Commodore Howell was to have assumed general command
of Cuban operations, with Schley second in control.

Lying there at Guantanamo with steam up, ready to sail
any hour for Spain, was rather weary work. On August
9 the marines, who had broken camp and embarked on the
Resolute, sailed on that vessel from Guantanamo, bound
for the Isle of Pines, a fertile spot for blockade runners and
where it was thought the marines could be used on land
to great advantage. Despite their hard campaign the
marines were in splendid condition and eager for action in
the new territory. With the Resolute were the Newark and
Suwanee. Captain Goodrich had general charge of
the expedition. The following day the captured gunboat
Alvarado, now commanded by Lieutenant Blue, sailed to
join Goodrich’s force.

On August 11 Sampson sailed from Guantanamo on the
New York to inspect the Maria Teresa. That night,
while we lay beside the captured Spaniard, the Scorpion
came flying up from Guantanamo, with dispatches from
Long saying that Governor-General Blanco was trying to
leave Cuba on the Montserrat, which once more had run
the blockade, this time at Matanzas. Sampson was or­
dered to head him off if possible. It was rather a “wild
goose” chase, but the New York ran over to the western
end of Jamaica and cruised around on the 12th, keeping a
sharp lookout in case the Montserrat had gotten around
the western end of Cuba and had headed for some British
port. The last gun fired by the New York was that after-
noon, August 12, when we hove to the British steamer Acme, with a blank shot. We found no trace of Blanco, the Acme was let go, and the New York returned to Guantanamo. There, on the morning of August 13, this cablegram for Sampson was found:

"WASHINGTON, August 12.

"Suspend all hostilities. Blockade of Cuba and Porto Rico is raised. Howell ordered to assemble vessels at Key West. Proceed with the New York, Brooklyn, Indiana, Oregon, Iowa, Massachusetts to Tompkinsville. Place the monitors in a safe harbor in Porto Rico. Watson remains at Guantanamo. Assemble all cruisers in safe harbor. Order marines north in Resolute.

"ALLEN, Acting Secretary."

A protocol had been signed between Spain and the United States, which eventually resulted in peace. The war was over; there was to be no eastern campaign, and we were going home. And I think most of us were glad.

The next morning, August 14, the Wompatuck and Rodgers sailed for Key West, and at 10 A.M. the armored ships that had stood the brunt of the fighting steamed out of Guantanamo Bay, bound for New York, their bands playing "Home, Sweet Home," and "Ain't I glad to get out of the Wilderness." The enthusiastic reception with which the people of New York greeted those vessels—the New York, Brooklyn, Oregon, Iowa, Massachusetts, and Indiana—when on August 20 they steamed up the Hudson and fired a salute opposite the tomb of General Grant, formed a fitting tribute to the men who so nobly fought their country's battles,—how nobly and how faithfully, in action and during the long, hot, trying months of inaction, I have been but poorly able to describe.

After the New York's arrival home I left her. And I was very sorry to do so. I had been on board from April 4 until August 22.

I cannot, however, close an account of the operations in
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The North Atlantic, without touching upon various important incidents which occurred on the north coast and elsewhere during the closing days of the Santiago and Porto Rico campaigns,—incidents that did not come under the personal observation of those who remained with the main body of the fleet. Commodore Howell, who was inspector of blockade on the north, had many difficulties to contend with during July and the beginning of August. He had four hundred miles of coast to blockade, including that important port, Havana, and on July 27, for instance, he had only thirteen vessels with which to accomplish this work. The number of vessels available varied from about thirty to the small total I have just quoted. It is little wonder that the northern blockade was not as rigorous as it might have been, though Havana itself, I believe, was kept tightly closed, notwithstanding the fact that on July 27 there were only four American vessels off that harbor, the most powerful of these being the Mayflower. These four vessels were inferior to the Spanish gunboats bottled up within. The work was tedious and the heat was trying. The force was mainly composed of gunboats, tugs, and revenue cutters. They captured a good many prizes and also participated in several minor engagements and useful operations.

The Hawk, Lieutenant Hood, on the night of July 4, chased a big Spaniard and fired on her till she ran herself ashore near Mariel, to the westward of Havana. She was the armed transport Alfonso XII., with arms, ammunition, and supplies for Havana from Cadiz. Ensign Schofield of the Hawk rowed off in a cutter toward her, and was met with a heavy fire from ship and shore. He got back to the Hawk, which little vessel was already banging away. The Spaniards tried to blow up the transport, and their work was finished for them by the Castine and Prairie, who came to help the Hawk and who filled the Alfonso with many shotholes. Thus one valuable cargo was never delivered in Cuba. Another of these armed
transports, big, valuable vessels, had been forced ashore off San Juan, Porto Rico, on June 28 by the Yosemite. She was the Antonio Lopez, and while achieving her destruction the Yosemite was under the fire of the forts of San Juan for two hours.

Sampson had ordered the occupation of Nipe Bay, on the northeast coast, in order that it could be utilized as a coaling station, so on July 21 the Annapolis, Topeka, Wasp, and Leyden went into the harbor. They knew it was mined. The little Wasp and Leyden, the latter only a small tug, went ahead and soon were under the fire of the Spanish gunboat Jorge Juan, nine hundred and thirty-five tons, and armed with 5-inch guns. Troops also opened from the beach, but the Wasp and Leyden replied hotly. The Annapolis came up, and in an hour the Jorge Juan was sunk, her crew of one hundred and fifty having deserted her soon after the opening of the engagement. The Topeka, from the rear, shelled troops and a small fort. Several floating mines were found by the American force, which was under the command of Commander Hunker, of the Annapolis. After thus securing free entry to the harbor and destroying the Spanish gunboat Hunker's force withdrew from Nipe, having suffered no casualties and no injuries.

On July 26, the Badger, while cruising off Nuevitas on the north coast, captured a Spanish tug, barge, and brigantine, all flying the Geneva cross. On board these vessels Commander Snow found several Spanish army officers and three hundred and seventy soldiers, all said to be ill, but not many showing serious signs of any complaint. They were taken prisoners to the quarantine station at Dry Tortugas, but afterward sent back to Havana.

The same day, July 26, Commander Maynard, of the Nashville, took possession of Gibara, not far from Nuevitas. It had been evacuated by the Spanish troops and was occupied by the Cubans. Maynard found five hundred and thirty-six Spanish soldiers ill in the Gibara hospital. Co-operating most tactfully with the insurgents he established
an excellent system of municipal government, and remained in charge of the place for several weeks after the protocol had been signed.

The last casualty to be sustained during the war by the North Atlantic fleet occurred on August 2, when a launch from the Bancroft commanded by Lieut. H. B. Wilson pursued a Spanish schooner that was trying to escape in Cortes Bay, Isle of Pines. The schooner ran inland and was dragged ashore by soldiers. The launch with a one-pounder and the rifles of her crew dispersed the men ashore, but was not able to go very close in. Apprentice James Munro bravely swam from the launch and made a rope fast to the schooner, which had a cargo of grain and rum. The launch then tried to haul her off, and the Spanish poured a hot musketry fire from the bushes, killing coal-passer Emanouil Koulouris, who was a member of the crew. The launch forced the Spaniards to retreat, and, finding the schooner too hard aground to pull off, disabled her with a few shots, and returned to the Bancroft.

The day the protocol was signed the San Francisco had a narrow escape, the batteries of Havana, at 5 A.M. August 12, opening on the inner blockaders, and firing about twenty shots. One struck the San Francisco, Howell's flagship, and did considerable damage to her after cabin, but luckily caused no casualties. The San Francisco withdrew. The same day, August 12, an unexpected bombardment of Manzanillo, on the south side, was in progress. On his way to the Isle of Pines Captain Goodrich had met the Hist, and Lieut. Lucien Young, her commander, had told him that any kind of bombardment would probably secure the surrender of the city of Manzanillo. At noon that day Goodrich sent in Lieutenant Blue, on the Alvarado, with a demand for surrender under penalty of bombardment, Manzanillo being a fortified place. The demand was refused, so at 3:40 P.M. the Newark, Suwanee, Hist, and Osceola began to bombard the forts and the city. At 4:15 P.M. the enemy hosted a flag of truce, and the Alvarado,
which had been using her Spanish guns with good effect, went forward with a similar flag flying, but some of the batteries continued firing, so the bombardment was resumed and continued through the night. The enemy continued to reply, from forts and with musketry, but inflicted no damage. The Resolute joined in and fired a few shots. At daybreak of August 13 Manzanillo was seen a mass of flags of truce. The captain of the port came out to Goodrich with a dispatch from Secretary Long, sent through Havana, and notifying him of the armistice. Thus victory was snatched from Goodrich’s grasp, and the marines were unable to win further distinction, as it was learned that the city had decided to surrender in any case.

The last engagement of the war was fought by the little Mangrove, and, as far as I can learn, the distinction of firing the last shot belongs to that converted lighthouse tender. On August 14, Lieutenant-Commander Daniel D. V. Stuart, knowing nothing of the peace that reigned, took the Mangrove into Caibarien harbor, on the north coast, near Cayo Frances, in support of a Cuban expedition that was attempting to land in the vicinity. Stuart had no chart of the harbor, but he knew that a Spanish gunboat, probably the Hernan Cortes, lay at Caibarien, and that she might prevent the landing of the Cubans. The Cortes has 4-inch guns and the Mangrove only 6-pounders. But that made small difference to Stuart. At 11 A.M. the Mangrove opened fire on the Cortes and the Spaniard replied. For an hour and a half the duel continued, the Mangrove firing over a hundred shells from her 6-pounders. Then the lighthouse tender put out toward sea, hoping to entice the Spaniard into more open water. But the Spaniard only sent several more bigger shells over the Mangrove, and that little boat lay biding her time. A flag of truce came from the shore, and at two o’clock on the afternoon of August 14 Stuart learned through the Spaniards that a peace protocol had been signed. This ended the engagement, the last of the war.
The naval campaign in the North Atlantic, broadly speaking, may be said to have been greatly, if not chiefly, responsible for the surrender by Spain of Cuba and Porto Rico; for the destruction of the best fleet Spain could put upon the seas, and the destruction of many of her gun-boats; for the infliction of great injury to Spain's commerce by the blockade of her West Indian possessions and by the capture of fifty-six of her merchant vessels, valued with their cargoes at over $900,000; and as being the cause of much loss of life among her land and sea forces. And all this in less than four months, without the loss of a single ship, and with only sixteen men killed and seventy-five wounded. From beginning to end the campaign reflected glory that should be historical upon all concerned, from Secretary Long and the commander-in-chief, Sampson, down to the youngest apprentice that sweltered in the Cuban heat.
**APPENDIX.**

**NAVY OF THE UNITED STATES.**

**SHIPS IN COMMISSION JULY 1, 1898.**

*Signifies vessel served with North Atlantic Fleet during the War; † Repairing at Navy Yard; ‡ In English Dockyard.

**BATTLESHIPS. — FIRST-CLASS.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Material of Hull</th>
<th>Displacement Tons</th>
<th>Speed, Knots</th>
<th>Armament</th>
<th>Commanding Officer (July 1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Iowa</em></td>
<td>Steel</td>
<td>11,340</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>4 13-in. B. in pairs in turrets, 1 forward and 1 aft; 8 8-in. B. in pairs in turrets, 2 on each beam; 6 4-in. r.f.; 20 6-pr. r.f.; 6 1-pr. r.f.; 4 Gatling guns; 6 torpedo tubes.</td>
<td>Capt. R. D. Evans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Indiana</em></td>
<td>Steel</td>
<td>10,288</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4 13-in. B. in pairs in turrets, 1 forward and 1 aft; 8 8-in. B. in pairs in turrets, 2 on each beam; 4 6-in. r.f., in sponsons, 2 on each beam; 20 6-pr. r.f.; 6 1-pr. r.f.; 4 Gatling guns; 7 torpedo tubes.</td>
<td>Capt. H. C. Taylor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Massachusetts</em></td>
<td>Steel</td>
<td>10,288</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4 13-in. B. in pairs in turrets, 1 forward and 1 aft; 8 8-in. B. in pairs in turrets, 2 on each beam; 4 6-in. r.f., in sponsons, 2 on each beam; 30 6-pr. r.f.; 6 1-pr. r.f.; 4 Gatling guns; 7 torpedo tubes.</td>
<td>Capt. F. J. Higginson.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Oregon</em></td>
<td>Steel</td>
<td>10,288</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4 13-in. B. in pairs in turrets, 1 forward and 1 aft; 8 8-in. B. in pairs in turrets, 2 on each beam; 4 6-in. r.f., in sponsons, 2 on each beam; 30 6-pr. r.f.; 6 1-pr. r.f.; 4 Gatling guns; 7 torpedo tubes.</td>
<td>Capt. C. E. Clark.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**BATTLESHIPS. — SECOND-CLASS.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Material of Hull</th>
<th>Displacement Tons</th>
<th>Speed, Knots</th>
<th>Armament</th>
<th>Commanding Officer (July 1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Texas</em></td>
<td>Steel</td>
<td>6,315</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2 13-in. B.; 1 in each turret; 6 6-in. B.; 1 forward, 1 aft, and 2 in sponsons on each side; 12 8-pr. r.f.; 6 1-on pr. r.f.; 4 1-pr. revolving cannon; 2 Gatling guns; 6 torpedo tubes.</td>
<td>Capt. J. W. Philip.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## ARMORED CRUISERS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Material of Hull</th>
<th>Displacement. Tons.</th>
<th>Speed. Knots.</th>
<th>Armament</th>
<th>Commanding Officer (July 1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>*Brooklyn</td>
<td>Steel</td>
<td>9,215</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>8 8-in. B. in pairs in barbettes, disposed lozengewise; 12 5-in. r.f., behind 4-in. shields; 12 6-pr. r.f.; 4 1-pr. r.f.; 4 Gatling guns; 5 torpedo tubes (Howell), 1 forward and 2 on each beam.</td>
<td>Capt. F. A. Cook</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*New York</td>
<td>Steel</td>
<td>8,300</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>6 8-in. B. of 35 cals. in a hooded barbette forward, 2 in a similar barbette aft, and 1 in a sponson on each beam; 12 4-in. r.f.; 6 on each beam; 8 6-pr. r.f.; 4 1-pr. r.f.; 4 Gatling guns; 5 torpedo tubes.</td>
<td>Capt. F. E. Chadwick</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## PROTECTED CRUISERS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Material of Hull</th>
<th>Displacement. Tons.</th>
<th>Speed. Knots.</th>
<th>Armament</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>*Columbia</td>
<td>Steel</td>
<td>7,375</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1 8-in. B.; 2 6-in. r.f.; 8 4-in. r.f.; 12 6-pr. r.f.; 4 1-pr. r.f.; 4 Gatling guns; 6 torpedo tubes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Minneapolis</td>
<td>Steel</td>
<td>7,375</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1 8-in. B.; 2 6-in. r.f.; 8 4-in. r.f.; 12 6-pr. r.f.; 4 1-pr. r.f.; 4 Gatling guns; 6 torpedo tubes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olympia</td>
<td>Steel</td>
<td>5,870</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4 8-in. B.; 10 6-in. r.f.; 14 6-pr. r.f.; 6 1-pr. r.f.; 4 Gatling guns; 6 torpedo tubes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>Steel</td>
<td>4,500</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14 6-in. r.f.; 3 6-pr. r.f.; 4 1-pr. r.f.; 2 1-pr. revolving cannon; 2 Gatling guns.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltimore</td>
<td>Steel</td>
<td>4,413</td>
<td>20.09</td>
<td>4 8-in. B.; 6 6-in. B.; 4 6-pr. r.f.; 2 3-pr. r.f.; 2 1-pr. r.f.; 4 1-pr. revolving cannon; 2 Gatling guns; 5 torpedo tubes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philadelphia</td>
<td>Steel</td>
<td>4,324</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>12 6-in. B.; 4 6-pr. r.f.; 4 3-pr. r.f.; 2 1-pr. r.f.; 3 1-pr. revolving cannon; 4 Gatling guns; 5 torpedo tubes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Newark</td>
<td>Steel</td>
<td>4,098</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>12 6-in. B.; 4 6-pr. r.f.; 4 3-pr. r.f.; 2 1-pr. r.f.; 3 1-pr. revolving cannon; 4 Gatling guns; 6 torpedo tubes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*San Francisco</td>
<td>Steel</td>
<td>4,098</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>12 6-in. B.; 4 6-pr. r.f.; 4 3-pr. r.f.; 2 1-pr. r.f.; 3 1-pr. revolving cannon; 4 Gatling guns; 6 torpedo tubes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charleston</td>
<td>Steel</td>
<td>3,730</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>2 8-in. B.; 4 6-in. B.; 4 6-pr. r.f.; 2 3-pr. r.f.; 2 1-pr. r.f.; 4 1-pr. revolving cannon; 2 Gatling guns; 4 torpedo tubes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*New Orleans</td>
<td>Steel</td>
<td>3,437</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>6-in.; 4 4.7-in.; 10 3-pr.; 1 8-pr.; 21-pr. revolving cannon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albany</td>
<td>Steel</td>
<td>3,437</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>6-in.; 4 4.7-in.; 106-pr.; 1 8-pr.; 1 21-pr. revolving cannon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Cincinnati</td>
<td>Steel</td>
<td>3,213</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1 6-in. r.f. on forecastle; 10 5-in. r.f.; 2 on poop and 4 on each side of gun deck in sponsons; 8 6-pr. r.f.; 4 1-pr. r.f.; 2 45-in. Gatling guns; 6 torpedo tubes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raleigh</td>
<td>Steel</td>
<td>3,213</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1 6-in. r.f. on forecastle; 10 5-in. r.f.; 2 on poop and 4 on each side of gun deck in sponsons; 8 6-pr. r.f.; 4 1-pr. r.f.; 2 45-in. Gatling guns; 6 torpedo tubes.</td>
</tr>
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</table>
### PROTECTED CRUISERS.—Continued.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Material of Hull</th>
<th>Displacement Tons</th>
<th>Speed Knots</th>
<th>Armament</th>
<th>Commanding Officer (July 1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Atlanta</em></td>
<td>Steel</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>8-in. B.; 6-in. B.; 2 6-pr. r.f.; 2 23-pr. r.f.; 2 21-pr. r.f.; 2 23-pr. revolving cannon; 2 1-pr. revolving cannon; 2 Gatling guns, 2 Gatl. guns.</td>
<td>Capt. F. Wildes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Boston</em></td>
<td>Steel</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>8-in. B.; 6-in. B.; 2 6-pr. r.f.; 2 3-pr. r.f.; 2 21-pr. r.f.; 2 23-pr. revolving cannon; 2 1-pr. revolving cannon; 2 Gatling guns, 2 Gatling guns.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### UNPROTECTED CRUISERS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Material of Hull</th>
<th>Displacement Tons</th>
<th>Speed Knots</th>
<th>Armament</th>
<th>Commanding Officer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Detroit</em></td>
<td>Steel</td>
<td>2,089</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9-in. r.f.; 6 6-pr. r.f.; 2 1-pr. r.f.; 2 Gatling guns; 6 torpedoes tubes.</td>
<td>Commander J. H. Dayton.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### MONITORS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Material of Hull</th>
<th>Displacement Tons</th>
<th>Speed Knots</th>
<th>Armament</th>
<th>Commanding Officer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Puritan</em></td>
<td>Iron</td>
<td>6,060</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>19-in. B.; 2 in each turret; 6-in. r.f.; 4 3-pr. r.f.; 4 1-pr. r.f.; 4 Gatling guns.</td>
<td>Capt. F. Rodgers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Miantonomoh</em></td>
<td>Iron</td>
<td>3,990</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>10-in. B.; 2 in each turret; 6 6-pr. r.f.; 2 3-pr. r.f.; 1 1-pr. r.f.; 2 1-pr. revolving cannon.</td>
<td>Capt. M. L. Johnson.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Amphitrite</em></td>
<td>Iron</td>
<td>3,990</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10-in. B.; 2 in each turret; 4 4-in. r.f.; 2 6-pr. r.f.; 2 3-pr. r.f.; 2 1-pr. revolving cannon.</td>
<td>Capt. C. J. Barclay.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monadnock</td>
<td>Iron</td>
<td>3,990</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>10-in. B.; 2 in each turret; 4 4-in. r.f.; 2 6-pr. r.f.; 2 3-pr. r.f.; 1 21-pr. revolving cannon.</td>
<td>Capt. W. H. Whiting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Terror</em></td>
<td>Iron</td>
<td>3,990</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10-in. B.; 2 in each turret; 26-pr. r.f.; 2 3-pr. r.f.; 2 1-pr. revolving cannon; 2 Gatling guns.</td>
<td>Capt. N. Ludlow.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canonicus</td>
<td>Iron</td>
<td>2,100</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>15-in. smoothbore M.; 2 12-pr. howitzer, 2 Ditto.</td>
<td>Lieut. M. E. Hall.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mahopac</td>
<td>Iron</td>
<td>2,100</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>15-in. smoothbore M.; 2 12-pr. howitzer, 2 Ditto.</td>
<td>Lieut. F. H. Fickbohm.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manhattan</td>
<td>Iron</td>
<td>2,100</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>15-in. smoothbore M.; 2 12-pr. howitzer, 2 Ditto.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wyandotte</td>
<td>Iron</td>
<td>2,100</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>15-in. smoothbore M.; 2 12-pr. howitzer, 2 Ditto.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comanche</td>
<td>Iron</td>
<td>1,875</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15-in. smoothbore M.; 1 12-pr. howitzer, 2 Ditto.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catskill</td>
<td>Iron</td>
<td>1,875</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15-in. smoothbore M.; 1 12-pr. howitzer, 2 Ditto.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jason</td>
<td>Iron</td>
<td>1,875</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15-in. smoothbore M.; 1 12-pr. howitzer, 2 Ditto.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
MONITORS. — Continued.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Material of Hull</th>
<th>Displacement, Tons</th>
<th>Speed, Knots</th>
<th>Armament</th>
<th>Commanding Officer (July 1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

From Ajax to Passaic inclusive built for the civil war, and manned by the Auxiliary Naval Force.

CRUISERS AND GUNBOATS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Material of Hull</th>
<th>Displacement, Tons</th>
<th>Speed, Knots</th>
<th>Armament</th>
<th>Commanding Officer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>*Adams</td>
<td>Wood.</td>
<td>1,375</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>7 8-in. r.f.; 2 12-pr. r.f.; 2 1-pr. r.f.</td>
<td>Boatswain C. Miller.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Badger</td>
<td>Steel.</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Not then provided with armament.</td>
<td>Command. W. H. Emory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Dixie</td>
<td>Steel.</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td></td>
<td>Not then provided with armament.</td>
<td>Command. W. H. Emory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Harvard</td>
<td>Steel.</td>
<td>11,350</td>
<td></td>
<td>Not then provided with armament.</td>
<td>Command. W. H. Emory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*St. Louis</td>
<td>Steel.</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>Not then provided with armament.</td>
<td>Command. W. H. Emory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*St. Paul</td>
<td>Steel.</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>Not then provided with armament.</td>
<td>Command. W. H. Emory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Yale</td>
<td>Steel.</td>
<td>11,550</td>
<td></td>
<td>Not then provided with armament.</td>
<td>Command. W. H. Emory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Yankee</td>
<td>Steel.</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td></td>
<td>Not then provided with armament.</td>
<td>Command. W. H. Emory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Yosemite</td>
<td>Steel.</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td></td>
<td>Not then provided with armament.</td>
<td>Command. W. H. Emory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Pinta</td>
<td>Iron.</td>
<td>660</td>
<td></td>
<td>Not then provided with armament.</td>
<td>Command. W. H. Emory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Panther</td>
<td>Steel.</td>
<td>625</td>
<td></td>
<td>Not then provided with armament.</td>
<td>Command. W. H. Emory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Peoria</td>
<td>Steel.</td>
<td>625</td>
<td></td>
<td>Not then provided with armament.</td>
<td>Command. W. H. Emory.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CRUISERS AND GUNBOATS.—Continued.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Material of Hull</th>
<th>Displacement, Tons</th>
<th>Speed, Knots</th>
<th>Armament</th>
<th>Commanding Officer (July 1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Prairie</em></td>
<td>Steel</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>66-in. B.; 26-pr. r.f.; 23-pr. r.f.; 1 1-pr. r.f.; 2 1-pr. revolving cannon; 2 Gatling guns; 2 torpedo tubes.</td>
<td>Commander C. J. Train</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bennington</td>
<td>Steel</td>
<td>1,710</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Commander H. E. Nichols</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concord</td>
<td>Steel</td>
<td>1,710</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Commander A. Walker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Topeka</em></td>
<td>Iron</td>
<td>1,709</td>
<td></td>
<td>64-in. r.f.; 26-pr. r.f.; 23-pr. r.f.; 2 1-pr. Maxim Nordenfelt; 1 Colt Automatic</td>
<td>Commander W. S. Cowles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Wilmington</em></td>
<td>Steel</td>
<td>1,392</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8 4-in. r.f., 4 in sponsons, 2 forward and 2 aft, and 4 on gun-deck behind shields; 4 6-pr. r.f., in sponsons; 3 1-pr. r.f.; 2 Gatling guns; 1 torpedo tube in bow.</td>
<td>Commander C. C. Todd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helena</td>
<td>Steel</td>
<td>1,392</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Commander W. T. Swinburne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nashville</td>
<td>Steel</td>
<td>1,370</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Commander W. Maynard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monocacy</td>
<td>Iron</td>
<td>1,370</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>8 4-in. smoothbore M.; 2 60-pr. B.; 1 3-pr. howitzer B.; 1 12-pr. smoothbore howitzer; 2 23-pr. r.f.; 6 1-pr. r.f.; 1 Gatling gun.</td>
<td>Commander O. W. Farenholt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Castine</em></td>
<td>Steel</td>
<td>1,177</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Commander R. M. Perry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Machias</em></td>
<td>Steel</td>
<td>1,177</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Commander J. F. Merry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Annapolis</em></td>
<td>Comp</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>64-in. r.f., 3 on upper deck, 1 forward and 1 aft, and 1 on each side in battery; 3 in each side forward, and 1 on each side between the 4-in. guns in battery; 3 1-pr. r.f.; 1 3-in howitzer B.; 1 Gatling gun.</td>
<td>Commander J. J. Hunker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Vicksburg</em></td>
<td>Comp</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Commander A. B. H. Lillie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Newport</em></td>
<td>Comp</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Commander H. F. Tillie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Princeton</em></td>
<td>Comp</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Commander C. H. West</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Marietta</em></td>
<td>Comp</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Commander F. M. Symonds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Wheeling</em></td>
<td>Comp</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Commander U. Seegers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Vesuvius</em></td>
<td>Steel</td>
<td>929</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>3 pneumatic dynamite guns; 2 23-pr. r.f.</td>
<td>Lieut.-Com. J. E. Pillsbury</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petrel</td>
<td>Steel</td>
<td>892</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>4 6-in. B.; 2 8-pr. r.f.; 11-pr. r.f.; 2 1-pr. revolving cannon; 3 Gatling guns.</td>
<td>Commander E. F. Wood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Bancroft</em></td>
<td>Steel</td>
<td>839</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>4 4-in. r.f.; 2 6-pr. r.f.; 2 3-pr. r.f.; 1 1-pr. r.f.; 1 1-pr. revolving cannon; 1 Gatling gun; 2 torpedo tubes.</td>
<td>Commander R. Clover</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TORPEDO BOATS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Displacement Tons</th>
<th>Speed Knots</th>
<th>Armament</th>
<th>Commanding Officer (July 1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>*Dupont</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>3 torpedo tubes; 4 1-pr. r. f.</td>
<td>Lieut. S. S. Wood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Porter</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Lieut. J. C. Fremont</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Cushing</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>3 torpedo tubes; 3 1-pr. r. f.</td>
<td>Lieut. A. Gleaves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Cushing</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Lieut. N. R. Usher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Foote</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>3 torpedo tubes; 4 1-pr. r. f.</td>
<td>Lieut. W. L. Rodgers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Rodgers</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Lieut. J. L. Jayne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Winslow</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Lieut. J. B. Bernadou</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Morris</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>3 torpedo tubes; 1 1-pr. r. f.</td>
<td>Lieut. C. E. Fox</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Talkot</td>
<td>46½</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>3 torpedo tubes</td>
<td>Lieut. W. K. Shoemaker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Swinn</td>
<td>46½</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Lieut. C. S. Williams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mackenzie</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Lieut. (Jr.) C. M. Kuepper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McKee</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>(Unassigned)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manly</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1 torpedo tube</td>
<td>(Unassigned)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Somers</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>2 torpedo tubes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Stiletto</td>
<td>31</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### YACHTS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Displacement Tons</th>
<th>Commanding Officer (July 1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aileen</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>Lieut. A. Gartley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Dorothea</td>
<td>394</td>
<td>Lieut.-Com. W. J. Barnett</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Eagle</td>
<td>432</td>
<td>Lieut. W. H. H. Sutherland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elfride</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>Lieut. (Jr.) W. O. Hulme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enquirer</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>Lieut. W. H. Sturton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free Lance</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>Lieut. T. C. Zerega</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Frolick</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>Commander E. H. Green</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Gloucester</td>
<td>506</td>
<td>Lieut.-Com. E. W. Wainwright</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Hawk</td>
<td>545</td>
<td>Lieut. E. H. Green</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Hart</td>
<td>494</td>
<td>Lieut. J. Hood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Hist</td>
<td>494</td>
<td>Lieut. E. H. Green</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Horace</td>
<td>494</td>
<td>Lieut. J. M. Rehn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huntress</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>Lieut. F. Parkin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kanawha</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>Lieut. W. E. McKay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inca</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>Lieut. W. G. Miller</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Onedia</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>Lieut. A. H. Day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restless</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>Lieut.-Com. A. T. Marix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Scorpion</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>(Unassigned)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shearwater</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>Lieut. J. M. Robinson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Siren</td>
<td>546</td>
<td>Lieut. G. L. Dyer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Stranger</td>
<td>389</td>
<td>Lieut. G. H. Peters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sylph</td>
<td>521</td>
<td>Lieut.-Com. E. C. Wilson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Sylvia</td>
<td>798</td>
<td>Lieut. A. Sharp, Jr.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Vixen</td>
<td>789</td>
<td>Lieut.-Com. J. D. Adams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wasp</td>
<td>799</td>
<td>Lieut.-Com. J. D. Adams</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These vessels were armed with rapid fire and machine guns, ranging from 5-in. to 1 pr.

### MISCELLANEOUS.


**Supply Ships.** *Celtic, Delmonico, *Supply, Zaffiro.

**Ferryboats.**—East Boston, Governor Russell.
Appendix

Steamers.—Iris, Marcellus, Nanshan, Nero, *Vulcan (repairship).

Distilling Ship.—Rainbow.

Transports.—*Resolute, *Fern.

Ambulance Ship.—*Solace.


Fish Commission Vessels.—Albatross, *Fish-Hawk.

Sailing Vessels.—Monongahela, Constellation, Jamestown, Portsmouth, Saratoga, St. Marys. (School ships.)

Receiving Ships.—Franklin, Wabash, Vermont, Independence, Richmond.

Unserviceable.—New Hampshire, Pensacola, Omaha, Constitution, Iroquois, Nipsic, St. Louis, Dale, Minnesota, Marion, Thetis, Yantic.
### SPANISH NAVY.

**SHIPS IN COMMISSION DURING THE WAR.**

#### BATTLESHIPS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Material of Hull</th>
<th>Displacement, Tons</th>
<th>Speed, Knots</th>
<th>Armament</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pelayo</td>
<td>Steel</td>
<td>9,900</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>2 12.5-in.; 48 ton; 2 11-in.; 28 ton; 2 5.5-in. r.f.; 6 smaller 12 m.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Numancia</em></td>
<td>Iron</td>
<td>7,355</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>8 10-in. m.l.r. (Armstrong); 6 8.5-in. r.f.; 6 4.7-in. (Hontoria); 8 m.; 3 l.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vitoria</td>
<td>Iron</td>
<td>7,250</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>8 9-in. m.l.r. (Armstrong); 3 8-in.; 17-8 in. (Hontoria); 8 m.; 21.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The Numancia was supplied with an additional battery during the war. She had just been reconstructed.*

#### ARMORED CRUISERS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Material of Hull</th>
<th>Displacement, Tons</th>
<th>Speed, Knots</th>
<th>Armament</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Emperador Carlos V</td>
<td>Steel</td>
<td>9,925</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>2 11-in. (Hontoria); 8 5.5-in. r.f.; 4 3.9-in.; 2 2.7-in.; 4 2.2-in.; 6 m.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cardinal Clamores</td>
<td>Steel</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>2 11-in.; 10 5.5-in. r.f.; 2 2.7-in.; 4 4.4-in.; 2 m.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cataluña</td>
<td>Steel</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>2 11-in.; 10 5.5-in. r.f.; 2 2.7-in.; 4 4.4-in.; 2 m.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Princesa de Asturias</td>
<td>Steel</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>2 11-in.; 10 5.5-in. r.f.; 2 2.7-in.; 4 4.4-in.; 2 m.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Almirante Oquendo</td>
<td>Steel</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>2 11-in.; 10 5.5-in. (all Hontoria); 8 2.3-in. r.f.; 8 1.4-in.; 2 m.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vasaya</td>
<td>Steel</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>2 11-in.; 10 5.5-in. r.f.; 22.7-in.; 5.5 in.; 4 4.4-in.; 2 m.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infanta Maria Teresa</td>
<td>Steel</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>20.25</td>
<td>2 11-in.; 10 5.5-in. (all Hontoria); 8 2.3-in. r.f.; 8 1.4-in.; 2 m.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cristobal Colon</td>
<td>Steel</td>
<td>6,840</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>2 10-in.; 10 6-in. r.f.; 6 4.7-in.; 10 2.3-in.; 10 1.4-in.; 2 m.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pedro d'Aragon</td>
<td>Steel</td>
<td>6,840</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>2 10-in.; 10 6-in. r.f.; 6 4.7-in.; 10 2.3-in.; 10 1.4-in.; 2 m.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### PROTECTED CRUISERS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Material of Hull</th>
<th>Displacement, Tons</th>
<th>Speed, Knots</th>
<th>Armament</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reina Regente</td>
<td>Steel</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>2 7.8-in.; 8 5.9-in. r.f.; smaller r.f.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alfonso XIII</td>
<td>Steel</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>4 7.8-in. (Hontoria); 6 4.7-in.; 6 2.3-in. r.f.; 6 1.4-in.; 3 m.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lepanto</td>
<td>Steel</td>
<td>4,880</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>4 7.5-in. (Hontoria); 6 4.7-in. r.f.; 6 2-pr.; 4 2-pr.; 3 m.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Río de la Plata</td>
<td>Steel</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>2 5.5-in. r.f.; 4 3.5-in.; 4 3.3-in.; 6 m.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### PROTECTED CRUISERS—Continued.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Material of Hull</th>
<th>Displacement, Tons</th>
<th>Speed, Knots</th>
<th>Armament</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marques de la Ensenada</td>
<td>Steel</td>
<td>1,030</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>4 4.7-in. (Hontoria); 5 r.f.; 4 m.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isla de Cuba</td>
<td>Steel</td>
<td>1,030</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>4 4.7-in. (Hontoria); 6 pr. r.f.; 2 3-pr.; 2 m.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isla de Luzon</td>
<td>Steel</td>
<td>1,030</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>4 4.7-in. (Hontoria); 4 6-pr. r.f.; 2 3-pr.; 2 m.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### CRUISERS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Material of Hull</th>
<th>Displacement, Tons</th>
<th>Speed, Knots</th>
<th>Armament</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reina Cristina</td>
<td>Steel</td>
<td>3,090</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>6 6.2-in. (Hontoria); 2 2.7-in.; 6 6-pr. r.f.; 4 3-pr.; 5 m.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reina Mercedes</td>
<td>Steel</td>
<td>3,520</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>6 6.2-in. (Hontoria); 2 2.7-in.; 3 2.5-in. r.f.; 21.5-in.; 63-pr.; 2 m.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Castilla</td>
<td>Wood</td>
<td>3,242</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>4 5.9-in. (Krupp); 2 4.7-in.; 23.3-in.; 4 2.9-in.; 8 r.f.; 2 m.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navarra</td>
<td>Wood</td>
<td>3,242</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>4 5.9-in.; 2 3.7-in.; 2 3.4-in.; 4 2.9-in.; 2 m.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aragon</td>
<td>Wood</td>
<td>3,242</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>6 6.2-in. (Hontoria); 2 3.3-in (Krupp); 4 2.5-in.; 2 m.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conde de Venadito</td>
<td>Iron</td>
<td>1,120</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>4 4.7-in. (Hontoria); 2 2.7-in.; 2 r.f.; 5 m.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don Antonio de Ulloa</td>
<td>Iron</td>
<td>1,120</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>4 4.7-in. (Hontoria); 2 2.7-in.; 2 r.f.; 5 m.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don Juan de Austria</td>
<td>Iron</td>
<td>1,120</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>4 4.7-in. (Hontoria); 3 2.3-in. r.f.; 2 1.5-in.; 5 m.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infanta Isabel</td>
<td>Iron</td>
<td>1,120</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>4 4.7-in. (Hontoria); 2 2.7-in.; 3 r.f.; 4 m.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isabel II</td>
<td>Iron</td>
<td>1,120</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>4 4.7-in. (Hontoria); 2 2.7-in.; 4 r.f.; 2 m.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Velasco</td>
<td>Iron</td>
<td>1,120</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>5 5.9-in.; 4 ton (Armstrong); 2 2.7-in. (Hontoria); 2 m.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jorge Juan</td>
<td>Wood</td>
<td>925</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>3 4.7-in. (Hontoria); 2 2.8-in. (Krupp); 2 m.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TORPEDO GUN VESSELS.

Doña María de Molina, Marques de la Victoria, Don Alvaro de Bazan, Velaz, Filipinas, Galicia, Nueva España, Marques de Molina, Martin Alonso Pinzon, Temerario, Vincento Yanez Pinzon, and Destructor. These vessels are armed with r.f. small-calibre guns and torpedo tubes. They are under 1,000 tons displacement.

### TORPEDO-BOAT DESTROYERS.

Furor and Terror, 370 tons displacement; speed 28 knots; armament 2 14-pr., 2 6-pr., 2 1-pr., 2 14-in. torpedo tubes. Audaz, Osado, Pluton, and Proserpina, 490 tons displacement; speed 30 knots; armament same as Terror and Furor.

### TORPEDO-BOATS.

**First-Class (Seagoing, 136 feet long or upward).—**Ariste, Azor, Barcelona, Habana, Halcón, Rayo; 4 boats building.

**Second-Class (of from 101 to 125 feet inclusive).—**Aceredo, Ejército, Julian Ordoñez, Orión, Retamosa, Rigel.

**Third-Class.—**Aire, Castor, Polux.
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GUNBOATS.


Twenty-six miscellaneous vessels, including transports, tugs, and wooden training-ships.

In addition to these vessels Spain purchased the Transatlantic liners Columbia and Normannia, and converted them into auxiliary cruisers. Nine other liners, Spanish-American ships, were also purchased and converted.
[Secretary Long's circular to the Navy.]

WASHINGTON, March 23, 1898.

Memorandum for the Commander-in-Chief of the North Atlantic Squadron:

In time of war the Commander-in-Chief must, to a very great extent, control his own vessels and act on his own responsibility; but the Department deems it worth while to lay before him certain suggestions for his consideration in connection with the probable uses to which the fleet will be put in the event of war with Spain.

Until it is possible to concentrate the fleet and strike a telling blow at the Spanish fleet, it is probable that much of its work will be in blockading Cuba. The Department will endeavor to furnish the Commander-in-Chief with a sufficient number of vessels to establish a strict blockade, particularly of the western half of the island, and of the ports of Havana and Matanzas in especial. Off much of the coast, and off the smaller harbors, a single vessel cruising to and fro may be all that is needed; this vessel of course keeping touch with the rest of the fleet when possible. Off an important port, and notably off the port of Havana, in the event of torpedo vessels being within it, there should probably be three lines of blockade. The inner line should consist of small, fast vessels, either torpedo-boats or revenue cutters, tugs, and the like, improvised to act as torpedo-boat destroyers and scouts, whose station shall be close to the mouth of the harbor. These vessels would of course stop blockade runners; but the prime object of their being would be to prevent the egress of torpedo-boats. They should not only watch the latter, but should unhesitatingly attack them, no matter what the odds may be at the moment. Even if sunk they will have achieved a most useful end if they cripple a torpedo-boat. They should fire upon and chase any hostile craft leaving port, and the vessels not engaged should at once steam to the firing. The Department will give ample recognition to gallantry and efficiency displayed by the commanders of these craft, and the men in command of them will be expected to run risks and take chances. Their duty is at all hazards to prevent the possibility of an attack by the enemy’s torpedo-boats upon the battleships and squadron.

The second line will be placed two or three miles outside of this inner one, and will consist, so far as is possible, of vessels like the Cincinnati or Detroit, which in case of need could promptly go to the first line of blockade. Outside of this second line will cruise the squadron of battleships, which in the discretion of the Commander-in-Chief may lie at a considerable distance from the port, and may change position after nightfall. Of course no definite rule can be laid down as to the position of this squadron, for the Commander-in-Chief must be guided by circumstances as they arise; but it is worth cali-
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ing his attention to the fact that the battle fleet must keep the sea, so as to make the blockade technically valid. The efficiency of the blockade does not depend upon the immediate presence of the fleet itself, but upon the fact that its support is always at hand, to support the inshore squadron and prevent the latter from being driven off by the enemy in port. A distance of twenty-five miles may be near enough, and if the position of the battle fleet can always be changed after nightfall, the chance of successful assault by the enemy's torpedo-boats will be minimized. The department would again repeat, however, that the captains in the inshore squadrons must understand that their duty is at any hazard to prevent hostile torpedo-boats getting by them, to detect, and, more than that, to immediately grapple with and fight them under any circumstances. The torpedo-boats, and even the torpedo-boat destroyers, lose nine-tenths of their menace when detected; and, moreover, they are fragile and easily destroyed.

Each man engaged in the work of the inshore squadron should have in him the stuff out of which to make a possible Cushing; and if the man wins the recognition given him shall be as great as that given to Cushing, so far as the department can bring this about.

JOHN D. LONG, Secretary.

[Sampson's battle order at San Juan.]

The squadron will pass near Salinas Point and then steer about east, to pass just outside the reefs off Cabras Island. The column is to be formed as follows:
The Iowa, flag; the Indiana, the New York, the Amphitrite, and the Terror. The Detroit is to go ahead of the Iowa, distant one thousand yards. The Wompatuck is kept on the Iowa's starboard bow, distant five hundred yards. The Detroit and Wompatuck to sound constantly after land is closed, and to immediately signal if ten fathoms or less is obtained, showing at night a red light over the stern and at daytime a red flag aft.
The Montgomery to remain in the rear of the column, stopping outside of the fire from Morro and on the lookout for torpedo-boat destroyers. If Fort Canuelo fires she is to silence it. The Porter will take station under the cover of the Iowa, on the port side. The Niagara to remain westward off Salinas Point.

While approaching a sharp lookout is to be kept on the coast between Salinas Point and Cabras Island for torpedo-boat destroyers. When near Cabras Island, one-half mile to one mile, the Detroit will rapidly cross the mouth of the harbor and be close under Morro to the westward, screened from the fire of Morro's western battery. If the old guns on the north side of Morro are opened she is to silence them. These two cruisers are to keep on the lookout, especially for Spanish torpedo-boat destroyers coming out of the harbor.
The Porter, when the action begins, will cross the harbor mouth behind the Iowa and get close under the cliff to the eastward of the Detroit and torpedo any Spanish cruiser trying to get out of the harbor, but she is not to attack destroyers.
The Wompatuck will tow one of her boats with its mast shipped, flying a red flag, and having a boat's anchor on board the tug so arranged that she can...
stop the boat and anchor at the same time. She is to anchor the boat in about ten fathoms, with Fort Canuelo and the western end of Cabras Island in range.

There will be two objects for attack—the batteries upon Morro and the men-of-war. If it is clear that Spanish vessels are lying in port, fire is to be opened upon them so soon as they are discernible over Cabras Island, the motions of the flagship being followed in this regard. If it should become evident, however, that neutral men-of-war are in the line of fire a flag of truce will probably be sent in before the vessels are opened. The Porter is to hold herself in readiness for this service.

Care must be taken to avoid striking the hospitals on Cabras Island. If it becomes necessary to silence the Morro batteries a portion of the fire will be directed with this object. But the principal object is to destroy the ships.

After passing the harbor mouth the Iowa will turn a little to starboard toward the town and will then turn out with a starboard helm and again pass to port, and, after passing Cabras Island to the westward, she will turn again with a starboard helm and pass as at first. Should this plan be changed and it be decided to hold the ships in front of the entrance, the signal "stop" will be made at the proper time.

The Indiana, the New York, and the monitors will follow the motions of the flagship and remain in column.

The course, after Fort Canuelo is brought into range with the west end of Cabras Island, will be cast by south.

Should nightfall come with the port in the enemy's hand and the ships inside, the cruisers will take up positions just outside the harbor, the Montgomery to the eastward and the Detroit to the westward, with their batteries ready and the men at the guns. They will show no lights.

The other ships in succession will sweep the entrance of the harbor and the channel leading into the anchorage with searchlights to keep the torpedo-boat destroyers from coming out.

In case the enemy should attempt to escape from the port, fire is to be concentrated on the leading ships. Should the attempt be made at night, the searchlights in use are to be turned on her bridge and conning-tower, and are to be held there.

[ Lieutenant Bernadou's report of the affair at Cardenas.]

The Winslow arrived off Cardenas from Matanzas at 9 A.M. on the 11th, having left her station on the blockade to obtain an additional supply of coal, the amount of fuel in her bunkers being reduced to five tons. The U. S. S. Machias and Wilmington were found at Piedras Cay. Upon making application to Captain Merry, the senior officer present, I was directed to apply to Captain Todd, commanding U. S. S. Wilmington, for necessary supplies.

On boarding the U. S. S. Wilmington I was informed by her commanding officer of his intention to enter Cardenas Harbor on the afternoon of that day. Of the three channels leading through the cays two were believed to be mined. There remained unexplored a third channel, between Romero and Blanco
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Cays, over which the minimum depth of water, as shown by the chart, was 12 fathoms. As the rise of tide at this place was about 14 feet, and as the Wilmington drew scant 10 feet, I was directed to receive on board a Cuban pilot, Santos, to take with me the revenue-cutter Hudson to sound this channel, and, in company with the Hudson, to sweep the channel for torpedoes. This work I completed by noon, except the sweeping of the channel, which could not be done on account of the grounding of the Hudson. That vessel touched lightly, but managed to work off without injury. The Winslow, therefore, dragged the channel with grapnels and returned to the Wilmington, reporting to Captain Todd upon the practicability of the entrance.

The entrance was begun at 12:30, high tide, the Hudson on the starboard side and the Winslow on the port side of the Wilmington assisting in marking out shoal water. No vessels were in sight on entering Cardenas Bay save two square-rigged merchantmen with sails unbent, anchored directly off the town. As it was thought possible that gunboats might attempt to escape, the Hudson was sent along the western side and the Winslow along the eastern side of the bay to intercept them in event of such movement; not finding them the three vessels met off the town at a distance of about 3,500 yards. When in this position the Winslow was signalled to approach the Wilmington within hail, and I was directed by Captain Todd to go in and investigate a small gunboat then observed for the first time, painted gray, with black smokestack, apparently not under steam and moored to a wharf, to the left of which arose a compact mass of buildings close to the water-front. Torpedoes were set for surface runs, the fans upon the war-noses were run up so as to provide for explosion at short range for use alongside of the gunboat, and all preparations were made for immediate action.

At a distance of about 1,500 yards, at which time the Winslow was advancing at about 12 knots, which seems her maximum speed in quite shoal water, the first gun of the engagement was fired from the bow of the Spanish gunboat, marked by a clear puff of white smoke. This shot, which passed over the Winslow, was at once replied to by that ship and was the signal for the commencement from the beach of a rapidly sustained fire, characterized primarily by a total absence of smoke. At the commencement of this firing I received a flesh wound in the left thigh. As the action advanced a cloud of haze collected on shore at the location of this battery, and when closest I detected one or two gun flashes among the buildings, but at no time could I detect the exact position of the guns. My uncertainty as to the position of the enemy was attested to by the commanding officer of the Hudson and by officers commanding gun divisions on the Wilmington, who inquired of me, shortly after the action, what I made out to be the enemy's exact position.

At this time the wind was blowing from the ships toward the shore. The first shot that pierced the Winslow rendered her steam and hand-steering gear inoperative and damaged them beyond repair. Efforts to work the hand-steering gear from aft were frustrated by the wrecking of that mechanism and the rupture of both wheel-ropes; relieving tackles failed to operate the rudder. For a short time the vessel was held in her bows-on position by use of her propellers. She then swung broadside to the enemy. A shot now pierced her engine-room, rendering one engine inoperative. I directed my attention...
to maintaining fire from her 1-pounder guns, to keeping the vessel constantly in movement, so as to reduce the chances of her being hit, to endeavoring to withdraw from close range, and to keeping clear of the line of fire of the Wilmington and Hudson. The use of the remaining engine, however, had the effect of throwing her stern toward the enemy upon backing, while going ahead threw her bow in the same direction. Under the heavy fire of the Wilmington the fire of the enemy slackened. The Spanish gunboat was silenced and put out of action early in the engagement.

The Winslow now being practically disabled, I signalled to the Hudson to tow us out of action. She very gallantly approached us, and we succeeded in getting a line to her. Previous to this, the alternate rapid backing and steaming ahead of the Winslow had had the effect of working her out from under the enemy's batteries, and in this way a distance of about 300 yards was gained. Finding that we were working out in this manner, I directed Ensign Bagley to concentrate his attention upon the movement of the ship, watching the vessel so as to keep her out of the Wilmington's way, and to direct the movements of the man at the reversing gear, mechanical communication from deck to engine room being impracticable. This necessitated Mr. Bagley making repeated short trips from the deck to the foot of the engine-room ladder while directing the vessel's course, and at the moment of being on deck he stood abreast the starboard gun close to a group of men who had been stationed below, but who had been sent on deck from the disabled machinery. A shell hitting, I believe, a hose-reel, exploded instantly, killing Ensign Bagley and two others and mortally wounding two. This accident, which occurred at the close of the action, was virtually its end; the enemy fired a few more shots, but was soon completely silenced by the heavy fire of the Wilmington. The conduct of Ensign Bagley and the men with him, as well as that of the crew who survived the fight, is beyond commendation.

After seeing the dead and wounded removed from the Winslow and conveyed on board the Wilmington, I turned over the command of the ship to Gunner's Mate G. P. Brady, my own injury preventing me from performing active duty for the time being. The 1-pounder guns of the Winslow were constantly in action throughout the fight. Torpedoes were ready, but there was no chance to use them.

John B. Bernadou, Lieutenant U. S. Navy.

[Report of Lieut. Frank H. Newcomb, commanding the Hudson at the Cardenas affair.]

At 11:30 A.M., while off the main entrance to Cardenas Bay, the Hudson was ordered by the senior officer present to accompany the United States steamer Wilmington and the United States torpedo-boat Winslow inside. All three vessels started immediately, and, after some preliminary soundings to determine the best water, passed through Blanco Channel into the bay and headed for Cardenas. About 1 P.M., when abreast of Corogal Point, the Hudson was ordered by the commanding officer of the United States steamer Wilmington to "go out and look at small craft." Steaming over toward Diana Bay and skirting the western shore of the bay, discovered no vessels, and observing that the Wilmington and Winslow were nearing Cardenas, at 1:35 P.M. steamed over toward them at full speed. At 1:45 P.M., when a little over a mile dis-

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tant from vessels, saw firing commence from the shore, which was immediately returned by our ships.

At 1:50, when within range of the shore guns, the Hudson opened fire upon them with her two 6-pounders. Observing that the Winslow was quite in shore and exposed to the full strength of the enemy's guns, ran alongside of the Wilmington and asked if we should go to her assistance (Winslow). Received the answer "Yes," and immediately steamed into the immediate vicinity of the Winslow, keeping up a constant and rapid fire from the Hudson's battery upon the enemy's guns on shore. At 2:30, commanding officer of the Winslow reported his vessel totally disabled and requested to be towed out of range. Owing to shoal water and the rapid drift toward shore of the Winslow (the wind was on shore), it was fully thirty minutes before the Hudson succeeded in making a line fast from the Winslow and starting ahead with her. The enemy kept up a constant fire during this time, which appeared to be especially directed toward the Winslow, which fire was returned at every opportunity by the Winslow and Hudson. The Winslow was towed alongside the Wilmington, from which vessel a boat was sent with a medical officer, who transferred the dead and wounded from the Winslow to the Wilmington. Finally, about 3:30 P.M. all three vessels steamed out of the bay, the Winslow in tow of the Hudson. At about dark joined the United States steamer Machias outside, where the Winslow was anchored. F. H. Newcomb.

To the Congress of the United States.

On the 11th day of May, 1898, there occurred a conflict in the Bay of Cardenas, Cuba, in which the naval torpedo-boat Winslow was disabled, her commander wounded, and one of her officers and a part of her crew killed by the enemy's fire.

In the face of a most galling fire from the enemy's guns the revenue cutter Hudson, commanded by First Lieut. Frank H. Newcomb, U. S. Revenue Cutter Service, rescued the disabled Winslow, her wounded commander, and remaining crew.

The commander of the Hudson kept his vessel in the very hottest fire of the action, although in constant danger of going ashore on account of the shallow water, until he finally got a line made fast to the Winslow, and towed that vessel out of range of the enemy's guns, a deed of special gallantry.

I recommend that, in recognition of the signal act of heroism of First Lieut. Frank H. Newcomb, U. S. Revenue Cutter Service, above set forth, the thanks of Congress be extended to him and to his officers and men of the Hudson, and that a gold medal of honor be presented to Lieutenant Newcomb, a silver medal of honor to each of his officers, and a bronze medal of honor to each member of his crew who served with him at Cardenas.

William McKinley.

Executive Mansion, June 27, 1898.

For their bravery in the action at Cardenas the following members of the Winslow's crew were promoted: T. C. Cooney, to carpenter; Hans Johnson and G. C. Brady, to gunner.
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[Sampson’s order of battle while cruising between Cayo Frances and Matanzas, May 22 to 27.]

[ORDER OF BATTLE]

OFF HAVANA, CUBA, May 22.

It is possible that the vessels of this squadron now off Havana will meet the Spanish ships, consisting of the Cristobal Colon, Viscaya, Oquendo, Maria Teresa, and one torpedo-boat-destroyer. These vessels are supposed to be now in Santiago de Cuba, where they are taking coal and provisions. The squadron of Commodore Schley will probably leave Cienfuegos to-morrow morning, bound east in pursuit of the Spanish ships, and it is anticipated that they will leave Santiago de Cuba, on the same day that Commodore Schley leaves Cienfuegos, or reach Havana by the north coast of Cuba, in which case the blockading squadron off Havana will attempt to intercept them by going East about two hundred miles, beyond the junction of Santaren and Nicholas channels. It appears to be possible that, if these ships come toward Havana from that direction, they can be intercepted and brought to action.

The order of battle will be as follows, subject to such modifications as may appear advantageous at the time:

Owing to the superior speed of the Spanish vessels, I have decided to form the ships in one column, heading to the eastward, on the assumption that the enemy will be proceeding to the westward in column. The New York, Indiana, Puritan, and Manitou will be the four leading vessels.

These will be followed by the cruisers of the blockading squadron, the idea being that the heavy ships should first meet the enemy, and the fire of the cruisers be brought into play after the damage inflicted by the larger ships.

The armored ships, after passing the rear of the Spanish squadron, will turn in succession by using the starboard or port helm, as the case may require, turning toward the enemy. It is believed that the fire of the cruisers, following that of the armored ships, will so embarrass the Spanish vessels that the armored vessels can turn, as before stated, and double on the enemy’s rear.

The ships designated will assemble twelve miles northeast of the Morro, at early daylight, Monday, the 23d inst.; thence they will proceed in three columns, to the eastward, in the order of cruising designated (see plan 1. First order of cruising). The New Orleans will act as scout on the starboard hand, the Montgomery on the port, and the Wasp ahead.

When the enemy heaves in sight, the vessels will proceed to the eastward to meet them. While so doing they will be formed in column (first order of battle).

The attention of commanding officers is called to the necessity of stopping these (Spanish) vessels.

In the first order of battle the two torpedo-boats will take station on the off side of the New Orleans, Detroit, and if there be a third, it will take its place on the off side of the Machias. They will take advantage of any opportunity to torpedo an enemy’s ship.

While the Viscaya, Maria Teresa, and Oquendo have strong protection on
barbettes and water line, they have no protection elsewhere, and are vulne­
ral to even 6-pounders.
Fire should be concentrated on the centre part of these ships, just above
the water line. In case of Cristobal Colon, her belt and barbette armor is in­
ferior to that of the other ships, but her protection elsewhere extends over a
larger area. None of this armor is face-hardened.

W. T. SAMPSO, Commander-in-chief.

[Captain Elliott’s report of the fight by marines and Cubans against Spaniards at Guan­
tanamo, June 14.]

CAMP McCALLA,
GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA, June 15, 1898.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report:

In accordance with your verbal directions, I left camp at 9 A.M. yester­
day with two companies of the battalion, C and D, commanded respectively
by First Lieut. L. C. Lucas and Capt. William F. Spicer, with an aggregate
of one hundred and sixty men and fifty Cubans, under command of Lieut.-
Col. Eugene Thomas. Colonel Laborde, Cuban army, was also present, but
without command.

My orders were to destroy the well at Cusco, about six miles from this
camp, which was the only water supply of the enemy within twelve miles of
this place, and the existence of which made possible the continuance of the
annoying attacks upon our force in camp here.

Two and a half miles from Cusco half the Cubans and the first platoon of
Company C, under Lieutenant Lucas’ command, passed over a mountain on
our left, hoping to cut off the enemy’s pickets. In this we failed, and our
force was discovered by the Spanish outposts, which retreated immediately,
and gave the alarm to the main body, whose headquarters were in
a

A high mountain separated the two forces at this point, and each attempted
to gain its crest as a point of advantage. In this we were successful, but were
fired on heavily by the enemy from the valley at a distance of eight hundred
yards. This fire was replied to by the Cubans of the main body. Lieutenant
Lucas, with thirty-two men of his platoon and the remaining Cubans, came
into the fight at 11:15, the other nine men of his platoon becoming exhausted,
and were obliged to return to Camp McCalla. Lieutenant Bannon conducted
the second platoon of Company C, just below the crest of the hill, out of fire
from the enemy, leaving the narrow path, which was the only road, and mak­
ing their way through the cacti. Just in rear of this platoon, and following
in single file, was Company D. The crest of the hill was in the shape of a
horseshoe, two-thirds encircling Cusco Valley and the well.

The Cubans and Companies C and D occupied one-half of this horseshoe
ridge, while Second Lieut. L. J. Magill, with one platoon (fifty men) of
Company A, came up from the valley on the opposite side, where he had
been stationed as an outpost from Camp McCalla, having been attracted by
the heavy fire and believing his force necessary to our assistance, and occu­
pied the left centre of this horseshoe ridge. As soon as he saw our position
he sent one of his men around the ridge to report to me. For fifteen minutes we were marching under a heavy fire, to which no reply was made, to gain this position. By the use of glasses and careful search by the men, individuals were discovered here and there, and fire being opened upon them, they would break from cover to cover, and we were thus enabled to gain targets at which to fire, which had been heretofore impossible, owing to the dense chaparral in which the enemy sought successful cover.

Many of the men fired as coolly as at target practice, consulting with each other and their officers as to range. Among these were Privates Carter, Faulkner, and Boniface, all of whom did noticeable execution. This movement of the enemy gave Lieutenant Magill an opportunity to get in a cross-fire, which was well taken advantage of. Having reduced the enemy’s fire to straggling shots, the U. S. S. Dolphin, Commander H. W. Lyon, U. S. N., which had been sent along the coast to co-operate with us if possible, was signalled to shell the house used as the enemy’s headquarters, and also the valley; but she was too far to the front, having mistaken the valley intended, so that her fire was in Lieutenant Magill’s direction, driving him to the reverse side of the ridge.

However, this shell fire started the enemy from his hiding-place, which gave the other companies the opportunity to fire at them on the move. Signal was made to the Dolphin to cease firing, and Lieutenant Magill was directed to form skirmish line and move down the valley in front of him, in order to rout out the enemy, driving him toward the sea. This was defeated by renewed shell fire from the Dolphin.

The fight, which began at 11 A.M., was now drawing to a close, being over at 3 P.M. The enemy began a straggling retreat at 2 P.M., getting out of the valley as best they could.

The fire of the force under my command was at all times deliberate and aimed, sights being adjusted and volleys fired when sufficiently large bodies of the enemy could be seen to justify it. The two platoons of Company C, under First Lieut. Lucas and Second Lieut. P. M. Bannon, were handled with the best of judgment. Company D crowded over on the firing line, and men needlessly exposed themselves by standing in groups.

First Lieut. W. C. Neville, commanding the first platoon, did his best with the men in front of him. Captain Spicer, commanding Company D, was overcome by the sun on the top of the hill, and had to be sent on board the Dolphin. Lieutenant Neville injured his hip and ankle in catching his foot and falling down the mountain-side after the fight was over. These accidents left Second Lieut. M. J. Shaw in command of Company D, which he handled with entire satisfaction. Forty men left the crest of the hill at 3:15 P.M., under Lieutenant Lucas, and destroyed the well and burned the house lately occupied by the enemy.

Canteens were taken from the men still holding the crest and filled with water, requested by signal from the Dolphin.

The marines fired on an average about sixty shots each, the Cubans’ belts being refilled during the action from the belts of the marines, each having to furnish six clips, or thirty cartridges.

The loss of our force was one private of Company D wounded slightly,
and ten or twelve overcome by heat. These latter were kindly taken on board the *Dolphin* and cared for. This ship rendered every possible assistance to the expedition.

Two Cubans were wounded during the fight on the hill, one being accidentally shot by Colonel Laborde by a pistol. While destroying the well the Cubans were placed up the valley from which the enemy retreated, and began a noisy and hot fight with guerillas who had not been dislodged. In this fight the Cubans lost two killed and two wounded, but killed five of the enemy.

The march home began at 5:30 P.M., camp being reached at 8 P.M.

From the best information since obtained, which is believed to be reliable, sixty of the enemy, among whom were two officers, were killed. The wounded were numerous, but the wounds were probably light, owing to the range of six hundred or one thousand yards, at these distances all explosive effect of the bullets being lost. Eighteen prisoners, including one lieutenant, were captured, besides about thirty Mauser rifles and a quantity of ammunition. Lieutenant Magill also captured a complete heliograph outfit, and destroyed the signal station. This has been used ever since our arrival here, and could be seen at all times. Before closing, I desire to commend Lieutenant Magill's good judgment in coming up and the excellent manner in which he handled his men.

Serg. John H. Quick was obliged to stand on the open ridge under fire to signal the *Dolphin*, which he did with the utmost coolness, using his rifle with equal judgment while not thus engaged. My only regret is that Company E, under the command of First Lieut. James C. Mahoney, which had been sent to us from an outpost near Camp McCalla when the heavy firing was heard there, was unable to report to me until 4 P.M. Had he been an hour and a half sooner I am satisfied that the entire force of the enemy, which was about five hundred men, would have been captured. This delay was not due to any lack of zeal on his part.

Upon leaving camp you asked me if I wanted an adjutant. I declined to take one, the command being short of officers for duty, but, having been notified that a Mr. Stephen Crane would be allowed to accompany the expedition, I requested him to act as an aid if one should be needed. He accepted the duty, and was of material aid during the action, carrying messages to fire volleys, etc., to the different company commanders.

Very respectfully,

G. F. Elliott, Captain U. S. M. C.,
Commanding Company C.

*Lieut.-Col. R. W. Huntington, U. S. M. C., Commanding Battalion.*

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*[Sampson's report on the sinking of Cervera's fleet, July 3.]*

U. S. FLAGSHIP NEW YORK (first rate).

OFF SANTIAGO DE CUBA, CUBA, July 15, 1898.

*SIR:* I have the honor to make the following report upon the battle with and the destruction of the Spanish squadron commanded by Admiral Cervera off Santiago de Cuba on Sunday, July 3, 1898.

Second—The enemy's vessels came out of the harbor between 9:35 and
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10 A.M., the head of the column appearing around Cay Smith at 9:31, and emerging from the channel five or six minutes later.

Third—The positions of the vessels of my command off Santiago at that moment were as follows: The flagship New York was four miles east of her blockading station, and about seven miles from the harbor entrance. She had started from Siboney, where I intended to land, accompanied by several of my staff, and go to the front and consult with General Shafter. A discussion of the situation and a more definite understanding between us of the operations proposed had been rendered necessary by the unexpectedly strong resistance of the Spanish garrison of Santiago. I had sent my chief of staff on shore the day before to arrange an interview with General Shafter, who had been suffering from heat prostration. I made arrangements to go to his headquarters, and my flagship was in the position mentioned above when the Spanish squadron appeared in the channel.

The remaining vessels were in or near their usual blockading positions, distributed in a semicircle about the harbor entrance, counting from the eastward to the westward, in the following order: The Indiana, about a mile and a half from shore; the Oregon, the New York's place between these two, the Iowa, the Texas, and the Brooklyn, the latter two miles from the shore west of Santiago. The distance of the vessels from the harbor entrance was from two and one-half to four miles, the latter being the limit of the day blockading distance. The length of the arc formed by the ships was about eight miles. The Massachusetts had left at 4 A.M. for Guantanamo for coal. Her station was between the Iowa and the Texas. The auxiliaries Gloucester and Vixen lay close to the land and nearer the harbor entrance than the large vessels, the Gloucester the eastward and the Vixen to the westward. The torpedo boat Ericsson was in company with the flagship, and remained with her during her chase until ordered to discontinue, when she rendered very efficient service in rescuing prisoners from the burning Viscaya. I inclose a diagram showing approximately the positions of the vessels as described above.

Fourth—The Spanish vessels came rapidly out of the harbor at a speed estimated at from eight to ten knots, and in the following order: Infanta Maria Teresa (flagship), Viscaya, Cristobal Colon, and the Almirante Oquendo. The distance between these ships was about eight hundred yards, which means that from the time the first one became visible in the upper reach of the channel until the last one was out of the harbor an interval of only about twelve minutes elapsed. Following the Oquendo, at a distance of about twelve hundred yards, came the torpedo-boat destroyer Pluton, and after her the Furor. The armored cruisers, as rapidly as they could bring their guns to bear, opened a vigorous fire upon the blockading vessels, and emerged from the channel shrouded in the smoke from their guns.

Fifth—The men of our ships in front of the port were at Sunday quarters for inspection. The signal was made simultaneously from several vessels, "Enemy ships escaping," and general quarters were sounded. The men cheered as they sprang to their guns, and fire was opened probably within eight minutes by the vessels whose guns commanded the entrance. The New York turned about and steamed for the escaping fleet, flying the signal, "Close in toward harbor entrances and attack vessels," and gradually increased speed,
With Sampson Through the War

until toward the end of the chase she was making sixteen and one-half knots, and was rapidly closing on the Cristobal Colon. She was not at any time within the range of the heavy Spanish ships, and her only part in the firing was to receive the undivided fire from the forts in passing the harbor entrance and to fire a few shots at one of the destroyers, thought at the moment to be attempting to escape from the Gloucester.

Sixth—The Spanish vessels, upon clearing the harbor, turned to the westward in column, increasing their speed to the full power of their engines. The heavy blockading vessels, which had closed in toward the Morro at the instant of the enemy’s appearance, and at their best speed, delivered a rapid fire, well sustained and destructive, which speedily overwhelmed and silenced the Spanish fire. The initial speed of the Spaniards carried them rapidly past the blockading vessels, and the battle developed into a chase, in which the Brooklyn and the Texas had at the start the advantage of position. The Brooklyn maintained this lead. The Oregon, steaming at amazing speed from the commencement of the action, took first place. The Iowa and the Indiana, having done good work, and not having the speed of the other ships, were directed by me in succession at about the time the Viscaya was beached to drop out of the chase and resume blockading stations. These vessels rescued many prisoners. The Vixen, finding that the rush of the Spanish ships would put her between two fires, ran outside of our own column and remained there during the battle and chase.

Seventh—The skilful handling and gallant fighting of the Gloucester excited the admiration of everyone who witnessed it and merits the commendation of the Navy Department. She is a fast and entirely unprotected auxiliary vessel—the yacht Corsair—and has a good battery of light rapid-fire guns. She was lying about two miles from the harbor entrance to the southward and eastward, and immediately steamed in, opening fire upon the large ships. Anticipating the appearance of the Pluton and the Furor, the Gloucester was slowed, thereby gaining more rapidly a high pressure of steam, and when the destroyers came out she steamed for them at full speed, and was able to close at short range, where her fire was accurate, deadly, and of great volume. During this fight the Gloucester was under the fire of the Socapa battery.

Within twenty minutes from the time they emerged from Santiago Harbor the careers of the Furor and the Pluton were ended, and two-thirds of their people killed. The Furor was beached and sunk in the surf; the Pluton sank in deep water a few minutes later. The destroyers probably suffered much injury from the fire of the secondary batteries of the battle-ships Iowa, Indiana, and Texas, yet I think a very considerable factor in their speedy destruction was the fire at close range of the Gloucester’s battery. After rescuing the survivors of the destroyers, the Gloucester did excellent service in landing and securing the crew of the Infanta Maria Teresa.

Eighth—The method of escape attempted by the Spaniards—all steering in the same direction, and in formation—removed all tactical doubts or difficulties and made plain the duty of every United States vessel to close in, immediately engage and pursue. This was promptly and effectively done. As already stated, the first rush of the Spanish squadron carried it past a number of the blockading ships which could not immediately work up to their best
speed; but they suffered heavily in passing, and the Infanta Maria Teresa and the Oquendo were probably set on fire by shells fired during the first fifteen minutes of the engagement. It was afterward learned that the Infanta Maria Teresa's fire-main had been cut by one of our first shots, and that she was unable to extinguish fire. With large volumes of smoke rising from their lower decks aft, these vessels gave up both fight and flight and ran in on the beach—the Infanta Maria Teresa at about 10:15 A.M. at Nima Nima, six and one-half miles from the Santiago Harbor entrance, and the Almirante Oquendo at about 10:30 A.M. at Juan Gonzales, seven miles from the port.

Ninth—The Viscaya was still under the fire of the leading vessels; the Cristobal Colon had drawn ahead, leading the chase, and soon passed beyond the range of the guns of the leading American ships. The Viscaya was soon set on fire, and at 11:15 she turned in shore and was beached at Acerraderos, fifteen miles from Santiago, burning fiercely, and with her reserves of ammunition on deck already beginning to explode. When about ten miles west of Santiago the Indiana had been signalled to go back to the harbor entrance, and at Acerraderos the Iowa was signalled to "resume blockading station." The Iowa, assisted by the Ericsson and the Hist, took off the crew of the Viscaya, while the Harcard and the Gloucester rescued those of the Infanta Maria Teresa and the Almirante Oquendo. This rescue of prisoners, including the wounded from the burning Spanish vessels, was the occasion of some of the most daring and gallant conduct of the day. The ships were burning fore and aft, their guns and reserve ammunition were exploding, and it was not known at what moment the fire would reach the main magazine. In addition to this, a heavy surf was running just inside of the Spanish ships. But no risk deterred our officers and men until their work of humanity was complete.

Tenth—There remained now of the Spanish ships only the Cristobal Colon, but she was their best and fastest vessel. Forced by the situation to hug the Cuban coast, her only chance of escape was by superior and sustained speed. When the Viscaya went ashore the Colon was about six miles ahead of the Brooklyn and the Oregon, but her spurt was finished and the American ships were now gaining upon her. Behind the Brooklyn and the Oregon came the Texas, the Vixen, and the New York. It was evident from the bridges of the New York that all the American ships were gradually out-running the chase, and that she had no chance of escape. At 12:50 the Brooklyn and the Oregon opened fire and got her range—the Oregon's heavy shell striking beyond her—and at 1:20 she gave up without firing another shot, hauled down her colors and ran ashore at Rio Torquino, forty-eight miles from Santiago. Captain Cook, of the Brooklyn, went on board to receive the surrender.

While his boat was alongside I came up in the New York, received his report, and placed the Oregon in charge of the wreck, to save her, if possible; and directed the prisoners to be transferred to the Resolute, which had followed the chase. Commodore Schley, whose chief of staff had gone on board to receive the surrender, had directed that all their personal effects should be retained by the officers. This order I did not modify. The Cristobal Colon was not injured by our firing, and probably is not much injured by beaching, though she ran ashore at high speed. The beach was so steep that she came
off by the working of the sea. But her sea-valves were opened and broken, treacherously, I am sure, after her surrender, and despite all efforts she sank. When it became evident that she could not be kept afloat she was pushed by the New York bodily upon the beach—the New York’s stem being placed against her for this purpose, the ship being handled by Captain Chadwick with admirable judgment—and sank in shallow water and may be saved. Had this not been done she would have gone down in deep water and would have been, to a certainty, a total loss.

Eleventh—I regard this complete and important victory over the Spanish forces as the successful finish of several weeks of arduous and close blockade, so stringent and effective during the night that the enemy was deterred from making the attempt to escape at night, and deliberately elected to make the attempt in daylight. That this was the case I was informed by the commanding officer of the Cristobal Colon.

Twelfth—It seems proper briefly to describe here the manner in which this was accomplished. The harbor of Santiago is naturally easy to blockade, there being but one entrance, and that a narrow one, and the deep water extending close up to the shore line, presenting no difficulties of navigation outside of the entrance. At the time of my arrival before the port, June 1, the moon was at its full and there was sufficient light during the night to enable any movement outside of the entrance to be detected; but with the waning of the moon and the coming of dark nights there was opportunity for the enemy to escape or for his torpedo-boats to make an attack upon the blockading vessels. It was ascertained with fair conclusiveness that the Merrimac, so gallantly taken into the channel all June 3, did not obstruct it.

I therefore maintained the blockade as follows: To the battle-ships was assigned the duty, in turn, of lighting the channel. Moving up to the port, at a distance of from one to two miles from the Morro—dependent upon the condition of the atmosphere—they threw a searchlight beam directly up the channel and held it steadily there. This lightened up the entire breadth of the channel for half a mile inside of the entrance so brilliantly that the movement of small boats could be detected. Why the batteries never opened fire upon the searchlight ship was always a matter of surprise to me, but they never did. Stationed close to the entrance of the port were three pickets launches, and at a little distance further out three small picket vessels, usually converted yachts, and when they were not available one or two of our torpedo-boats. With this arrangement there was at least a certainty that nothing would get out of the harbor undetected.

After the arrival of the army, when the situation forced upon the Spanish Admiral a decision, our vigilance increased. The night blockading distance was reduced to two miles for all vessels, and a battle-ship was placed alongside the searchlight ship, with her broadside trained upon the channel in readiness to fire the instant a Spanish ship should appear. The commanding officers merit the greatest praise for the perfect manner in which they entered into this plan and put it into execution. The Massachusetts, which, according to routine, was sent that morning to coal at Guantanamo, like the others had spent weary nights upon this work, and deserved a better fate than to be absent that morning.
Appendix

I inclose for the information of the Department copies of orders and memoranda issued from time to time relating to the manner of maintaining the blockade. When all the work was done so well it is difficult to discriminate in praise. The object of the blockade of Cervera's squadron was fully accomplished, and each individual bore well his part in it, the commodore in command of the Second Division, the captains of ships, their officers and men. The fire of the battle-ships was powerful and destructive, and the resistance of the Spanish squadron was in great part broken almost before they had got beyond the range of their own forts.

The fine speed of the Oregon enabled her to take a front position in the chase, and the Cristobal Colon did not give up until the Oregon had thrown a 13-inch shell beyond her. This performance adds to the already brilliant record of this fine battle-ship, and speaks highly of the skill and care with which her admirable efficiency has been maintained during a service unprecedented in the history of vessels of her class. The Brooklyn's westerly blockading position gave her an advantage in the chase which she maintained to the end, and she employed her fine battery with telling effect. The Texas and the New York were gaining on the chase during the last hour, and, had any accident befallen the Brooklyn or the Oregon, would have speedily overhauled the Cristobal Colon.

From the moment the Spanish vessel exhausted her first burst of speed the result was never in doubt. She fell, in fact, far below what might reasonably have been expected of her. Careful measurements of time and distance gave her an average speed, from the time she cleared the harbor mouth until the time she was run on shore at Rio Tarquino, of 13.7 knots. Neither the New York nor the Brooklyn stopped to couple up their forward engines, but ran out the chase with one pair, getting steam, of course, as rapidly as possible on all boilers. To stop to couple up the forward engines would have meant a delay of fifteen minutes, or four miles in the chase.

Thirteenth—Several of the ships were struck, the Brooklyn more often than the others, but very slight material injury was done, the greatest being on board the Iowa. Our loss was one man killed and one wounded, both on the Brooklyn. It is difficult to explain this immunity from loss of life or injury to ships in a combat with modern vessels of the best type; but Spanish gunnery is poor at the best, and the superior weight and accuracy of our fire speedily drove the men from their guns and silenced their fire. This is borne out by the statements of prisoners, and by observation. The Spanish vessels, as they dashed out of the harbor, were covered with the smoke from their own guns, but this speedily diminished in volume and soon almost disappeared. The fire from the rapid-fire batteries of the battle-ships appears to have been remarkably destructive. An examination of the stranded vessels shows that the Almirante Oquendo especially had suffered terribly from this fire. Her sides are everywhere pierced and her decks were strewn with the charred remains of those who had fallen.

Fourteenth—The reports of Commodore W. S. Schley and the commanding officers are inclosed.

Fifteenth—A board appointed by me several days ago has made a critical examination of the stranded vessels, both with a view of reporting upon the
result of our fire and the military features involved, and of reporting upon
the chance of saving any of them and of wrecking the remainder. The re­
port of the board will be speedily forwarded.

Very respectfully,

W. T. SAMPSON,
Rear-Admiral United States Navy, Commander-in-Chief
United States Naval Force, North Atlantic Station.

The Secretary of the Navy, Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

[Schley’s report of the battle of July 3.]

NORTH ATLANTIC FLEET, SECOND SQUADRON.
UNITED STATES FLAGSHIP BROOKLYN,
GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA, JULY 6, 1898.

The Command-in-Chief, United States Naval Force, North Atlantic Station.

SIR: First—I have the honor to make the following report of that part of
the squadron under your command which came under my observation during
the engagement with the Spanish fleet on July 3, 1898.

Second—At 9:35 A.M. Admiral Cervera, with the Infanta Maria Teresa,
the Viscaya, the Oquendo, the Cristobal Colon, and two torpedo-boat destroy­
ers, came out of the harbor of Santiago de Cuba in column at distance and
attempted to escape to the westward.

Signal was made from the Iowa that the enemy was coming out, but his
movement had been discovered from this ship at the same moment. This
vessel was the furthest west, except the Vixen, the blockading line; signal
was made to the western division, as prescribed in your general orders, and
there was immediate and rapid movement inward by your squadron and a
general engagement at ranges beginning at 1,100 yards and varying to 3,000
until the Viscaya was destroyed, about 10:50 A.M. The concentration of the
fire of the squadron upon the ships coming out was most furious and terrific,
and great damage was done them.

Third—About twenty or twenty-five minutes after the engagement began
two vessels, thought to be the Maria Teresa and the Oquendo, and since veri­
ified as such, took fire from the effective shelling of the squadron and were
forced to run on the beach, some six or seven miles west of the harbor en­
trance, where they burned and blew up later. The torpedo-boat destroyers
were destroyed early in the action, but the smoke was so dense in their direc­
tion that I cannot say to which vessel or vessels the credit belongs. This,
doubtless, was better seen from your flagship.

Fourth—The Viscaya and the Colon, perceiving the disaster to their con­
sorts, continued at full speed to the westward to escape, and were followed
and engaged in a running fight with the Brooklyn, the Texas, the Iowa, and
the Oregon until 10:50 o’clock, when the Viscaya took fire from our shells.
She put her helm to port, and with a heavy list to port side in shore and ran
aground at Acerraderos, about twenty miles west of Santiago, on fire fore and
aft, and where she blew up during the night. Observing that she had struck
her colors, and that several vessels were nearing her to capture and save her
crew, signal was made to cease firing.
The Oregon proving vastly faster than the other battle-ships, she and the Brooklyn, together with the Texas and another vessel, which proved to be your flagship, continued westward in pursuit of the Colon, which had run close in shore, evidently seeking some good spot to beach if she should fail to elude her pursuers.

Fifth—This pursuit continued with increasing speed in the Brooklyn, the Oregon, and other ships, and soon the Brooklyn and the Oregon were within long range of the Colon, when the Oregon opened fire with her 13-inch guns, landing a shell close to the Colon. A moment afterward the Brooklyn opened fire with her 8-inch guns, landing a shell just ahead of her. Several other shells were fired at the Colon, now in range of the Brooklyn and the Oregon’s guns. Her commander, seeing all chances of escape cut off and destruction awaiting his ship, fired a lee gun and struck her flag, at 1.15 P.M., and ran ashore at a point some fifty miles west of Santiago Harbor. Your flagship was coming up rapidly at the time, as was also the Texas and the Vixen. A little later, after your arrival, the Cristobal Colon, which had struck to the Brooklyn and the Oregon, was turned over to you as one of the trophies of this great victory of the squadron under your command.

Sixth—During my official visit a little later Commander Eaton, of the Resolute, appeared, and reported to you the presence of a Spanish battle-ship near Altares. Your orders to me were to take the Oregon and go eastward to meet her, and this was done by the Brooklyn, with the result that the vessel reported as an enemy was discovered to be the Austrian cruiser Infanta Maria Theresa, seeking the Commander-in-Chief.

Seventh—I would mention for your consideration that the Brooklyn occupied the most westward blockading position, with the Vixen, and, being more directly in the route taken by the Spanish squadron, was exposed for some minutes—possibly ten—to the gun-fire of three of the Spanish ships and the west battery at a range of 1,500 yards from the ships and about 3,000 yards from the batteries, but the vessels of the entire squadron, closing in rapidly, soon diverted this fire and did magnificent work at close range.

I have never before witnessed such deadly and fatally accurate shooting as was done by the ships of your command as they closed in on the Spanish squadron, and I deem it a high privilege to commend to you, for such action as you may deem proper, the gallantry and dashing courage, the prompt decision, and skilful handling of their respective vessels of Captain Philip, Captain Evans, Captain Clark, and especially of my chief of staff, Captain Cook, who was directly under my personal observation, and whose coolness, promptness, and courage were of the highest order. The dense smoke of the combat shut out from my view the Indiana and the Gloucester, but as these vessels were closer to your flagship, no doubt their part in the conflict was under your immediate observation.

Eighth—Lieutenant Sharp, commanding the Vixen, acted with conspicuous courage; although unable to engage the heavier ships of the enemy with his light guns, nevertheless he was close into the battle line under heavy fire and many of the enemy’s shot passed beyond his vessel.

Ninth—I beg to invite special attention to the conduct of my flag lieutenant, James H. Sears, and Ensign Edward McCauley, Jr., aid, who were com-
stantly at my side during the engagement, and who exposed themselves fear·
lessly in discharging their duties; and also to the splendid behavior of my
secretary, Lieutenant B. W. Wells, jr., who commanded and directed the
fighting of the fourth division with splendid effect.

Tenth—I would commend the highly meritorious conduct and courage in
the engagement of Lieutenant-Commander N. E. Mason, the executive officer,
whose presence everywhere over the ship during its continuance did much to
secure the good result of this ship's part in the victory.

Eleventh—The navigator, Lieutenant A. C. Hodgson, and the division
officers, Lieutenant T. D. Griffin, Lieutenant W. P. Rush, Lieutenant Ed·
ward Simpson, Lieutenant J. G. Doyle, and Ensign Charles Webster, and
the junior divisional officers were most steady and conspicuous in every detail
of duty, contributing to the accurate firing of this ship in their part of the
great victory of your forces.

Twelfth—The officers of the Medical, Pay, and Engineer and Marine corps
responded to every demand of the occasion and were fearless in exposing
themselves. The warrant officers, Boatswain William L. Hill, Carpenter G.
H. Warford, and Gunner F. T. Applegate were everywhere exposed in
watching for damage, reports of which were promptly conveyed to me.

Thirteenth—I have never in my life served with a braver, better, or wor·
thier crew than that of the Brooklyn. During the combat, lasting from 9.30
A.M. until 1.15 P.M., much of the time under fire, they never flagged for a
moment, and were apparently undisturbed by the storm of projectiles pass·
ing ahead, astern, and over the ship.

Fourteenth—The result of the engagement was the destruction of the
Spanish squadron and the capture of the Admiral and some thirteen hundred
to fifteen hundred prisoners, with the loss of several hundred killed, esti·
mated by Admiral Cervera at six hundred men.

Fifteenth—The casualties on board this ship were: G. H. Ellis, chief
yeoman, killed; J. Burns, fireman, first class, severely wounded. The marks
and scars show that the ship was struck about twenty-five times, and she
bears in all forty-one scars as the result of her participation in the great vic·
tory of your force on July 3, 1898. The speed-cone halyards were shot
away, and nearly all the signal halyards. The ensign at the main was so
shattered that in hauling it down at the close of the action it fell in pieces.

Sixteenth—I congratulate you most sincerely upon this great victory of
the squadron under your command, and I am glad that I had an opportunity
to contribute in the least to a victory that seems big enough for all of us.

Seventeenth—I have the honor to transmit herewith the report of the com·
manding officer and a drawing in profile of the ship showing the location of
hits and scars; also a memorandum of the ammunition expended and the
amount to fill her allowance.

Eighteenth—Since reaching this place and holding conversation with sev·
eral of the captains—viz., Captain Eulate, of the Viscaya, and the second in
command of the Colon, Commander Contreras—I have learned that the Span·
ish admiral's scheme was to concentrate all fire for a while on the Brooklyn,
and the Viscaya to ram her, in hopes, if they could destroy her, the chance
of escape would be increased, as it was supposed she was the swiftest ship of
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your squadron. This explains the heavy fire mentioned in the Viscaya’s action in the earlier moments of the engagement. The execution of this purpose was promptly defeated by the fact that all the ships of the squadron advanced into close range and opened an irresistible, furious, and terrific fire upon the enemy’s squadron as it was coming out of the harbor.

Nineteenth—I am glad to say that the injury supposed to be below the water line was due to a water valve being opened from some unknown cause and flooding the compartment. The injury to the belt is found to be only slight and the leak small.

Twentieth—I beg to inclose a list of the officers and crew who participated in the combat of July 3, 1898.

Twenty-first—I cannot close this report without mentioning in high terms of praise the splendid conduct and support of Captain C. E. Clark of the Oregon. Her speed was wonderful and her accurate fire splendidly destructive. Very respectfully,

W. S. SCHLEY,
Commodore United States Navy, Commanding Second Squadron,
North Atlantic Fleet.

[The manœuvre of the Brooklyn at the battle of July 3, and the statement of Commodore Schley.]

On February 18, 1899, Commodore Schley sent to the naval committee of the United States Senate a lengthy communication in reference to the manœuvre executed by the Brooklyn during the battle of July 3, and regarding his own conduct prior to that date. The account of the battle was written in this book before Schley’s statement was published, and I have made no changes in my text, preferring rather to deal with the matter in this appendix. Schley stated, on February 18, that he headed the Brooklyn away from the enemy because he did not wish to blanket the fire of the other American vessels. I have stated in my chapter that in conversation Schley said he turned the Brooklyn away from the enemy to avoid being rammed. After reading Schley’s statement, I have no correction to make, except to say that on July 3, 1898, Schley attributed the manœuvre to the cause I have stated, and that on February 18, 1899, he attributed it to an entirely different motive. As the later statement was evidently inspired by misguided political friends, I have adhered in the text to what I believe was Schley’s real reason for the manœuvre, despite his after declarations. This, I believe, is far more fair to Schley, because the contention that the Brooklyn would have blanketed the fire of our own vessels had she been kept headed for the enemy is not borne out by the statements of the commanding officers of the other vessels engaged, nor by the official chart. Schley further maintained, in his communication to the Senate committee, that the turning of the Brooklyn away from the enemy “was the crucial and deciding feature of that combat.” This is utterly at variance with what Schley said immediately after the battle, and to consider this sweeping assertion seriously would be an insult to his own intelligence and that of the reader. I have purposely refrained, throughout this book, from giving mention to any of the more serious denunciations of Schley that were common talk among the fleet, because I found no actual
facts to justify them, and because I wished, if anything, to err on the side of fairness to Schley. But, as a sample of what might be written, I quote the New York Sun of February 22, 1899, which, in dealing with Schley's contention that the Brooklyn's manœuvre was a "deciding feature" of the battle, printed the following conversation which was alleged to have taken place during the battle on the Brooklyn's bridge between Schley and Lieutenant Hodgson, the navigating officer:

"Schley: 'Put your helm hard a-port.' "

"Hodgson: ' You mean starboard.' "

"Schley: ' No, I don't. We're near enough to them [the Spaniards] already.' "

"Hodgson: ' But we'll cut down the Texas.' "

"Schley: ' Let the Texas look out for herself.' "

The Sun stated that the Texas had to reverse both engines to avoid running down the Brooklyn or being run down by her, and The Sun concluded that the manœuvre endangered the safety of both vessels, without aiding the victory, and that Schley should have been court-martialled for it.

The reader will observe that, basing my deductions on Schley's original statements, I have taken a far more lenient and conservative view of the manœuvre, and I still maintain that the results of the battle freed Schley from such strenuous criticism. If I were confined to Schley's statement as made to the Senate, I fear I could find but small defence for the theoretical advisability of making the manœuvre.

In this statement to the Senate, Schley also claimed that upon the hoisting of the signal, "Disregard movements of commander-in-chief," the command devolved upon him. Previous to reading Schley's statement, I endeavored to explain the fallacy of this by a footnote to Chapter VIII., and in making his later assertion regarding the status of command Schley directly contradicts his own cablegram of July 10 to Secretary Long and his own report of the battle. Therefore, it is again impossible to take Schley's statement to the Senate seriously.

In explaining his delay at Cienfuegos, Schley quoted to the Senate as excuse a letter from Sampson, which I have not included in my chapter upon that period. This letter was written on May 20, from Key West, and told Schley that Sampson had decided to hold Cienfuegos and Havana until further developments. In short, it was simply an expansion of Sampson's cablegram of the same date to Secretary Long. In the chapter upon this period I took some pains to bring out this very point, i.e., that Sampson would not change a plan of campaign instituted by Secretary Long himself upon the strength of a report that Long characterized only as one that "might very well be correct" (the report that Cervera was at Santiago). However, as soon as Sampson was definitely informed of Cervera's presence at Santiago, he changed his plans in accordance, and took particular trouble to notify Schley of the new order of things, sending two vessels to him on May 21. Schley told the Senate that he received the letter dated May 20 on May 23, and that it "confused the situation and threw grave doubts over the location of the Spanish fleet." Schley, however, omitted to bring out the fact that at 7:30 A.M. on May 23 he also received Sampson's letter "No. 8," which was a day later than the other,
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and which told him that the Spanish fleet was probably at Santiago; and also
that he received at the same hour the additional memorandum, saying that
Sampson regarded it very important that Schley should be at Santiago by
daylight of May 24. These communications, being of later date than the
letter Schley quotes as an excuse, countermanded previous orders, and, in ad-
dition, were far more explicit and positive. When it is remembered that
Schley received these orders at the same time as the letter he quotes as an ex-
cuse, and that he did not leave Cienfuegos until thirty-six hours later, it
seems to me utterly inexplicable that the letter dated May 20 can be held to
have any bearing whatsoever upon the matter. By the very fact of the simul-
taneous delivery of later orders, admitted by Schley, the letter of May 20 was
not worth the paper it was written on.

The statement of Schley to the Senate committee afforded no explanation
of the turning back of the Flying Squadron toward Key West, while off San-
tiago, except that Schley could not then see how it was possible to coal his
fleet. His statement concluded with this:

"On May 31 I received a telegram from the commander-in-chief [Samp-
son], congratulating me upon success in locating and blockading the enemy's
fleet at Santiago. If it was worthy of commendation at that time, I am at a
loss to understand how it could have grown into reprehensible conduct, as
suggested by Admiral Sampson in his letter of July 10, 1898, some six
weeks later."

The reader will remember that the message from Sampson which Schley
refers to was written on May 29, and merely congratulated the commodore
upon his final arrival at Santiago. The congratulations, it was hoped, would
spur Schley to further effort better than would any amount of reprimand.
Had the "congratulations" come from any ordinary man, they might have
been taken as irony of the keenest kind; but that is not the way of Sampson.
The "congratulations" were accompanied by the strict injunction to keep a
close blockade of Santiago, and it was not until several days later that Samp-
son found that this had not been done, nor was it until several days later
that Sampson learned the circumstances of the unwarranted delay of the Fly-
ing Squadron at Cienfuegos and the details of its projected return to Key
West. Had Sampson known these things on May 29, it is scarcely likely
that Schley would have had reason to complain of being congratulated in the
month of May.

I would like to produce the statement of Commodore Schley in full if only
space permitted, merely as a guarantee of impartiality, and not because it does
the commodore himself justice. But I have perused it carefully, and I see
nothing that prompts me to change anything that appears in the body of the
book—which was written previous to Schley's statement—and nothing worth
comment, except those points which I have touched upon in this appendix.

THE END