A HISTORY OF THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR OF 1898

By

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With Diagrams and Index

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PREFACE

Much has been published on the brief but interesting and very important war of 1898 between the United States and Spain; but practically everything that has appeared belongs to one of two classes. On the one hand, there are the narratives of sailors, soldiers, and correspondents who took part in it, and who describe what they saw. These books are not history, though many of them are excellent material for history. On the other hand, there are records of a more general character, most of which are hasty compilations of little value. The contemporary accounts of the war were very inaccurate and imperfect; it was not until some time later that there was a sufficient body of trustworthy evidence to make it possible to write anything like a real history.

For the present volume it is claimed that it is based upon a study of all the available first-hand evidence. On the American side there is a great quantity of this in the shape of the copious reports
made public by the War and Navy Departments, and the numerous books and magazine articles written by participants in the war. On the Spanish side comparatively little has been published, but there is interesting material in the works of Lieutenant Müller and Captain Severo Gomez Nuñez, which have been translated and printed by the Bureau of Naval Intelligence, and in a few letters and reports by Admirals Cervera and Montojo and other officers.

This narrative appeared serially in Munsey's Magazine, and has since been revised in the light of recently published evidence and of letters received by the writer.

Richard H. Titherington.

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The war of 1898 between the United States and Spain was the logical and inevitable ending of a long chapter of history. The conditions that caused it began with the earliest settlements of the English and the Latin peoples in the new world. The race that was to dominate the wide continent of North America came into conflict with its French rivals two centuries ago, and their struggle was decided by Wolfe at Quebec in 1759. While Spain held Florida and Louisiana, hostilities with the English colonies, which had now become the United States, were a constant probability, and were averted only by the timely cession of both those great provinces. The possession of Texas and California was the prize of victory in the war of 1846 and 1847 against the Spaniards of Mexico—a war that seems to have finally settled the southwestern frontier of the Union. Cuba, lying scarcely more than a hundred miles from the shores of the great republic, facing its southern seaports, and commanding the Gulf of Mexico, is geographically as necessary an appanage of its territory as Florida. Under Spanish rule the so-called Pearl of the Antilles has been an unfailing source of anxiety in the foreign relations of the United States, a perpetual
problem to American statesmen—a problem to which there could be but one ultimate solution. The unhappy island has long been a running sore in the body politic of the northern half of the new world. It is extraordinary that the nineteenth century should almost have ended before the great power to which Nature has set her in such close relation found itself compelled to draw the sword against the government responsible for her intolerable condition.

It was the first westward voyage of Columbus that made Cuba known to European civilization. Sixteen days after the Italian navigator’s landing on the island that he christened San Salvador—which was probably Watling’s Island—he sighted the Cuban coast at a point near the present site of Nuevitas. This was on the 28th of October, old style, or the 7th of November, new style, in the year 1492. Here was no low-lying islet, such as he had seen in the Bahamas; it was a land of forests and rivers and noble mountains—a part, doubtless, of the Asiatic mainland of which Columbus was in search. In the discoverer’s optimistic way he described it in his diary as “the most beautiful land that human eyes ever beheld.” The natives received him with wondering hospitality, but, naturally enough, could give him little information. Hearing them mention a village or district called Cubanacan, Columbus concluded that he had reached the dominions of Kublai Khan, the great Tartar sovereign whose court Marco Polo visited two hundred years before. He sent some of his men inland, as ambassadors to the reigning prince; but after travelling a dozen leagues they came back, reporting that they could find no prince, no cities, no roads—nothing but the same primitive villages of naked, harmless Indians.

Columbus spent two months on the northern coast of Cuba; then he sailed from Cape Maysi—
which he named "Alpha and Omega," supposing it to be the easternmost extremity of Asia—to Hispaniola (Haiti), where his flagship, the Santa Maria, was wrecked, and he left its crew to build the fortified post of La Navidad. He never founded any settlement in Cuba, though on his second voyage (1494) he passed along almost the entire length of its southern coast, and on his fourth and last (1503) he paid it another brief visit. When he died, three years later, he still believed that it was part of the mainland of Asia. He had named it Juana, in honour of the Infant Juan (John), the son of his patrons, Ferdinand and Isabella. It also appears on early maps as Fernandina, Isabella, Santiago (after the patron saint of Spain), and Ave Maria; but all these titles were soon superseded by the old Indian name which it still bears.

To the chance that wrecked the Santa Maria on its shores was due the fact that Spanish colonization of the new world began in Hispaniola. In 1511 Diego Columbus, the great discoverer's son, who was ruling in that island as admiral of the Indies, sent out Diego Velasquez, with four ships and three hundred men, to conquer Cuba. With this force—of which Hernando Cortez, the future conqueror of Mexico, was an undistinguished member—Velasquez established the armed posts of Baracoa (1511), Santiago de Cuba (1514), and some others whose names still appear on the maps of the island. Baracoa, now a decayed seaport with the population of a village, was the first seat of government, being made a city and a bishopric in 1518; but four years later the capital was transferred to Santiago, of whose long history the latest and most eventful chapter is fresh in all American minds.

In Hispaniola the Spaniards had already established the bloody and brutal system of enforced la-
bour—or slavery, to give it its true name—which utterly exterminated the West Indian aborigines. They carried the same policy to Cuba. The Inquisition, established in Spain thirty years before, went with it, and the torch of the Holy Office seconded the sword of the soldier in cowing the helpless natives. "Thus began," says Arrate, the Cuban historian of the eighteenth century, "that gathering of an infinite number of gentiles to the bosom of our holy religion, who otherwise would have perished in the darkness of paganism." They were gathered so rapidly to that gentle bosom that within fifty years the Indians of Cuba, who had numbered several hundred thousand when the Spaniards came, were totally extinct.

There is a characteristic story of Hatuey, a chief whom Velasquez ordered to the stake for his resistance to the conquerors. A priest soothed his last moments by asking if he wished to go to heaven. "Are there any Spaniards there?" Hatuey inquired. "Many," replied the priest. "Then," said the Indian, "I would rather go to hell!"

Spain has suffered from no little misrepresentation at the hands of Cuban writers, and of some Americans; but the facts of this dark page of her colonial annals do not rest upon the testimony of any foreign critic. They are told by that great Spaniard, Bartolome de las Casas, whose Destruction of the Indies is a narrative of what he himself saw in Cuba and Hispaniola between 1502 and 1530.

For more than two hundred years after the first colonization of Cuba the development of the island was very slow. Spanish interest centred upon the richer provinces of Peru and Mexico, and the chief value of Cuba was as a port of call for treasure ships sailing from the mainland. It was this traffic that gave Havana its importance.
The history of the chief city and seaport of the West Indies begins in 1515, with the settlement of fifty of the men of Diego Velasquez’s expedition at the post of San Cristobal de la Habana, on the present site of the town of Batabano, on the southern coast of Cuba. A few years later, finding the spot they had chosen unhealthy, the settlers crossed to the northern shore, little more than thirty miles distant, and established themselves at the narrow entrance of a bay in which Ocampo—the Spanish admiral who first circumnavigated Cuba—had repaired his ships in 1508. Here, beside its fine harbour, Havana had a long struggle for existence. The sixteenth century was a stormy time in West Indian waters. There might be peace at home, but in the new world the Spaniard, the Frenchman, the Englishman, and the Hollander were foes wherever they met; and all of them were fair game to the buccaneers who fought under any flag or no flag. Havana suffered several hostile visitations. In 1538, the settlement having been burned by a French pirate or privateer—the distinction between the two was often very slight—Hernando de Soto, the governor of Cuba, came from Santiago, his capital, and built the fort of La Fuerza to defend it. The old building, not a formidable fortress, still stands, the most ancient relic of Havana’s early days.

It was at Havana that De Soto gathered his expedition for the exploration of Florida, and from thence that he sailed with nine ships on the 12th of May, 1539—never to return. A dozen years later the seat of government was transferred from Santiago to Havana; but this did not save the place from another piratical raid in 1554. In 1589, to protect his treasure ships from those dreaded wolves of the sea, Drake and Hawkins, who “held the power and glory of Spain so cheap,” Philip II ordered two strong fortresses built to defend the
harbour. These, too, are standing to-day—the Bat­
eria de la Punta (Battery of the Point) at the
northernmost point of the city, west of the entrance
to the bay, and the famous Morro* on the low
heights that rise on the east side of the channel. In
the same year the colonial government of Cuba was
reconstituted, and Juan de Tejada was sent out as
the first captain-general.

During the next century the fortification of Ha­
vana was completed by the building of a wall
around the town; and from this time, owing to its
situation and defences, it was long regarded as im­
pregnable. A contemporary description pictures
it as an unkempt place, with houses of straw and
wood, surrounded by little gardens with hedges of
a prickly shrub. At night the narrow streets were
unlighted, and swarmed with land crabs.

As agriculture slowly gained a footing in Cuba,
and commerce developed, gold seekers were no
longer the only adventurers in the West Indies, and
the day of the buccaneers passed away. Trade
questions began to be the motives of political con­
tention. In 1717 the first clash between the inter­
est of the colony and those of the mother country
was caused by the proclamation of the tobacco in­
dustry as a royal monopoly. In 1739 hostility be­
tween Spanish and English traders broke out into
war, which lasted for nine years without any de­
cisive result, its principal incident being an unsuc­
cessful British attack upon Santiago de Cuba in
1741.

In 1762 occurred an event which, memorable and
interesting in itself, is of historical importance as
having first brought Cuba prominently into the field
of international politics, and as marking the begin­

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* The Spanish word morro, which means "a protruding lip," is fre­
quently applied to forts standing upon an elevation at the mouth of a
harbour. There is another famous Morro at Santiago de Cuba, and
another at San Juan, in Porto Rico.
The early history of Cuba

The beginning of the island's relations with the United States, then a dependency of England. This was the capture of Havana by the British and colonial troops commanded by the Earl of Albemarle. It was one of the scenes of that great drama of battle, the Seven Years' War, in which Europe's soldiers and sailors met and fought in Asia and America, on Atlantic and Pacific. England, after some initial reverses, had shattered the French fleets at Lagos and Quiberon, and driven the Bourbon flag from Canada and India. When Spain entered the conflict as France's ally, the next blows were directed against her colonial possessions, and British expeditions were despatched against Havana and Manila. Both were completely successful, although in each case diplomacy gave back to Spain what had been won from her by the sword.

Havana being reputed a strongly fortified and garrisoned place, the force sent against it was a powerful one. There were thirty-two ships of war, with nearly two hundred transports, in the fleet that was sighted off the harbour on the 6th of June, 1762. A landing was effected at Guanabacoa, a few miles east of Havana, on the 17th, and the British army, numbering about twenty thousand men, advanced and captured the heights above the harbour, where the fortress of Cabanas now stands. The Spaniards, who had twenty-seven thousand regulars, besides an auxiliary force of volunteers, still held the Morro, and prevented the English men-of-war from entering the port by sinking ships in the channel.

In many respects the campaign suggests comparisons with the experiences of Shafter's army at Santiago a hundred and thirty-six years later. Although a considerable part of their force had been raised in the West Indies, the British found the fevers of the Cuban coast a deadlier foe than the
Spanish guns. Before the end of July nearly half of their force was disabled by sickness, and the arrival, on July 28th, of a body of fresh troops from the North American colonies was a most welcome reinforcement. These earliest American invaders of Cuba consisted of a thousand men from Connecticut, eight hundred from New York, and five hundred from New Jersey, with General Lyman, of the first-named colony, in command. It is worth recording that Israel Putnam, destined to win fame in the Revolution, was acting colonel of the Connecticut regiment.

The Morro was stormed a few days later, and on August 13th the city surrendered, the garrison being allowed to march out with the honours of war. An immense quantity of spoil fell to the victors, who confiscated public property and levied contributions unsparingly. The tobacco and sugar seized and sold on the spot alone brought three and a half million dollars. Sir George Pocock, who commanded the fleet, and Lord Albemarle drew six hundred thousand dollars apiece as prize money. The comparative value that eighteenth-century officialdom attached to officers and men may be inferred from the fact that each soldier's share was twenty dollars and each sailor's eighteen.

The territory surrendered to the British stretched eastward to Matanzas, but they had made no effort to push their conquests when peace was proclaimed, and on the 6th of July, 1763, they evacuated Cuba, George III's Government having accepted in exchange the Spanish province of Florida—which was returned to Spain twenty years later. While holding Havana the soldiers were terribly scourged by disease. Mante, a chaplain from New England, has left in his diary a vivid picture of the sufferings of his compatriots, in whose camp the "putrid fever" wrought frightful havoc. Only a remnant returned alive.
To Havana a year of British occupation was not without benefit. Efforts were made to improve the sanitary condition of a city which Spanish incompetence allowed to remain a hotbed of fever to the present day. Its port, for the first time, was opened to the commerce of the nations, and the world’s attention was called to the possibilities of Cuba as a mart for trade. Havana’s importance as a modern city may be said to have begun at this point, although with the restoration of Spanish rule the law giving Spain a monopoly of traffic with Cuba was temporarily reaffirmed. At the end of the eighteenth century it was probably the largest American city of European settlement, and certainly the richest and most important seaport in the new world.

Luis de las Casas, who came out as captain-general in 1790, did much for Havana, helping to form its Sociedad Patriotica (Patriotic Society), to found its first newspaper, the Papel Periodico, and to promote useful public works. Another name of the same period that is held in grateful memory is that of Francisco Arango. Born in Havana in 1765, Arango was secretary of the local chamber of commerce when Napoleon drove the Bourbon dynasty from Madrid, in July, 1808. The Spanish officials in Cuba promptly met, and at four thousand miles’ distance defied the conqueror of Europe by affirming their loyalty to the deposed sovereign. Their action won for Cuba the title of the Ever Faithful Isle—a name of grim irony, in the light of later events—and the privilege, bestowed by the constitution framed in 1812, when Ferdinand VII returned to his throne, of representation in the Cortes at Madrid. Arango went to Spain as one of the first Cuban delegates, and secured the final abolition of the law debarring foreign ships from the ports of the island.
The first quarter of the nineteenth century has been called the "golden period" of Cuba's history. It was for her a time of general internal tranquility, and of great industrial and commercial development. She was benefited by the fact that Spain was at its lowest ebb of weakness both at home and abroad. For years at a time, during the Napoleonic wars, communication with Madrid was cut off by the hostile sea power of Britain, which, though it seized Trinidad, made no further attack upon Cuba. The successful revolt of all the mainland colonies, too, seemed at least temporarily to have opened the ear of the Spanish Government to Cuban grievances. At the same time it brought loyalist settlers to the island, just as Canada, after the American Revolution, became a refuge for colonists who preferred their old allegiance. A more important immigration came from Haiti, whence thirty thousand white families, victims of the island's race war, are said to have fled to Cuba between 1798 and 1808, bringing with them the cultivation of coffee—which became the chief Cuban product, till superseded by sugar. All these causes contributed to the island's rapid advance in wealth and population. She had but 170,370 inhabitants in 1775, and 272,140 in 1791. The number grew to 551,998 in 1817, to 704,487 in 1827, and to 1,007,624 in 1841.

But with all this material development signs of Cuba's later troubles were not lacking.

The West Indies seem to be well fitted by nature to be the home of civilized and prosperous communities, yet European colonization can show little, if anything, but failure in that rich chain of islands. They have had four centuries of checkered history—history full of revolts and massacres, of crimes and horrors, of battles fought for the spoils of war. The white conquerors exterminated the native tribes, to replace them with negro slaves; and it has been their just retribution to see the
African multiply and possess the land where the superior race failed to take thrifty root. In Haiti negro domination has long been absolute. Jamaica, always orderly under English rule, and for a time a prosperous colony, has but a dwindling remnant of a few thousand whites to more than half a million coloured inhabitants. In the lesser islands—British or French, Danish or Dutch—the story is the same.

To this long chapter of failures Cuba has appeared as the conspicuous exception. With all her mistakes and shortcomings as a colonizing power, Spain seemed to have done in the West Indies what France and England could not do—to have planted the seeds of a community capable of becoming a civilized nation. But recent history suggests a serious question of this conclusion. There are many to-day who hold that the prosperity of Cuba was founded upon slave labour; that from the industrial viewpoint Cuba without slavery—which, it must be remembered, ended little more than a dozen years ago—is still an experiment; that from the social and political viewpoint the islanders, taken as a community, have yet to prove their capacity for self-government and their right to rank with the free peoples of America.

There were no schools in Cuba till near the end of last century. In 1836, when the population was nearly a million, only nine thousand pupils were receiving instruction. In 1860 the municipalities of the island had two hundred and eighty-three schools for white children, and just two for coloured, and the total attendance was no larger, in proportion to the population, than in 1836. In 1883 a report shows eight hundred and thirty-five schools, but their management is described as one of utter neglect, few teachers being paid their salaries, and sixty-seven schools being entirely vacant. There is no census of illiteracy in Cuba, but, of
course, it is practically universal among the negroes and quite general among the poorer whites. Enrique Varona, a Cuban deputy to the Cortes, stated in 1895 that seventy-six per cent of the population—meaning, presumably, the adult population—could neither read nor write; and his estimate is probably too low. Of another test of popular enlightenment—the relative proportion of legitimate and illegitimate births—we find no recent report. The percentages of forty years ago are given by Ballou:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Legitimate</th>
<th>Illegitimate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>67.8</td>
<td>32.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colored</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>66.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>49.5</td>
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Even allowing for the existence of slavery, the figures are sufficiently shocking. Both Spain and Cuba were to pay a terrible penalty for allowing successive generations to grow up under such conditions of savagery.

Negro slavery, as has been said, ended in Cuba in 1886, but it has left a deep and indelible mark upon the island’s present and future. Slavery in Cuba. It began almost with the Spanish occupation, and by a curious anomaly its origin is traced to the sainted Las Casas. Seeing that the native Indians, a people neither accustomed to labour nor physically competent for it, were perishing in thousands under the lash of their taskmasters, Las Casas suggested, as an alternative, the importation of a limited number of African slaves. The suggestion, developed to an extent of which its author never dreamed, was destined to bring momentous results, and to stain the history of the new world with a crime to be expiated by the blood and tears of nations. Yet to stigmatize Las Casas
as the founder of American slavery is scarcely fair. There were African bondsmen in Spain before the time of Columbus, and the institution was certain to cross the Atlantic to lands where it found so fertile a field prepared for it.

Nominally, at least, the Spanish laws that regulated slavery in Cuba were fairly humane. They forbade the owner to work his slaves longer than from sunrise to sunset (from six to six, in the tropics), with two hours for a siesta at noon, and with Sunday as a day of rest. They prescribed a certain quantity and variety of food, allowed slaves to keep pigs and cultivate patches of their own, and created a system whereby an industrious negro could secure his freedom by paying the amount of his first cost to his master; but it appears that if there was little ill treatment of slaves—and Ballou, Abiel Abbott, and other American travellers in Cuba testify that they witnessed none—it was rather from self-interest on the part of their owners than from respect for the statutes.

Whatever the material condition of the slaves, the institution was a fruitful source of social and political disorder. It was bitterly opposed by the mass of white Cubans, just as it was opposed by the free labouring class in the United States. On the other hand, it kept the rich planters loyal to Spanish rule, which protected them in the possession of their chattels; especially as the cafetals (coffee farms) were turned into great sugar plantations, operated on a far larger scale of agriculture. It was a fruitful source of official corruption. The negroes themselves formed a dangerous element of the population in slavery, and an undesirable one since emancipation. Their numbers, at different times, are given in the table on the next page.

Their number in 1898 was estimated at half a million. If these figures are correct, it is strange
that Cuba's coloured population should have decreased by nearly one hundred and fifty thousand in the last half century, while that of the United States during the same period has considerably more than doubled. It looks as if many Cuban negroes had been set down as whites.

The first blow at slavery in Cuba was struck in 1817, when Spain agreed to prohibit the importation of African negroes into her colonies. A consideration for this act of humanity was the receipt of two million dollars from the British Government—which, a hundred years before, had itself bought from Spain a monopoly of the slave trade in her ports. But long after 1817 the forbidden traffic went on clandestinely. With the full cognizance of the Spanish officials, and to their great financial profit, the barracoons of Havana continued to be a mart for planters who needed labour. The trade was not without its risks, of course, and many a human cargo from the east coast of Africa was confiscated and liberated by the watchful British cruisers; and as the demand outran the supply, the price of slaves went up. In 1830 an able-bodied negro was worth two hundred and fifty dollars or less; in 1850 his value had doubled, and in 1870 it had doubled again.

But the government at Madrid could not much longer maintain an institution offensive to the civilized world, and in 1870, without compensating the planters, a law was passed to effect its gradual abolition. Slaves sixty years old were declared free, and those not yet sixty were to become free.
on reaching that age; children born to slavery were to remain under "patronage" until they were twenty-two, and then be free. One purpose of this act was to dissuade the negro population from joining the revolt then in progress. Ten years later the Spanish Cortes hurried matters by declaring slavery abolished, while patronage—the same thing under another name—was to end in 1888. Shortly before the latter date arrived, the liberation of all negroes was completed by the decree of October 7, 1886.

It was the Cuban negroes who first began the series of revolts that have made the island's later history so turbulent and disastrous. During the race war in Haiti, ending in the triumph of the blacks, order was preserved in Cuba; but in 1812, when the first agitation for the abolition of slavery was in the air, there was a revolt under a free negro, one José Aponto, which was speedily ended by the execution of its leaders.

The first rising of white Cubans—creoles, as they used to be called, though the word is not often used now—was that of the Soles de Bolivar in 1823. The revolution of 1820 in Spain had led to intervention by the Holy Alliance, and a French army, commissioned by that league of rulers by divine right, had invaded the peninsula and restored Bourbon absolutism by force of arms, suppressing the newly established liberal constitution. Of this constitution Cuba had briefly enjoyed the benefit, but Marshal Vives was sent to Havana to cancel the privileges it had granted. Intense discontent was the result, and the secret association of the Soles de Bolivar was organized, its aim being to accomplish for Cuba what the South American liberator had achieved for the mainland colonies. It is said to have been in correspondence with Bolivar, and to have received from him promises of help. Au-
August 16, 1823, was fixed as the date for simultaneous risings in several cities; but there were traitors in the camp. On the day of the intended outbreak the head of the society, José Lemus, and his chief lieutenants, were arrested, and the conspiracy collapsed.
CHAPTER II

AMERICAN RELATIONS WITH CUBA, 1823-1873

That same year, 1823, was a memorable one in American history. The close political relations of Cuba and the United States may be dated from it. The Holy Alliance, organized to combat democracy wherever found, sought to follow up its success in Spain by reconquering her revoluted colonies, the South American republics. With Cuba as a military base it would not have been a difficult task, had there not been strenuous and probably unexpected opposition. In December, 1823, President Monroe sent to the United States Congress his famous message declaring that “we could not view an interposition by any European power in any other light than as a manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States”—thus laying down the principle that has become historic as the Monroe Doctrine. The stand he took was backed by England, and the Continental powers were checked.

The Monroe Doctrine was not a new principle of American statesmanship, but its enunciation at this time marked a new era in the foreign relations of the United States. To the destiny of Cuba it was a fact of decisive importance, for it directly implied that the island would not be allowed to pass to any power other than Spain. Thus much had been foreshadowed a few months before by John Quincy
Adams, then Secretary of State, writing to Mr. Nelson, American minister at Madrid:

The transfer of Cuba to Great Britain would be an event unpropitious to the interests of this Union. The opinion is so generally entertained that even the groundless rumours that it was about to be accomplished which have spread abroad, and are still teeming, may be traced to the deep and almost universal feeling of aversion to it, and to the alarm which the mere probability of its occurrence has stimulated. The question both of our right and of our power to prevent it, if necessary by force, already obtrudes itself upon our councils, and the administration is called upon, in the performance of its duties to the nation, at least to use all the means within its competency to guard against and forestall it.

At nearly the same time the veteran Jefferson wrote to Monroe, whose valued political counsellor he had always been:

Cuba alone seems at present to hold up a speck of war to us. Its possession by Great Britain would indeed be a great calamity to us. Could we induce her to join us in guaranteeing its independence against all the world, except Spain, it would be nearly as valuable as if it were our own. But should she take it, I would not immediately go to war for it; because the first war on other accounts will give it to us, or the island will give itself to us when able to do so.

After Monroe's message, American statesmen took a more decisive tone. For instance, in Henry Clay's instructions to the American ministers in Europe, issued shortly after he became Secretary of State in 1825, he said:

You will now add that we could not consent to the occupation of those islands [Cuba and Porto Rico] by any other European power than Spain under any contingency whatever.

Spain's extreme weakness at this period, and her loss of great colonies in rapid succession, naturally led to the belief that she could not retain her hold upon her remaining dependencies. That England intended to seize Cuba seems to have been
a baseless supposition. At that time—and later—American politicians were prone to mistrust of British designs. There was a strong feeling in favour of annexing the island to the United States. Adams, in the note already quoted, declared: 

> It is scarcely possible to resist the conviction that the annexation of Cuba to our Federal Republic will be indispensable to the continuance and integrity of the Union itself.

And Jefferson gave his opinion that

> her addition to our confederacy is exactly what is wanted to round our power as a nation to the point of its utmost interest.

But nothing was done to realize the suggestion. The sinister shadow of the slavery question was an obstacle to action, either in the direction of acquiring Cuba from Spain, or in that of helping the island to assert its independence. All the South American states, on throwing off the Spanish yoke, had abolished human servitude. An influential element in the United States was very unwilling to aid Cuba to take a similar step. As for admission to the Union, the North would not accept the island with slavery, the South—or those who controlled the South's political course—would not admit her as a free State. Van Buren, as Secretary of State, in 1829, thus stated the situation, after asserting the country's "deep interest" in the fate of the Spanish Antilles:

> Considerations connected with a certain class of our population make it to the interest of the Southern section of our Union that no attempt should be made in that island to throw off the yoke of Spanish dependence, the first effect of which would be the sudden emancipation of a numerous slave population, which result could not but be very sensibly felt upon the adjacent shores of the United States.

It is noteworthy that a couple of years after Jefferson's expression of a wish that England would
join in guaranteeing Cuba to Spain, the British Government made that very proposal to France and the United States, the consideration from Spain being her acknowledgment, which she still refused, of the independence of the South American republics; but both Paris and Washington declined the suggestion. The former, possibly, did not care to renounce its chance for a valuable possession that seemed to be in the international market; the latter acted strictly on the lines of the Monroe Doctrine.

Amid these international complications a second rebellion against Spanish rule was planned by Cuban creoles in 1826. Its chief organizers were fugitives of the unsuccessful movement of three years before; their headquarters were in Caracas, and again the aid of Bolivar was expected; but again, through treachery or lack of support, the rising collapsed before a blow was struck. The Spanish authorities were now equipped against disaffection with the weapon which from that time they used so unsparingly to subvert popular rights and render pretended concessions worthless. By the decree of May 28, 1825, the captain-general had been permanently invested, in "extraordinary circumstances"—of which he was to be the sole judge—with "all the powers which are conceded to the governors of cities in a state of siege"—in other words, with absolute military power superseding all forms of law and all guarantees of liberty.

With his authority thus asserted in Cuba, Captain-General Vives formed a highly ambitious plan for the reconquest of Spain's mainland colonies. It was a task far beyond his powers. Landing at Tampico in August, 1828, with three thousand five hundred men, he was speedily hemmed in by superior Mexican forces, and compelled to surrender his arms and withdraw. But Spain's power in Cuba was not shaken by this reverse, and a third native
AMERICAN RELATIONS WITH CUBA

rising, planned by the secret society of the Aguila Negra (Black Eagle), was crushed as readily as its predecessors. Vives, who personally was a clear-sighted ruler and capable administrator, refrained from any bloody vengeance upon the conspirators, none of whom was executed.

Vives was succeeded by Ricafort, Ricafort by Tacon, the most famous of Spain's colonial governors. Cuban historians paint Miguel Tacon in dark colours. A more impartial estimate of him is given by an American* who lived in Havana during his administration. He seems to have been a benevolent tyrant. He took vigorous measures to end the social and political disorders that had made Cuba a place where there was no honesty in government and little security for life and property. He warred fiercely upon the organized bands of criminals. He divided the island into partidos, and required all who went from one district to another to carry a passport. He shut the gates of Havana at eleven o'clock at night, and allowed no one on the streets after that hour without a lantern. He forbade the carrying of weapons. Even swearing was prohibited till it was found that Cuban horses and cattle could not be driven without the cries to which they were accustomed. He inspected prisons, and invited petitions from all who had grievances. He promoted public works, and built the first railway in the island, the line from Havana to Guines.

"General Tacon," says the American chronicler, "was the only Spanish official I ever knew who would not accept a bribe." When an importer who did not know his peculiarities, and who had recently landed a shipload of slaves, brought him

* Jonathan S. Jenkins, an artist, who was afterward United States consul in Samoa, and whose memoirs were published in the Century Magazine in 1898.
what was both before and after his time the captain-general's customary tribute—a doubloon per head of the cargo—Tacon gave the money to a favourite orphan asylum. Some of his corrupt underlings he punished severely, thereby earning much hatred among the Spanish officials in Cuba. He was not merciful to those who dared to oppose him, whether they were great or small. When he learned that some negroes in Havana were organizing a rebellion, he promptly arrested them, and their punishment is thus described:

The leaders and instigators were taken to the garrote. The iron collar was drawn until they were nearly dead from suffocation; then they were released until life was restored, their heads were struck off, inclosed in parrot cages, and set on the bridges as a warning to others.

Well-meaning despot as he was, the benefits of Tacon's rule were temporary, while the evil he wrought was lasting. It was he who deliberately destroyed the last chance of reconciliation between Spaniard and Cuban. Amid the troubles that followed the death of Ferdinand VII, in 1833, the revolution of La Granja secured for Spain the re-establishment of the liberal constitution of 1812. When the news crossed the Atlantic, General Lorenzo, governor of the province of Santiago, at once proclaimed the new order, which affirmed the liberty of the press, and created local governing bodies and a national militia. At Havana, Tacon utterly refused to recognise the reformed constitution, and used his arbitrary power to suppress it. Declaring Lorenzo a public enemy, he was moving an armed force to invade the eastern province, when the governor of Santiago fled to Spain and laid his case before the Cortes. With fatuous inconsistency, the Madrid legislators approved Tacon's course, excluded the deputies who had arrived as representatives of Cuba, and declared that the island was not governed by the restored constitution, but by
special laws. Meanwhile Tacon had established a reign of terror in Santiago, where he laid heavy hands on those who had dared to antagonize him. Clergymen and leading citizens were imprisoned or banished, and five hundred men were set to work with shackled feet in the streets of Havana.

In the early forties, when the troubles of the Texan border were bringing the United States nearer and nearer to war with Mexico, American attention again became focused upon Cuba. The British Government's active work for the abolition of the slave trade—which, as has been said, continued to flourish in the Spanish West Indies with corrupt official connivance—gave rise to a widespread belief that England's real aim was the acquisition of Cuba for herself. Such a plan certainly never materialized, and there seems to be not a scintilla of evidence that it was ever contemplated; but the alarm evidently found credence at Washington. John Forsyth, Secretary of State, wrote to the American minister at Madrid, in 1840:

You are authorized to assure the Spanish Government that in case of any attempt, from whatever quarter, to wrest from her this portion of her territory, she may securely depend upon the military and naval resources of the United States to aid her either in preserving or recovering it.

Daniel Webster, who succeeded Mr. Forsyth in the State Department, told the same official, three years later:

It is represented that the situation of Cuba is at this moment in the highest degree dangerous and critical, and that Great Britain has resolved upon its rule.

Had such a design been formed in London, the war with Mexico offered a favourable opportunity for its execution; but nothing of the sort occurred. That war over, leaving the United States with a vast accession of territory, President Polk sought to
round out its new acquisitions by a stroke like Jefferson’s purchase of Louisiana, and in 1848—a year of trouble in Europe—he instructed his minister at Madrid to offer the Spanish Government a hundred million dollars for the sovereignty of the island. Spain refused the proposal, regarding the mere suggestion of such a transaction as an indignity; and it was never officially renewed, though various plans for the purchase of Cuba were brought forward by individuals or newspapers, and President Buchanan twice urged Congress to consider the subject.

At this same date, just fifty years ago, the political disorders of Cuba developed a new phase, bringing them into closer connection with the United States, and constituting a source of annoyance that ultimately became almost intolerable. In 1848 the first society of Cuban refugees in America was formed by Narciso Lopez, a Venezuelan soldier of fortune, who had escaped from the island after another attempt at rebellion, too feeble and abortive to deserve chronicling; and in the following year Lopez organized his first filibustering expedition. He was stopped by the United States Government, but in 1850 he rendezvoused six hundred men on an island off the Yucatan coast, and effected a landing at Cardenas, where he expected that recruits would flock to his standard.

The story of a dozen insurrections shows that while the grievances of the Cubans have undoubtedly been great, and their outcry against their oppressors correspondingly loud, they have been singularly backward in striking a bold and united blow for liberty. The expectations of Lopez were totally disappointed. The people did not rise. They did not even obstruct the railway from Havana, which speedily brought two thousand five hundred of Captain-General Roncali’s soldiers; and
at his approach the invaders, who had seized the government house, retreated to their steamer. They disbanded at Key West, and Lopez was arrested by the Federal authorities. Brought to trial he was discharged, but his ship, the Creole, was confiscated.

The expedition of 1851 was at least a more stirring and romantic failure. Lopez had gathered about four hundred and fifty men and procured a steamer, the Pampero. His second officer, General Pragay, was an exiled Hungarian rebel. There were a few more Hungarians and Germans among his men; forty-nine were Cubans, the rest Americans, one of them being a well-known Kentuckian, Colonel Crittenden. They sailed from New Orleans, and, after nearly running into Havana harbour by mistake, landed at Bahia Honda, some forty miles to the west, on the 11th of August. As Lopez stepped ashore he went down on his knees and kissed the earth, saying: "Querida Cuba!" ("Beloved Cuba!")

With about three hundred of his soldiers, Lopez pushed inland toward the mountains, where he planned to establish himself in an intrenched camp. Colonel Crittenden and one hundred and fifty men were left at Bahia Honda to land the ammunition and baggage. They had not brought everything ashore when a Spanish steamer entered the harbour and attacked them. Some of the filibusters fled inland and rejoined Lopez; Crittenden and most of his men attempted to escape in their boats, but were captured, taken to Havana, and shot.

The Spanish troops found Lopez at Las Pozas. Attacking his camp, they were received with a deadly fire, and driven off with a loss of two hundred killed. The filibusters had lost thirty-five men, and when they abandoned Las Pozas they had to leave their wounded behind to be murdered by the Spaniards, who had no mercy for outlaws. They made a second stand at Las Frias, where two hun-
dred of them defeated thirteen hundred of the enemy, but their doom was certain. No recruits joined them, they had no supplies, and their scanty ammunition was ruined by tropical storms. They became scattered, and wandered through the forests till every one of them perished miserably, or was captured and taken to Havana for execution. Lopez met a felon’s death by the garrote in the castle of La Punta.

The annihilation of the Lopez expedition did not deter the Cubans and their sympathizers in the United States—among whom General Quitman of Mississippi was actively prominent—from threatening fresh descents, and the result was a serious strain in the relations between the Governments at Washington and Madrid. The bitter feeling of the latter found expression in interferences with American commerce, which provoked intense indignation in the United States. In 1851 the American ship Falcon was fired on, and two other vessels were seized upon a vague suspicion that they had been concerned in Lopez’s operations. In 1852 the United States mail bags at Havana were opened and examined by order of the captain-general; and the Crescent City was debarred from landing her passengers and mails because her purser, a Mr. Smith, was personally obnoxious to the Spanish officials. In his annual message that year President Fillmore stated the situation thus:

The affairs of Cuba remain in an uneasy condition, and a feeling of alarm and irritation on the part of the Cuban authorities appears to exist. This feeling has interfered with the regular commercial intercourse between the United States and the island, and led to some acts of which we have a right to complain.

In the same document the President reported a renewal of the British suggestion of 1825, and its renewed rejection:
Early in the present year (1852) official notes were received from the ministers of France and England inviting the Government of the United States to become a party with Great Britain and France to a tripartite convention, in virtue of which the three powers should severally and collectively disclaim, now and for the future, all intention to obtain possession of the island of Cuba, and should bind themselves to discountenance all attempts to that effect on the part of any power or individual whatever. This invitation has been respectfully declined. I have, however, directed the ministers of France and England to be assured that the United States entertain no designs against Cuba, but that on the contrary I should regard its incorporation into the Union at the present time as fraught with serious peril.

During the next two years the friction of which Mr. Fillmore complained became still more serious, and in 1854 the seizure of the American ship Black Warrior at Havana, on a charge of violating the customs-house regulations, brought Spain and the United States to the verge of war. The famous Ostend manifesto, issued by the American ministers at London, Paris, and Madrid, was generally indorsed by American public opinion when it declared:

Our past history forbids that we should acquire the island of Cuba without the consent of Spain, unless justified by the great law of self-preservation. We must, in any event, preserve our own conscious rectitude and our self-respect. Whilst pursuing this course, we can afford to disregard the censures of the world, to which we have been so often and so unjustly exposed. After we shall have offered Spain a price for Cuba, far beyond its present value, and this shall have been refused, it will then be time to consider the question: "Does Cuba in the possession of Spain seriously endanger our internal peace and the existence of our cherished Union?" Should this question be answered in the affirmative, then by every law, human and divine, we shall be justified in wresting it from Spain if we possess the power: and this upon the very same principle that would justify an individual in tearing down the burning house of his neighbour if there were no other means of preventing the flames from destroying his own home.
This bold and somewhat undiplomatic statement was signed by Pierre Soulé of Louisiana, John Young Mason of Virginia, and James Buchanan of Pennsylvania; but neither Congress nor the Executive took any action upon it. Two years later, when Buchanan was elected to the Presidency, it was thought that he would take some step toward carrying out the decided views he had expressed; but beyond his repeated suggestion that Congress should consider the purchase of Cuba, nothing was done. All less pressing questions were now thrust aside by the great conflict that culminated in the civil war."

The prospect of intervention by the United States naturally did not tend to allay Cuba's internal troubles, and the social and political disorder of the island continued. In 1865 the Liberal party, then in power at Madrid, made a characteristic attempt to restore the once vaunted loyalty of the Ever Faithful Isle, by referring its grievances to a commission of reform, half of whose members were appointed by the Government itself, and the rest elected in Cuba, but by a system that gave the Spanish party control of the polls. The Cuban demands * were submitted and rejected seriatim.

Three years later there was again a gleam of hope for Cuba, which proved equally illusory. The reign of Isabella ended in a revolution, and another constitution—one of the seven or eight that Spain has had in the present century—was proclaimed. On paper, at least, it was quite an advanced one, decreeing universal suffrage and a free press, and granting Cuba and the Philippines complete political equality with the mother country; but it was never put into operation beyond the

* The chief points of these were the abolition of the military autocracy of the captain-general; representation in the Cortes; mitigation of the press censorship; the right of assembly; the lessening of taxation, and the enforcement of the laws against the slave trade.
ocean. It would have destroyed the political supremacy of the *Peninsulares*, the Spanish element that regarded itself as rightfully the ruling class in Spain's colonies; and Lersundi, captain-general at Havana, simply ignored it. Had he desired to recognise it, the Spanish volunteers, who were now established as the strongest political force in Cuba, would not have permitted him to do so.

It was clear that the Cubans could rest no further hope on political agitation. Plans for a new revolution were already afoot, and on October 10, 1868, the standard of revolt was raised by Carlos Cespedes on the plantation of Yara, near Manzanillo, in the province of Santiago. At the head of one hundred and forty men, Cespedes proclaimed the Cuban republic; and thus began the Ten Years' War, which, barren of other results, was destined to bring such frightful losses to Spain and such equally terrible devastation to the Pearl of the Antilles.

The military history of the Ten Years' War is utterly insignificant. It consisted of a confused series of guerrilla campaigns, similar to those that have laid Cuba waste during the last few years. There were frequent reports of important actions, which were always sweeping victories for the side making the report. It was several times announced that the insurgents had captured this or that city, but quite or almost invariably these triumphs were purely imaginary. The Spaniards succeeded in confining the rebellion to the provinces of Santiago and Puerto Principe, its western limit being practically marked by the trocha, or fortified line, which they threw across the island from Moron to Jucaro. In the two eastern provinces they held the sea-coast, the towns, and many fortified posts, but were utterly unable to dislodge the patriots from the forest-clad mountains of the interior.

Had they sent thirty or forty thousand men to
Cuba on the outbreak of the rebellion, and moved against its scanty and ill-armed forces with promptness and vigour, it is very improbable that the Cubans could have kept the field. But Spain was distracted by domestic troubles; civil war was threatened, and in 1872 it broke out, the Carlists attacking the supporters of the Italian Amadeo. Such troops as could be spared were sent over to Cuba in driblets. Some were Carlist prisoners, whose loyalty was doubtful. Some officers high in command were strongly suspected of a desire to continue the war for the chances of illegitimate profit it brought them.

There were shocking atrocities on both sides, terrible waste of life, and great destruction of property. Statistics of the Spanish losses were never published, but it is believed that during the ten years not less than one hundred and fifty thousand soldiers from the Peninsula left their bones in Cuba—some of them victims of the bullets or machetes of the insurgents, but far more slain by the fevers of the tropics. The Cubans suffered in turn, for half of the island was laid waste; and though they seem never to have had more than a few thousand men in the field at once—it is impossible to give the exact number, estimates varying all the way from two thousand to thirty thousand—their losses from the hardships of guerrilla warfare were disproportionately heavy.

Some of the worst excesses of the war were committed by the Spanish volunteers—a force numerous enough to have suppressed the rebellion had they displayed any desire for active service in the field rather than for terrorizing the cities. There were about sixty thousand of them in Cuba, twenty thousand in Havana alone, and they carried matters with a high hand in the capital.

In May, 1870, a performance was announced at one of the Havana theatres for the benefit of “Cu-
ban insolvents,” which doubtless meant the insurgents. A crowd of armed volunteers broke into the house and poured a volley into the audience. In the following month, displeased with the mild policy of Captain-General Dulce, they arrested him and forced him to sail for Spain—a bold usurpation in which the Madrid Government meekly acquiesced. In November, 1871, they seized forty-three students of the University of Havana, charging them with scratching the glass in a cemetery vault containing the remains of a Spanish soldier. The students were acquitted in court, whereupon the volunteers constituted a court-martial of their own officers, condemned eight of the young men to death, and shot them the next morning. The official paper announced that “some negroes had killed a volunteer, and two of them were summarily shot.”

“It could not be expected,” wrote an American correspondent who was in Cuba in 1873, “that the insurgents, on their side, should abstain from fearful reprisals. The practice with them when a prisoner, and especially an officer, falls into their hands, is to tie his feet up to a tree, and to pile up fuel under the dangling head, thus burning their enemy alive with a slow fire. It would not be easy to ascertain on which side the atrocities first began, or are carried to greater lengths.”

A specially sinister reputation was earned by the Spanish general, Balmaceda (afterward captain-general of Cuba), whose proclamation of April 4, 1869, in the districts of Bayamo and Jiguani, anticipated the ruthless policy of Weyler in some of its orders:

Every man from the age of fifteen years upward found away from his habitation, who does not prove a proper reason therefor, will be shot.
Every unoccupied habitation will be burned.
Every habitation that does not fly a white flag, as a sign that its occupants desire peace, will be burned.
Women not living at their own homes, or at the houses of their relatives, will collect in the towns of Jiguani and Bayamo, where subsistence will be provided. Those who do not present themselves will be conducted forcibly.

It was only natural that popular sympathy in the United States should be strongly enlisted on behalf of the insurgents. The spectacle of a people struggling to be free is one that appeals too strongly to give time for a close scrutiny of the standing and the methods of those whom misgovernment has driven to revolt. Washington's soldiers were ragged regiments, and partisan warfare had helped to win the struggle against the armies of George III. On the other side was a power against whom Americans had a long series of grievances, and who represented a European domination such as they themselves had cast off. There was a strong demand that the Government should formally recognise the insurgents as belligerents, as had been done by some of the South American republics; but the Administration, with undoubted political wisdom, opposed this step, which would have been of no practical benefit. As President Grant said in his first annual message (December 6, 1869):

The contest has at no time assumed the conditions which amount to a war in the sense of international law, or which would show the existence of a de facto political organization of the insurgents sufficient to justify a recognition of belligerency.

Conditions had not changed when in June, 1870, the President sent to Congress a special message in which he described the shocking state of affairs existing in Cuba. It was a description that applied as well to the rebellion of 1895 as to that of 1868:

The condition of the insurgents has not improved, and the insurrection itself, although not subdued, ex-
hibits no signs of advance, but seems to be confined to an irregular system of hostilities carried on by small and illly armed bodies of men, roaming without concentration through the woods and the sparsely populated regions of the island, attacking from ambush convoys and small bands of troops, burning plantations and the estates of those not sympathizing with their cause.

But if the insurrection has not gained ground, it is equally true that Spain has not suppressed it. Climate, disease, and the occasional bullet have worked destruction among the soldiers of Spain; and although the Spanish authorities have possession of every seaport and every town on the island, they have not been able to subdue the hostile feeling which has driven a considerable number of the native inhabitants of the island to armed resistance against Spain, and still leads them to endure the dangers and the privations of a roaming life of guerrilla warfare.

Public feeling in the United States was greatly excited by the seizure (January 21, 1869) of the American steamer Colonel Lloyd Aspinwall, on the charge, apparently unfounded, that she had been landing arms for the insurgents. She was held for three months, and was finally liberated on the ground that she carried official despatches, the Spanish Government ignoring repeated protests from Washington that her arrest on the high seas was a violation of international law. Subsequently a small indemnity—$19,702.50 in gold—was paid to her owners.

In March of the same year another American ship, the schooner Lizzie Major, was arrested at sea by a Spanish frigate, and two passengers, alleged to be Cuban revolutionists, were forcibly taken from her. The act was disclaimed, however, and the prisoners released. In May, Captain-General Dulce attempted to legalize such seizures by a proclamation authorizing Spanish men-of-war to stop and search foreign vessels. Of course the United States Government promptly protested against this palpable breach of the law of nations, and Dulce had to withdraw his proclamation.
Much greater excitement was caused by the Virginius affair, which for a time made war appear inevitable. The Virginius was a small side-wheel steamer, British built, but claiming a somewhat questionable American registry, which had made several filibustering voyages to Cuba. On October 31, 1873, she was sighted off the south coast of the island by the Spanish gunboat Tornado, which promptly gave chase. By a curious coincidence the two vessels were sister ships, built in the same English yard; and in the light of recent tests of Spanish and American seamanship it might have been expected that the Virginius would outrun her pursuer. But though she made frantic efforts to reach Jamaican waters, throwing her cargo of horses and arms overboard to lighten the ship, as well as to destroy evidences of her unlawful mission, she was overhauled and taken to Santiago de Cuba.

One hundred and fifty-five men were captured with the Virginius. On November 4th four of them—three Cubans and one American—were summarily shot by order of the Spanish commander, General Juan Burriel. Three days later, thirty-seven prisoners, one of whom was the ship's commander, Captain Joseph Fry, a former officer of the United States navy, were taken ashore, lined up before a file of marines, and shot. These men were Cubans, Americans, and British subjects. The American and British consuls protested vehemently, but without effect. On the 8th twelve more prisoners suffered the same fate.

The news of the executions was received with wild rejoicings in Havana, with a burst of horrified indignation in the United States. The Government at Washington found itself in a very difficult position. Whether they were filibusters or not, the shooting of American citizens captured on the high seas was an undisguised outrage upon international
law; but the weakness of the navy—which since the end of the civil war had been left to rot in defenceless harbours—rendered a prompt and effectual protest impossible. A fleet was ordered to rendezvous at Key West, but little could be expected of the rusty ironclads and obsolete wooden ships. The rest of the Virginius prisoners would probably have shared the doom of the fifty-three who had perished had it not been for Sir Lambton Loraine, captain of the British sloop of war Niobe, who ran into Santiago harbour with his guns ready for action, and threatened to open fire on six Spanish gunboats lying in the port if there were any further executions. He had come from Jamaica in answer to an urgent message from Mr. F. W. Ramsden, the British consul at Santiago—a gentleman who will be mentioned again in this history.

There followed weeks of tedious correspondence between Washington and Madrid. The Spanish Government declared that it had sent orders forbidding the shooting, but that owing to the interruption of telegraph lines by the insurgents they had not reached Santiago in time. Finally Spain consented to surrender the Virginius, to release the surviving Americans in her crew, to pay an indemnity of eighty thousand dollars, to salute the American flag, and to punish "those who have offended." By way of carrying out the last promise, General Burriel was promoted. The formal transfer of the Virginius, which had been taken in triumph to Havana, was ungraciously carried out in the obscure harbour of Bahia Honda; she was in a filthy and unseaworthy condition—the Spaniards had purposely defiled her—and she sank on her way to the north.

But once more war with the United States had been postponed, and Spain was left to wreak her will in Cuba.
CHAPTER III

FROM THE VIRGINIUS TO THE MAINE, 1873–1898

The series of unpleasant incidents that culminated in the Virginius affair created a mutual feeling of intense bitterness in America and in Spain. In the latter country, where civil war was in progress, Don Carlos sent an aide-de-camp to Madrid to propose to his cousin Alfonso, lately restored to the throne of the Bourbons, that the two factions should suspend their strife to join forces against their common foe, the United States, whose arrogance punished, each prince should be free to assert his claim to the crown. In America the general feeling in favour of an official recognition of the Cuban insurgents was greatly strengthened, and the step would undoubtedly have been taken had it not been for the opposition of the Secretary of State, Mr. Fish, whose advice was decisive with President Grant—an opposition that was unpopular at the time, but which has been abundantly justified by later events.

As the hope of American intervention faded, the rebellion seemed to wane. In December, 1873, its lack of organization was shown by reports of dissensions among its leaders. Carlos Cespedes, who had been designated as the first president of the

* General Grant’s position upon the question of recognising the Cuban insurgents was fully stated in his first annual message (December 6, 1869); in the special message of June 13, 1870; and in his seventh annual message (December 7, 1875).
insurgent republic, was deposed by the so-called Cuban congress; and it was found impossible to agree upon a successor, though Salvador Cisneros Betancourt assumed the title of acting president. Cespedes continued in the field, but in March, 1874, he was mortally wounded in a skirmish, and his death brought further discouragement.

The war had dragged on for two years more when the Spanish Government decided, in 1876, to make a supreme effort to end it. The old Bourbon dynasty was now firmly re-established at Madrid, the struggle with the Carlists was over, and the man of the hour, the man to whom Spain owed the restoration of peace and order, was General Martinez Campos. With twenty-five thousand soldiers, the flower of the Spanish army, he was sent out to Havana as captain-general, in the hope that he would do for Cuba what he had accomplished at home.

As a rule, the military operations of the Cuban wars have been practically limited to the winter and spring months, which constitute the dry season; there being on both sides a wholesome dread of the climatic terrors of the summer and early autumn, which decimated the American troops during the brief Santiago campaign of 1898. Campos's first winter, that of 1876-'77, passed without any tangible result; and he found his task so heavy that he turned over the captain-general's office to General Jovellar, devoting himself solely to his work in the field against the insurgents. Perhaps the most patriotic and clear-sighted public man that his country has produced in our time, he recognised that Spain's policy in Cuba had been a disastrous failure. In one of his reports—a remarkable document, which must have been read with unpleasant surprise in Madrid—he openly arraigned its blunders and crimes:
The insurrection here, acknowledging as its cause the hatred of Spain, is due to the causes that have separated our other colonies from the mother country, intensified by the fact that promises made to Cuba at different times have not been fulfilled; that, as I understand it, their fulfilment, when begun, has been forbidden by order of the Cortes.

When one day after another passed without the island's hopes being realized, the concessions occasionally granted by this or that governor being more than cancelled by his successor; when bad officials and a worse administration of justice aggravated the existing disorders; when the provincial governorships, continually growing more corrupt, fell at last into the hands of men without training or education, petty tyrants who could practise their thefts, and sometimes their oppressions, because of their distance from the supreme authority; then public opinion began urgently to desire those liberties which, if they bring much good, contain also some evil, especially when applied to a country that has so peculiar a life of its own, and is not prepared for them.

Seeing that pacification by the sword was impossible, and that to prolong the war meant ruin to Cuba and disastrous loss to Spain, Campos resolved to attempt conciliation. His first negotiation failed because the insurgent leaders to whom he made overtures, and who expressed a desire for peace, were murdered by the irreconcilables who had decreed death to any one treating with the Spaniards except on the basis of independence. In spite of this outrage he succeeded in communicating with Vicente Garcia, who had recently been named to succeed Cisneros as head of the insurgent government, and on the 7th of February, 1878, the two commanders had a seven hours' interview at Chorrilla, near Las Tunas. On the 10th there was a second meeting, at Zanjon, between Campos and ten Cuban commissioners, of whom Garcia was one and Maximo Gomez another; and here was signed the document, variously called the treaty or compromise of Zanjon, which ended the Ten Years' War. These were its terms:
ARTICLE I. Concessions to the island of Cuba of the political, organic, and administrative privileges accorded to the island of Porto Rico.*

ART. II. Forgetfulness of the past as regards political offences committed from 1868 to the present time, and amnesty for all now under sentence for such offences in or out of the island; full pardon to deserters from the Spanish army, irrespective of nationality, including all who had taken part in revolutionary movements.

ART. III. Freedom to the Asiatic coolies and the slaves who are now in the revolutionary ranks.

ART. IV. No one who by virtue of this convention recognises and remains under protection of the Spanish Government shall be compelled to render any military service until peace be established throughout the island.

ART. V. All persons affected by these provisions who desire to leave the island without stopping in any town shall receive the aid of the Spanish Government to that end.

ART. VI. The capitulation of the forces shall take place in the open field, where, preferably, the arms and military equipments shall be surrendered.

ART. VII. The commander-in-chief of the Spanish army, in order to facilitate the disbanding of the several sections of the Cuban army, will place at their disposal the railway and steamship facilities at his command.

ART. VIII. This agreement with the central committee shall be considered general and without special restrictions, extending to all departments of the island accepting these conditions.

To the terms of this treaty the signature of Campos morally—though perhaps not technically, as there seems to have been a convenient vagueness about his authority to treat with the insurgents—committed the Spanish Government; and after provisionally establishing a system for the election of Cuban deputies to the Cortes, he went back to Madrid to secure the execution of the agreement. The premier, Canovas del Castillo, declared that Spain could accept nothing but the complete subjection of Cuba, and resigned office to avoid submitting a compromise to the legislature. Campos

* These were substantially identical with the concessions demanded by the Cubans before the outbreak of the Ten Years' War, and enumerated on page 28 (footnote).
took the vacant place, but found himself unable to form a cabinet that would accept his plans, and gave up the attempt in despair. Canovas returned to the premiership, and the promises of Zanjon were laid aside.

Cuba still had her right of representation at Madrid, but even that was speedily rendered little more than a mockery. The Peninsulares regarded themselves as entitled to a political domination over the Insulares as natural as that exercised by the white men of the Southern States over their seven million negro fellow-citizens; and their methods of insuring their supremacy were as ingenious and as unscrupulous as anything yet devised in Louisiana or Mississippi. The franchise was limited to those paying a tax of twenty-five dollars annually—a provision which excluded all but the richer Cubans, many of whom, especially in former years, were loyal to the Spanish connection, mainly through dread of the disorders of civil war. But to prevent the disfranchisement of Spaniards, all government employees, and all persons recognised as belonging to any mercantile company, were registered as voters without taxation.

The result was that the Peninsulares, numbering not more than one sixth of the total population, were enabled to carry most of the election districts. In 1879, of forty delegates, ten were Cuban autonomists, thirty Spanish or Cuban conservatives, and the disproportion grew still more marked at later elections. In 1886, of thirty-eight delegates, eight were autonomists, thirty conservatives, all but four of the latter being Spanish born; in 1896, of thirty delegates, all but four were Spaniards. Some of the Spanish candidates were men who had never seen Cuba.

The Ten Years' War was followed by seventeen years of comparative quietude in Cuba. There was official friction with the United States, but not so
serious as to create an alarm of war, though in 1880 Mr. Evarts, then Secretary of State, sent an urgent protest to Madrid against a “grave affront to the honour and dignity of our flag” in the overhauling of four American vessels by Spanish gunboats off the Cuban coast. There were minor internal disorders—banditry in the hills, the legacy of years of guerrilla warfare, and plots, or suspicions of plots, in the cities; but no disturbance loud enough to reach the ears of the outside world. The diary of Captain-General Polavieja, subsequently published in Madrid, records that in 1892 he executed no less than sixty-three prisoners accused of treasonable conspiracy against the existing régime. During the following year there were two more attempts at insurrection—one under the Sartorius brothers in the province of Santiago, the other under Esquirre in Santa Clara; but both were feeble and futile.

It would not be fair to say that the Spanish Government made no attempt whatever to improve the condition of Cuba. The burden of taxation, which had been mercilessly extortionate, was made less crushing. The Cuban budget for 1878–’79 was more than forty-six million dollars; that of 1882, a little less than thirty-six millions; that of 1893, twenty-three millions. Of the other reforms, or pretended reforms, some were farcical in their worthlessness; others, perhaps well meant by their authors at Madrid, were frustrated by the officialdom of Cuba, whose morale was hinted at in Campos’s report, already quoted.

Under the changes effected in the Spanish constitution in 1876, the government of Cuba, hitherto regarded as an appanage of the crown, was transferred to the Cortes. This was not proclaimed in the island until five years later, and then proved to be a reform only in name. In 1892 the qualifica-
tion for the franchise was reduced from twenty-five dollars a year in taxes to five dollars; but the extension of the suffrage had no apparent influence upon the result of the elections, as returned by the Spanish authorities in control of the polls. In 1895 it was announced that the military power of the captain-general was to be tempered by a council of thirty members, but the constitution of the advisory body was characteristic. Of its thirty members, fifteen were to be appointed by the crown, fifteen elected in Cuba, and to muzzle any champion of popular rights who might slip into it, the captain-general was empowered to suspend at will any fourteen councillors, and with the consent of certain officials—all pretty sure to be Peninsulares—to dismiss the entire body.

Spaniards who recount these efforts at conciliation, and bewail the ingratitude of the colony that is now lost to them, add that taxes are proportionately higher in the Peninsula than they were in Cuba; that the Cubans have had the privilege of exemption from the conscription; and that the long maintenance of slavery, in the face of strenuous opposition, was a special favour to the industries of the island. They do not add that it may have been because Spain dared not arm and train the Cubans that she asked no military service from them; or that the connivance at human servitude suited the interests of peculating Spanish officeholders rather than the public sentiment of Cuba. None of these excuses can palliate the fact that the island was utterly, hopelessly, and shamelessly misgoverned, under a vicious system badly administered by corrupt officials.

Under such conditions, the recurrence of disorder was inevitable. It is idle to discuss whether those who began the latest rebellion were justified in drawing the sword. They were men who saw the Ten Years' War, and who must have foreseen,
if they foresaw anything, that in raising the standard of revolt they were dooming the island they professed to love to years of blood and ruin, of anarchy and starvation. Revolt is justified only when it has the prospect of military success; and could these leaders of small guerrilla bands expect to cope with Spain's army and navy? Events brought them a mighty ally, but Gomez and Maceo and their comrades have much to answer for besides the ending of Spanish rule in the West Indies. And yet—we think of the "embattled farmers" who defied the power of George III, and sympathy silences criticism.

The 24th of February, 1895, was a day of excitement in Havana, and of consternation in the palace of the captain-general, Don Emilio Calleja. There were tidings of new revolts both in the east and in the west. Juan Gomez had taken the field, near Matanzas, with a small band of followers; at Manzanillo, Bartolome Masso was at the head of two hundred men; and at several points in the province of Santiago there were risings under Jesus Rabi, Guillermo Monçada, and other rebel leaders. Calleja at once proclaimed a state of siege, and telegraphed to Madrid for assistance. There were about eighteen thousand Spanish troops in the island, besides the volunteers, but, as is quite usual with Spanish troops, they were poorly supplied and equipped. Little had been done to modernize the mediaeval fortifications of the chief cities; the captain-general had scarcely any artillery, and only eleven small cruisers and gunboats to patrol a coast line of two thousand miles. The neglect and inefficiency of the Spanish military administration was a powerful ally to the rebels.

The revolutionists in Matanzas, or a part of them, were speedily forced to surrender to the governor of the province, who thereupon reported his
district as "pacified"; but further east the Spaniards were practically powerless, and the rebellion spread like a prairie fire. In the province of Santiago, within three weeks several thousand men, armed with rifles or machetes, had flocked to its standard, and the Spanish troops found themselves unable to leave their fortified posts without subjecting themselves to guerrilla attacks. The gravity of the situation was appreciated both at Havana and at Madrid, for on the 27th of March Captain-General Calleja resigned, and next day the cabinet of Premier Canovas del Castillo met to decide upon heroic measures.

Campos, who had once pacified Cuba with promises which he had not been allowed to fulfil, was again summoned to save for Spain the Pearl of the Antilles. He can scarcely have approached the task with confidence, or without reluctance; but he accepted the commission, and sailed promptly—not to Havana, but to the troubled east, the headquarters of the rebellion, landing at Guantanamo on the 16th of April, 1895. Three gunboats were sent at the same time to Cuban waters, twelve thousand additional troops were ordered from Spain, and an unlimited credit was voted by the Cortes for the expenses of the war.

Meanwhile the rebels had received important accessions, for the chieftains of the Ten Years' War, who had sought safety in exile, now returned to strike another blow at Spain. On the 1st of April the two negro leaders, Antonio and José Maceo, landed near Baracoa, easily avoiding the Spanish gunboats; and on the 11th they were followed by José Marti, who assumed the provisional headship of the government nominally established by the insurgents, and by Maximo Gomez, who was recognised as commander-in-chief of the scattered and scantily equipped "army of liberation."

Campos's first plan of campaign was to confine
the insurrection to the Santiago province, and he posted ten thousand troops along the Puerto Principe border. Marti was killed in attempting to break through the cordon, but Gomez made his way into Puerto Principe; and during the summer, when hostilities slackened, he remained there, organizing the rebellion, threatening the Spanish positions, and beginning his work of destruction among the plantations and the railroads. At the approach of the dry season he moved westward again, in concert with Antonio Maceo.

During the Ten Years' War a main feature of the Spanish military policy was the maintenance of the trocha, or fortified line running across the island from Moron to Jucaro, near the western boundary of Puerto Principe; and this line Campos now attempted to hold against Gomez and Maceo. As a question of strategy, his judgment was of doubtful wisdom. Although he massed along the trocha troops that might have been better employed in attacking and following up the enemy, it was impossible to guard its fifty miles of length effectually. Gomez and Maceo had little difficulty in crossing the barrier when hostilities reopened in the autumn of 1895.

With fire and sword the rebel leaders continued their westward advance. Campos marched in pursuit, but their rapid movements and better knowledge of the country baffled him. Their forces were usually split into small commands, which engaged the Spaniards only when they could intercept a convoy or ambush a detachment. In spite of Spain's determined efforts to crush the revolt—fifty thousand soldiers were sent to Cuba during the summer and autumn, and in November General Pando sailed from Cadiz with thirty thousand more—her ablest commander, when he entered Havana on the day before Christmas, appeared there as a
defeated general, while Gomez followed him with impunity almost within sight of the capital. The smoke of burning villages and plantations could be seen from the suburbs, and the railroads running out of the city were paralyzed by the destruction of bridges and trains.

Unsuccessful in the field, and assailed by a fierce storm of criticism both in Havana and from Spain, Campos resigned his command, and on January 17, 1896, it was announced from Madrid that General Valeriano Weyler had been selected to succeed him. This appointment, which was regarded as foreshadowing a stringent and vigorous prosecution of the war, was received with delight by the Peninsulares, with bitter resentment by the Cubans and their sympathizers. As an officer in the Ten Years' War Weyler was accused of numerous and shocking cruelties. The charges may have been false, as were many of those brought against him later; but he speedily proved himself truculent enough.

Weyler reached Havana on the 10th of February. On the 17th he issued a sweeping proclamation ordering a summary military trial, with the death penalty upon conviction, for fourteen specified offenses, including the furnishing of arms, provisions, horses, or any other assistance to the rebels; the disclosing of telegraph messages to any but the proper official; the invention or circulation of any news directly or indirectly favouring the rebellion; the speaking or writing of anything that might belittle the prestige of Spain or of the Spanish army. He further ordered that in the two eastern provinces, Puerto Principe and Santiago, all stores in country districts should be vacated by their owners, and that no person should go abroad without a passport issued by the military commanders.
It would be useless to attempt to follow in detail the campaigns of 1896 and 1897. The struggle continued to be a confused series of guerrilla combats, destructive yet indecisive, uninteresting to the historian and utterly valueless to the student of tactics. The facts of the situation were constantly obscured by a cloud of false statements. The official bulletins, chronicling nothing but Spanish successes, were manifestly unreliable. Reports from insurgent sources were still more irresponsible and imaginative.

It may be regarded as strange that the American newspaper press, with its record of almost invincible enterprise, should have allowed years of civil strife in Cuba, an island so close to the shores of the great republic, and bound to it by so many ties of interest, to pass without a more earnest and successful effort to record the exact facts of the case. While Campos was in command, correspondents were free to go and come throughout the island, and to investigate the character and progress of the struggle; but little or nothing was done in this direction. Certainly not one of them went afield with the Spanish forces. Weyler, from the first, was less accommodating to newspaper men; few soldiers regard them with special affection—witness Kitchener in the Sudan, Otis at Manila, and sundry generals in the civil war; but he did not begin to expel them until he had received very serious provocation. A correspondent is always held responsible for the news that appears in the periodical he represents, and any commander might well resent the utterly unscrupulous fakes—if that expressive term may be employed—continually published by certain sheets which loudly proclaim themselves the leaders of American journalism, and which the foreigner may be pardoned for accepting as such.
An exposure—which apparently stands uncontradicted and uncontroverted—of this long series of misstatements has been published by Mr. George Bronson Rea, one of the very few American correspondents who witnessed any considerable amount of fighting in Cuba. According to Mr. Rea’s Facts and Fakes About Cuba, there were only three, or possibly four, who can truthfully claim to have done so. Of the dozens of others who started for the seat of war in 1896 and 1897, many seem to have gone no farther south than Florida, where they found abundant material for sensational stories in the information they gathered from Cuban laborantes—a class with whom the invention of news favourable to the insurgents may be said to have been a recognised duty.

It is from this source that American newspapers received the imaginative tales that only need to be collected and compared, as they are in Mr. Rea’s book, to make evident their reckless inconsistencies and extreme improbabilities—the stories of desperate battles, when in the whole war there was scarcely an action that deserved the name; of the capture of fortified towns, of terrible machete charges, of dynamite guns that mowed down whole Spanish battalions, of the marvellous prowess of regiments of Cuban Amazons—all equally fictitious; of the thorough organization, civil and military, of the rebel government; of its “capital” at Cubitas, of its school system and postal service—almost all of which were mere figments of the imagination. Spanish atrocities, which may have occurred, but which were established solely by hearsay evidence, were contrasted with the miraculous and incredible clemency said to distinguish the insurgent chiefs.

As a typical instance, out of scores that might be given, take the case of the alleged outrage upon a Cuban woman, a passenger on the American
The steamer Olivette, who in February, 1897, was charged with carrying documents for the insurgents, and was searched before being allowed to leave Havana. A New York newspaper * paraded this as a sensation, and published a large engraving showing the woman stripped naked, standing before three Spanish officials. The not unnatural result was a burst of public indignation at what appeared to be a very shocking incident—until the correspondent who had furnished the story emphatically disclaimed it in any such guise as that in which his paper presented it. The woman had been searched only by a female inspector, privately, in a state­room; the sensational picture had been drawn by an artist who was not present, and who very care­lessly and culpably relied upon his imagination.

The newspaper press possesses much less prac­tical and direct political influence in the United States than unthinking observers suppose. All this journalistic misrepresentation was unfortunate, but it had no effect upon the policy of either the Cleveland or the McKinley Administration. It aroused Spanish resentment, created false impres­sions in America, and led to utterances in Congress that were unwise and regrettable; but it could never have brought on a war. That came, primarily, from the inevitable logic of an age-long situation, and was immediately precipitated by the terrible and unforeseen disaster of the Maine explosion.

As a matter of fact, during the last two months of Campos's command the Cuban rebellion reached its high-water mark, and from the arrival of Weyler it steadily declined. To the Spaniards, indeed, the cost of the war, in men and money, con­tinued to be frightful, and even ruinous; nor was

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* The New York Journal, February 12, 1897. The reporter was Mr. Richard Harding Davis, the artist Mr. Frederic Remington.
there any apparent prospect of restoring peace and order in Cuba so long as the last of the native inhabitants remained alive to face the starvation that was closing in upon them; but it became more and more clear that the insurgents were hopeless of military success. Antonio Maceo, by general testimony the most soldierly of the Cuban leaders, was hemmed in in Pinar del Rio, the trocha that stretched from Mariel to Majana cutting him off from Gomez, who seems to have made no effort to succour him; and when he made his way across the trocha with a few followers, in December, 1896, he was killed in a chance encounter with Spanish troops. His successor in command of the insurgents in the west, Rius Rivera, was captured in March, 1897, and deported. His brother, José Maceo, had fallen in the preceding July. The operations of Gomez, of whom so much was heard in the first year of the war, seem to have degenerated into mere guerrilla tactics—if, indeed, they ever were anything else.

Seldom caring to take the offensive, the insurgents were constantly aided in eluding the Spaniards by the fact that most of the rural population were ready to serve as spies, carrying information of every movement attempted by the Spanish commanders. It was to prevent this, and to render it more difficult for the enemy to obtain food, that Weyler issued his reconcentration order—an order that brought detestation upon his name, that was rightly denounced by President McKinley as "brutal" and "horrible," and that proved disastrous to both parties in the struggle. It may have been as much of a military necessity as Sheridan's devastation of the Shenandoah Valley, but its effects were so cruel that it proved to be one of those blunders that are worse than crimes.

Yet it is easy to show—not as any excuse for its author—that reconcentration was not the only nor
Indeed the main cause of famine and death in Cuba. The sufferings of the pacíficos began before it was inaugurated and continued after it ended. Weyler’s first bando directing the country people to assemble in the fortified towns was issued October 21, 1896, and the new policy was not in general operation before February, 1897, to be revoked by Blanco’s decree of November 13th in that year; but as far back as December, 1895, there were reports of thousands of refugees flying to the cities from the devastated rural districts. In his report presented at the meeting of Congress in 1896, Mr. Olney, then Secretary of State, said:

It is officially reported that there are in one provincial city alone some four thousand necessitous refugees from the surrounding country, to whom the municipal authorities can afford little or no relief.

It would be easy to multiply evidence of this state of affairs, and it is equally easy to discover reasons for it. How could there but be destitution and suffering when all the industries of the island were practically suspended—when plantations were burned on every hand, factories razed and railroads destroyed, while a considerable part of the able-bodied male population, instead of working to support their families, took to the woods as guerrilla warriors?

General Gomez, in the letter he sent to President McKinley in February, 1898, had the effrontery to assert:

The revolution, as master of the country, has never prohibited any citizen, whatever his nationality, from earning his living.

This was the same commander who issued the following proclamation under date of November 6, 1895:

ARTICLE I. All plantations shall be totally destroyed, their sugar cane and outbuildings burned, and railroad connections destroyed.
ART. II. All labourers who shall aid the sugar factories shall be considered as traitors to their country.

ART. III. All who are caught in the act, or whose violation of Article II shall be proven, shall be shot. Let all officers of the army of liberty comply with this order, determined to unfurl triumphantly, even over ruin and ashes, the flag of the Republic of Cuba.

Such, as a matter of fact, was the deliberate policy of the insurgents throughout the war. As early as March, 1895, an American traveller who was in eastern Cuba during the first two weeks of the rebellion, said that "the most deplorable feature of the warfare is the pillaging and burning done by the insurgents"; and so it continued to the end. Gomez's order was frequently and emphatically reiterated by those of other chieftains; witness one of Antonio Maceo's, dated June 9, 1896:

Allow me to impress on you the necessity of employing all means to destroy the railroads in your district, and to blow up trains and bridges with dynamite.

It is also advisable to destroy all houses that may offer refuge or shelter to the Spanish troops, and to render useless all corn and tobacco found deposited in your territory.

Here is another signed by "Jose B. Aleman, Secretary of War," and dated December 2, 1897:

Considering that the working of the sugar estates favours the plans of our enemies, as shown by the marked interest in their last winter campaign, thus injuring the steady headway of the revolution:

It has been ordered by our government . . . to absolutely prohibit the realization of the sugar crop of 1897-'98. . . Violators will suffer the punishment prescribed by our laws.

The practical working of these ruthless edicts, and their effect upon the starving plantation hands of Cuba, may be illustrated by a few quotations from the official reports of the American consuls in Cuba—authorities unlikely to be unduly favourable to the Spaniards. Mr. Barker wrote from Sagua la Grande, December 28, 1897:
This (Santa Clara) province is capable this season of producing perhaps two thirds of whatever cane might be made in the entire island. To grind this cane without interruption would be the means of saving the lives of thousands who, without this or outside aid within the next thirty to fifty days, must die of actual hunger. Over a month since the planters were officially advised of Spain’s inability to provide protection in order to operate their mills. This leaves the sugar-growers entirely in the hands of the Cubans in revolt. I know that strict orders have been given that under no circumstances must mills be permitted to grind.

A month later—January 31, 1898—the same official reported:

One sugar mill is running, not without interruption, with chances of making one fourth of a crop. Another, just started up, was attacked yesterday by a band of insurgents, killing fourteen and wounding five of the guerrillas paid by the estate to protect the operatives. Seven labourers were killed.

An adjoining estate, the property of the British consul, was also attacked, the growing cane burned. This precludes further attempts to grind, as men can not be induced to work while the insurgents roam at will over the country.

Such was the humane warfare of which Gomez boasted!

Mr. Brice wrote from Matanzas, November 17, 1897—after the reconcentrados had received official permission to return to the country:

Only those who can obtain employment on sugar plantations can live. ... Several plantations report cane burned by insurgents, and the general opinion is little or no sugar will be made this season.

On December 5, 1897, Mr. Hyatt reported from Santiago de Cuba:

Mr. Rigney, an American sugar planter near Manznillo, was preparing to grind during the coming season. A few nights since, the insurgents fired seven cannon shots among his buildings, one ball passing through the roof of his house.
On January 12, 1898, the same consul added:

I regret to say that the stoppage of industries, from present appearances, will not halt at the sugar crop, but coffee and other agricultural crops fall under the same ban. . . . All of the benefits that should have accrued to our citizens are thwarted by the action of the insurgents, who refuse to allow them to return to their sugar, coffee, and other estates. The Pompo manganese mines, owned by Americans, are also being held up by the same power.

It is beyond the power of my pen to describe the situation in Eastern Cuba.

On the other hand, where the insurgents were unable to carry out their policy of destruction, somewhat better conditions prevailed. Mr. McGarr, American consul at Cienfuegos, reported on January 10, 1898:

All the sugar mills in this consular jurisdiction, twenty-three in number, have been grinding since the first of the month. . . . The demand for labour has drawn from the towns a great portion of the unemployed labourers and given employment to the male concentrados, many of whom were in a state of enforced idleness and destitution. As a consequence, few of them are now seen here, and the labour congestion has been relieved.

Small predatory parties of insurgents make frequent attempts to fire the cane fields, and it requires constant and active vigilance to prevent their destruction. The dry weather and the high winds prevailing at this season render it a simple matter for one person (who can easily conceal himself in the tall cane) to start a conflagration that will, unless promptly extinguished, destroy hundreds of acres in a few hours.

The sugar crop is the support of all classes, and especially of the labouring class, and should it be in large part destroyed a famine in reality would be inevitable.

This letter explains the extreme difficulty the Spanish commanders experienced in preventing the destruction of the industries by which, in time of peace, the island supported itself. That their efforts to do so were sincere—as they naturally would be, if only from motives of self-interest—is attested by General Fitzhugh Lee, who reported under date of November 23, 1897:
The Spanish authorities are sincere in doing all in their power to encourage, protect, and promote the grinding of sugar. The insurgents’ leaders have given instructions to prevent grinding wherever it can be done, because by diminishing the export of sugar the Spanish Government revenues are decreased. It will be very difficult for the Spanish authorities to prevent cane burning, because one man at night can start a fire which will burn hundreds of acres, just as a single individual could ignite a prairie by throwing a match into the dry grass.

Nor is it true that the Spanish authorities, military and civil, made no effort whatever to relieve the victims of the cruel war. The measures taken were indeed inadequate and futile; when Spain could not pay her own officials and feed her own troops, how could she provide for half a million hungry Cubans? She was powerless before the hideous spectre of famine that arose in the island which she had so long misruled, and whose doom was now sealed by its own sons. Yet there were attempts at relief, besides the three million pesetas (six hundred thousand dollars) voted by the Cortes in March, 1898, but never sent to Cuba—the outbreak of war with the United States being a good excuse for its retention. While Campos was at Havana he raised a fund for the destitute, himself heading the list with two thousand dollars, and the entire Spanish army subscribing a day’s pay. In many cities a junta de socorros was formed, which distributed such money or provisions as could be obtained. In November, 1897, General Lee reported that “charitable committees” were caring for “large numbers” of refugees. General Blanco gave one hundred thousand dollars in Spanish silver to feed the destitute, and the city of Havana raised eighty thousand dollars by a special tax for the same purpose.

Elsewhere municipal relief failed because public and private resources were exhausted. Consul
Brice wrote from Matanzas, also in November, 1897, that "several days ago an order from captain-general * was given municipal authorities to issue rations and clothing, but no attention is paid the order"—lack of funds being, no doubt, one reason for the neglect. Later, in the same city, "two thousand rations were given out, for a few days only, to eight thousand persons." But by this time the situation almost everywhere was that described by Consul Barker, of Sagua la Grande: "The authorities are utterly helpless to extend any relief to those who have thus far survived the pangs of hunger." Truly General Sherman's saying that "war is hell" was never more frightfully verified than in Cuba. There was no hope of relief from within. The situation was one that cried to Heaven for the merciful intervention of a foreign power, more loudly than ever Bulgaria cried, or Armenia, or Crete.

But terrible as was the island's plight, it was exceedingly difficult to formulate any proper and practical plan of ameliorating it. It is not strange that while intervention was so eagerly urged by American sympathy, two successive administrations were so reluctant to undertake it. For more than two years the United States witnessed the spectacle—not an entirely pleasant one to the friends of popular government—of periodical scenes of excitement in Congress, which, vehement and even disorderly in debate, yet failing to agree upon any definite and consistent line of action; making inflammatory speeches and passing bellicose resolutions, yet continuing its neglect of the national defences—stood in more or less direct opposition to an executive policy, which, though criticized as unduly conservative, was firm, prudent,

* This word appears in consular reports (Senate document No. 230, Fifty-fifth Congress, second session) as "Captain Gin"—no doubt a typographical error.
and based upon a better understanding of the situation.

The question first came to the front in the national legislature when the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee reported, on January 29, 1896, a curiously worded resolution instructing President Cleveland to use in a friendly spirit the good offices of this Government, to the end that Spain shall be requested to accord to the armies with which it is engaged in war the rights of belligerents.

After a month's debate, during which the resolution went through several changes, the Senate finally passed it in the form of a recognition of the insurgents as a belligerent power, with the further request that the friendly offices of the United States should be offered by the President to the Spanish Government for the recognition of the independence of Cuba.

The House of Representatives adopted a much less pacific resolution, declaring that the only permanent solution of the conflict was the establishment of a government by the choice of the Cuban people; that American interests were seriously injured by the struggle, and should be protected by intervention if necessary. There were conferences and further debates, in one of which Senator Mills, of Texas, offered a motion calling on the President to seize the island and hold it by military force until the Cuban people could organize a republic; but finally, on April 6th, the House accepted the Senate resolution. The President took no action upon it.

It could hardly have been expected that the "friendly offices" thus proffered had the slightest chance of acceptance by what Senator Sherman termed the "sensitive, proud, and gallant nation" of the Iberian peninsula, whose temper was indicated, during the debate in Congress, by an attack
on the United States consulate in Barcelona, and by riotous anti-American demonstrations in other Spanish cities. Two days before the final passage of the resolution—April 4, 1896—Secretary Olney had sent to Madrid a frank and full statement of the position of the Washington Administration. He pointed out that Spain’s promises of a speedy restoration of order had signally failed; that the anarchy existing in Cuba had greatly damaged American commerce, and threatened the “absolute impoverishment” of the island’s inhabitants; that while not suggesting intervention at the time—in deed, he expressly declared that “the United States has no designs upon Cuba, and no designs against the sovereignty of Spain”—yet he hoped

to find a way of co-operating with Spain in the immediate pacification of the island on such a plan as, leaving Spain her rights of sovereignty, shall yet secure to the people of the island all such rights and powers of local self-government as they can reasonably ask.

The Spanish reply, not received until June, was a refusal of Mr. Olney’s rather vague offer; and there the matter ended for a time.

When Congress met in the following December, President Cleveland’s message contained a brief review of the situation in Cuba, which remained unchanged, and a carefully guarded yet distinct warning of possible future interference:

> When the inability of Spain to deal successfully with the insurrection has become manifest, and it is demonstrated that her sovereignty is extinct in Cuba for all purposes of its rightful existence, and when a hopeless struggle for its re-establishment has degenerated into a strife which means nothing more than the useless sacrifice of human life and the utter destruction of the very subject-matter of the conflict, a situation will be presented in which our obligation to the sovereignty of Spain will be superseded by higher obligations which we can hardly hesitate to recognise and discharge.}
This cautious utterance was severely criticised in Congress, and several motions were made with a view to forcing the Administration to take some more decided step. The most important was a resolution offered by Senator Cameron, of Pennsylvania:

That the independence of the Republic of Cuba be and the same hereby is acknowledged by the United States of America.

That the United States should use its friendly offices with the Government of Spain to bring to a close the war between Spain and Cuba.

This resolution was reported favourably by the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee (December 18, 1896), in spite of the fact that Secretary Olney appeared before that body and strongly opposed it. On the day after the committee's decision the secretary publicly stated that if it passed both houses, as was then generally expected, it would be nothing more than "an expression of opinion by the eminent gentlemen who might vote for it. The power," he added, "to recognise the so-called republic of Cuba as an independent state rests exclusively with the Executive"—thereby raising an interesting point of constitutional law which still remains in doubt. For a time it seemed as if a conflict between the national legislature and the Executive was imminent, but a more conservative feeling arose in Congress, created partly by the alarm of various commercial interests at what appeared to be a threat of war, and partly by the general willingness to leave the whole question to be dealt with by the incoming Administration, and the Cameron resolution was never pressed to a vote.

It soon became clear that under President McKinley and Secretary Sherman the Administration's Cuban policy was to be a continuation of the masterly inactivity of Messrs. Cleveland and Olney; Mr. McKinley's position being that domestic prob-
lems of the currency, the tariff, the deficit in the government revenue, and the long-continued industrial depression were paramount to any call from beyond the republic’s frontiers. On May 17, 1897, however, the tidings of increasing distress in Cuba, and Consul-General Lee’s report that from six hundred to eight hundred American citizens were among the destitute, led him to send to Congress, which he had called together in special session, a message asking for an appropriation of fifty thousand dollars for their relief. The money was voted, not without some delay in the House, caused by an attempt to attach to the grant a recognition of the insurgents.

Seven months later (December 24, 1897), the President issued a public appeal for charity to Cuba’s famine-stricken people. There was a generous response, about two hundred thousand dollars being speedily contributed. The Red Cross Society gave valuable aid, and its president, Miss Clara Barton, went to Havana to distribute the supplies, which Captain-General Blanco admitted free of duty, and which proved at least a temporary assistance to thousands of sufferers until the coming of war ended the relief work.

Meanwhile the Senate (May 20, 1897), by forty-one votes to fourteen, passed a joint resolution according belligerent rights to “the government proclaimed and for some time maintained by force of arms by the people of Cuba.” This was done in spite of the well-understood objections to such a recognition. It was not warranted by the known status of the rebellion; it might have encouraged the insurgents, but it would have been of much greater practical aid to Spain, by giving her ships the right of searching neutral vessels on the high seas; it would have tied the hands of the United States Government in its later dealings with the
island, and it would have precluded all claims from American citizens for damages caused by the war. The Senate's declaration, however, was entirely fruitless. It never came before the House, as Speaker Reed, who was no less strongly opposed to hasty intervention than was the President, had named no committees for the special session, and there was no medium for receiving and transmitting a joint resolution.

Throughout this critical period of American relations with Spain, constant friction was caused by the activity of Cuban agents and sympathizers in the United States, by expeditions carrying arms to the insurgents, and by questions of the rights of American citizens involved in the struggle—all of which had been such sinister factors in the situation during the Ten Years' War, and were certain to remain so while Spanish sovereignty in Cuba should last. The list of individuals on whose behalf the Washington Government was called upon to intervene was a long one, the most important cases being those of Julio Sanguilly, who was liberated at its request by the Spanish Government; of Ricardo Ruiz, whose death in prison was never satisfactorily explained; and of Alfredo Laborde and four others, captured on the filibustering schooner Competitor. These names will suggest what was undoubtedly the case—that American citizenship was acquired, or claimed, by many Cubans with the deliberate intention of invoking its protection in case of conflict with the Spanish authorities; but the Federal Government was none the less bound to defend their rights, and it did so—in one instance, that of the Competitor prisoners, to the point of threatening the most serious consequences had not their death sentence been rescinded.

On their side, the United States authorities ex-
ercised great vigilance in the fulfilment of neutral obligations and the suppression of filibustering. On the 30th of July, 1896, President Cleveland issued a special and very stringent proclamation against such illegal attempts "to make war upon a foreign country." Several arrests were made, in American ports and on the seas, and a diligent patrol was maintained by revenue cutters and naval vessels, at a cost said to amount to nearly a million dollars annually; yet many expeditions succeeded in reaching Cuba, and the Spaniards found it impossible to believe that the United States was not deliberately giving aid and comfort to the rebels.

The assassination of the Spanish premier, Canovas del Castillo, on the 8th of August, 1897, again delayed action from Washington upon the Cuban question; and when, after the stopgap ministry of Azcarraga, Sagasta, leader of the Liberal party at Madrid, came into power, the new Government made a genuine effort to forestall the demands which the United States, in the name of civilization, must inevitably sooner or later formulate. At a meeting held on the 6th of October the Spanish cabinet decided upon the recall of Captain-General Weyler, and announced a new constitution for Cuba, giving the island a local parliament of its own, and a fairly liberal measure of autonomy. Intimations were made at Washington that Sagasta's ministry would be willing to negotiate a treaty abolishing the differential duties which had given Spanish manufacturers a practical monopoly of the Cuban market—a system very unfair to Cuba and detrimental to American commercial interests. To succeed Weyler, General Blanco was sent to Havana, where his earliest official actions were a formal revocation of his predecessor's reconcentration order, a proclamation offering amnesty to all political offenders, and the release of the Competitor
prisoners, whom Weyler had held for eighteen months.

When Congress met, in December, President McKinley's message reviewed the Cuban question at some length. With regard to the demand for a recognition of the insurgents, either as a government or as belligerents, the President recited General Grant's arguments against such a step, and repeated the conclusion that it was "now unwise, and therefore inadmissible," adding a sentence which reads a little curiously in the light of later events:

I speak not of forcible annexation, for that can not be thought of. That, by our code of morality, would be criminal aggression.

Continuing, the message hailed Spain's new policy with somewhat optimistic gratification:

That the Government of Sagasta has entered upon a course from which recession with honour is impossible can hardly be questioned; that in the few weeks it has existed it has made earnest of the sincerity of its professions is undeniable. I shall not impugn its sincerity, nor should impatience be suffered to embarrass it in the task it has undertaken. It is honestly due to Spain, and to our friendly relations with Spain, that she should be given a reasonable chance to realize her expectations, and to prove the asserted efficacy of the new order of things to which she stands irrevocably committed. She has recalled the commander whose brutal orders inflamed the American mind and shocked the civilized world. She has modified the horrible order of concentration, and has undertaken to care for the helpless and permit those who desire to resume the cultivation of their fields to do so, and assures them the protection of the Spanish Government in their lawful occupations. Not a single American citizen is now in arrest or confinement in Cuba, of whom this Government has any knowledge.

Had Sagasta's move been made two years earlier, it is possible, though not probable, that it might have succeeded; but now it came far too late. Indeed, by a curious train of events, and
with the ill luck that seems to be the historical attendant of weakness and unwisdom, it was Spain's most earnest attempt at conciliation that brought about the catastrophe which was to lose her the remnant of her empire in the new world.

It speedily became clear that the offer of autonomy was an absolute failure. Years before there had been an organized political party of autonomists in Cuba, but it had practically ceased to exist. Enough of its adherents could not be found to fill the offices in which the Spanish Government now desired their services.* There was no possibility of any compromise with the insurgents—the single exception reported being the surrender of Juan Masso, in the province of Santiago, with one hundred and ten men. Colonel Joaquin Ruiz, of the Spanish army, commissioned by Blanco to treat with the rebel leader Aranguren, was seized and shot, in spite of his flag of truce—a brutal murder that was excused as an "execution" under the insurgents' decree against all dealings with the enemy.

On the other hand, the new constitution provoked furious opposition from the Peninsular party in Cuba. There were violent outbreaks in Havana, and on January 12, 1898, a mob led by officers of the Spanish garrison attacked the offices of three autonomist newspapers—the Diario de la Marina, the Discusion, and the Reconcentrado. Soldiers sent to restore order fraternized with the rioters, and though little damage was done there was great ex-

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* Consul Hyatt reported from Santiago, January 8, 1898: "That the Spanish Government has made a most energetic and thorough campaign to make autonomy successful there is no room for doubt. . . . Wholesale removals of Spanish officers from civil positions are made by sweeping orders, with instructions to fill their places with Cuban autonomists. About a week since there came an order dismissing every employee of the custom house in this city, to take effect as soon as proper autonomists could be found to fill their places. As yet only two have been named—the collector and first deputy."
citement. The crowds shouted threats against Blanco, and there was alarm among the Americans in the city. On the following day Consul-General Lee telegraphed to Washington:

Uncertainty exists whether he [Blanco] can control the situation. If demonstrated he can not maintain order, preserve life, and keep the peace, or if Americans and their interests are in danger, ships must be sent, and to that end should be prepared to move promptly.

For a month the second-class battleship Maine had been lying at Key West, with orders to answer any call that might come from General Lee. She was now instructed to go at once to Havana, her mission being announced as a “friendly naval visit.” General Lee was informed of her despatch on January 24th, and at once replied:

Advise visit be postponed six or seven days, to give last excitement more time to disappear.

Secretary Day’s immediate answer was:

Maine has been ordered.

And on the following morning, January 25, 1898, at eleven o’clock, the white battle ship, flying the Stars and Stripes, exchanged salutes with the Spanish batteries and steamed into the harbour, where so terrible a fate awaited her.
CHAPTER IV

THE COMING OF WAR

While the Maine lay in Havana harbour the
tension of the situation was greatly increased by an
incident which at another time might have pos-
sessed little significance. On February 9, 1898,
there was published a letter written by Señor
Dupuy de Lome, the Spanish minister to the
United States, whose tactfulness and influential per-
sonal friendships had made him a valuable agent
for his country at Washington. It was a private
letter to Señor José Canalejas, the editor of a Mad-
rid newspaper, the Heraldo, who had recently
visited America and had gone thence to Cuba, and
it had come into the hands of Cuban sympathizers,
presumably, through theft in the Havana post
office. It was an astounding indiscretion on the
part of a man regarded as an accomplished and ex-
perienced diplomatist. It condemned Sagasta's
policy of attempted conciliation as "a loss of time
and a step in the wrong direction," and went on to
record the writer's private opinion of President
McKinley and his statesmanship:

The message has undeceived the insurgents, who ex-
pected something different, and has paralyzed the action
of Congress, but I consider it bad. Besides the natural
and inevitable coarseness with which it repeats what the
press and public opinion in Spain has said of Weyler, it
shows once more what McKinley is—weak and catering
to the mob, and moreover a small politician [politicastro]
who wishes to leave a door open and to stand well with
the jingoes of his party.

Self-respect compelled the Administration to
take action, but the Spanish Government, instead of
recalling the offending minister, allowed him to re­
sign, appointing Señor Luis Polo y Bernabe to
take his place at Washington. The incident had a
very unfortunate effect upon public feeling in the
United States. If the suave and courtly Dupuy de
Lome in private held this cynical estimate of the
men with whom he had been
deal~,
what Spanish
professions could be trusted? No wonder that
there was an instant cry of treachery a few days
later, when news came of the fearful tragedy of
February 15th.

The Maine had been at Havana for three weeks,
lying at the buoy assigned her by the authorities of
the port. The usual formal courtesies
were exchanged between her com­
mander, Captain Charles D. Sigsbee,
and the local officials. Her errand was
announced as a friendly visit, and her presence
evoked practically no demonstration of hostility—
the only exceptions being a few derisive calls from a
passing ferryboat crowded with people returning
from the bullfight at Regla, and a circular, copies of
which were sent to Sigsbee, denouncing the cochinos
yankees (Yankee pigs) and their podrida escuadra
(rotten squadron). As was natural and proper, the
captain had enjoined an extra degree of watchful­
ness upon all those responsible for the care of the
ship, but there was no alarm of any sort until
twenty minutes to ten o'clock on the night of Tues­
day, February 15th. Then, without a moment's
warning, from deep down in the bowels of the ves­
sel there came the shock and roar of a tremendous
explosion—or rather of two explosions with a brief
but distinct interval—instantly transforming the en­
tire forward part of the Maine into a shattered
wreck, scattering débris over other vessels anchored in the harbour, and breaking windows and extinguishing lights along the water front of the city.

Captain Sigsbee was sitting in his cabin writing a letter when the upheaval came. As he reached the door an orderly, from whom no explosion could shock the habit of discipline, stumbled against him in the darkness—the ship's lights had gone out—and reported that the Maine had been blown up. The captain ran on deck and ordered that the magazines should be flooded; but the magazines, partly exploded, were already filled by the water that rushed through the rent frame of the vessel.

The Maine was blazing fiercely and sinking fast. In a few minutes she had settled down in about thirty feet of water, her upper works, a mass of wreckage, remaining above the surface, and continuing to burn, with occasional explosions of ammunition, for four hours more. Three of her boats, which hung aft, were intact, and were launched before she sank; and in these, and in boats from two neighbouring vessels—the Spanish cruiser Alfonso XII and the American steamer City of Washington, of the Ward line—the survivors were carried ashore. Most of the crew, whose quarters were directly above the seat of the explosion, were instantly killed, or were drowned with the sinking ship, the total loss being two hundred and sixty men, including two officers, Lieutenant Jenkins and Engineer Merritt. A third officer, Lieutenant Blandin, died some months later from causes attributed to the shock of the disaster.

To his brief announcement of the loss of his ship, cabled as soon as he went ashore, Captain Sigsbee added the sentence:

Public opinion should be suspended until further proof.
The circumstances were such that a suspension of the popular judgment was impossible. The case was one that decided itself. The simple fact that an American man-of-war had gone to a Spanish port, and there, moored in the spot assigned by Spanish officials, had been destroyed by a nocturnal explosion, led inevitably to one conclusion.

At another time it might have been possible to consider, as was urged by a technical journal,* that "the combination of steam, electricity, high explosives, and coal that may become self-igniting, is not a happy one, and the most exact precautions against accidents may fail at times, as they have in the case of other vessels." There had been narrow escapes from disastrous explosions on at least three others of the new American steel war ships, due to the escape, in the coal bunkers, of the gas that causes "fire-damp" explosions in mines—a gas which, innocuous in the open air, is a very dangerous explosive when it accumulates in a confined space. About two years before, while she was stationed at Key West, some of the Cincinnati's coal was fired by spontaneous combustion, and the steel bulkhead which—just as in the Maine—separated the bunker from a magazine full of projectiles and ammunition became red hot. The imminent peril was revealed only by a tiny curl of smoke, and the magazine was flooded in time to prevent disaster, although some of the shells it contained had actually been charred by the heat. Among other cases cited was that of the British man-of-war Dotterel, destroyed in the Straits of Magellan, in 1873, by an explosion which remained a mystery until it was traced to the paint room, where a dangerous inflammable gas had generated.

But no technical plea of the possibility of acci-

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* The Army and Navy Journal, February 19, 1898.
dent to the Maine could avail against the over­
whelming suspicion—nay, the practical certainty—
engendered by the broad facts of the case. She had
been destroyed, by deliberate and fiendish treach­
ery, and her destroyers must be brought to account.
That was the verdict rendered by a public opinion
so strong, so unanimous, so earnest, that no official
authority, however anxious to avoid a conflict so
long as an honourable way of escaping it was to be
found, could restrain the voice of national indigna­
tion.

The sinking of the Maine meant war between
the United States and Spain. That soon became
evident even to those who least desired hostilities.
But war was not to be proclaimed without proper
formalities, and these could not proceed with undig­
nified haste. They might have moved faster had
the great republic’s armed forces been better pre­
pared. The game was in its hands, but it was not
ready to play the trump card that its vast and un­
doubted superiority of strength gave it. Every
day’s delay enabled it to organize that strength
for action, and much effective work was accom­
plished during those eight weeks of suspense, when
impatient critics were denouncing the Administra­
tion for its supposedly timid and half-hearted policy.

The President’s first step was the natural and
regular one of appointing a commission of inquiry
to make a formal report on the disaster. Four
naval officers of ability and experience were se­
lected—Captain Sampson, Captain Chadwick,
Lieutenant-Commander Marix, and Lieutenant-
Commander Potter. Their sessions began in Ha­
vana harbour, on board the lighthouse tender Mangrove, which brought them from Key West, on the 21st of February. Divers and wrecking
apparatus had already been sent from the United
States, but it was soon determined that the Maine
could not be raised. About a hundred of her dead
were never recovered from the wreck; the rest were buried in the Cristobal Colon cemetery, the funeral (February 17th) of those first found being attended by a great demonstration of public sympathy.

The commission of inquiry sat for twenty-three days in Havana harbour and at Key West, closely following the work of the divers, and examining officers and men of the Maine and a few others who had been near the scene of the disaster. No Spanish witnesses were summoned, and suggestions for a joint inquiry were declined; but no objection was made to the inspection of the wreck by Havana divers, whose evidence was taken by a Spanish board appointed on the night of the explosion. During the inquiry the Montgomery, which had been ordered to Cuban waters with the Maine, arrived at Havana from Matanzas (March 9th). The Spanish cruiser Vizcaya entered the harbour a few days earlier. To keep up the polite fiction of the Maine's "friendly visit" to Havana, the Vizcaya had been despatched to New York, to return the courtesy. She had arrived there in time to hear of the destruction of the American vessel (February 18th), and had spent a week in the port, watchfully guarded by the metropolitan police, before sailing for Havana, where she was joined on March 5th by her sister ship, the Almirante Oquendo—doomed to share her fate in Sampson's marine graveyard off Santiago.

 Awaited with intense eagerness by Congress and the country at large, the commission's report—signed by Captain Sampson as president and Lieutenant-Commander Marix as judge advocate—was delivered to the President on the 21st of March, but was not transmitted to Congress until the 28th. The message that accompanied it was brief, formal, and non-committal, reciting the facts ascertained by the court, and concluding:
I have directed that the finding of the court of inquiry and the views of this Government thereon be communicated to the Government of her Majesty the Queen Regent, and I do not permit myself to doubt that the sense of justice of the Spanish nation will dictate a course of action suggested by honour and the friendly relations of the two Governments.

It will be the duty of the Executive to advise Congress of the result, and in the meantime deliberate consideration is invoked.

This was highly unsatisfactory to that portion of the American public which retains its old-time appetite for flamboyant oratory. The country's lack of preparation for hostilities was not generally appreciated, even by those who should have understood it; and fiery spirits in Congress and in journalism continued to talk war with the "light heart" with which Émile Ollivier, in 1870, sent the unready legions of France against the perfectly organized armies of Germany. "I do not think," declared a senator, on the 28th of March—and his easy confidence was by no means exceptional—"that any war measure will be necessary, except to blockade two or three Cuban ports and compel their capitulation." The President's utterances and actions were in a different spirit. As be-fitted his vastly greater responsibilities as the official head of the nation, he moved with a dignified deliberation; as commander-in-chief of the armed forces of the United States he was preparing for the decisive moment with the whole energies and resources of the Government.

It is a familiar fact that the United States was not ready for war. It was afterward stated by the American minister to Spain* that on February 18th, three days after the destruction of the Maine, he was warned, by departments other than the State

* General Woodford's speech at the Army and Navy Club in New York, January 28, 1899.
Department, to defer decisive action as long as possible, because "there were not on American ships or in the ordnance depots of the United States two rounds of powder per gun." He also spoke of the hasty despatch of a sealed express train across the continent, loaded with ammunition which the Baltimore carried to Dewey, at Hong-Kong, in the nick of time. As a matter of fact, if such information was sent to General Woodford, it was incorrect. Such a shortage could exist only by a flagrant and inexcusable neglect of the standing regulations of the Navy Department, which prescribe forty rounds per gun as the minimum supply that every war ship must maintain while at sea; and the Bureau of Ordnance emphatically denied* that any American vessel carried less than that allowance. Ammunition had been shipped to the Asiatic station on the Concord, which left San Francisco on January 8th, and on the Mohican, which left on March 11th and met the Baltimore at Honolulu. The only trainload sent West was one made up at Harrisburg on June 30th, to replenish the supply at the Mare Island navy yard.

But though it was by no means entirely unready for service, the American navy was an untried weapon. Some of its ships had never been under forced draft since their first trial.t Owing to the refusal of Congress to vote the necessary money in time, it had no guns ready to arm the merchant vessels purchased as auxiliaries.

With a mere handful of standing army, and with very inadequate coast defences, there was much to do at the eleventh hour, and both War and Navy Departments—the latter, as appeared in the light of later revelations, working with the greater foresight and efficiency—were busily making ready for

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* Statement of Captain O'Neill, Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, January 30, 1899.
† Chief Engineer Melville's report for 1898.
hostilities. Enlistments were hastened, the navy yards and arsenals toiled day and night, guns and ammunition were hurried to strategic points, orders were placed for all kinds of military material. Had all this, which of course was done as quietly as possible, been more widely known at the time, it might have silenced the popular impatience.

On the 7th of March, as the result of a conference at the White House—the most important participants being Secretaries Day and Long, Senator Hale, chairman of the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs, and Representative Dingley, chairman of the House Committee on Ways and Means—Representative Cannon introduced a briefly worded bill appropriating fifty million dollars "for the national defence, and for each and every purpose connected therewith, to be expended at the discretion of the President." More might have been voted, for the Treasury had an available cash balance of more than two hundred million dollars. The appropriation was passed by the House, on the 8th, by a vote of three hundred and eleven to none—a signal demonstration of the fact that all political parties were united in support of a firm policy—and by the Senate, on the 9th, without change or debate. This placed ample funds at the disposal of the War and Navy Departments, and, besides employing almost all the available industrial forces at home, a trusted agent, Commander Brownson, was immediately sent to Europe to purchase anything that might be in the market.

Another valuable preparatory measure was the Hawley bill, passed by the Senate on the 22d of February, and approved by the House on the 7th of March, adding to the army two regiments of artillery, urgently needed to man the coast defences.

A bill providing for a much larger increase, reorganizing the regular forces and augmenting them
to one hundred and four thousand six hundred men—four times their existing number—failed of passage, meeting with an opposition that might seem unaccountable were it not of a piece with the historical policy of Congress. Ever since the ending of the Revolutionary War, when it reduced the Continental Army to eighty men, and refused to send garrisons to the frontier posts surrendered by the British,* the national legislature has shown an extraordinary jealousy of a standing force. The statesmen of 1784 may be excused for fearing that such a body might one day subvert their hardly won popular liberties, as it had done in ancient Rome; but in 1898 prudence seems to have degenerated into prejudice. In the debate upon the Hull bill—so named after the chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs, who fathered it in the House—Representative Lewis, of Washington, is reported as describing the regular army as consisting of "gilded military satraps on the one hand and tasselled society sapheads on the other." Mr. Hepburn, of Iowa, voiced the traditional sentiment of Congress when he said, in the same debate (April 6th):

If the country enters upon war, we want that war to be a popular one. To make it so, the patriots of the land must be invited to take part in it, as they have done in all previous wars.

"Ignorance and prejudice held high carnival," Mr. Hull afterward said, and his description of the debate is not an unjust one, "and the bill was defeated by sheer force of the lung power of members who have since confessed that they knew nothing of the subject." †

* McMaster's History of the People of the United States, vol. i, p. 186.
† North American Review, April, 1899. "An army can be raised in a day, and be drilled and disciplined in a month," Senator Foraker
Had the Hull bill been passed, the United States would have had, even at the eleventh hour, a regular army large enough to conquer the Spanish colonies, while the militia could have been relied on for service as a home guard. The sufferings of the volunteers in the field and in camp would have been minimized or avoided, and the nation would have escaped most of the unpleasant developments that tarnished the glory of its victory. If the lessons of the war with Spain are heeded, as those of previous wars have not been, it will have an adequate force of trained regulars for the next emergency, instead of depending upon a hasty "invitation" to the "patriots of the land."

The proceedings of the Maine commission had been carefully kept from the public until the report was published on the 28th of March. It was another comparatively brief and formal document, giving a general description of the condition and discipline of the ship and crew previous to the explosion, a technical summary of the injuries she had received, and the following momentous verdict:

The court finds that the loss of the Maine was not in any respect due to fault or negligence on the part of any of the officers or members of the crew of said vessel.

In the opinion of the court the Maine was destroyed by the explosion of a submarine mine, which caused the partial explosion of two or more of her forward magazines.

The court has been unable to obtain evidence fixing the responsibility for the destruction of the Maine upon any person or persons.

The commission had been able to gather comparatively little definite and positive evidence; and no ray of light has since been thrown upon the subject. Only one of the Maine survivors was actually

said in an article published in Munsey's Magazine, December, 1897, and that extraordinary statement may be taken as the keynote of the military policy of Congress.
an eye-witness of the explosion—Marine William Anthony, the orderly who reported it to Captain Sigsbee. He testified that he saw “an immense shoot of flame” and “débris going up with it,” but did not notice any column of water, such as might have been expected to be thrown into the air by a submarine mine. Captain Teasdale, of the British bark Deva, anchored near the destroyed battleship, “saw no wave after the explosion”—another negative piece of testimony. On the other hand, the divers—whose work was accomplished under great difficulties, owing to the shattered condition of the wreck and its rapid settling in the soft bottom of the harbour—testified positively to finding a hole in the mud under the Maine’s bow, and some of her bottom plates bent inward and thrust upward; and this testimony, no doubt, was conclusive with the board of inquiry. One diver spoke of wires and pieces of plate, not belonging to the ship, lying near her in the mud—not a very suspicious circumstance in so frequented a harbour. A large piece of cement found on the deck of the City of Washington after the explosion, and at first supposed to have come from the Maine’s bottom—which would have been striking evidence—was afterward identified as part of the floor of a wash room on the berth deck.

The proceedings of the Spanish board of inquiry were belittled by the American correspondents in Havana, but they resulted in a voluminous report—it fills more than seventy pages as a Congressional document—which at least made a display of careful examination of such slight evidence as was procurable. The Spanish divers flatly contradicted the American divers. Witnesses from the Alfonso XII, moored only about a hundred and fifty yards from the Maine, and from the Legazpi, which lay at twice that distance, testified that there was no disturbance of the water, as from the
explosion of a mine. One of these witnesses was Ensign Guillermo Farragut, said to be nearly connected by blood with the famous American admiral, whose father was a Spaniard, a native of the island of Minorca. There had been an official search of the harbour early in the morning after the disaster, and no dead fish had been found—a point on which the Spaniards laid much stress, but which was, at best, negative and inconclusive. Their conclusion, of course, was that the catastrophe was due to internal causes; and this was confirmed by the statement, officially made through the Spanish legation at Washington, that no mines had ever been placed in the harbour of Havana. It is pointed out by Captain Sigsbee* that no demonstration of the truth of this statement was made or suggested. On the other hand, in an interview published in the Madrid Heraldo (April 6, 1898), Admiral Beranger, Secretary of the Navy under Canovas, declared that he had shipped one hundred and ninety electrical and contact torpedoes to Cuba, and arranged for their installation at Havana, Cienfuegos, Santiago, and Nuevitas.

There is much about the destruction of the Maine that still remains unexplained. The Spaniards have only themselves to blame if their official reports are disbelieved and disregarded. The investigation by the American naval officers was to a certain extent an ex parte inquiry. Those who virtually stood before it as men accused of a frightful crime—the official authorities of Havana—were not and could not be represented by counsel. Had they been so represented, it is at least conceivable that the evidence on which the court based its findings might have been modified at material points. Those findings suggest interesting and important questions. A submarine mine powerful enough to

* The Maine, p. 188.
THE COMING OF WAR

destroy a war ship is no ordinary article of commerce. It costs hundreds, or even thousands, of dollars; it weighs several hundred pounds; it is not likely to be possessed or operated except with official authority and by expert hands. Who set so mighty an engine of destruction under the keel of the Maine? Was it exploded there—exploded with such fatal precision, such a maximum of destructiveness—by some accident of criminal carelessness, or by the foulest act of deliberate treachery that ever blotted the name of Spain? How was it all accomplished without leaving behind any apparent trace of telltale evidence? If no later revelations answer these questions, the loss of the Maine will go down in history as one of the most extraordinary and mysterious events ever recorded.

Although the Government at Washington was actively making ready for the foreseen event of war, diplomatic dealings with Madrid were not abandoned. On the 27th of March General Woodford, the United States minister to Spain, was instructed to submit a proposition for a six months' armistice in Cuba, to give time "for the negotiation of peace with the good offices of the President"; and to ask for the immediate and final revocation of the order of reconcentration. In reply, on the 31st, Sagasta's cabinet offered to intrust the preparation of peace to the island's newly constituted parliament, which was to convene on the 4th of May; meanwhile, the insurgents might ask the captain-general for an armistice, to which the home Government would raise no objection. As for the reconcentration system—which, nominally ended by the decree of November 10, 1897, had practically continued, chiefly owing to the absolute helplessness both of the refugees and of the local authorities—Blanco at once (March 30) issued a proclamation declaring it abolished throughout the island, without any limita-
tion or condition, and ordering all civil and military officials to assist the destitute in finding means of livelihood.

Sagasta's counter proposal, it will be seen, was carefully framed so as to avoid the humiliating appearance of accepting American intervention. It was—largely, perhaps, in consequence of this exigency—somewhat indefinite and dilatory; yet in conjunction with the grant of three million pesetas for the relief of Cuban distress, voted a few days before, and with the free field allowed to American charitable effort, it certainly showed a conciliatory disposition. It might have led to further negotiation but for the prevalent fatal distrust of Spanish official sincerity. President McKinley, however, regarded it as so disappointing that he let the matter drop, and made no further pretence of amicable dealing with Madrid.

The last interlude in the drama, before the Government at Washington took the decisive and irrevocable step for which it was preparing, came on the 7th of April, when the representatives of the six great powers of Europe, headed by the senior ambassador, Sir Julian Pauncefote, called at the White House to present a joint note urging further negotiations for the maintenance of peace. Whether undertaken at the request of Spain, or at the suggestion of one of the powers, the proceeding—which might have carried an unpleasant meaning as a hint of possible intervention in the coming struggle—was treated as simply a humane formality. The President's reply was perfectly courteous, but showed no sign of stirring from the policy upon which he had now fully determined, and which he was to announce to the country and to the world four days later:

The Government of the United States recognises the good will which has prompted the friendly communication of the representatives of Germany, Austria-Hungary,
France, Great Britain, Italy, and Russia, as set forth in the address of your excellencies, and shares the hope therein expressed that the outcome of the situation in Cuba may be the maintenance of peace between the United States and Spain by affording the necessary guarantees for the re-establishment of order in the island, so terminating the chronic condition of disturbance there which so deeply injures the interests and menaces the tranquility of the American nation by the character and consequences of the struggle thus kept up at our doors, besides shocking its sentiment of humanity.

The Government of the United States appreciates the humanitarian and disinterested character of the communication now made on behalf of the powers named, and for its part is confident that equal appreciation will be shown for its own earnest and unselfish endeavours to fulfil a duty to humanity by ending a situation the indefinite prolongation of which has become insufferable.

The Spanish answer to the communication of the verdict of the Maine board was a proposal "that the facts be ascertained by an impartial investigation by experts, whose decision Spain accepts in advance."

To this no reply was made. On the 11th of April the President sent to Congress his message reviewing the whole situation, recapitulating the position of the Government during Cuba's years of agony, and declaring that at last the hour for intervention had struck. It was an able and dignified state paper, and of such importance as defining the issues upon which America stood ready to draw the sword, that it deserves extended quotation. The opening paragraphs describe the intolerable conditions existing so close to the southern shores of the United States:

The present revolution is but the successor of other similar insurrections which have occurred in Cuba against the dominion of Spain, extending over a period of nearly half a century, each of which, during its progress, has subjected the United States to great effort and expense in enforcing its neutrality laws, caused enormous losses to American trade and commerce, caused irritation, annoyance, and disturbance among our citizens, and, by the ex-
exercise of cruel, barbarous, and uncivilized practices of warfare, shocked the sensibilities and offended the humane sympathies of our people.

Since the present revolution began, in February, 1895, this country has seen the fertile domain at our threshold ravaged by fire and sword in the course of a struggle unequalled in the history of the island and rarely paralleled as to the numbers of the combatants and the bitterness of the contest by any revolution of modern times where a dependent people struggling to be free have been opposed by the power of the sovereign state.

Our people have beheld a once prosperous community reduced to comparative want, its lucrative commerce virtually paralyzed, its exceptional productiveness diminished, its fields laid waste, its mills in ruins, and its people perishing by tens of thousands from hunger and destitution. We have found ourselves constrained, in the observance of that strict neutrality which our laws enjoin, and which the law of nations commands, to police our own waters and watch our own seaports in prevention of any unlawful act in aid of the Cubans. Our trade has suffered; the capital invested by our citizens in Cuba has been largely lost, and the temper and forbearance of our people have been so sorely tried as to beget a perilous unrest among our own citizens which has inevitably found its expression from time to time in the national legislature.

The war in Cuba is of such a nature that short of subjugation or extermination a final military victory for either side seems impracticable. The alternative lies in the physical exhaustion of the one or the other party, or perhaps of both—a condition which in effect ended the Ten Years' War by the truce of Zanjón. The prospect of such a protraction and conclusion of the present strife is a contingency hardly to be contemplated with equanimity by the civilized world, and least of all by the United States, affected and injured as we are, deeply and intimately, by its very existence.

The President then recounted his offers of friendly mediation, which Spain had uniformly declined, and discussed an alternative course which had been so frequently urged in Congress—the recognition of the insurgents either as belligerents or as an independent power. He pointed out that in avoiding this step he had followed the precedents clearly established by Jackson and other chief
magistrates, and had continued the policy consist­ently maintained by his more recent predecessors before whom the same question had come—Presi­dents Grant and Cleveland; and he added, in a pas­sage whose foresight will now be admitted:

Such recognition is not necessary in order to enable the United States to intervene and pacify the island. To commit this country now to the recognition of any par­ticular government in Cuba might subject us to embar­rassing conditions of international obligation toward the organization so recognised. In case of intervention our conduct would be subject to the approval or disapproval of such government. We would be required to submit to its direction and to assume to it the mere relation of a friendly ally.

When it shall appear hereafter that there is within the island a government capable of performing the duties and discharging the functions of a separate nation, and having, as a matter of fact, the proper forms and attributes of na­tionality, such government can be promptly and readily recognised.

Recognition of the insurgents being inadmis­sible and inexpedient, and mediation being de­clined, nothing but intervention remained. That the time would come for the United States to take action, Spain had long ago been warned. President Grant had declared that “the agency of others, either by mediation or by intervention, seems to be the only alternative which must sooner or later be invoked.” President Cleveland had repeated the warning, in a passage already quoted, and Mr. McKinley’s earlier messages had reiterated it. And as to the moral right to intervene:

The forcible intervention of the United States as a neutral to stop the war, according to the large dictates of humanity, and following many historical precedents where neighbouring states have interfered to check the hopeless sacrifices of life by internecine conflicts beyond their borders, is justifiable on rational grounds. It involves hostile constraint upon both the parties to the contest, as well to enforce a truce as to guide the eventual settle­ment.
The grounds for such intervention may be briefly summarized as follows:

First. In the cause of humanity and to put an end to the barbarities, bloodshed, starvation, and horrible miseries now existing there, and which the parties to the conflict are either unable or unwilling to stop or mitigate. It is no answer to say this is all in another country, belonging to another nation, and is therefore none of our business. It is specially our duty, for it is right at our door.

Second. We owe it to our citizens in Cuba to afford them that protection and indemnity for life and property which no government there can or will afford, and to that end to terminate the conditions that deprive them of legal protection.

Third. The right to intervene may be justified by the very serious injury to the commerce, trade, and business of our people, and by the wanton destruction of property and devastation of the island.

Fourth, and which is of the utmost importance. The present condition of affairs in Cuba is a constant menace to our peace, and entails upon this Government an enormous expense. With such a conflict waged for years in an island so near us, and with which our people have such trade and business relations; where the lives and liberty of our citizens are in constant danger and their property destroyed and themselves ruined; where our trading vessels are liable to seizure and are seized at our very door by war ships of a foreign nation; the expeditions of filibustering that we are powerless to prevent altogether, and the irritating questions and entanglements thus arising—all these and others that I need not mention, with the resulting strained relations, are a constant menace to our peace, and compel us to keep on a semi war-footing with a nation with which we are at peace.

All these sinister conditions had been patiently endured until there came the crowning and intolerable outrage of the destruction of an American battle ship, while "reposing in the fancied security of a friendly harbour."

The naval court of inquiry, which, it is needless to say, commands the unqualified confidence of the Government, was unanimous in its conclusion that the destruction of the Maine was caused by an exterior explosion, that of a submarine mine. It did not assume to place the responsibility. That remains to be fixed.
THE COMING OF WAR

In any event, the destruction of the Maine, by whatever exterior cause, is a patent and impressive proof of a state of things in Cuba that is intolerable. That condition is thus shown to be such that the Spanish Government can not assure safety and security to a vessel of the American navy in the harbour of Havana on a mission of peace, and rightfully there.

On all these convincing and carefully stated premises the President based his concluding call for immediate and decisive action.

The only hope of relief and repose from a condition which can no longer be endured is the enforced pacification of Cuba. In the name of humanity, in the name of civilization, in behalf of endangered American interests which give us the right and the duty to speak and to act, the war in Cuba must stop.

... I ask the Congress to authorize and empower the President to take measures to secure a full and final termination of hostilities between the Government of Spain and the people of Cuba, and to secure in the island the establishment of a stable government, capable of maintaining order and observing its international obligations, insuring peace and tranquility and the security of its citizens as well as our own, and to use the military and naval forces of the United States as may be necessary for these purposes.

The issue is now with the Congress... Prepared to execute every obligation imposed upon me by the Constitution and the law, I await your action.

The message was received with a marked and rather curious absence of enthusiasm. The impression it made in Congress was one of disappointment. In the House, where it was read to crowded galleries, it was greeted with only two faint outbursts of applause. It was not regarded as a call to arms, though it certainly seems such as we read it in the light of its consequences. Many in Washington had expected a direct and unqualified declaration of war with Spain; they were dissatisfied with a policy of intervention, seeing a possible loophole in the fact that no date for action was fixed. It is difficult to see how they expected Spain to re-
garded the announcement of forcible interposition—
"hostile constraint upon both the parties to the
contest," the message said—as anything else but a
virtual declaration of hostilities.

Two days later (April 13th) the Senate Com-
mittee on Foreign Affairs, to which the President's
two messages had been referred, with
several resolutions, most of them in
favour of recognising the Cuban in-
surgents, presented its report. This,
written by the chairman of the committee, Senator
Davis, was another document of such historical im-
portance that its salient points must be cited here.
It first dealt with the situation created by the
destruction of the Maine, a catastrophe which
excited to an unprecedented degree the compassion and
resentment of the American people.

The event itself, though in a certain sense a distinct
occurrence, was linked with a series of precedent tran-
sactions which can not in reason be disconnected from
it. It was the catastrophe of a unity of events extend-
ing over more than three years of momentous his-
tory. Standing by itself it would be, perhaps, merely
an ominous calamity; considered, as it must be, with
the events with which reason and common sense must
connect it, and with animus by Spain so plainly appar-
ent that no one can even plausibly deny its existence,
it is merely one reason for the conclusion to which the in-
vestigating mind must come in considering the entire sub-
ject of the relations of the United States—with that Gov-
ernment.

Coming, then, to the policy proper in these un-
toward circumstances, the report took issue with
the President's opposition to any recognition of the
insurgents, and defended the constant moves—all
of them fruitless—that Congress had made in this
direction:

The United States ought at once to recognise the in-
dependence of the people of Cuba.

It is believed that recognition of the belligerency of
the insurgents in Cuba, if it had been given seasonably,
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when it was suggested by concurrent resolutions to that effect passed by Congress, would have insured the speedy termination of the war without involving the United States in the contest.

The recognition of the independence of the people of Cuba is justified and demanded by the highest considerations of duty, right, and policy.

This very positive assertion was supported by a description of the “Cuban Republic” and its supposed established control of the eastern half of the island.

The insurgents hold the eastern portion of the island, to the practical exclusion of Spain. This possession extends over one body of territory comprising fully one half of the area of Cuba.

. . . . The insurgents comprise in the eastern half nearly one third of the population of the island. That third of the population pays taxes to them, serves in their armies, and in every way supports and is loyal to them.

The cause of Spain has continually grown weaker, and that of the insurgents has grown stronger. The former is making no substantial effort for the recovery of these lost provinces. Their people are secure from invasion and cruel administration. Spain has never been able to subject them to her unprecedented and murderous policy of concentration and extermination.

Her control over the western portion of the island is dominance over a desolation which she herself has created. Even there she controls only the territory occupied by her cantonments and camps.

This description accorded with the prevalent impression of the existing state of affairs in Cuba, but it was quite at variance with the facts given in the reports quoted on an earlier page,* and with the conditions which our forces found confronting them when the war began. The President’s view was, as has been said before, the better informed one. It was strange that the Senate committee should speak of the eastern provinces as having escaped the horrors of the war when the American consular agents were

* Page 54.
giving such frightful pictures of their sufferings—sufferings far more severe than the distress of the western provinces, serious as that was. "I do not believe," Consul Hyatt wrote from Santiago, February 1, 1898, "that the western continent has ever witnessed death by starvation equal to that which now exists in eastern Cuba."

The plea for recognition of the insurgents was little more than a thrashing of old straw. The report touched a more vital point in its justification of intervention by sufficient precedents, and by the opinions of authorities on international law. It pointed out that the great political principles which guide national policies in the old world and in the new—the "balance of power" in Europe and the Monroe Doctrine in America—are distinct assertions of the right of intervention in certain contingencies. Under those principles, in 1878, united Europe intervened between Turkey and Russia—which latter power had itself forcibly intervened in Turkey to put a stop to flagrant misgovernment—and in 1867 the United States, "by threat and show of force" compelled France to evacuate Mexico. Egypt, Crete, and Greece have furnished further instances in point.

After a final summary of the injuries suffered by American interests, already stated in the President's message, Senator Davis's report concluded by submitting the following resolution:

Whereas, The abhorrent conditions which have existed for more than three years in the island of Cuba, so near our own borders, have shocked the moral sense of the people of the United States, have been a disgrace to Christian civilization, culminating, as they have, in the destruction of a United States battle ship, with two hundred and sixty-six of its officers and crew,* while on a friendly visit in the harbour of Havana, and can not longer be endured, as has been set forth by the President of the

* This seems to have been a slight inaccuracy. The figures given by the Navy Department are 260.
United States in his message to Congress of April 11, 1898, upon which the action of Congress was invited; Therefore, Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled:

First. That the people of the island of Cuba are, and of right ought to be, free and independent.

Second. That it is the duty of the United States to demand, and the Government of the United States does hereby demand, that the Government of Spain at once relinquish its authority and government in the island of Cuba, and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters.

Third. That the President of the United States be, and hereby is, directed and empowered to use the entire land and naval forces of the United States and to call into the actual service of the United States the militia of the several States to such an extent as may be necessary to carry these resolutions into effect.

A week of vehement debate followed in both branches of Congress. The House was the quicker to act, passing a resolution, framed by its Foreign Affairs Committee, on the 13th of April, after a discussion in which the strained feelings of the hour found expression in passages of violent disorder. The lie was passed between the two sides of the House; there was much shouting and shaking of fists; one Southern member hurled a heavy book at an opponent, and another ran along the top of a line of desks to plunge into the fray, which was finally quieted by the sergeant-at-arms.

The resolution adopted amid such scenes of excitement was couched in terms that were certainly sweeping and vigorous. It declared that for three years Spain had waged war upon the inhabitants of Cuba without making any substantial progress toward suppressing the revolution; that she had conducted her warfare in a manner contrary to the laws of nations, had caused the death by starvation of more than two hundred thousand non-combatants, and had destroyed the lives and property of many...
American citizens; that the long series of losses, injuries, and murders for which Spain was responsible had culminated in the destruction of the Maine.

With all this as a preamble, it authorized the President to intervene at once to stop the war in Cuba, "with the purpose of establishing, by the free action of the people thereof, a stable and independent government of their own." It passed the House by 322 votes to 19, Representative Boutelle, of Maine, being the most prominent member of the minority.

The debate in the Senate was also marked by an excitement rare in that dignified body, and the lie was passed when one speaker alluded to another Senator's visit to Cuba as the "commissioner" of a sensational New York newspaper. It ended in the adoption of the resolution submitted by the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, and already quoted at the conclusion of Senator Davis's report, with two notable amendments. One was the addition—suggested by a minority of the committee, including Senators Foraker and Turpie—of the following words to the first paragraph:

And that the Government of the United States hereby recognises the Republic of Cuba as the true and lawful government of that island.

This was in direct opposition to the President's message and reaffirmed the Congressional antagonism to his policy of non-recognition. As Mr. McKinley had very justly pointed out, it would have ended his freedom of action in Cuba. Having once acknowledged the authority of the insurgents, the United States could not have appeared in the island without their permission, nor have acted except at their direction.

The other amendment, moved by Senator Davis, was the addition of a fourth paragraph to the resolution:
Fourth. That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island, except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination when that is accomplished to leave the government and control of the island to its people.

With these amendments the Senate passed the resolution by a vote of sixty-seven to twenty-one, on the night of April 16th, after a continuous session of eleven hours.

The difference between the House and Senate resolutions necessitating a conference, the representatives of the former branch agreed to the fourth paragraph, but refused to accept the recognition of the insurgents. The refusal, in spite of the strong feeling in favour of recognition that had always existed in the House, was a fortunate and patriotic concession to the judgment of the President, as well as a remarkable tribute to the influence of Speaker Reed. It is to be regretted that the other Senate amendment could not also have been left off the record. Well intentioned as was the disclaimer of desire for aggrandizement, and correctly as it expressed the feeling in which the United States entered upon the war, it is easy to see now that its wisdom was doubtful. History moves rapidly in war time, and it is difficult to predict, before drawing the sword, what policy will best meet the problems that may have arisen when it is sheathed again. It would have been better to follow more strictly the lines laid down in the President’s message, and avoid all the “embarrassing conditions” of which he spoke in warning.

The final debate took place on the 18th, lasting beyond midnight and ending at half past one in the morning of the 19th, when the conference report was adopted by the House. The President held the resolution for a day, adding his signature on the 20th, at 11:24 A.M., in the presence of most
of his cabinet. In accordance with its terms, instructions were immediately sent to General Woodford, United States minister at Madrid, to present to the Spanish Government a formal demand that it should "at once relinquish its authority and government in the island of Cuba, and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters." For a "full and satisfactory response," the American ultimatum continued, the President would wait till noon on April 23d; in default of such reply, he would use the power of the nation to carry it into effect.

That Spain would comply with the demand was not to be expected. Although diplomatically she had admitted that the conduct of the United States during the Cuban civil war had been correct, she bitterly resented the fact that the insurrection had been to a great extent organized and directed from that country, and assisted by illegal expeditions recruited there. She had been the subject of constant abuse, both just and unjust, in its newspapers and in Congress. Her proud and sensitive people, ignorant of the real character and resources of the American republic, would not have suffered her statesmen to accept the proffered terms even had they themselves desired to do so. Such a concession would have unseated Sagasta's ministry and might have upset little Alfonso's throne.

Señor Polo, the Spanish minister at Washington, was notified by a messenger from the State Department, on the morning of the 20th, of the signing of the joint resolution, and of the instructions that had gone to General Woodford. He at once replied with a request for his passports. "The resolution," he wrote, "is of such a character that my permanence in Washington becomes impossible." At seven o'clock—after an interview with the ubiquitous newspaper correspondents, to

Diplomatic relations broken off, April 20, 1898.
whom he foretold victory for Spain in the coming struggle—he took a train for the north. Police guarded the station to prevent any hostile demonstration, but none was attempted. His destination was Niagara Falls, just over the Canadian frontier, whither Señor du Bosc, first secretary of the legation, followed him a day later, leaving the affairs of the Spanish Government in the hands of the French ambassador, M. Cambon, and the Austrian minister, Baron Hengelmüller.

Meanwhile, there was great excitement in Madrid. On the 19th Señor Sagasta addressed a meeting of his supporters in the Cortes—which had been summoned in special session—and called on "all sons of Spain" to "repel with the whole might of the nation a most odious outrage, the like of which has never been seen in history." On the following day the boy king and his mother, the queen regent, went in person to open the legislature, and their appearance was the signal for a great demonstration of enthusiasm. Maria Cristina herself read the opening speech to the Cortes, which body, she declared, would "undoubtedly indorse the invincible resolution which inspires my Government to defend our rights with whatever sacrifices may be required from us." It is impossible not to feel a touch of personal sympathy for this hapless princess, a pathetic figure amid the troubles of her adopted country, and never, perhaps, more pathetic than when, on the eve of a disastrous war that was Spain's just punishment, she told the Cortes that "with the self-devotion which always guided our ancestors in the great emergencies of our history, we will surmount the present crisis without loss of honour."

The American ultimatum was never officially presented, for on the morning of April 21st, before General Woodford had handed it to the Spanish Government, he received a note from Pio Gullon,
the minister for foreign affairs, informing him that diplomatic relations were at an end. Congress, said Señor Gullon, had passed a resolution which "denies the legitimate sovereignty of Spain and threatens immediate armed intervention in Cuba—which is equivalent to a declaration of war." American newspapers saw in this another piece of Spanish treachery, and declared that the President's despatch to General Woodford must have been surreptitiously copied at the telegraph office in Madrid; but the supposition is unnecessary. As already stated, the ultimatum had been communicated to the Spanish legation in Washington twenty-four hours before, and Señor Polo had no doubt promptly informed the home Government of so momentous a piece of news.

General Woodford at once asked for his passports, and on the afternoon of the 21st he started for the French frontier, leaving the affairs of his legation in the hands of the British ambassador, and instructing the American consuls in other Spanish cities to take similar steps. He was escorted to the station by Señor Aguilera, the governor of Madrid, who preserved an attitude of grave Castilian courtesy till the train was moving away, when he led the bystanders in cheering for Spain. There was an unpleasant incident as the departing minister passed through Valladolid, where a mob yelled "Death to the Yankees!" and threw stones at the train, in spite of the efforts of the local police. In Madrid, that same evening, excited crowds thronged the streets, and there was some disorder, a gilded eagle being pulled down from the office of an American life insurance company.

Such were some of the incidents of the day that was to be memorable in history as the first of the war; but its great and decisive event was the flashing of a brief message along the wire from Washington to Key West, where the most powerful fleet
of war ships that ever floated in American waters lay waiting with intense eagerness for the word for action. Before entering upon the battle drama that ensued, it may be well to give a brief review of the forces that the combatants had marshalled for the struggle thus signalled to begin.
CHAPTER V

THE RESOURCES OF THE COMBATANTS

Four hundred years ago Spain rose suddenly to the foremost place among the nations; but she fell almost as speedily, and in the present century she has not been reckoned as one of the great powers of Europe. At the beginning of 1898 her population was estimated at eighteen millions—about a quarter of that of the United States; and in other respects the disproportion of resources was still greater. Her one point of advantage—on paper, at least—lay in the fact that she had the greater number of trained soldiers. The issue of the conflict depended on the command of the sea, and her navy was weaker than her adversary's, though the tremendous inferiority it was to display under the guns of Dewey and Sampson did not appear in the navy lists. Almost overwhelmingly burdened with debt, her Government had neither ready money nor credit—the sinews of modern war. Her financial condition, indeed, was in itself a handicap that predetermined the result of her struggle against her rich and powerful enemy from the day it began.

There is no boastfulness in saying that the American is a better fighter than the Spaniard. Napoleon stigmatized the British as a nation of shopkeepers, and in that historical epigram he unintentionally phrased the strength of the peoples whom we classify by the oft-abused term of Anglo-Saxon. The qualities that win in the arts of peace
The Spanish army.

will also win in the arts of war, and the greater energy, intelligence, and organizing power—in a word, the superior business ability—of the men who speak the English language is setting them further and further ahead of the Latin races in the struggle for worldwide dominion.

Of all the Latin countries, Spain is probably the least advanced, the most mediaeval. Her people live primitively by agriculture; her manufactures are utterly insignificant in comparison to the vast industrial forces of the United States. In 1889 sixty-eight per cent of her inhabitants were returned as illiterate. In such a soil good government does not thrive, and she has suffered sorely from misrule and civil disorder. Her lack of great men is sufficiently shown by the disastrous ineptitude with which her foremost soldiers and statesmen have met the military and political emergencies of the last few years.

The Spaniard can fight bravely, but modern war, especially at sea, is not won by personal bravery. It is a matter of engineering, of the skillful use of ponderous and intricate machinery. In this the Spaniard is specially deficient, and the American conspicuously strong. As has been said by Hiram S. Maxim: “The complication of modern implements of destruction gives to the highly scientific and mechanical races a marked advantage over the untrained and unscientific nations”; * and the war of 1898 was a signal demonstration of this principle.

As in practically all the countries of continental Europe, Spain’s army is raised by conscription, 80,000 recruits being levied annually. Their term of service is twelve years—three in the line, three in the first reserve, six in the second reserve. The full force of the army is nominally 1,083,595 men, but this

* The Engineering Magazine, September, 1898.
is on paper only, as nothing like that number could be equipped for service. The standing army is stated at 128,183 on a peace footing, 183,972 on a war footing. The infantry is equipped with the Mauser, a good modern rifle that is also used by the German and other armies. It is of German make, a magazine rifle of small calibre and great range and power, using smokeless powder, and shooting five bullets without reloading.

Of the \textit{morale} of the Spanish soldiers, their ill success in Cuba had created an unfavourable—a much too unfavourable—opinion in the United States. Americans who saw them there described them as not lacking in courage, but undisciplined, undrilled, and badly officered—criticisms that agree with those made by Wellington during the Peninsular war. They were wretched marksmen, the correspondents said, never doing target practice, and so careless in action that they seldom raised their rifles to the shoulder, finding it easier to fire with the butt held under the arm. They spoiled their weapons by ignorant misuse, knocking off the sight, for instance, because they complained that it tore their clothes.

In the face of the American navy Spain had little prospect of sending any further reinforcement to her army in Cuba. The strength of her garrison there at the outbreak of the war was not known with anything like exactitude. According to Mr. Springer, vice-consul at Havana, official records showed that since February, 1895, she had despatched 237,000 men across the Atlantic; a few of these had been killed in action, many thousands had died of disease, many more thousands had been invalided home. Consul-General Lee testified before the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, on April 12th, that there were probably 97,000 or 98,000 Spanish troops then in the island, of whom only about 55,000 were capable of bearing arms. This
was far too low an estimate; the figures given by General Miles—150,000 men with 183 guns—were much nearer the truth. At the end of the war, after some 23,000 troops had left Santiago, the American commissioners in Cuba—Admiral Sampson and Generals Wade and Butler—reported that there were in the island about 118,000 Spanish regulars, 21,000 volunteers on duty, and 52,000 volunteers armed but not on duty.

It has been repeatedly stated that Spain’s naval power, on paper, was quite equal to that of the United States; but the navy lists do not bear this out. Her total number of vessels in service was given as 137, against 86 in the American navy; but such figures mean nothing. Of armoured men-of-war—the ships that win sea fights—she had in commission six, against seven, and her vessels were individually inferior. In its second line the United States had thirteen good modern steel cruisers—besides the New Orleans, bought just in time for the war; Spain had only five that could be classed as such. The rest of her navy consisted mainly of old iron and wooden vessels and of small gunboats used in patrolling the Cuban coast. Of her six first-rates, only one was a battle ship—the Pelayo, a steel vessel of 9,900 tons, launched at La Seyne (Toulon) in 1887 and since fitted with new boilers. Another battle ship, the Emperador Carlos V, launched at Cadiz in 1895, was at Havre taking her armament aboard when the war began. In June she was hurried off with Camara’s squadron, her equipment still incomplete. Spain had no other ship of this class in service or building.

The fighting strength of the Spanish navy lay in its armoured cruisers. Nine of these were listed, but two of the nine were unfinished, and two—the Numancia and the Vittoria—were iron ships more than thirty years old, very slow, and practically useless for distant work. The other five cruisers were
fine modern vessels. Four—the Almirante Oquendo, the Infanta Maria Teresa, the Princesa de Asturias, and the Vizcaya—were sister ships, built in the Spanish yards, mainly by British constructors, during the last eight years. Each was of 7,000 tons, with a speed stated at twenty knots an hour, and costing three million dollars. The fifth was the Cristobal Colon, built at Sestri, Italy, as the Giuseppe Garibaldi II, the purchase of which was reported by the American newspapers, in March, 1898, as part of Spain’s hostile preparations. As a matter of fact the Colon was bought in 1897, an order being placed with the same builders for a sister ship, which has never been delivered.

At the Spanish yards—the most important are those at Cartagena, Cadiz, Ferrol, and Bilbao—some other ships were building. Two were the unfinished cruisers Cardinal Cisneros and Cataluna, similar to the Vizcaya class. Another, the Isabel la Catolica, a 3,000-ton cruiser, was to be paid for by a fund raised in Mexico; a third small cruiser, the Rio de la Plata, was building at Havre, as a gift from the Spaniards of South America. None of these could be made ready for service, but two swift torpedo cruisers had just been completed in Thomson’s yard, at Glasgow. In bringing them south their Spanish crews ran afoul of the Irish coast, and one was badly damaged.

Never, since the days of the Armada, has Spain’s navy been famed for good seamanship. Her people, as has been said, do not possess the mechanical ability that is proverbially an American characteristic; and in handling so complicated a piece of machinery as the modern war ship a lack of intelligent care is speedily ruinous to efficiency. During the last three years her vessels had suffered many mishaps, and four had actually been lost—one being the cruiser Reina Regente, which went down with all on board off Cape Trafalgar in 1895.
The personnel of the Spanish navy—recruited mainly by conscription in the coast districts—was thus stated for 1898:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>1,002</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sailors</td>
<td>14,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marines</td>
<td>9,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanics, etc.</td>
<td>725</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>24,727</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For fourteen years the United States had been busily at work upon the construction of its new navy, but for about two years there had been something of a lull in the work. During that time the Iowa and the Brooklyn were the only important additions to the list, and no large vessels were under construction until, in 1897, five new battle ships were ordered. These—the Illinois, the Kearsarge, the Kentucky, the Alabama, and the Wisconsin—will be powerful vessels of 11,525 tons each, and will practically double the fighting strength of the navy's first line. None of them had been launched at the outbreak of war with Spain.

At the head of the list of ships in actual service there stood seven great engines of warfare which in speed, armament, and general efficiency were well prepared to meet anything of their inches on the sea. These included the four first-class battle ships—four floating fortresses, carrying twelve- and thirteen-inch guns, making from fifteen and a half to seventeen knots an hour, and costing more than three million dollars each:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SHIPS</th>
<th>Tonnage</th>
<th>When launched</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iowa</td>
<td>11,410</td>
<td>Philadelphia, 1896.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiana</td>
<td>10,288</td>
<td>Philadelphia, 1893.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>10,288</td>
<td>Philadelphia, 1893.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oregon</td>
<td>10,288</td>
<td>San Francisco, 1893.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Spain had nothing to pit against this quartette of bulldogs of the sea. Next came one second-class battle ship, a vessel very similar to the lost Maine, and classed by some authorities as an armoured cruiser:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ship</th>
<th>Tonnage</th>
<th>When launched</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>6,315</td>
<td>Norfolk, 1892</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Then the two great armoured cruisers:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ships</th>
<th>Tonnage</th>
<th>When launched</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brooklyn</td>
<td>9,215</td>
<td>Philadelphia, 1895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>8,200</td>
<td>Philadelphia, 1891</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These carried eight-inch guns, with a good secondary rapid-fire battery, and had a rated speed of 21 and 21.9 knots respectively. After them, in a class by themselves, came two large and swift protected cruisers:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ships</th>
<th>Tonnage</th>
<th>When launched</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Columbia</td>
<td>7,375</td>
<td>Philadelphia, 1892</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minneapolis</td>
<td>7,375</td>
<td>Philadelphia, 1893</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These two, generally designated as "commerce destroyers," were built for speed, carrying no armour and a comparatively light armament—one eight-inch gun apiece, with batteries of four-inch rapid-firers. They did not play any very prominent part in the war with Spain.

Of smaller protected cruisers the United States had eleven of three thousand tons or more, all of them good modern steel vessels:
The heaviest weapons carried on these vessels were eight- and six-inch rifles, supplemented by rapid-fire batteries—usually of six-pounders, but in the Olympia, the Raleigh, and the Cincinnati of five-inch guns. A valuable addition to their class was made by the purchase, in March, of the cruisers Amazonas and Almirante Abru (rechristened New Orleans and Albany) built by the Armstrongs, at Elswick, for the Brazilian Government. The Albany* was still unfinished; the New Orleans, a fine vessel of 3,600 tons, twenty knots, and armed with a powerful battery of 6-inch and 4.7-inch rapid-fire guns using smokeless powder, had just been completed, and left the Thames for New York on the 27th of March.

In the remainder of the navy list the more important items were the six double-turreted monitors—Puritan, Monterey, Amphitrite, Monadnock, Miantonomoh, and Terror—vessels of low speed, armed with heavy guns (ten- and twelve-inch rifles), and designed for coast and port defence, though the voyage of the Monterey and the Monadnock to Manila proved their availability for distant service in an emergency; the trio of small cruisers, each displacing 2,089 tons—the Detroit,

* The Albany was launched January 14, 1899.
the Marblehead, and the Montgomery; that unique naval type, the Vesuvius, with her three fifteen-inch dynamite guns; and a dozen gunboats. Of these last the largest were the 1,710-ton Bennington, Concord, and Yorktown, armed with six-inch guns; next came the Wilmington and the Helena, 1,392 tons apiece, carrying four-inch rapid-fire guns; the Nashville, 1,371 tons; the Castine and the Machias of 1,177 tons; the Annapolis, the Marietta, the Newport, the Vicksburg, the Wheeling, and the Princeton, each of 1,000 tons—the last named not quite ready for service; and the Petrel, 892 tons.

The personnel of the navy was thus stated at the beginning of the year:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officers (line)</td>
<td>1,031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineers</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paymasters, surgeons, and chaplains</td>
<td>262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrant officers</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seamen</td>
<td>11,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marines, officers</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marines, men</td>
<td>1,939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>15,425</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The naval militia, which had been organized in fifteen seaboard and lake States, constituted an auxiliary force of 200 officers and 3,703 men—volunteers who, though not experienced sailors, had had some training in seamanship and gunnery.

The corresponding figures for the army were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Men.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infantry, 25 regiments</td>
<td>877</td>
<td>13,125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cavalry, 10</td>
<td>432</td>
<td>6,170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery, 5</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>4,025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General and staff officers</td>
<td>362</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordnance department</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>605</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital corps</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>706</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>575</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,116</strong></td>
<td><strong>25,706</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
To this force the Hawley bill had added two regiments of artillery. The adjutant general’s returns (February, 1898) showed 114,632 men enrolled in the militia of the States, and estimated the total number of men available for service in case of necessity at 10,301,339.

The meaning of this brief array of figures was that the United States had gone to war, practically speaking, without an army. To create one, the first step must be a call for volunteers, and to provide for this Congressman Hull, chairman of the House Military Affairs Committee, introduced a bill (April 20th) framed by the War Department. It declared that all able-bodied male citizens from eighteen to forty-five years old constituted the national forces, and were liable to military duty; that troops might be called out by the President, to be supplied by each State and Territory in proportion to its population; that the regimental and company officers should be named by the Governors of the States, the general and staff officers by the President. The bill was hurried through House and Senate, and received Executive approval April 22d; and on the following day a call for 125,000 men was issued.

By an act that became law four days later Congress partially retrieved its failure to pass the original Hull bill for the reorganization of the regular army. This later measure, also named after Mr. Hull, who fathered it in the House, authorized additional enlistments up to a total of 62,597 men, doubling the rank and file of each of the existing regiments. It was carefully provided that the increase should be only temporary, and that the army should be reduced to its former strength—or rather weakness—at the end of the war.

The first plans of the War Department were to concentrate the regular troops, scattered in small
detachments at the army posts, at three Southern ports—New Orleans, Mobile, and Tampa—in readiness for an immediate move upon the Spanish West Indies. Like a great many other plans made during the war, this was changed before it had been carried out. It was decided to form a great central camp in the national park on the battlefield of Chickamauga, to whose poignant memories of warfare a new chapter was to be added by the great host that gathered there—the North and the South in arms together.

The first regiment to move southward was the Seventeenth Infantry, which left its post at Columbus Barracks, Ohio, on the 18th of April, bound for Camp Thomas, as the point of concentration at Chickamauga had been named, in honour of the general who stemmed the tide of Federal defeat there in 1863. Later, another great instruction camp—Camp Alger—was formed at Falls Church, Virginia; and troops were sent to three points in Florida—Tampa, Jacksonville, and Fernandina—selected for their healthfulness, real or supposed, and for their convenience as ports of embarkation. At Tampa a powerful train of siege artillery was organized as rapidly as possible, under General John J. Rodgers—only one battery of it being destined to see active service.

Such were the army’s chief offensive preparations. It had also to care for the defence of the coast, which, except at a few points, was very inadequately protected. In 1886, at a time when the ports of the United States were practically devoid of defences, a commission of officers, generally known as the Endicott Board, drew up a comprehensive scheme of fortification; but Congress dealt out the necessary money so grudgingly—only $50,000 was appropriated in 1893, and no more than $3,521,000 from 1890 to 1895 inclusive—that only
a small part of the work had been completed. Plans had been prepared for batteries at thirty ports, to consist of about five hundred heavy guns, seven hundred smaller rapid-fire weapons, and a thousand mortars. Of these, at the beginning of the fiscal year (July 1, 1897) only one hundred and six—less than five per cent—had actually been mounted. The supply of powder and projectiles was entirely inadequate, only about one fifth of the quantity needed being on hand.* Many important points were in a condition of defencelessness which, in the face of a more powerful and active enemy, might have proved disastrous. To remedy this the ordnance and engineer departments, as far back as the preceding February, had been making special efforts, and though the work is of the sort that moves slowly, much had been accomplished. At the end of the fiscal year (June 30, 1898), 630 emplacements were reported as completed or under construction, 291 guns and mortars were mounted, and it was promised that within three months 156 more would be in place. Besides these, 1,500 submarine mines had been planted in twenty-nine harbours.

The navy's preparations were much farther advanced than those of the army. It was the service upon which the first brunt of the struggle was expected to fall; nor had it, like the army, been kept in time of peace at merely skeleton strength. Roughly speaking, its personnel was doubled during the war; that of the army was multiplied by ten. Its problems of organization and equipment were easy ones compared to the overwhelming task that confronted the army staff. This, however, does not detract from the credit due to Secretary Long's department for the remarkable record it made

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* Annual report of General Flagler, Chief of Ordnance.
throughout the conflict, administering the affairs of the American fleets in two hemispheres without a breakdown, a hitch, or a complaint.

For months the navy had been holding itself in readiness to strike at short notice. In January, Admiral Sicard, commanding the North Atlantic squadron, rendezvoused at Key West the strongest fleet that ever went to sea under the American flag, its chief vessels being the Iowa, the Massachusetts, the Indiana, the Maine, the Texas, the Brooklyn, and the New York. It was from this squadron that the Maine was detached for her fatal cruise to Havana. The rest of the fleet was still in Southern waters, from Hampton Roads to the West Indies, and the Cincinnati (brought up from the South Atlantic station), the Detroit, the Marblehead, the Montgomery, the monitors Amphitrite, Miantonomoh, Puritan, and Terror, and several other vessels, much more than replaced the lost battle ship.

On the European station, at the beginning of the year, there were only the cruiser San Francisco and the gunboats Helena and Bancroft. These were ordered home, the San Francisco crossing the Atlantic in company with the newly purchased New Orleans, and reaching New York on the 14th of April.

Of the eleven second-class cruisers, four—the Philadelphia, the Newark, the Chicago, and the Atlanta—were undergoing repairs or alterations. The Newark went into commission in June; the Philadelphia was ready for sea in July, when she was ordered to Hawaii; the two latter were not available during the war. Three more—the Olympia, the Raleigh, and the Boston—were on the Asiatic station, commanded by Commodore George Dewey. A fourth cruiser, the Baltimore, had been ordered from the Pacific station to strengthen Dewey's squadron, for which fighting
was foreseen; and she joined him at Hong-Kong on the second day of the war (April 22d).

On the Pacific coast were the battle ship Oregon, the cruiser Charleston, and the monitors Monadnock and Monterey, besides the cruiser Philadelphia, laid up for repairs, and the gunboat Marietta, which had been showing the flag in the Pacific ports of Central America. The Oregon, of little service where she was, would make a splendid addition to the navy's fighting strength in the main theatre of war, and immediately after the Maine explosion she had been dry-docked and prepared for the fifteen-thousand-mile journey around Cape Horn. It was an object lesson upon the strategic value of a canal through the Central American isthmus.

The Oregon's voyage from Puget Sound to Florida was a remarkable one, far surpassing all previous records made by men-of-war over anything like so great a distance.* Leaving the Bremerton dry dock on March 6th, she sailed from San Francisco, under command of Captain Charles E. Clark, on the 19th, and reached Callao on April 4th. Here coal—ordered by the Marietta, which had preceded her, having started from Panama March 24th—was waiting in lighters, and was hurried aboard. The Marietta had gone on to Punta Arenas, the southernmost Chilian port, to arrange for another supply of fuel; but the Oregon, leaving Callao on April 7th, passed her in the Straits of Magellan, after weathering one of the fierce squalls of those stormy seas. The gunboat overtook the battle ship at Punta Arenas, and the two coaled together.

* When the cruiser Columbia made her speed trial across the Atlantic, in July and August, 1895, she recorded a considerably higher average speed (18.41 knots an hour from Southampton to Sandy Hook); but her journey was only one fifth as long as the Oregon's great voyage.
From this point—which they left on April 21st, of course unaware that it was the first day of the war—the run was an exciting one. It was expected that hostilities might be declared at any time, and it was known that a Spanish torpedo cruiser, the Temerario, was in their track, off the South American coast. The American ships were kept in constant readiness for action, and no lights were shown at night. On the 30th they reached Rio de Janeiro, where they heard the news of war, and learned that the Temerario had sailed from Montevideo, probably for Rio. Expecting that she might appear at any moment, and fearing that in the neutral harbour his costly ship might not be safe from treacherous attack, Captain Clark sent word to the port authorities that if the Spanish torpedo cruiser entered the bay and came too near him he would sink her.

The Temerario did not appear, and on May 4th the Oregon and the Marietta put to sea, followed by the Nictheroy, which the United States had purchased from the Brazilian Government. The Nictheroy, renamed the Buffalo, had originally been El Cid, of the Morgan line, and had since been fitted as a cruiser and armed with a dynamite gun. She was a vessel of nearly five thousand tons, but proved an unsatisfactory purchase, her machinery being in very poor condition. Her first performance was to break down, shortly after starting from Rio, and the Oregon pushed on alone, leaving the Marietta to convoy the crippled ship. The engineers repaired her, but at Para she broke down again, and the Marietta left her, making for Key West, where she arrived on June 4th. The Buffalo reached Norfolk only three days later.

Meanwhile the Oregon, straining every nerve for speed, had called at Bahia to inquire for news of Cervera's movements. Later acquaintance with the Spaniards' seamanship and gunnery showed
that she need scarcely have feared an encounter with the enemy's squadron, overwhelmingly superior as it was on paper. Captain Clark was quite prepared to fight if necessary, and telegraphed to the Navy Department from Bahia (May 9th) his opinion that his vessel "in a running fight might beat off and even cripple the Spanish fleet." Secretary Long's reply was cautious but confident: "Avoid if possible—we believe that you will defeat it if met." On the 12th the naval war board discussed the question of sending him assistance, but it was decided not to do so, as the Oregon could probably take care of herself, and it was not desired to weaken Sampson's fleet.

There was no definite news of Cervera till Captain Clark put in at Barbadoes (May 18th), where he learned that seven Spanish men-of-war were at Martinique, just to the north of him. Leaving the little British island at sunset that day, he steamed to the northwest, as if direct for Cuba, but as soon as darkness fell he turned about, went south of Barbadoes, and eastward into the ocean, before again heading toward the United States. On the 25th he put into Jupiter Inlet, Florida, for instructions, with the Oregon in as fine condition as when she left the dry dock, and needing only a supply of coal to be in complete readiness for instant action.

During the civil war, when the Federal Government, with but little naval strength at its command, found itself compelled to blockade the long coast line of the Southern States, it bought almost everything that Northern shipmasters had to sell. More than four hundred vessels, from ocean steamers to coasting schooners and New York ferryboats, were purchased, and it was one of the latter unwarlike craft—a boat taken from daily duty on the Fulton Ferry—that captured, in Cuban waters, one of the most valuable prizes of the war. There was less
need of indiscriminate purchases in 1898, but auxiliaries and supply ships of all sorts were wanted, and immediately after the voting of fifty million dollars for military preparations a board, with Captain Frederick Rodgers at its head, was appointed to buy or lease the most available vessels.

The most important accessions were the four swift passenger steamers of the American line—the St. Paul, the St. Louis, the New York (rechristened Harvard), and the Paris (rechristened Yale), for whose services the Government paid nine thousand dollars a day, and whose great speed (twenty to twenty-two knots) and carrying capacity made them valuable as scouts and transports. The St. Paul, armed with eight five-inch rapid-fire guns, was to show that she could fight, too. A number of smaller steamers were bought from other commercial lines, some of which had their business suspended by the war. A flotilla of small and speedy auxiliary cruisers and despatch boats was formed by the purchase of twenty-five private steam yachts, and two more were lent to the Government, without charge, by their public-spirited owners—Messrs. Augustus Schermerhorn and William R. Hearst, of New York. The city of Philadelphia gave the use of an ice-boat, the Arctic—or, to be precise, rented it for the nominal sum of one dollar. The total cost of one hundred and two vessels added to the navy before the war ended was nearly eighteen million dollars.

Of the ships bought abroad, the New Orleans, the Albany, and the Buffalo have already been mentioned. Another was the 1,800-ton cruiser Diogenes, built in Germany, in 1884, for Peru, but never delivered. In 1896 she was rebuilt by the Thames Iron Works, which firm now sold her to the United States for $175,000—a low price, even though her machinery was not in first-rate condition. The one other armed vessel that the Ameri-
can agents succeeded in finding in the market was the torpedo boat Somers, which Lieutenant Knapp purchased in Germany from the Schichau Company, of Elbing. The lieutenant took her to Weymouth, where she met the Diogenes (renamed the Topeka), and crews were picked up to take the two vessels across the Atlantic; but the Somers proved to be unseaworthy, and had to put in at Falmouth, where she was dismantled and laid up.* The Topeka went on without her, and reached New York on May 1st.

The Treasury Department also turned over to the navy fifteen revenue cutters and four lighthouse tenders. Four of the former, by courtesy of the British and Canadian authorities, were brought down by way of the St. Lawrence from the great lakes to the Atlantic. Another, the Hugh McCulloch, was on its way from New York to the Pacific Coast, via the Suez Canal, when it was ordered to join Dewey, who afterward acknowledged its usefulness in a special despatch.

Another imposing fleet was created by the War Department, as need arose for transports.† More than fifty troop ships were required for the expeditions to Manila, Cuba, and Porto Rico, besides water boats, lighters, barges, and such prosaic but useful craft. High rates were paid for some of them—for instance, a Plant line steamer of 5,018 tons was rented to the Government for $1,200 a day. In the Pacific the transport service was still more expensive, the Pacific Mail receiving $1,500 daily for the 5,000-ton China, and steamers of no more than 2,400 tons being rated at $1,000 a day.

* The Somers was finally brought across the Atlantic on board an ocean liner in April, 1899.
† Transports are under the sole charge of the War Department. When the St. Louis and other American liners were used to transport troops, they had been turned over to the army service by the navy.
In all, the War Department chartered seventy-seven vessels and bought sixteen.

Each service had a hospital ship, the two vessels (the Solace for the navy, and the Relief for the army) being purchased for $600,000 and $450,000 respectively, besides the cost of equipment. They were a new feature in warfare, as was also another experiment which proved its value, the naval repair ship Vulcan.

A rich government can buy ships, but it can not buy experienced naval officers; and the great increase in the number of vessels in service proved a heavy strain upon the personnel of the navy. In other words, there were just enough officers to go around, and none to spare. Had the struggle proved a long and severe one, with many casualties on both sides, the American navy would have suffered seriously for want of a reserve of trained men. Coming through the war, as it did, with the marvellous record of only eighteen men killed, it escaped this difficulty; but the lesson is one that should not be forgotten.

It was evident that Key West, lying in the Gulf of Mexico, opposite Havana, and only a hundred miles from the Cuban capital, would be a very important point in the naval strategy of the war. Early in March a great depot of supplies was established there, and the building of a repair plant—long planned, but never undertaken owing to lack of the necessary appropriation—was begun. In the latter part of April the War Department erected a hospital and a distilling plant—the latter made necessary by the lack of water on the island—for the benefit of troops using Key West as a base of operations for the invasion of Cuba.
CHAPTER VI

THE BEGINNING OF WAR

The preparatory moves outlined in the preceding chapter were forming the effective force of the United States navy into two fleets, on opposite sides of the globe, ready to strike at Spain in the two remaining strongholds of her colonial empire. One was the North Atlantic squadron, in which were all the first-rate men-of-war; the other the fleet of cruisers at Hong-Kong. Their chief officers were two men destined to win the brightest laurels of the war, and to prove themselves worthy to rank among the heroic figures of American naval annals—Commodore George Dewey, commanding the Asiatic station; and Captain William T. Sampson, acting rear admiral, promoted from the captaincy of the Iowa to succeed Rear-Admiral Sicard, who was relieved on account of ill health.

Admiral Sicard relinquished his command to Captain Sampson on March 26th. On the first day of the war (April 21st) Sampson was appointed an acting rear admiral, and on the following day he hoisted his admiral's pennant on his flagship, the cruiser New York. He owed his selection for the most important and responsible post in the entire service to the fact that he was the senior officer present with the squadron, that he knew its vessels and their capabilities, and that his record had been an excellent one ever since the days when, as a young lieutenant, he narrowly escaped death in the
Patapsco's daring run into Charleston harbour, in January, 1865.

The great fleet under Sampson's orders was divided into two main bodies—one, under his personal command, with its base at Key West; the other, under Commodore Winfield Scott Schley, held in reserve at Newport News as a "flying squadron" to meet any move that might be made by the Spanish fleet lying at St. Vincent, in the Cape Verde Islands. The "flying squadron" consisted, at the date of the outbreak of hostilities, of the armoured cruiser Brooklyn (Commodore Schley's flagship, Captain Cook), the battle ships Massachusetts (Captain Higginson) and Texas (Captain Philip), the cruisers Columbia (Captain Sands) and Minneapolis (Captain Jewell), and the collier Merrimac (Commander Miller). Sampson's own fleet, at the same date, when he first moved upon Cuba, comprised twenty-two men-of-war—the armoured cruiser New York (Admiral Sampson's flagship, Captain Chadwick); the two battle ships Iowa (Captain Evans) and Indiana (Captain Taylor); the three monitors Amphitrite (Captain Barclay), Puritan (Captain Harrington), and Terror (Captain Ludlow); the four cruisers Cincinnati (Captain Chester), Marblehead (Commander McCalla), Detroit (Commander Dayton), and Montgomery (Commander Converse); the six gunboats Wilmington (Commander Todd), Nashville (Commander Maynard), Castine (Commander Berry), Machias (Commander Merry), Newport (Commander Tilley), and Helena (Commander Swinburne); the despatch boat Dolphin (Commander Lyon), the converted yacht Mayflower (Commander Mackenzie), and the four torpedo boats Dupont (Lieutenant Wood), Foote (Lieutenant Rodgers), Porter (Lieutenant Fremont), and Winslow (Lieutenant Bernadou).

Besides these two fleets, a "northern patrol
squadron" was hastily organized for the protection of the Atlantic coast from the capes of the Delaware northward. It was commanded by Commodore John A. Howell, and consisted, in the first days of the war, of his flagship, the cruiser San Francisco (Captain Leary), and four auxiliary cruisers manned by naval reserve men—the Yankee (Commander Brownson), the Dixie (Commander Davis), the Prairie (Commander Train), and the Yosemite (Commander Emory). In May the Columbia and the Minneapolis were detached from the Flying Squadron, and served for a time under Howell, the latter being posted at Newport News to guard the battle ships building there; but as Spain's navy demonstrated its impotence, and the fear of an attack upon the northern coast dwindled to the vanishing point, one after another of the commodore's ships was detached for more active service in Cuban waters, till on the 25th of June he was ordered to Key West with all his remaining force except the Minneapolis.

But in the early days of hostilities there were many alarms of mysterious Spanish war ships. On the 27th of April, for instance, it was very positively reported that a Spanish battle ship and three torpedo boats had been seen in the North Atlantic, in the track of the ocean liners; and some uneasiness was felt for the Paris, which had left Southampton on the 22d, to take her place in the navy as an auxiliary cruiser. On the 30th, however, she reached New York in safety, having seen nothing of the phantom foe.

To all the warlike preparations of the United States Spain had made but little answer—chiefly, no doubt, through her lack of means, but partly because her statesmen seem to have been strangely blind to the crisis that was upon them. There is a characteristic Spanish proverb which says that "it is a
long way from said to done, and from talking war to making war”; and Sagasta’s Government apparently acted upon it to the last moment. Their defensive moves were few. Just before hostilities began they purchased three German Atlantic liners and an English yacht as auxiliary cruisers. On the day when General Woodford left Madrid, a call was issued for eighty thousand men of the reserves. The most important move was the concentration of a squadron at St. Vincent. A small flotilla of torpedo boats and torpedo-boat destroyers, commanded by Captain Fernando Villamil, had left Cadiz early in March, going to the Canaries, and thence (March 24th) to the Cape Verde Islands. Here they were joined on April 14th by the Maria Teresa, Admiral Cervera’s flagship, and the Cristobal Colon, which had followed them from Cadiz, and on the 19th by the Vizcaya and the Almirante Oquendo, from Havana. With a couple of transports—the Ciudad Cadiz and the San Francisco—the squadron remained at St. Vincent, a Portuguese port, awaiting the outbreak of war.

It was in no condition to meet the powerful fleet that was waiting for it across the Atlantic. The Colon had never received the heavy guns that should have been in her turrets. On the three other cruisers, the batteries of fourteen centimetre (five-and-a-half-inch) artillery—their chief power of offence—were disabled by defective breech mechanism and inferior ammunition. The Vizcaya urgently needed docking and cleaning, and was far below her speed. Cervera had repeatedly reported the deficiencies of his ships, but the authorities at Madrid took no notice of either recommendations or protests. Just before leaving Cadiz he frankly declared that he was going upon a desperate, not to say a suicidal, errand:
It seems to me a most risky adventure, which may cost us very dear, for the loss of our flotilla and the defeat of our squadron in the Caribbean Sea entails a great danger for the Canaries, and perhaps the bombardment of our coast cities. I do not mention the fate of the island of Cuba, because I have anticipated it long ago.

In spite of this, on the 22d of April, orders came from Madrid that the squadron should sail for Cuba at once. Cervera acknowledged their receipt thus:

It is impossible for me to give an idea of the surprise and astonishment experienced by all on the receipt of the order to sail. Nothing can be expected for this expedition except the total destruction of the fleet or its hasty and demoralizing return. . . . This is already a disaster, and it is to be feared that it will be a more frightful one before long.

And Captain Villamil, his second in command, added in a private telegram to Sagasta—a pathetic message from the brave sailor who was to lose his life off Santiago:

I deem it expedient you should know, through a friend who does not fear censure, that while as seamen we are all ready to meet honourable death in the performance of duty, I think it certain that the sacrifice of these naval forces will be as sure as it will be fruitless and useless.

The fleet did not put to sea until April 29th, and then it separated—the torpedo boats Rayo, Ariete, and Azor, and the two transports, putting back to the Canaries, while Cervera, with the four cruisers and three torpedo-boat destroyers, headed westward. The subsequent career of his squadron—a career neither long nor glorious—will be traced later.

As Havana was the great seat of Spanish power in the West Indies, it was natural that the first plan of attack should look toward the Cuban capital. Admiral Sampson was anxious to begin the war by striking direct at it with the full power of his squadron, and at least three of his leading officers—
Captains Evans of the Iowa, Taylor of the Indiana, and Chadwick of the New York—strongly supported him. The matter was fully discussed before hostilities began. On April 6th Secretary Long instructed him:

The department does not wish the vessels of your squadron to be exposed to the fire of the batteries at Havana, Santiago de Cuba,* or other strongly fortified ports in Cuba, unless the more formidable Spanish vessels should take refuge in those harbours. Even in this case the department would suggest that a rigid blockade and employment of our torpedo boats might accomplish the desired object, viz., the destruction of the enemy's vessels, without subjecting unnecessarily our own men-of-war to the fire of the land batteries.

There are two reasons for this:

First. There may be no United States troops to occupy any captured stronghold, or to protect from riot and arson, until after the dry season begins, about the first of October.

Second. The lack of docking facilities makes it particularly desirable that our vessels should not be crippled before the capture or destruction of Spain's most formidable vessels.

On April 9th Sampson replied with a long letter in which he pleaded hard for permission to carry out his aggressive policy. He described the shore batteries at Havana, all of which face seaward, with little protection for their gunners, and explained his plan of attack:

These batteries are well calculated to keep off a fleet from seaward, which approaches to within a moderate distance of a few thousand yards. I do not think they are well placed to resist an attack (for instance, the western batteries) from the westward and close inshore, where the batteries would be exposed to a flank fire, or to the fire of our big ships at short range, where the secondary batteries would have full effect. Even under these circumstances the ships must have such a heavy fire that the men in the batteries would be overwhelmed by its volume. Before the Puritan and Amphitrite arrived I was not en-

* The strength of the batteries at Santiago de Cuba was greatly overestimated at this time.
tirely sanguine of the success of such an attack. Since their arrival yesterday I have little doubt of its success.*

Having silenced the western batteries, it would be quite practicable to shell the city, which I would do only after warning given twenty-four hours in advance.

I see the force of your reasoning that we would have no troops to occupy the city if it did surrender, yet, Mr. Secretary, it will be very unfortunate, besides a great loss of time, if we must delay until the rainy season is over. Probably a close blockade would terminate the trouble before October.

Captain Chadwick, Sampson's chief of staff, records that an order of battle for an assault upon Havana was drawn up and placed in the hands of each officer whose ship was to take part in it. Another plan discussed at the naval council was that of forming three squadrons—one to bombard Havana; a second to be held at Cape Haitien in readiness to attack San Juan, Porto Rico, as soon as war was declared; and a third, consisting of swift cruisers, to move upon the coast of Spain itself.

In spite of Sampson's plea, it was decided to defer the blow till an army could be organized to follow it up, and the first mobilization of troops was made with this object in view. But when the War Department, a few days before hostilities began, ordered the regulars to the Gulf ports (April 15th), it does not seem to have realized how ill prepared its forces were for an active campaign, and how tremendous the task before the commissary, quartermaster, medical, and other bureaus. The camp

* After the expedition to San Juan, Admiral Sampson's opinion of the monitors was less favorable. In a report dated May 20th, he described them as "very inefficient."

† Instructions to the commanding officers of the United States fleets and armies issue from the President, as commander in chief of the land and sea forces of the nation, through the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy. In planning the grand strategy of the late war, the President and Secretary Long were assisted by a specially appointed naval war board, which at first consisted of Rear-Admiral Sicard, Captain Barker, Captain Crowninshield, and Theodore Roosevelt, Assistant Secretary of the Navy. In May Mr. Roosevelt and Captain Barker left the board, and Captain Mahan joined it.
at Chickamauga was formed to give time for the work of equipment; and from this point men were to be moved as rapidly as possible to Tampa, or other Southern ports.

On the 21st of April, as was said at the end of Chapter IV, Admiral Sampson, at Key West, received the orders for which he had been waiting for weeks. What they were the world knew on the following day, when President McKinley issued a proclamation declaring a blockade of "the north coast of Cuba, including ports on said coast between Cardenas and Bahia Honda, and the port of Cienfuegos on the south coast." This meant a blockade covering Havana and extending some forty miles westward and fifty miles eastward. Cienfuegos, on the other side of the island, was closed because it had railroad communication with the Cuban capital.

The instructions sent to Sampson on the 21st informed him that a plan was under consideration for an expedition to Matanzas, where a sufficient force might be landed to hold the place and open communication with the insurgents. Meanwhile, an attack upon the defences of Havana was definitely forbidden.

It is possible that the admiral's plan of immediate and vigorous aggression might have ended the war more summarily, but the policy that prevailed at Washington was an eminently safe one. The first move made Blanco's position in Cuba untenable, unless Spain should make some effective counter stroke—which, with her weaker navy, and with all the disadvantages of fighting from a base four thousand miles distant, was practically impossible. The American fleet at once took undisputed command of Cuban waters. A number of armed vessels lay in the harbours of the island—the cruisers Alfonso XII and Conde de Venadito, with one or
more torpedo boats, at Havana; the Reina Mercedes at Santiago, the Jorge Juan in Nipe Bay, and smaller gunboats at Manzanillo, Cienfuegos, and other ports; but they made no serious attempt to attack the American ships. The first prize, the Spanish steamer Buena Ventura, was taken by the Nashville early on the morning of April 22d, shortly after Sampson's squadron left Key West; and in the afternoon of the same day the New York overhauled a larger vessel, the Pedro, coming out of Havana.

The seizure of ships owned by citizens of a hostile country is a survival from the days when might was right, and a successful battle meant indiscriminate loot. In warfare on land, private property has long been respected by civilized armies, and it is a curious anomaly that the same principle should not obtain on the sea. It was partially recognised, forty years ago, in the Declaration of Paris, by which the leading European powers agreed to abolish privateering, and to respect neutral flags and neutral goods. Spain did not sign that agreement, nor did the United States, though President Pierce offered to go further, and to join in a declaration exempting all private property, except contraband of war, from seizure, whether by privateers or by naval vessels. It has been suggested that the Washington Government, with the prestige of a victorious war, should propose to add such a rule to the canons of international law, and the suggestion commends itself to all respecters of the eighth commandment.* Overhauling some helpless merchantman, which may have had no notice of the

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* In his annual message of December 5, 1898, President McKinley recommended "that the Executive be authorized to correspond with the Governments of the principal maritime powers with a view of incorporating into the permanent law of civilized nations the principle of the exemption of all private property at sea, not contraband of war, from capture or destruction by belligerent powers."
existence of war; making prisoners of its crew; de­
priving its skipper of the ship that is perhaps his
only property and source of livelihood; and con­
fiscating its cargo, which may be of no possible
service to the enemy’s forces—the Buena Ventura,
for instance, was a small steamer carrying American
lumber—this is a poor business for the navy of a
great power.

At the same time, it is so profitable that naval
officers can not be expected to oppose its continu­
ance. During the civil war, for instance, Admiral
Farragut—besides the fifty thousand dollars pre­

tented to him by a subscription raised in New
York—received no less than one hundred and forty
thousand dollars in prize and bounty money, and
several other Federal officers drew an amount not
much less. In the United States army, which has
no such perquisite, the pay of all ranks is increased
twenty per cent during war. It would be more con­
sonant with the advance of civilization to give the
navy a similar allowance, and to end the seizure of
private property on the sea.

It was announced by the State Department, on
the day before the war began, that the United States
would commission no privateers; but
as Spain had not signed the Decla­
oration of Paris, she was technically
at liberty to do so. There is reason to believe that
an inquiry—which implied a warning against a
policy that might work serious damage to neutral
commercial interests—was sent to Madrid from
London. On April 24th Sagasta’s Government re­
plied by issuing a decree which declared a state of
war to exist between Spain and the United States,
and added:

The Spanish Government, reserving its right to grant
letters of marque, will at present confine itself to organiz­
ing, with the vessels of the mercantile marine, a force of
auxiliary cruisers, which will co-operate with the navy,
according to the needs of the campaign, and will be under naval control.

The threatened force of auxiliary cruisers did not figure in the war, though the Government, in addition to its few purchases abroad, took over several steamers from the Compania Transatlantica Española, whose traffic to West Indian ports was cut off by the blockade. Only one American vessel was taken during the struggle—the bark Saranac, which, not knowing that hostilities were in progress, entered the port of Iloilo, in the Philippines, and was captured by a Spanish gunboat. She was subsequently released, as her owners had transferred her to a British subject while she was at sea. On the other hand, the American men-of-war took no less than fifty-six prizes.*

The United States was a day behind Spain in its formal announcement of war. On the 25th of April the President requested Congress to give legal status to the operations of the country's armed forces, and a brief bill stating that "war has existed since the 21st day of April, 1898, including said day, between the United States of America and the kingdom of Spain" was passed without a dissenting vote in either House. The State Department at once notified all the foreign powers, who promptly responded with proclamations of neutrality.

The American squadron in Cuban waters had before it plenty of nobler and more serious work than the taking of prizes. It first exchanged shots with the enemy at Matanzas, on April 27th. On that morning Captain Harrington, of the monitor Puritan, reported to Admiral Sampson that a new battery was being constructed at Punta

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* According to the Attorney-General's annual report for 1898. The amount realized by the sale of these vessels and their cargoes, up to the date of the report (November, 1898), with several ships still to be sold, was $701,034.
Gorda (Broad Point) on the west side of the entrance to Matanzas harbour. Deciding that his instructions * would permit him to give his gunners some target practice, the admiral steamed eastward from his blockading station off Havana, and, in company with the Puritan and the cruiser Cincinnati, opened fire on the Spaniards, bombarding both the Punta Gorda battery and another on the east side of the harbour. The range was long—from two to four miles—but the shells seemed to reach their mark, and the batteries replied with only a few shots, which did no damage. The three ships had discharged about three hundred projectiles in half an hour when the admiral signalled to "cease firing." The Spaniards reported that their loss was "one mule"—which, whether true or not, was distinctly humorous, and caused much mirth in Havana and Madrid.

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* On April 26th Secretary Long telegraphed to Sampson: "While the department does not wish a bombardment of forts protected by heavy cannon, it is within your discretion to destroy light batteries which may protect vessels you desire to attack, if you can do so without exposure to heavy guns."
CHAPTER VII

THE BATTLE OF MANILA BAY

Very different news was to come a few days later, from a widely distant point. It was strange that the first battle of a war waged for the liberation of an island almost in sight of the American shores should be fought on the opposite side of the globe; but it was a perfectly logical—indeed, an inevitable—train of action that led to the attack on Manila, with all the new and unforeseen chapter of history of which that was to be the beginning. War consists in striking at the enemy's forces wherever they are to be found; and a blow at the Spanish power in the Philippines was not only a telling offensive move, but also a defensive necessity for the protection of American commerce in eastern seas, and even for the security of the Pacific coast.

The Philippines were Spain's, like the rest of her once vast empire, by right of discovery. Fernao de Magalhaes, better known as Magellan, landed on their shores in March, 1521, and was slain there by hostile natives. In 1565 Spaniards from Mexico, under Legazpi, crossed the Pacific to plant colonies in these eastern islands, which they named after the reigning sovereign, the Philip of the Armada. Manila was founded in 1571, on the finest harbour on the west coast of Luzon; and from that date to 1898 the Philippines have had very little history. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries there were hos-
tilities with Chinese pirates, and with the Dutch, who harried the Spanish commerce, but were defeated in an attack on Manila.

In 1762 the city was taken by the British. A fleet under Admiral Cornish, with twenty-five hundred men commanded by Sir William Draper, entered the bay on September 23d of that year; and on October 6th the defences of Manila were stormed, except the citadel, which the Spanish governor, the Marquis de Medina, surrendered a few days later, together with the entire archipelago. A ransom of four million dollars was demanded, and was paid in drafts on Madrid, which were afterward repudiated; and in 1763 the Philippines were returned to Spain, together with Havana, captured in the same year.

Under Spain's colonial rule the development of the islands was extraordinarily slow. Manila was almost fifty years old when the Pilgrims landed at Plymouth, yet the Philippines are to-day in great part a terra incognita. Compare what the Spaniards have done for them with the achievements of the Anglo-Saxon race in Australia, whose colonization began in 1788, and in South Africa, British only since 1806; or with the changes wrought in India by her present rulers, whose power dates from Clive's victory at Plassey in 1757. While civilization has fought its battles and won its triumphs in America, in Asia, in Africa, in the isles of the sea, the greater part of this richly endowed archipelago has progressed little since the days when the pagan king of Cebu came to meet Magellan.

The ruinous disorders of Cuba, too, have had their counterpart in Spain's eastern possessions. Throughout this century the natives have grown more and more discontented with the domination of the monastic orders, the corrupt and oppressive administration of the courts, the burden of compulsory military service, and above all the intolerably ex-
tortionate system of taxation. One revolt followed another, but the Spaniards suppressed them—usually with little difficulty, always with great cruelty.

The insurrection of 1896 was more formidable than any that preceded it. Blanco, then captain-general at Manila, could do little to suppress it. He had only a handful of regular soldiers, and his native auxiliaries could not be trusted; and when he left the islands, in December of that year, the insurgents controlled all the southern part of Luzon, close up to the capital. His successor, General Polavieja, came out with strong reinforcements, and inaugurated an active campaign. More than twenty thousand Spanish troops, commanded in the field by General Lachambre, made a clean sweep of the revolted territory, and drove the remnants of the Filipino forces into the mountains of the north. But Polavieja, irritated at the failure of the Madrid Government to support him with the men and supplies he needed, resigned after four months in office; and under the next captain-general, Primo de Rivera, the rebels continued to hold their own. Finally, Rivera succeeded in effecting a pacification, ostensibly by liberal promises of political concessions, but secretly, it is understood, by the more effectual method of bribing the Filipino leaders.* The natives disbanded, and seven thousand of Rivera’s troops were returned to Spain; but the promised reforms were not made, and in the early months of 1898, when Rivera was succeeded by Basilio Augustin, there were renewed risings on several of the

* Oscar F. Williams, United States consul at Manila, reported to the State Department (February 22, 1898) that “certain rebel leaders were given a cash bribe of $1,650,000 to consent to public deportation to China.” Mr. Wildman, consul-general at Hong-Kong, gave a different version in a report dated July 18, 1898: “I was in Hong-Kong in September, 1897, when Aguinaldo and his leaders arrived under contract with the Spanish Government. They waited until the 1st of November for the payment of the money promised for the widows and orphans of the insurgents and the fulfilment of promised reforms. Only $400,000 Mexican was ever placed to their credit.”
islands. Meanwhile Emilio Aguinaldo, who had been the head and front of the rebellion in Luzon, had gone to Singapore, where he met Mr. Pratt, the United States consul, and through him opened relations with the American forces which were to have an important bearing on the Manila campaign.

Dewey at Hong Kong.

On April 24th Commodore Dewey, at Hong-Kong, received the following despatch from the Navy Department at Washington:

War has commenced between the United States and Spain. Proceed at once to Philippine Islands. Commence operations at once, particularly against the Spanish fleet. You must capture vessels or destroy. Use utmost endeavours.

This, of course, was not his first notification of the task before him. For several weeks he had been preparing his squadron for it. He had dismantled the one unserviceable vessel in his command, the old wooden corvette Monocacy, and had distributed her crew among his other men-of-war, leaving her at Woosung. At the beginning of April he was instructed to secure two auxiliary ships to carry coal and supplies; he accordingly bought the Nan-shan and the Zafiro, with ten thousand tons of Welsh coal, besides filling up the bunkers of the cruisers. His fuel bill for the month was $81,872.

At Manila, Governor-General Augustin prepared for the coming fray by issuing, on April 23d, a proclamation which, if the published version of it be correct, was so ridiculously bombastic that it is worth quoting as a curiosity:

The North American people, constituted of all the social excrescences, have exhausted our patience and provoked war with their perfidious machinations, with their acts of treachery, with their outrages against the law of nations and international conventions.

The struggle will be short and decisive. The God of
victories will give us one as brilliant as the justice of our cause demands. Spain, which counts upon the sympathies of all the nations, will emerge triumphantly from this new test, humiliating and blasting the adventurers from those States which, without cohesion and without a history, offer to humanity only infamous traditions and the ungrateful spectacle of a legislature in which appear united insolence and defamation, cowardice and cynicism.

A squadron manned by foreigners possessing neither instruction nor discipline is preparing to come to this archipelago with the ruffianly intention of robbing us of all that means life, honour, and liberty.

Filipinos, prepare for the struggle, and united under the glorious Spanish flag, which is ever covered with laurels, let us fight with the conviction that victory will crown our efforts, and to the challenge of our enemies let us oppose, with the decision of the Christian and the patriot, the cry of "Viva España!"

Your General,

BASILIO AUGUSTIN Y DAVILA.*

This was as fine a piece of vituperation as anything that Napoleon ever launched at his foes.

Dewey was still at Hong-Kong—completing his preparations, and awaiting the arrival of Oscar F. Williams, the American consul at Manila,† who was expected to bring important information—when, on April 25th, the governor of the colony requested him to leave the harbour, to prevent any breach of British neutrality. The squadron—now reinforced by the Baltimore, which reached Hong-Kong on the 22d—accordingly withdrew to Mirs Bay, in Chinese territory, about thirty miles distant. Mr. Williams arrived on the 27th, and in the

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* This is an instance of the Spanish custom of adding the maiden name of a man's mother to his own surname, to distinguish him from others of the same name.

† Mr. Williams left Manila on April 23d, turning over the affairs of his office to E. H. Rawson Walker, the British consul, whose services were afterward acknowledged by Dewey as "of invaluable assistance," Mr. Walker being his "only means of communicating with the Spanish authorities, and the chief agent in the protection of foreign residents." The Belgian consul, M. André, also did valuable work of the sort.
afternoon of that day the start for Manila was made. Besides the Olympia (flagship, Captain C. V. Gridley commanding; Commander Lamberton, chief of the commodore’s staff), the Baltimore (Captain N. M. Dyer), the Raleigh (Captain J. B. Coghlan), and the Boston (Captain Frank Wildes), the fleet included the small cruiser Concord (1,700 tons, Commander Asa Walker), the gunboat Petrel (890 tons, Commander E. P. Wood), the two colliers, and the revenue cutter Hugh McCulloch, now serving as a despatch boat.

Accommodating its speed to that of the heavy colliers, the squadron crossed the China Sea together. On the morning of the 30th, when the shore of Luzon was sighted, the ships were cleared for action, nets were stretched around the boats to lessen the danger from flying splinters, and on some of the cruisers chain cables were coiled around the ammunition hoists. The ingenuity of this last device for increasing the protection of a vulnerable point was afterward warmly commended by an English naval critic, who apparently did not know that it was used on board the Kearsarge when she fought and won her famous duel with the Alabama. Captain Winslow went into action with his engines protected by sheet chains hung over the side of his vessel.

Steaming southward, in the afternoon of the 30th the American ships reached Subig Bay, an indentation of the coast about forty miles north of Manila. Dewey had information that Montojo, the Spanish admiral, intended to meet the attacking squadron at this point, and he sent the Boston and the Concord into the bay, which is about seven miles deep, in search of the enemy; but the Spaniards’ plans had been changed, and they were not there. During the reconnaissance, the Baltimore, lying in the entrance of the bay, fired the first shot of the campaign in overhauling a Spanish
schooner—of which, however, it was not thought worth while to make a prize. Late in the afternoon the commodore ordered the fleet to lie to, to avoid appearing before Manila by daylight, and summoned his commanding officers to a council on board the flagship. He informed them that he meant to enter Manila Bay during the night.

The bay is a large sheet of water, running inland for thirty miles, and the same distance in average width, though much narrower at the mouth. In the entrance are two high rocky islands, Corregidor and Caballo, dividing the waterway into two channels, the Boca Chica (Little Mouth) on the north, and the Boca Grande (Great Mouth) on the south. In the latter, which is about six miles wide, rises the isolated rock of El Fraile (The Friar); in the former are La Monja (The Nun) and several other islets. Corregidor was fortified and garrisoned by the Spaniards; there were small batteries on Caballo and El Fraile, and on the mainland at Punta Restinga, south of the entrance, and at Mariveles, Punta Gorda, and Punta Lasisi, north of it. None of them contained guns of more than fifteen-centimetre (six-inch) calibre.

An hour before midnight the American fleet reached the mouth of the bay and turned into the Boca Grande, steaming at eight knots. The ships were in column, the Olympia leading, and the Baltimore, Raleigh, Petrel, Concord, and Boston following in order. No lights were shown except one at the stern, to guide the vessel next in line. There was a half moon, and the night was light enough to make it a risky matter to run through a channel that was commanded by batteries and might be laid with mines. In a published narrative by Lieutenant Fiske,* of the Petrel, it is stated that not an

* The Century Magazine, November, 1898.
Sketch map of Manila and the surrounding country.
officer in the squadron had been in the bay before, but this is not quite correct, for Captain Gridley was at Manila in 1894, when he commanded the Marion. Nevertheless, Lieutenant Calkins, the navigator of the Olympia, who piloted the fleet, had a very difficult and responsible task.

Commodore Dewey had been perfectly correct in his belief that the Spaniards would not dream of his forcing an entrance into the bay before daybreak. Their watch was not a very sharp one, for half of the ships had passed Corregidor before any alarm was given. Then a rocket went up from the island, and a little later the guns on El Fraile opened fire. The Raleigh and the Concord replied, and the rear-guard ship, the Boston, turned aside to pass close to the battery, not a formidable one, and hammered it until it was silenced.

The McCulloch and the two colliers formed a separate column to the right of the war ships. As they passed into the bay the former signalled that her chief engineer had been disabled by sudden illness. It was a stroke of heat prostration or of apoplexy, and in twenty minutes Engineer Randall was dead—the only life lost in the attack on Manila.

Past the batteries, and untouched by a hostile shot, the fleet advanced at its leisure toward the Philippine capital, still about twenty miles distant. There was time to spare, as it was useless to arrive there before daybreak, and the crews, who had stood to their guns since nightfall, had three or four hours for such rest as they could get. At four o'clock coffee and hardtack were served out. At five the ships were opposite the city, and it was light enough to see that there were no men-of-war in the port. Turning southward again, the squadron moved toward the peninsula of Cavité, which projects into the bay a few miles below Manila, and on which the Spaniards had their naval arsenal; and here Montojo's fleet was speedily descried. As
the American ships circled toward Cavite, a few shots were exchanged with a shore battery in Manila—that of the Luneta, consisting of twenty-five-centimetre (ten-inch) Krupp guns—but at too great a range to be effective.

Montojo had only one vessel that could be ranked as high as the second class—his flagship, the Reina Cristina, a steel cruiser of 3,500 tons, launched at Ferrol in 1886, and armed with six six-inch and fourteen smaller guns. Her consorts were two small English-built cruisers, the Isla de Cuba and the Isla de Luzon, 1,030 tons each, and two others, old iron ships, slightly larger but less efficient, the Don Antonio de Ulloa, which was under repair, and the Don Juan de Austria; a still more ancient wooden vessel, whose engines were disabled—the Castilla, 3,342 tons; two 500-ton gunboats, the General Lezo and the Marques del Duero; and four small torpedo boats. There were also two transports, the Manila and the Isla de Mindanao, and the Velasco, another obsolete iron ship which was undergoing repairs. In offensive and defensive power the squadron was far inferior to Dewey’s fine quartette of cruisers, but it had a great advantage in position, fighting in its own waters, where it knew the ranges, and had the aid of batteries on shore.

Montojo had abandoned his plan of meeting Dewey in Subig Bay only two days before, having found the fortifications there to be worthless. In Manila Bay he had a stronger base, but he had not had time to complete his preparations. Whatever may have been the case elsewhere, at Cavite the Spaniards had an abundant store of war material. When the American marines occupied the arsenal, they found it well supplied and apparently well kept. The most serious defect in the Spanish defences was the lack of mines. It was believed on
the Olympia that as she approached Montojo’s squadron two mines were exploded in the bay, ahead of her. Captain Gridley reported so, and in Dewey’s first detailed account of the action he also said that “while advancing to the attack, two mines were exploded ahead of the flagship, too far to be effective.” In a statement given by one of the Olympia’s engineers it is asserted that a mine went off twelve hundred yards in front of the ship. At such a distance, in the dim light of dawn, it would be easy to mistake the splash of a shell, which sometimes throws the water masthead high, for the explosion of a torpedo. Spanish projectiles frequently fell as much as twelve hundred yards short of their mark, but it would be an extraordinary miscalculation to discharge an electric mine nearly three quarters of a mile away from its intended victim.

On the other hand, the reports of Dewey’s other captains, and the narratives of Lieutenant Fiske, of Engineer Ford of the Baltimore,* and of several other eye-witnesses, do not record any explosion of mines. The official report of Admiral Montojo, in which he details his preparations for defence, mentions no mines; nor does the account published in the Diario de Manila of May 4th. Lieutenant Fiske expressly states that the Spaniards had none in place, though some mine cases lay in the arsenal, unfinished. This is confirmed by Montojo’s statement † that he had repeatedly asked for torpedoes

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* An American Cruiser in the Far East.
† Reported by the China Mail’s correspondent in Manila shortly after the battle.

A comparison of Gridley’s report with Montojo’s confirms the suggestion that the splash of shells was mistaken for the explosion of mines. The captain of the Olympia says: “At 5.06 two submarine mines were exploded near. At 5.15 battery on Shangly Point opened fire.” Montojo records that “at 5 the batteries on Sanglely Point opened fire. The two first shots fell short and to the left of the leading vessel. These shots were not answered by the enemy. . . . At 5.15 I made signal that our squadron open fire.”
from Madrid, but had received none, and his attempts to make them had been failures.

The peninsula of Cavité is shaped like a two-pronged fork, with the small bay of Canacao between the prongs, and the larger bay of Bakoor between the peninsula and the mainland of Luzon. Montojo’s ships were drawn up in line across Bakoor Bay, their left resting on the Cavité arsenal, their right on the shore near the village of Bakoor. The two disabled vessels, the Castilla and the Ulloa, were moored close to Sanglely Point, the former having a row of lighters, filled with sand, to protect her water line. The Velasco was tied up at the arsenal, and was not in the action. The six other cruisers and gunboats were at anchor, with steam up. In spite of the warning sounded by the firing at the mouth of the harbour, Dewey’s attack apparently took the Spaniards by surprise, for many of the officers and men were ashore, and came hurrying out in boats as the battle began.

The American ships came on in the same order as before, attacking in column, as Nelson did at the Nile and at Trafalgar, but veering to the right, so as to turn their port broadsides to the enemy. The Spanish batteries and men-of-war had been firing for about half an hour when at twenty minutes to six, and at a distance of three miles, Dewey gave the order for the Olympia to reply. The engagement soon became general. Every ship in both fleets was using every gun it could bring to bear, and the Spaniards had the assistance of five shore batteries. None of the five, however, proved dangerous to the American vessels, the most formidable being that on Sanglely Point, consisting of two fifteen-centimetre (six-inch) Ordonez guns, of which Montojo reported that only one could be used. A mile southward, at Canacao, was another battery of a single twelve-centimetre (five-inch)
THE BATTLE OF MANILA BAY

gun, and a totally ineffective fire, at long range, was kept up from three points in Manila—by the heavy cannon of the Luneta, by some smaller guns on the mole at the mouth of the Pasig River, and by the old fort in the southern suburb of Malate.

To render them a more difficult mark, Dewey kept his ships passing slowly up and down in front of the Spanish line. Early in the action Montojo ordered all of his vessels that could do so to slip their anchors and get under way. Two of the torpedo boats boldly dashed out to attack the Olympia, but the American gunners did not allow them to get within striking distance. One was sunk, the other driven ashore disabled. The Reina Cristina also steamed out to attack at close quarters, but she too had to retreat, and the Spaniards made no further move until at the end of the battle they went inshore to sink, as a dog crawls into his kennel to die.

There being no armoured ships on either side, the result was simply a question of gunnery; and here the Americans had a great advantage in their more powerful batteries, and a still greater one in their vastly superior marksmanship. Whether from lack of training or from inability to preserve, in the stress and strain of battle, the steadiness of hand and eye that is needed for accurate gun practice, the Spaniards' fire was extraordinarily wild and ineffective. With about seventy guns firing for two hours at an enemy within easy range, they did practically no damage. Only one of their shells—a 4.7-inch projectile from the Isla de Cuba—injured a gun or a man in the American fleet, striking a six-inch gun on the Baltimore, disabling it, and sending out a shower of splinters that wounded Lieutenant Kellogg, Ensign Irwin, and six seamen, none of them seriously. Besides this the Baltimore was hit or grazed by four other shots, the Olympia by eight, the Boston by four, the Raleigh by one, the Petrel
by one, but none of them left more than a slight mark. The Concord was not struck. Indeed, the chief injury received by Dewey’s ships was the shattering of boats and skylights, the starting of planks, and the breaking of wires by the concussion of their own artillery.

On the other hand, the American fire was exceedingly accurate and destructive. As they passed along the Spanish line Dewey’s gunners paid special attention to the Reina Cristina, their only antagonist that could be considered formidable, and Montojo’s flagship suffered terribly. Early in the action a shell exploded in the forecastle, and killed or disabled the crews of four of her rapid-fire guns. The helmsman on the bridge being wounded by splinters struck from the foremast, Lieutenant Nunez took the wheel and kept it, amid the hail of shot, until another shell destroyed the steering gear. The admiral’s flag was shot from the mizzenmast, one gun after another was put out of action, the smokestack was riddled, the engines were struck and damaged. A shell burst in the hospital, killing wounded men who were being treated there; another set fire to the crews’ quarters, and another caused a serious blaze close to one of the magazines. Altogether, as reported by Montojo, the flagship was struck seventy times.

Both here and on the other ships, the Spaniards fought with great bravery. The Cristina’s guns were fired until only two gunners remained unhurt. Finally, with his ship hopelessly disabled and burning in half a dozen places, with more than half her crew killed or wounded, with her boilers and magazines likely to explode at any moment, the admiral, who had himself been wounded by a splinter from a shell, ordered her abandoned. The boats were launched, and Montojo was rowed over to the Isla de Cuba. Many of the crew jumped overboard and swam to other vessels or to the shore. Captain
Cadars, the Cristina's chief officer, stayed on the ship to the last, and was killed by a shell as he was about to leave her.

The rest of the Spanish vessels had suffered almost as severely. The wooden Castilla was no better than a floating coffin under the fire of the American guns, and she had burned and sunk where she lay. As Lieutenant Fiske remarks, Montojo would have been wiser to dismantle her before the battle, and mount her guns on shore. The whole fleet was practically silenced and wrecked when, at twenty-five minutes to eight, after passing five times along the Spanish line, and gradually drawing closer until he was within two thousand yards of it, Dewey ordered his squadron to cease firing. It had been reported to him that the Olympia's ammunition was running low, only fifteen rounds remaining for her five-inch rapid-fire battery; and he drew out of range, to communicate with his other ships and redistribute his supply of shot and shell. It was soon discovered that the report of a shortage was a mistake, but the commodore remained out in the bay for three hours and a half, receiving reports of casualties—or, rather, of the extraordinary absence of casualties—from his captains, and giving his men time for rest and refreshment. During this interval he sent in a message to the governor-general, informing him that if the city batteries continued to fire the American fleet would bombard Manila. The warning silenced them.

At sixteen minutes past eleven Dewey gave the signal for returning to the attack, and the squadron moved inshore again, the Baltimore now leading the way. Montojo had moved his ships—all that could be moved—close to the point of Cavite. Only one of them—the Antonio de Ulloa—was still able to fire a gun. Most of them were in flames, and one of them after another was scuttled and
abandoned. The admiral himself had been carried to a convent in the town. A few more rounds from the American cruisers completed the work of destruction, and at twenty minutes to one, the Spanish ships being wrecked and sunk, the shore batteries silenced, and the arsenal having hauled down its flag, Dewey steamed northward again to Manila,

![Sketch map showing position of the sunken Spanish ships after the battle of Manila Bay, May 1, 1898.](image)

leaving the Petrel—whose light draught enabled her to go into the shallow water inshore—to destroy or capture anything that might still remain afloat. Commander Wood carried out his commission effectually, sending his executive officer, Lieutenant Hughes, with a boat’s crew to set fire to the scuttled gunboats, while his navigator, Lieutenant Fiske, seized and brought out the tugs Rapido and
Hercules and three steam launches, without any attempt at resistance by the Spanish soldiers and seamen on the beach at Cavité. The coast-survey vessel Manila, which had been run ashore at Bakoor, was afterward hauled off uninjured and added to the list of prizes.

Thus was executed one of the most brilliant and completely successful naval operations in history. The morning's work of Dewey's squadron had obliterated Spain's naval power in the East, and had given him command of the great Philippine archipelago. All this had been done without losing a single man in a battle in which the enemy's loss, as reported to Madrid by Montojo, was three hundred and eighty-one killed and wounded—besides the destruction of a fleet and the ruin of a colonial empire.

In the afternoon, while the victorious squadron was anchored off Manila, which lay at the mercy of its guns, Mr. Rawson Walker, the British consul, came out to the Olympia and requested, on behalf of resident foreigners of twenty-one nationalities, that the city should not be shelled. Dewey consented on certain conditions, which included a supply of coal for his ships, and control of the cable to Hong-Kong. Governor-General Augustin refused his terms, but there was no further firing. A bombardment would have caused frightful destruction, and would have been of no equivalent military advantage, as Dewey could not land a force sufficient to hold the city against the insurgents who would have swarmed in to loot it.

On the following day (May 2d) the commodore moved his ships back to Cavité, where they took up a position which they were to hold for many weeks. On the 3d the arsenal, which the Spaniards had evacuated, was occupied—not in time to prevent some plundering by the rebels, who also despoiled
the neighbouring villages of Cavite and San Roque. On the same day the Baltimore and the Raleigh went over to Corregidor Island and received the surrender of its garrison, which was released on parole.

During the battle, General Augustin had sent to Madrid a vaguely worded despatch which, though it admitted the loss of two ships, gave the impression that the Spaniards had the best of the fight. It created momentary jubilation in the Spanish capital, which was gradually changed to sorrow and indignation as later reports, though still very indefinite, left no doubt of a disaster. On the 3d of May, when the Cortes met, Señor Salmeron, the republican leader, demanded an explanation, and declared that it would be necessary to establish the responsibility attaching to the existing Government. Sagasta replied by appealing to the house to subordinate partisanship to patriotism. Communication between Madrid and Manila had ended on the previous day, when Dewey cut the cable of which Augustin had refused him the use.

In America, meanwhile, there was intense suspense, in the absence of definite news. Dewey's success was not doubted, but no one dreamed that it could have been won without serious loss. Not until May 4th did the commodore send the McCulloch speeding off to Hong-Kong, the nearest cable station, with despatches for the Navy Department, and on the 7th the country was thrilled by his laconic announcement of his magnificent and bloodless victory.

Five more weeks were to pass before a detailed story of the battle was received. By that time an army was on its way across the Pacific to reap for America the fruit of the fleet's great achievement of the 1st of May.
CHAPTER VIII

THE CUBAN BLOCKADE, MAY, 1898

The course of events in the chief theatre of war during the months of May and June may be thus briefly summed up:

1. Plans for the immediate invasion of Cuba, which were abandoned or postponed; the blockade, meanwhile, being maintained and extended.

2. The coming of Cervera's fleet, and the movements of the squadrons under Sampson and Schley to intercept it.

3. The "bottling" of Cervera at Santiago, which thereupon became the centre of naval and military operations, and the scene of the chief sea fight and the only land battle of the war.

The first army of invasion was formed by moving men from Camp Thomas, at Chickamauga, to Tampa, where in the early days of May a corps was organized, designated as the Fifth Corps, and commanded by General William R. Shafter—a brigadier in the regular army,* appointed a major-general of volunteers. On May 2d it was decided, at a White House conference—in which General Miles and Admiral Sicard took part, as well as the President and Secretaries Alger and Long—to move forty or fifty thousand men to some point near Havana, and attack or besiege the capital on the land

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* The general officers of the regular army, just before the war, were Major-Generals Miles (commanding the army), Merritt, and Brooke; Brigadier-Generals Otis, Coppinger, Shafter, Graham, Wade, and Merriam; and the heads of the staff bureaus, Brigadier-Generals Greely (chief signal officer), Breckinridge (inspector-general), Flagler
side. On May 9th Shafter was instructed by Secretary Alger to "move his command, under protection of navy, and seize and hold Mariel, or most important point on north coast of Cuba and where territory is ample to land and deploy army."

Mariel is twenty-six miles from Havana, and is the nearest harbour west of the city. General Wade, in command at Tampa, was to send reinforcements as fast as they could be brought from Chickamauga and other points. He was directed to "have troops fully equipped; send abundance of ammunition, and ship with them food for men and animals for sixty days, to be followed by four months' supplies."

It was vastly easier to issue these instructions than to execute them. There was a great deficiency of ammunition and of supplies and equipments of all sorts, and on the 10th orders came from Washington to defer sailing until May 16th. Meanwhile, to get the army in motion, twelve thousand men were to be transported from Tampa to Key West, as a halfway station on the route to Cuba. This

(chief of ordnance), Sternberg (surgeon-general), Lieber (judge-advocate-general), Stanton (paymaster-general), Wilson (chief of engineers), Ludington (quartermaster-general), Corbin (adjutant-general), and Eagan (commissary-general).

The following army corps were organized during the war:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corps</th>
<th>Commander</th>
<th>Where organized</th>
<th>Strength, June 30th.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First</td>
<td>Major-General Brooke</td>
<td>Camp Thomas</td>
<td>58,548</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third</td>
<td>Major-General Wade</td>
<td>Camp Alger</td>
<td>23,511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second</td>
<td>Major-General Graham</td>
<td>Camp Alger</td>
<td>23,511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth</td>
<td>Major-General Coppinger</td>
<td>Mobile</td>
<td>20,816</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fifth</td>
<td>Major-General Shafter</td>
<td>Tampa</td>
<td>15,736</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sixth</td>
<td>Major-General Wilson</td>
<td>Tampa (moved to Jacksonville)</td>
<td>19,156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seventh</td>
<td>Major-General Lee</td>
<td>Tampa (moved to Jacksonville)</td>
<td>19,156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eighth</td>
<td>Major-General Merritt</td>
<td>San Francisco and Manila.</td>
<td>22,989</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Sixth Corps was never organized; General Wilson was assigned to command a division of the First Corps.
also was speedily found to be impracticable, as there was no adequate supply of water on the island, and nothing had been done to provide it.

Finally the idea of attacking Havana with a large army was given up, and Shafter was ordered to take five thousand men for a "reconnaissance in force." The plan was to effect a landing on the south coast, in Santiago or Puerto Principe province, and open up communications with Gomez; but this, too, fell through. Besides the difficulty of equipping an adequate force, the wet season was beginning in Cuba, with its terrible menace to the health of unacclimated invaders; the fortifications of Havana had been greatly strengthened; there was risk in sending transports to sea while there existed the possibility of an attack by Cervera’s fleet; and when the blockade of Santiago ended this latter danger, the whole plan of campaign was changed.

What may be called legalized filibustering expeditions were a feature of these early days of the war, when the assistance of the Cuban insurgents was valued much more highly than it came to be upon closer acquaintance. Official relations with them were first opened by Lieutenant A. S. Rowan, of the military information bureau. Charged with messages to General Calixto Garcia, the exact nature of which has not been disclosed, Lieutenant Rowan was ordered to Jamaica early in April, to await the inevitable outbreak of war. When it came, he crossed to the south coast of Cuba in a fishing smack, in company with agents of the insurgent junta in Jamaica, and landed between Santiago and Cape Cruz, on April 25th. On May 1st, after an arduous journey through mountains and forests, he met Garcia at the town of Bayamo, which had just been evacuated by its Spanish garrison and occupied by the insurgents. He delivered his de-
spatches, rode on across the province of Santiago, which he found to be a desolated wilderness, to the north coast, and on the 5th sailed from the harbour of Manati, with five companions, in an open rowboat, which was so small that its occupants were forced to sit upright with their provisions between their knees. They were picked up by a Bahama sponging steamer, and on May 11th Lieutenant Rowan’s adventurous journey ended at Key West, whence he hurried to Washington to report.

The first expedition with arms and supplies for the insurgents had left Key West a few days before, under the command of Colonel R. H. Hall, of the Fourth Infantry. Its purpose was accomplished, and the honour of being the first American officer to set foot on Cuban soil during the war was claimed for one of its members, Lieutenant W. M. Crofton, of the First Infantry; but Lieutenant Rowan would seem to possess a prior title to this particular distinction.

Another expedition, which left Key West May 11th on the transport Gussie, with a cargo of arms and ammunition, and a hundred men of the First Infantry, commanded by Lieutenant J. H. Dorst, was less successful. At Puerto Cabanas (about forty miles west of Havana), where she attempted to make a landing, she found herself confronted by a strong force of Spaniards. Even with the assistance of the gunboats Wasp and Manning, the enemy could not be dislodged, and the Gussie had to withdraw. Much of the blame for her failure was charged to the newspapers, which had openly advertised the starting of the expedition two days before it sailed; and as a result, the military censorship of press despatches became more strict.*

* The chief signal officer, Brigadier-General A. W. Greely, speaks of this “most responsible as well as most delicate duty” in his annual report: “The great daily journals of the country not only held up the hands of the chief signal officer, but also refrained at critical times
No news was published of an expedition which started from Tampa a week later. For this eight hundred Cubans had been recruited—an ill-equipped, undisciplined regiment; so undisciplined that on the night of embarkation nearly half of them straggled down to the pier too late for their steamer, the Florida, which took the rest to the harbour of Banes, on the north coast of the province of Santiago.

There were a few other similar expeditions, but their movements were kept so quiet that their history can not now be written fully; and, indeed, it would scarcely be worth while to write it, as they had little or no effect upon the course of the war. One was diverted into a filibustering attack upon Santo Domingo.* What was probably the last went from Key West on the transports Florida and Fanita, June 25th, with two hundred Cubans, and fifty coloured troopers of the Tenth Cavalry, escorted by the auxiliary cruiser Peoria. After an unsuccessful attempt to land near Trinidad, and

from publishing information detrimental to the public interests. All messages to the West Indies were carefully supervised. Through the signal-corps censorship a rich harvest of information was gained from the telegrams of newspaper correspondents, blockade runners, personal despatches, etc.

"While hundreds of improper messages were quietly deposited in the waste-basket, others were allowed to pass freely as leading up to other and more valuable information."

The War and Navy Departments, of course, were from the first very sparing of information for the press, and on April 29th Secretary Alger issued an order absolutely forbidding his subordinates to answer any questions from reporters. The New York Sun said on May 1st: "The system inaugurated yesterday is more stringent than a press censorship. A query in regard to the most inconsequential matter connected with the routine work of the department was treated in the same way as a query in reference to the next important strategic move; a refusal to answer was given in all cases. The department believes that some recent publications have caused embarrassment to the plans of the Government in its campaign against Spain."

* Commander Clover, of the Bancroft, reported overhauling this expedition, on board the Fanita, off Key West, on May 27th, and allowing it to proceed, not without some misgiving as to its purpose. Its leader was a "General Rodriguez," who seems to have been the Dominican revolutionist Jiminez. A full account of the incident was published in the New York Herald, August 6, 1899.
another at Tunas, a little farther east—where the Cubans were repulsed with some loss by a Spanish detachment—the men were put ashore at Palo Alto, in Puerto Principe province, and joined Maximo Gomez, who, according to the story told by a volunteer member of the expedition, gave them a somewhat chilly reception, declaring that he needed arms and supplies, not recruits. During July they took part in some minor engagements with the Cuban general’s nephew, Miguel Gomez, who horrified his American allies by shooting prisoners and looting a captured town (Arroyo Blanco). At the close of the war, after suffering much hardship, they made their way to the north coast.

It was naturally desired that the Cuban coast should be more effectively patrolled, but during the month of May, with the limited number of ships available, it was not found possible to watch any ports except those covered by the proclamation of April 21st. Indeed, it was not until the end of June, when Sampson’s fleet had grown from twenty vessels to almost a hundred, that an extension of the blockade was declared. The whole coast of Cuba was a line of two thousand miles—“greater in extent,” as Sampson said, “than that patrolled by nearly six hundred ships during the civil war, and one in many respects offering greater difficulties.” To watch even a small part of it was a tedious and exhausting service for the American ships and sailors, without many exciting incidents.

Sampson’s bombardment of the Matanzas batteries (April 27th), already chronicled, was followed by a series of small brushes with the enemy, the first occurring two days later off Cienfuegos. At this point, owing to its distance from a coaling base (it is six hundred miles from Key West by way of Cape San Antonio), and to Sampson’s lack of ships, it was impossible, in the early weeks of the war, to
maintain a strict blockade. The first American ships to appear there were the cruiser Marblehead, the gunboat Nashville, and the converted yacht Eagle, on April 29th. Sampson had detached this little squadron, whose senior officer was Commander McCalla, of the Marblehead, with orders to intercept two Spanish transports which had been reported as bound for Cienfuegos. Unfortunately the Marblehead and the Eagle ran aground, losing twelve hours; and McCalla was too late to catch the intended prizes. He was off the port, and had captured the coasting steamer Argonauta, when the torpedo boat Gallicia and two other small armed vessels came out and fired on the Eagle, seconded by batteries on shore. The American ships replied in kind, and drove the Spaniards off, disabling the Gallicia, which limped back into port with a shot through her boilers. Immediately after the brief engagement McCalla was obliged to withdraw, as his coal was running low.

On the same day the New York fired upon forts and a company of cavalry at Puerto Cabanas, the scene of the Gussie’s repulse. The Spaniards maintained a cavalry patrol along many parts of the blockaded coast, and on May 2d the gunboat Wilmington and the torpedo boat Ericsson had some target practice of the same sort. On the 6th and 7th the torpedo boats Dupont and Winslow and the yacht Hornet fired upon the shore batteries near Matanzas, where the Spanish engineers had resumed work since Sampson’s visit. On the 7th the gunboat Vicksburg and the revenue cutter Morrill chased a schooner under the Havana fortifications and exchanged shots with them.

The most serious engagements of the blockade, and the first in which American lives were lost, were fought on May 11th, at Cardenas and Cienfuegos. At the former port—which lies on one of those deep indentations so characteristic of the
Cuban coast, with an entrance barred by a chain of keys—were three Spanish gunboats, which constantly showed themselves at the mouth of the harbour, and one day repelled an attack by the torpedo boat Foote. Early on the morning of May 11th, when the gunboats Machias and Wilmington, the revenue cutter Hudson, and the torpedo boat Winslow were off the port, Commander Merry, of the Machias, the senior officer present, after a consultation with Commander Todd, of the Wilmington, ordered an attack, in hope of capturing the daring Spaniards.

The bay of Cardenas is shallow, and the main entrance was believed to be laid with mines operated from a station on Diana Key, one of the obstructing islands. The Machias stayed outside to attack this point, while the three other vessels picked their way into the harbour by another channel through the keys, and moved across the wide bay toward the town. The Winslow, leading the way, was within a mile of the wharves, which were lined with small craft, when a hot fire suddenly opened upon her, apparently coming from a battery at the water's edge, as well as from the Spanish gunboats. She made a spirited reply with her puny armament of three one-pounder rapid-fire guns, and the Wilmington and Hudson joined in the bombardment, doing serious damage to the enemy's vessels and some to the town, but failing to silence the Spaniards' fire, which was concentrated on the Winslow, and fairly riddled her. One of her engines was struck and injured, her steering gear was shot away, a shell exploded in one of her boilers, another started a fire in her paint room, and another disabled one of her guns; and she was drifting helplessly toward the shore when her commanding officer, Lieutenant J. B. Bernadou, signalled for help, and the Hudson steamed up to tow her out of her imminent peril. Lieutenant Berna-
dou had been wounded in the thigh by a splinter, but had stuck to his post, stopping the flow of blood by means of a tourniquet improvised with a towel and an empty shell case.

A line was thrown from the Hudson to the Winslow, but fell short. At the second attempt, as the torpedo-boat's crew stood ready to grasp the rope, a shell exploded among a group of them, instantly killing the second officer, Ensign Bagley, and two seamen, and mortally wounding two others. Ensign Bagley, a very promising young North Carolinian, was the only officer of the United States navy killed in action during the war. Finally the line was made fast, and the Winslow was taken out of the bay and to Key West.

The skirmish at Cardenas, which was more like a defeat than anything else that the American arms encountered during the war, showed that to pit such unprotected vessels as torpedo boats against even mediocre shore batteries may be magnificent, but is not war. Even for the routine work of the blockade these frail craft were ill adapted, and probably they would not have been ordered to this duty but for the urgent need of all the ships that could be mustered into service. They are, of course, designed for a special purpose, armament, protection, and seagoing ability being sacrificed to the power to make a lightninglike dash at the enemy in battle. Of their condition after the four months' campaign Engineer-in-Chief Melville said in his official report: "Nearly every one has had some accident, and the machinery of some at the close of the war was in a condition that can only be described as horrible."

It has been charged, or at least hinted, that in taking the Winslow so close to an enemy whose strength was imperfectly known, Lieutenant Ber­nadou was guilty of the rashness to which young commanders are naturally prone. The charge is
Cable cutting at Cienfuegos, May 11.

answered, as far as the lieutenant is concerned, by the fact that he was acting throughout under the orders of superior officers.

As it was, the American loss—five killed and three wounded—was small, and the Winslow's injuries, though numerous, were so slight that she was ready for sea again a few hours after reaching Key West. The Spaniards, on the other hand, had suffered considerably. They reported one of their gunboats, the Antonio Lopez, a total wreck, and much damage along the water front of the town. The Machias, moreover, had shelled and demolished the station on Diana Key. A boat's crew, commanded by Ensign A. L. Willard, went ashore on the key and hoisted the Stars and Stripes above the Spanish barracks—the first appearance of the American flag as an emblem of conquest on Cuban soil.

On the same day, soon after sunrise, four boats—the steam and sailing launches of the Marblehead and the Nashville, commanded by Lieutenant Winslow, of the latter vessel, a son of Captain Winslow of the old Kearsarge—made a daring and partly successful attempt to cut the telegraph cables that connected Cienfuegos with Havana and with Europe. For more than three hours the boats' crews grappled for the submarine wires, going within sixty feet of the beach, in a heavy sea, and working with the utmost coolness under a constant rifle fire from troops on shore. Two lines were brought up and cut, and another small one had been found when the Spanish fire became so heavy that Lieutenant Winslow, who had been shot through the hand, was obliged to order the launches to withdraw from their perilous position. The Marblehead and the Nashville, together with the revenue cutter Windom, though they had not been able to drive the Spaniards from their cover on the beach,
THE CUBAN BLOCKADE

had wrecked the cable station; and as the boats had been fired on from the lighthouse at the harbour mouth, it was also demolished. The Eagle, meanwhile, destroyed an outlying lighthouse (Piedras Key) and lightship (Diego Perez Island), and sent ashore their keepers—who had not been paid for months, and in one case had had no food for three days. The American loss in the launches was twelve men wounded, of whom two died.

The severing of the ocean cables landing in Cuba was part of the plan for a complete blockade of the island.* A specially fitted steamer, the Adria, was commissioned for this difficult and frequently dangerous work, but she proved a failure. Better results were gained by the St. Louis and the Wompatuck. The big liner and her small consort, a tug bought from the Standard Oil Company, had little equipment for fighting, but Captain Goodrich and Lieutenant Jungen, their commanding officers, on May 18th took them under the batteries at the mouth of the harbour of Santiago de Cuba and severed the cable running to Jamaica. On the following day they were repulsed in an attempt to cut the French line near its landing at Guantanamo; but on the 20th Captain Goodrich found and broke it off the Haitian coast,† and a few days later he reported to the Navy Department his belief that

* This step was decided upon only after much hesitation in Washington. Sampson's first orders were to cut no cables, and on April 27th Secretary Long telegraphed: "We are considering the advantage of declaring telegraph cables neutral." Three days later, when it was known that Cervera had sailed from the Cape Verde Islands, Sampson was authorized to destroy the cables on the south coast of Cuba. Of course it was unnecessary to cut those that ran northward to the United States.

† It was claimed by the Spaniards—and correctly, it appears—that this was a breach of international law. A neutral cable within the enemy's territorial waters must take the chances of war; in neutral waters, or in the high seas, it is protected by the rights of neutrals ('The Spanish-American War, by Captain Severo Gomez Nunez, translated and published by the United States Office of Naval Intelligence, page 58).
"the island of Cuba is now isolated, telegraphically speaking." This same announcement was made more than once, but always prematurely,* for when Santiago fell it still had its cables to Havana and Madrid. It was fortunate for the American forces, and perhaps for the Spaniards, too, that such was the case, for these wires carried to Cervera the orders that sent his squadron from its stronghold in Santiago harbour to destruction under Sampson's guns, precipitating the fall of the Cuban city and bringing near the end of the war.

* The mistake may have been due to the fact (reported by Admiral Sampson, July 19th) that the Spaniards had laid dummy cables, so that it was almost impossible to know when a "live wire" had been cut.
CHAPTER IX

THE COMING OF CERVERA

Meanwhile, in the early days of May, the situation in the West Indies was changed by the appearance of Cervera’s fleet as a factor—indeed, as the central factor—in the campaign. Although its strength was small in comparison with the whole American naval force in the Atlantic, the Spanish squadron was powerful enough, with Sampson’s ships scattered in Cuban waters, and a long stretch of scantily protected coast before it, to threaten grave danger at almost any point at which it might strike. To insure the command of the sea, and to make feasible the invasion of Cuba, it must be met and vanquished.

Cervera’s departure from St. Vincent on April 29th with the four cruisers, Maria Teresa (flagship; Captain Concas), Cristobal Colon (Captain Moreu), Vizcaya (Captain Eulate), and Almirante Oquendo (Captain Lagaza), and the three torpedo-boat destroyers, Furor (flagship of Captain Villamil, commanding the flotilla; the Furor commanded by Lieutenant Carlier), Pluton (Lieutenant Vazquez), and Terror (Lieutenant de la Rocha), was reported to the Navy Department on the same day. Secretary Long immediately informed Sampson that the Spanish fleet had sailed westward, probably for Cuba, but possibly to strike at the coast of the United States or to intercept the Oregon. With equal promptitude he despatched
THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR

the Harvard and St. Louis, which were at New York, waiting for orders, to cruise off Martinique and Guadeloupe to watch for the Spaniards and cable the earliest news of their movements. Two days later (May 1st) another of the American liners, the Yale, was sent out to circle about Porto Rico. It was not thought likely that Cervera would make direct for Cuba without calling at some of the intervening islands, either for coal, for communication with Madrid, or for news of the military situation; and it was fully expected that one of these speedy scouts would be able to give ample warning of his approach.

Behind this first line of the American naval defences was Sampson’s fleet, which was now called upon to present a double front to the enemy. To meet the emergency it was divided into two bodies. With the most powerful fighting ships the admiral faced westward to meet Cervera, leaving Commodore Watson* to maintain the blockade with a squadron consisting mainly of auxiliaries and “mosquito” craft. A thousand miles to the north, at Hampton Roads, the central point of the eastern coast, was Schley, with the Flying Squadron, ready to sally forth against the Spaniards if they should make any attempt to strike at American seaports.

It was calculated that Cervera would reach West Indian waters about May 8th—a reckoning that proved to be based upon an overestimate of his squadron’s speed. During the first three days of the month Sampson was at Key West with his flagship, the New York, and his two battle ships, the Iowa and Indiana, taking on coal and supplies and making preparations for the expected fight. In

* To relieve Admiral Sampson of part of his tremendous burden of work and responsibility, Commodore J. Crittenden Watson, who had been serving as governor of the United States Naval Home, was appointed (May 6th) to command the blockading squadron, under the
the early morning of the 4th the three great war ships slipped out singly, to rendezvous a few hours later at Juruco Cove, a dozen miles east of Havana. The small cruiser Detroit also met them here, and the four vessels steamed eastward toward San Juan, Porto Rico, which both Sampson and the Navy Department regarded as the admiral’s probable meeting place with the Spaniards. On their way, in the Nicholas Channel, they picked up the monitors Terror and Amphitrite, the small cruiser Montgomery, the torpedo boat Porter, the tug Wompatuck, and the collier Niagara. It was a heavily armed but not a swiftly moving squadron. It could, of course, go no faster than its slowest vessels, and the monitors were credited, at their best pace, with only ten knots an hour. Every one of Cervera’s vessels was rated at fully twice that speed. That a slow fleet should set out in search of a swift one was an anomaly which the Navy Department would doubtless have avoided had it been possible. Had the United States possessed only two or three more battle ships or good armoured cruisers, it would not have been necessary to undertake an offensive movement with vessels designed, as the monitors were, for coast defence.

As a matter of fact, Sampson could not make anything like ten knots an hour, even by taking the monitors in tow of the New York and the Iowa. He had expected to reach San Juan in five days’ steaming; it took him more than seven. On his way (May 6th) he sent the Montgomery in to Cape Haitien, on the north coast of Haiti, where she found a despatch from Secretary Long: admiral’s orders. His “broad pennant” was hoisted successively on the Cincinatti, the Dolphin, and other vessels. At the same time Commodore George C. Remey was sent from the Portsmouth (New Hampshire) navy yard to take charge of the station at Key West, the great naval base of the war. Later (June 21st) his command was extended to include “all vessels within signalling distance”—being still, of course, subordinate to Sampson.
Do not risk so crippling your vessels against fortifications as to prevent from soon afterward successfully fighting Spanish fleet, composed of Pelayo, Carlos V,* Oquendo, Vizcaya, Maria Teresa, Cristobal Colon, four deep-sea torpedo boats, if they should appear on this side.

Sampson replied with a request that the American liners should be ordered to meet him at St. Thomas. “Lacking the services of these vessels,” he told the Navy Department, “I will have to return to the west immediately. I shall await answer to this request at Cape Haitien, and if granted I will proceed to San Juan, probably destroying fortifications, establishing a temporary base at Culebra Island, to the east of Porto Rico, as entrance to San Juan is obstructed.”

Secretary Long replied that the scouts had been ordered to St. Thomas to await Sampson’s instructions, and on May 11th the squadron left Cape Haitien, moving slowly eastward, and sighting the lights of San Juan at three o’clock the next morning. At half past three breakfast was served; at four “all hands” was sounded for the final clearing for action. All this time the ships were slowly moving in toward the sleeping city. “One who was there,” said a correspondent who was with the fleet, “knows how the tiger feels as it creeps up on its prey.”

The harbour of San Juan is a wide bay sheltered from the Atlantic by a long, narrow island, which at its eastern end approaches the mainland of Porto Rico so closely that it is practically a peninsula. The city, a place of about thirty thousand people, lies at the western end of the island, facing toward

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* The whereabouts of the Spanish battle ships Pelayo and Emperador Carlos V was not positively known at this date. It was several times reported that they had sailed or were about to sail for American waters. Secretary Long was stating Cervera’s squadron at its maximum of possible strength.

† Admiral Sampson had been notified by Secretary Long (April 29th) of a report, which seems to have been correct, that the Spaniards had sunk hulks loaded with stones at the entrance of San Juan harbour.
the bay, and partly screened from the ocean by a ridge of high ground that rises abruptly along the beach some sixty feet above high tide. On the westernmost point of the ridge, directly overlooking the harbour entrance, stands the Morro Castle, an extensive but antiquated stone fortress. The other gate-post of the harbour is Cabras Island, and just inside of this is Fort Canuelo, a small work built on a sand bar.

Admiral Sampson had carefully formulated his plan of attack, and had sent detailed instructions, in writing, to each of his captains on the previous day. His five armour­clads advanced in column, led by the Iowa, the most powerful vessel in the fleet, to which the admiral, in expectation of heavy fighting, had temporarily transferred his flag. The Indiana, the New York, the Amphitrite, and the Terror followed in order. In advance of all, a thousand yards ahead of the Iowa, the Detroit sounded her way across the harbour mouth and under the Morro, with orders to signal when she found the water shoaling to ten fathoms. Five hundred yards to starboard of the column, the little Wompatuck steamed inshore, off Cabras Island, to anchor a boat at the ten-fathom mark—this to serve as a "turning stake" for the steersmen of the fighting ships when shore marks might be hidden by smoke. The Montgomery, bringing up the rear of the squadron, was instructed to take her station east of the harbour entrance and silence Fort Canuelo if its guns were fired. Both the small cruisers, and the Porter—which came up close alongside of the Iowa, screened by the big battle ship—were to watch for any of Cervera’s vessels that might sally out of the bay. If one of the Spanish torpedo-boat destroyers should make a dash at Sampson’s ironclads, the Detroit and the Montgomery were to sink it or drive it back; if a cruiser should come out, the Porter was
to rush in and torpedo it—at the imminent risk, of course, of her own destruction.

At sixteen minutes past five, when the Iowa was about a mile and a quarter from the Morro, now clearly visible in the dawning light, with the Detroit halfway between the flagship and the shore, the first shot of the action was fired from a six-inch gun in the battle ship's bows, and her whole starboard battery immediately followed it up. She was now opposite the mouth of the bay, and the officers on her deck—all the American officers scorned the protection of the conning towers—could see, to their great disappointment, that Cervera's squadron was not inside. No Spanish flags were in sight in the harbour or on the fortifications, and the garrison was apparently taken wholly by surprise. Eight minutes passed before there was any reply to the attack; then the old muzzle-loading guns in the Morro opened fire, seconded by the more formidable weapons—six-inch Krupp guns—in some newly built batteries farther east on the shore bluff.

In the absence of Cervera's fleet, Sampson's expedition had failed of its main purpose, but he did not countermand his orders for an attack upon the San Juan batteries. To use the words of his report to the Navy Department, he had determined "to develop their position and strength, and then, without waiting to reduce the city or subject it to a regular bombardment—which would require due notice—turn to the west," toward Cuba or Key West.

At a speed of four knots an hour, the five armouredclads steamed in front of the Morro, each ship pouring in her full fire as she passed. Then, led by the Iowa, the column turned seaward and out of range. From the flagship's opening shot to the last discharged by the Terror, the first round of the engagement had lasted nearly an hour. The enemy
Sketch map showing Sampson's order of attack at San Juan, Porto Rico, May 12, 1898.
had not suffered severely; although the breeze was very light, there was a long, rolling swell that made Sampson's vessels, especially the monitors, poor gun platforms, and the American gunners scarcely got the proper distance and elevation in their brief turn in the firing line. The Spaniards' marksman­ship was very much worse still, and not a ship had been touched, though the three small vessels in particular had been subject to a heavy fire at such close range that the admiral was alarmed for their safety—especially for that of the Detroit, which kept her place in front of the Morro. After the first round he ordered them out to sea, where they remained to the end of the battle, in company with the Wom­patuck, the collier Niagara, and two newspaper tugs. These last had accompanied the fleet from Key West—uninvited and not wholly welcome companions, whose presence was a novel feature in naval warfare.

Circling around at four or five miles' distance from shore, the armourclads passed a second and then a third time before the fortifications, which Sampson found to be much stronger than he had expected. In these rounds, using the heavy guns only—their gunners had complained that the smoke from the rapid-fire batteries made it difficult to aim—the American fire was much more accurate, while the enemy's shooting improved little. The Spaniards scored only three hits in the three hours' artillery duel. Two shells struck the Iowa, one doing no damage, the other, which exploded on the battle ship's deck as she withdrew after the second round, wounding three men; a third reached the New York at nearly three miles' range, as the action ended, destroying a boat, and killing one and wounding four of a gun crew.

The five American armourclads fired, in all, eight hundred and ninety-four shells, and the execution they did was considerable. The stone walls
THE COMING OF CERVERA

of the Morro were riddled, and during the latter part of the battle the old fortress was veiled in a cloud of dust from its shattered masonry, as well as smoke from its own guns; yet these were served to the last, their fire diminishing under the hail of shot, but never being silenced. As the fleet withdrew they sent shells after it almost as long as it was in sight. Many of the American projectiles wasted themselves on the sea wall below the Morro, which was built with embrasures that made it look like part of the fort. Many others passed over the batteries into the town, where they did great damage. This bombardment of noncombatants, without the "due notice" of which Sampson had spoken, must be set down as one of the shocking but inevitable incidents of war. It cannot be termed purely an accident, for the Terror deliberately fired some of her ten-inch shells over the bluff, "hoping," Captain Ludlow said in his official report, "to strike any vessel in the inner harbour"—which would scarcely seem to have been necessary, when it was known that Cervera's ships were not there; and missiles fired in this somewhat random fashion were as likely to fall in the city as in the port. Of twenty persons killed in San Juan, it is stated that fourteen were civilians.

At a quarter to eight o'clock Sampson signalled "Form column, course northwest," and the fleet slowly steamed away from land, reluctantly ceasing its fire as it drew out of range. Its last shot came from the after turret of the rear-guard ship, the Terror, at 8.15; and the action was over, though the Spanish gunners continued to waste their ammunition for a quarter of an hour.

Viewed as the sole achievement of a two-weeks' cruise by a fairly powerful fleet, the bombardment of San Juan was a disappointment. Had Cervera's squadron been there, the case would have been entirely different; and Sampson, of course, was no
whit blamable for his failure to encounter the Spaniards where both the admiral and the strategists at Washington had expected to find them. In itself, though the manoeuvres of the attacking fleet were well planned and efficiently executed, the action was resultless and indecisive. It gave the captain-general of Porto Rico, Macias, an opportunity to issue one of the usual Spanish bulletins, optimistic beyond the verge of mendacity, declaring that his redoubtable gunners had repulsed the Yankee ships.

Sampson could no doubt have forced the surrender of the Porto Rican capital—not, perhaps, without loss—but there was no adequate military advantage to be gained by doing so. He could hold the place only by keeping his squadron there, leaving Havana open to entry by a force as strong as Cervera's. As it was, he had not fulfilled his announced intention of destroying the fortifications. His ships, though practically unscathed by the enemy's fire, had suffered many slight injuries from the concussion of their own heavy guns; the Indiana's engines were out of order; the monitors had proved themselves a drag upon the squadron's movements; he would soon be in need of coal; and with no clew to Cervera's whereabouts it was useless, as well as scarcely practicable, to prolong the cruise. That afternoon he informed Secretary Long:

Have received no information of Spanish armed vessels. The Spanish fleet is not here. The United States fleet in great need of repairs; was seven days from Havana to San Juan. If I can not obtain information of the Spanish squadron by Yale at St. Thomas, I will leave tomorrow for blockade, Cuba.

This despatch was cabled to Washington from St. Thomas by the Yale, which fell in with Sampson's fleet as it left San Juan. She had been on her cruising station off Porto Rico since May 6th, and had several times reconnoitred San Juan harbour,
where she had observed two small gunboats and a transport.

There was no news of Cervera at the Danish island, and Sampson moved westward. On the 14th he was off Puerto Plata, in Santo Domingo, when a newspaper despatch boat brought him the unexpected report that Cervera, instead of making for American waters, had taken his squadron back to Spain, and was in the harbour of Cadiz. The admiral immediately sent the Porter speeding into Puerto Plata, with despatches requesting that if this latest intelligence were confirmed, the Navy Department should send a collier to San Juan, and that Commodore Remey, at Key West, should order the dynamite cruiser Vesuvius to the same rendezvous. With the Spanish fleet out of the West Indies, he had resolved to return to the Porto Rican capital, to complete his work there and capture the place. But Secretary Long's reply informed him that the elusive squadron had at length been sighted, and ordered him to "proceed with all possible despatch to Key West."

Cervera left St. Vincent with orders to sail for the Antilles, calling at some neutral port for information; then to make for either Cuba or Porto Rico, as his "skill, discretion, and courage" might suggest. Besides the poor condition of some of his ships, he was heavily handicapped, in setting forth to face an enemy whose strength was greatly superior to his own, by the fact that no adequate provision had been made for furnishing him with coal. No supply ships accompanied his fleet. The torpedo-boat destroyers, with their small coal capacity, were dependent upon the cruisers. A British steamer which cleared for the Cape Verde Islands from Norfolk, Virginia, on April 15, with three thousand tons of coal, may have been intended for his use, but she was stopped by the United States Govern-
ment as she left port. About the time of his start from St. Vincent a quantity of coal was purchased in England and shipped to the West Indies on three British ocean tramps, in the somewhat vague hope that it would escape the American blockaders and reach Cervera. These colliers did get to San Juan, whence one, the Restormel, was sent on to Curaçao, and thence to Santiago de Cuba, where it was captured (May 25th) by the St. Paul, almost within gunshot of the harbour in which the Spanish fleet lay. Another, the Twickenham, appeared at Martinique with four thousand tons of coal consigned to the Spanish consul. Permission to land her contraband cargo being refused, she sailed for Kingston, Jamaica, and on her way was captured by the St. Louis, on June 10th. Crossing the Atlantic the three torpedo-boat destroyers were taken in tow by the Teresa, Oquendo, and Colon, the Vizcaya having all she could do to propel herself. Slow progress was made, the best day's run recorded in the Colon's log, which has been published by the United States Navy Department, being two hundred and eighteen knots. On the evening of May 10th, nearly twelve days from St. Vincent, the squadron was approaching the lesser Antilles, and that night the ships were cleared for action and the men stood at their guns. No American vessels were sighted, however. On the afternoon of the 11th Martinique was reached, and the Furor went into the port of Fort de France, in order, no doubt, to communicate with Madrid and collect any information that might be useful. The cruisers lay in the offing till she rejoined them, when Cervera shaped his course for Curaçao—either in obedience to orders from Madrid, or for the reason that he had not coal enough to take him to Havana, and that the Dutch island, lying south of the direct route to Cuba, offered a safe and convenient stopping place. He probably
heard, at Martinique, of Sampson's eastward cruise, news of which would come from Cape Haitien.

On leaving Martinique the Terror was sent back to Fort dé France, apparently owing to an accident to her boilers.* She was repaired there, and subsequently (May 25th) left for San Juan, where we shall hear of her again.

At Willemstadt, the port of Curaçao, which he reached on the morning of May 14th, Cervera requested permission to coal his ships. The Dutch officials insisted upon a strict observance of the rules of neutrality, which allow a belligerent only so much fuel as is necessary to carry him to the nearest port on his route; and they would permit only two of the cruisers to enter the harbour. The Teresa and the Vizcaya went in, the rest of the squadron waiting outside. On the night of the 15th the fleet was again in motion, steering northwest, toward Cuba. It made slower progress than ever, the condition of the Vizcaya's engines necessitating a stop for repairs; and Cervera found it impossible to reach Havana with the coal he had. On the morning of the 18th the flagship signalled: "Admiral intends making port of Santiago de Cuba"; and soon after sunrise on the 19th the Teresa led the way into the harbour about which the war was to centre for the next two eventful months. At night, in crossing the Caribbean, the gun crews had again stood at their stations in readiness for an encounter, but again no enemy had been sighted.

Meanwhile, the movements of the Spanish ad-

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* The Colon's log, as published by the Navy Department, states that she coaled the Terror at Curaçao on May 15th, but apparently the name "Terror" must be a misprint or mistake for "Furor." All the other evidence is that the Terror did not go beyond Martinique with Cervera. For instance, Lieutenant Müller, who as second in command of the port of Santiago had abundant opportunity of ascertaining the facts he recorded from the officers of Cervera's squadron, states that she was left behind at Martinique. Captain Cotton of the Harvard reported her to be lying disabled at Fort de France on May 14th.
miral, simple and straightforward as they were, had caused an extraordinary amount of perplexity to the American strategists. There were all sorts of rumours and conjectures, to which the newspapers gave wide circulation, but there was a singular absence of authentic news. The first American vessel to report Cervera’s squadron was the Harvard, which put in at St. Pierre, Martinique, on May 11th, and learned that the Furor had called that day at Fort de France, a dozen miles away. Captain Cotton, the Harvard’s commander, was informed by the governor of Martinique that he could not leave port until twenty-four hours after the Spanish vessel’s departure. On the following morning he was warned by some American sympathizers—who were a small minority in the little French colony—that the Spaniards were lying off St. Pierre in readiness to catch him, and that his departure would be signalled to them from the hills. “That we were expected to go to sea last night,” he says in a report dated May 13th, “was evidenced by the lively signalling going on on shore; and that the Spanish squadron was so distributed as to give us the least possible chance of escape I have no doubt.” It appears that the captain or his informants had an overactive imagination, as Cervera, at the time, was under way for Curacao.

To guard against his supposed peril, Captain Cotton applied for permission to remain seven days at St. Pierre, to make “necessary repairs to boilers and engines”—another exhibition of imaginative powers. The request was granted, but on the morning of the 15th a despatch from Washington informed him that the Spaniards had reached Curacao, and ordered him to follow and endeavour to overtake them—whereupon he notified the governor that his repairs, “not having required as long a time as was anticipated, were completed,” and that he proposed to sail the next day. Before he got
off, however, orders came from Sampson to cruise in the Mona Passage, between Haiti and Porto Rico.

Cervera being reported from the southeastern end of the Caribbean, making it clear that his destination was Cuba and not the United States coast, Secretary Long at once ordered Schley’s flying squadron from Hampton Roads to Charleston (May 13th), and thence, on May 15th, to Key West. The cruiser Minneapolis and the liner St. Paul, also lying at Hampton Roads, were hurried southward, and on the 15th, when the American consul at Curacao had sent word of Cervera’s arrival, these two swift scouts were ordered to follow the Spanish fleet, which was now supposed, on the strength of a report from London, to be bound for the Gulf of Venezuela, to take coal from colliers that might meet it there. Similar instructions were sent to the Harvard, as has been stated.

Before these latter orders could be carried out, Sampson, on his way back from San Juan, had issued another set. The admiral’s plan was to patrol the passages by which Cervera might make his way northward through the island chain of the Antilles. He assigned the Yale and the St. Paul to the waters between Jamaica, Cuba, and Haiti; the Harvard to the Mona Passage; and the St. Louis to cruise south of Porto Rico to St. Thomas. The conflict of orders naturally caused some confusion, and suggested allusions to Dewey’s good fortune in being ten thousand miles from Washington, at the end of a severed cable; but such criticism was superfluous. It was entirely proper that the Navy Department should direct the movements of vessels which, as frequently happened, were in touch with it but not with the admiral. That it had entire confidence in Sampson was shown by such despatches as that sent to Captain Cotton at Martinique, on May 16th, authorizing him to obey the admiral’s
orders rather than the department's, if conflicting instructions had been received.

The consul at Curaçao reported the Spanish fleet on May 14th, and Secretary Long ordered him to protest against its being allowed to coal. On the 16th, apparently from a European agent, the secretary was informed that it carried munitions essential to the defence of Havana, and had imperative orders to reach either the Cuban capital or some harbour connected with it by railroad. Cienfuegos was the port best fulfilling this condition, and it was thought so probable that Cervera would make for it that as soon as Schley was ready to leave Key West he was instructed to go there at once.

On his way back from San Juan Sampson left his squadron off the north coast of Cuba and hurried on to Key West, where he found Schley on his arrival (May 18th). On the morning of the 19th—at the very hour when Cervera was entering Santiago—Schley started for Cienfuegos with the cruiser Brooklyn (flagship), the battle ships Massachusetts and Texas, and the yacht Scorpion. Nearing his destination on the afternoon of the 21st, the commodore heard guns which he took for a salute fired in welcome to the Spanish fleet; and on the next morning, standing in close to reconnoitre, he saw so much smoke rising from the harbour that he was confirmed in his belief that he had trapped the enemy—a belief which, it is said, was not shared by many of his officers.* To verify it by observation from the ships was impossible, the port, like that of Santiago, being a deep bay screened from the sea by fortified heights; and no attempt was made at communication with the insurgents, or at such a feat of scouting as was afterward accomplished at

* So reported by Lieutenant Hood, the commanding officer of the Hawk.
Santiago by Lieutenant Blue. It was at this point that Commodore Schley first displayed that lack of push and energy which was so disappointing in view of his previous record of admirable service. For three days he lay off the harbour mouth. The Scorpion had been detached to cruise eastward, but on the 22d and 23d the squadron was joined by the battle ship Iowa, the gunboat Castine, the torpedo boat Dupont, and the collier Merrimac.

A few hours after Schley left Key West it was learned at Washington that Cervera had that morning (May 19th) arrived at Santiago. The news came through Colonel James Allen, of the signal corps, who received it from an agent in Havana; and the prompt reporting of this most crucial piece of intelligence in the entire campaign is a feat for which the signal service deserves full credit.* The information transmitted was not entirely correct. The first despatch stated: “Five† Spanish vessels arrived at Santiago de Cuba”; the second, received on the 20th: “Pelayo and four cruisers in Santiago. No destroyers or torpedo boats arrived there”; but these were errors of detail only.

On the assurance of General Greely, the chief signal officer, that his information from Santiago was trustworthy, it was at once credited at Washington and recognised as the key to the whole situation. It was less easy for Sampson and Schley—especially, as it proved, the latter—to accept it. On the 20th, in reply to a despatch from Secretary Long, “strongly advising” him to order Schley to Santiago immediately, Sampson telegraphed from Key West that he was in favour of the commo-

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* Cervera’s arrival was bulletined in Madrid on the same day (May 19th), but in America no reliance was placed in an announcement that might be inaccurate or intentionally falsified.
† This was the truth, but not quite the whole truth. Cervera had only five ships actually with him when he reached Santiago. The Furor had dropped behind, and arrived three hours later than the rest of the squadron.
dore remaining at Cienfuegos for the present, but had instructed him to communicate with the Minneapolis and the Harvard, which were ordered to reconnoitre Santiago. These instructions went to Schley in duplicate by the Iowa and the Dupont, reached him on the 22d, and were at once carried out, the Scorpion being detached to inquire for news from the scouting ships.

Sampson also sent a private letter to the commodore on the 20th, in which he thus stated the situation:

DEAR SCHLEY: The Iowa leaves this morning at II o'clock, bound for Cienfuegos. The Marblehead and the Eagle will both be ready to depart to-night and join you.

Enclosed is a telegram * received at Key West, May 19th, marked “A.” After duly considering this telegram I have decided to make no change in the present plan—that is, that you hold your squadron off Cienfuegos.

If the Spanish ships have put into Santiago they must come either to Havana or Cienfuegos to deliver the munitions of war which they are said to bring for use in Cuba. I, therefore, am of the opinion that our best chance of success in capturing these ships will be to hold the two points—Cienfuegos and Havana—with all the force we can muster.

If, later, it should develop that these vessels are at Santiago, we could then assemble off that port the ships best suited for the purpose and completely blockade it.

Meanwhile there had been more correspondence between Key West and Washington, and early in the morning of the 21st Sampson, now fully accepting the signal-service news, sent the following despatch to Schley, by the Marblehead:

Spanish squadron probably at Santiago de Cuba, four ships and three torpedo destroyers. If you are satisfied that they are not at Cienfuegos, proceed with all despatch, but cautiously, to Santiago de Cuba, and if the enemy is there blockade him in port.

The admiral was so anxious to insure the prompt delivery of these instructions that a few

* This was the despatch reporting Cervera's arrival at Santiago.
hours later he sent a duplicate of them by the Hawk, adding as an indorsement:

It is thought the inclosed instructions will reach you by two o'clock A.M., May 23d. This will enable you to leave before daylight (regarded very important) so that your direction may not be noticed, and be at Santiago A.M., May 24th.

This second despatch* was sent by the Hawk, whose commander, Lieutenant Hood, was specially and emphatically urged to get it into Schley's hands at the earliest possible moment. He reached Cienfuegos on the morning of the 23d, having passed the Marblehead, which came up early the next day in company with the yachts Vixen and Eagle, and was sent back to Sampson with letters in which the commodore gave it as his opinion that it would seem to be extremely unwise to chase up a probability at Santiago de Cuba reported via Havana, no doubt as a ruse. I shall therefore remain off this port with this squadron.

I think I have them here almost to a certainty.

In the afternoon of the 24th, in answer to signals displayed on shore, Commander McCalla, of the Marblehead, landed and communicated with some Cuban insurgents. He gave them needed ammunition, and clothing, probably no less needed, and learned from them that the Spanish fleet was not in the harbour. His report at last convinced the commodore that he was blockading the wrong port, and at sunset he started his squadron eastward, leaving the Castine to watch Cienfuegos, and sending the Dupont to Key West to report his movements.

* Later in the day Sampson telegraphed to Washington: "Schley has been ordered to Santiago de Cuba." It will be seen, however, that the order, though it made the admiral's wishes tolerably plain, was only a conditional one, and left the commodore at liberty to prefer his own judgment.
Notwithstanding the urgency of its errand, Schley’s fleet—now consisting of the Brooklyn, the Iowa, the Massachusetts, the Texas, the Marblehead, the Vixen, the Eagle, and the collier Merrimac—made slow progress. The sea was rough, and the Eagle could make no more than six knots an hour; and though his fighting force would not have been perceptibly diminished by leaving her behind, the commodore held back the other ships to her speed. On the 26th, however, as her coal ran short, he ordered her to Port Antonio, Jamaica, and late that afternoon the rest of the squadron arrived off Santiago.

It found there the Minneapolis, the St. Paul, and the Yale. None of them had seen the Spaniards, and Schley afterward asserted * that Captain Sigsbee expressed his belief that the hostile fleet was not in the harbour. This the captain denied, saying that “every officer on board the St. Paul knew that I believed Cervera to be at Santiago.” The capture of the collier Restormel on the previous day certainly indicated that such was the case. But without attempting to institute a blockade, as Sampson had ordered, or even to ascertain whether the Spaniards were there or not, Commodore Schley signalled to his squadron the unexpected order that it should make for Key West, going by the southern side of Cuba.

Schley’s reason for his withdrawal, as explained in his official report, was that some of his ships were short of coal, and that he believed he could still block any attempt of Cervera’s to reach Havana through the Yucatan Channel, while Sampson was on guard on the other side of Cuba. The explanation is a very unsatisfactory one. There were then on board the Brooklyn 940 tons of coal;

* Rear-Admiral Schley’s statement of February 20, 1899, to the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs, and Captain Sigsbee’s reply to it.
the Iowa had 762 tons, the Massachusetts 789, the Texas 394, the Marblehead 116; and there were 4,300 tons on the Merrimac. The rough sea made it difficult to transfer fuel from the collier to the men-of-war, but there were sheltered spots within reach where it could have been done without trouble. As was afterward stated in a communication from the Navy Department to the United States Senate, “there was coal enough to return to Key West, and therefore to remain at Santiago till further supplies came. He [Schley] could have counted on the department’s sending him a further coal supply.”* His position was no doubt difficult, but nothing short of an imperative necessity should have led him to abandon it. He has been criticised for wasting three days at Cienfuegos; but the commodore, hitherto reputed an able and gallant officer, made a much graver error of judgment, and one that might have had the most serious consequences, in failing to strain every nerve to hold his station off Santiago.

Schley’s westward start was delayed by an accident to the Merrimac, which disabled her machinery. The Yale was ordered to take the collier in tow, but this proved a difficult operation, the tow-line breaking again and again; and the squadron had moved only a few miles when the Harvard overtook it, on the morning of the 27th. She brought from the Mole St. Nicholas, Haiti, an urgent despatch from Secretary Long, informing Schley that

* This statement was drawn up in answer to the Senate’s request (January 23, 1899) for the facts on which nominations for promotion were made. It was signed by Secretary Long, and verified by a board consisting of Captain Evans, Captain Taylor, Lieutenant Sears, Schley’s flag lieutenant on the Brooklyn, and Ensign Ward.

The quantity of coal on board the vessels of the Flying Squadron on May 26th is given above as it appears in this same official statement. Slightly different figures are furnished to the writer by the Bureau of Steam Engineering, which states the amount thus: Brooklyn, 1,600 tons; Iowa, 858 tons; Texas, 468 tons; Massachusetts, 878 tons; Marblehead, 184 tons.
all reports indicated that Cervera was at Santiago, and begging him to secure positive information—which, the secretary suggested, could be done by communicating with the insurgents, or by sending a scout to one of the hills overlooking the harbour. Still the commodore did not change his mind. He signalled his captains: “Can you fetch into the port of Key West with coal remaining?” and replied to Washington, by the Harvard:

Can not remain off Santiago present state squadron coal account. . . . Much to be regretted, can not obey orders of the department. Have striven earnestly; forced to proceed for coal to Key West by way of Yucatan Passage. Can not ascertain anything respecting enemy positive.

During the 27th, however, the sea moderated, and it was found possible for the Texas and the Marblehead to take fuel from the Merrimac, the squadron lying that night about forty miles west of Santiago. On the 28th the Vixen also coaled, and at one o’clock in the afternoon Schley signalled an order to return to the harbour mouth. Arriving there at dusk, the Vixen and the Marblehead were sent in close to watch the entrance, the other ships lying about ten miles out. Next morning they circled in nearer, and saw the Colon and two other Spanish cruisers lying in the channel. There could be no further question as to Cervera’s whereabouts—though it was not until June 3d that all his six vessels were positively known to be with him—and the St. Paul was sent off to take the news to Sampson.

The admiral had left Key West on May 21st, and gathered, off Havana, a squadron that included the New York, the Indiana, the monitors Puritan and Miantonomoh, the cruisers New Orleans, Detroit, and Montgomery, and several gunboats and torpedo boats—besides the monitor Amphitrite, the cruiser Cincinnati, and the dynamite gunboat
Vesuvius, which joined him on the 25th. He cruised slowly backward and forward in the Nicholas Channel,* expecting to meet Cervera, who, according to Sampson's calculations, was likely to leave Santiago before Schley could intercept him, and to make for Havana by the north coast of Cuba. At the same time, as it was possible that the Spaniards might go south of the island, and through the Yucatan Channel, he was prepared to fall back at short notice and cover Havana from the west as well as from the east. No lights were shown at night, and three different "orders of battle" had been given to the commander of each ship, to be used according to the circumstances of the expected encounter. Despatches passed frequently between the admiral and Washington, but it was less easy to keep in touch with Schley—whose command, hitherto rated as an independent one, by an order dated May 24th was directly subordinated to Sampson's instructions. The change was no mark of censure to Schley, who had been informed by Secretary Long, at the time of his appointment to the Flying Squadron, that if his ships should join Sampson's the latter would have command of the whole fleet.

On May 26th Sampson despatched the Vesuvius to Schley with another message, assuring him that Cervera was at Santiago; and next day, when the Wasp brought the commodore's letter of May 23d, the same courier was sent back with an urgent order that he should "proceed with all possible despatch to Santiago to blockade the port."† Later that day the admiral heard from Washington that Schley had informed the Navy Department that he was about to start from Cienfuegos,

* This is the passage between the Cuban keys, off Cardenas and Sagua, and Salt Key Bank. It is the narrowest part of the wide channel along the north coast of Cuba.
† Schley had already started when this reached Cienfuegos.
but could not blockade the Spaniards for lack of coal.

It is easy to understand that with the situation in so critical and uncertain a state it was a time of great anxiety for Sampson. This last news decided him to cut loose from Havana, and go with his own ships to the central point of the campaign—the spot where the enemy's naval power lay. To do so he must first return to Key West for coal; but he sent on the New Orleans and the collier Sterling direct to Santiago, with a message to Schley instructing him "to remain on the blockade at all hazards," and adding an order that the collier should be sunk in the mouth of the harbour so as to close the entrance.

From Key West Sampson telegraphed to Washington that "the failure of Schley to continue blockade must be remedied at once if possible," and on the evening of the 29th he was at sea again, taking with him the battle ship Oregon, the yacht Mayflower, and the torpedo boat Porter. To the former, fresh from her great voyage around Cape Horn, he signalled: "Can you make thirteen knots an hour?" "Fourteen if necessary," replied the Oregon, and the squadron speeded off. On the 30th it met the St. Paul, with the news that Schley had seen Cervera's ships. This same welcome intelligence had reached Washington the day before, shortly after Secretary Long, in his extreme anxiety about the situation at Santiago, had sent Schley the following despatch in triplicate, addressing it to each of the three nearest cable stations—Port Antonio and Kingston, in Jamaica, and the Mole St. Nicholas, in Haiti:

It is your duty to ascertain immediately if the Spanish fleet is in Santiago, and report. Would be discreditable to the navy if that fact were not ascertained immediately. All military and naval movements depend upon that point.
CHAPTER X

THE BLOCKADE OF SANTIAGO

SANTIAGO DE CUBA * is almost the most ancient European settlement in America. Founded in 1514 by Spanish colonists sent from Santo Domingo by Diego Columbus, it was for a time the capital of Cuba. In 1873 it was the scene of the shooting of the Virginius prisoners. Other notable names in its annals are those of Antommarchi, Napoleon’s physician and biographer at St. Helena, who settled here after the emperor’s death; of Adelina Patti, who is said to have made her first public appearance in Santiago, shortly before her recorded début in New York; and of the notorious “Boss” Tweed, who made it his first hiding place after his flight from the United States. But the old city was destined to have more history between May and August of 1898 than it had had in its four centuries of previous existence.

No American war ships appeared off Santiago until May 18th, when the St. Louis and the Wompatuck cut the cable to Jamaica. Cervera’s squadron arrived on the 19th. During the following week the St. Paul watched the harbour entrance, and her commander, Captain Sigsbee, formerly of the Maine, made sketches of it. On the 26th Schley came up, withdrew at once, and returned on

* Santiago de Cuba—commonly abbreviated to “Santiago” by Americans, to “Cuba” by its own citizens—is named after the patron saint of old Spain, St. James the elder, whose body is supposed to lie at Santiago de Compostella, near Corunna.
the 28th; but even yet there was no close blockade of the port. The Spaniards had plenty of time to continue their voyage unmolested, had they been able to fill their empty bunkers.*

There was coal at Santiago. The navy depot had twenty-three hundred tons of Welsh steam coal, and fuel was requisitioned from the Juragua mines (owned by an American company), and from the little local railway; but there were no proper appliances for getting it aboard. The cruisers could not come up to the coaling piers, which were in such shallow water that only lighters could lie at them, and not more than two boats could be loaded at once. When baskets were ordered for carrying the coal, very few could be found in the city. It was almost equally difficult to supply the fleet with the fresh water it needed.

Work went on day and night, and some of the ships were able to move on the morning of May 25th, when the Colon went down to a position inside the harbour mouth. She was just in time to witness the St. Paul's capture of the collier Restormel—a disaster which it would seem that she might have prevented. Lieutenant Müller † explains that she could not, in his opinion, have reached the scene in time; that she could not spare the fuel that would have been burned in a chase; and that the sea was so rough that she might have

*C For some days after Sampson's arrival, with good luck, they might have escaped with little loss. As late as June 15th the admiral warned his captains that through carelessness in maintaining positions there were times when "the fleet is so scattered that it would be perfectly possible for the enemy to come out of the harbour and meet with very little opposition." Gradually, however, the blockade became more and more perfect, especially at night.

† Combates y Capitulación de Santiago de Cuba, by Lieutenant José Müller y Tejeiro, who was second in command of the local naval office during the siege. The United States Navy Department has published a translation of most of this interesting record.
grounded in going down the channel. All this would scarcely have prevented most of the American captains from an effort to reach the enemy, had the case been reversed.

In the afternoon of that day (May 25th) the Vizcaya joined the Colon, both ships anchoring where their broadsides commanded the channel, but neither vessel, it appears, being sighted by the St. Paul. Coal was still coming out to them in lighters. The Pluton had reconnoitred outside on the 24th; on the 29th both of the destroyers went out, but attempted no attack, though Schley's squadron was in sight.

That morning (May 29th) the lookouts of the Flying Squadron saw the Colon and the Vizcaya, and observed the masts of a third cruiser farther up the channel. Here was Schley's opportunity. Two, at least, of the Spanish ships—the ships whose destruction was the grand object of the American strategy, the ships which the strength of the American navy had been vainly seeking for weeks—lay in plain sight, within easy range, and probably without sufficient steam to manoeuvre. It can hardly be doubted how Nelson, or Dewey, or Sampson, would have followed up such a discovery. They would have struck at the enemy at once, and with all their strength. Unfortunately, Schley did nothing of the sort. Captain Evans records that in expectation of an immediate attack he cleared the Iowa's decks for action; but the commodore gave no signal to engage. Throughout the 29th and the 30th he lay off the harbour mouth—maintaining a close blockade, as he subsequently reported; but his idea of a close blockade seems to have differed materially from Sampson's. Captain Evans states that the squadron—which cruised in column, following the movements of the flagship—remained from five to ten miles off shore, and a meeting place was appointed, in case the ves-
sels should become separated, twenty-five miles away.*

Not until the afternoon of May 31st did Schley attempt an offensive movement. Transferring his pennant to the Massachusetts, he moved in to within five miles of the harbour entrance, followed by the New Orleans, which had joined him on the 30th, and by the Iowa. Only a few shots were exchanged, at too long range for damage on either side, though the Spaniards—too easily elated, as usual—believed that they had hit two of the American ships, and the officer who wrote the Colon's log cheerfully recorded that the assailants "retired in disorder." Schley reported to Washington that his reconnaissance "was intended principally to injure or destroy the Colon." This makes it difficult to understand why the commodore's order was to engage at a distance of seven thousand yards, and why the firing, which lasted only about ten minutes, was actually done at a still greater range—from eight thousand to eleven thousand yards.† The elevating gear of some of the Iowa's guns was strained by firing at so high an angle. Next morning (June 1st) Sampson arrived, and,

* In the chapter contributed by Captain Evans to W. A. M. Goode's With Sampson through the War.

Lieutenant Müller, the Spanish historian, thus chronicles Schley's movements:

"May 28.—At 4.30 P. M. six large ships were signalled, disappearing to the south at nightfall.

"May 29.—At 7, seven hostile ships were sighted, reconnoitring the coast at a distance of about eight miles; they withdrew to the south before dark.

"May 30.—At 5.30 the hostile fleet was signalled approaching to within nine miles of the harbour.

"May 31.—The ships disappeared, as usual, to the south before dark."

After Sampson's arrival, on June 1st, Lieutenant Müller notes that "from that time on the hostile ships, which were afterward increased in number, established day and night a constant watch, without withdrawing at nightfall, as they used to do."

† So stated by Captain Evans and Captain Higginson, who add that with their gun sights set at these ranges most of their shots fell short. "Do not go in any closer" was signalled to the squadron.
probably in expectation that the enemy, thus rein­forced, would make a more persistent attack, the two Spanish cruisers withdrew further into the har­bour, out of sight from the sea.

The admiral, on his arrival off Santiago, found Schley’s squadron cruising in column west of the harbour entrance. The commodore had not car­ried out his instructions regarding the Sterling, which had joined him on May 30th; and Sampson decided to use the other collier, the Merrimac, which was a larger ship and more likely to block the channel. He had discussed the manœuvre, on the way from Key West, with Naval Constructor Richmond P. Hobson,* and the young officer had shown so enthusiastic an interest in it that at his urgent request the admiral intrusted him with its execution, though this involved the removal of the captain of the Merrimac, Commander J. M. Miller, from his ship.

As worked out by Lieutenant Hobson, the plan was to steam into the channel just before day­light, and at the narrowest point—which is only a short distance inside the entrance, a little more than a hundred yards from the nose of the Morro—to swing the big collier round, drop anchors at stern and bow, and sink her by opening her sea valves and exploding torpedoes along her sides. He needed six assistants—two in the engine and boiler rooms, one at each anchor, one at the wheel, and

* It has been popularly supposed that Lieutenant Hobson originated the Merrimac adventure, but such was not the case. He has himself recorded the fact that Admiral Sampson first discussed the subject with him on May 20th, the day on which the New York left Key West. The admiral’s despatch to Commodore Schley, dated May 27th, when he ordered the Sterling to Santiago, contains an accurate outline of the manœuvre: “I believe it would be perfectly practicable to steam this vessel into position and drop all her anchors, allow her to swing across the channel, then sink her either by opening the valves or whatever means may be best in his [Schley’s] judgment.” It is said that the idea was first suggested to Sampson by Commander Converse of the Montgomery.
one to help with the torpedoes. The men on deck were to lie on their faces at their stations, with a cord tied to their wrists, with which Hobson, on the bridge, was to signal the moment for action. Then the anchors, lashed over the side, were to be

Sketch map of the harbour of Santiago de Cuba.
cut loose, and the men were to jump overboard and swim to a lifeboat towing behind. As the ship swung athwart the channel—she was three hundred and thirty-three feet long,* and the charts showed a point at which the deep water was only about three hundred and fifty feet wide—the lieutenant was to fire the torpedoes, which were connected with the bridge by electric cables, and then follow his men overboard. The details were carefully arranged, even to the specification that the crew's uniform was to consist of one suit of woollen underwear, two pairs of socks, a life preserver, and a revolver belt, with revolver and cartridges.

To take an unarmed vessel close under the enemy's batteries and sink her there, trusting for escape to luck and a lifeboat, was an undertaking of such manifest peril that to man the Merrimac a signal was made for volunteers. In the American navy "the danger's self is lure alone," and hundreds of officers and men at once proffered their services. The six selected were Daniel Montague, chief master at arms of the New York; Gunner's Mate Charette, of the New York; and Boatswain Mullen, Coxswain Deignan, Machinist Phillips, and Water-Tender Kelly, all of the Merrimac.

It took so long to get the collier ready that it was after four o'clock in the morning of June 2d when Sampson, who had gone on board to say farewell to her brave crew, left her, and she started for the harbour mouth. As she steamed in it grew so light that the admiral sent the Porter speeding after her to order her back, thinking it wiser to postpone the attempt till the following night.

The day (June 2d) passed uneventfully, and at night the Merrimac was ready for a second attempt. A few changes had been made in her equipment.

* The Merrimac was a five-thousand-ton ship, the largest of the Navy Department's fleet of colliers. She had about twenty-three hundred tons of coal in her hold when she sank.
To minimize the chance of failure in the apparatus for igniting the torpedoes, it was arranged that each should be fired with a separate battery. As this necessitated the services of another pair of hands, Coxswain Clausen, of the New York, was added to the ship’s company; * and as one of the original six, Mullen, was exhausted by the mental and physical strain, Coxswain Murphy, of the Iowa, took his place. A lifeboat and a catamaran were slung over the side of the vessel, and Cadet Joseph W. Powell, of the New York, was ordered to follow her to the harbour mouth with the flagship’s steam launch, and wait there on the chance of picking up her crew should they succeed in escaping.

Mr. Crank, the assistant engineer of the Merrimac, took the ship to the starting point of her run, and left her, very reluctantly, at the last moment, being taken off by Cadet Powell’s launch. It was about half past three o’clock, with the moon shining brightly above the western horizon. Lieutenant Hobson steered straight for the Morro, and was within five hundred yards of the point when the first shot came from a picket boat that lay under the west bank of the channel. It was a plucky challenge, for the Spaniards in the little craft could hardly have guessed that the big vessel that came driving right up to them was unarmed. In a few minutes there was a heavy fire on both sides, while the Merrimac passed in, her engines stopped, but her own momentum and a strong tide carrying her on.

As she reached the spot that had been picked out, on the chart, as the place to sink her, the sea valves were thrown open, and Hobson gave the order to explode the torpedoes. Only two of them could be discharged; the others had had their wires or batteries broken by the enemy’s fire. The ship

* The newspaper story of the Merrimac represented Clausen as a stowaway—a picturesque bit of fiction.
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was not sinking fast enough, nor could she be swung fairly across the channel; her steering gear was shot away, and her stern anchor had been prematurely cut loose by a shell. The tide swept her steadily in. A tremendous fire came from the batteries and troops on shore; eight* electric mines were fired in the channel; torpedoes were discharged by two Spanish vessels—the Pluton and the cruiser Reina Mercedes; and finally the Merrimac went down between Soldados Point and Smith Key, where she lay with her masts and smokestack out of the water, obstructing but by no means blocking the fairway.

Her lifeboat had disappeared, but the catamaran floated, and all the crew reached it and clung to it. Boats came out to the wreck with lanterns, but the men were not discovered; and Hobson ordered silence, fearing that even an offer to surrender might be answered with bullets, and expecting that at daylight a responsible officer would come out to reconnoitre. The catamaran was fastened to the sunken hulk by a rope; and with only their heads above water and their teeth chattering with cold, the refugees had held their position for an hour, when, just after sunrise, a steam launch came down the harbour. As it passed, thirty yards away, Lieutenant Hobson hailed, inquiring if any Spanish officer was aboard, and saying that an American officer wished to surrender himself and seamen as prisoners of war. A Spaniard, who proved to be Admiral Cervera himself, stepped forward and

*Sinking of the Merrimac, June 3.

So Lieutenant Hobson asserts. Lieutenant Müller, who gives the Spanish side of the story, says that only three mines were fired. During the day (June 3) two of the Spanish torpedoes were found outside the harbour by the Porter, having drifted out with the tide. One was taken aboard as a trophy, the other sank.

The Merrimac's lifeboat was picked up by men from the Colon, on June 6th. The Spanish cruiser's log for that day says: "Secured the Marymak's boat, repaired it, and supplied it with a new rudder."
helped Hobson to board the launch; and the lieutenant and his men, who were very courteously treated by their captors, were taken to the Reina Mercedes and thence to the Morro. They were afterward moved to the Reina Mercedes Barracks in Santiago, where they were confined till released on July 5th.

It is easy to say, after the event, that it would have been almost a miracle had the Merrimac manoeuvre proved successful. To block a channel has never, even under the most favourable circumstances, proved an easy operation. In the civil war, for instance, it was again and again attempted unsuccessfully—notably at Charleston, in December, 1861. The work there was done by an officer who knew the harbour well, having spent four years, shortly before the war, in improving it; there was no hindrance from the enemy; no less than sixteen ships, loaded with stone, were carefully towed into position and scuttled; and yet the channel remained navigable.

The sinking of the Merrimac was the most picturesque exploit of personal courage performed during the war, and as such it has brought its reward to the brave men who undertook it. At the same time, it is no detraction of their achievement to say that other soldiers and sailors performed deeds that were less showy but no less truly heroic. Many of these, no doubt, will never be chronicled; others are to be found in the formal records of the official reports. Among the many instances that might be given, here is one that occurred off Santiago just four days earlier:

Assistant-Engineer J. P. Morton of the Vixen officially reports the conduct of P. Johnson and G. Mahoney, two of the Vixen’s firemen, on the night of May 28, 1898, when “the lower front manhole gasket of boiler A blew out, sending out a large stream of boiling water and steam into the fire-
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room, driving the men from the fireroom and lowering the water in the boiler below the gauge glass. Upon calling for volunteers to haul the fires the two men above mentioned responded, went below, and with the scalding water blowing into their faces, and subject to the most intense heat, succeeded in hauling the fires and thereby saving the boiler from injury and the ship from great damage."

And Lieutenant Sharp, commanding officer of the Vixen, in forwarding the report, adds: "Assistant-Engineer Morton says nothing of his own conduct; when the gasket, having been refitted, again blew out, he, with Johnson, hauled the fires a second time."

Sampson's first order of blockade, issued June 2d, arranged his fleet in two squadrons, the first consisting of the New York, the Iowa, the Oregon, the New Orleans, the Mayflower, and the Porter, under the admiral's direct command; the second, under Commodore Schley, including the Brooklyn, the

Sampson's first order of blockade off Santiago de Cuba.
Massachusetts, the Texas, the Marblehead, and the Vixen. Both squadrons formed a single line, drawn in a semicircle off the harbour mouth, Sampson's ships on the east and Schley's on the west, the battle ships in the centre of the line, and the swifter cruisers on the flanks. In the daytime the distance from the Morro was to be six miles; at night the blockaders were to draw in closer.

This simple plan was soon modified, Sampson devoting much care and thought to its elaboration, and finally evolving a remarkably effective formation. In this perfected arrangement the night watch was drawn up in three lines. The first, a mile from the Morro, consisted of three picket boats—steam launches from the men-of-war; the second, two miles out, of three videttes, chosen from the smaller vessels of the fleet; the third, from three to four miles from shore, of the battle ships and cruisers. The novel and ingenious feature of
the blockade was the advancing of one battle ship to the line of videttes, where it held a searchlight steadily upon the entrance of the harbour, making it impossible for even a small boat to slip out unseen; while one of her sister ships lay close at hand, ready to use her guns in case of fire from the enemy.

Throughout the blockade, with the exception of an occasional rifle shot at the picket boats, the Spaniards never fired upon the American ships at night, though the latter constantly lay within a moderate range. This fact, which caused no little wonderment at the time—for, as was said by Captain Chadwick, of the New York, "we, had the case been reversed, would not have been so forbearing"—was due in part, perhaps, to that disinclination for the offensive which seems to be a traditional and characteristic trait of the Spanish military genius; but it may probably be explained more directly by their lack of good guns and shortage of ammunition. The Morro battery, just east of the Morro Castle—which latter was armed with ancient bronze cannon—had only five guns as large as sixteen-centimetre (six-inch) calibre, and these were muzzle-loaders. The Socapa battery, on the other side of the entrance, had two good sixteen-centimetre Hontoria guns, taken from the cruiser Reina Mercedes. Two similar weapons, together with two howitzers of fifteen centimetres, and two nine-centimetre Krupp guns, were mounted at Punta Gorda, nearly a mile up the harbour. There were other small batteries along the channel, at Estrella Point and along the hillside under the Socapa, but these had no heavy guns. The guns from the Mercedes were set in place during the first two weeks of June; later in the month three twenty-one-centimetre howitzers were mounted at the Socapa and two in the Morro battery.
After his brief and cautious bombardment of May 31st, Schley had reported that the Spanish fortifications were “well provided with long-range guns of large calibre.” Sampson estimated their strength more accurately when he said, in the instructions he issued on the day after his arrival (June 2d): “It is not considered that the shore batteries are of sufficient power to do any material injury to battle ships.” But for the certainty that the channel was mined, it may be taken for granted that the admiral would speedily have forced an entrance into the bay, and would have destroyed or captured Cervera’s fleet without waiting for the army. No doubt he remembered Farragut’s “Damn the torpedoes!” but he also remembered the fate of the Maine—a fate that probably awaited the first ship to enter.

It is noteworthy, too, that the Spaniards never made an attempt at attacking with their torpedo cruisers. In bolder hands these might have proved dangerous weapons, and in the early days of the blockade they caused much anxiety. “The end to be attained justifies the risk of torpedo attack, and that risk must be taken,” Sampson said in an order dated June 7th. There were several false alarms. The first was on the night of May 29th, when the Vixen signalled, “Enemy’s torpedo boat sighted,” and after some random firing it was discovered that the supposed torpedo boat was a train on the narrow-gauge railway that runs along the beach near Fort Aguadores.* A few nights later the New Orleans gave the alarm, and a stream of shot was hurled at a mysterious dark object, which proved, when the valorous Yankee dashed in to cut off its retreat, to be a floating mass of seaweed. After this, Sampson’s perfecting of the blockade, and especially his effective use of search-

* Reported by Captain Higginson of the Massachusetts, August 5th.
lights, lessened the danger, and greatly relieved the strain upon his crews.

On the morning of the Merrimac's dramatic suicide (June 3d) Cadet Powell's steam launch, though it was observed and fired at, waited off the Morro until hope for the escape of Hobson and his men was abandoned. Their fate was not known to the fleet till the afternoon, when a Spanish tug came out flying a flag of truce, and the Vixen, which Sampson sent to meet her, found that she carried Cervera's chief of staff, Captain Bustamente, with a message announcing that the collier's crew were prisoners. The message, sent in recognition of the dramatic bravery of their exploit, was a fine piece of courtesy on the part of the Spanish admiral.

With the powerful fleet now under his command, Sampson was not content with merely lying off Santiago and waiting for the Spanish ships to come out. His next moves against the enemy were his bombardment of the harbour defences on June 6th, and the attack on Guantanamo Bay on the 7th.

The former was intended to destroy the Spanish batteries, or at least to injure and weaken them enough to make it safe for the blockading squadron to close in around the entrance of the harbour. The admiral issued an order of battle on the 5th, and after sunrise the next morning his two divisions formed in a double column, heading inshore. At twenty minutes to eight a tremendous fire was opened with every gun that could be brought to bear, Sampson's ships, on the east, bombarding the Morro and Fort Aguadores, about three miles further east; Schley's, on the west, devoting their attention to the Socapa.

The hail of projectiles hurled upon the Spanish batteries during the next three hours was probably the heaviest ever fired from the guns of a fleet, not
excepting the British bombardment of Alexandria in 1882. Beginning at three miles' distance, the ships worked in until they were within two thousand yards of the forts, where they used their rapid-fire weapons as well as their big rifles, about two thousand shots being fired in all. It was a still, misty morning, with no swell to disconcert the American gunners, though heavy showers occasionally obscured their aim.

In the afternoon Sampson reported to Washington * that he had “silenced the works quickly without injury of any kind.” “Silenced,” in the report of a bombardment, is, of course, a very indefinite word. It may merely mean that the gunners have been driven to shelter, to return when the enemy’s fire ceases; and such seems to have been the case in this instance. The batteries were frequently hit—they had three men killed and forty wounded, principally in the Morro; but little or no injury was done to the guns. It was a signal proof of the difficulty of firing effectively from shipboard upon fortifications that stand high above the water. Most of the American shells shattered themselves against the rocks of the Morro and the Socapa. Many passed over the heights, and fell inland, or in the waters of the inner bay. Here, indeed, the principal damage was done. Most of the village on Smith Key was destroyed, some of its inhabitants only escaping by standing waist deep in the water. The Reina Mercedes, moored near the key, was struck by thirty-five shells, and was twice set on fire; her second officer, Commander Acosta, and five seamen were killed, and twelve wounded.

The reply of the batteries was feeble and ineffec-

* Until he had a cable station at Playa del Este, on Guantanamo Bay, Sampson’s usual method of communicating with Washington, while off Santiago, was by sending a despatch boat—which sometimes, as in the present case, was a newspaper tug—to the Mole St. Nicholas, Haiti. The station at Playa del Este was opened on June 21st.
tive. The six-inch guns in the Socapa fired forty-seven shots, those at Punta Gorda, which seldom had a ship in line, only seven. None of the American vessels was injured, though the Massachusetts was hit once, and another shot went through her flag.

During the bombardment the Suwanee entered the mouth of the small harbour of Cabanas, about a mile and a half west of the Socapa, and silenced a battery there. In the afternoon she made a landing further west, at Aserraderos, where for three days she lay landing arms and ammunition for a Cuban force under Colonel Cebreco, a part of General Jesus Rabi’s brigade.

This communication with the insurgents led to one of the notable individual exploits of the war. Commander Delehanty of the Suwanee, being ordered by Sampson to get positive assurance of the presence of Cervera’s ships in the blockaded harbour,* and believing, as he afterward reported, that “reliable information could not be secured through the insurgent forces, assigned the task to his second officer, Lieutenant Victor Blue, who had been ashore, only a few days before, on a mission to the Cubans in Matanzas province. Wearing his uniform and side-arms, Lieutenant Blue landed at Aserraderos on the 11th and went inland to the camp of General Rabi, who furnished him with a guide and a mule, and sent him on to an insurgent post nearer Santiago. Here he found three other guides, with whom he made his way through the Spanish lines to a hilltop overlooking the bay, where he could see vessels that were unmistakably Cervera’s. He was back at Rabi’s camp on the evening of the 12th, and reported on

* The information was urgently needed to disprove the report that some of the Spanish ships had escaped, and had been sighted off the north coast of Cuba. See p. 210.
the Suwanee next morning, after a daring journey of seventy miles through the enemy's country.

A fortnight later (June 25th) the same officer went ashore again, as Sampson desired once more to verify the position of the enemy's squadron. Again he accomplished his mission successfully, though his journey was more dangerous than before, the Spaniards having occupied the hills west of Santiago in force, with intrenched lines at several points, in expectation of an attack from that direction by American troops.

The operations in Guantanamo Bay, which began on June 7th, marked a step of cardinal importance in the naval campaign—the securing of the first American foothold on the Cuban coast. As a station for coaling, cable communication, and refitting, it proved to be of the greatest value to Sampson's ships. The admiral might indeed have found it difficult, or even impossible, to maintain an effective blockade of Santiago had Key West, nearly a thousand miles away, remained his only available base. Especially would it have been so in case of stormy weather. It was only by the good fortune which seemed to follow the American forces throughout the war that Sampson's fleet, in waters notorious for their hurricanes, encountered few rough seas and no serious gale.

The seizure of the bay had figured, no doubt, in the war plans discussed at Washington before hostilities began; and when Cervera was shut in at Santiago the American strategists naturally turned their attention to the convenient harbour that lies some thirty-five miles farther east.* On May 28th Secretary Long suggested its capture,

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* Guantanamo Bay (then called Walthenham Bay) was the base of the British attack upon Santiago in 1741, under General Wentworth and Admiral Vernon. The expedition failed because Wentworth found it impossible to move his troops, who suffered terribly from sickness, through the difficult country between the bay and Santiago.
both to Sampson—then at Key West—and to Schley; and on the 29th he telegraphed the former that Captain Goodrich, who had reconnoitred the place on his cable-cutting expedition (May 19th), reported the Spanish position there to be very weak. “The seizure of, immediately, is recommended,” the secretary added.

Nor was it necessary to call upon the army to supply a garrison; the navy had at hand a sufficient force of its own. As long ago as April 16th—five days before war began—an order was sent to New York to organize a marine battalion immediately. Just six days later the battalion started southward on the transport Panther—six hundred and forty-seven officers and men, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel R. W. Huntington, and divided into five companies of infantry and one of artillery, with four small rapid-fire guns. On April 29th it reached Key West, where it was held in readiness for just such service as was now in prospect at Guantanamo.

The bay of Guantanamo consists of an outer and an inner basin, connected by a narrow channel running through a cluster of islands. When the Marblehead and the Yankee entered the outer basin, on the morning of June 7th, they found that the Spanish defences consisted of the gunboat Sandoval, which, after firing a few shots, retreated into the upper harbour; an old fort on Toro Key, near the town of Caimanera, which was speedily silenced; and a blockhouse, near the cable station at Playa del Este (“Eastern Shore”), which was shelled and demolished. The American ships did not follow the Sandoval, as the entrance of the inner bay was known to be laid with mines, and the outer basin afforded the sheltered anchorage that Sampson needed. Their task done, the Yankee returned to Santiago, while the Marblehead remained to secure possession, which was clinched
on the 10th, when the Panther arrived from Key West, by landing the marine battalion.

The marines pitched their camp—which they named Camp McCalla, after the commander of the Marblehead—on the ridge above the cable station,

![Sketch map of part of Guantanamo Bay.](image)

where the demolished blockhouse had stood. The site chosen was not an easy one to defend, being conspicuously set in a clearing on the brow of the ridge, which was commanded by a higher hill a little farther inland, while a dense growth of
manigua scrub, affording perfect cover, came up within fifty yards of the tents. Apparently no attack was expected; no trenches were dug, and the artillery was not sent ashore.

Under the fire of the ships the Spaniards had withdrawn from the neighbourhood, but in the evening of the 12th they returned, and from the safe cover of the bushes opened a galling fire that never ceased for three days and nights. The marines' position was a trying one; they had no shelter and could get no rest; and had the enemy's marksmanship been better they must have suffered severely. Their rapid-fire guns were landed on the 12th, but it was difficult to reply effectively to the fire of the Spanish sharpshooters, whose smokeless powder gave little sign of their whereabouts. That night the enemy came in some force up to the edge of the clearing, but did not attempt to rush the camp—perhaps owing to the furious firing of the marines, who, almost exhausted by the strain, observed no fire discipline, and poured away their ammunition in a wild fusillade.

On the next day (June 13th) shelter trenches were dug, and some Cubans came into camp with useful reports of the enemy's movements. Acting on their information, Captain George F. Elliott was sent out, on the 14th, with two companies of marines and fifty Cubans, to destroy a well from which the Spaniards had been drawing their water supply. Captain Elliott marched six miles through the scrub, in a heat so intense that twenty-three of his men were prostrated, though all of them recovered; and not only did he succeed in choking the well, but he attacked and routed a Spanish force whose numbers were variously reported at from two hundred to five hundred, killing forty or more of them, taking eighteen prisoners, and capturing a heliograph signal apparatus. The prisoners, who belonged to the Sixty-fourth Regiment of the line, told their
captors that the soldiers at Guantanamo had only rice for rations, and had six months' pay due them.

As the Spaniards were bringing reinforcements over the bay from Caimanera, Sampson next day (June 15th) detached the Texas and the Suwanee to join the Marblehead in an attack upon the defences of the inner bay, and—if it could be reached —upon the Sandoval, which had been carrying the troops across. The ships bombarded the fort on Toro Key till there was nothing left to fire at, but did not venture to run over the mines into the inner bay, and the gunboat again escaped. In passing through the channel west of Hospital Key, both the Texas and the Marblehead had already risked serious injury or even destruction. Each struck her propeller against a contact mine, which failed to explode only because it was incrusted with a thick growth of barnacles. Gratitude for the vessels' escape may fairly be divided between "divine care," to which the gallant and devout Captain Philip attributed it in his report, and the Spaniards' neglect to maintain a proper inspection of their defences. A number of these torpedoes, which were of French manufacture, and contained forty-six and a half kilogrammes (one hundred and two pounds) of guncotton, were afterward dragged up in the channel.

Besides destroying the Toro Key fort, the men-of-war shelled Point Hicacal, from which some infantry had fired on them. The operation was repeated on the 17th, and the point was swept so clear of cover that the Spaniards made no further attempt to hold it.

The whole loss of the marines, during ten days of more or less constant fighting, was six killed and sixteen wounded, among the former being Surgeon John Blair Gibbs, a New York physician of high professional standing, who had sought service from patriotic motives. The first three to lose
their lives were a sergeant and two privates who went into the bush as a scouting party, and when their bodies were found it was thought that they had been mutilated by the enemy. It was unfortunate that this shocking allegation—too shocking to be credible in a war with a civilized foe—found its way into the official reports, being forwarded by Commander McCalla to Admiral Sampson, and by him to Washington, where of course it aroused widespread horror and indignation. The charge was afterward retracted, the apparent mutilation being attributed to the effect of Mauser bullets at short range. The fact, so well established later, that the small-calibre projectile fired by the Spanish rifle inflicts a remarkably clean wound, makes it seem more probable that the ghastly work was done by some of those gruesome scavengers of Cuba—the buzzards or the land crabs.

The Spanish forces at Guantanamo and Caimanera, numbering some seven thousand men under General Felix Pareja, were known to be in great straits for food. The stories told by the marines’ prisoners were confirmed by a letter sent by General Pareja to Santiago, and intercepted by the Cubans, who hanged the messenger. It told how on the 7th seven ships—the general’s enemies multiplied like Falstaff’s men in buckram—had attacked Playa del Este; that his guns were not powerful enough to make any effective defence; and that “the American squadron in possession of the outer bay has taken it as if for a harbour of rest, they having anchored as if in one of their own ports.” As to his own situation the general said:

The forces of the brigade here are in good spirits. I continue serving out half rations of everything, and in that way I expect to reach only the end of the month, above all in bread, as I have no flour of any kind, and no way of getting any, on account of there having been no corn for some time. Quinine for the hospitals the same. Town in needful circumstances.
CHAPTER XI

THE SANTIAGO EXPEDITION

Up to this point the navy, on the American side, had been practically the sole actor on the stage of war. The army missed its chance of an early blow at the enemy, as has already been told, by its unreadiness for immediate action; but when the plans for an attack upon Havana were perforce postponed, the organization of an invading force was still pushed as energetically as possible. Besides this immediate task, the powers of the War Department were tremendously taxed by the rapid increase of the volunteer forces, and the necessity for furnishing the recruits with equipments. The full nominal strength of the army mounted within five weeks from less than 30,000 to a little more than 280,000. The first call for 125,000 volunteers was followed by another (May 25th) for 75,000 more, and Congress authorized the enlistment of four special forces—ten regiments of volunteer infantry composed of "immunes," or men not liable to yellow-fever infection; three regiments of cavalry, one of which was to become famous as the "Rough Riders"; a volunteer signal corps, and an engineer brigade of 3,500 men.

The actual enlisted strength rose very close to the same figure, reaching, in August, a maximum of 58,688 regulars and 216,029 volunteers, or 274,717 in all. Less than one fifth of this great army saw service in the field—a fact which certainly justifies the opinion of the commanding general, whose plans, submitted shortly before the war began, sug-
gested the immediate calling out of 50,000 volunteers, with 40,000 more to be held in reserve and to garrison coast defences. General Miles, to use his own words, "deemed it of the first importance to well equip such a force, rather than to partly equip a much larger number"; but his views were overruled—not for the only time in the campaign.

At the end of May the War Department began to collect its fleet of transports at Tampa, where about 16,000 troops (the Fifth Corps, commanded by Major-General Shafter) were encamped, with as many more within easy reach at Fernandina and Mobile, besides some 40,000 at Chickamauga. On May 24th Sampson was instructed—somewhat prematurely—to be prepared to convoy forty troopships, carrying 30,000 men, to Cuba. Three days later the estimate of the force prepared to move suddenly dropped to 10,000, and Secretary Long cabled to Schley, who was supposed to be blockading Santiago, that if Cervera's squadron was in the harbour immediate movement against it and the town will be made by the navy and division of about ten thousand men of the American troops, which are ready to embark.

A similar despatch was sent to Sampson, then at Key West:

If the Spanish division is proved to be in Santiago de Cuba it is the intention of the department to make descent immediately upon that port with ten thousand men, United States troops. You will be expected to convoy transports, probably fifteen or twenty, going in person and taking with you the New York and Indiana and the Oregon, and as many smaller vessels with good batteries as can possibly be gathered, to guard against possible attack by Spanish torpedo-boat destroyers, etc.

But Sampson could not wait for the unready expedition, and sailed for Santiago on the 29th,* leaving the Indiana for convoy duty. Two days later a de-

* Page 180.
spatch was sent after him, from Washington, telling him that 25,000 men were “now embarking at Tampa.” On June 3d, however, he was informed that “General Shafter expects to start from Tampa on June 4th with 18,000 or 20,000 men.”

To these puzzling messages Sampson replied, on the 4th, with a telegram giving information of the Spanish forces at Santiago,* and continuing:

With superior force and insurgent forces, which are ready, though mostly needing arms, Santiago de Cuba must fall, together with ships in port, which can not be entered against obstructions and mines.

To his report of the bombardment of June 6th the admiral added (June 7th):

If ten thousand men were here, city and fleet would be ours within forty-eight hours. Every consideration

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* This telegram appears in three different forms in the printed reports of the War and Navy Departments. In Sampson’s report the estimate of the Spanish force is given thus: “Have received reliable information from Cuban officers the Spanish force in this vicinity of Santiago consists of 7,000 men, intrenched in Juraguacito and Daiquiri; 5,000 men in Santiago de Cuba; in Morro de Cuba, 400 men; at other points in the bay, 100 men, with small rapid-fire gun and submarine mines at various points.”

In the Bureau of Navigation’s report on “Operations in Conjunction with the Army,” the figures appear thus: “7,000 men intrenched in Juraguacito and Daiquiri; 5,000 men at Morro de Cuba, 400 men at other points in the bay, 500 men with small Hotchkiss 37 mm. rapid-fire guns, and submarine mines at various points.”

In the Secretary of War’s report they are given as “7,000 men intrenched in Juraguacito and Daiquiri; 5,000 at Morro de Cuba; 4,000 at other points; in bay 500, with small Hotchkiss gun.”

It would appear that the wording of an official cipher despatch is not so fixed and unalterable a thing as might be supposed. Perhaps none of these variant versions gives the admiral’s estimate exactly as he intended it. It seems improbable that 7,000 men would be located in Juraguacito and Daiquiri, when the Spanish commander was of course unaware that Shafter would land in that quarter, and was preparing, as Lieutenant Blue found, to resist an attack on the other side of Santiago. It may perhaps be conjectured that Sampson meant 7,000 to be his figure for the whole force of the Spaniards. Other reasons for this supposition are, first, that 7,000 was very near their actual strength; second, that it agrees well enough with the admiral’s estimate (reported June 11th) of about 12,000 regulars and 3,000 militia between Santiago and Guantanamo; and third, that in speaking of the American expedition he uses the terms “superior force” in one despatch, and “10,000 men” in another, as if synonymous—the inference being that he believed the Spaniards to have less than 10,000.
demands immediate army movement. If delayed, city will be defended more strongly by guns taken from fleet.

Sampson has been criticised for this misleading estimate, as it has been termed, of the task Shafter had to undertake. It may be answered that "ten thousand men" was not his own suggestion for the strength of the expedition; it was the figure given him from Washington as far back as May 27th. Moreover, the delay that followed strengthened the enemy's position, as he had foretold.

The delay was a disconcerting one to the navy, as vessels for the convoy had been withdrawn from the blockade, and were lying idle at Key West. On the 5th Sampson telegraphed to Washington that it was "very important we should know immediately whether the army expedition has sailed." The Navy Department forwarded the message to the War Department, and suggested "that urgent measures be taken to terminate the present delay."

Affairs at Tampa were in a state of almost inextricable confusion. "The capacity of the place had been greatly exceeded," as General Shafter very conservatively phrased it. The port was approached by a single-track railroad, which proved unequal to the demands upon it. For miles the line was choked with freight cars, which could not be unloaded with any promptitude. Few had labels showing their contents, and consignments could not be found when wanted. There were instances of provisions spoiling on the railway while soldiers suffered from insufficient rations, and some of the volunteers were actually seen begging for food in the streets. No storage facilities had been provided. The little local post office was overwhelmed with the sudden increase of business, and could not distribute the freight bills. At Port Tampa, where about thirty transports had been collected by the end of May, the docking space was limited, there being wharf room for only eight vessels; the chan-
nel was narrow and overcrowded, and one ship, the Florida, was disabled by a collision while loading.

It was useless to send urgent messages from Washington; the officers in charge of loading the transports toiled day and night, but their best exertions were sorely handicapped by the adverse conditions under which they had to work—conditions due, primarily, to a lack of systematic and intelligent prevision on the part of those responsible for the equipment of the troops. One of the heads of the army staff subsequently testified before the commission that investigated the conduct of the campaign, that when, war being imminent, he suggested the purchase of supplies for his branch of the service, he was informed that "the policy was to wait"—a policy curiously suggestive of the Spanish motto of "mañana." At the same time, much of the blame may fairly be traced to Congress, with its eagerness for hostilities, and its persistent refusal to provide a military organization adequate to the needs of war.

On May 30th General Miles left Washington to give his personal assistance to the task of embarking the expedition. From Tampa he telegraphed to the War Department (June 5th):

This expedition has been delayed through no fault of any one connected with it. It contains the principal part of the army,* which for intelligence and efficiency is not exceeded by any body of troops on earth. It contains fourteen of the best-conditioned regiments of volunteers, the last of which arrived this morning. Yet these have never been under fire. Between thirty and forty per cent are undrilled, and in one regiment over three hundred men had never fired a gun.... This enterprise is so important that I desire to go with this army corps or to immediately organize another and go with it to join this and capture position number 2.†

The answer to General Miles’s request for service was an inquiry how soon he could have an expeditionary force ready for Porto Rico. It is

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* That is, the regular army.  
† Porto Rico.
scarcely strange that there should have been some impatience at Washington, as appears in the peremptory order transmitted to Shafter by Secretary Alger on June 7th:

The President directs you to sail at once with what force you have ready.

Shafter's reply was: "I will sail to-morrow morning. Steam can not be gotten up earlier"; and Miles added:

From the commanding general down to the drummer boys, every one is impatient to go, and annoyed at the delay.

On the 8th nearly sixteen thousand men were on board the transports, and the fleet was actually under way for Key West, when there came an unexpected and unfortunate interruption.

The converted yacht Eagle, after her brief service with the Flying Squadron,* had rejoined the north coast blockade. On the night of June 7th she was cruising in the Nicholas Channel, when she sighted a strange ship, which did not answer her signals. She ran nearer, and made out four vessels, two large and two small, heading eastward in column, with no lights showing except one at the stern of each ship. For more than half an hour she watched them, steaming parallel with their course, and within a mile of them; and as the private night signal had been made twice without bringing a reply—"an omission," says her commander, Lieutenant Southerland, "which would have been almost criminal in a United States man-of-war"—it was concluded that the four vessels were enemies. The Eagle was headed for Key West, and Commodore Remey, in command there, at once informed Washington of the news she brought:

* Page 176.
Spanish armoured cruiser, Spanish cruiser second-class, and Spanish torpedo-boat destroyers seen by Eagle near Nicholas Channel, Cuba. Delay convoy.

It scarcely seemed possible that four of Cervera's ships had slipped out and escaped Sampson's vigilant watch, or that another squadron, of whose movements the American strategists had no information, had arrived from Spain; and the Eagle's disturbing statement might have been dismissed at once had it not been confirmed by the Resolute, which came into Key West a few hours later and reported that she had been chased by four strange vessels, near the scene of Lieutenant Southerland's nocturnal adventure. It was manifestly unsafe to send out a fleet of unprotected transports loaded with troops, when hostile war ships were directly in their path, and on receipt of the news from Remey Secretary Alger at once telegraphed to Shafter (June 8th):

Wait until you get further orders before you sail. Answer quick.

Shafter's answer, sent the same afternoon, was:

Message received. Vessels are in the stream, but will be able to stop them before reaching the Gulf.

The transports were recalled, and the vessels waiting at Key West to convoy them were ordered out to cruise in search of the mysterious Spanish squadron. No trace of it could be found. Sampson, when he heard of it, promptly declared it a myth, and cabled his opinion to Secretary Long. He cited another case of false alarm—a double one—that had just come under his notice. The Yankee, returning to Santiago from the Mole St. Nicholas, had reported that on the night of the 9th she passed "a squadron of eight vessels, one of which was a battle ship." The "eight vessels" proved to be the Resolute (an Old Dominion liner) and five smaller auxiliaries, one of which—the Scorpion—had sighted the Yankee and fired upon her, mistaking
her for a Spanish torpedo-boat destroyer. "This," said Sampson, "shows how easily the most experienced may be deceived at night at sea"; and he telegraphed to Washington (June 10th):

Have no confidence in the report of Eagle as to nationality or character of the vessels, and consider very unwise to suspend operations on this account. Armoured vessel was probably Talbot [a British cruiser]. . . . Delay seems to me most unfortunate.

And again the following day:

The vessels seen by the Eagle were the Armeria, Scorpion, and Supply. They were in just that position at time named.

On the 13th Lieutenant Blue's daring expedition enabled the admiral to report positively that Cervera's six ships were still in Santiago harbour. By this time the transports were once more under orders to sail, and some of them started that afternoon, the rest getting under way on the 14th.

Campaigns are not won by commanders who never make a mistake and by armies whose organization is faultless, for such commanders and such armies do not exist. Warfare—even victorious warfare—with all its outward show of pomp and glory, generally proves on closer acquaintance to be more full of blunders and errors than of brilliant achievements. Shafter's expedition against Santiago was successful—sweepingly successful—not because its management was without blot or blemish, but because it fought with unsurpassed valour against an enemy inferior in numbers and weaker in resources.

Its embarkation was of a piece with the state of confusion characteristic of the camp at Tampa. The transports, which had been fitted out for the much shorter voyage to Havana, proved unable to accommodate anything like the number of men for which they had been rated.* The degree of system in

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* "The quartermaster-general was not told in advance of the proposed size of Shafter's expedition, or its destination. Had it been
the assignment of troops to the different ships may be judged from the statement of Lieutenant-Colonel Roosevelt that when the depot quartermaster allotted a transport to the Rough Riders, he found that the same vessel had already been allotted to two other regiments; and when she came up to the wharf there was an exciting race to seize her.

The commissary supplies taken with the expedition were ample in quantity, though the quality of some of them has been a subject of controversy. There was plenty of ammunition for the small artillery force. The medical stores were found inadequate. Only three ambulances were embarked; the surgeon-general's orders prescribed two for each regiment, but Colonel Jacobs, chief quartermaster of the corps, testified that the commanding general ordered them left behind.* Before blaming Shafter for what proved to be a serious omission, it must be remembered that his orders to hurry were imperative, and that space on the transports was at a premium. Practically nothing had been done to fit the clothing of the troops for service in the tropics, and the regulars went to Cuba in the uniforms they had perhaps been wearing, two months before, in Dakota or Montana. Some of the regiments carried overcoats as well as blankets.

There are discrepancies in different accounts of the expedition's equipment, due, apparently, to the difficulty of exact knowledge as to what was taken done, there would have been a vast difference in the war-transportation work."—Statement of Colonel Bell, of the transportation division of the quartermaster-general's office, before the War Investigation Commission, December 2, 1898.

* Lieutenant Miley (In Cuba with Shafter, p. 44) states that seven ambulances were taken, so does the report of Quartermaster-General Ludington; but Surgeon-General Sternberg's report gives the number as three, and the report of the War Investigation Commission (p. 84) adopts his figure. Shafter's report asserts that "as many were taken as was thought necessary, judging from previous campaigns." The general fails to specify which campaigns justified him in landing an army of invasion practically without ambulances.
and what left behind, and what, after being carried to Santiago, was sent north again without being unloaded. Even the number of men who sailed is variously stated. General Shafter’s official report puts it at 815 officers and 16,072 men. General Miles, who was at Tampa, reported 803 officers and 14,935 men. The figure given by Secretary Alger to the War Investigation Commission was 16,988. Lieutenant Miley, of Shafter’s staff—a careful and well-informed statistician—says 819 officers and 15,058 men.*

The corps consisted of the following commands:

FIRST DIVISION (BRIGADIER-GENERAL KENT)

First Brigade (Brigadier-General Hawkins).—Sixth Infantry (Lieutenant-Colonel Egbert), Sixteenth Infantry (Colonel Theaker), and Seventy-first New York Volunteers (Colonel Downs).

Second Brigade (Colonel Pearson).—Second Infantry (Lieutenant-Colonel Wherry), Tenth Infantry (Lieutenant-Colonel Kellogg), and Twenty-first Infantry (Lieutenant-Colonel McKibbin).

Third Brigade (Colonel Wikoff).—Ninth Infantry (Lieutenant-Colonel Ewers), Thirteenth Infantry (Lieutenant-Colonel Worth), and Twenty-fourth Infantry (Lieutenant-Colonel Liscum).

SECOND DIVISION (BRIGADIER-GENERAL LAWTON)

First Brigade (Colonel Van Horn).—Eighth Infantry (Major Conrad), Twenty-second Infantry (Lieutenant-Colonel Patterson), and Second Massachusetts Volunteers (Colonel Clark).

Second Brigade (Colonel Miles).—First Infantry (Lieutenant-Colonel Bisbee), Fourth Infantry (Lieutenant-Colonel Bainbridge), and Twenty-fifth Infantry (Lieutenant-Colonel Daggett).

* In Cuba with Shafter, p. 44.
Third Brigade (Brigadier-General Chaffee).—Seventh Infantry (Colonel Benham), Twelfth Infantry (Lieutenant-Colonel Comba), and Seventeenth Infantry (Lieutenant-Colonel Haskell).

CAVALRY DIVISION (MAJOR-GENERAL WHEELER)

First Brigade (Brigadier-General Sumner).—Third Cavalry (Major Wessels), Sixth Cavalry (Lieutenant-Colonel Carroll), and Ninth Cavalry (Lieutenant-Colonel Hamilton).

Second Brigade (Brigadier-General Young).—First Cavalry (Lieutenant-Colonel Viele), Tenth Cavalry (Major Norvell), and First Volunteer Cavalry, popularly designated as the Rough Riders (Colonel Leonard Wood).

The cavalry division sailed without horses, because there was no room for them on the transports, and because it was reported, quite correctly, that mounted troops would be of little use in the rough country around Santiago. The animals were left at Tampa, and only two squadrons (about five hundred men) of each regiment went to Cuba. Armed with their cavalry carbines, the three thousand men of the division fought as infantry throughout the campaign.

There were four light batteries: Batteries E (Captain Capron) and K (Captain Best) of the First Artillery, and A (Captain Grimes) and F (Captain Parkhurst) of the Second Artillery. Each consisted of four three-inch guns, and all were under the command of Major Dillenback, of the Second Artillery. There were also Batteries G (Captain Ennis) and H (Captain Cummins) of the Fourth Artillery, each equipped with two five-inch siege rifles and four 3.6-inch mortars; and two machine-gun detachments, one of four Gatlings, commanded by Lieutenant Parker, of the Thirteenth Infantry, and one of an equal number of one-pound Hotchkiss guns, manned by men of the Tenth Cavalry, under Lieu-
tenant Hughes. Besides these, the Rough Riders had two rapid-fire Colts, presented by members of the regiment, and a dynamite gun.

An engineer battalion, under Captain Burr, accompanied the expedition, as did also a signal corps and balloon detachment commanded by Major Greene. An entire division of infantry—Brigadier-General Snyder's—consisting of volunteer regiments, was left at Tampa for lack of ships to carry it and time to embark it. To make up for this, a detachment was shipped from Mobile, which included the Third Infantry (Colonel Page), the Twentieth Infantry (Major McCaskey), and Major Rafferty's squadron of the Second Cavalry, mounted—the only mounted cavalry in the expedition. It formed an independent brigade, under the command of Brigadier-General Bates.

Two other general officers accompanied the expedition—Major-General Breckinridge, inspector-general of the army, and Brigadier-General Ludlow, of the engineer department. In the field, the latter took command of the first brigade of Lawton's division, replacing Colonel Van Horn, who was seriously injured on the day before the landing at Daiquiri. The chief commissary of the expedition was Colonel Weston, the chief quartermaster Lieutenant-Colonel Humphrey.

On June 14th the transports rendezvoused at Egmont Key, outside of Tampa harbour, where five of the smaller men-of-war were waiting to escort them southward. Off the Tortugas, on the evening of the 15th, they met the Indiana, whose chief officer, Captain Taylor, took over the command of the convoy from Commander Hunker of the Annapolis. From this point the course was to the southeast, toward Santiago. The transports moved slowly; they had two scows and a water boat to tow, and there was a good deal of straggling. One or two of them had
to put in at Great Inagua, in the Bahamas, for water. Two—the Yucatan, carrying the Rough Riders, and the City of Washington—fell so far behind that the Bancroft and the Wasp were sent back to protect them, and they reached Santiago several hours later than the rest of the fleet. Captain Taylor had been instructed, if possible, to form a fast division and hurry some of the vessels forward, in order to reinforce the marines at Playa del Este, who were reported as being hard pressed; but Shafter did not wish to divide his army, and Taylor found his hands full without reorganizing his unwieldy flotilla.

The transports had all been freight vessels, and their lack of proper ventilation and accommodations caused discomfort among the troops; but the voyage was uneventful, no enemy appearing, and the most serious mishap being the loss of one of the two scows, which was much needed for landing Shafter's artillery.

While waiting for the army, Sampson had been reconnoitring possible landing places near Santiago, and testing the Spanish defences. To prevent any strengthening of the harbour works he bombarded them heavily on the 16th. Once more the batteries were "quickly silenced," but the injuries inflicted again proved slight. The Morro and the Socapa reported three men killed and eighteen wounded, but no guns dismounted, though one of the six-inch weapons in the Socapa was temporarily disabled by being buried in débris. On the following day two steam cutters from the New York and the Massachusetts attempted to enter Cabanas Bay, the nearest harbour to the west, but were driven off by a heavy fire from shore.

The Vesuvius, which joined the blockading fleet on the 13th, was having her first test in warfare at this time. Every night she ran in close to the harbour mouth and fired three of her dynamite shells. Their tremendous explosions undoubtedly had a
moral effect upon the Spaniards, although—largely owing to the difficulty of aiming them accurately—they did very little actual damage.*

On June 19th General Calixto Garcia, commander of the insurgent forces in eastern Cuba, reached Rabi's camp near Aserraderos, and came out to the New York to see Sampson. The Cuban leader, though the conference was interrupted by his seasickness, made a favourable impression upon the American admiral, who describes him as a man "of most frank and engaging manners and most soldierly appearance." His arrival was a sequel to the negotiations begun by Lieutenant Rowan in the first days of the war. One of his officers, Colonel Hernandez, who had accompanied Rowan to Washington, went back to Cuba with a letter from General Miles (dated June 2d) informing Garcia of the proposed movement against Santiago, and suggesting that he could render valuable assistance. Garcia replied—through Sampson, who cabled his message to Washington—that "the roads were bad and Cubans scattered"; but he ordered his lieutenants to concentrate their forces about the three chief Spanish military posts in the province—Holguin (where ten thousand troops were quartered), Manzanillo, and Guantánamo, in order to prevent reinforcements from going to Santiago. He himself mustered some four thousand men near Aserraderos, and readily promised their aid in return for the arms, clothing, and rations

* Lieutenant Müller speaks of "the Vesuvius that gave us so much trouble." He says that "one of her projectiles, which fell on the northern slope of the Socapa, tore up trees right and left for a distance of twenty metres. Another made an excavation not very deep, but very wide; I was told that it would hold twenty horses. Still another dropped in the water, but close to one of the destroyers, which was violently shaken, as also the Mercedes, anchored at a short distance."

Of this last shot, fired on the night of June 15th, an officer of the Pluton told Mr. Ramsden, the British consul at Santiago, that its explosion lifted the small vessel out of the water, throwing every one on board off his feet.
given him from the fleet's stores. He had recently received a cargo of rifles and ammunition from the United States, landed at Banes by the Florida.

On the morning of the 20th the Wompatuck, which Captain Taylor had sent ahead to herald the approach of the army, reached Sampson's fleet, and about noon the transports came in sight. The admiral sent Captain Chadwick, on the Gloucester, to invite Shafter up to the blockading line; and on his arrival Sampson went on board of the general's headquarters ship, the Segurança. In the afternoon the Segurança took both commanders to Aserraderos, where they landed—Garcia not caring for another experience afloat—and conferred with the Cuban leader and Generals Rabi and Castillo. It is scarcely probable, if the campaign were to be fought over again, that the American admiral and major-general would begin it by a visit to an insurgent camp, while an American army corps waited off shore.

It was arranged, at Aserraderos, that at sunrise on the 22d a feint of landing should be made at Cabanas, while the real debarkation should be begun at Daiquirí; that a Cuban force under General Castillo should engage the Spanish detachment in the rear, while Rabi supported the attack at Cabanas.

On the 21st Shafter summoned his division and brigade commanders to receive their landing orders, and the Bancroft brought them to the Segurança—a task which, as Commander Clover reported, meant more than twenty miles steaming among the scattered transports. The sea was rough, and the transfer of the officers from vessel to vessel was difficult and even dangerous. It was in boarding the Bancroft that Colonel Van Horn, who was to have led the first brigade ashore in the morning, received the injury which disabled him, and from which he died a few months later.
Next day (June 22d) the plan already outlined was successfully carried out, except that the Cubans entirely failed to intercept the enemy's retreat. The fleet bombarded all the Spanish defences for nearly twenty miles along the coast, from Daiquiri to Cabanas. Off this latter point the Texas was struck by a shell from the Socapa, which killed one man and wounded eight. The landing at Daiquiri was carried out with a good deal of confusion, yet with creditable rapidity. Captain Goodrich, of the St. Louis, who was in command on behalf of the navy, had much to contend with. Half a dozen men-of-war had shelled the country about the bay, with a fire heavy enough, as the captain said, "to drive out the whole Spanish army in Cuba, had it been there," but the transports could not be induced to go anywhere near the shore. The navy had no control over these marine hirelings, and their captains—moved, perhaps, by a conscientious regard for their owners' interest, or possibly by a tender care for their own personal safety—declined to face any avoidable risk in the service of their country. As a result, the boats—more than fifty of which were furnished by the men-of-war, to supply the army's deficiency in this respect—had to make a voyage of several miles to carry the troops ashore. One ship, carrying six hundred men who were to have landed in advance of the army, did not put in an appearance till the afternoon, after four steam launches had spent hours in searching for her.

There were two piers in the little bay of Daiquiri. One, a large iron structure owned by an American mining company, and used for loading ships with iron ore, was too high above the water to serve as a landing stage. The troops used the other, a small wooden pier which the Spaniards had un成功fully tried to burn. The pack mules and officers' horses were thrown overboard and left to swim ashore—
which a few of them failed to do. The first soldier landed a few minutes before ten o’clock; at sunset about six thousand men—Lawton’s division and part of Wheeler’s—were on Cuban soil. The only loss of human life was that of two infantrymen, drowned from a capsized boat. There was no molest- tation from the enemy. General Rubin, who had been stationed at Daiquiri with six hundred men and two guns, withdrew to Siboney as soon as the bombardment began, losing one killed and seven wounded; and from Siboney he continued his retreat to a position in front of Sevilla, where he received considerable reinforcements. Here the first fight- ing of the land campaign was to take place.

On the following day (June 23d), while the de- barkation at Daiquiri continued, Lawton’s and Wheeler’s troops pushed westward to-

Landing at Siboney, June 23.

ward Siboney, which they reached in the afternoon. As there was no opposi- tion from the enemy, Shafter decided to put the rest of his men and material ashore in the bay of Siboney—or the Ensenada de los Altares ("bay of the altars"), as the Spaniards called it—thus bring- ing his base several miles nearer Santiago.* At the same time he placed the transports under the per- sonal authority of Captain Goodrich—an order which enabled that energetic officer to board each vessel as it came up to land its men, and take it close inshore. There was no pier at Siboney, and the soldiers had to go ashore through the surf, but six thousand more were landed during the day.

Shafter’s orders for the arrangement of the army ashore directed Lawton to lead its advance, occup- ing "a strong defensive position" a little way be- yond Siboney, on the road toward Santiago; Bates’s

* In General Shafter’s report the distance from Daiquiri to Siboney is stated at eight miles, in General Wheeler’s at eleven, in Captain Goodrich’s at four—which shows how estimates of distance vary, even when made by minds trained to accuracy. On the map it measures six miles.
brigade was to be close behind, supporting Law-ton; Kent's division was to be held at Siboney, where it landed; Wheeler's was to bring up the rear,
taking its station between Siboney and Daiquiri.* But Wheeler, who was the senior officer ashore—Shafer remained on the Segurança until the 29th—partly upset this programme. The gallant veteran was as eager to get at the enemy as he had ever been thirty-five years before, when he was a daring young leader of Confederate cavalry. On the evening of the 23d he ordered the commander of his second brigade, General Young, who had just reached Siboney from Daiquiri, to move forward, in the morning, to reconnoitre General Rubin’s position near Sevilla. He had received information of the Spaniards’ whereabouts from General Castillo, whose men had had a skirmish with their rearguard, and had been driven off with one killed and nine wounded.

The main road from Siboney to Santiago runs inland along a small valley, and then ascends some three hundred feet to a gap in the hills, at a point called Las Guasimas ("the guasima trees"), where it turns westward to Sevilla and thence through an undulating country to the capital of the province. General Castillo had pointed out another trail, which climbs the hillside directly above Siboney, and passes along the high ground to join the main road at Las Guasimas, about three miles inland. The former is an ordinary Cuban highway, rough and narrow; the latter a mere footpath through dense woods. General Young’s plan of attack was to advance a squadron of the First Cavalry and another

* On the morning of June 24th Shafter sent the division commanders, through Lieutenant Miley, a message repeating and emphasizing these instructions:

"The commanding general begs me to say it is impossible to advance on Santiago until movements to supply troops can be arranged. Take up strong positions where you can get water, and make yourself secure from surprise or attack. Lawton’s division will be in front. Kent’s near Siboney, Wheeler’s near Daiquiri, and Bates’s command where it will be in support of Lawton.”

Wheeler had moved out of Siboney before this message reached him.
of the Tenth, four hundred and sixty-four men in all, with the battery of Hotchkiss guns—he had not been able to get rations for his other two squadrons of regulars—along the main road, while his other regiment, the Rough Riders, with five hundred men, nearly its full strength, moved forward by the hill trail to join them. General Castillo was to support the attack with eight hundred Cubans, whom he promised to bring up at five o'clock the next morning.

At half past five Young's men were ready to move, and he sent Lieutenant Rivers, one of his aides, to notify Castillo, who had not put in an appearance. Rivers came back and reported that the Cuban general was asleep, and his sentries would not allow him to be aroused. Young then gave the order to march, and the First Cavalry led the way forward, followed by the Hotchkiss battery—of which Captain Watson, Tenth Cavalry, was in temporary command that day—and by the negro troopers of the Tenth. At half past seven, approaching the enemy's position, the column was halted in an open space and scouts were sent forward to reconnoitre. They reported the Spaniards in plain sight on a hill above the gap through which the road passed.

Young advanced two of his guns along the road to draw the enemy's fire, while he deployed his men, keeping them covered in the thick chaparral, for an attack upon the left of Rubin's lines. In order to allow the Rough Riders, who had a more difficult trail to follow, time to reach the Spanish right, he waited twenty minutes before opening fire. During this delay General Wheeler rode up and joined him, but made no change in his arrangements. The two commanders were with the guns, in full view of the Spaniards, who did not fire until the Hotchkiss guns began the fight. The enemy then replied with
rifle volleys from behind rough breastworks of piled stones, and their fire was so hot that Young ordered his guns—which he had to use sparingly, as they had only one box (fifty rounds) of ammunition—under cover for a time. Wheeler even sent back a message to Lawton, saying that he had encountered "a bigger force of the enemy than he had anticipated," and requesting that reinforcements should be hurried forward—a circumstance which he neglects to mention in either of his published narratives of the campaign.

Meanwhile his troopers were creeping forward through dense undergrowth and wire fences till they reached a position close under the Spanish lines. Here for the first time they opened fire, advancing upon the enemy's front and left flank, and pressing forward with the greatest courage and determination over very difficult ground and up a steep slope.

Colonel Wood's men came in contact with the Spaniards just before Young's column got into action, meeting them almost face to face in the tropical jungle. It has been stated that the Rough Riders were ambushed, but the term can not be applied to an encounter so deliberately planned. The volunteer troopers, knowing that the enemy was close in front, were moving cautiously through the woods, with Captain Capron's troop as an advance guard, but without flankers, the jungle beside the trail being too dense. Capron had sent back word that he thought he had discovered a Spanish outpost, and Wood had begun to deploy his men into the forest, when they received a sharp fire at short range. Several of the Rough Riders fell, one of the first men killed being Sergeant Hamilton Fish, a member of a well-known New York family. A Cuban guide who was at the head of the column fled at the first fire; so did the drivers of the mules that carried the Colt guns, leaving the animals to
stray off into the forest. They were trailed and re­
covered after the fight.

Deploying both to the right, to get in touch with the other column, and to the left, to outflank the enemy, the volunteer cavalrymen pushed on as bravely as the regulars, driving the Spaniards before them through the woods. Rubin’s men made a brief stand at some ranch buildings, but retreated before the advancing Americans came to close quarters, and about an hour and a quarter after the action began the brigade had captured the entire position of the enemy, who “fled precipitately,” according to General Young’s report; but as they carried all their wounded with them, their disorder may have been more apparent than real.

The Spanish account of the action, as given by Lieutenant Müller, is that General Rubin was attacked by a strong American force, which he drove back, but that he withdrew in obedience to orders received the day before from General Linares. Two days later Linares issued a general order, in which he declared:

Soldiers! We left the mineral region* because I did not wish to sacrifice your lives in unequal battle, with musket fire, against the pompous superiority of the enemy, who was fighting us under cover of his armoured ships, armed with the most modern and powerful guns.

Linares’ tactics seem to have been weak and un­
decided. Sampson’s guns could sooner or later have rendered untenable any position within three miles of the shore, but a more determined stand at Las Guasimas, a position quite as well suited for defence as Caney or San Juan, might at least have checked Shafter’s advance and given time for the arrival of reinforcements from Manzanillo. The half-hearted resistance that Rubin offered to Young

* The neighbourhood of Daiquiri and Juragua (near Siboney), where there are extensive iron mines owned by three American com­
panies.
was worse than useless, and his hasty retreat before so small a force was not calculated to encourage the defenders of Santiago.

The Spanish force at Las Guasimas has been variously stated, American estimates running from twelve hundred to four thousand. Colonel Roosevelt gives the former figure, which is probably near the truth. Wood's official report puts it at twenty-five hundred, but commanding officers almost always overestimate the numbers opposed to them. Lieutenant Müller asserts that only part of Rubin's troops—seven companies, under Major Alcainiz, together with some engineers and artillery, perhaps eight hundred men in all—were actually in the fight. It is quite possible that Rubin's whole force was not engaged, though the Spanish army officers from whom Müller got his information were by no means unimpeachable authorities. The detailed list they gave of the American regiments in the attacking force was highly imaginative, including troops that were not within miles of the place.

Young's attack was so bold that the Spaniards very probably regarded his four squadrons as the advance guard of a much larger body. Indeed, they must have seen other American troops coming up from Siboney along the valley below them. But Young deserves credit for a successful stroke. With nine hundred and sixty-four men he had driven a force larger than his own from a strong position. Bravery is expected of American soldiers, but his troops had fought notably well, though practically none of them had been under fire before, and the Rough Riders had never fired a Krag-Jørgensen rifle until that day, having received their guns only just before they left Tampa. The American loss was sixteen killed (eight in each column) and fifty-two wounded, the dead including one officer—Captain Capron,
whose troop led the advance of the Rough Riders.*

As for the enemy’s loss, General Young reported that forty-two dead bodies were seen; Colonel Wood, that the Rough Riders alone found forty; but Colonel Roosevelt, in his interesting record of his regiment’s share in the campaign, states that these figures are too high, and that after going over the ground carefully he counted only eleven dead Spaniards, probably missing two or three. The Spanish official report nearly agrees with this, admitting only nine killed and twenty-seven wounded. General Wheeler, in his book on the campaign, records that General Toral told him that the Spanish loss on June 24 was about two hundred and fifty, and that General Escario put it at about two hundred; but these figures are incredible, and must be the result of a misunderstanding.

It has been pointed out that in attacking the enemy’s position with a divided force, General Young violated a rule of tactics. The trails along which his command moved, however, were nowhere more than a mile and a half apart—much less than that at the point where fighting was expected; and his two columns were out of touch with each other for only a brief time. Moreover, Castillo had assured him that the Cuban outposts covered both roads. And, like many another move in warfare, the plan was vindicated by its complete success. After the fight, Young said to Wheeler: “General, if I had lost this battle and lived through it, you would have had my resignation.”

The day was an oppressively hot one, and Young’s men were too much exhausted to pursue the Spaniards, even had it been prudent to do so. The race to the front—for the eagerness of the

* Captain Allyn K. Capron of the Rough Riders was a son of Captain Allyn Capron of the First Artillery, who commanded one of Shafter’s field batteries. Both father and son lost their lives, the former dying, after his return to the United States, of a fever contracted in Cuba.
American commanders really made it a race—was now taken up by the Ninth Cavalry, which came up an hour after the fight closed, and relieved Young’s outposts. Chaffee’s brigade was close behind, and Miles had also been ordered forward when Lawton received Wheeler’s request for reinforcements. Naturally, in view of Shafter’s instructions, Lawton and his brigade commanders had been surprised to find that Wheeler was in front of them. On the night before, as the Rough Riders’ dynamite gun was being hurried forward from Daiquiri, under Wheeler’s orders, to join Young’s attacking column, its captain, Sergeant Borrowe, was halted by one of Lawton’s officers, who refused to let him pass to the front.

Shafter, no doubt, was also astonished when he heard that his rearguard division had pushed forward and won a sharp fight, but he accepted the result with soldierly readiness, and commended Wheeler and Young in his official report. At the same time, while he remained on the Segurança he sent daily despatches to the veteran cavalryman enjoining him not to bring on another engagement.

Castillo had not appeared during the action at Las Guasimas, but after it was over a column of Cubans came up, led by a Frenchman, who, according to General Young, “was in a very bloodthirsty mood. He said that he had orders from Castillo to follow up the Spaniards and fight them wherever he found them. I ordered him to go back,” Young adds, “and would not have him near me.” From this time the insurgents figured less prominently in the American plans of campaign.

If the mobilizing of Shafter’s corps brought to light serious weaknesses in the organization of the United States army, the campaign revealed, on the Spanish side, a state of affairs exceedingly discreditable to Spain’s military administration in
Cuba. Few or none of the preparations that ordinary foresight would have suggested had been made. When Cervera's squadron first lay in Santiago harbour, helpless for lack of coal, and the American blockaders gathered outside, the least accomplished strategist might have seen where the war was about to centre; yet no timely steps were taken to gather men and supplies at the threatened point. Not until the last days of May were the mediæval batteries at the harbour mouth reinforced with guns from the Reina Mercedes. There had been a chronic shortage of provisions, and nothing was done to remedy it. Had not a German steamer come in on May 7th with a cargo of rice,* the troops would have fared even worse than they did. With more than thirty thousand soldiers in the province, and with plenty of time to send reinforcements to the garrison of Santiago, no effort was made to do so in season to render effective aid.

Captain-General Blanco's first defensive move was an order issued on June 20th—almost three weeks after the beginning of the blockade—constituting the forces of the extreme southeastern district, extending from Manzanillo to Baracoa and Guantanamo, a separate army corps, under Lieutenant-General Arsenio Linares. Two days later Colonel Frederico Escario left Manzanillo for Santiago with 3,550 men and two guns. His march was a difficult one, and the insurgents constantly harassed him, killing or wounding ninety-seven of his men, but failing to keep him out of Santiago, where he arrived on the evening of July 3d—just too late for the decisive fight of the campaign. It

* This vessel, the Polaria, was bound for Havana, but put in at Santiago on hearing of the blockade. Lieutenant Müller states that she carried 1,700 sacks of rice; Commander Jacobsen of the German cruiser Geier, who visited Santiago during the blockade, and whose account of his observations has been published by the Navy Department, says 14,000 sacks.
is stated in General Miles's report that another body of Spaniards started to Linares's relief from Holguin, but was compelled to turn back. General Pareja, whom Shafter left in his rear at Guantanamo, never attempted a hostile movement, and had apparently no orders to do so.

On withdrawing Rubin's brigade from Sevilla, Linares posted his forces along a line beginning on the coast at Fort Aguadases, following the railroad from that point to its terminus at Las Cruces on Santiago Bay, and thence running northeastward, his last outpost on the left wing being in the village of Caney, four miles northeast of Santiago. This long line was thinly held, there being, according to Lieutenant Müller, 3,000 around the city and as far in front of it as San Juan; 800 on the right wing, from Las Cruces to Fort Aguadases; and 520, under General Vara del Rey, at Caney—in all 4,320 men, of whom about two thirds were Spanish regulars, the rest being mobilized troops (Spanish militia), volunteers, and sailors from Cervera's fleet. Besides these, there was in Santiago a small reserve force of cavalry, police (the guardia civil), and firemen; nearly 1,000 men were stationed in the harbour batteries—450 at the Morro, 400 at the Socapa, 120 at Punta Gorda; and 900 more, under Colonel Aldea, were intrenched west of the bay. These figures do not include the outlying detachments at Palma Soriano, San Luis, and other inland points.

This does not seem to be the best disposition that could have been made. Shafter moved straight forward to deliver his attack, not veiling it by feint or strategy, and the defending force might have been concentrated more effectively to meet him. It may have been necessary to station a regiment west of the bay, but the garrison of the harbour forts might well have been diminished to strengthen the position in front of Shafter's advance. Lieutenant Müller-
ler accounts for the effort to cover so wide an extent of country by the necessity of protecting the aqueduct that supplied Santiago with water, and of holding a district that kept the troops supplied with a certain amount of fresh food—presumably mangoes, sweet potatoes, and sugar cane.
CHAPTER XII

THE BATTLES OF CANEY AND SAN JUAN

On the evening of June 24th—the day of the action at Las Guasimas—the last men of Kent's division were ashore at Siboney. Six comparatively uneventful days followed, during which the corps gradually pushed forward and occupied the hilly, wooded country about Sevilla, as far as El Pozo. The field batteries were disembarked at Daiquiri on the 25th and 26th. The first tactical problem, that of the landing, had been successfully accomplished; General Shafter was now struggling with the second—that of getting ashore the supplies that his army needed before it could go into battle. It proved an exceedingly difficult task, owing to the lack of tugs and scows, and for several days the troops lived from hand to mouth, provisions being landed no faster than they were consumed. Had a storm driven the fleet from the coast the result might have been serious, or even disastrous. Two weeks passed before the corps had three days' rations in advance.

On the 25th and 26th Garcia and 2,978 of his Cubans were carried on the transports from Aserraderos to Siboney. On the 27th the first reinforcements arrived from the United States, the Thirty-third and part of the Thirty-fourth Michigan, forming a brigade under Brigadier-General Duffield, being landed at the same point. These regiments came from Camp Alger.
On the 29th Shafter came ashore, and established his headquarters about a mile east of El Pozo—that is, a mile behind his outposts—close to the trail along which most of the army was encamped. His heavy guns were not landed, and the equipment of his corps was still far from complete, but he was unwilling—and very properly so—to delay a day longer than was absolutely necessary. Coming into the tropics in the rainy season, his men were certain, if the campaign were prolonged, to find the fevers of Cuba a more deadly foe than the guns of the Spaniards.* "It was to be a dash or nothing," as Shafter himself said.

General Shafter did not attempt any reconnaissance in person, beyond overlooking the country before him from a hill near his headquarters. He has been severely criticised for failing to keep in closer touch with his troops, and to foresee more exactly the difficulties of the field of battle; but it must be remembered that he was a man of sixty-one, exceedingly stout, and that his health suffered seriously in the tropical climate and under his tremendous burden of hard work and responsibility. Besides the exhaustion of malaria, he was enduring great pain from an attack of the gout, which incapacitated him from putting his foot into a stirrup.

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* During nine weeks, while the Fifth Corps was in Cuba, it lost 318 men from disease, against 263 who were killed in action or died of their wounds.

In describing the conditions under which he went into battle, Shafter said in his official report: "These preparations were far from what I desired them to be, but we were in a sickly climate; our supplies had to be brought forward by a narrow wagon road which the rains might at any time render impassable; fear was entertained that a storm might drive the vessels containing our stores to sea, thus separating us from our base of supplies; and, lastly, it was reported that General Pando, with 8,000 reinforcements for the enemy, was en route from Manzanillo, and might be expected in a few days." The movement of Escario's brigade was of course the foundation for this last report. General Pando, it afterward appeared, was not in that part of Cuba at the time.
He was absolutely compelled to let other men represent him at the front.

Generals Wheeler, Lawton, and Chaffee, Colonel Derby of the engineers, and other officers, had been active in reconnoitring, and had received pretty full information as to the Spanish forces and positions from Cuban peasants. The enemy's weakness in artillery and lack of supplies were also learned, and it was concluded that his resistance would not be strong. Shafter undoubtedly underestimated the task he was about to set his men; but his mistake was shared by his ablest officers, and probably by every member of his corps. Wheeler, who had been close up to Caney, asked permission to attack at that point, his plan being to concentrate a heavy artillery fire upon it, and cut off the retreat of its garrison, which was known to be small, by placing a division between the village and Santiago. Shafter agreed with him as to the direction of the first attack, but preferred to intrust it to Lawton. On the 29th the commanding general telegraphed to Washington:

Advance pickets within a mile and a half of Santiago. No opposition. Spaniards have evidently withdrawn to immediate vicinity of the town. Expect to put division on Caney road, between that place and Santiago, day after to-morrow, and will also advance on Sevilla road to San Juan river, and possibly beyond. General Garcia, with three thousand men, will take railroad north of Santiago at the same time to prevent Pando reaching city.

On the afternoon of the 30th Shafter summoned his division commanders to a council of war, at which his plans for an immediate attack were formulated. Lawton's division, supported by Bates's brigade and by one battery of artillery (Captain Capron's), was to assault Caney at daybreak; the other two divisions were to march straight forward toward Santiago by the road through San Juan, Kent's deploying to the left, Wheeler's to the right; and Lawton, who promised to take Caney in two
hours at most, was to come down the high road from that village, and bring his left in line with the right of the cavalry division in time for the attack upon the Spaniards’ central position. Captain Grimes’s battery, posted at El Pozo, was to support the left wing; the other two batteries of light artillery, and the Gatling guns, were to be held in reserve. The only infantry reserve was a battalion of the Thirty-fourth Michigan, back at Siboney.* General Duffield, who was present at the conference, was ordered to move the Thirty-third Michigan along the narrow-gauge railroad from that point and threaten the Spanish detachment at Fort Agua­dores.

General Wheeler was not at the council. The veteran cavalry commander was lying in his tent, exposure to heat and rain having brought on a slight fever; and though he had not reported himself unfit for duty, it seems that Shafter, or possibly one of Shafter’s aids, considered him so, and summoned his senior brigade commander, General Sumner, to headquarters in his place.

Lawton’s division marched toward Caney during the night, and at sunrise next morning (July 1st) was in position for the attack. For his plan of action Lawton gives credit to General Chaffee, who had made a very thorough reconnaissance close up to the enemy’s lines. Chaffee’s own brigade was to move upon the village from the east, at daybreak, and capture it. Ludlow was to occupy the road between Caney and Santiago, cutting off the garrison’s retreat. Of Miles’s three regiments, the First Infantry was to be held in support of Capron’s battery, together with Troop D of the Second Caval­ry; the Fourth and the Twenty-fifth were to follow Ludlow. Caney taken, the division was to ren­dezvous at the Ducrot house, on the Santiago road,

* The other two battalions of the Thirty-fourth Michigan, and the Ninth Massachusetts, reached Siboney on the Harvard on July 1st.
and thence to march forward and join Wheeler and Kent in attacking the Spanish lines.

During the night, Chaffee personally guided companies of the Seventh and the Twelfth to points where, at dawn, they could seize the ridge overlooking the village on the east. The first shot was fired by Capron’s battery at a quarter past six, with a range of about twenty-four hundred yards. The Spaniards had no artillery, and there was no reply till Chaffee’s skirmish line was within half a mile of the trenches, when the Spaniards opened fire with unexpected spirit and effect, and for three hours the battle was a sharp infantry duel. It was soon clear that Lawton’s estimate had been far too sanguine, and that the garrison of Caney, though greatly outnumbered, had heavy odds in the strength of its defences, and was prepared to make a desperate resistance. The key to the position was a small conical hill at the southern end of the village, on the top of which stood an old masonry fort. In front of this were trenches—some of them cut in solid rock—and wire entanglements. There were also five blockhouses, with connecting trenches, dotted around Caney, and when the Spaniards were finally driven into the village they continued a desperate resistance from its houses and its stone church, whose walls were loopholed for rifle fire.

The defence of Caney was the best and bravest bit of fighting the Spaniards did in the whole war. It was worthy of the finest traditions of a nation whose most famous deeds of valour, from the days of Saguntum to those of Saragossa, have been done in defence of beleaguered towns. For more than ten hours General Vara del Rey’s five hundred men kept at bay ten times their number of American soldiers. And while the Spanish resistance was nothing less than heroic, the action was equally creditable to Lawton’s troops, whose attack was
finally successful only because it was pushed home with unfaltering courage and persistence.*

The fire of the American artillery was disappointingly ineffective,† and the work was done by hard fighting on the part of the infantry. The first movement to get at close quarters with the enemy was made by the Seventeenth Infantry, forming Chaffee's extreme right, who advanced along a slightly sunken road to seize a low ridge commanding the village on the northeast. As they deployed through a gap in the hedge that bordered the road, they met such a heavy fire that they had to withdraw, Lieutenant-Colonel Haskell, who was leading his men, being badly wounded by three bullets. The regiment was moved to a less exposed position still further to the right.

The Seventh Infantry, meanwhile, came up along the road, deployed behind the ridge, advanced, and held it under a heavy fire, which caused serious losses, and to which they could make little reply, the Spaniards being seldom visible. Their loss of thirty-three men killed and a hundred and one wounded was far heavier than that of any other American command. General Chaffee, who was with them, had a button shot from his coat, and a bullet went through his shoulder strap.

His other regiment, the Twelfth Infantry, was fighting its way forward a little farther to the left, along a valley that led close under the Spanish fort. Far to the left, Ludlow was gradually closing in on

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* "On the 1st of July," says Lieutenant Müller, the Spanish historian of the campaign, "the Americans fought with truly admirable courage. . . . Did they think that all they had to do was to attack our soldiers en masse to put them to flight? God knows."

† General Chaffee reported that the fire of Capron's battery was "accurate and very effective," but though the guns began at 6.15 A. M. it was more than eight hours later when the fort was charged and captured by the infantry. Other observers agreed with General Ludlow, whose report states that "the artillery fire was too distant to reduce the blockhouses or destroy the intrenchments, so that the attack was practically by infantry alone."
the southwest side of the village; Miles had come up in line with him on the south; and when Bates’s brigade—which had had to march up from Siboney during the night—arrived and occupied the gap between Miles and Chaffee, Caney was surrounded on three sides with a continuous ring of fire. Ludlow’s two regiments of regulars, the Eighth and the Twenty-second Infantry, were hotly engaged with the Spanish riflemen in two blockhouses and behind loopholed walls. His third regiment, the Second Massachusetts, took little part in the battle. Like all the volunteers except the Rough Riders, they carried the old Springfield rifles, with non-smokeless cartridges, and when they tried to push a line of skirmishers toward the enemy their fire drew so heavy a return that they were ordered to fall back.

Capron’s battery kept up its fire almost continuously, under the personal direction of General Lawton, until about two o’clock; it was then moved forward to a new position south of Caney, a thousand yards from the Spanish lines. Half an hour later, judging that the enemy had not strength left to resist a charge, Chaffee ordered the Twelfth to storm the stone fort. Lawton had authorized him to make this decisive movement at his discretion, and it was executed with great gallantry, Bates’s advance guard and some of Miles’s men coming up almost simultaneously on the other side of the hill. It was claimed, indeed, by Lieutenant-Colonel Daggett, of the Twenty-fifth, that the credit of the capture was due to his regiment, but this Chaffee branded as “absurd,” stating that the first command to reach and enter the fort was the Twelfth; next, Bates’s two regiments, the Third and the Twentieth; and then the Twenty-fifth.

This point of vantage captured, the assailants commanded the village; but fighting lasted fully two hours longer, the Spaniards resisting stubbornly
as they fell back from house to house. When Caney finally became untenable under the overwhelming fire poured into it, the surviving defenders fled toward Santiago, suffering terribly from the volleys of Ludlow's men—especially of the Twenty-second—as they passed his lines. At five o'clock the battle was over, and Caney had been taken, at a heavy cost to its captors, for the division had lost 453 men killed and wounded.* On the Spanish side, General Vara del Rey had been killed at noon; he was wounded in both legs, and as he was being carried to the rear on a stretcher another bullet despatched him. Two of his sons had fallen with him, and of his 520 men about 300 were dead and wounded, 120 were captured, and 100 escaped to Santiago.

A considerable body of Garcia's Cubans took part in the battle of Caney by making one of their characteristic attacks upon an outlying blockhouse about a mile from the village. Although they are

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* The following table shows the strength and the losses of the American troops at Caney:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strength, June 30th.</th>
<th>Killed, July 1st.</th>
<th>Wounded, July 1st.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lawton's Division, staff</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ludlow's Brigade, staff</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eighth Infantry</td>
<td>506</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twenty-second Infantry</td>
<td>496</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Massachusetts</td>
<td>907</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miles's Brigade, staff</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Infantry</td>
<td>452</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth Infantry</td>
<td>465</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twenty-fifth Infantry</td>
<td>527</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chaffee's Brigade, staff</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seventh Infantry</td>
<td>916</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twelfth Infantry</td>
<td>584</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seventeenth Infantry</td>
<td>506</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bates's Brigade, staff</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Infantry</td>
<td>485</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twentieth Infantry</td>
<td>596</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capron's Battery</td>
<td>82</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Cavalry (estimated)</td>
<td>75</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>6,654</strong></td>
<td><strong>88</strong></td>
<td><strong>355</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
said to have numbered several hundred, while the blockhouse was garrisoned by possibly a dozen men, they remained about a mile from the enemy, at which distance they poured in a hot but harmless fire until their ammunition was exhausted and General Chaffee refused them a fresh supply.

On the other hand, Colonel Miles reported that a small Cuban detachment—forty men under Captains Vargas and Bravo—fought bravely with his brigade.

Meanwhile the other two divisions had moved forward toward the San Juan River, where, according to Shafter's plan, Lawton was to come up in line with them on their right, after taking Caney. There was only one road for the advance—a rough, narrow trail, deep in mud from the daily rains, crossing the low ground that stretched between the hills about El Pozo and the heights of San Juan, about a mile in front of Santiago. This basinlike depression is traversed by three rivers, or, rather, good-sized brooks—the Aguadores, flowing westward from El Pozo; its tributary, the creek of Las Guamas, coming down southward from Caney; and a stream marked on the maps as the Purgatorio Creek, rising in the mountains north of Santiago. This last passes close under the San Juan ridge, and in the southwest corner of the basin it joins the Aguadores to form the San Juan River, which runs down to the sea at Fort Aguadores. In the reports of the battle of July 1st the Aguadores and the San Juan are frequently confused.

The trail from El Pozo ran through dense woods to a ford of the Aguadores, just above its junction with the western stream; beyond was a short stretch of open country, partly cultivated; then, beyond the second brook, the ground sloped upward to the low ridges on which the first Spanish lines were posted.
General Wheeler was not present when the Cavalry Division formed at sunrise. He had not reported sick—"I was not off duty for a single moment during the campaign," he declares—but Sumner, the senior brigadier, took command of the division by Shafter's order, leaving his own brigade to Lieutenant-Colonel Carroll of the Sixth Cavalry. The other cavalry brigade was commanded by Colonel Wood, of the Rough Riders, General Young being down with a severe attack of fever. About nine o'clock, when the fighting had scarcely begun, Wheeler, ailing as he was, rode to the front; and it is quite clear, from his narrative of the engagement, that he regarded himself as being in command of the two divisions, as senior officer in the field.† Some, at least, of the other officers do not seem to have understood so. "The battle was fought by General Sumner and by General Kent," says Colonel Roosevelt, and those generals' reports bear out his statement. In the afternoon, when the Spanish position had been captured, Wheeler sent Shafter a message inquiring whether he should "continue commanding and supervising as I am now," or "resume command of the cavalry division and displace Sumner." Shafter ordered him to take the latter course, and Wheeler so notified Sumner.

Kent had his division ready to move at seven o'clock, when Lieutenant-Colonel McClernand, Shafter's adjutant-general, gave him the word to advance. His first brigade (General Hawkins's) was leading, followed by the third (Colonel Wikoff's) and the second (Colonel Pearson's). The head of his column—formed by the Sixth Infantry—was a few

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* The Santiago Campaign, p. 119.
† "I had been directed by Colonel McClernand, General Shafter's adjutant-general, to give directions to General Kent. . . . My former instructions and the general custom of the service made it proper that I should exercise this control over the whole line. . . . I also gave directions to General Sumner, and, through my staff officers, to Colonel Carroll and Colonel Wood."—The Santiago Campaign, p. 43.
hundred yards beyond El Pozo when he received orders to allow the cavalry division right of way, and his troops halted along the trail. There was a delay of three quarters of an hour, which Kent and Hawkins utilized for reconnoitring. They rode down to the river, forded it, and observed the Spanish position, from which a sharp fire, both of rifles and of artillery, was already coming. The enemy's guns were replying to Grimes's battery at El Pozo, and a damaging fusillade was attracted by the signal-corps balloon, which was being slowly drawn forward along the crowded trail, revealing to the Spaniards the precise line of the American advance.* The balloon was finally anchored at the main ford of the Aguadores, making the passage of the stream a bloody one.

It took the two divisions more than six hours to push through the mile and a half of woods between El Pozo and the river, and to deploy on the further bank of the stream. During the continual halts and delays along the narrow and crowded trail they were under a severe fire, to which they could make practically no reply, the enemy's position not being in sight. It was impossible to tell from what quarter the Mauser bullets, fired with smokeless powder, were flying. They came, as General Kent said in his report, or seemed to come, "from all directions, not only from the front and the dense tropical thickets in our flanks, but from sharpshooters apparently posted in our rear."

Much was heard of these Spanish sharpshooters. It is probable that they were fewer than was gen-

* For this costly blunder General Greely's annual report, on behalf of the signal corps, emphatically disclaims responsibility: "The forcing of the signal-corps balloon to the skirmish line, where its position is reported to have caused serious loss to the troops by disclosing their movements and attracting the enemy's fire, was the action of Major-General Shafter, through his chief engineer, Colonel G. McC. Derby, in the face of professional advice given him by Lieutenant-Colonel Maxfield of the United States Volunteer Signal Corps, who was charged with the practical operation of the balloon."
erally supposed, for a reason given by General Shafter, who says: "I do not think there were any sharpshooters in the rear of our lines. The Mausers have a range of two miles, and it was dropping bullets which gave this impression." Some, however, there undoubtedly were, posted here and there in the trees. They were accused of deliberately firing on wounded men and Red Cross attendants. It is doubtful whether they could be proved guilty of this crime against civilization; but the fact that such a form of warfare was used at all was a blemish upon Spanish chivalry. "Sniping" of this sort may annoy an enemy, and certainly adds to the horrors of war, but it could never win a battle or change the course of a campaign.

Kent's and Wheeler's divisions lost nearly a thousand men on the 1st of July, and most of the loss was suffered during their slow and toilsome advance into a position where they could begin to fight. The movement was one to be commended to students of strategy as a warning rather than as a model. It would scarcely have been undertaken had the ground been more thoroughly studied beforehand, and had not the enemy been held in something very near to contempt. If the defenders of San Juan had been stronger in numbers, had their marksmanship been more accurate, had they been better supported by artillery, or had they not yielded and fled at the critical moment of the battle, the attacking force might have been annihilated. As it was, the two divisions lost thirteen per cent of their strength (reported at 362 officers and 7,391 men) in killed and wounded.

The spirit of the American troops was signally displayed by their unflinching endurance of such a trying situation. There were, of course, as always happens, individual cases of straggling,* but among

*About noon Lieutenant-Colonel McClemand, stationed at El Pozo, sent back this message to Shafter's headquarters: "If you have
the regiments there was only one partial exception to the army's record of heroism—an exception which any but the most censorious historian might have passed over unnoticed had it not been so loudly advertised by the bitter controversies subsequently waged over it. The facts of the case, though they have been hotly denied, are clearly and incontestably on record. Besides the official reports and various published accounts, the writer has the personal testimony of a correspondent who was an eyewitness.

The advance was well under way when Colonel Derby, who had been reconnoitring from the balloon—work that should have been done earlier—informed Kent of a narrow wood road that branched to the left from the main trail, and led to another ford of the San Juan River, a little farther down the stream. The general at once went to the forks of the road, with his staff. The two leading regiments of Hawkins's brigade, the Sixth and Sixteenth, had already passed, marching in double or even in single file, together with the cavalry troopers. The Seventy-first New York, coming up next, was ordered by General Kent to take the left-hand trail. It did so, but its first battalion had gone only a short distance when it fell into confusion under the galling fire, and, as the general says in his report, "recoiled in disorder."

Such an incident is nothing exceptional with raw troops on first going into battle, especially under conditions so trying as those of the advance upon San Juan. There were many instances in the civil war, some in the case of regiments that afterward made notable records as fighters. If there be any word of blame, it must be for the officers who failed

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a troop of cavalry or a company of infantry to spare, they can do good work out here stopping stragglers. This does not imply any reverse at the front, but the firing was probably hotter than some like." Shafter sent him Troop A of the Second Cavalry, and later in the afternoon, when this command went forward with the artillery, Troop F took its place.
to rally their men. General Kent's staff to a certain extent took their place, and, as he states, "formed a cordon behind the panic-stricken men," who were ordered to lie down in the thicket, leaving the trail clear.* The other two battalions of the volunteers came forward in better order, but they were halted, and were passed by Wikoff's brigade of regular infantry—the Thirteenth, Ninth, and Twenty-fourth, which moved down the left-hand road, crossed the river, and deployed into position to the left of the lower ford, with the Thirteenth on the right, the Ninth on the left. All this was done under a heavy fire—how heavy may be judged from the fact that within half an hour, between twelve and one o'clock, the brigade had four commanders. Colonel Wikoff—the ranking American officer killed in the war—was mortally shot as he stood near the river, personally directing the deployment of his men, and daringly exposing himself. His successor, Lieutenant-Colonel Worth, of the Thirteenth, fell five minutes later, severely wounded; in another five minutes Lieutenant-Colonel Liscum, of the Twenty-fourth, the next in command, was also wounded, leaving Lieutenant-Colonel Ewers, of the Ninth, senior officer of the brigade.†

Farther to the right, the Sixth and the Sixteenth were suffering still more severely. General Hawkins had directed these regiments to push forward, telling them that they would reach a position where they could enfilade the enemy's works. Lieutenant-Colonel Egbert, commanding the Sixth, made his way across both rivers, and after halting for about an hour in a partly sheltered position along the bank of the second—which in his report he calls the San

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* Nevertheless, the regiments that followed were more or less impeded by being obliged to "step over prostrate forms of men of the Seventy-first," as General Kent and other officers reported.

† Lieutenant-Colonel Ewers was not aware of this until after the taking of the hill. It is a fact that the brigade charged with no officer actually in command.
Juan—exchanging shots with the lines on the hill above, he boldly moved forward into the open ground beyond, within four hundred yards of the Spanish trenches. He was greeted with a tremendous fusillade, the whole fire of the heights being concentrated upon him. Nearly a quarter of his men were killed or wounded within ten minutes. To save the rest he ordered them to retreat to the river. On his left, at the same time, some men of the Sixteenth and of the Thirteenth, who had advanced beyond the main bodies of their regiments, also fell back; and the Tenth Cavalry's Hotchkiss gun detachment, which had fired a few shots from a position near the ford of the Aguadores, had been forced to withdraw. All along the American line there was so much confusion, and the losses had been so heavy, that affairs began to look decidedly critical.

Meanwhile Kent was hurrying his remaining brigade—the second, Colonel Pearson's—forward, the Tenth and Second Infantry by the left-hand trail, to the left of Wikoff's men, the Twenty-first by the main road, to support Hawkins; and about one o'clock all these regiments were in line beyond the river. The cavalry division was already in position on the right wing, Colonel Carroll's brigade, which led the way across the river, forming the first line. Of his regiments, the Third was on the left, next to the infantry division; the Sixth was in the centre, the Ninth on the extreme right. Wood's brigade formed, or was supposed to form, a second line, with the Tenth on the left, the First in the centre, and the Rough Riders on the right; but owing to the exceedingly difficult nature of the ground the cavalry kept even less of orderly formation than Kent's division, and in the charge the two lines mingled and rushed forward together.

The American lines were now at an average distance of about six hundred yards from the enemy's
works. The Spanish position was a strong one, its centre being Fort San Juan—a large brick blockhouse with loopholed walls, on the summit of a ridge that rose about a hundred and fifty feet above the low ground at its foot. Along the crest ran four long trenches and several shorter ones, and the slope was partially protected with barbed-wire entanglements. Farther to the American right, in front of the cavalry division, a slightly lower hill rose in front of the main ridge. On this detached elevation—which became known as Kettle Hill, from a huge iron sugar caldron on its top, belonging to the San Juan ranch-house—was posted the Spanish advance guard, “favourably positioned,” as General Wheeler says, “but not strongly fortified.”

There is some doubt as to the direct responsibility for what followed. General Shafter, in his narrative published by the Century Magazine, states that about nine o’clock he decided to send the main column forward without waiting for Lawton, as originally intended. “They understood,” he says, “that they were to assail the Spanish blockhouses and trenches as soon as they could get into position.” It seems, nevertheless, that some at least of the commanders did not so understand their instructions. Both in his official report and in his book on the campaign, General Wheeler describes the original plan of attack in which Lawton was to have joined, and adds that after his division crossed the river he ordered an assault for the reason that “it was quite evident that the enemy had our range very accurately established, and that it would not increase our casualties to charge.” The general does not add that his men had already been in position for two hours or more, holding their ground under a fire from which they had very little shelter. Several messages came and went during the day between Shafter and Lieutenant Miley, who was representing him at the front; but no mention is made of any
that passed at this critical moment of the battle. Communication with the corps commander was by no means easy. The field telegraph had been extended only to El Pozo, nearly two miles from the firing line, along a rough and narrow trail blocked with wagons and wounded men.*

General Hawkins is quoted by a correspondent as saying, after the fight: "My understanding of the orders was that the left wing was to wait at a designated place on the road to San Juan for Lawton to come up, but the fire was so hot that we either had to go on and take the ridge or to retire."

General Kent's report does not locate the responsibility for his division's assault upon the hill. It does state, however, that early in the morning Lieutenant-Colonel McClernand, Shafter's adjutant-general, pointed out a green knoll which was to be his objective on the left; but when his left, formed by Pearson's brigade, had crossed the river, it "passed over the knoll and ascended the high ridge beyond." When it did so, Kent's centre and right were already holding the Fort San Juan Hill, for the capture of which he gives credit to "the officers of my command, whether company, battalion, regimental, or brigade commanders, who admirably directed the formation of their troops, unavoidably intermixed in the dense thicket, and made the desperate rush for the distant and strongly defended crest."

Most explicit of all—and, it must be said, most positive in its implied contradiction of General Shafter's version—is the report of General Sumner. So far from setting out with the plain and simple order to "assail the Spanish blockhouses and trenches as soon as he could get into position," he

* It may be recalled at this point that in Shafter's despatch of June 29th, quoted on page 234, he announced his intention of advancing, two days later, "on the Sevilla road to the San Juan river, and possibly beyond."
records that his command had advanced only three quarters of a mile beyond El Pozo when he had to halt it—though already under fire—for nearly an hour to await instructions. Then, after crossing the Aguadores, he was directed to move to the right, "to connect with Lawton’s left." The deployment completed, and there being no news of Lawton, "the command was so much committed to battle that it became necessary either to advance or else retreat under fire. Lieutenant Miley, representing General Shafter, authorized an advance, which was ordered." It appears that to Lieutenant Miley—whose promising military career was cut short, a year later, by a fatal illness at Manila—belongs a great share of the responsibility for the assault upon the San Juan heights, and of the credit for its success.

The story of the assault, in brief, was that the right half of Sumner’s division—consisting chiefly of the First Cavalry, the Ninth Cavalry, and the Rough Riders, but with many stragglers from other regiments, charged up Kettle Hill, the Spaniards fleeing as they came up the slope. Reaching the top, they were in time to see the American centre and left move upon the main Spanish position—an attack of greater difficulty, there being a wider intervening space to traverse, and the defenders being much stronger in numbers. The charge was not a swift rush of cheering regiments, sweeping forward in serried ranks, as the popular fancy has pictured it. It was a climb up a rough, steep slope, covered with tall grass and dotted with trees, and the assailants were irregular masses of men, now halting to fire, now rushing on, breaking down the wire fences or vaulting over them. Of the many descriptions given by officers who took part in it, perhaps the most graphic is that of Captain Bigelow, of the Tenth Cavalry, who was at
about the centre of the American line. He reports that after cutting an impeding fence with a sharpened bayonet:

I struck out as fast as the tall grass would permit me toward the common objective of the mass of men which I now saw surging forward on my right and left—San Juan Hill. The men kept up a steady double time, and commenced firing of their own accord over one another’s heads and the heads of the officers, who were well out in front of the men. I tried to stop the firing, as I thought it would seriously retard the advance, and other officers near me tried to stop it; but a constant stream of bullets went over our heads, the men halting in an erect position to fire. The men covered, I should say, about fifty yards from front to rear. They formed a swarm rather than a line.

Close under the ridge there was a considerable space sheltered from fire by the steep slope above, the Spanish trenches having been located too far back upon the crest of the hill. Here, at some points, the assailants halted to gather themselves together. Captain Kerr, of the Sixth Cavalry, reports that his squadron was half an hour in this “dead” space, about sixty yards from the summit, not being in sufficient force to charge the trenches, and the Spaniards not daring to leave their defences and fire down upon him.

Immediately under the blockhouse the charging troops were stopped by the fire of the American artillery and machine guns, which just at this time began to pour in upon the Spanish lines. Lieutenant Parker, who had been sent forward with the somewhat vague order to “make the best use he could” of his Gatlings, got three of them into action about the centre of the firing line, and poured a destructive stream of bullets along the top of the hill as the assault began. Back at El Pozo, where Captain Grimes had been firing intermittently during the day, Best’s and Parkhurst’s batteries had gone into position beside him, and had sent one round of shells into the Spanish blockhouse and
trenches. As they saw these projectiles and the Gatling bullets striking above them, the leaders of the charge stopped, although at that very moment the Spaniards were running from their defences.

"At this time," reports Captain Allen, of the Sixteenth Infantry, "there arose at the foot of the slope and in the field behind us a great cry of 'Come back! Come back!' The trumpets there sounded 'Cease firing,' 'Report,' and 'Assembly.' The men hesitated, stopped, and began drifting down the steep slope."

"We rushed forward almost to the trenches," says Captain Byrne, of the Sixth, "when shells from our guns in rear commenced to fall a short distance, probably thirty yards, in front of us, and we saw that those in rear had stopped and would not follow or support us. In this front party there were comparatively very few men, not enough to accomplish anything, and we turned reluctantly back."

Captain McFarland, of the Sixteenth, another of the leading officers, was wounded at this point—it was thought by the fire from the rear. But the American batteries now ceased firing; and a few minutes later—the time was half past one o'clock—the infantrymen made a final rush, occupied the trenches, in which only dead and wounded men were left, and poured a brisk fusillade upon the retreating Spaniards.

When the cavalrymen on Kettle Hill saw the centre and left charging, they supported the movement first by firing volleys into the Spanish lines and then by moving on to attack the San Juan ridge. Rushing across the intervening valley and through a swampy pond, they climbed the heights north of the blockhouse. Here, too, the Spaniards ran before the assailants came to close quarters. Lieutenant-Colonel Viele, of the First Cavalry, was left to hold Kettle Hill with all the men he could gather for a reserve force. Lieutenant-Colonel Hamilton, of the
Ninth Cavalry, had been shot dead on the hill, and Lieutenant-Colonel Carroll, the brigade commander, was wounded there.

General Hawkins, who had personally started the Sixth and the Sixteenth in their charge, running with them and waving his hat, was the first general officer to ascend the ridge, about half an hour after it was taken; and shortly afterward, when General Kent came up, the gallant brigadier reported to his division commander that his two regiments of regulars had captured the Spanish works at Fort San Juan. Kent later pronounced this a mistake, and attributed an equal share in the exploit to the three regiments of Colonel Ewers's brigade, the Ninth, Thirteenth, and Twenty-fourth. The Spanish flag on the blockhouse was captured by a private of the Thirteenth.* Nevertheless, it is no more than justice to say that to the Sixth and the Sixteenth fell the very hardest of the fighting—the casualty lists prove this—and that they took the lead in the assault on the key of the enemy's position.

It appears from Lieutenant Müller's rather confused account of the battle that the Spaniards' "foremost echelon," posted on San Juan Hill, consisted of three hundred men under Colonel José Baquero, with two small rapid-fire guns commanded by Colonel Ordoñez. The guns were placed behind the crest of the first hill, and were withdrawn in time to escape capture. Of the two commanding officers, Colonel Baquero was killed, Colonel Ordoñez wounded. The force in the second line, that of Fort San Juan, the lieutenant does not specify, beyond stating it at three hundred men when the battle opened. Several bodies of reinforcements were sent forward during the morning, among them being a detachment of marines under Captain Bustamente,

* Captain Noble, of the Sixteenth (afterward major of the Twenty-fifth), states in a letter to the author that "the Thirteenth found the flag lying on the roof, after our men had gone through the blockhouse."
Admiral Cervera's chief of staff, who was mortally wounded early in the afternoon. About the same time Lieutenant-General Linares, who had come up from his headquarters at the junction of the roads from Santiago to San Juan and to Caney, was shot through the arm. He was carried on a stretcher to his house in the city, relinquishing his command to Major-General José Toral.

Colonel Roosevelt states the Spanish strength at San Juan as forty-five hundred, which is merely an estimate, arrived at by taking six thousand as the total effective force in Santiago and deducting fifteen hundred for the outpost at Caney and the garrisons of the harbour forts. It is not likely, however, that General Linares was able to put every soldier he had, outside of these detachments, into action at any one point. He had men at Fort Aguadares, and others on the north and west of the city.* Colonel Aldea's regiment was not withdrawn from the other side of the bay until July 2d.

Lieutenant Miley puts the number defending the San Juan intrenchments at 750, adding that behind them, close around the city, were 3,500 soldiers, sailors, and marines. His figures, apparently, are based on those of Lieutenant Müller. The Spanish court of inquiry which tried and acquitted Toral de-

* Senator Lodge, in his brilliant but highly inaccurate narrative of the war, asserts that "the Spaniards had 12,000 to 13,000 men in Santiago; they had over 9,000 along the line of defences on the east side, confronting the Americans." Adding 3,500 for Escario's brigade, which arrived July 3d, and deducting 1,000 for the naval landing parties, this would make about 15,000 at the time of the surrender—a great over-statement. It must be remembered, too, that at least 1,000 Spaniards were in the hospitals. More than 2,000 sick and wounded men—chiefly the former—were found there when Shafter occupied the city.

As another instance of Senator Lodge's misrepresentations, he quotes Lieutenant Müller as saying that there were "only 3,000 men defending Santiago," and denounces him for so transparent a falsehood. Lieutenant Müller nowhere states the total Spanish strength at any such figure. On the contrary, in one place he catalogues 6,190 troops and mentions others; in another, he estimates the entire force as "at most, 8,000 men."
clared in its report that 1,700 men were available to meet the attack, but its list of regiments does not include the naval detachment. From these perplexingly different statements, and in the absence of exact and trustworthy Spanish returns, it does not seem probable that the defenders of San Juan were more than three thousand at most. The attacking force, undoubtedly, greatly outnumbered them; but allowing for this, their resistance was far less tenacious than Vara del Rey's at Caney. They replied briskly to the American fire, but, as usual, their marksmanship was poor, the great majority of their bullets flying too high. Very little of their musketry seemed to be aimed at individual objects; when the attacking force came within short range of the trenches they put their rifles at arms' length above their heads, and pulled trigger at a guess. When the Americans charged home, they fled without waiting for a hand-to-hand fight.

Lieutenant Müller states the Spaniards' loss for the day, including both Caney and San Juan, as being 593—94 killed, 376 wounded, 123 prisoners and missing. Elsewhere he gives these same figures as the casualty list for the three days, July 1st to 3d—a discrepancy which does not create added confidence in the accuracy of his statistics. Moreover, he says that of 520 men at Caney only 80 returned, most of them crippled and bruised. Not reckoning any of the "crippled and bruised" as wounded, this leaves only 153 for all casualties at San Juan—an incredibly small figure. Probably he does not include the losses of the naval brigade; very possibly his returns are for the Spanish regulars only. Six or seven hundred wounded men were found in the hospitals when the city surrendered. It is easy to believe, however, that the defenders' losses were much smaller than those of the assailants.

On the American side, Kent's division, with a strength of 5,206 men, had 93 killed, 492 wounded,
and 58 missing. Most of the missing were in the Seventy-first New York, and nearly all reported later. The cavalry division suffered slightly more in proportion to its numbers, losing 45 killed and 313 wounded, with 10 missing, of its total of 2,738 men. The following table shows the losses by regiments, as reported by the division commanders:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>regiment</th>
<th>Killed</th>
<th>Wounded</th>
<th>Missing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kent's Division:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sixteenth Infantry</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sixth Infantry</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>99</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seventy-first New York</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenth Infantry</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twenty-first Infantry</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Infantry</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ninth Infantry</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thirteenth Infantry</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twenty-fourth Infantry</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cavalry Division:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Cavalry</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sixth Cavalry</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>55</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ninth Cavalry</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Cavalry</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenth Cavalry</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Volunteer Cavalry</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>72</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The work of Lieutenant Parker and his Gatling detachment at a critical moment of the battle has already been mentioned. After the taking of the heights he went forward to the firing line; so did Lieutenant Hughes, with the Hotchkiss guns. The field artillery played no great part in the battle. General Shafter states that when Grimes's battery opened fire, early in the morning, upon the San Juan blockhouse, "this fire was effective, and the enemy could be seen running away from the vicinity of the blockhouse." Evidently, however, they came back again when the bombardment, which seems to have

* The following table shows the whole American strength at San Juan and the losses during the 1st, 2d, and 3d of July, as given by the
done no noticeable damage, was over. Grimes fired for fifteen or twenty minutes and then stopped, practically silenced by the Spaniards' return fire, which was fairly spirited and accurate, causing several casualties in the battery and in regiments halted near it. The Spanish artillery had the great advantage of using smokeless powder, making it a far less conspicuous target than the American guns.

Grimes resumed firing at intervals, but discharged only a hundred and sixty shots during the day—not a large number for guns calculated to fire three shots a minute. When Best and Parkhurst, who had been held in reserve, came into action,

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Returns Division of the adjutant-general's office. There are slight discrepancies between its figures and those printed above:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strength,</th>
<th>Killed, July 1st-3d</th>
<th>Wounded, July 1st-3d</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kent's Division, staff</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawkins's Brigade, staff</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sixteenth Infantry</td>
<td>679</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sixth Infantry</td>
<td>492</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seventy-first New York</td>
<td>969</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pearson's Brigade, staff</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Infantry</td>
<td>638</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenth Infantry</td>
<td>455</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twenty-first Infantry</td>
<td>497</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wikoff's Brigade, staff</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ninth Infantry</td>
<td>466</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thirteenth Infantry</td>
<td>465</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twenty-fourth Infantry</td>
<td>539</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheeler's Division, staff</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sumner's Brigade, staff</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Cavalry</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sixth Cavalry</td>
<td>451</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ninth Cavalry</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood's Brigade, staff</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Cavalry</td>
<td>523</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenth Cavalry</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Volunteer Cavalry</td>
<td>583</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery, three batteries</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Cavalry (estimated)</td>
<td>150</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>8,336</strong></td>
<td><strong>144</strong></td>
<td><strong>951</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Besides the above casualties, on the 2d and 3d Lawton's division lost 6 killed and 33 wounded; Bates's brigade, 1 killed and 18 wounded.
Major Dillenback reports that “after a vigorous shelling of the enemy’s works on the ridge by all three batteries, the position was occupied by our infantry.” As a matter of fact, this “vigorous shelling” consisted in firing just eight shells, one by each of Best’s and Parkhurst’s guns, Grimes’s men being engaged, at the time, in refilling their ammunition chests. Captain Parkhurst, in his interesting account of The Artillery at Santiago, claims that the eight shots fell with marvellous accuracy into the trenches and blockhouse, and did more to drive the Spaniards from their defences than all the rest of the American fire. Lieutenant Parker, in his narrative of The Gatlings at Santiago, is equally confident that his machine guns were the more effective weapon, and asserts that not a shell hit the blockhouse or exploded near it.

The hill taken, Best’s battery was hurried forward, escorted by a troop of the Second Cavalry, and took station with the firing line, two hundred yards north of the San Juan blockhouse. It stayed there for about ten minutes, and then, finding the Spanish fire too warm, fell back to Kettle Hill, where it was of no further service, the higher ridge in front shutting it off from the enemy.

In the demoralized condition of the Spaniards as they fled from their defences, the Americans might probably have marched straight forward into Santiago; but after eight hours’ marching and fighting under a blazing sun they were too much exhausted to do more than hold what they had won. A few men of the Tenth Cavalry, the Rough Riders, and other regiments who had pushed on beyond the main line, were recalled. There was no available reserve, except the Seventy-first New York, some of whose men had already joined other commands in the assault of the hill, and the rest of which was moved forward during the afternoon. Lawton’s nonarrival left the right of the American line with-
out support, and along the thinned ranks of the cavalry division it was fully expected that the enemy would return in force to retake the captured position. In response to urgent messages from Sumner and Wood, Kent moved the Thirteenth Infantry over from his centre to support them, but he could spare no other troops.

Viewing the battle from the hill near his headquarters, Shafter had naturally felt anxiety at Lawton's failure to finish his work at Caney in the two hours allowed him. As the day wore on and Vara del Rey's men still held out, he sent one of his aids with instructions that Lawton should withdraw from Caney and march down the Santiago road to join Wheeler's right. The movement ordered was undoubtedly a correct one. Lawton's division was urgently needed at the front, while Caney was not a vital point in the American campaign, and would in any case become untenable by the Spaniards when the hills of San Juan were taken. But to abandon an attack in which so many lives had been sacrificed would be to admit a defeat, and the order was not obeyed. General Shafter, whose reports were notably generous to his subordinate officers, says that when his messenger reached Lawton, "the troops were in the act of making the final charge; nothing could stop them; and when that charge was over, the fight at El Caney was won. It was then near evening." Captain Lee, the British military attaché, in his account of the battle, of which he was an eyewitness, records the arrival of Shafter's order at half past one—at least an hour before the storming of the fort. In Lawton's report it is not mentioned at all.

The first American troops to leave Caney were the two regiments of Bates's brigade, the Third and the Twentieth. General Bates says in his report that "after consultation with General Chaffee" he withdrew at about half past four, hoping to be in time to
take part in the battle at San Juan. Retracing their steps toward El Pozo, his men, who had been marching or fighting all day and most of the previous night, were too much exhausted to move fast, and as darkness was coming on Bates halted them at the first stream they crossed, and rode to Shafter’s headquarters for instructions. The general ordered him to the left of Kent’s line, and at midnight his tired troops were in position there.

It was near sunset before Lawton could get his men in motion, marching forward in column along the road from Caney to Santiago, which is a good macadamized highway, the only good road running east from Santiago. He left five companies of the Seventh Infantry, and one of the Seventeenth, as a guard at Caney. The head of the column had passed the Ducrot house—the abandoned country place of a French resident of Santiago—and was nearing the right of Wheeler’s position, when the order was given to halt for supper. The soldiers were boiling their coffee when bullets began to fall among them. It was impossible to tell just whence the fire came, and Lawton, not knowing what might be in front of him, and not considering it safe to advance further in the darkness, sent back to Shafter for orders. The messenger reached headquarters half an hour after midnight, and returned with instructions that Lawton should turn about face toward Caney, and make his way to the front along the El Pozo trail. This long and circuitous march took all the rest of the night. At half past seven next morning (July 2d) Chaffee’s brigade reached San Juan and deployed to the right of Wheeler’s lines; and the whole division was in position by noon.

To complete the story of the operations of July 1st, it only remains to mention General Duffield’s movement against Fort Aguadores. On the previous day Shafter wrote to Sampson:
I wish you would bombard the works at Aguadores in support of a regiment of infantry which I shall send there early to-morrow.

Accordingly, at sunrise on the 1st, the New York, the Gloucester, and the Suwanee were lying off the shore, ready to use their guns. Three hours later the Thirty-third Michigan came up, having been brought from Siboney on the narrow-gauge railway, and the ships opened fire on the old fort west of the San Juan River, and on a couple of rifle pits upon a hill behind it. Not more than twenty Spanish soldiers were to be seen, and these disappeared when the shells began to fly. When the order to cease firing was given by the New York, the Suwanee signalled for permission to knock down the flag on the fort. Sampson replied that she might have three shots. Lieutenant Blue, the hero of two ventur-esome reconnoitring expeditions, fired them with a four-inch gun, at thirteen hundred yards. The first tore the Spanish ensign, the second struck near the base of the staff and bent it, the third shot staff and flag away.

The Michigan volunteers now advanced as far as the bridge over the river, which the enemy had broken down, and for some time a few Spaniards concealed among the trees on the hill beyond the stream exchanged a desultory fire with them. Several requests were signalled to the ships to drive the enemy off, to which the New York uniformly replied that there was no perceptible enemy to drive off. About noon the Spaniards brought a field piece along the railway from Santiago. It had fired only four or five shots when the New York turned her guns upon it and silenced it; but General Duffield, who had had two men killed and six wounded, withdrew his regiment to Siboney. The New York remained off Fort Aguadores another hour. She was joined by the Oregon, and both ships slowly fired eight-inch shells over the hills in the direction of Santiago.
General Duffield has been severely criticised for his half-hearted and resultless attack, but the general, in reply, has shown that he acted in precise accordance with Shafter's orders. At the conference of June 30th, at El Pozo, the corps commander cautioned him not to drive the Spaniards out of their position, as they might come upon the exposed left flank of the American line. On the following day Shafter telephoned to Siboney:

I do not wish you to sacrifice any of your men, but to worry the enemy at Aguadore sufficiently to keep him there.

Shafter himself confirms General Duffield's statement. In his official report he states that that officer "attacked Aguadore as ordered, but was unable to accomplish more than to detain the Spaniards in that vicinity." In his Century article, he says that the general "was ordered to make a feint at Aguadore, to detain the Spanish troops in the vicinity. This movement was well executed." In his indorsement on General Duffield's report, dated September 30, 1898, he is still more explicit, saying that the object of the manoeuvre was "accomplished perfectly," and adding:

There was no intention of attempting to capture the place, as it would naturally fall with Santiago, and, besides, was very strong. I had had the place carefully examined by my engineer officers and General Bates, besides personal observation of it in passing it, and knew it was no place to assault, and not on the true line of advances for Santiago.

As to the strategy of the movement, it would appear, at a time when men were so urgently needed where real fighting was in progress, that it was a mistake to detach a whole regiment, not to mention three war ships, to detain the few Spaniards—Duffield states them at five hundred, and his estimate is probably much too high—who held Fort
Aguadores.* As much might have been accomplished by a single company, or by a boat load of marines from the fleet.

On the following day—July 2d—the demonstration was repeated, on a smaller scale, by a battalion of the Thirty-third Michigan under Major Webb, who exchanged a few shots with the Spaniards, and had one man fatally wounded.

On the evening of July 1st the "thin blue line" of Wheeler's and Kent's divisions was holding the ridge from which it had driven the Spaniards, and keeping up a rifle duel with the enemy posted in their second series of trenches, a few hundred yards nearer Santiago. The soldiers had won a very gallant victory, but the situation was one of no little anxiety. A thousand men had been killed and wounded, and many others detailed to find and bury the dead and to carry the injured to the rear; all were exhausted, and as most of them, while fighting in the tropical heat, had thrown away—either of their own motion or by order of their officers—everything but guns and ammunition, there was little to eat except the scanty rations the Spaniards had left in the captured position. Few men had coats, still fewer had blankets. The discomfort of the situation was extreme, but its imminent danger was the thinness of the American line at such a distance from its support, and so close in front of a considerable force of the enemy.

General Wheeler records that a number of officers urged him to abandon the San Juan heights, and take up a more defensible position farther back; but the veteran fighter stoutly refused to withdraw, and fearing that the same appeal would be made to the commanding general he sent a message to head-

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* A prisoner told General Wheeler that the garrison consisted of one hundred men, with three guns, two of which were useless (The Santiago Campaign, p. 303).
quarters that such a movement "would cost us much prestige." He had already requested that intrenching tools should be hurried forward. As soon as it was dark Shafter sent all he had, and Wheeler personally set his weary men at work to fortify their position, telling General Kent to do the same. As with most of the supplies of the corps, there were not enough shovels to go around, but the deficiency was partly remedied with Spanish tools found along the enemy's trenches.

Shafter also ordered all the field artillery to the front, and during the night three batteries—Grimes's, Best's, and Parkhurst's—occupied the position which Best had attempted to hold the day before, with orders to open, at dawn, on the nearest part of Santiago, the centre of the Spanish position. "We ought to knock that part of the town to pieces in a short time," Shafter told Colonel McClernand, but this proved too much to expect of a dozen three-inch field pieces. After firing for about an hour, greatly hampered by their own smoke,* and under a heavy fusillade from the enemy's lines, Major Dillenback ordered them to withdraw, and they fell back all the way to El Pozo, where Capron, returning from Caney, joined them.

All day, on the 2d of July, firing was kept up between the two armies, with considerable loss on both sides, the American casualties being about one hundred and fifty killed and wounded. Among the wounded was General Hawkins, who was succeeded as brigade commander by Colonel Theaker, of the Sixteenth. Shafter's line was now extended by the

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* Lieutenant Aultman, who was left in command of Captain Parkhurst's battery by the wounding of the latter officer, early in the morning, reports: "Our fire was unaimed, and the results could neither be observed nor ascertained, as our view was absolutely obscured by our own smoke"—a severe commentary upon the mismanagement that sent the artillery into the field equipped with a powder discarded by every military power.
arrived of Bates and Lawton, on the left and on the right respectively, but it was as thinly held as ever, and another anxious day followed. Lying on their arms, at some points only a quarter of a mile from the enemy, under a continual fire and in constant expectation of an attack in force, the men felt the strain of the situation severely. Without shelter, they were alternately drenched with rain and scorched by the sun. The trail to El Pozo and Siboney had become almost impassable, and so little food could be brought up that semistarvation was added to physical exhaustion.

At the rear, the sufferings of the wounded were nothing less than shocking. It was not realized at first how heavy the American losses had been. Shafter telegraphed to Washington,* late on July 1st, that his casualties were “above four hundred,” including but few killed. When the four hundred grew to be thrice as many, the medical department was simply overwhelmed, devotedly as its personnel worked to cope with so entirely unexpected a situation. For the wounded men the journey from the chief emergency station, at the ford of the Agua­dores River, to the field hospital near El Pozo and the general hospital at Siboney was a terrible one. There were practically no ambulances, and but a limited number of wagons—springless vehicles of bare and splintered boards that caused frightful agony to the ghastly freight they bore over the rough trail. They carried only those who could not possibly make their way over the six miles afoot, perhaps with a rude crutch cut from a tree. Most of the wounded men were half naked, many entirely so. There were not enough tents or cots or coverings for them in the hospitals, not enough medi-

* Shafter was in communication with Washington through a coastwise cable from Santiago to Playa del Este, which had been picked up and carried ashore at Siboney, where it connected with the field telephone to his headquarters.
cines,* not enough surgeons, not nearly enough nurses, and no better food than canned meat and hardtack. A heavy penalty was being paid for the failure to bring proper hospital equipments from Tampa, but it was not being paid by those responsible for the failure. And yet—this was one of the strangest facts of the campaign—the mortality among the wounded was phenomenally small, being only about one per cent.

Though the Spaniards maintained a constant fire until fighting was suspended by Shafter’s flag of truce about noon on the 3d, it does not seem that they made any real sortie against the beleaguer ing lines, although there were several alarms of an attack, and once, at least, the American troops believed that they had repelled an assault in force. This was between nine and ten o’clock on the night of July 2d, when a wave of fierce firing swept around the trenches. Shafter speaks of it as “the attack called the night sortie,” and adds that “it did not amount to much, though there was wild firing in the dark.” This is no doubt a more correct account than the earlier one he gave in his official report: “About ten p. m. the enemy made a vigorous assault to break through my lines, but he was repulsed at all points.” His authority was probably the statement in Kent’s report that “at nine p. m. a vigorous assault was made all along our lines. This was completely repulsed, the enemy again retiring to his trenches.” Wheeler makes no mention of the supposed sortie. The division commanders, at the time, were with Shafter at El Pozo.

“Suddenly a burst of firing broke out,” says Lieutenant Parker, who was at the front with the

* This was admitted even by the army staff. “During and after the battles at El Caney and San Juan there was an insufficiency of tents, cots, bedding, and medicines,” said Surgeon-General Sternberg in his annual report for 1898. Unofficial observers with the army—George Kennan, for instance, in Campaigning in Cuba—describe a scene of pitiable misery and gruesome horror.
cavalry division, "and it was believed by many that a serious night attack had been made." The lieutenant tells how two officers near his position tried to stop the waste of ammunition in the dark. Lieutenant-Colonel Roosevelt strode along the trenches in front of the Rough Riders and told them that "he thought cowboys were men who shot only when they could see the whites of the other fellow's eyes." Captain Ayres, of the Tenth Cavalry, called to his negro troopers that they were "no better than the Cubans," upon which the men laughed and ceased their wild firing.* How wild it was is shown by the fact that some American officers reported that they were fired upon from their own lines.

On their side, at the same time, the Spaniards believed that they had sustained and repelled an attack. "A little before ten P. M.," † says Lieutenant Müller, "the enemy, who no doubt intended to surprise us, furiously attacked our lines, and was repulsed with great loss."

At six o'clock on the evening of the 2d, General Shafter summoned his division commanders to meet him at El Pozo. The conference began about eight, and each of the officers he had sent for—Wheeler, Lawton, Kent, and Bates—beginning with the junior, gave his view of the situation. The four men were not unanimous upon the question of a withdrawal; but after an hour's discussion, Shafter stated his intention of making no move at present. Early the next morning he took two steps which may at first seem somewhat contradictory, but which can readily be reconciled. He telegraphed to the Secretary of War:

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* Lieutenant Parker seems to date this incident as occurring "on the night of the 3d" (The Gatlings at Santiago, p. 161), but the night of the 2d must be meant, as firing was suspended at noon on July 3d until ten A. M. on the 5th.

† This appears, in the translation published by the Navy Department, as "ten A. M."—an evident mistake, as it occurs at the end of the
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We have the town well invested on the north and east, but with a very thin line. Upon approaching it we find it of such a character and the defences so strong it will be impossible to carry it by storm with my present force, and I am seriously considering withdrawing about five miles and taking up a new position on the high ground between the San Juan River and Siboney, with our left at Sardinero, so as to get our supplies to a large extent by means of the railroad, which we can use, having engines and cars at Siboney.

At the same time he sent a flag of truce into the enemy’s lines with this message to the “commanding general of the Spanish forces”:

Sir: I shall be obliged, unless you surrender, to shell Santiago de Cuba. Please inform the citizens of foreign countries, and all women and children, that they should leave the city before ten o’clock to-morrow morning.

In the fire of criticism, just and unjust, of which General Shafter has been the object, his despatch to Secretary Alger has been cited in proof of his vacillation and mental and physical debility. In reality, the fact that he demanded the enemy’s surrender while he was warning his Government that he might be compelled to move backward, shows his correct estimate of the situation, and his promptness and resolution in availing himself of it. It was, to a certain extent, like Grant after the first day of Shiloh. His position was bad, and might become untenable, but he had reason to believe that that of the enemy was much worse. The Spanish troops were necessarily quite as exhausted as his own men; it was known that their food was meagre, and it was easy to guess that their ammunition was running low. The climate was but little less trying to them than to the Americans. Blockaded by sea, defeated on land, what could Toral see before him but destruction or surrender?

day’s chronicle, and a few lines farther on the affair is called “a night surprise.”

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At Washington, where the situation was very imperfectly understood—Shafter’s despatches had been few and not specially luminous—there was some natural anxiety. Secretary Alger had waited with the President until four o’clock that morning (July 3d) for news from the front, one of the last despatches they received on the 2d having been a request for more surgeons. It was nearly noon when the telegram telling of a possible retreat reached them. The secretary, a politician as well as a soldier, replied:

Of course you can judge the situation better than we can at this end of the line. If, however, you could hold your present position, especially San Juan heights, the effect upon the country would be much better than falling back.

Shafter’s answer, received at Washington shortly after midnight, was brief and decided:

I shall hold my present position.

For in the meantime the situation had entirely changed. Cervera’s squadron had gone out of the harbour, leaving the city to its fate.
CHAPTER XIII

THE SANTIAGO SEA FIGHT

During the battle of the 1st of July Cervera's ships threw a few shells in the direction of the American lines, but with little effect, as the intervening hills prevented any accurate aim. The Punta Gorda battery also joined in the firing, but its heavier guns turned seaward, and could not be brought to bear.

During the day the French consul at Santiago wrote to the admiral, inquiring whether he intended to bombard the city if the American troops occupied it, and requesting that he should not do so without giving notice. Cervera replied, next morning, that if the enemy entered Santiago he would at once turn his guns on the town, without further warning. The French official at once informed his countrymen and the other consuls, and there was something of a panic. Mr. Ramsden, the British representative, sent the civil governor of Santiago to see Cervera, who modified his truculent announcement—for there were more than twenty thousand women and children in the city—saying that he would bombard the place if the Americans took it and the inhabitants deserted it.*

*A detailed account of the incident appeared in the New York Sun, December 5, 1898, in which it was stated that Cervera's bloodthirsty design—quite foreign to the character displayed at other times by the gallant Spanish admiral—was frustrated only by the interference of the British Government. According to the Sun's historian, Ramsden telegraphed information of it to Sir Alexander Gollan, the British consul-general in Havana, at two o'clock A.M., July 2d. Gollan went to Blanco, but was rebuffed, Blanco telling him that Cervera was entirely at liberty "to take the measures which he should deem best for the success of the campaign"; but a protest to London caused a change of
On the morning of the 2d the harbour batteries were again shelled at close range by the blockading ships. This was in answer to a note from Shafter, requesting Sampson to keep up his fire upon Santiago. The action lasted two hours, the Spaniards making little attempt to reply; and a shot from the Texas accomplished what had not been done in all the bombardments of the blockade—it dismounted one of the six-inch guns in the Socapa, besides killing three men and wounding six, among the latter being Ensign Piña, the commander of the battery.

Throughout the day Cervera made preparations for leaving the harbour, Blanco having sent him imperative orders to make a dash for Havana, in spite of the admiral's protest of his inability to cope with the blockading fleet.* The marines who had gone ashore to reinforce Linares were taken aboard, a pilot was sent to each ship, steam was made, and a little before half past nine o'clock on the morning of Sunday, July 3d, the six vessels, cleared for action, were moving toward the sea gate of the harbour that had sheltered them for forty-five eventful days.

heart, and the captain-general ordered Cervera to leave Santiago instead of bombarding it.

This version of the affair is not borne out by Mr. Ramsden's diary; indeed, it is contradicted at an essential point by his statement that it was ten o'clock on the morning of July 2d when he saw Cervera's note to the French consul. It must therefore be relegated to the already well-filled realm of war fiction.

* On September 10, 1898, according to a press report, Señor Aunon, the Spanish minister of marine, stated in the Cortes that Cervera "wanted to blow up his ships in the harbour; but I informed him that it would be preferable to leave the port and engage the enemy. General Blanco ordered Admiral Cervera to leave Santiago, and fixed the day of his departure."

Cervera's official report to Captain-General Blanco was read to representatives of the Madrid press on August 22, 1898, but no copies of it were given out. According to the version published by the Heraldo (translated by the Navy Department) it begins: "In obedience to your orders, in the face of that which would have happened, and of which you were informed, I left the bay of Santiago for sea on the 3d day of July." Its account of the battle is very brief.
Cervera's choice of the daytime, rather than the night, for the moment of his sortie, was a paradox that is not explained in his official report; but officers of his squadron afterward gave what was no doubt the true reason—that the American ships lay so close inshore from sunset to sunrise, and their watch with searchlights was so perfect, that the Spanish admiral saw no possible hope of a night escape.* Mistaken as his judgment probably was, it was a remarkable testimony to the effectiveness of Sampson's plan of blockade.

The militant captain of the Iowa is reported as saying, some time after the battle, that the Spaniards "were so thoroughly rattled that they just started to run out of the way as fast as they could." To show how unfair is such a description of Cervera's sortie, it is worth while to quote the account given to Lieutenant Müller by the pilot of the Maria Teresa:

I was in the forward tower by the side of Admiral Cervera, who was as calm as though he had been at anchor in his own cabin, and was observing the channel and the hostile ships, and only said these words:

"Pilot, when can we shift the helm?"

He had reference to turning to starboard, which could be done only after we had passed Diamante Bank. After a few seconds he said:

"Pilot, advise me when we can shift the helm."

"I will advise you, admiral," I answered.

* In The Story of the Captains (Century Magazine, May, 1890) Captain Taylor records his opinion that in coming out by daylight Cervera "exhibited a sound tactical sense," and that if he had made his sortie at night his ships would have been sunk before passing the Morro. On the other hand, Captain Clark, in the same symposium, adduces some strong reasons to the contrary; and Captain Taylor's argument is seriously weakened by the fact that on the night of July 4th the Reina Mercedes—an unarmoured vessel—came down the channel, under a heavy fire from the blockading fleet, practically uninjured. She went down near the harbour mouth, but she was scuttled by the opening of her valves, not sunk by the American gun-fire.

As to the courses open to Cervera when he came out of the harbour—to go eastward, to go westward, or to scatter his ships—while the latter might have saved one or possibly more of his cruisers, it can hardly be doubted that his decision to steam to the west was strategically correct.
A few moments later I said: "Admiral, the helm may be shifted now."

In a moment the admiral, without shouting, without becoming excited, as calm as usual, said: "To starboard," and the next minute, "Fire!"

At the same moment the two guns of the turret and those of the port battery fired on a ship which seemed to me to be the Indiana. By this time there were already many dead and wounded in the battery, because they had been firing on us for some time, and I believe that in spite of the water that was in the ship she was already on fire. The admiral said to me:

"Good-bye, pilot; go now; go, and be sure you let them pay you, because you have earned it well."

The Spanish cruisers came down the channel in column, Cervera's flagship, the Maria Teresa, in the lead, and the Vizcaya, the Cristobal Colon, and the Almirante Oquendo following in order, with about eight hundred yards' distance between each ship and the next. Twelve hundred yards behind the Oquendo came the torpedo-boat destroyers. As to the order in which the destroyers went out, there are discrepancies in the reports of the American officers, and even in Lieutenant Müller's narrative, in which accuracy might have been expected. Apparently the explanation is that the Furor led down the channel, and when just outside the Morro she circled to port as if to escape to the eastward, but seeing the Gloucester and other vessels in her path, she turned west to follow the cruisers—thereby losing enough ground to allow the Pluton to overhaul and pass her. *

Cervera's plan was to turn westward as soon as he reached the sea, and run for it. His one hope of success lay in outrunning the American battle ships and beating off Sampson's speediest vessel, the Brooklyn—not by any means an impossible scheme on paper. In the test of action, his ships proved

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* This is based on the detailed account given by Lieutenant Müller on the authority of Lieutenants Bustamente of the Furor and Caballero of the Pluton.
much slower than they should have been, the Americans faster than he had expected; while in fighting power his four cruisers showed themselves pitifully inferior to the five powerful men-of-war—four battle ships and a cruiser—of whose guns they had to run the gantlet.

These five—the Indiana, the Oregon, the Iowa, the Texas, and the Brooklyn, recounting them in order from east to west—lay at or near their regular blockading stations, in a semicircle about the harbour mouth, and from two and a half to four miles distant from it. The Massachusetts had gone early that morning to Guantanamo Bay for coal. The New York had signalled, at a quarter to nine, "Disregard movements of the commander-in-chief," and had started eastward for Siboney, where Sampson intended to land for a conference with Shafter. She was nearly ten * miles east of the Morro when the Teresa came out, and in company with her were the torpedo boat Ericsson and the converted yacht Hist. Of the other small vessels, the Gloucester and the Vixen lay inside the main blockading line, the former to the east of the harbour entrance, the latter to the west. The Resolute was farther out, close to the Indiana. On all the ships the men were at "quarters for inspection," according to the regular routine of Sunday morning.

Suddenly, at almost exactly half past nine, the Teresa, with smoke pouring from her funnels, came around Smith Key and turned down the channel toward the sea. She was in plain view of several American ships, and three or four of them announced "Enemy's ships escaping" at almost the same instant, the Iowa also firing a gun to attract attention. The Brooklyn's records show that she made the warning signal at 9.35, having received

* "About seven," Sampson says in his report; but the distance measures almost ten miles on the chart drawn up by the board of officers appointed to make a map of the battle.
it from the Iowa.* Sampson had prescribed this signal in a general order dated June 7th. Elsewhere in the carefully prepared instructions with which he had sought to insure that there should be no un-readiness in any emergency that might arise, he had directed that whenever the enemy appeared, "the ships must close and engage as soon as possible, and endeavour to sink his vessels or force them to run ashore in the channel."

Even without this order, there was no doubt of what was to be done. The Spaniards' simple tactics rendered manœuvring unnecessary, and the remarkable combat that followed was a gunners' and engineers' rather than a commanders' battle. Commodore Schley flew from the Brooklyn the signals "Clear for action" and "Close up," but apparently they were not noticed in the smoke and the excitement, as they are not recorded in the logs of the other men-of-war. Sampson, when he saw what was happening, put the New York about and signalled "Close in toward harbour entrance and attack vessels," but his orders could have been visible only to the easternmost of his ships.

* In The Story of the Captains, Captain Philip remarks that "when so many eyes must have seen the approach of Cervera at once, it is to the credit of all that none claims the distinction of having been the first to discover the sally." But Captain Evans asserts that "the Iowa was the first to discover the Spanish ships," and accounts for it "because of her position, by which she was enabled to see farther into the harbour than any other ship. All the vessels," he adds, "were most vigilant and watchful, as is shown by the fact that no fewer than three claim to have been the first to see the Spaniards." For the Oregon, Lieutenant Eberle claims that "at twenty-eight minutes after nine, our sharp-eyed chief quartermaster sighted the masthead of a ship coming from behind Smith Cay." Captain Cook's view is that "it cannot be determined which ship first discovered the enemy. The Iowa was first to signal the fact, but the other vessels were in the act of hoisting the signal arranged by the admiral."

In his official report, Captain Philip states that the Texas made the signal a moment earlier than the Iowa; but this must be a mistake. Captain Evans's quartermaster had "bent on" those particular flags the evening before, when suspicious columns of smoke were seen rising from the harbour; and when the Teresa was sighted they were hoisted instantly.
It has been stated that Cervera's sortie caught the blockading fleet napping; that most of the American vessels were ready to shoot but not to pursue; that—with two shining exceptions—their engineers were "unprepared to make a quick movement of any kind in the face of the enemy." * While not wholly untrue, the criticism is decidedly unfair. Of course, the ships were not ready to jump instantly to their highest speed. To keep them, through all the weeks of the blockade, in condition to use their full steaming power at a moment's notice, would have been utterly impossible. It would have involved an intolerable strain upon the crews, and an expenditure of fuel that would have crippled the fleet's efficiency by necessitating constant recoring. The New York had steam in four of her six boilers; the fifth was hot, the sixth was ready for lighting fires; her forward engines were disconnected, as they can not be used to advantage except with full boiler power. The Brooklyn, which has seven boilers, had steam in three, with three more full of hot water. If any ships were caught napping it was the Iowa and the Indiana. Captain Evans reports that the former could make only five knots at first, quickening later to about ten; and the latter, whose machinery was not in prime condition, did no better. Readiest of all the fleet was that naval bulldog, the Oregon. Her engineers, who had already distinguished themselves by speeding her from San Francisco to the West Indies, won fresh laurels by their ship's fine performance on the 3d of July—a performance that entitles her chief engineer, Robert Milligan, to a place among the heroes of the war. The other vessel whose readiness for action deserves special mention was the Gloucester.

* This criticism was made in an article published in the Engineering Magazine, December, 1898, which attracted some attention at the time.
Quickly as the crew sprang to their stations, it was some few minutes * before the gunners were ready to fire, and they were not in time, nor near enough, to prevent Cervera’s ships coming out of the channel. But when they opened, with every gun that could be brought to bear, the hail of shell that rained upon the Spaniards was terrific. There was no swell to render an accurate aim difficult, and the American marksmanship was deadly. It drove the Spanish gunners from their pieces, it made slaughter pens of their decks, and, most fatal of all, it set their ships on fire. When two of Cervera’s cruisers—the Vizcaya and the Oquendo—lay beside the Maine in Havana harbour, Captain Sigsbee noticed the “long stretch of beautiful woodwork” in their cabins, and foresaw their danger of fire in battle.† His forecast was verified now. The Teresa and the Oquendo were ablaze after fifteen minutes’ fighting. The former had her fire main cut by one of the first shots, leaving her powerless to extinguish the flames that were devouring her.

The Spanish cruisers came down the channel at a speed of eight or ten knots. When they turned westward they used the full power of their engines, but only the Colon could quicken materially. Their speed was enough, however, to carry them past the American ships before the latter could get well under way. The five first-rate vessels within range headed in directly toward the escaping foe, the only exception being a manœuvre made by the Brooklyn, out of which there subsequently grew one of the innumerable controversies of the war.

The westward station of Schley’s flagship placed

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* “Within eight minutes,” Sampson says in his report. “Within five minutes,” says Captain Cook. “Within three minutes,” says Captain Philip. “Not two minutes, it seemed to me,” says Captain Taylor. Under the circumstances, the discrepancy is not surprising.
† The Maine, pp. 56, 57.
her nearest to Cervera’s ships when they turned to starboard out of the channel; but their line of flight was close along shore, almost a mile from her. The Teresa had passed, and the Vizcaya was following, when the Brooklyn, which was heading to the northeast, wore around to seaward. As her tactical diameter—that is, the space in which she can go about—is eight hundred yards, this movement turned her in the direction taken by the fleeing Spaniards, but set her nearly half a mile farther away from them.

His handling of the Brooklyn having been criticised—or, perhaps it would be fairer to say, having been commented on with much curiosity as to its precise purpose—Commodore Schley subsequently explained that he made his seaward turn, at a moment when the other ships were following the order to close with the enemy, in order to prevent the Brooklyn from cutting off the fire of the rest of the fleet. He added that he regarded it as “the crucial and deciding feature of the combat,” and claimed the sinking of four ships within half an hour as the result of it.* In view of this it is certainly curious that in his official report of the battle he makes no mention of the manoeuvre. His flag captain, Captain Cook, merely records that “the enemy turned to the westward to close in to the land. We then wore around to starboard, bringing the starboard battery into action. The enemy hugged the shore to the westward.” Before his later explanation, Schley’s statement that “the Spanish admiral’s scheme was to concentrate all fire for a while on the Brooklyn, and the Vizcaya to ram her” was regarded as giving his reason for the course he took. The commodore attributes his information to two of Cervera’s captains, but no other officer seems to have noticed any threat of ramming

* Rear-Admiral Schley’s statement to the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs, February 19, 1899.
on the part of the Vizcaya.* Cervera's general plan was simply to run; and such a bold offensive stroke would have been most uncharacteristic of Spanish seamanship. Moreover, had it been attempted, a vessel can not ram without risk of being rammed, and the Brooklyn was more than two thousand tons heavier than any of the Spanish ships, as well as swifter.

The Brooklyn's seaward turn was made, too, at very serious risk of collision with the Texas, which was coming up outside of her. It appears that when Commodore Schley gave the order to port the helm, Lieutenant Hodgson, navigating officer of the flagship, who was beside him on the platform around the conning tower, pointed out the danger, but his suggestion was disregarded.† The officers of the Texas had last seen the Brooklyn heading northeast, toward the Spaniards; then the smoke hid her, till suddenly she appeared, Captain Philip states, "bearing toward us and across our bows. She seemed so near that it took our breath away. 'Back both engines hard!' went down the tube to the astonished engineers, and in a twinkling the old ship was racing against herself. The collision which seemed imminent, even if it was not, was averted, and as the big cruiser glided past all of us on the bridge gave a sigh of relief. Had the Brooklyn struck us then, it would probably have been an end of the Texas and her half thousand men. Had the Texas rammed the Brooklyn, it would have been equally disastrous; for the Texas was not built for

* "No Spanish ship," says Captain Evans, "gave the slightest indication of using either ram or torpedo."
† An unpleasant controversy afterward arose over this incident, it being stated by Lieutenant Helmer, of the Texas, who cited Lieutenant Hodgson as his informant, that Schley said "Damn the Texas: let her look out for herself!" The matter being officially investigated by the Navy Department, Lieutenant Hodgson testified that the commodore's words were "All right; the Texas must look out for that"—or to that effect. Schley himself stated (to Lieutenant Hodgson, in June, 1899) that he had no recollection of any such conversation.
ramming, and she would have doubled up like a hoop. Few of our ship's company knew of the incident."*

The Brooklyn was still nearest to the leading Spanish ships. The Iowa, the Indiana, and the Texas, after pouring in a tremendous fire upon each of Cervera's cruisers as it came out of the harbour mouth, headed after the fugitives at the best pace they could make, their guns still steadily at work. The unarmoured Vixen, finding herself between the two fleets, prudently turned seaward and ran outside of the American ironclads. The Oregon dashed forward with a splendid burst of speed, and drew almost level with the Brooklyn. "It was an inspiring sight," the captain of Schley's flagship generously says in his report, "to see this battle ship, with a large white wave before her, and her smokestacks belching forth continued puffs from her forced draught. We were making fourteen knots at the time, and the Oregon came up off our starboard quarter at about six hundred yards and maintained her position, though we soon after increased our speed to fifteen knots, and just before the Colon surrendered were making sixteen." †

In The Story of the Captains, Captain Evans gives an equally appreciative description. "Clark, of the Oregon," he says, "put his helm to starboard, and came through the lee of the Iowa with the speed of a locomotive. So sudden was his change of position in the dense smoke that he had great difficulty, as he afterward told me, in preventing his men from firing into us, as they took us for one of the enemy's ships. As it was, he did not waste much time, and as he cleared us on our port side, his thirteen-inch guns fairly raised the scalps of those in the conning-

* Century Magazine, May, 1899, p. 91.
† Captain Cook's estimate of his ship's speed was a little too high. The map plotted by the official board already mentioned shows that the Brooklyn's average speed in the long chase of the Colon was a little more than thirteen knots, the Oregon's a trifle less.
tower of the Iowa. We may all live a hundred years, and fight fifty naval battles, but we can never hope again to see such a sight as the Oregon was on this beautiful Sunday morning. We could see her for a moment only as she sped on after the Colon, completely enveloped in the smoke of her own guns—a great white puffball, decorated every second with vicious flashes as her guns spoke out." *

The Teresa and the Oquendo soon dropped behind the other two cruisers. Their fate had been sealed by the terrific fire that met them as they left the channel. Both were ablaze, and the hail of shells had wrought frightful havoc on their decks. Captain Concas, of the Teresa, had been wounded, and as the second officer could not be found Admiral Cervera took command in person. His ship was a mass of flame and smoke. It was too late even to flood the magazines, and to save her from sinking in deep water the admiral ordered her beached. “I thought to lower the flag, but that was not possible, on account of the fire,” Cervera says, but several American officers report that a white flag was shown as she ran ashore. She went aground in a small cove at Nima Nima, six and a half miles west of the Morro, and lay there, burning fiercely, about a hundred yards from the beach.

This happened at a quarter past ten. The Oquendo lived just five minutes longer, and got half a mile farther west, before she followed the flagship's example and ran for the shore, hauling down her colours. She was on fire fore and aft, and her fire pumps were disabled; her decks were a shambles, and most of her guns had been put out of action. Among the dead were her commander, Captain Lagaza, who was drowned in attempting to reach the shore, and his two chief officers.

The next victims of the American gunners were

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* The Century Magazine, May, 1899, pp. 54, 55.
THE SANTIAGO SEA FIGHT

the Pluton and the Furor. The two destroyers—frail craft, yet dangerous weapons if properly handled—were sent to sure destruction by Cervera's tactics. In the broad daylight their only chance of escaping, or of getting within striking distance of the enemy, lay in creeping close beside the cruisers, where they would have had at least a partial shelter. Coming out about fifteen minutes later than the Teresa, they were doomed. The blockading ships had had time to close in, and were ready to meet them with a deadly fire. All four of the battle ships, while their heavy guns were hammering the cruisers, turned their secondary batteries upon the destroyers.

The Gloucester, too, steamed in to engage them at close quarters. Her attack—a bold movement for an unprotected yacht, whose heaviest guns were six-pounders—was a well-planned stroke, as well as a brave one, on the part of her captain, Lieutenant-Commander Wainwright, who was executive officer of the Maine at the time of the fateful explosion of February 15th. As the Spanish cruisers came out of the harbour he ordered his engines slowed, gaining steam, and waiting for the expected appearance of the destroyers. When the Pluton and the Furor left the channel, he dashed at them at full speed. Captain Taylor, of the Indiana, signalled "Enemy's torpedo boats coming out," but in the smoke Wainwright read it as "Gunboats will advance," which he interpreted as an assurance that he would not be fired on by his own ships; and though he narrowly escaped the fire of both the Indiana and the Iowa, he closed in upon the destroyers, training his forward guns upon the Pluton, his after guns upon the Furor, and getting within six hundred yards' range.

Both were disabled within three miles of the Morro. At half past ten the Pluton, with fire and smoke bursting from her decks, turned shoreward,
and ran upon the rocks west of the Cabanas inlet, where she blew up and settled in the surf. The Furor, also on fire, was circling about helplessly, and as a white flag was waved from her deck Wainwright ceased firing and launched his boats, to rescue the crews, and to see if there was any chance of saving the prizes. The boats had taken aboard Lieutenant Carlier and eighteen of his men, and were picking up the survivors of the Pluton, when there was a series of explosions on the Furor; her bow rose into the air, and she went down stern first in deep water.

The Gloucester’s boats saved twenty-six men from the Pluton, including her captain, Lieutenant Vazquez. Captain Villamil, commanding the two destroyers, was on the Furor, and perished with her.* A few refugees from both vessels, with some from the Teresa and the Oquendo, escaped to the shore and made their way back to Santiago, swimming the Cabanas inlet.

Credit for the destruction of the Pluton and the Furor has been claimed as the sole possession of the Gloucester. Lieutenant Huse, executive officer of the plucky yacht, states in his report that after Captain Taylor’s signal “it appeared that the fight between this ship and the two apparently uninjured destroyers was a thing apart from the battle in which the larger ships were engaged.” Lieutenant-Commander Wainwright, though he mentions the fact that “the Indiana poured in a hot fire from all her secondary batteries upon the destroyers,” asserts that until the Gloucester closed with them “they were not seriously injured.”

On the other hand, Captain Taylor’s version is that when the Teresa and the Oquendo gave up the fight, “we (the Indiana) then devoted our special

* Remains identified as those of Captain Villamil were found among the rocks on the beach in March, 1899.
attention to prevent the escape of the destroyers, which appeared more than a match for the Gloucester. They were soon seen to blow up, apparently struck by our six-inch and six-pounders." Captain Eaton, of the Resolute, corroborates this, testifying that he distinctly saw the Furor "struck by an eight-inch or thirteen-inch shell from the Indiana, which was followed by an explosion and flames."

Furthermore, Captain Evans asserts that the fire of the Iowa, "together with that of the Gloucester and another smaller vessel,* proved so destructive that one of the torpedo-boat destroyers (Pluton) was sunk, and the Furor was so much damaged that she was run upon the rocks." Captain Philip claims a share of the work for the Texas. "Owing to our secondary battery," he says, "together with the Iowa and Gloucester, the two destroyers were forced to beach and sink." And Captain Clark, of the Oregon, adds that "when it was discovered that the enemy's torpedo boats were following their ships, we used our rapid-fire guns, as well as the six-inch, upon them with telling effect." The New York also fired some four-inch shells—the only shots she discharged in the battle—at the Furor.

Other ships, besides the Indiana, claim the shots that exploded the two boats. "One of our heavy shells," says Captain Taylor, "was seen to strike one of the destroyers, an explosion and flames following." In narrating the fate of the Furor, Captain Evans writes: "A large projectile, we believed from the Iowa, seemed to cut her in two." Captain Philip also describes her explosion, and adds: "The men of the Texas have always insisted that this was caused by a shell from Ensign W. K. Gise's six-inch gun." Lieutenant Eberle, of the Oregon, records that "the plucky little vessels fought their guns

* This seems to be an error, as the Gloucester was the only smaller vessel engaged. Captain Evans also confuses the Pluton and the Furor.
until a shell—which, it is claimed, was fired by our after six-inch gun—struck the Furor amidships and caused an explosion. The torpedo boat was literally torn to pieces.”

No doubt none of Sampson’s captains had the least desire to claim more than his due, but it is easy to understand that all of them were, as the admiral said, “vitaliy interested and justly proud of their ships.” Sampson’s report gives what is probably a very fair summary of the matter:

The destroyers probably suffered much injury from the fire of the secondary batteries of the battle ships Iowa, Indiana, and the Texas. Yet I think a very considerable factor in their speedy destruction was the fire, at close range, of the Gloucester’s battery.

From the wreck of the Pluton the Gloucester’s boats went on to the Teresa and the Oquendo. The Spanish flagship had lowered a boat, which sank at once, and a steam launch, which also went down after making one journey to the beach. The admiral jumped overboard, and his son, Lieutenant Angel Cervera, and two sailors helped him ashore, where he surrendered to Lieutenant Norman of the Gloucester. The work of rescue was rendered perilous by the explosion of guns and ammunition on board the burning cruisers. The Teresa’s magazines had flooded as she filled with water, but one of the Oquendo’s blew up, shattering the forward part of the ship. Farther aft her torpedoes added to the destruction, and she was left a hopeless wreck, her frame practically broken in two. Her flag, and those of the two destroyers, were captured by the Gloucester’s boats.

Meanwhile the Colon and the Vizcaya were fleeing westward, hotly pursued by the Brooklyn and the Oregon, with the Texas following, and the Iowa and the Indiana doing their best to keep up with the chase. The Colon passed her consort about half past ten,
and drew out of range of the American ships; but
the Vizcaya was still under fire from all five,
and in twenty minutes more her race was over.
Burning, and with a heavy list to port, she
was headed for the shore, and after veering about
as if in indecision she was run ashore in the small
bay of Aserraderos, twenty miles west of the
Morro.

The Vixen, which had followed the pursuit, was
in time to fire a few shots at the Vizcaya before
her flag went down. The New York, which had
turned westward at sight of the escaping Spaniards,
and had passed through the fire of the Morro and
Socapa batteries without deigning to return it, was
now coming up, accompanied by the Ericsson and
the Hist. The Ericsson had her torpedoes ready for
use, but she was too late to get within striking dis­
tance.

As there was now no enemy afloat but the Colon,
who was too fast for him, and whom the swifter
ships were pretty sure to overtake, Captain Evans
sent five of the Iowa's boats to take off the crew of
the burning Vizcaya. The rescuers, who were rein­
forced from the Ericsson and the Hist, kept up their
dangerous work in the face of constant explo­sions—
both of the cruiser's main magazines blew up—until
there were no more living men to save. Captain
Eulate was taken aboard the Iowa. He had his
sword, and proffered it, in token of surrender, to
Captain Evans, who chivalrously declined to re­
ceive it.

Sampson had already ordered the Indiana to
return to her blockading station—a wise precaution,
as there were still a couple of armed vessels in San­
tiago harbour, which might have wrought havoc
among the transports at Siboney—and he now sent
back the Iowa and the Ericsson, leaving the Hist to
stand by the Vizcaya. Of Cervera's ships, only the
Colon was left. At this time she had a lead of six
miles, but it is evident that Captain Moreu had no hope of escape. He kept close along shore, following the bends of the coast, while his pursuers steered straight forward to cut him off. A little after eleven o'clock, when the Vizcaya turned shoreward, the Brooklyn was three quarters of a mile ahead of the Oregon, both ships having now worked up to a speed of quite or nearly fifteen knots, and gaining steadily on the Colon. The Vixen was nearly abeam of the Oregon, but farther seaward; the Texas was a mile and a half from the Oregon, and not quite holding her own in the race; the New York was six miles behind the Texas, steaming a little faster than any of the other vessels.

It was an exciting race, but its end was certain. At twenty minutes after twelve the Oregon was near enough to the quarry to open fire at long range with her great thirteen-inch rifles. A little later the Brooklyn began to use her eight-inch guns, but her shots fell short. A thirteen-inch shell from the Oregon, however, fell just ahead of the Colon, and another struck under her stern; and at a quarter past one she turned into the cove at the mouth of the Rio Turquino ("Blue River"), fifty-four miles west of Santiago harbour, and ran for the shore, hauling down her flag. Commodore Schley sent Captain Cook on board to receive her surrender. Captain Moreu, Cook reports, "surrendered unconditionally. He was polite, shook hands, and said that his case was hopeless, and that he saw we were too much for him." Captain Paredes, second in command of the Spanish squadron, was also on the Colon.

As Captain Cook left the Colon the New York and the Texas came up, and he went aboard the flagship to report to Sampson. The admiral ordered Captain Chadwick to take over the prize. After transferring the prisoners—five hundred and eight
in number—to the Resolute, which had followed the chase, he left Lieutenant-Commander Cogswell, of the Oregon, in charge, with a crew from the Oregon and the New York. But the fine Spanish cruiser was not destined to be of service to her captors. Her sea valves had been opened, and so broken that they could not be closed. Many of her crew were drunk, and Lieutenant Eberle, of the Oregon, states that they deliberately damaged the vessel’s armament and equipment. It is said that her firemen had been ashore without food for thirty-six hours, and on their return to the ship brandy was given them. Demoralization resulted, and a number of men were shot by the officers for abandoning their places in the fireroom. The Colon had been run upon a steep beach, where the water was seventy feet deep at her stern and only eight at her bow; but as she settled she slipped backward, and was in danger of going down in deep water. Captain Chadwick thereupon placed the New York’s stem against her, and pushed her bodily up on the beach. Here she gradually settled, in spite of all efforts to stop her leaks; and finally, just after the prize crew abandoned her, she went over on her starboard beam ends.

An hour before midnight Sampson started the New York for Santiago, leaving the Oregon and the Texas to stay by the Colon. Except for the breaking of her valves, the captured cruiser was practically uninjured when she sank, and it was fully—though, as it proved, mistakenly—expected that she could be raised. She showed the marks of only half a dozen shells, probably received as she left the harbour, and some of them had not penetrated her armour. Her handling during the battle was not creditable to the Spaniards. Rated at twenty knots an hour, she allowed the sixteen-knot Oregon to overhaul her; she was surrendered practically without a fight—though this is to a great extent excused
by the fact that she was without her heavy guns—and most ingloriously scuttled.

The battle was over, and one of the greatest and most complete of naval victories had been won. The Spanish squadron was utterly destroyed. Of its complement of about twenty-three hundred men, some three hundred and fifty were killed, burned, or drowned; the rest—except those who escaped to Santiago—were prisoners.* The American fleet was practically unscathed. It had lost one man killed—Chief Yeoman Ellis, of the Brooklyn, who was struck by a shell—and ten wounded, none fatally, most of the cases being injuries to eardrums from the concussion of the guns. The ships were scarcely marked by the torrent of ill-aimed fire that had come from the fleeing Spaniards.

The Brooklyn showed most traces of the fight—chiefly in her rigging and upper works, the Spanish gunners having fired high, as seems to be their inveterate habit. The flag at her main was shot to pieces, and her signal halyards repeatedly cut. In all she was struck by twenty shells, besides pieces of bursting projectiles and small shot from machine guns. Of the other ships, the Oregon was hit three times, the Indiana twice, by fragments or small-calibre missiles which did no damage. A six-inch shell struck the Texas, going through her ash

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* The prisoners captured on July 3d were confined at Annapolis and at Portsmouth, N. H., the number being 93 at the former place and 1,681 at the latter, besides a few sick and wounded men sent to the Naval Hospital at Norfolk, and 8 who, through a regrettable misunderstanding, were shot and killed by their guards on board the Harvard, during a false alarm of mutiny. The number of those who escaped to Santiago is stated by Lieutenant Müller at about 150. Stories are told, both by Spaniards and by Americans, of unarmed refugees being murdered by Cubans; but it is fair to add that Cervera, who mentions that the insurgents temporarily held about 200 prisoners from the Teresa and the Oquendo, makes no complaint of ill treatment, and Lieutenant Hazeltine, of the Hist, reports that Cubans at Aserraderos helped in the rescue of the Vizcaya's crew, and gave "first aid" to some of the wounded men.
hoist and injuring her forced-draught apparatus. The Iowa received two of about the same calibre, which pierced her hull, but did no material harm, though one started a small fire; and about seven minor projectiles, which left only trifling marks. The Gloucester, which went nearest to the enemy’s guns, seemed to bear a charmed life, for not a shot touched her. At one moment of the battle she had a narrow escape. As she closed with the destroyers, her crew could hear, amid the roar of cannon, the drumming sound of a machine gun, and could trace its fire by a line of splashes, about as long as their ship, and steadily drawing nearer as the Spaniards gauged the range. It was from a one-pounder Maxim on the Furor, and if its stream of shot reached the Gloucester, even for a few minutes, it meant terrible slaughter on her decks; but when the splashes were only a few yards away they suddenly ceased—the gun, no doubt, having been put out of action by the American fire.

The completeness of Cervera’s defeat is not adequately explained by his squadron’s inferiority to the enemy it had to meet. The Spanish admiral states in his report that “the hostile forces were three times as large as ours.” Lieutenant Müller calculates that “six ships, if the Pluton and Furor may be called such, had to fight against twenty-four that were better protected and armed.” These are utter misrepresentations. The battle was fought, on the American side, by six ships—the battle ships Iowa, Oregon, Indiana, and Texas, the cruiser Brooklyn, and the converted yacht Gloucester. Another auxiliary, the Vixen, must be added to the list, as she was present throughout the fight, though her part in it was little more than that of a spectator. The New York, though she fired a few shots, was practically out of the battle. The Hist, the Ericsson, the Harvard, and the Resolute came up
only in time to receive the prisoners. No other American ship was present at all. Some of the twenty-four vessels listed by Lieutenant Müller were as far away as Manila.

The comparative gun power of two fleets may be stated in various ways. The seven American vessels engaged at Santiago had a total of 225 guns to Cervera’s 146, and they had 14 guns—the twelve- and thirteen-inch rifles of the battle ships—heavier than anything the Spaniards carried. In the medium-sized weapons, with which most execution was done, the Spanish ships were better off. The American ships had 64 guns of calibres from four to eight inches, only 18 of which were rapid-firers; Cervera had 46 rapid-fire guns of calibres from four and a half to six inches. Not all the guns, of course, on either side, could be used. A published calculation by Lieutenant Wells, of the Brooklyn, estimates that the number actually engaged during the battle was 105 on the American ships and 91 on the Spanish, and that the weight of metal they could throw per minute was respectively 6,720 and 4,827 pounds. As a summary of all these figures it is probably fair to say that on paper the American gun fire was superior to the enemy’s by fully fifty per cent.* In this no account is taken of the shore batteries, which maintained a brisk but quite ineffective fire during the early part of the battle.

Several of the Spanish cruisers’ guns, Lieutenant Müller states—as Cervera also stated before he left the Cape Verde Islands—were out of order, and some of their ammunition was defective; but it was not so much the better guns as the better gunnery that won the sweeping victory. It was the same story that was told in Manila Bay two months be-

* Captain Taylor records that Admiral Cervera, a few hours after the battle, said that he had estimated Sampson’s force as four times stronger than his own. “The odds,” adds the commander of the Indiana, “were surely exaggerated in the mind of this gallant officer.”
fore. Sampson's men had a special advantage in the practice they had had during the blockade. Their fire killed the enemy's fire, and would have done so had the Spaniards possessed twice the batteries they had. Another very important factor in the result was the extensive use of wood in the construction of the Spanish ships. With the possible exception of the Furor, none of Cervera's vessels was destroyed by the direct effect of shot and shell; all of them but the Colon perished by fire, the flames being started by exploding projectiles, and the disabling of pumps and hose leaving them to spread unchecked.

There is scarcely a chapter of history, however stately or terrible, that has not its footnote of comedy; and such was the case with the story of the Santiago sea fight, brilliant with triumph for America, and tragic with ruin and death for the ships and sailors of Spain. A gleam of humour is to be found in the adventures of certain minor members of Sampson's fleet.

When Cervera's ships came out of the harbour, the Resolute, as has been said, lay east of the Morro, near the Indiana. She had on her decks several tons of guncotton, which Sampson intended to use in an attempt to explode the channel mines, in order to remove the obstructions most to be dreaded in forcing an entrance to the harbour. When the shells began to fly, Captain Eaton regarded his position as too perilous, and made full speed for Siboney. Meeting the New York, he informed Sampson of Cervera's sortie—a service which the admiral neglects to acknowledge in his report, possibly because he could see for himself what had happened—and was ordered to "proceed to Guantanamo and notify the ships there to join the fleet." Passing Siboney on this mission, vigorously sounding his whistle, and flying a signal which announced that the Span-
yards "had fled," he caused much natural alarm to the transports lying there. Captain Cotton, of the Harvard, who was discharging stores in the bay, hastily recalled his boats, and stood westward after Sampson, his ship cleared for action.

From Siboney the news, becoming more and more alarming as it travelled, was cabled to Playa del Este, on Guantanamo Bay. The Suwanee, which had been coaling in the bay, was just putting to sea, when Commander McCalla of the Marblehead, lying at Playa, signalled her to wait for him; and coming within hailing distance, he informed her captain, Lieutenant-Commander Delehanty, that "the Spanish fleet had escaped from Santiago de Cuba, and was in all probability on its way to this port to destroy unarmed vessels." On this appalling intelligence, Delehanty called his line officers—three in number—about him, and explained the situation. A month ago, he told them, the Navy Department had stated that if Cervera's squadron escaped the service would be disgraced. Apparently that misfortune had come to it; and the four line officers of the Suwanee, without a dissenting voice, resolved to do all in their power to redeem the reputation of the American navy. All this is modestly recorded in Lieutenant-Commander Delehanty's report, which continues:

I thereupon directed these officers to draw the common charges from the guns, to load with armour-piercing shell, and to which parts of the enemy's ships they should direct their fire. We were in a small gunboat, with a maximum speed of ten knots, standing out to meet a fleet of heavily armed armoured cruisers with reputed speed of double ours. Under other circumstances it would have been my duty to avoid so unequal a conflict. I felt the full responsibility of making the decision, and I record with pride that not a man flinched when it was made known.

Unfortunately for history, the Suwanee did not encounter the Spanish fleet, and an hour or so
later the Dupont brought news of its destruction. Meanwhile the Resolute had been spreading a second alarm. Off Daiquiri, on the way eastward, she sighted a "large, strange man-of-war," whose colours Captain Eaton took to be Spanish. He promptly faced about, and steamed at full speed to give notice of this new and entirely unexpected enemy. After warning the transports at Siboney—this was an exciting morning for nervous skippers—he continued westward till he met the Indiana, returning from the wrecks of Cervera's cruisers, and informed her that a "Spanish battle ship" was approaching. While the Resolute passed on to find Sampson, Captain Taylor stood for the mysterious stranger with his guns ready for use, and found her to be the Austrian cruiser Kaiserin Maria Theresa—a name curiously like that of Cervera's flagship—which desired permission to enter the blockaded harbour.
On the morning of July 3d, Lieutenant Allen, of the Second Cavalry, stationed on Lawton's extreme right, saw the departure of Cervera's fleet, and at once sent word to Shafter's headquarters. The scene of the great sea fight was screened from the armies ashore by the high hills along the coast, and its result was not known till after noon, when news came from Siboney that all the Spanish ships but one had been destroyed. That the Colon had shared the fate of her consorts was not reported until the following day.

To Santiago, too, the news came slowly. Half an hour after noon a message from the Morro told of the loss of the two destroyers; but not until evening did refugees from the Teresa and the Oquendo come in with their story of disaster, and the fate of Cervera's other vessels was not known until the officers of the Kaiserin Maria Theresa reported it next morning. The Austrian cruiser and a small British man-of-war, the Alert, came to take away from the doomed city residents claiming the protection of their flags. Neither ship entered the harbour; they lay off the Morro, and the refugees were taken out to them in boats.

Toral had already answered the demand for capitulation. "It is my duty to say to you that this city will not surrender," was his reply, which
reached Shafter at half past six on the 3d. Firing—which had ceased in the morning, when the flag of truce left the American lines—was not resumed, as four of the foreign consuls in Santiago came out with Colonel Dorst, Shafter's messenger, and begged for a day's respite. They stated that fifteen or twenty thousand people desired to leave the city, and begged that the noncombatants should be allowed to occupy the village of Caney, and be supplied with food. Shafter at once wrote to Toral that he would not bombard until noon of the 5th, if in the meantime no move were made against him, and requested that the consuls would come out again next morning for another interview.

That same evening (July 3d) Colonel Escario's column from Manzanillo marched into Santiago from the west, by the Cobre road, apparently without resistance from Garcia, who had undertaken to stop it. Although this added thirty-five hundred soldiers to the garrison, it made little change in the situation. When Shafter heard of it, on the 4th*—Garcia reported that five thousand men had passed in—he sent a message to Wheeler warning him to be ready in case of attack; but with Cervera's fleet destroyed, and with some reinforcements arriving and more promised, he felt strong enough to hold his position without any difficulty, except, perhaps, in the event of a larger body of Spaniards coming up from Holguin. Escario's advent meant that Toral would have more mouths to feed—for the newcomers had exhausted their rations during the march from Manzanillo—and more men to surrender.

* On the evening of July 3d, Shafter had telegraphed to Washington: "To-night my lines completely surround the town from the bay on the north of the city to a point on the San Juan River on the south. General Pando, I find to-night, is some distance away, and will not get into Santiago"—a despatch that shows imperfect information both as to the movements of the enemy and even as to the situation of his own troops.
Of Shafter's reinforcements, the Ninth Massachusetts had come up from Siboney on the 2d, and other troops were reported on their way from Tampa and Newport News. On the 3d General Miles telegraphed from Washington:

I expect to be with you within one week with strong reinforcements.

When the consuls came out again on the morning of the 4th, Lieutenant Miley, representing Shafter, conferred with them upon the question of quartering and feeding the noncombatants. It was a difficult problem, because Caney, a village of three hundred houses at most,* had been shelled during the battle of July 1st, and contained many wounded men and some unburied dead; it was fifteen miles from Shafter's base of supplies, and all that he could promise to furnish was the simplest food—bread, bacon, sugar, and coffee—for not more than three or four thousand. The consuls were advised to keep the people in the city as long as possible, unless a bombardment should be ordered, and to send them out gradually as their provisions became exhausted; and another conference was arranged for the following day, the 5th.

The events of the night, however, precipitated matters.

Fearing lest the batteries and the mines might not avail, without the support of Cervera's fleet, to prevent Sampson from forcing an entrance to the harbour and putting an end to all possibility of further resistance, General Toral and the commandant of the port decided upon an attempt to block the channel by sinking the Reina Mercedes at its narrowest point. It was a repetition of the Merrimac manoeuvre, and it proved equally unsuc-

*Sinking of the
Mercedes,
July 4.

* Lieutenant Müller gives the number as two hundred; Mr. Ramsden, who was among the refugees, as three hundred.
cessful. The dismantled cruiser—her guns had already been taken ashore—was hastily stripped during the 4th, and an hour before midnight her commander, Ensign Nardiz, and a few engineers and sailors moved her down the harbour, intending to drop her bow and stern anchors, swing her across the channel, and open her valves.

Shafer had notified Sampson that fighting on land was suspended, but the admiral did not regard the truce as applying to the navy, and he still kept up the nightly watch with searchlights. As soon as the Mercedes came into view the Massachusetts, which was the ship on guard duty, and the Texas, which lay beside her, opened fire, and the shore batteries replied. A mortar shell from the latter struck the Indiana, going through her forward deck and exploding below, where it did some damage but hurt none of her crew. This was the only hit the Spanish mortars scored during the campaign.

The Mercedes went down at the intended spot, but not in the intended position, a shell—so her crew reported—having cut her stern anchor loose prematurely. Next morning (July 5th) the Suwanee reconnoitred close in, and reported that the channel was not closed by the sunken ship, which lay with her upper deck partly submerged; but it was thought that she would prove a dangerous obstruction to Sampson’s larger ships.

An immediate result of the midnight firing was a panic in Santiago. Fully believing that the American fleet was forcing the harbour, the inhabitants poured out of the city, and on the morning of the 5th the Caney road was thronged with women, children, and old men, who during the remaining days of the siege, in spite of the efforts of Shafer’s commissary department and of the Red Cross organization, had to endure terrible sufferings. Many fugitives fled to camps in the mountains; others sought
refuge along the shores of the bay; and Santiago was almost emptied of all but soldiers.*

During these days of truce, and the week that followed, the American lines were gradually extended, north of the city, until Ludlow's brigade, on the extreme right of Lawton's division, finally closed the gap through which Escario had entered, commanding the Cobre road and touching the head of the bay.† Two of the field batteries (Capron's and Parkhurst's, the latter now commanded by Lieutenant Hinds) were brought up from El Pozo and stationed with Lawton; the other two (Grimes's and Best's) were also moved forward to a position in the rear of Bates's brigade, on the left of the army. The field mortars were sent up to San Juan, and one of the siege guns was disembarked at Siboney, but it was found impossible to carry it over the muddy trail to the front.‡ Besides strengthening his own lines, Shafter endeavoured to cripple the

* Lieutenant Müller gives a striking picture of the desolation of the beleaguered city:

"Santiago presented the same aspect that Pompeii and Herculaneum must have offered. Not a single store was open, not even the drug stores. A few horses were running through the city, pulling up the grass growing along the sidewalks. Many dogs were staying at the entrances of the houses, which their masters had abandoned. At night they barked incessantly.

"At night the city was truly impressive. The streets were dark as wolves' dens. A few guerrillas were breaking into abandoned stores and houses, which they ransacked."

To suppress such robberies General Toral issued a special decree fixing death or life imprisonment as the penalty for offences against persons or property.

† The Spaniards seem to have been able to use the Cobre road as late as the 10th of July, for Garcia reported on that day that he had driven in the enemy's outposts at Cobre and Dos Caminos. On the afternoon of the 11th Ludlow's lines were extended down to the bay.

‡ Some of these movements do not seem to have been in strict accordance with the rather indefinite truce between the two armies. On July 12th Toral called Shafter's attention to the advance of the American troops north of the city, "of which," the Spanish general said, "I suppose you are ignorant," and requested that they should return to their former position. It does not appear that any withdrawal resulted, but Shafter promised that there should be no further advance, and sent the division commanders explicit orders to that effect.
enemy by cutting the pipe that brought water to Santiago from the hills north of the city. In the dry season this might have been an effective stroke; but with heavy rain falling daily, the Spaniards had an ample supply in cisterns for their immediate needs.*

Shafter's position grew stronger day by day—he telegraphed to the War Department, on the 8th, that it was "impregnable against any force the enemy can send"—but the task of storming Toral's defences did not promise to be less difficult or less costly. At one time, indeed, the idea of abandoning the siege occurred to him, as is shown by a despatch he sent to Washington on the 4th:

If we have got to try and reduce the town, now that the fleet is destroyed, which was stated to be the chief object of the expedition, there must be no delay in getting large bodies of troops here.

At Washington, General Miles took up the suggestion of withdrawing from Santiago, and proposed that Shafter's corps, with all the reinforcements ready to leave the United States, should be sent to Porto Rico, the conquest of which he was eager to undertake at once. He was overruled, however—and fortunately, for the withdrawal would have revived the drooping hopes of Spain, while the city's fall undoubtedly prompted her Government to sue for peace.

With "take Santiago" the keynote of every despatch from Washington, Shafter contemplated an assault only as a last resort. He kept up negotiations for a surrender, and meanwhile he urged Sampson to force his way into the harbour and end the campaign with the great guns of the fleet. His first

* It seems, however, from Lieutenant Müller's narrative, that in the last days of the siege a shortage was beginning to be felt, or at least apprehended; and the immediate repair of the broken pipes was one of the concessions requested by the Spanish commissioners who negotiated the surrender.
note to Toral, written on July 3d, was followed up by three letters on the 4th. One offered to parole and return the wounded men captured at Caney. Another proposed the exchange of a corresponding number of Spanish prisoners for Lieutenant Hobson and his seven comrades of the Merrimac, who were still held in Santiago, Blanco having declined to authorize their release. The third announced the destruction of Cervera’s squadron and the death of Vara del Rey at Caney, and concluded:

In view of the above, I would suggest that, to save needless effusion of blood and the distress of many people, you may reconsider your determination of yesterday. Your men have certainly shown the gallantry which was expected of them.

The return of the wounded Spaniards, besides its slight relief to Shafter’s overworked hospital service, was designed to disprove the idea that the invading army was in the habit of murdering its prisoners. The behaviour of the men captured at Caney showed that this preposterous myth had found wide credence among the Spanish soldiers. Many Americans thought that it accounted for the unexpectedly stubborn resistance they had offered, and that it had been deliberately spread by their officers.

Toral replied to all three notes with a letter of the most formal politeness, thanking Shafter for his courtesy, informing him that the proposition for Hobson’s exchange had been referred to the captain-general, and again refusing to surrender.

Next day (July 5th) twenty-eight wounded prisoners—four officers, one of whom was Lieutenant-Colonel Vara del Rey, a brother of the dead general, and twenty-four men—were delivered to the Spaniards; and word came from Toral that Blanco had agreed to the exchange for Hobson, which was carried out on the afternoon of the 6th. Besides the four he had paroled, Shafter had three Spanish offi-
cers among his prisoners. From them Toral chose Lieutenant Arias, who was sent into Santiago with seven privates; and the crew of the Merrimac came out to the American lines, where they received a warm greeting on their way to Siboney and the fleet. With these pacific negotiations in progress, firing was not resumed, though the limit set for the truce had expired at noon on the 5th.

A conference between Shafter and Sampson—postponed from the 3d of July, when the admiral, on his way to Siboney, was called back by the events of that memorable morning—had been arranged for the 6th. A serious misunderstanding had arisen between the two commanders, dating back to their meeting on the 20th of June, the day of the arrival of the Fifth Corps off Santiago, when the joint plan of campaign was first outlined. Of this plan Sampson has stated his idea very clearly and positively in a report dated July 15th:

It was essential . . . that the positions occupied by the eastern and western batteries should be carried, and this was the scheme of action first proposed by General Shafter in his discussion with my chief of staff, who was sent by me to meet General Shafter the day of his arrival. The chief of staff carried with him a chart of the harbour and explained the situation, stating that it was regarded by us as a movement of primal importance that these points should be carried before any attention was paid to the city. The possession of these points insured the destruction of the mines by us, the entrance of our heavy ships in the harbour, and the assault on Admiral Cervera’s squadron inside. To this General Shafter gave most cordial assent, and stated that he had no intention of attacking the city proper, that here [pointing to the entrance] was the key to the situation, and that when we had this we had all. This was repeated in his interview with General Garcia at Aserraderos.

I do not know why a change of plan occurred, unless it was that the troops on being landed advanced themselves so far on the roads toward Santiago before any specific plan of operations had been decided upon that it was found inconvenient to divert them to the other points.
On the other hand, Shafter’s memorandum of the conference at Aserraderos—which he dictated on the spot to Lieutenant Miley, of his staff, and of which Lieutenant Staunton, of Sampson’s staff, took a copy—makes no mention of the harbour batteries, simply recording the proposal to “land expedition at Daiquiri and march on Santiago.” In his article published in the Century Magazine the general adds:

Soon after coming on board the Segurancía, some of the naval officers suggested that, in their opinion, the first thing to do was to drive the Spanish troops from the Morro and Socapa batteries, thus enabling the navy to remove the mines in the harbour; but after my interview with General Garcia, and having seen the character of the shore on my way down to Aserraderos, I regarded this as entirely out of the question. . . . There could have been no misunderstanding as to my purpose.*

* This recalls the general’s statement that his instructions for the battle of July 1st were clearly understood by the officers who commanded in the field (see p. 247).

In his official report of the campaign, General Shafter says, after describing the arrangements for landing at Daiquiri:

“These movements committed me to approaching Santiago from the east over a narrow road, at first in some places not better than a trail, running from Daiquiri through Siboney and Sevilla, and making attack from that quarter. This, in my judgment, was the only feasible plan, and subsequent information and results confirmed my judgment.”

The general has also stated, as his reason for not attacking the Morro, that the country along the coast was “rugged, devoid of water, and densely covered with a poisonous undergrowth.” Could it have been more difficult than the jungles through which Wheeler’s and Kent’s divisions made their way, at such heavy cost, on July 1st?

On the other hand, he would have had the railroad to bring his supplies from Siboney. It will be remembered that on July 3d he wanted its aid so much that he was “seriously considering withdrawing about five miles, and taking up a new position on the high ground between the San Juan river and Siboney, with our left at Sardinero”—on the coast between Siboney and Fort Aguadores—“so as to get our supplies to a large extent by means of the railroad, which we can use, having engines and cars at Siboney.” (See page 267.) He might also have received effective assistance from Sampson; but apparently Shafter had a low estimate of the value of a fleet as a factor in land fighting. This is shown by his confident assertion that it was “nonsense” to suppose that Cervera’s squadron could have kept him out of Santiago. “We could easily have protected ourselves,” he says, “and taken position to clear his decks with musketry fire.” A general who can defeat and silence heavily armed ironclads with musketry fire, even when
THE SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO

It is quite clear, nevertheless, that there was a fundamental misunderstanding, and one sure to cause friction in the management of the joint campaign. Expecting the troops to strike at the Morro, Sampson was disappointed, to use no stronger word, when their only move in that direction—Duffield's feeble demonstration at Fort Aguadores—proved utterly abortive, in spite of his own co-operation. On the following day (July 2d) he told Shafter, by telephone from Siboney:

Impossible to force entrance until we can clear channel of mines, a work of some time after forts are taken possession of by your troops. Nothing was accomplished yesterday by the advance on Aguadores.

the ironclads are Spanish and the riflemen are Americans, is not a man to argue with.

On June 26th, Colonel Pearson, with the Second Infantry, reconnoitred along the coast, marching six miles westward from Siboney, along the railroad, without any special difficulty. He found the bridges intact, and no enemy in sight.

In his book on The Santiago Campaign (pp. 286, 310), General Wheeler gives some despatches which are scarcely consistent with Shafter's positive and repeated assertion that he regarded an attack on the harbour batteries as "entirely out of the question" from the first. On July 2d the cavalry commander received this note:

"My dear General Wheeler: What do you think of the idea of sending a division in rear of the left division to clear out the forts along the entrance to the bay so as to let the navy in and have the business over. Can it be done? Very respectfully,"

"William R. Shafter."

Wheeler's reply was: "I regret to say that I do not think infantry can take the forts along the entrance to the bay. I would like to do it, but the effort would be attended with terrible loss."

Again, on July 6th, Shafter wrote: "If it was possible to get between the town and the lower bay and try and clear those batteries out and let the navy in, the capture of the city would be easy; but I am at a loss how to accomplish it."

It would appear that but for Wheeler's contrary advice, Shafter contemplated ordering an assault upon the Punta Gorda or Morro battery, or possibly both, as the next step after the battle of July 1st. Wheeler's belief that the landward defences of the batteries were too strong for assault seems to have been based upon observation with "a very powerful glass" at several miles' distance (The Santiago Campaign, p. 87).

General Shafter has one triumphant answer to make to all criticisms upon his management of the campaign: he was sent to take Santiago, and he took it. In war success covers a multitude of mistakes, and very properly so.
Shaft replied:

It is impossible for me to say when I can take batteries at entrance to harbour. If they are as difficult to take as those which we have been pitted against, it will be some time and a great loss of life. I am at a loss to see why the navy can not work under a destructive fire as well as the army.

And an hour later he added:

I urge that you make effort immediately to force the entrance to avoid future losses among my men, which are already very heavy. You can now operate with less loss of life than I can.

Sampson at once wrote a letter in which he reiterated his opinion that it was impracticable to enter the harbour while the Spaniards controlled the mines, but promised to attempt to remove them by countermining. On the following morning (July 3d) the Resolute brought a quantity of guncotton from Guantanamo for this purpose, and the admiral, as already recorded, started for the army headquarters, intending to propose the storming of the Morro and Socapa batteries by the marines—there were about a thousand of them at Playa del Este and with the fleet—and a detachment of Shafter's troops.

On the 4th, after the great sea fight, Shafter repeated his demand that Sampson should force the harbour, and twice telegraphed his view of the case to Washington, stating in one despatch:

I regard it as necessary that the navy force an entrance into the harbour of Santiago not later than the 6th instant, and assist in the capture of that place. If they do, I believe the place will surrender without further loss of life.

And in the other:

If Sampson will force an entrance with all his fleet to the upper bay of Santiago we can take the city within a few hours. Under these conditions I believe the town will surrender. If the army is to take the place, I want fifteen thousand troops speedily, and it is not certain that they can be landed, as it is getting stormy. Sure and speedy way is through the bay. Am now in position to do my part.
On the 5th the two commanders received orders to confer and arrange a joint attack. Shafter was unable to ride to Siboney, and Sampson promised to come to his headquarters; but next morning (July 6th) the admiral was ill, and Captain Chadwick went ashore to represent him. At the conference it was agreed that another demand should be made for Toral's surrender. If this should be refused, at noon on the 9th the navy was to bombard Santiago with its great guns, lying off Fort Aguadores. Should the Spaniards still fail to come to terms, the Socapa was to be stormed, and some of Sampson's smaller ships were to attempt a dash into the harbour.

The demand for surrender—which Captain Chadwick states that he wrote, though Shafter signed it—was similar in tenor to Shafter's previous notes to Toral, adding the warning that unless terms were arranged by noon of the 9th the navy would open fire—the three days' respite giving time for communication with Havana and Madrid. The Spanish commander replied with a request that the English cable operators, who were among the refugees at Caney, should be sent into Santiago. This was done, with the result that on the 8th he sent an offer to evacuate the city and the eastern part of the province—the territory subsequently surrendered—on condition that he should be allowed to withdraw unmolested to Holguin, with his arms, ammunition, and baggage.

Shafter telegraphed this unexpected offer to Washington, and after a conference with his division commanders he sent a second despatch strongly advocating its acceptance. It would, he pointed out, at once open the harbour, and relieve him from dependence upon his base at Siboney, which the possibility of stormy weather made more or less precarious; it would end the terrible sufferings of the refugees who had fled from the city; it would save
the property, mostly owned by Cubans, which a bombardment would destroy; and it would leave his corps ready for service elsewhere, while yet in good health—which might not be the case much longer, for yellow fever had appeared at Siboney. All that would be lost, he said, would be some prisoners, who were not wanted, and the arms they carried. But the reply from Washington, despatched late in the evening of the 9th, was:

Your message recommending that Spanish troops be permitted to evacuate and proceed without molestation to Holguin is a great surprise, and is not approved. The responsibility of destruction and distress to the inhabitants rests entirely with the Spanish commander. The Secretary of War orders that when you are strong enough to destroy the enemy and take Santiago, you do it.

Toral was at once informed that his proposal was declined, and that unless he surrendered the truce would end at four o'clock in the afternoon of July 10th. He repeated his refusal, and at the hour named the Spaniards opened fire. They were promptly answered from the American lines, and late in the day—Shafter's message requesting Sampson's co-operation having been delayed—the Brooklyn and the Indiana threw eight-inch shell into the city for an hour. Hostilities ceased at nightfall, but were renewed early on the 11th, the New York, the Brooklyn, and the Indiana again joining in the bombardment, which was stopped, in the afternoon, by a flag of truce from Shafter.

The principal result of the firing was the disabling of most of Toral's artillery. In men, the Spaniards lost seven killed and sixty-five wounded, the Americans two killed and thirteen wounded. The shells from the fleet destroyed or damaged fifty-nine houses, but the city was almost entirely deserted, and Lieutenant Müller states that there was no loss of life. Many of the projectiles did not explode; those that did so caused no serious fires, as Santiago is a stone-built town.
The message from Shafter to Toral, which ended the fighting, gave a new turn to the negotiations. It was the result of a telegram from Washington:

Should the Spaniards surrender unconditionally and wish to return to Spain, they will be sent back direct at the expense of the United States Government.

Informed of this offer, Toral replied that he "confirmed his former communication," but added: "I have communicated your proposition to the general-in-chief [Blanco]" — an unmistakable sign of yielding.

Meanwhile, the reinforcements for which Shafter had asked had begun to arrive in force. On the 9th the First Illinois—a Chicago volunteer regiment—and six batteries of light artillery, under Brigadier-General Randolph, had reached Daiquiri; on the 10th the First District of Columbia and the Eighth Ohio had landed at Siboney. The District of Columbia men and two battalions of the Illinois regiment were at once moved forward, and placed between Wheeler and Lawton; the artillery was disembarked, but the roads were now in such impassable condition that only two batteries had reached the front on the 14th, when the final negotiations for the surrender began. On the 11th General Miles arrived off the harbour on board the Yale, which, with the Columbia, had brought the Sixth Massachusetts and part of the Sixth Illinois, under Brigadier-General Henry, from Charleston.

General Miles had planned to land troops west of the harbour, and before going ashore he ordered Henry to be ready to disembark at Cabanas. He rode to headquarters on the morning of the 12th. Shafter at once informed Toral that the commanding general of the American army was present, and suggested a personal interview. At noon on the 13th the three generals met, and a conversation followed of which Shafter reported: "I think it made
a strong impression on him [Toral].” But pending instructions from Havana nothing was finally settled, and another interview was arranged for noon of the 14th.

Uncertain of the success of these long-drawn-out negotiations, Shafter had again appealed to Washington that Sampson should be ordered to force the harbour. On the 13th Secretary Alger, who apparently took Shafter’s view of the matter, wrote to the Navy Department formally requesting that the necessary instructions should be issued at once. Secretary Long, who evidently agreed with Sampson, formally acknowledged the receipt of the letter, but, instead of issuing the requested order, telegraphed to the admiral:

The commanding general of the army urges, and Secretary of War urgently requests, that navy force harbour. Confer with commander of army. Wishing to do all that is reasonably possible to insure the surrender of the enemy, I leave the matter to your discretion, except that the United States armoured vessels must not be risked.

Adjutant-General Corbin sent Shafter a private telegram, confidentially informing him:

The Secretary of War suggests that if the navy will not undertake to break through, take a transport, cover the pilot house and most exposed points with baled hay . . . and call for volunteers, from the army—not a large number—to run into the harbour, thus making a way for the navy.

But the remarkable idea of running ships piled up with inflammable hay past batteries of rapid-fire guns was never tested. Three hours before noon on the 14th Toral informed Shafter that he had heard from the captain-general. Blanco said that he had referred the question to Madrid; and that meanwhile, if the American commander would continue the truce, terms of capitulation might be agreed upon provisionally. Here was a distinct step in the slow progress toward a surrender.
That the Spaniards were perfectly aware of the hopelessness of their situation was shown by a despatch which General Linares sent to Blanco on the 12th, in answer to an official suggestion that he might break through the American lines by attacking in conjunction with the troops at Holguin:

Although confined to my bed by great weakness and much pain, the situation of the long-suffering troops here occupies my mind to such an extent that I deem it my duty to address your Excellency and the Minister of War that the state of affairs may be explained.

Enemy's positions very close to precinct of city, favoured by nature of ground; ours spread out over fourteen kilometres; large number sick; not sent to hospitals because necessary to retain them in trenches. Horses and mules without food and shelter; rain has been pouring into the trenches incessantly for twenty hours. Soldiers without permanent shelter; rice the only food; can not change or wash clothes. Many casualties; chiefs and officers killed; forces without proper command in critical moments. Under these circumstances impossible to open passage, because one third of the men of our contingent would be unable to go out; enemy would reduce forces still further; result would be great disaster without accomplishing the salvation of eleven much-thinned battalions, as desired by your Excellency. In order to go out under protection of Holguin division it would be necessary for the latter to break through the enemy's line, and then with combined forces to break through another part of the same line. This would mean an eight-days' journey for Holguin division, bringing with them a quantity of rations which they are unable to transport. The situation is hopeless; surrender inevitable; we are only prolonging the agony.

Santiago de Cuba is not Gerona, a walled city, on the soil of the mother country, defended inch by inch by her own sons, by old men, women, and children, who encouraged and assisted the combatants, and risked their lives, impelled by the sacred idea of independence and with the hope of succour which they received. Here is solitude, the complete exodus of the population, insular as well as peninsular, including the public officials, with few exceptions. Only the clergy remain, and they intend to leave to-day, headed by their archbishop.

The defenders are not just beginning a campaign, full of enthusiasm and energy; for three years they have been fighting against the climate, privations, and fatigue; and
now that the most critical time has arrived their courage
and bodily strength are exhausted. . . . There is a limit
to the honour of arms, and I appeal to the judgment of the
Government and the whole nation.

At noon on the 14th, when Miles, Shafter, and
Toral met again, the latter was told that he must
surrender immediately and with no conditions be­
yond the return of his troops to Spain. After some
discussion, carried on through interpreters, the two
American officers understood that he consented to
do so, and commissioners were appointed to draw
up terms—Generals Wheeler and Lawton and
Lieutenant Miley, for the United States; for Spain,
General Escario,* Lieutenant-Colonel Fontan, and
Robert Mason, the British vice-consul.

Both Miles and Shafter telegraphed to Washing­
ton that Santiago had surrendered, and the welcome
news went all over the country; but when the com­
missioners met, at half past two o'clock (July 14th),
it was found that there had been a misunder­
standing, and that Toral's representatives had power to
act only subject to approval from Madrid. This
was a serious disappointment, but negotiations pro­
ceeded, several questions of detail being raised, and
the Spaniards making a hard fight for permission
to retain their arms, so that they could go back to
their native land with some at least of the honours
of war. The three American officers could not
grant such a concession, but they agreed to make
a strong recommendation to the Government at
Washington that the surrendered weapons should
be returned to the prisoners.

The commissioners sat until after midnight, and
then adjourned to meet early on the 15th. In the
morning Shafter sent a telegram correcting his pre­
mature announcement of a surrender, and reporting

* Colonel Escario was promoted to the rank of brigadier-general by
cable from Madrid, in recognition of the skill and gallantry of his march
from Manzanillo to Santiago.
The negotiations in progress. "It can not be possible," he added, "that there will be a failure in completing arrangements"—a sentence which inevitably created an impression that a failure was by no means impossible. Secretary Alger replied with a despatch suggesting that Toral might be playing for time, in hope that reinforcements would reach him; and a similar misgiving had naturally arisen at the front. With this disturbing doubt in the background, the presence of Mr. Mason as a member of the joint commission proved valuable to the Americans as an assurance that the Spaniards, as finally became evident, were acting in entire good faith throughout the negotiations.

Few of Shafter's officers and men expected that Toral would surrender until Santiago was stormed. The whole army was prepared to attack at the word. The artillery, reinforced by Randolph's batteries, and pushed boldly forward—one battery, Captain Reilly's, was posted in front of the firing line—was eager for a chance to redeem its comparative failure in the battles of the 1st of July. At the point where the American lines were nearest to the enemy, on the extreme right, two of Lawton's brigades, Ludlow's and McKibbin's—Brigadier-General McKibbin, who came to Cuba as lieutenant-colonel of the Twenty-first Infantry, had succeeded Colonel Evan Miles—were ready to charge the Spanish trenches.

The attack would probably have been a bloody one. In front of the trenches was a double line of barbed-wire fences, which would have held the assailants under a murderous fire. Farther back there were pitfalls and barricaded streets. "Upon entering the city," Shafter said in the despatch he sent to Washington at the moment of the hoisting of the flag, "I discovered a perfect entanglement of defences. Fighting as the Spaniards did the first day, it would have cost five thousand lives to have taken it."
At three o'clock on the 15th the terms of capitulation were signed. They provided for the surrender of the whole eastern district of the province of Santiago, with all the troops and war material it contained; the garrison of the city of Santiago to march out and deposit their arms, the officers retaining their side arms, and both officers and men keeping their personal property; all the Spanish troops to be transported to Spain with as little delay as possible, any volunteers or guerrillas who wished to remain in Cuba being allowed to do so on parole. This agreement was only provisional, but all suspense was ended next morning (July 16th) when a note came from Toral announcing that the Spanish Government had authorized him to capitulate.

There now remained only the signing of the final convention—identical in terms with the preliminary agreement—which took place at six P.M. that same day, and the formal ceremony of the surrender. Shafter and Toral met at half past nine in the morning of the 17th, under a tall ceiba tree between the lines—which had been the meeting place of the commissioners—and when Toral had saluted and said: “I yield the city and the military division of the province of Santiago de Cuba to the authority of the United States of America,” the two generals, with their escorts, rode into Santiago, and at the stroke of noon the American flag went up over the Government palace in the centre of the ancient Spanish city—Spanish no longer.

The Santiago campaign was over, and Shafter, after being brought to the very brink of disaster by adverse circumstances and by his own mistakes, had won a sweeping and complete success. As he afterwards said himself,* there had been very little strategy in his movements. He certainly had not

* In his speech at a dinner of the Sons of the Revolution, in New York, November 25, 1898.
proved himself a Napoleon or a Cæsar, but he had earned the right to say *veni, vidi, vici*. Bluff and untactful in personal intercourse, he was not a man to be widely popular among his subordinates. His attitude to the press representatives—gentry seldom beloved of commanding generals—involved him in some undignified controversies, and brought upon him, in retaliation, much unjust censure. But a hundred newspaper criticisms are more than offset by one such expression as those that have come from some of the men who were with him at Santiago.

General Wheeler, who has an ill word for no one, calls him “a man of more than ordinary intellect and force of character.” General Breckinridge, not regarded as an especially friendly critic, bears testimony in his official report to “the remarkable energy, decision, and self-reliance which characterized General Shafter’s course during this distinguished military adventure throughout its arduous course to its most honourable conclusion.” More valuable still is the judgment of that fine soldier General Chaffee, given in his reply to a speaker who had complimented him at Shafter’s expense:

*He worked night and day at his duties, and though his physical disabilities made his strength unequal to mine, and prevented him from doing some of the things I was able to do, yet I say there is no more honest, faithful, and conscientious man who ever went out to command troops. Let no one decry him in my presence. No man ever possessed more iron courage. General Shafter is a man. He has my unbounded respect. These are strong words of praise, and they are entirely true.*

When the Fifth Corps was preparing to embark at Tampa, newspaper prophets were spreading abroad detailed forecasts of the marvellous ways in

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*At a dinner of the Commercial Club of Kansas City, Mo., December 19, 1898.*
which American engineering skill was to be applied to military uses. Shafter, we were told, was to invade Cuba with “fortification machines” that would throw up breastworks at railroad speed; with “road builders” that would construct macadam highways as if by magic; with powerful searchlights to reveal the enemy’s movements at night; and with other novel paraphernalia destined to make victory swift and easy. As a matter of fact, if we except the work done by the signal service in establishing telegraph and telephone communication, the Santiago campaign was fought out on the most primitive lines, with scarcely an attempt at “scientific warfare.” Shafter’s small engineer corps accomplished practically nothing;* his weak force of artillery did little for him; of cavalry he had almost none. His battles were fought by infantry, and were won by the sheer pluck and dash of his men, in spite of the fact that to a certain extent they had the disadvantage of inferior equipment.†

Much has been said, in the newspapers and elsewhere, upon the question whether Santiago was surrendered to General Miles or to General Shafter. Unlike another question that has been raised by sundry war critics ignorant of warfare, who have debated whether Admiral Sampson or Commodore Schley was in command of the fleet that destroyed Cervera,‡ this is not entirely an idle query. It ap-

* The engineers built a pier for the Cubans at Aserraderos, and later one at Siboney, which was not finished until just before the end of the campaign. They also did a little scouting and some road repairing, but did not succeed in making even a tolerable trail from Siboney to the front. They complained—no doubt truly—that they were seriously handicapped by lack of proper equipment, and especially of transportation.

† There is little to choose between the Mauser rifle and the Krag-Jórgensen, but there is no question of the terrible disadvantage under which the American volunteers and artillery laboured by reason of their lack of smokeless powder.

‡ The answer to this question is so self-evident to any one who has the slightest understanding of naval affairs that no space has been
pears that on July 8th, the day after Miles left Washington, Adjutant-General Corbin telegraphed to Shafter:

Secretary of War directs me to inform you that General Miles left here at 10:40 last night for Santiago, but with instructions not to in any manner supersede you as commander of the forces in the field near Santiago so long as you are able for duty.

This not unnaturally led to a certain amount of misunderstanding. On the day of the surrender, in reply to an order directing him to move his troops to fresh camps, Shafter telegraphed to Miles:

Letters and orders in reference to movement of camp received and will be carried out. None is more anxious than myself to get away from here. It seems from your orders given me that you regard my force as a part of your command. Nothing will give me greater pleasure than serving under you, general, and I shall comply with all your requests and directions, but I was told by the secretary that you were not to supersede me in command here.

To this communication, an entirely creditable and soldierly one, Miles, who had gone to Guantanamo Bay with the transports carrying Henry's troops, replied (July 18th):

wasted on it in the present narrative. It may be said here that the attempts which have been made in the press, and even in Congress, to deprive Admiral Sampson of the honour justly earned by his splendid services to his country are disgraceful to their authors. They must rest either upon a total misunderstanding of the facts, or upon some most unworthy motive of jealousy.

As a sample of the methods employed, Sampson's signal, on the morning of July 3d, to "disregard the movements of commander-in-chief," has been distorted into "disregard the orders of commander-in-chief," and paraded as a proof that he had nothing to do with the battle of that day.

The fact that venomous attacks upon Sampson have been coupled with extravagant praise of Schley must be most embarrassing to the latter officer, who very properly said, in an official despatch written a week after the battle with Cervera: "Victory was secured by the forces under the command of the commander-in-chief, North Atlantic station, and to him the honour is due."

As has been said by Captain Mahan, the foremost American authority on naval strategy, "the first credit of the battle, as of the campaign, belongs to the man whose dispositions prevailed in both—to Admiral Sampson."
Have no desire and have carefully avoided any appearance of superseding you. Your command is a part of the United States army, which I have the honour to command, having been duly assigned thereto, and directed by the President to go wherever I thought my presence required and give such general directions as I thought best concerning military matters, and especially directed to go to Santiago for a specific purpose. You will also notice that the orders of the Secretary of War of July 13th left the matter to my discretion. I should regret that any event would cause either yourself or any part of your command to cease to be a part of mine.

This was unanswerable, and exactly defined the position General Miles occupied during his brief stay before Santiago. When he landed at Siboney, in the afternoon of July 11, he had found the place in a very unsatisfactory condition. General Duffield, in command, was ill, and apparently no one had taken his place; an alarming outbreak of yellow fever had begun—probably caused, and certainly hastened, by the use of infected buildings which should have been destroyed; the medical and transportation services were frightfully inadequate. The landing stage was still unfinished, and General Miles went on shore through the surf. He began to issue orders at once, signing them “Nelson A. Miles, major-general commanding”;* but he countermanded no plan of Shafter’s, and his part in the conclusion of the campaign was limited to his share in the conferences with Toral—which, on Shafter’s own statement, Miles allowed to continue when his own judgment was in favour of breaking them off—and

* One of his first orders was for the burning of the buildings believed to be infected with yellow fever, including the army post-office, a house used by the newspaper correspondents, and others occupied by the Thirty-third Michigan. General Shafter had that morning issued instructions to the same effect, but apparently nothing had been done toward carrying them out.

Warnings against the use of buildings likely to be infected had been issued before the Fifth Corps landed, and General Miles regarded the neglect of proper precautions at Siboney as a distinct violation of orders.
his preparations, afterward abandoned, to land troops at Cabanas.

It was hardly a secret at the time, and has since become notorious, that an unfortunate ill feeling had arisen between General Miles and the army staff at Washington; but Secretary Alger's despatches distinctly recognize him as in command, notably the one mentioned in Miles's note of the 18th to Shafter, already quoted. This is dated July 13th, and addressed to "Major-General Miles, Camp near Santiago":

You may accept surrender by granting parole to officers and men, the officers retaining their side arms. The officers and men after parole to be permitted to return to Spain, the United States assisting. If not accepted, then assault, unless in your judgment an assault would fail. Consult with Sampson, and pursue such course as to the assault as you jointly agree upon. Matter should now be settled promptly.

After such an order, clothing him with complete authority, and therefore with full responsibility, it was certainly both tactful and generous on Miles's part to leave the formal reception of Toral's surrender to Shafter, whom he would necessarily have outranked had he been present. At the same time, it was a very proper recognition of the fact that to the commander of the Fifth Corps belonged the honours of a victorious campaign, and especially the credit of having secured a capitulation without further fighting, thus capturing Santiago at a cost which, after all, was small in proportion to the great results gained.

General Miles's report indicates his belief that his preparations to land a brigade at Cabanas helped to bring Toral to terms:

The Spanish commander was well aware of our designs, as the position and movements of the fleet had been in full view of the officers commanding his troops, and they had reported to him having seen fifty-seven vessels, some of them loaded with troops, menacing that part of his position.
For the navy, too, a share in the work is claimed—apart from its victory over Cervera, which was the great decisive event of the campaign and of the war. A board appointed by Sampson to inspect the captured city reported, after a detailed account of the damage done by the war-ships' fire:

We believe that the bombardment by the ships had much to do with the early surrender of the city.

This is indorsed by the admiral. "The effect of our shell," he says, "was undoubtedly one of the principal causes of the surrender at this time."

And in distributing the credit where it is due mention should be made of the effective stroke of military diplomacy that came from Washington. There is no doubt that the offer to return Toral's forces to Spain did much toward making the surrender possible.

It was somewhat anomalous that in the ceremonies marking the successful ending of a joint land and sea campaign the American navy was not represented. On July 13th, when Shafter informed Sampson that a surrender was expected, the admiral expressed his desire to share in the negotiations, which involved questions of importance to both branches of the service. The general acquiesced, and promised that if possible he would give due notice of the final arrangement of terms, in order that Sampson might send a representative. Next morning (July 14th) Shafter again telephoned to Siboney that there was "every prospect of capitulation," and Miles invited the admiral to send an officer ashore; but before this could be done there came a message telling him that Santiago had already surrendered.

On the 15th Sampson was informed of the hitch in the negotiations. On the 16th Shafter telephoned:
Enemy has surrendered. Will you send some one to represent navy in the matter?

Captain Chadwick, as Sampson’s chief of staff, landed and went to the front as quickly as he could. The convention had already been signed; it contained no reference to the navy, nor to the Spanish ships at Santiago. The captain told Shafter that these latter—the gunboat Alvarado and five merchant steamers, one of which, the Mejico, was armed—would be regarded by the navy as its prizes. Shafter said that he would refer the matter to the Secretary of War.

“This,” Sampson says, “could have no bearing upon what I considered my duty in the matter, particularly in view of our late experience of Spanish perfidy in regard to injury of ships, which in my opinion made it necessary to look after their safety at once.” But when he sent in prize crews, they found army officers in charge of the vessels, and General McKibbin, who had been designated as military governor of Santiago, declined to give them up until Sampson had sent Shafter an emphatic protest. In a joint campaign, the admiral pointed out, usage gives captured cities or forts to the army, floating property to the navy; he had left the harbour batteries to be occupied by the troops, and he expected, in return, similar consideration with regard to the ships. “My prize crews must remain in charge,” he concluded, “and I have so directed.” His action was approved at Washington, but the merchant vessels were afterward released, it being decided that shipping captured jointly by the army and the navy is not liable to seizure as prizes. The Alvarado, commanded by Lieutenant Blue, formerly of the Suwanee, was added to Sampson’s fleet.

On the day before the surrender (July 16th) Shafter personally invited Garcia and his staff to witness the ceremony. The Cuban chief asked if it was intended to continue the Spanish civil
officials in power, and on being answered in the affirmative he dramatically declared that he could not go where Spain ruled. No Cuban troops were allowed to enter the city—a very proper precaution against disorder, but one that was bitterly resented by the excluded patriots. Garcia was so deeply offended that he marched his men northward into the interior, and sent Shafter a letter * reproaching the American commander for his ingratitude. On July 30th he appeared at Gibara, on the north coast, which had been evacuated by the Spaniards a few days before; and meeting Commander Maynard, of the Nashville, he announced his intention of moving upon Holguin, where the garrison, commanded by General Luque, was in great straits for food, but apparently no serious fighting followed.

Early in the morning of the 17th the Spanish troops began to deposit their rifles at the arsenal in Santiago, where they were received and inventoried by Lieutenant Brooke, Shafter’s ordnance officer, the disarmed men being marched out to a camp near San Juan. Of the Spanish Mauser, the weapon of the regular troops, the number surrendered was 7,902 rifles and 833 carbines, besides about 7,000 guns of other makes, chiefly the Remington, which was used by the volunteers. There were only 1,500,000 rounds of Mauser ammunition—less than 200 cartridges for each gun. The store of food was larger than might have been expected, amounting—on the authority of General Wood—to 1,200,000 rations, but including little except rice.

Of the men, it seems that no precise count was taken—a rather curious omission.† In his official

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* Or at least Shafter received a letter purporting to come from Garcia. Its authenticity does not seem to be certain.
† No report was made to Washington of the number of men forming the garrison of Santiago. The only figures received by the War
report Shafter estimates their number as about 12,000. In his Century Magazine article he gives it as 11,500, which is still probably an overstatement. Lieutenant Miley, who was in a position to have exact information, puts it at 10,500,* and other estimates are lower. Of these more than 2,000 were sick and wounded men in the four hospitals.†

Toral's division included nine garrisons outside of Santiago, numbering 13,000 men, and stationed at Guantanamo, Baracoa, Sagua de Tanamo, El Cristo, El Songo, Dos Caminos, Moron, San Luis, and Palma Soriano. The surrender of such considerable forces without a shot fired against them came as a surprise when the Spanish general offered it; yet it is easily accounted for. General Pareja's men at Guantanamo, as was already known, were on the brink of starvation; † and the other detachments were little better off. Toral told Miles that all of them were hard pressed by insurgents. With Santiago taken and the coast blockaded their position became hopeless, and if not surrendered to Shafter they would be left to the tender mercies of the Cubans.

Shafter commissioned Lieutenant Miley, of his staff, to receive the surrender of the inland garrisons. With two mounted troops of the Second Cavalry, under Captain Lewis, and accompanied by Captain Ramus, an aid of Toral's, the lieutenant started on July 19th, making his way over the mountains,

Department were those of the whole number of soldiers transported to Spain, 22,137, of whom 14,995, representing the garrisons of the city and of six inland stations, sailed from Santiago.

* In Cuba with Shafter, p. 214.
† "At the hospitals," says Lieutenant Müller, "only the seriously wounded and sick were admitted; those who could stand on their feet were refused and sent back to the trenches. If this had not been the case, there would not have been beds enough in which to put them nor physicians to attend them."
‡ The condition of the Spanish troops at Guantanamo may be judged from the fact that from April to September 12th nine hundred and eighteen men—nearly one-seventh of Pareja's force—died in hospital.
through a country from which almost all traces of civilization had disappeared, to El Cristo. The small Spanish detachments here and at Moron and Dos Caminos * surrendered readily, but the comandante of the larger force at San Luis refused to accept the statements of Miley and Ramus until he had sent a messenger of his own to Santiago. At Palma Soriano, on the 22d, eight hundred men capitulated without resistance, though Miley had been warned at San Luis that he would probably be fired upon. The prisoners from all these places, and from El Songo, which yielded without a visit, were marched down to Santiago as rapidly as possible, and the First Infantry, a regiment which had scarcely suffered in the fighting, was sent up to garrison the towns.

The Spanish troops at Guantanamo surrendered to Colonel (now Brigadier-General) Ewers; but it was not until August 13th—the last day of the war—that Lieutenant Miley, with another Spanish staff officer, Major Irles, set out for Baracoa and Sagua de Tanamo, on the northern coast. At neither place was there any attempt at resistance, though no news of the fall of Santiago had reached these isolated towns. Shafter's transports had passed within sight of Baracoa, and the comandante had told his men

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* This is a station on the railroad from Santiago to San Luis, and must not be confounded with the village of the same name just outside of Santiago, on the road to Cobre, mentioned on page 298. "Dos Caminos," meaning Two Roads, or Crossroads, is a common Spanish name.

Lieutenant Miley (In Cuba with Shafter, p. 193) thus describes the condition of these outlying Spanish posts:

"Surrounding each of the towns there was a little cultivated zone with a radius of half a mile or a mile, depending on the size of the place, planted mainly to corn and sweet potatoes. The mango trees were to be found everywhere loaded with fruit. The natives in the towns consisted of old men, women, and children, while the able-bodied men were all soldiers in the insurgent army. I found all these towns surrounded by bands of insurgents, and the Spanish garrisons could not lay down their arms in safety unless I had American troops to leave as guard. For that reason the garrisons at El Cristo, Moron, and Dos Caminos were not disarmed until I came back on my return to Santiago."
that they were Spanish ships, loaded with troops on their way to conquer the Americans. At Sagua, which Miley reached on the 15th, a bulletin was posted announcing a great victory won by Montojo at Manila.

At Santiago, on July 16th, the refugees from Caney, a miserable procession of sick and starving people, who had endured horrors worse than a bombardment, began to return to their homes. On the two following days the electric mines in the harbour mouth were exploded, and the contact torpedoes taken up, two that could not be moved being marked with buoys; and on the afternoon of the 18th the transports, headed by the Red Cross ship State of Texas, were able to come into the bay.

This ended all fear of a shortage of supplies; but the victorious army was in a sorry and shocking condition of sickness and debility. More than half the soldiers were either down with malarial fever, or slowly recovering from it; dysentery was prevalent, typhoid had appeared, and there were cases of yellow fever in every regiment. Attempts were made to fight this last, the most dreaded of diseases, by moving to fresh camping grounds, but it was soon found that the soldiers had not strength enough to move their tents and impedimenta. Any exertion in the hot sun only increased the sickness. The hospital service was still utterly inadequate; there was a lack of needed medicines, and a total absence of suitable food.

The wounded and part of the sick were sent back to the United States on returning transports. On some ships—notably the Seneca and the Concho, which reached Fort Monroe on the 18th and 28th of July respectively, and, hoisting the yellow flag, were ordered on to New York—there was great suffering through their utter lack of proper accommodation and attendance. The Seneca had four
deaths during the voyage, the Concho six; and the arrival of these vessels with their wretched cargo—in such pitiable contrast to the strong and eager host that sailed from Tampa a few weeks before—was the first revelation to the people of the United States of the sinister results that a defective army organization had inevitably caused.* But still, both in Washington and in the country generally, there was no realization of the desperate plight of the soldiers in Cuba.

On July 14th Secretary Alger had telegraphed to General Miles:

As soon as Santiago falls, the troops must all be put in camp as comfortable as they can be made, and remain, I suppose, until the fever has had its run.

Miles gave similar directions to Shafter several times, and on the 21st he cabled to Washington from Guantanamo, where he was preparing to sail for Porto Rico:

There is not a single regiment of regulars or volunteers with General Shafter's command that is not infected with yellow fever, from one case in the Eighth Ohio to thirty-six in the Thirty-third Michigan.

* "Algerism" is a word that was coined by certain newspapers to denote the cause of all the army's sufferings. The term was an unfair attack upon the Secretary of War, and betrayed either political spite or ignorance of the true facts of the case.

Secretary Alger did not accomplish such wonders as those that Stanton achieved when he brought order and efficiency out of the chaos of President Lincoln's war office. The task of equipping an army to fight Spain was well nigh an impossible one, and the badly organized system of which General Alger was the official head was incompetent to grapple with it. Much creditable work was done, but it was inevitable that there should be failure at many points, and that loss and suffering should result. But in attempting to fasten blame upon the personnel of the department it is impossible to find more than the unavoidable percentage of human error. Though he did not prove to be the rare and brilliant organizer who alone could have cut the obstructive red tape and met the overwhelming needs of the service, the secretary himself laboured with the most devoted energy.

The main cause of the army's troubles is to be found in the illiberal and unintelligent policy that has been traditional with Congress in its control of the military establishment. The responsibility rests upon the national legislature, and indirectly upon the nation that it represents.
After consulting with best medical authorities, it is my opinion that the best mode of ridding the troops of the fever will be as I have directed—namely, the troops to go up as high into the mountains as possible, selecting fresh camps every day. If this does not check the spread of the disease, the only way of saving a large portion of the command will be to put them on transports and ship them to the New England coast, to some point to be designated by the surgeon-general.

The plan of changing camps, as has been said, proved worse than useless, yet on August 3d Shafter was again instructed to move his command along the San Luis railroad to the high ground north of Santiago. It was quite impossible to carry out such an order. Shafter assembled his general officers, read the instructions he had received, and asked their opinion. One of them * was for seizing every ship in the harbour and starting northward at once, orders or no orders; all agreed that to leave Cuba was an imperative necessity. At the suggestion of General Bates, they drew up a "round robin" letter to the corps commander, stating that the army was utterly disabled by malarial fever; that it was in a condition to be destroyed by an epidemic, already threatened, of yellow fever; that it must be moved at once or perish as an army; and that those responsible for preventing such a move would be responsible for the unnecessary loss of thousands of lives.

This strong letter was signed by all the officers present—Major-Generals Wheeler, Kent, Lawton, Bates, and Chaffee, Brigadier-Generals Sumner, Ludlow, McKibbin, Ames, and Wood, and Colonel Roosevelt. † There was, as Shafter says, no secrecy

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* General Shafter records this incident without mentioning names, but the outspoken officer was probably General Ames, who expressed a similar opinion to a correspondent, and who sent a private telegram to Mr. Allen, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy: "This army is incapable, because of sickness, of marching anywhere except to the transports. If it is ever to return to the United States, it must do so at once."

† Brigadier-Generals Kent, Lawton, Bates, and Chaffee had just received their major-generalships. General Ames—a distinguished gen-
about it, and the newspaper correspondents cabled its contents to the United States, where it came as a revelation. This was no utterance of a sensational reporter; it was the voice of an army that had been sent out to fight the nation's battles, and that now found itself left to perish on the soil it had won.

At Washington—Shafter telegraphed it to the War Department with an expression of his own opinion, saying that if the troops were not to be moved till the fever had passed there would be very few to move—its effect was immediate. Next day (August 4th) the general was ordered to transport his men as rapidly as possible to Montauk Point, where General S. B. M. Young, himself a fever convalescent, was commissioned to prepare a camp for them.

The embarkation began on August 7th, and was continued as rapidly as transports could be secured. On the 25th General Shafter sailed with almost the last men of his corps, leaving General Lawton in command of the province, with General Wood in charge of the city. Some of the "immune" regiments were sent from the United States to do garrison duty, it being expected—too sanguinely, as it proved—that they would not suffer from the climatic fevers that had been so disastrous to the Fifth Corps.

The shipment of Toral's troops† began on August 9th, and on September 17th all the prisoners had left Santiago except a small number who

eral of the civil war, hailing from Massachusetts, though formerly governor of Mississippi—was in command of Kent's third brigade, formerly Colonel Wikoff's. Wood, promoted brigadier-general, had on July 20th succeeded McKibbin as military governor of Santiago. Being a physician by profession, he was peculiarly fitted for a post whose most immediate and important problem was that of sanitation. Colonel Roosevelt, who had also gained a step in rank, was present as commander of the second cavalry brigade.

* Just before he sailed, Toral is said to have sent Shafter a letter commenting bitterly on the fact that the surrendered arms had not been returned, as recommended—or promised, as the Spaniards seem to have understood—by the American commissioners who negotiated the capitulation.
elected to remain in Cuba, and a few yellow-fever patients at Baracoa and Guantanamo. The work was done by the Compania Transatlantica Española, which made the lowest tender when bids were invited by the quartermaster-general's department. It seemed, at first sight, anomalous that the United States Government should employ a Spanish company, some of whose ships were actually serving as auxiliaries in the enemy's navy; and representatives of other ocean lines—willing to accept the contract at a much higher price—were greatly concerned at so extraordinary an arrangement. Undoubtedly, however, the War Department's action was businesslike and judicious. It was very satisfactory that the Spanish soldiers should be intrusted to their own people, so that no charge of ill treatment could be laid at any American door. For these hapless men were suffering terribly during the unhealthy months of August and September. Several hundred died before they could be taken on board the ships, and several hundred more during the voyage. On one vessel, the Pedro de Satrustegui, there were seventy-six deaths.

The total number of people carried to Spain was 22,864. This included 22,137 soldiers — 1,163 officers and 20,974 men; the rest were officers' wives and children, priests, and sisters of mercy. Of the soldiers, 5,820 sailed from Guantanamo, 1,322 from Baracoa and Sagua de Tanamo, and the remainder from Santiago. The cost to the United States Government was a little more than half a million dollars.

At Camp Wikoff—as the Montauk encampment was named, in honour of the ranking American officer killed in the war—there was at first much confusion, and some actual suffering, owing to the difficulty of preparing for so large a body of men at such short notice; but the outburst of newspaper criticism that ensued was quite unwarranted. After
the first weeks the comfort of the soldiers was well provided for, and private beneficence fairly showered them with attentions, which in many cases took the form of delicacies actually injurious to men recovering from fever. There were 257 deaths in the camp during August and September, but quite or nearly all of them were due to disease contracted before arriving there. The total number of men it received was 21,870, of whom 17,577 were from Santiago, the remainder from Tampa and elsewhere.

The sanitary condition of some of the other camps, at this time, had become very unsatisfactory. The army’s death rate in May and June —0.46 and 0.70 per thousand respectively—was not above normal. In July it rose to 2.15—“somewhat higher than that of most well-cared-for cities,” Surgeon-General Sternberg said in his report for the year; but his comparison is palpably a most unfair one. An army consists only of picked men in the prime of life, and its mortality, apart from loss in battle, should be but a fraction of that of a community including all ages and conditions. In August the rate was 4.08 per thousand, which even Sternberg characterizes as “excessive.” In September, when the most unhealthy camps had been abandoned, it fell to 2.45. The total number of deaths for the four months was 2,910. Secretary Alger may be correct in his assertion that this was “the smallest death rate recorded of any army of history,” but it does not follow, in view of the recent advance of sanitary science, and of the fact that not a quarter of the troops saw any active service, that the mortality was as low as it should have been.

More discreditable than the actual number of deaths was the fact that there were about fifteen thousand cases of typhoid fever, that scourge of ill-kept camps. Of these Camp Thomas is charged with 3,426; the camp of the Seventh Corps, at
Jacksonville, which proved particularly unhealthy, had about 4,600.* Some of the smaller encampments made a still worse showing, notably those of the Fifteenth Minnesota Volunteers, at St. Paul and Fort Snelling, where, in August, out of 1,323 soldiers, 260 contracted the disease.

There were many causes that contributed to bring about this unsatisfactory state of affairs. One was that mainspring of the American army’s troubles—the inadequacy of the staff departments to the huge task suddenly thrust upon them. Some of the camp sites were badly chosen; none was properly prepared for the occupancy of large bodies of troops. There was very little official inspection, half of the inspector-general’s small corps of assistants having taken line commissions in the volunteer army; the supplies of tentage, transportation, medicines, disinfectants, and camp requisites of all sorts were sometimes far from complete; and the inexperience of volunteer officers frequently caused avoidable discomfort to the men under their charge. Many regimental camps were not properly laid out; many were very inadequately policed.

But most of the blame must rest upon the soldiers themselves. Of the regulars, perhaps, it was true, as a foreign officer observed, that “every man looked fit to command,” and, as the adjutant-general asserted, that the force put into the field was, for its size, “the finest army the world had ever known”; but it would be idle to deny that in a hasty levy of more than two hundred thousand volunteers, with the age limit as low as eighteen years, an undesirable element was present. Even a casual inspection of some of the camps—Camp Black, for instance, the chief rendezvous of the New York volunteers—was enough to show that “toughness” was too commonly mistaken for soldierliness. Surgeon-

* The surgeon-general’s figures are 4,760, including a few cases from Tampa.
General Sternberg points out, in his report, that drunkenness and immorality were prominent causes of the early increase of sickness. For further testimony on this unpleasant subject there may be cited the evidence given before the War Investigation Commission as to the shockingly unsanitary habits of the troops at Camp Thomas, and a report by Lieutenant Miner, of the navy, on the condition of some of the transports that carried volunteers from San Francisco to Manila.*

* On one vessel, the Valencia, "the army officers were advised to take the necessary steps to preserve cleanliness, which some of them attempted to do, but were unable to carry out. The bedding soon became unfit for use, and had to be thrown overboard. The troops were not clean in their persons, because no wise bathing regulations were adopted, and the regular 'scrub and wash clothes' was unknown. Lice and other vermin were rampant. The men spit on the deck, threw waste food on deck, and defecated there without regard to the expositions of the officers of the transport."
CHAPTER XV

THE PORTO RICO CAMPAIGN

The Spanish colony of Porto Rico had figured in the early war plans. General Miles had suggested an attack upon it in a letter dated May 27th, and on June 6th Secretary Alger telegraphed to him, at Tampa:

The President wants to know the earliest moment you can have an expeditionary force ready to go to Porto Rico large enough to take and hold island without the force under General Shafter.

Miles replied that he could be ready in ten days—an estimate that seems decidedly sanguine, in view of the experience of Shafter's corps, and of the lack of transports. On June 9th he was again informed that "expedition No. 2 must be organized as rapidly as possible"; but on the 15th his preparations were interrupted by an urgent summons to Washington. On the 26th a new plan was formulated: General Brooke was to organize a corps from Chickamauga and Camp Alger, for "operation against the enemy in Cuba and Porto Rico"; Shafter's troops, or any that he could spare, were to join it, and Miles was to be commander-in-chief. But instead of detaching part of his force, Shafter began to plead for reinforcements, and Miles went to Santiago, where his share in the last days of the campaign has already been narrated.

For some time after Sampson's resultless bombardment of San Juan on May 12th, Porto Rico
Blockade of San Juan.

scarcely appeared in the war news. On June 19th, to prevent the armed ships* at San Juan from attempting to molest the transports passing between the United States and Santiago, Admiral Sampson ordered the St. Paul and the Yosemite to blockade the port. Captain Sigsbee reached his station first, on the morning of the 22d, and he had been there only a few hours when he was attacked by the Isabel II and the Terror.

The Spanish vessels had been ordered to drive the St. Paul off, and the bluff above the harbour mouth was crowded with people who came out to see the fight. The Isabel opened an entirely ineffective fire at long range, keeping close under the shore batteries. The Terror—whose only weapons were her torpedoes and two small guns, her twelve-pound rapid-firers having been put aboard the Maria Teresa for the voyage across the Atlantic, and left there when she parted company with Cervera—moved eastward along shore, to get out of the Isabel's line of fire, and then steamed straight at the big liner. Such an attack showed more pluck than judgment. At night it might have succeeded; in the daylight the St. Paul's five-inch guns were not likely to let her come within striking distance. The two ships were three quarters of a mile apart † when a shell shattered the Terror's steering gear. She veered around, practically disabled, and another shot went clear through her, killing three men,

* At San Juan were the small Spanish cruiser Isabel II (1,130 tons, a sister ship to the Antonio de Uloa and the Juan de Austria, destroyed by Dewey in Manila Bay), the torpedo-boat destroyer Terror, and three gunboats. This was no doubt known to the Navy Department, which had an agent—Ensign H. H. Ward, of the Bureau of Navigation—in the city during June. Ensign Ward, who passed as an English traveller, was arrested on suspicion by the Spanish authorities, but was released on the demand of the British consul.

† According to the account of the engagement given by her captain, Lieutenant de la Rocha, to Commander Jacobsen, of the German cruiser Geier, and published by the latter in the Marine Rundschau.
damaging her engines, and making a dangerous hole in her side just below the water line. She was barely able to turn and get back into the harbour, where she was run aground to prevent her sinking, and was subsequently under repair for a month.

During the same afternoon (June 22d) the Isabel appeared again, accompanied by a gunboat, apparently attempting to draw the St. Paul under the shore batteries—a challenge which Captain Sigsbee wisely declined, his great ship, with her high freeboard, being a mark that even Spanish gunners might have found an easy one.

The Yosemite arrived on June 25th. On the 26th the St. Paul started for New York, to coal; and on his way north Captain Sigsbee called at Cape Haitien and cabled to Washington that in order to blockade San Juan effectively a “considerable force of vessels” was needed. No other ships could be spared, and the Yosemite, manned by men of the Michigan Naval Reserve, was left to maintain the blockade alone. On June 28th she had a sharp engagement. At dawn that day she caught the Spanish transport Antonio Lopez attempting to steal up to the harbour entrance from the west, and drove her ashore. The Isabel II and two gunboats—probably informed of the Lopez’s approach by a signal sent along the coast—came out to rescue the blockade runner, and the shore batteries also opened fire. The odds were heavily against the Yosemite, but the Spanish gunners could not hit her, and a long-range artillery duel was kept up for four hours, ending, as Commander Emory reported, in the repulse of the enemy’s vessels, without any injury to his ship.

The Yosemite was alone off San Juan for three weeks; in July the New Orleans was sent to the station, and later the Amphitrite, the Cincinnati, and some other men-of-war.
On July 21st, as he had thirty-five hundred troops at Guantanamo, and reinforcements were on their way from Tampa and Charleston, General Miles decided to move upon Porto Rico. The regiments with him were the Sixth Massachusetts and the Sixth Illinois, with two hundred and seventy-five recruits ordered to join Shafter's corps, but not needed at Santiago; Batteries C and F of the Third Artillery, B and F of the Fourth, and B of the Fifth; and detachments of engineers, of the signal corps, and of the hospital corps. He had requested permission to take the marines from Playa del Este, but the Secretary of War refused it, saying "we have enough army for our work." His troops were on the Columbia, the Yale, and seven transports, and as a convoy Sampson assigned the Massachusetts, the Gloucester, and the Dixie, with Captain Higginson of the Massachusetts as senior naval officer. The Cincinnati was also ordered from the Havana station to Porto Rico. The admiral's hands were very full at this time, with almost the whole Cuban coast to patrol, and with some of his strongest men-of-war detached for service in Commodore Watson's Eastern Squadron; and he had considered that with Cervera's fleet destroyed and San Juan blockaded, the Cincinnati alone, in addition to the guns of the Columbia and the Yale, would be a sufficient protection; but at Miles's request, and finally upon the President's positive order that a battleship should be sent, he added the three vessels mentioned.

The garrison of Porto Rico consisted, according to General Miles's report, of 8,223 Spanish regulars and 9,107 volunteers. These figures, presumably, were obtained officially after the surrender, and are accurate, though Commander Jacobsen gives the Spanish army roll of January 1, 1898—since which time it seems that no reinforcements were sent—
as showing 7,002 regulars. It was believed—quite correctly, as it proved—that the volunteers were disaffected, and would refuse to fight. The chief mili-

Sketch map of the Island of Porto Rico.
tary stations, besides San Juan, were Mayaguez, in the west; Ponce, the largest city in the island, in the south; and Guayama, in the southeast; but since the outbreak of war the Spanish forces had been concentrated in San Juan, only small detachments remaining elsewhere.

The port of Fajardo, near Cape San Juan, at the northeast corner of the island, was the point selected for the landing of the expedition; but on the way eastward from Guantanamo, General Miles went on board of the Massachusetts (July 23d) and told Captain Higginson that he preferred to make for Guanica, at the other end of Porto Rico, in the extreme southwest.* His reasons were that the enemy was likely to have information of his plans, and to be prepared to resist a landing at Fajardo; that there were reported to be no defences either at Guanica or at the neighbouring city of Ponce, from which a fine military road led across the island to San Juan; and that he would find there plenty of sugar lighters, which he could use in taking men and material ashore, the tugs and launches promised him from Washington having failed to arrive.† Captain Higginson at first demurred on the ground

* It has been stated that a landing at Guanica or Ponce was really planned from the first, Fajardo being mentioned merely as a ruse; but such does not seem to have been the case. On July 18th Miles telegraphed to Washington that Sampson and himself had agreed upon Cape San Juan (presumably meaning Fajardo). On the same day he received a despatch—the result of a conference between the President and Secretaries Alger and Long—authorizing him to use his own discretion in the matter. On July 26th, just before his report of the capture of Guanica reached Washington, the Secretary of War sent him a telegram that shows surprise, if not disapproval:

"Conflicting reports here as to your place of landing. Why did you change? Dorado [Dorado], fifteen miles west of San Juan, is reported an excellent place to land. Did you leave ships to direct Schwan and Wilson, now en route, where to find you?"

Miles replied with a despatch stating at length his reasons for preferring Guanica to Fajardo.

† General Miles received valuable information about Porto Rico from Lieutenant H. H. Whitney, of the Fourth Artillery, who during May spent two weeks in the southern part of the island, travelling in disguise, and who now returned there on Miles's staff.
that the harbour at Guanica was too shallow for the heavier ships, and that the southern coast was less convenient for coaling, and less sheltered from the prevailing winds; but he finally waived his objections, and after passing Haiti the fleet turned southward by the Mona Passage, detaching the Dixie to summon any ships that might go to the abandoned rendezvous near Cape San Juan.

Guanica was reached at sunrise on July 25th, and Lieutenant-Commander Wainwright took the Gloucester into the harbour, scorning the possible dangers of unknown batteries or torpedoes. A landing party of thirty men, under Lieutenant Huse, executive officer of the Gloucester, went ashore and hoisted the Stars and Stripes. At this a few shots came from the outskirts of the village, and a countryman—the only male inhabitant who had not fled at sight of the American ships—told the lieutenant that the garrison of Guanica, thirty Spanish regulars, had sought shelter in the bushes, after telegraphing to Yauco for reinforcements. Huse barricaded the road leading inland, and a little later, when a small body of mounted troops appeared, a few shots from the Gloucester's three-pounders drove them off.

By this time the transports had followed the Gloucester into the bay, and the soldiers were landing in boats from the ships and in some lighters found in the harbour and promptly seized. The village was occupied without further resistance, and at daylight next morning (July 26th) General Garretson, with six companies of the Sixth Massachusetts and one of the Sixth Illinois, moved upon Yauco, about four miles inland. At the hacienda of Santa Desidera they encountered a Spanish force, which opened a brisk fusillade, and there was a moment of confusion among three companies of the Massachusetts men whom Garretson had posted, as a reserve, in a hollow that proved to be unsheltered from
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the enemy's fire. They were soon rallied, however, the advance was continued, and the Spaniards retreated, leaving the road to Ponce open. The American loss in the skirmish was four men wounded, all in the Massachusetts regiment; their antagonists had two killed and eighteen wounded.

On the morning of the 27th the Wasp and the Annapolis joined Captain Higginson's squadron, and Major-General Wilson and Brigadier-General Ernst arrived from Charleston with the latter's brigade, which included the Second Wisconsin, the Third Wisconsin, and the Sixteenth Pennsylvania. The troops were not landed at Guanica, as Miles was now ready to take and hold Ponce, a point of importance in itself, and a better base for his movement upon San Juan.

It fell to Commander Davis, of the Dixie, to receive the surrender of Ponce and of its port, La Playa. With the Annapolis and the Wasp, the Dixie anchored in the harbour before sunset that same day (July 27th). Lieutenant Merriam, who was sent ashore, found that the garrison of La Playa had fled, leaving no one with whom he could deal; but the British and German consuls came down from Ponce, with some representatives of mercantile interests, and through their mediation the comandante, Colonel San Martin, surrendered the city to Commander Davis, on condition that he should be allowed to retreat unmolested with his soldiers—who numbered about three hundred, besides forty or fifty sick men who were left behind. He could have done nothing else; the Dixie alone, with her guns trained on his defenceless city, was a sufficient argument for capitulation, without considering the overwhelming force close behind her; yet it was the luckless colonel's fate to be a scapegoat for Spain's resentment of her misfortunes. On reaching San Juan he was arrested and court-martialed by Captain-General Macias, and
sentenced to death for giving up Ponce without resistance. Upon the intercession of General Brooke and other American officers, his punishment was subsequently commuted to life imprisonment, and it is understood that he was sent to the Spanish convict station at Ceuta, in Morocco.

The transports came into the harbour of Ponce early on the 28th, and the army took possession of the city. Here, as elsewhere, they were received with a general display of friendliness by the natives. General Miles issued a proclamation, setting forth in somewhat flowery periods that the American forces were in Porto Rico "in the cause of liberty, justice, and humanity," and "bearing the flag of freedom;" that they represented "the fostering arm of a nation of free people, whose greatest power is in its justice and humanity to all those living within its fold. Hence," the general added, "the first effect of this occupation will be the immediate release from your former political relations, and, it is hoped, a cheerful acceptance of the Government of the United States." General Wilson was appointed military governor of Ponce, and Captain Chester, of the Cincinnati, captain of the port.

General Miles had declined to consider himself bound by Commander Davis's agreement that there should be no pursuit of the withdrawing Spaniards for forty-eight hours, but he made no immediate movement. With this firm foothold in the southwest of the island, he waited for the troops he needed to advance in force. They came on the 31st, when Brigadier-General Schwan arrived from Tampa with the Eleventh and the Nineteenth Infantry, a troop of the Second Cavalry, and two batteries of the Seventeenth Artillery; and Major-General Brooke and Brigadier-General Hains brought nearly six thousand men from Newport News, including the Third Illinois, the Fourth Ohio, the Fourth Pennsylvania,
a company of the Eighth Infantry, a troop of the Sixth Cavalry, the Philadelphia City Troop, Troops A and C, New York Cavalry, and Rodney's battalion of artillery. One of Schwan's transports had an adventure en route. She was chased by the Eagle off the Cuban coast, and as her captain ignored Lieutenant Southerland's signals and warning shots she narrowly escaped being fired on.

Miles's plan of campaign now began to disclose itself. At Ponce he had before him a fine highway running through Coamo and across the centre of the island for seventy miles to San Juan. General Brooke's division was carried eastward on its transports to Arroyo, which surrendered to Captain Goodrich, on the Gloucester, on August 1st. Landing there, Brooke was to march by Guayama to reach the San Juan road at Cayey. Schwan, meanwhile, was ordered to go ashore at Guanica and move around the western end of Porto Rico, by way of San German and Mayaguez. Henry and Garretson—with General Stone, famous as a road builder, to make a practicable highway out of a neglected trail across the hills—headed straight across the centre of the island, by Adjuntas and Utuado, to cut off the retreat of any Spanish forces dislodged by Schwan. All four columns were to converge upon San Juan, where the Spaniards were likely to make their last stand, and where the final blow could be struck by army and navy together.

The story of the Porto Rico campaign recalls the proverb which says that the happiest nation is the one that has the least history. Its brief annals are not lengthened by any record of sufferings and difficulties like those that made the story of Santiago. General Miles's well-laid plans were carried out with almost clocklike precision, and in the nineteen days between the landing at Guanica and the end of the war his four advancing columns occu-
pied about one third of the island, with the insignificant loss of three men killed and forty wounded.

General Schwan, with the westernmost column—consisting of the Eleventh Infantry (Colonel De Russy), Troop A of the Fifth Cavalry, a battery of Gatling guns, and two of field artillery, a total of 1,447 men, with a few native guides—left Yauco on August 9th. At San German, which was reached next morning, he heard that the garrison of Mayaguez—eleven hundred Spanish regulars of the Alfonso XIII regiment, commanded by Colonel Soto, and a few volunteers—was coming out to meet him.

Moving on down the valley of the Rio Grande, the American advance guard encountered the enemy at Hormiguero, about four miles from Mayaguez. Here the Spaniards were posted on a hillside commanding the valley, and their fire caused a few casualties while Schwan's men were discovering their position and deploying for an attack. Turning into the fields on both sides of the road—planted with sugar cane, and intersected by creeks and wire fences—the American soldiers pushed steadily forward; the Gatling guns, under Lieutenant Maginnis of the Eleventh, moved with the firing line, and the artillery was brought to bear from the foothills. The Spaniards, who had the advantage of position, but were outnumbered and had no guns, made a feeble resistance and a precipitate retreat. Schwan's losses in the skirmish were one man killed and sixteen wounded; the enemy's he estimated at fifty killed and wounded.

Early next day (August 11th) the American troops entered Mayaguez, a city of 22,000 people, and the chief seaport on the west coast of Porto Rico. The inhabitants received them with every demonstration of satisfaction. The garrison had retreated by a road running inland toward Lares,
and Schwan's first intention was to hurry on in pursuit; but the settlement of affairs in Mayaguez demanded attention; his men were tired, the roads were poor, and drenching rains helped to make operations difficult. He decided to send out a flying column, under Lieutenant-Colonel Burke, of the Eleventh, to follow the enemy.

With seven hundred men—six companies of his regiment, a platoon of cavalry, and another of artillery—Burke set out on the morning of the 12th. That night, after pushing all day along a road that climbed into the mountains, he had bivouacked in the trail, when news reached him that the Spaniards had assembled from one to two thousand men at Las Marias, and were preparing to make a stand. He sent a courier back to General Schwan with this information, adding that he proposed to move forward at daybreak and attack the enemy.

Fearing that Burke's force might be inadequate, Schwan promptly hurried after him with the cavalry troop, ordering Colonel De Russy to follow as rapidly as possible with the rest of the brigade. He found the advance guard drawn up on the crest of a ridge, firing upon the Spaniards, who held the opposite hill and were scattered in the valley between. Through the valley ran a swift and deep mountain torrent, the Rio Prieto, which most of Colonel Soto's men had crossed, but some had been unable to cross. After a brisk exchange of shots, the main body continued its retreat, leaving the rear guard, utterly disorganized, to hide in the woods, where forty prisoners were rounded up by the American cavalry. Colonel Soto was found in a peasant's cottage, disabled by an injury; his second in command was also among the prisoners.

Schwan was ready to move on early the next morning (Sunday, August 14th) to attack Lares—which would no doubt have proved easy prey—when he received word that the peace protocol had
been signed the day before, and he had to recall his orders for an advance. "No troops," he says, "ever suspended with a worse grace."

No fighting at all fell to Garretson's brigade, which, with General Henry as division commander, left Ponce on August 8th. Its movements were slower than Henry had anticipated. He had nothing but ox carts to carry his supplies through a hilly country where pack trains would have given better service. Besides a battalion of the Nineteenth Infantry and a small mounted detachment—Troop A, of the Second Cavalry—his force consisted of two unseasoned volunteer regiments, the Sixth Illinois and the Sixth Massachusetts. The discipline of the latter had been unsatisfactory both in the skirmish of July 26th before Yauco and during the march to Ponce. At Ponce several of the officers, who had been ordered before a board of inquiry, resigned their commissions, and since then its morale had improved; but on the first day's march northward Henry reports that there was much straggling in the brigade, "new shoes being the alleged cause." Only nine miles were covered on the 8th, and the troops did not reach Adjuntas until August 10th. On the 13th, when the order to discontinue hostilities came, Henry was at Utuado with his regulars and two battalions of the Massachusetts men, preparing to advance upon Arecibo, where there was a small body of Spaniards; Garretson, with the rest of the brigade, was still at Adjuntas.

Meanwhile, after some delay in the landing of the necessary supplies and material at Ponce, Ernst's brigade—the Sixteenth Pennsylvania (Colonel Hulings), the Second Wisconsin (Colonel Born), and the Third Wisconsin (Colonel Moore), with two batteries, Potts's and Anderson's, both commanded by Major Lancaster—had advanced along the main highway across the island, running
eastward and northward to San Juan. Before leaving Ponce the volunteers exchanged their Springfield rifles for Krag-Jörgensens. The Pennsylvania regiment led the advance, and its reconnoitering parties came into conflict with the outposts of the Spaniards, who were falling back slowly. On August 8th General Ernst, with the rest of the brigade, passed the Pennsylvanians, and camped within four miles of Coamo.

General Wilson, the division commander, came out from Ponce on the previous afternoon (August 7th). From deserters and friendly natives he had full information of the Spaniards' movements. They were preparing to meet him near Aibonito, at the highest point on the road, where it crosses the mountain ridge that parallels the south coast of the island. Here they had some two thousand troops in a strong natural position, which they were further strengthening with batteries and intrenchments. At Coamo, where the road first reaches the hills, was an outpost held by about three hundred men. This, too, was a strong position, not to be taken by direct assault without risk of serious loss, and General Wilson planned a turning movement.

On the evening of the 8th the Pennsylvania regiment moved out from the rear and struck into a hill trail north of the road, which had been reconnoitred by Lieutenant-Colonel Biddle and other staff officers. After bivouacking in the hills, the march—a rough and difficult journey of about a dozen miles—was resumed before daybreak, and at eight o'clock next morning Colonel Hulings's men reached a point commanding the San Juan road in the rear of Coamo. The Spaniards were already retreating, Major Lancaster's guns having opened upon them in front. A few escaped toward Aibonito, but their commander, Major Martinez, who exposed himself with reckless gallantry, was shot down,
and after returning the Pennsylvanians' fire till their position was evidently hopeless, the main body gave up the fight, waving hats and handkerchiefs in token of surrender. The Pennsylvanians, who had had the fight practically to themselves, marched back into Coamo with two hundred and one prisoners. Their loss was only six wounded; the Spaniards had seven killed and sixty-nine wounded.*

A bridge over a deep ravine before Coamo had been destroyed, but General Wilson saved several others on the road to Aibonito by sending out a mounted detachment—Troop C of the New York cavalry, under Captain Clayton—in prompt pursuit of the fleeing enemy. Five and a half miles beyond Coamo the troopers came under fire from the Spanish batteries on the hill of Asomanta, commanding the highway where it winds up to the summit of the divide, over which it passes to the village of Aibonito; and here the American cavalrymen were ordered to remain as an outpost.

During the 10th and 11th General Wilson was bringing up his forces and reconnoitring. He found a serious task before him. The Spaniards' position gave them a plunging fire down the steep road, and the American artillery could not be brought to bear except with the disadvantage of firing from points several hundred feet lower than the enemy's guns. On both sides of the road the ground was broken by deep and precipitous ravines. Nevertheless General Wilson decided that another flanking movement was practicable, and ordered Ernst to be ready, on the morning of the 13th, to take a mountain trail branching to the left and run-

* In his official report of the action, dated Coamo, August 10, 1898, Colonel (now Brigadier-General) Huling stated the Spanish loss as 6 killed, 40 wounded, and 167 prisoners. In a personal statement to the writer he substitutes the figures given above, saying that men were found later among the houses in the village.
ning westward and northward over the divide to Barranquito, whence Aibonito could be taken in the rear.

Meanwhile, on the 12th, to engage the Spaniards’ attention and develop their strength, Major Lancaster took a field battery to a hilltop on the left of the road and opened fire upon the works on the hill of Asomanta. At first the Spanish guns replied feebly, and Major Lancaster thought he had silenced them; but after an hour’s firing, when his ammunition was running low, the enemy apparently received reinforcements, and he found his battery the target of a hail of shells and bullets, his smoke powder helping the Spaniards to get his range. His position was evidently untenable, and the guns were withdrawn, Lieutenant Hains, who commanded one of them, being shot through the body, and the battery’s whole loss being one man killed and six wounded, one mortally.

Knowing that he might at any moment receive news of an armistice, General Wilson delayed Ernst’s flanking movement and sent a flag of truce to the Spanish lines with a demand for surrender. The message was forwarded to San Juan, to the captain-general, whose reply, received early the next morning (August 13th) was a curt refusal; and Ernst was on the point of starting when General Miles telegraphed from Ponce the order to suspend operations.

General Brooke’s advance, too, was halted at the very moment when a sharp fight was imminent. His disembarkation at Arroyo was slow, there being no wharf and few available boats, and two of his transports being delayed by running aground at Ponce. On August 5th the infantry was ready to move, and that morning General Hains marched upon Guayama with the Fourth Ohio (Colonel Coit) and the Third Illinois (Colonel Ben-
nitt), the former leading the way. About a mile from the town the Ohioans encountered a small number of Spaniards, who fired a few shots and retreated through Guayama, of which the Americans took possession. Just beyond the town, on the road to Cayey, there was another skirmish, the enemy being dispersed again by the Ohio regiment's dynamite guns.

No further advance was made till the 8th, when General Hains ordered a company of the Fourth Ohio to reconnoitre toward Cayey. Colonel Coit took two companies, and three miles out they came under a sharp fire from Spaniards posted on a hill commanding the road, near the village of Pablo Vasquez. The enemy had the range accurately, and the reconnoitring party could do nothing but seek shelter and then fall back, which they did with five men wounded. They met the rest of the regiment, with the dynamite guns, hurrying out to support them, an alarming report of disaster having reached Guayama.

Again General Brooke was forced to wait, in order to get his cavalry and artillery ashore and to the front. On the 12th he issued orders for an attack, his plan being to threaten the Spanish position with the Third Illinois, a battalion of the Fourth Pennsylvania, and a couple of batteries, while General Hains, with the Fourth Ohio, marched northward into the hills to take it in the rear. Hains set out early next morning, and was close upon the enemy—who would seemingly have been taken by surprise, and could scarcely have escaped capture, Brooke's guns being ready to open fire upon them in front—when a staff officer overtook him with news of the signing of the protocol.

The navy, which had opened the way for Miles's troops at Guanica, at Ponce, and at Arroyo, conducted practically no offensive operations during the last days of the campaign. It made a small
diversion by sending ashore thirty-five sailors and marines from the Amphitrite at Cape San Juan, on August 6th. The landing party, commanded by Lieutenant Atwater, occupied the Cape San Juan lighthouse, and defended it against a night attack by some one hundred and twenty Spanish mounted infantry; but on the 9th, as the advantage of holding the place seemed slight, Captain Barclay withdrew his men. They had suffered no casualties, except the fatal wounding of Naval Cadet Boardman by the accidental discharge of a revolver.

A reason for the comparative inaction of the navy may possibly be found in certain despatches which General Miles sent to the Secretary of War. One was dated from Ponce, August 9th:

I am informed the naval vessels at this place have been ordered round to San Juan. In order that there may be no conflict of authority I request that no aggressive action be taken against that place, that no landings be made, or communication held with the Spanish officials or forces on this island by the navy.

And on the following day the general telegraphed to Secretary Alger:

I am fully convinced that Sampson has sent orders to the commander of this fleet, as soon as army leaves south coast, to take his fleet, go round to San Juan, and demand the surrender of the capital or bombard the city, and not to waste ammunition on any of the batteries. First, to bombard a city containing innocent women and children would be a violation of the first order of the President. Second, it is an interference with the work given the army by the President. I ask that any such action be suspended. After we have raised the flag over all the principal cities and arrived at San Juan, any aid by the navy against land batteries, intrenchments, or fortifications would be advisable, but not against a city of non-combatants. The control of all military affairs on the land of this island can safely be left to the army.

* This despatch is not among those published by the War Department, but it appeared in the New York Sun, July 3, 1899, and is presumably authentic.
It is only natural that General Miles should have been anxious to finish his well-planned campaign with his own forces, but these letters certainly show professional jealousy carried to an extreme.

Commander Davis, of the Dixie, submitted to Sampson, on August 2d, a plan for taking San Juan by a bombardment from the ocean front and by landing marines and light guns at the eastern end of the island on which the city lies; and it can hardly be doubted that Sampson would have been willing to sanction the attack, which would have been tolerably sure of success.
CHAPTER XVI

THE MANILA CAMPAIGN

Like the invasion of Porto Rico, the campaign which completed Dewey's triumph in Manila Bay by forcing the surrender of the Philippine capital involved little actual fighting; but it was interesting in a military sense, from the novelty and the difficulty of the work it set before the American army, and its political importance was still more momentous. It marked, indeed, a new era of history for the United States, setting its flag over a great empire in the eastern hemisphere, and making it no longer an American power merely, but a world power.

Very few Americans, even among those in authority at Washington, realized this in the early days of May, 1898, when hurried preparations to follow up Dewey's victory were afoot. The irresistible logic of events—destiny, if the term be preferred—was swiftly making obsolete the policy that had guided American statesmanship for more than a century; yet it is hard to single out any precise point as that of the new departure, or, indeed, any point at which it was feasible to halt or turn back. Dewey's instructions (cabled from Washington on April 24th) were to "commence operations, particularly against the Spanish fleet." A previous telegram (February 25th) warned him that in case of war his duty would be "offensive operations in
Philippine Islands." No despatch, or at least no published despatch, gave any more explicit order for an attack upon Manila, and the conquest of the islands can hardly have been a long-preconceived plan of the Administration that stood committed to a declaration that by the American code of morality the annexation of another power's territory would be "criminal aggression." Yet to destroy Spain's fleet and leave her land forces at the mercy of the insurgents, to shatter her power without replacing it with any other constituted authority, would have been a disaster to civilization.

That a land campaign in the Philippines had not been reckoned among the probable developments of the war is shown by the fact that during April the whole military resources of the United States had been concentrated in the East and South, the Pacific coast being practically stripped of men and material. General Shafter, commanding the Department of California, had gone to Tampa with his whole staff and most of the troops of his command, leaving only the Fourteenth Infantry (Colonel Thomas M. Anderson, then stationed in Alaska) and part of the Third Artillery (Colonel Marcus P. Miller), the latter a force quite insufficient to man the defences of San Francisco.

On May 7th, with Dewey's first announcement of his victory, there came another despatch saying:

I control bay completely and can take city at any time, but I have not sufficient men to hold.... Will ammunition be sent?

Secretary Long immediately replied:

The Charleston will leave at once with what ammunition she can carry. Pacific Mail Steamship Company's steamer Peking will follow with ammunition and supplies. Will take troops unless you telegraph otherwise. How many will you require?

* President McKinley's message to Congress, December 6, 1897.
Dewey's answer went from Cavite on May 13th, and from Hong-Kong two days later:

I believe the Spanish governor-general will be obliged to surrender soon. I can take Manila at any moment. To retain possession and thus control Philippine Islands would require, in my best judgment, well-equipped force of five thousand men. . . . Spanish force is estimated ten thousand men. The rebels are reported thirty thousand.

With such an estimate of the situation—by no means an accurate one—coming from the admiral, it is not strange that in the United States there should have been divergent opinions as to the task an army expedition would have to face and the force it would require. General Miles seems to have been the first to formulate a plan of operation. On May 3d, when Dewey's victory was known, though not officially reported, he wrote to the Secretary of War:

I have the honour to recommend that General Thomas M. Anderson be sent to occupy the Philippine Islands, in command of the following troops: two battalions Fourteenth Infantry, two troops Fourth Cavalry, one regiment of infantry, California volunteers; two batteries heavy artillery, California volunteers; one regiment of infantry, Washington volunteers; the troops to go with all the necessary appliances, supplies, and equipment. Miles has been criticised for so greatly underestimating the force needed at Manila, just as Sampson received censure for his statement that ten thousand soldiers could take Santiago in forty-eight hours; but he might reply that his figures agree closely with Dewey's.

On May 11th Major-General Wesley Merritt, then commanding the Department of the East, was summoned to Washington, and on the 12th it was announced that he had been appointed to command an army corps—the Eighth Corps—to be organized immediately for service in the Philippines. General Merritt was fortunately unwilling to undertake an almost unknown task with a mere handful
of men, and requested (May 13th) a total force of fourteen thousand four hundred, including four regiments of regulars. Two days later, after some further study of the situation, he wrote to the President that still more men might be needed, adding, with remarkable foresight:

It seems more than probable that we will have the so-called insurgents to fight as well as the Spaniards.

General Miles—who had not seen Merritt's estimate—submitted a different list of troops, including only two regular regiments—the Fourteenth and Fifteenth—with two squadrons of cavalry, three batteries of artillery, thirteen thousand volunteers from the Western States, and some heavy guns, which were to be mounted for the defence of Manila as soon as the city should be captured. "When this is accomplished," he suggested, "the fleet can be released for more important service."

To this Merritt replied, on May 17th:

Two regiments of regular infantry, two thirds of a regiment of regular cavalry, and two light batteries is a very small proportion of the forty-two regular regiments in the army when the work to be done consists of conquering a territory seven thousand miles from our base, defended by a regularly trained and acclimated army of from ten thousand to twenty-five thousand men, and inhabited by fourteen million of people, the majority of whom will regard us with the intense hatred born of race and religion.

My letters of May 13th and 15th give the composition and minimum strength of the regular force I deem necessary.

Merritt's view prevailed at Washington, and orders were finally issued that twenty thousand men should be assembled and equipped at San Francisco, and sent across the Pacific as fast as transports could be secured. Organizing work was at once begun—or rather had already been begun—under Colonel Anderson, now appointed a brigadier-general of volunteers, and General Merriam,
who had succeeded Shafter in San Francisco; and on May 25th the advance guard of the expedition—the first soldiers the young republic of the west had ever sent into the ancient lands of the east—sailed from the Golden Gate. It consisted of the First California (Colonel Smith), the Second Oregon (Colonel Summers), and six companies of the Fourteenth Infantry, in all 2,491 men, under General Anderson, in three transports, the City of Sydney, the Australia, and the City of Peking.

At Honolulu, where the transports put in for coal, they found the cruiser Charleston, which left San Francisco a few days before them, waiting to serve as their escort. They carried an order from Secretary Long to Captain Glass of the Charleston—there being no cable to Hawaii—instructing him to seize the island of Guam, in the Ladrones, on his way to Manila.* The expedition left Honolulu on June 4th, and reached Guam on the morning of the 20th. Captain Glass first visited Agaña, the capital, whose port he found entirely empty; then—in search of a Spanish gunboat of which he had heard rumours at Honolulu—he took the Charleston into the picturesque harbour of San Luis d'Apra, a reef-fringed bay commanded by rocky cliffs. The chart showed fortifications—Fort Santiago and Fort Santa Cruz—but these proved to be nothing more than abandoned ruins; and the only vessel in the harbour was a small Japanese trader. No Spanish man-of-war had called at the island for eighteen months; no news had come from the outer world since April 14th, and the exiles who formed Spain's garrison

* The Ladrone or Marianne Islands had belonged to Spain ever since their discovery by Magellan in 1521. They consist of fifteen islets scattered in a broken line from north to south, with a total area of 420 square miles and a population of about 10,000. Guam, the most important island, which was the seat of the Spanish colonial government, lies at the southern end of the chain, 900 miles north of the equator and 1,300 miles east of the nearest of the Philippines.
in this remote speck of land knew nothing of the war with the United States. They had no defences; the only cannon in Guam were four little cast-iron antiquities once used for saluting, but condemned as unsafe even for that peaceful purpose.

Captain Glass fired a shot or two at the fortifications before he discovered that they were deserted, and the sound of his guns brought out two officers in a boat, who were mightily surprised to find themselves prisoners. They were paroled and sent ashore to summon the governor, Lieutenant-Colonel Marina, from Agaña. That official replied that the Spanish law forbade him to board a foreign vessel, but he would be pleased to confer with Captain Glass on shore. The captain's answer was a note sent ashore on the following morning, with a landing party under Lieutenant Braunersreuther, giving Marina half an hour to surrender unconditionally. No resistance was possible; the garrison—sixty Spaniards and a few native soldiers—was disarmed, the Spaniards were taken on board the Sydney, and on the 22d the four ships resumed their voyage, entering Manila Bay on June 30th.

Here the situation had changed little since the destruction of Montojo's fleet two months before. Rear-Admiral Dewey (promoted to that rank May 7th) had been waiting in the bay, in possession of the Cavité arsenal and of the fortifications on the island of Corregidor, and with Manila itself, rigidly blockaded, lying at the mercy of his guns. He had lost one of his officers, Captain Gridley, of the Olympia, through illness,* the vacant place being taken by Captain Lamberton, who had been serving on the flagship as the admiral's chief of staff.

* Captain Gridley was "condemned by a medical survey" — to use the cynical-sounding phrase that ends the career of many a brave sailor who has served his country well—in May, and was ordered home. He died on the way, at Kobe, Japan, June 4th.
Commander Wood, of the Petrel, had been put in charge of the station at Cavite, which was well equipped with storehouses and barracks, and with machine shops that proved very useful for small repairs to the squadron. On May 12th another prize had been captured—the Spanish gunboat Callao, which steamed into the bay in ignorance of Dewey’s presence there.

The position of the Manila garrison was a desperate one. In the harbour were Dewey’s ships; on the landward side they were hemmed in by the insurgents, who had pushed their lines close up to the city, and who mustered about fourteen thousand men, commanded by General Emilio Aguinaldo. This remarkable young Filipino leader, who has since been the author of such disasters to his countrymen and so much suffering and loss to the American troops, landed at Cavite on May 19th, having been brought from Hong-Kong on the McCulloch, sent for despatches. Negotiations with him had been begun in April, at Singapore, by United States Consul Pratt, who, with Dewey’s permission, sent him to Hong-Kong for a conference. Arriving there a few days after the admiral’s departure, he was received by Rounsevelle Wildman, the American consul at Hong-Kong. Aguinaldo afterward asserted that both Mr. Pratt and Mr. Wildman promised that their Government would assist him to establish the independent republic for which he had long been fighting; but his allegations can not be credited in the face of their emphatic denials, and of Dewey’s repeated and explicit assertion that no pledges of any sort were given. With or without pledges, however, it must be admitted that it was a mistake to accept his cooperation on any basis. He proved to be an effective weapon against the Spaniards, but in thoroughly scrupulous fighting such a weapon should not have
been employed. If the Filipinos were to have no
political recognition, they should have had no mili­
tary recognition. If they were to be regarded—no
doubt correctly—as incapable of civilized self-gov­
ernment, they should not have been used as allies
in war, aided with gifts of arms, and intrusted with
the care of Spanish prisoners.

The admiral thus described his relations with
the insurgents on June 27th, in answer to an inquiry
from Washington:

Aguinaldo, insurgent leader, with thirteen of his staff,
arrived May 19th, by permission, on Nanshan.* Estab­
lished self Cavite, outside arsenal, under the protection of
our guns, and organized his army. I have had several
conferences with him, generally of a personal nature.
Consistently I have refrained from assisting him in any
way with the force under my command, and on several
occasions I have declined requests that I should do so,
telling him the squadron could not act until the arrival of
the United States troops. At the same time I have given
him to understand that I consider insurgents as friends,
being opposed to a common enemy. Aguinaldo has acted
independently of the squadron, but has kept me advised
of his progress, which has been wonderful. I have allowed
to pass by water recruits, arms, and ammunition, and to
take such Spanish arms and ammunition from the arsenal
as he needed. Have advised frequently to conduct the
war humanely, which he has done invariably. My rela­
tions with him are cordial, but I am not in his confidence.
The United States has not been bound in any way to
assist insurgents by any act or promises, and he is not,
to my knowledge, committed to assist us. I believe he
expects to capture Manila without my assistance, but doubt
ability, they not yet having many guns. In my opinion,
these people are far superior in their intelligence and more
capable of self-government than the natives of Cuba, and
I am familiar with both races.

On the other side, Aguinaldo’s attitude was stated
in a proclamation he issued at Cavite, May 24th:

Now that the great and powerful North American
nation have come to offer disinterested protection for the

*Apparently a mistake, as other accounts agree that Aguinaldo went to Manila on the McCulloch.
effort to secure the liberation of this country, I return to assume command of all the forces for the attainment of our lofty aspirations, establishing a dictatorial government which will set forth decrees under my sole responsibility, assisted by the advice of eminent persons, until these islands are completely conquered and able to form a constitutional convention and to elect a president and a cabinet, in whose favour I will duly resign the authority.

During June, as the insurgents gained in strength, Aguinaldo issued several decrees constituting a civil government in the territory they controlled, and on July 1st he proclaimed himself president of the Filipino republic—a step of which, portentous as it was of coming trouble, no official notice was taken.

Immediately after the battle of May 1st, and before the naval weakness of the Spaniards was fully understood, there were rumours that they would make an effort to retrieve their first great disaster. When Cervera left the Cape Verde Islands, one of the many conflicting reports, or conjectures, as to his destination was that he was bound for the east, to attack the American fleet with what would indeed have been an overwhelming force. On May 12th Secretary Long cabled to Dewey that the whereabouts of the powerful Spanish squadron was still unknown; but that day its arrival at Martinique was reported by Captain Cotton, of the Harvard.

Although it had sent the flower of its navy to sure destruction in the West Indies, instead of probable success in the Philippines, the Madrid Government, it soon appeared, still entertained the idea that it could save Manila. Its attempt proved an utterly feeble one, and effected nothing save to expose its lack of resources and the almost ludicrous incompetence of the directors of its military policy. In the whole story of Spanish weakness and failure, the adventures of Camara's squadron form the most pitiable chapter.
During May and June there were active preparations at the Cadiz navy yard—watched, during part of the time, by two young American officers, Ensigns W. H. Buck and H. H. Ward, of the Bureau of Navigation, who had volunteered for secret service duty—to equip for foreign service all the war ships that could be sent to sea. The available vessels included two battle ships—the old 9,900-ton Pelayo and the Emperador Carlos V, a fine new ship of 9,235 tons, whose armament was still incomplete; the two armed auxiliaries Rapido and Patriota, formerly the Hamburg-American liners Normannia and Columbia; and several torpedo boats and destroyers, of the class whose inefficiency, in Spanish hands, was demonstrated at Santiago. On June 17th it was reported that a squadron under Admiral Camara had left Cadiz, sailing eastward; on the 19th it had reached Cartagena. As far back as May 20th Secretary Long had warned Dewey that there were rumours of such a movement, but on May 29th he had cabled:

There is no Spanish force en route to Philippine Islands.

Even when Camara's sailing was reported, it was not believed at Washington that he would actually leave the Spanish coast. On June 22d Secretary Long telegraphed to Dewey: *

Our special agents report Camara's fleet at Cartagena, Spain. It is thought reliable information. His future destination not ascertained yet.

* Correspondence between Dewey and Washington went through the American consulate at Hong-Kong, requiring from two to five days to pass between Hong-Kong and Manila. The McCulloch and Dewey's supply ships made frequent voyages to and fro with despatches.

It appears that on cutting the Manila cable the admiral took the wire on board the Olympia and attempted to use it, but the Spanish Government prevented this by sealing the line at Hong-Kong—a right reserved by its contract with the cable company.
That there was no alarm at Washington is shown by the secretary's despatch of the same date to Sampson at Santiago:

Spanish fleet at Cartagena, Spain; movement probably made to satisfy people. This information probably reliable.

As a matter of fact, Camara passed Cape Bon, in Tunis, on the 22d, and on the 26th he appeared off Port Said, at the northern end of the Suez Canal. Sagasta, the Spanish premier, announced in the Cortes, on the 23d—the legislature was dissolved on the following day—that Manila was the objective point of the expedition. On the 25th, and again on the 27th, Secretary Long cabled the news to Dewey.

Admiral Dewey is established in the popular regard as so invincible a hero that many Americans, no doubt, vaguely assume that if Camara had reached Manila he would have been destroyed as speedily as was Montojo's feeble fleet. They may be surprised to learn that the admiral himself was very far from possessing such an easy confidence. On the contrary, it is recorded by General Greene,* who was personally in conference with him, that he fully decided, in case the Spanish squadron continued its voyage, to abandon Manila Bay and retreat before it. He was not prepared to pit his unarmoured cruisers against a pair of heavy battle ships. He resolved, the general relates, to take his men-of-war and the transports out into the Pacific, and cruise eastward to meet the monitors Monterey and Monadnock, which were on their way to him from California. With this important addition to his fighting strength, he would return and give battle to Camara. The army, meanwhile—its senior officer, General Anderson, having readily accepted

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* The Capture of Manila, published in the Century Magazine for March and April, 1899.
Dewey’s plan—would march inland from Cavite, intrench itself in the interior of Luzon, and await the fleet’s return. The result, as General Greene observes, would have been a very interesting campaign; but on July 22d, just as the admiral was on the point of taking steps to put his design into action, the news came that Camara had turned back.

To Dewey himself, apparently, belongs the first suggestion of the effective counter stroke that removed the danger. In the first despatch he sent to Secretary Long after hearing of Camara’s start from Cadiz he said:

In my judgment, if the coast of Spain was threatened, the squadron of the enemy would have to return.

This reached Washington on June 27th, and that very day an official bulletin of the Navy Department announced that “Commodore Watson sails to-day in the cruiser Newark to join Admiral Sampson at Santiago, where he will take under his command an armoured squadron, with cruisers, and proceed at once to the Spanish coast.” The new move was not kept a secret, and news of it immediately went all over the world, and to Madrid in particular. Further information was given out the same day. Watson’s fleet—the command, it may be presumed, would have been Schley’s had he made a better record with the Flying Squadron—was to be called the Eastern Squadron, and was to consist of the Newark as flagship, the battle ships Iowa and Oregon, the armed auxiliaries Yosemite, Dixie, and Yankee, and three colliers. When the squadron was actually commissioned (July 7th) these arrangements had been modified, the Massachusetts taking the place of the Iowa; and as it never sailed for Spain, all the vessels named remained under Sampson’s orders.

Here we may note another testimony to the
supreme importance of the destruction of Cervera’s fleet as the great decisive event of the war. While his squadron remained intact it would have been exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to hold the American position at Santiago, to maintain the blockade of Cuba, and at the same time to detach a powerful force for offensive operations beyond the Atlantic. The triumphant ending of Sampson’s naval campaign made this last undertaking entirely feasible, and ended Dewey’s chief apprehension.

Camara reached Port Said short of coal, after the fatal habit of Spanish admirals; and according to instructions from Washington, Mr. Watts, the deputy consul-general, who was in charge of the American consulate at Cairo, promptly lodged a protest against his being allowed to take on fuel in any Egyptian port. The fact that the protest was successful is ascribed to the good offices of Lord Cromer, the British agent. Nevertheless, the Spaniards passed through the canal—except the three torpedo-boat destroyers, Audaz, Osada, and Proserpina, which were ordered back to Spain from Port Said; but they still lay at Suez on July 6th, the war ships having taken some coal from the auxiliaries, when an order came recalling them to the threatened coast of the peninsula. The fiasco of the Camara expedition was over, and Manila was left to its fate.

Though the position of the Spanish garrison was now hopeless, that of Admiral Dewey was not entirely easy or comfortable. He was seven thousand miles from an available base; his stock of ammunition was small, and his supply of provisions—most of which came from Australia—more or less precarious, though he never was actually short of food or fuel.* He had to face a peculiar embarrassment,

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* On June 13th Dewey sent to Washington a request for six months’ supplies in all departments, stating that it was “practically impossible
moreover, in the behaviour of some of the foreign war ships which lay, ostensibly to watch the interests of their respective flags, in the blockaded harbour. Germany, in particular, was represented by a squadron that seemed disproportionate to her share in the commerce of Manila. Admiral Diedrichs, commanding the German fleet on the East Asiatic station, came into the harbour on June 12th, and at the end of the month he had with him five vessels whose rated strength was superior to Dewey's small fighting force.

Amid the excitement of war, and under the strain of a trying situation, it is probable that anxiety and resentment were created by incidents which under other conditions would have passed unnoticed. It is entirely clear, now, that the German Government cherished no insidious designs against the United States, and had no idea of provoking a conflict with its forces in Asiatic waters. It is equally clear that the American officers at Manila, from the admiral down, believed the situation to be one of real danger, and that there was a bitter ill feeling between the two fleets. It appears that Diedrichs failed to display a proper respect for Dewey's position as a blockader of the port, and that Dewey, at least on one occasion, was peremptory in enforcing his rule that every vessel entering or leaving the harbour should be examined by his guard ship of the day.

The situation was not improved by an incident which occurred early in July, when Aguinaldo sent word that his troops had captured the shore defences of Subig Bay, and had endeavoured to attack to obtain further supplies within the limits of the station during the war." On July 22nd, however, he said that he had six months' provisions on hand. On August 9th he reported "provisions for three months, fresh; also plenty of coal." A British ship, the Ellen A. Reed, brought him a cargo of coal from Cape Town in July; he also took a supply from another British vessel, the Honolulu, laid up at Manila by the blockade.
the main Spanish position on an island in the harbour (Isla Grande), but had been prevented from doing so by the German cruiser Irene, which had threatened to fire on their boats, on the ground that they flew no recognised flag. Dewey met the difficulty by sending the Raleigh and the Concord to Subig (July 7th), where the Spaniards, numbering about thirteen hundred, surrendered without resistance, the Irene—whose interference with the insurgents, though perhaps officious, was technically quite correct—of course interposing no objection. The prisoners were turned over to the insurgents—a transaction which came dangerously near to being a recognition of them as a belligerent power.

The first American troops, as has been said, arrived on June 30th, and next morning General Anderson began to disembark his men and material at Cavite. During the day he had an interview with Aguinaldo, whom he found to be in control of everything between the navy-yard gates and the Spanish lines. The Filipino leader, the general reports, “did not seem pleased at the incoming of our land forces.” No further move was made, though Anderson did some reconnoitring meanwhile, till July 15th. Then, in order to secure space for the landing of Greene’s brigade, whose arrival was expected, a battalion of the California regiment was sent across from Cavité to the eastern shore of the bay, and encamped near the hamlet of Tambo, some three miles from Malate, the southernmost suburb held by the Spaniards. To the new camp—christened Camp Dewey—the rest of the Californians went on the 17th, on which day the second army expedition came into the harbour. This consisted of a battalion of the Eighteenth Infantry and another of the Twenty-third; three regiments of volunteer infantry, the First Colorado (Colonel Hale), the First Nebraska (Colonel Bratt),
and the Tenth Pennsylvania (Colonel Hawkins); and two batteries of volunteer artillery from Utah—in all 3,586 men, commanded by General Francis V. Greene, a former officer in the regular army, and late colonel of the Seventy-first New York.

Greene's brigade left San Francisco on June 15th, on the four transports China, Colon, Zealandia, and Senator. After calling at Honolulu (June 23d to 25th), and passing Wake Island (July 4th) and Guam (July 9th), off Cape Engano, at the northern end of Luzon, the Boston was found waiting to escort the transports to Manila. On the 17th they were in the harbour, and next day the men began to go ashore at Camp Dewey, where General Greene took command, General Anderson, who until Merritt's arrival was senior officer, remaining at Cavite. Aguinaldo had moved his headquarters from Cavite to Bakoor, across the small bay of that name, to make room for the Americans, but his attitude was by no means cordial, and he gave them no aid in securing what they most needed—vehicles and draught animals. The insurgents still occupied a thin line of intrenchments between Camp Dewey and the Spanish works.

On July 25th the transport Newport, with Major-General Merritt and his staff, reached Cavite, and on the 30th five other vessels brought in Brigadier-General MacArthur and his brigade. This pretty nearly doubled the force in the field, the new arrivals numbering 4,847, including four volunteer regiments—the Thirteenth Minnesota, First North Dakota, First Idaho, and First Wyoming; another battalion each of the Eighteenth and Twenty-third Infantry; and the Astor Battery, a volunteer field battery organized as a gift to the Government by Colonel John Jacob Astor, of New York.

With almost eleven thousand men under his
command, besides nearly five thousand more already on their way from San Francisco,* General Merritt was eager to end a situation that was full of perplexities by an immediate attack on Manila. After reviewing the ground he decided, as Anderson and Greene had already agreed, that the best approach to the city was by the road from the south, the Calle Real ("Royal Road"), which ran parallel to the shore from Camp Dewey to the Spanish lines at Malate, within easy range of the guns of the fleet. To clear the ground for an advance it was necessary to get the insurgents out of the way; and Greene was commissioned to arrange this with Aguinaldo—unofficially, as Merritt preferred to have no dealings with the Filipino leader. Aguinaldo consented to withdraw his soldiers four hundred yards from the beach, on condition that the request should be made of him in writing; and on July 29th this arrangement was carried out, the abandoned line being occupied by some of Greene’s men, who were promptly set to work to strengthen the trenches.

The growth of the defences, in plain view of their lines, and but a thousand yards distant, seemingly apprised the Spaniards that American troops had taken the place of the Filipinos, and on the night of July 31st, just before midnight, they opened a heavy fire of musketry and artillery. The trenches were held, at the time, by the Tenth Pennsylvania, with four guns of the Utah artillery. The Spaniards

* Five additional transports were on their way across the Pacific when the war ended: the Peru and the City of Puebla with 1,689 men, under Major-General Elwell S. Otis, who left San Francisco July 15th and arrived at Manila August 21st; the Pennsylvania, with 1,348 men, left San Francisco July 19th; and the City of Rio de Janeiro (July 23d) and the St. Paul (July 29th), with 1,735 men, under Brigadier-General Harrison Grey Otis.

The monitor Monadnock started from San Francisco on June 25th, in company with the collier Nero, but did not reach Manila until August 16th.
Sketch map of the scene of General Merritt's campaign in July and August, 1898.
kept up a hot fusillade for about two hours, but did not advance from their works, though an attack in force was momentarily expected, and the whole American camp was under arms. A company of the Third Artillery, serving as infantry, hurried to support the Pennsylvanians, and the California regiment was also moved up.

It was a dark, stormy night, with high wind and tropical rain, and it was difficult to ascertain what was happening. Major Cuthbertson, commanding a battalion of the Pennsylvanians, reported that the enemy had sallied out and attempted to turn the right flank of the American line, but he was undoubtedly mistaken. General Greene, who was at the front, had been ordered to remain on the defensive, and therefore sent no more men forward than were necessary to hold the trenches. For the same reason he did not signal to the Boston, which lay off the shore, ready to use her guns if called upon. The skirmish—the expedition’s baptism of fire—ended without result, though not without casualties, Greene’s loss being ten killed and forty-three wounded.

After the night encounter of July 31st, General Greene kept his men at work extending their intrenchments, to secure the American right against the possibility of an attack in flank. Before the final advance upon Manila, a strong line of works had been completed, about twelve hundred yards in length, its left coming down to the bay, while its right extended across the Calle Real and rested upon a practically impassable rice swamp just beyond a parallel road farther inland, running into the city from the village of Pasay. To construct and hold this line was a task of no small difficulty and hardship. Any exposure drew the enemy’s fire. Tropical rains were incessant, and shelter from them impossible. The soil was so wet that it could be held in place only by bagging it, and the mud
so deep that shoes were ruined and many men perforce went barefoot. One storm left two feet of water in part of the trenches.

Almost every night the Spaniards fired upon the American works, generally with both artillery and musketry. Greene's instructions were to make no reply unless they actually came out to attack him; but with raw troops posted close to the enemy's lines, and under fire for the first time in the darkness and rain, it proved impossible to enforce such an order strictly, and in four of these resultless nocturnal skirmishes a hundred and fifty thousand rounds of ammunition were expended. Almost every night, too, a few men were killed and wounded. It began to appear that though Greene's forward move was in accordance with the spirit of his orders, it was unfortunate that he had taken up so advanced a position so long before the besieging forces were prepared to strike a decisive blow.

For though General Merritt was anxious to end the army's discomfort by an immediate attack, Admiral Dewey now declared himself not quite ready for the final move. It may be remembered that in May and June the admiral had repeatedly reported that he could take Manila at any moment.* Since then he had been strengthened by the arrival of the Charleston, while the Spaniards had been weakened in numbers and morale by the long siege, by their losing fight with Aguinaldo, and by the growing hopelessness of their position between the American fleet and army and the insurgent forces. It is possible that the prolonged strain of an anxious situation had lessened Dewey's confidence and increased his caution; it is possible that he dreaded political

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* "I control bay completely, and can take city at any time," he said in his despatch of May 4th. Again, on May 13th: "I can take Manila at any moment"; and on July 3d: "This squadron can reduce the defences of Manila at any moment."
complications. To put into words what the admiral probably refrained from putting into words, if he should summon the Spaniards to surrender or stand his fire, and if one or more of the foreign squadrons should protest against a bombardment, he would find himself in a situation of great embarrassment, perhaps of humiliation. He had five cruisers, none of them armoured or very heavily armed; two monitors—the Monterey and the Monadnock—were on their way across the Pacific. The ten- and twelve-inch guns of these formidable fighting machines* would give him a trump card in any game he might be called upon to play; and he wished to wait for them, or at any rate for one of them, before taking action.

On August 4th the Monterey came into the bay fifty-four days from San Diego—a remarkable voyage for a coast-defence ship, even though she was towed most of the way by the collier Brutus. On the 5th General Greene went to General Merritt, who had remained on his transport, the Newport, and reported the situation at the front. Merritt sent him on to Dewey, who explained his wish for a little further delay. To silence the Spaniards’ heavy guns without risk of loss, he needed the Monterey to engage the city batteries; but she required time for slight repairs after her long journey. If the troops could not be withdrawn from the first line of trenches—which Greene naturally regarded as impossible—he would stand ready to aid them, if they were hard pressed, whenever they signalled to him from the beach; but he would prefer not to use his guns, except in case of necessity, as he did not desire to bring on a general engagement. Besides—although this is not mentioned in General

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* Sampson reported the monitors inefficient for such service as the San Juan expedition, because they lacked speed and were poor gun platforms in a swell. They were well suited for fighting in the smooth water of Manila Bay.
Greene's narrative—he was negotiating through the Belgian consul, M. André, for the peaceful surrender of the city.

Next day (August 6th) Dewey and Merritt had a further conference, and on the morning of the 7th one of the navy launches took into Manila the following joint note to the captain-general, Fermin Jaudenes, who had superseded General Augustin on the 4th:

*SIR: We have the honour to notify your excellency that operations of the land and naval forces of the United States against the defences of Manila may begin at any time after the expiration of forty-eight hours from the hour of receipt by you of this communication, or sooner if made necessary by an attack on your part.

This notice is given in order to afford you an opportunity to remove all noncombatants from the city.

General Jaudenes replied promptly, thanking the American commanders for their "humane sentiments," and saying that as he was surrounded by the insurgents he was "without places of refuge for the increased number of wounded, sick, women, and children now lodged within the walls."

As a result of the notice thus served upon the Spanish captain-general, there was no further firing, either by night or by day, upon the American trenches. Not another shot was exchanged between the opposing forces, until the last day of the campaign and the war.

At noon on the 9th the forty-eight hours had expired, and Manila expected an immediate bombardment. Red-cross flags were hoisted on buildings containing sick or wounded men. Boats came out of the Pasig carrying foreign residents, and the neutral squadrons steamed out of range. It was

* The change is said to have been made under orders from Madrid, for the reason that Augustin had requested permission to surrender without further resistance. The orders must presumably have been sent through one of the foreign squadrons at Manila.
noted as a significant fact—though perhaps its meaning was exaggerated—that the British and the Japanese vessels took up a position beside Dewey's, off Cavite, while the fleets of Germany and France moved away northward into the bay. But there was no bombardment. Instead, another joint note was sent to Jaudenes, formally demanding a surrender:

Sir: The inevitable suffering in store for the wounded, sick, women, and children, in the event that it becomes our duty to reduce the defences of the walled town in which they are gathered, will, we feel assured, appeal successfully to the sympathies of a general capable of making the determined and prolonged resistance which your excellency has exhibited after the loss of your naval forces, and without hope of succour.

We therefore submit, without prejudice to the high sentiments of honour and duty which your excellency entertains, that surrounded on every side as you are by a constantly increasing force, with a powerful fleet in your front, and deprived of all prospect of reinforcement and assistance, a most useless sacrifice of life would result in the event of an attack, and therefore every consideration of humanity makes it imperative that you should not subject your city to the horrors of a bombardment. Accordingly, we demand the surrender of the city of Manila, and the Spanish forces under your command.

The captain-general replied with a refusal to surrender, but offered to refer the question to Madrid if time were granted him to send and receive a message by way of Hong-Kong. As this would involve a delay of several days, Dewey and Merritt declined the proposal, and made final arrangements for an attack. At the same time, almost up to the last moment, they continued their negotiations through the Belgian consul. M. André's mediation would no doubt have been entirely successful had not the Spanish officers feared the disapproval of the home Government in case they laid down their arms without a fight. As it was, though no such agreement was officially made or recorded, it was tacitly understood that nothing more than a show of resistance would be offered. Manila, with its two
hundred and fifty thousand people, lay at the mercy of Dewey’s guns; the insurgents had cut off its water supply, leaving it dependent upon the rains, and upon such food as was stored in the city; its garrison must have surrendered, before long, either to the Americans or to the still more hated and dreaded Aguinaldo.

The reports of the army officers who commanded in the action of August 13th scarcely give a historical account of the events of the memorable day that saw the American flag hoisted over the capital of the Philippines. They relate the advance of their troops, the capture of the Spanish lines, the entry into the city, and its surrender, as if that told the whole story. As a matter of fact, though there was some real fighting, and though it was not the fault of the American troops that there was not more, the land “battle” of Manila was a curious and Pickwickian sort of combat. The Philippine capital was practically taken when Dewey destroyed Montojo’s squadron on the morning of May 1st. The affair of August 13th was little more than a formality. The Spaniards had seventy pieces of modern artillery, of calibres up to nine inches, but they did not use them, with the exception of two small guns in the trenches, Dewey having promised M. André that if their batteries remained silent he would throw no shells into the city. Of Jaudenes’ thirteen thousand men only a very small part contested the American advance, though he might have massed nearly his whole force to meet it. Five thousand were held behind the fortifications of the old city, where they stood, without firing a shot, to watch Greene’s men march under the walls.

Had Dewey’s fleet held aloof, had there been no besieging army of insurgents, and had the Spaniards resisted with all their power, Merritt’s men would very probably have taken Manila;
but the battle would have been an entirely different one.

The plan of attack was that Dewey should open fire upon Fort San Antonio, at Malate, seconded by Greene's artillery—seven of the Utah guns, and three lent by the navy and manned by men of the Third Artillery. When the bombardment seemed to have been effective, Greene's brigade, on the American left, near the beach, was to advance upon the Spanish works. MacArthur,* who had the Astor Battery and one of the Utah guns, was to follow a similar programme on the right, where the centre of the Spanish position was a blockhouse marked as "No. 14" on the plan of the Manila defences. The admiral was then to signal a demand for the city's surrender, and it was understood that this would be yielded, although it was not known just how much resistance would satisfy the Spaniards. The Oregon regiment was to come up from Cavite on a transport, in readiness to go ashore and take possession. The division commander, General Anderson, went over from Cavite to direct operations at the front; General Merritt did not go ashore, making his headquarters on the Zafiro.

At half past nine the Olympia fired the first shot. The artillery on shore promptly followed suit, and the bombardment was kept up for three quarters of an hour, the Spaniards making no reply.

* By an order dated August 1st, Major-General Merritt organized his forces into a division (the second division of the Eighth Corps), under Brigadier-General Anderson, whose headquarters were at Cavite. The division consisted of two brigades:

First Brigade (Brigadier-General MacArthur)—Fourteenth and Twenty-third Infantry, Thirteenth Minnesota, First North Dakota, First Idaho, First Wyoming, and Astor Battery.

Second Brigade (Brigadier-General Greene)—Eighteenth Infantry, First California, First Nebraska, First Colorado, Tenth Pennsylvania, Third Artillery, Utah Artillery, and Company A, United States Engineers.

The Second Oregon, the California Heavy Artillery, and a signal-corps detachment were stationed at Cavite, under the immediate orders of General Anderson, who remained at that point until August 13th. General Merritt did not go ashore until Manila surrendered.
The Manila Campaign

whatever. Then, Fort San Antonio having been heavily buffeted, and its magazine exploded, Greene sent the First Colorado forward along the beach, and signalled the navy to cease firing. As the Colorado men advanced, a few shots came from behind the Spanish lines. They volleyed in reply, forded the shallow channel in front of the fort, and entered its battered walls without opposition. The garrison had deserted it, carrying off the breech-blocks of the guns, and leaving behind a wounded man and two dead.

MacArthur's artillery, on the right, opened on the enemy's lines while Dewey was bombarding Fort San Antonio, the Utah gun firing upon Blockhouse Fourteen, from which no response came, and the Astor Battery, on the extreme right, engaging in a brief duel with a couple of field guns in the Spanish lines. These latter having ceased firing, a squad of the Twenty-third Infantry scouted forward and found that the enemy's trenches were abandoned. The brigade then advanced, and the Thirteenth Minnesota occupied the blockhouse, where the American flag was hoisted about twenty minutes past eleven. Still pushing forward, no resistance was encountered till the Minnesota regiment, leading the way, entered the streets of the suburban village of Cingalon.

Here, of course, the ground had not been reconnoitred. There was a blockhouse in the village, with emplacements—fortunately empty—for six guns. It was held by the rear guard of the retreating Spaniards, who fired into the Minnesota men at short range, causing them to fall back in some disorder. The position was a strong one, and it was obstinately held, though MacArthur brought up his force as rapidly as he could over the difficult ground. He was hampered by the necessity of moving along a single road, with thick timber and rice swamps on either hand. Only a small part of
his brigade could be put on the firing line; and the check was so serious that General Anderson, who was now in Malate, sent over the field telegraph a message instructing him to retreat from Cingalon and make his way over to the left to follow Greene's advance. This was at twenty-five minutes past one o'clock, but when MacArthur received the order—which is not mentioned in his report—the Spanish fire was dying out, and a little later the blockhouse was abandoned, leaving the way to Paco and Manila open.

Meanwhile Greene's brigade, entering Malate, had a brief exchange of fire with the Spanish positions farther inland; but no serious resistance was offered, and after clearing the enemy's line of trenches the American troops marched steadily forward through Malate and Ermita, keeping close to the bay. The Callao, the captured Spanish gun-boat, now commanded by Lieutenant Tappan, moved beside them along the shore. Occasional shots still came from street corners and from houses, though when they reached the open space of the Luneta—the water-side parade ground of Manila—and were in full view of the old walled city, a white flag was seen flying above its ancient fortifications.

The white ensign of surrender had been hoisted shortly after eleven o'clock, in answer to Dewey's signalled demand, and Lieutenant Brumby and Lieutenant-Colonel Whittier, representing the admiral and General Merritt, had already gone ashore to negotiate terms with General Jaudenes. The surrender was of course complete, but Spanish honour was salved by the proviso that the garrison should "capitulate with all the honours of war." This enabled them to claim the privilege for which Toral pleaded so hard at Santiago—that of carrying their arms back to Spain. Merritt yielded the point—which would no doubt have been disallowed by his
official superiors had he been in communication with Washington, as Shafter was. For the rest, the articles—finally signed on Sunday, August 14th, by a commission consisting of General Greene, Lieutenant-Colonels Whittier and Crowder, of Merritt’s staff, and Captain Lamberton, chief of staff to Dewey, and by General de la Pena and Colonels Reyes and Feliñ for the Spaniards—provided that the city, its defences, and all public property, should be turned over to the victorious army; that Jau­denes’s troops should be prisoners of war pending the conclusion of a peace treaty, the officers retaining their side arms, horses, and personal property; and that the question of their return to Spain should be left to the United States Government.

The casualties in Greene’s brigade, on August 13th, were one man killed and six wounded; in MacArthur’s brigade, four killed and thirty-nine wounded. In the firing between the trenches, earlier in the month, Greene had fifteen killed and sixty wounded, making the entire American loss in action during the Manila campaign twenty killed and one hundred and five wounded.

It appears that most of the fighting on the 13th, and most if not all of the few casualties to Merritt’s men, took place after the white flag had gone up over the Manila walls. The order to cease firing may have been delayed in transmission to some parts of the Spanish lines, or may not have been promptly obeyed when received. Each army, it seems, blamed the other for the desultory exchange of shots that accompanied Greene’s march into the city. At one point a body of insurgents, on the road from Paco, had fired upon the Spaniards, and the latter replied with a volley that killed one man and wounded two of the First California, the only loss the regiment suffered during the day.

Merritt had hoped, by closely following up the retreating Spaniards, and by holding the bridges
on the roads entering Manila from the south and east, to keep Aguinaldo's men out of the city, where their presence could only be a serious embarrassment and a menace to law and order. Moreover, their exclusion appears to have been part of the understanding with the captain-general. Unfortunately, during the blocking of MacArthur's advance at Cingalon, some two or three thousand of them made their way in from Paco and established themselves at several points in the suburbs. They are said to have looted some houses, among them the residence of a Spanish official in Ermita, where they broke open the safe and appropriated the funds it contained. Though they were held in check by the American troops, and though they afterward withdrew from the city, the friction thus caused helped to precipitate the disastrous rupture that ultimately resulted.

By the evening of the 13th, except for the positions held by the insurgents, Manila was effectively occupied by the American troops. The Oregon regiment had come up the Pasig in boats and taken possession of the walled city, where Merritt made his headquarters in the ayuntamiento, or city hall. MacArthur's brigade was distributed through Malate, Ermita, and the southern suburbs, while Greene held Binondo, Tondo, and the northern districts. MacArthur himself was appointed governor of the city.

And so, almost without a blow, the seat of Spanish power in the east was captured, with thirteen thousand prisoners of war, twenty-two thousand small arms, seventy modern and several hundred obsolete pieces of artillery, and a public fund of nine hundred thousand dollars.
CHAPTER XVII

THE LATTER DAYS OF THE CUBAN BLOCKADE

After outlining the campaigns of Santiago, Porto Rico, and Manila, it only remains, in order to complete the military and naval record of the war, to chronicle several minor engagements that took place on the Cuban coast during the last two months of hostilities. The story of the blockade has already been briefly given up to the point at which the advent of Cervera changed the course of events. When the struggle centred about Santiago, and the main strength of the American navy was concentrated there under Admiral Sampson, Commodore Watson was left in command off Havana. At this time, it may be recalled, the blockade covered only a hundred miles of the island's northern coast, from Bahia Honda to Cardenas, and the port of Cienfuegos on the south; but it was proposed to extend it as soon as possible. To reinforce Watson's scanty fleet—composed of small armed auxiliaries—vessels were drawn from Commodore Howell's squadron, patrolling the North Atlantic coast; and on June 19th Sampson sent word to Washington:

The President may declare immediately the blockade of whole southern coast.

Three days later Secretary Long telegraphed to the admiral:

It is proposed to proclaim the blockade on the east* side of Cape Cruz, Cuba, to Cape Frances, Cuba. When will you be ready?

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* This word should probably read "south."
And again on June 24th:

Reports constantly received of provisions reaching Spanish forces via southern port of Cuba, and of preparation at Mexico, Jamaica, to forward further supplies; therefore the department desires greatly to keep all blockade effective, to establish blockade from Cape Cruz, Cuba, to Cape Frances, Cuba. When shall you be ready for the latter to be proclaimed?

On the 28th the proclamation was issued, the port of San Juan, in Porto Rico, being included. This set the navy a difficult task. Sampson had telegraphed, on June 23d, that the detachment of men-of-war for convoy duty with transports would "so reduce the available ships for blockade as to make it quite impossible to maintain strict blockade on the whole of Cuba. Vessels running blockade," he added, "are smaller in size but greatly increased in number."

Watson had now been ordered to Guantanamo, to organize a squadron for a strategic move against the coast of Spain; and to take his place, on June 25th, Commodore Howell was instructed to bring his remaining ships south. On July 1st, when he reached Key West, Howell was put in charge of the blockade, his new command being designated as the "first North Atlantic squadron," and being still subject to Sampson's authority as commander-in-chief. At this date the admiral had a total of ninety-eight vessels under his orders.

During June, the tedious routine of the blockade was enlivened by but little fighting. On the 13th the Yankee—ordered to Cienfuegos after her brief service with Sampson at Santiago, and specially commissioned to watch for the blockade runner Purissima Concepcion, which was afterward destroyed at Manzanillo—had a brush with two Spanish vessels, the Gallicia and a smaller gunboat; and though the enemy had the aid of shore bat-
Firat attack on
Manllanlllo,
June
30-

teries, her amateur gunners—the New York naval
reserve men—dove their antagonists into the har­
bour. Cubans with whom Commander Brownson
communicated a few days later told him that the
Gallicia was so badly damaged when she retreated
that she was beached to prevent her from sinking.
The Yankee was not hit, though she had one man
wounded by fragments of a shell that burst just
outside a gun port.

A week later (June 20th) she exchanged shots
with another gunboat at Casilda, the port of Trini­
dad, forty miles east of Cienfuegos—as did also the
Dixie on the 22d. On the 29th the Dixie, the
Eagle, and the Yankton practised upon a body of
Spanish cavalry at Rio Hondo, between Casilda and
Cienfuegos.

The chief Spanish strongholds on the south
coast, west of Santiago, were Cienfuegos and Man­
zanillo. The first reconnaissance of
the latter was made on June 30th, by
three auxiliaries of the “mosquito”
class—the Hist, the Hornet, and the
Wompatuck. This adventurous little squadron, two
yachts and a tug, with Lieutenant Young, of the
Hist, as its senior officer, steamed boldly into the
bay—a wide, shallow sheet of water behind a line
of keys. In the entrance it encountered a Spanish
gunboat, which was speedily disabled and blown up.
Nearing Manzanillo, quite a formidable array of de­
fences was found. Five gunboats and some armed
pontoons were drawn up across the inner harbour;*

First attack on
Manzanillo,
June 30.

* Lieutenant Young reports seeing a large torpedo boat, four gun­
boats, and four large pontoons. Lieutenant Helm, of the Hornet, ob­
served “five to six armed vessels.” Lieutenant Jungen, of the Wom­
patuck, saw a torpedo boat, three small gun vessels, an old steam
ruiser, and a sailing vessel. Captain Barreda, the Spanish commander
of the port, states that his force consisted of five gunboats—the Guan­
tanamo, the Estrella, the Delgado Pareja, the Guardian, and the Cuba
Espanola, the last two being disabled—and the pontoon Maria, supported
by the “few guns” that the city had. He reports his loss as two killed
and seven wounded on the ships, and a few wounded on shore. On
behind them were several small batteries on the water front, and another in a fort above the town, while for two miles the shore was lined with soldiers.

Though the odds were heavily against them, the three little American ships steamed up within a mile of the enemy, and for an hour and a half a brisk fire was exchanged. The attacking vessels were repeatedly hit, but received no material injury till a shot cut the Hornet's steam pipe, temporarily disabling her, and scalding three of her crew. She was towed out of range by the Wompatuck, and the squadron withdrew. The Spaniards had suffered far more severely. One of their gunboats and a sloop loaded with soldiers were sunk, and a pontoon burned; but it was clear, as Lieutenant Young reported to Sampson, that a much stronger force than his was needed to capture the place.

The Scorpion (Lieutenant-Commander Marix) and the Osceola (Lieutenant Purcell) were to have joined in the attack on Manzanillo, but they did not receive their orders in time. Arriving on the following day (July 1st), and missing the Hist and her consorts, they made an independent reconnaissance, steaming into the bay and opening fire on the Spanish gunboats. The return fire was so heavy and accurate that after a twenty minutes' engagement Marix decided to withdraw. The two ships remained outside, watching the port, and capturing some small prizes. The skipper of a British schooner, the Edmund Blunt, which came out carrying refugees to Jamaica, told them that the town was in great straits for food.

On that same day (July 1st) Commodore Howell arrived at Key West from the north, and took personal charge of the north coast blockade. As to the

the other hand, the captain of the British ship Edmund Blunt told an officer of the Scorpion that an American shell killed thirteen men on the Maria.
extent of this, there was some doubt and misunderstanding. For once, the clocklike workings of the Navy Department seem to have slipped a cog. Howell found no orders awaiting him at Key West, and to his request for instructions the only answer was a despatch saying that his duty was to be "that formerly performed by Commodore Watson as inspector of blockade." Taking his flagship, the cruiser San Francisco, to Havana, he found there only Watson's directions to the vessels on that one station. He therefore confined himself to patrolling the coast from Bahia Honda to Cardenas, the limits fixed by the President's proclamation of April 21st.

On July 9th, however, Sampson sent him instructions to blockade the whole north coast of Cuba, as far as his force permitted, and especially the part of it between Nipe and Nuevitas, to prevent communication between Havana and the Spanish troops in Santiago province. Howell carried out the order as well as he could, though he reported that he needed fifty vessels—more than twice as many as he could muster*—to do the work effectively. He also applied to the Navy Department for more precise information as to the status of the blockade; but the misunderstanding seems to have continued, for on August 8th he received the following despatch from Secretary Long:

* By what authority are you blockading Sagua La Grande? It is not included in the President's proclamation. Sampson has not informed department that he has blockaded it, and therefore no proclamation has been

* On August 3d Howell reported only fourteen vessels at their stations on the north-coast blockade—nine off Havana, two off Matanzas, two off Sagua la Grande, one off Cardenas, none off such ports as Mariel and Bahia Honda—and added: "I desire to call your attention to the small number of ships with which I am supposed to keep up an efficient blockade of over four hundred miles of coast, and also to the fact that most of these ships are of low speed, light gun fire, and would be entirely at the mercy of a hurricane."
issued. Courts are releasing vessels captured. Claims for damages will be heavy. Protests from three governments already received at State Department.

In reply, Howell informed the secretary of the directions received from Sampson, and stated that he had allowed the Nuevitas to Nipe blockade to lapse after the surrender of Santiago, but was patrolling the coast farther west, between Cardenas and Nuevitas, in order to prevent the landing of supplies for Havana, which, he had learned, was being done on a large scale. Secretary Long answered by instructing him to restrict the blockade to its original limits, not molesting vessels trading with other ports, unless they were Spanish or carried contraband cargoes; and in compliance with this he withdrew his ships from the coast east of Cardenas.

Though Howell's force was so small, it made two captures in July that seriously discouraged the business of blockade running. The victims were two Spanish Atlantic liners, vessels of five thousand tons each—the Alfonso XII, which, after showing her heels to the Eagle off the Isle of Pines, was run ashore at Mariel by the Hawk, and set on fire by shells from the Castine; and the Santo Domingo, which, pursued by the Eagle, met a like fate near Cape Frances, on the south coast. The latter vessel was armed with two five-inch guns—which she did not attempt to use—and carried in her hold two twelve-inch rifles and a full cargo of provisions, intended for Havana.

The capture of Nipe Bay, on the 21st of July, was of importance because it secured another harbour of refuge for the blockading squadron and a half-way station on the direct route to Porto Rico. It was executed by the Annapolis (Commander Hunker), the Wasp (Lieutenant Ward), the Topeka (Lieutenant-Commander Cowles), and the Leyden
(Ensign Crosley), under direct orders from Sampson. Cuban insurgents had informed Cowles that the place was held by eight hundred Spanish troops, the nine-hundred-ton gunboat Jorge Juan, and a smaller vessel, with mines and a battery to defend the entrance. Approaching the mouth of the bay, Commander Hunker, senior officer of the attacking squadron, ordered the Wasp and the Leyden to steam ahead and develop the enemy's strength. The young officers commanding the two small vessels were so eager for the fray that they raced forward at full speed,* the Wasp overhauling her consort and reaching the entrance first. The shore battery proved to be dismantled; the mines were there, as was afterward found, but the daring little craft passed them without injury—probably for the same reason that made the torpedoes in Guantanamo Bay so harmless to the Texas and the Marblehead.† In the bay, quite unprepared for action—no doubt through misplaced confidence in the protection of the mines—lay the Jorge Juan, at anchor, with her awnings spread, her boats lowered alongside, and her firemen hurriedly attempting to get up steam. The Wasp and the Leyden promptly opened fire, which she returned with such of her guns—her main battery consisted of three six-inch rifles—as she could bring to bear, being of course unable to manoeuvre. The Annapolis and the Topeka were within range a few minutes later, and in half an hour the Jorge Juan was sinking. A boat from the Leyden captured her colours just before she went down, and the Annapolis took off one of her small guns. Her crew, or most of it, escaped ashore.

* Lieutenant Ward was so anxious to establish the fact that he was instructed to go in first that he submitted a special report citing the names of thirty-five witnesses—members of his crew—who, he said, could testify that Commander Hunker authorized him to take the lead.
† Page 202.
The other vessel reported to be in the bay was not to be found. Insurgents afterward told Commander Hunker that the Spaniards had taken her up a creek and sunk her, and had then abandoned the place, retreating to Holguin.

Meanwhile, on the south coast, Lieutenant-Commander Marix was still blockading Manzanillo, but had deferred another attack until an adequate force could be mustered. He sent word to Sampson (by the Hist, on July 11th) that he was willing and anxious to assault, but that he considered it his duty—though it would probably place another officer in command—to recommend that a protected man-of-war should be assigned to the work. As a result the Wilmington (Commander Todd) and the Helena (Commander Swinburne) were detached to join Marix’s squadron, and on the 17th these two gunboats rendezvoused with the Scorpion, the Hist, the Hornet, the Wompatuck, and the Osceola at Guayabal, twenty miles west of Manzanillo, Commander Todd being senior officer. Early next morning they were in the bay, where they lay for three hours deliberately firing upon the Spanish ships, opening at long range and gradually closing in, until nothing was to be seen afloat in the harbour. All the enemy’s gunboats were burned or sunk, as was also the blockade-runner Purissima Concepcion. The American ships, which were entirely uninjured, then withdrew, Sampson having ordered them not to engage the forts.

One of the navy’s marvellously few casualties during the war occurred on August 2d, when the Bancroft, which had been patrolling about the Isle of Pines,* sent a launch into Cortes Bay in pursuit of a schooner, and one of the boat’s

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* It had been believed that provisions were being sent to Havana from the Isle of Pines, but Commander Clover reported that this was probably untrue, as food was very scarce on the island.
crew was killed by rifle fire from an ambuscade on shore.

The last action on the southern coast of Cuba was the fourth and final attack on Manzanillo, on August 12th. On the 9th the Newark—now commanded by Captain Goodrich, formerly of the St. Louis, Captain Barker having been transferred to the Oregon—and the Resolute, carrying Colonel Huntington's marine battalion, left Guantanamo for the Isle of Pines; but as some smaller vessels, which were to have accompanied them, were not ready, Captain Goodrich decided, at the suggestion of Lieutenant Young, of the Hist, to strike at Manzanillo while waiting. With a flotilla consisting of the Newark, the Resolute, the Suwanee, the Hist, the Osceola, and the Alvarado—the last being the gunboat captured at Santiago, now commanded by Lieutenant Blue—he entered the bay on the morning of the 12th, and sent in a demand for the surrender of the town and garrison, which was refused. Goodrich then began to use his guns. After half an hour's firing he saw, or thought he saw, a white flag, and ordered the Alvarado, also flying the signal of truce, to go in and communicate with the Spaniards. The latter, however, continued their fire, and the bombardment was resumed, and kept up until sunset, the Newark firing an occasional shell during the night.

At daybreak white flags were seen in the town, and a boat came out with the news that the peace protocol had been signed. The armistice robbed the navy of another victory, for it appears that the Spanish comandante had drawn up a formal document of surrender on the previous evening, and was intending to send it to Captain Goodrich in the morning.

The last shots of the Havana blockade were heard at dawn on the 12th, when the San Francisco went within range of the batteries, which fired
on her, and a twelve-inch shell from the Morro went through her stern, doing but little damage. The last shots of the war were exchanged between the Mangrove and two Spanish gunboats off Cai-barien, in Santa Clara province, on the morning of August 14th.
CHAPTER XVIII

THE CONCLUSION OF PEACE

In the early days of July, when Cervera's fleet had been destroyed; when the fall of Santiago was imminent, and the American troops were already preparing to move upon Porto Rico; when the last hope of relieving Manila was abandoned, and Spain itself was threatened with attack, the hopelessness of prolonging the struggle began to be evident even at Madrid. The air was full of rumours of negotiations for peace. Rumours became certainty on the 26th of the month, when Jules Cambon, the French ambassador at Washington, called at the White House and presented an informal but definite inquiry, on behalf of Sagasta's Government, as to the terms upon which the United States would be willing to end the war.

He got his answer on the 30th, in a long interview with the President. The conditions offered were that Spain should renounce all claim to sovereignty in Cuba, and evacuate the island at once; that Porto Rico, with its dependent islets, and one of the Ladrones, should be ceded to the United States; and that the American forces should occupy the city and bay of Manila pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace, by which the "control, disposition, and government" of the Philippines should be finally decided.

Sagasta's cabinet met on Monday, August 1st, to consider these terms. It took several days for Span-
ish pride to swallow so severe a dose of humiliation; and it was not until the 7th that the minister of state, the Duke of Almodovar del Rio, replied. His note accepted the first two propositions; to the third it also gave a seeming acceptance, though in somewhat ambiguous terms. To remove all doubt, Secretary Day drew up a protocol stating clearly, and without the slightest modification, the terms already offered to Spain; and this document he sent to M. Cambon for signature. Its precise contents were:

**The Peace Protocol.**

**ARTICLE I.** Spain will relinquish all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba.

**ART. II.** Spain will cede to the United States the island of Porto Rico and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies, and also an island in the Ladrones, to be selected by the United States.

**ART. III.** The United States will occupy and hold the city, bay, and harbour of Manila pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace, which shall determine the control, disposition, and government of the Philippines.

**ART. IV.** Spain will immediately evacuate Cuba, Porto Rico, and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies; and to this end each Government will, within ten days after the signing of this protocol, appoint commissioners, and the commissioners so appointed shall, within thirty days after the signing of this protocol, meet at Havana for the purpose of arranging and carrying out the details of the aforesaid evacuation of Cuba and the adjacent Spanish islands; and each Government will, within ten days after the signing of this protocol, also appoint other commissioners, who shall, within thirty days after the signing of this protocol, meet at San Juan, in Porto Rico, for the purpose of arranging and carrying out the details of the aforesaid evacuation of Porto Rico and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies.

**ART. V.** The United States and Spain will each appoint not more than five commissioners to treat of peace, and the commissioners so appointed shall meet at Paris not later than October 1, 1898, and proceed to the negotiation and conclusion of a treaty of peace, which treaty shall be subject to ratification according to the respective constitutional forms of the two countries.

**ART. VI.** Upon the conclusion and signing of this protocol hostilities between the two countries shall be sus-
THE CONCLUSION OF PEACE

pended, and notice to that effect shall be given as soon as possible by each Government to the commanders of its military and naval forces.

Once more, of course, a reference to Madrid was necessary; but acceptance was the only possible course, and M. Cambon was authorized to sign the protocol with Secretary Day. The formal act that ended hostilities took place in the cabinet room of the White House, at twenty-three minutes past four o'clock on the afternoon of August 12th. It has already been told how the news reached Miles’s army in Porto Rico just in time to stop a battle at Aibonito and another near Cayey; how it prevented the surrender of Manzanillo, but was too late to save Manila.

On August 26th the President named the American peace commissioners—William R. Day, Secretary of State, chairman; Senator Davis, of Minnesota, chairman of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee; Senator Frye, of Maine; Justice White, of the United States Supreme Court; and Whitelaw Reid, formerly minister to France. One of these, Justice White, declined to serve, and his place was taken by Senator Gray, of Delaware, a leading Democratic member of the Senate. Spain’s commissioners were Eugenio Montero Rios, president of the Spanish senate, chairman; Señor de Abarzuza, a member of the same body, and formerly his country’s ambassador at Paris; Señor de Garnica, a justice of the supreme court; General Rafael Cerero; and Señor de Villa Urrutia, Spanish minister to Belgium.

The commission met in Paris, on October 1st, the French Government providing quarters for it in the foreign office on the Quai d’Orsai. Its conferences lasted ten weeks, the Spaniards fighting hard for concessions that would at least enable their Government to put the best possible face on
the disasters it had brought upon itself. Cuba being dealt with first, they sought to free Spain from the huge debt that she had contracted in her maladministration of the island’s affairs, urging that international law requires that the liabilities of a territory should pass with its sovereignty. The American commissioners declined to admit the principle in this particular case, for the reason—a reason of indisputable equity—that the so-called Cuban debt was not contracted in any sense for the benefit of Cuba, but was incurred by Spain in her ineffectual and costly efforts to subjugate the island.

The Americans also declined a proposition that Cuba should be ceded direct to the United States, the Spanish contention being that if Spain withdrew her authority, and the United States asserted none, the island would be left in a state of anarchy. This was a mere technical objection, perhaps a deliberate attempt at embarrassment, the Washington Government having pledged itself before the world to leave Cuba to her own people.

A much more serious difference arose when the question of the Philippines was taken up, and the Spaniards were first informed (October 31st) that entire possession of the great eastern archipelago was required for the United States. The demand was referred to Madrid, where it was answered by a flat refusal; and it actually appeared, for a time, that the negotiations might be broken off. It seems clear that the Spanish Government regarded the protocol as leaving its sovereignty in the Philippines intact, and not open to subsequent challenge. In a despatch sent on August 7th the Duke of Almodovar del Rio declared that in assenting to the clause about Manila, his country did not renounce her title to the islands, but left it to the peace commission “to agree upon such reforms as the condition of these dependencies and the civilization of their natives may render desirable.” But it is equally
clear that the terms of the document have an entirely different meaning. They express precisely what Secretary Day meant them to express—that the United States Government had not decided whether it desired to annex the Philippines, and that their ownership was left for later settlement. "Possession" was the word in the original draft of the protocol; "disposition" was substituted at M. Cambon's suggestion, as a word less offensive to Spanish sensibilities.

The Spaniards suggested arbitration as to the meaning of the protocol, which was of course refused, and no progress was made until November 21st, when the American commissioners made a final proposition—practically an ultimatum, allowing a week for a definite reply. The demand for the archipelago was not modified, but it was promised that for ten years Spanish ships and merchandise should enter Philippine ports on equal terms with American traders, and that the United States should pay to Spain the sum of twenty million dollars. An impression went abroad that the money was offered as a repayment of such part of the Spanish Government's past expenditures in the islands as represented actual betterments. Spain's commissioners may have accepted it as such—perhaps to veil the commercial character of the transaction; but it appears that the offer was intended by the American commissioners—at any rate by most of them—as practically a proposition of sale and purchase, or at least a _douceur_ to facilitate the desired agreement.* Neither in the wording of the proposal as submitted on November 21st, nor in the treaty as finally drawn, is any reason or consideration for the payment specified.

* That this view was taken by the American commissioners has been explicitly stated by at least two of them. At the dinner of the Ohio Society in New York, February 25, 1899, Senator Gray spoke of the choice that presented itself of taking the islands either "by the ruthless
On the 28th, the day by which an answer was required, the Spaniards signified their acceptance, coupling it with a formal and of course ineffectual protest. Recognising the impossibility of resisting their powerful antagonist, they declared, and to avoid still greater loss and suffering to their country, they could do nothing but yield to the victor's terms, however harsh. And so, on the evening of December 10th, the commissioners met for the last time to sign the treaty that freed Cuba from Spain, and transferred a colonial empire from an ancient monarchy of Europe to the young and mighty republic of the west.

hand of conquest, or by some concessions that comported with the greatness and character of this country. And therefore," he went on, "we believed that it was better . . . to take them by voluntary cession and by purchase, so to speak."

Secretary Day, in a letter published in the daily press on October 12, 1899, quotes and approves Senator Gray's statement, and adds: "It was not claimed that the United States had a right to the Philippine Islands as a matter of conquest. By the cession for a consideration we obtained an indisputable title."

On the other hand, Mr. Whitelaw Reid (Later Aspects of Our New Duties, page 9) says that when the American commissioners first demanded the cession of the islands, they "accompanied this demand for a transfer of sovereignty with a stipulation for assuming any existing indebtedness of Spain, incurred for public works and improvements of a pacific character in the Philippines. The United States thus asserted its right to the archipelago for indemnity, and at the same time committed itself to the principle of payment on account of the Philippine debt"; and that though the ultimatum gave no reason for the twenty-million-dollar payment, "it was really nothing but the old proposition, with the mention for the first time of a specific sum for the payment, and without any question of 'pacific improvements.' That sum just balanced the Philippine debt—forty million Mexican, or, say, twenty million American dollars."

The difference of opinion between Mr. Reid and his colleagues is curious.
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