

FORTY-FIVE YEARS UNDER THE FLAG

BY
WINFIELD SCOTT SCHLEY
REAR ADMIRAL, U. S. N.

ILLUSTRATED



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MCMIV



Very truly Yours

W. A. Chesley

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PREFACE

In preparing this history of forty-five years of service under the flag of the United States, the writer has felt that it was his duty, while still in vigorous health, to record the incidents and activities of a career that has covered many important years in the nation's progress. This service has included, in times of peace, all quarters of the globe. It has imposed responsibilities and afforded experiences that do not usually come to naval men, and at the same time it has given opportunities to observe other civilizations and to visit other countries. In time of war it has included the Civil War, the storming of the Korean fortifications on Kang Hoa Island and participation in the war with Spain that ended in the total destruction of the Spanish fleet and the capture of Admiral Cervera, his officers and men, on July 3, 1898, off Santiago de Cuba. In a description of these incidents and activities it has not been possible to cover, in the preliminary chapters, everything that happened in the times there referred to.

The main purpose has been to adhere to a simple recital of experiences in the order of their sequence, and to keep in view the fact that others who served with the writer shared with him in all that these pages relate. In the chapters which relate to the operations against Cervera's fleet the purpose has been to record the events from the writer's own view-point, to criticize in a spirit of fairness, but without malice, bearing in mind that wherever it has been necessary to refer to appar-

① B. 11. 7. 01,

3, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100

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ent inconsistencies in the statements of others, the author has endeavored always to avoid unnecessary harshness. Through the courtesy of Secretary Moody recourse has been had to official papers which were not available before his accession to office. The writer has been pleased to find that his memory of many circumstances was verified almost to the day and hour, so ineradicably were events impressed upon him at the time of their occurrence.

Whether the many incidents of this service have been useful, whether they effected much or little for the good of the country, it is only fair to say that, in times of danger and duty, the writer endeavored to do the work set before him without fear of personal consequences. With this thought in mind, he has felt moved, as a duty to his wife, his children and his name, to leave a record of his long professional life, which has not been without some prestige, at least, for the flag he has loved and under which he has served.

WASHINGTON, July 20, 1904.

W. S. S.

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FORTY-FIVE YEARS UNDER THE FLAG

CHAPTER I

BIRTHPLACE, SCHOOL-DAYS AND ANNAPOLIS

1839-1860

In the year of our Lord 1839 the subject of these memoirs was born at Richfields, Frederick County, Maryland, the home of his parents, John Thomas Schley and Georgianna Virginia Schley.

On his paternal grandparents' side the descent was German and Huguenot and on the maternal Scotch-Irish. John Schley, an eminent citizen of Frederick in the last century, was descended from John Thomas Schley, one of two brothers who emigrated to America in 1739, from Phalsburg, Bavaria, took up a residence in Frederick County, and named it after Frederick of Prussia, surnamed "The Great." John Schley's wife, Mary Ferree Shriver, was descended from Louis du Bois, a Huguenot, who emigrated to America and founded the colony of Huguenots at New Paltz, in Ulster County, New York, in the year 1660. Like all the settlers of America in those older days, these pioneers preferred the dangers lurking in the wilderness of America, and even the privations therein, to the militarism, the discriminations and distinctions of caste and class, and the intolerant religious bigotry of their day in the older countries of Europe.


John McClure and Mary Ann Thornburg McClure, the maternal grandparents, were Scotch-Irish. They removed from Ireland to Baltimore before the war of the Revolution, and

lived in that city until their death. John McClure was captain of a company of riflemen in the Maryland defenders in the War of 1812. His accounts, scrupulously kept, are still in existence, and show him to have been methodical and exact in dealings and in details in matters of money. John McClure was identified with the development of Baltimore. Like the older Schleys, he was an excellent citizen, who had connected himself with the earlier settlers of the State, and helped in gathering together family societies, which improved the laws, gave greater security to settlements, and in the end more stability to the State. His ideals were high.

Richfields, the home of the family, lay about three miles north of Frederick, on the Emmettsburg Turnpike, just north of the Tuscarora Creek. It embraced about 300 acres of cultivated, well-watered, fertile soil, lying on the bottom-land of the river east of the turnpike. Its rich fields yielded abundant crops of wheat, rye, corn, oats and hay. Its climate in summer was tempered by the cool breezes which came down from the mountain, distant some two miles to the westward. During the winter months these mountains served as a protecting barrier against the cutting northwest winds, which at that season brought bitter cold. The scenery of mountain and plain was indeed picturesque. The soil, always under careful cultivation in the early spring and summer months, presented a picture from the cleared mountain tops resembling the cultivated valleys of Europe.

In these surroundings the earlier years of the writer's life were passed. The primary school at Harmony Grove, a mile from the home, was where the preliminary education was begun and continued until he had reached his eighth year. With three older brothers he walked daily to school in all but the very worst weather, and during holidays fished with them in the Monocacy River, or trudged with them over the fields in the season, shooting varieties of game which at that time was abundant wherever there was covering.

It was in this outdoor life during school-days that the physique of after-life was cultivated, and the endurance necessary in the profession chosen was built up. As the service afterward embraced every variety of climate from the tropics to the



THE BIRTHPLACE OF ADMIRAL SCHLEY, RICHFIELDS, MARYLAND.

pole, the influence of outdoor life was important. Early to bed and early to rise became a rule, along with simpler and more wholesome ways of living, and thus were laid sure foundations for that health so necessary to a life which was to be full of activity and exposure afterward.

Early in life a cloud of sorrow and bereavement overshadowed the beautiful home in the death of a loving and beautiful mother at a moment when her care and guidance were most needed by the helpless family of little ones, the oldest being only thirteen years and the youngest only eleven months. This sad calamity had been preceded about a year by the loss of a younger brother and was followed a year later by that of the oldest brother, a promising lad of thirteen years. These sorrows in the father's life promoted the belief that the locality lacked healthfulness and decided him to dispose of the old home where his nine children had been born. "Richfields" was therefore sold, and the new life of the family was begun in Frederick some time in the year 1848; but the beauty and reposeful quiet of that country home near the mountains of western Maryland and on the banks of the picturesque Monocacy where the author spent his earliest years have survived among the sweetest memories of his life, filled as that life has been with much that has been eventful and historic. From 1848 to 1856 this newer life and its experiences were passed in Frederick. In the halcyon days of school life many were the visits paid to the home of Barbara Fritchie, whose fondness for children was always evident in her many kindnesses to them. Living near her home and seeing her almost daily, the writer had many opportunities to get from her hands the ginger cakes she always had in store for the boys. She was a living personality, but she seemed then to our boyish notions almost as old as it was possible to be.

The remembrance of school-days at Hammond's and Cassidy's primary schools, at the Frederick Academy under the tutelage of Nathaniel Vernon and Jesse Bonsal, and at St. John's College under the instruction of Fathers Macatee, Champion, Miller and Carroll, with the friends then made, has lived ever since among the cherished recollections of life. In those days of the long ago the patience of those teachers must have

been sorely tried by the boys, who held pleasure and holidays in higher esteem than plodding study, which was more interesting in some such ratio as the square of the distance separating us from books.

About the year 1855 a number of comparatively new books, such as *Midshipman Easy*, *Peter Simple*, *Jacob Faithful* and *Frank Mildmay*, written by that inimitable author of sea fiction, Captain Marryat, came into the writer's reach and so fascinated his young mind as to determine an almost unconquerable desire for a sea life. Under this influence, joined to the fact that his great namesake and sponsor, General Winfield Scott—a conspicuous figure in the war of 1812 and that of Mexico in 1847 and 1848—had encouraged the idea of a military life, and had promised his influence to this end when the writer had reached the proper age, a military career with its ambitions and hopes seemed to exclude thoughts of all others. Nothing was known of the limitations to a military life in that time, and no thought of its requirements, its sacrifices, its exposures or its responsibilities could enter a mind filled with dreams and hopes that the time would come in later life when there might be such opportunities as others had had to do some lasting benefit to their home and country.

Toward the end of the year 1855 events took such shape in the political outlook of the Fifth Congressional District of Maryland, where the author's family resided, that the Hon. H. W. Hoffman was elected to Congress. It so happened that during the contest, which was a spirited one, the author's relatives became influential in carrying the District by a handsome majority for Mr. Hoffman, who in turn acknowledged their services by nominating the writer for appointment as acting midshipman in the Navy early in the year 1856.

General Winfield Scott at that time was Commander-in-Chief of the armies of the United States, but owing to some misunderstanding with Mr. Jefferson Davis, Secretary of War under President Pierce, he had removed to New York City and was without influence to help in carrying out his expressed wishes and desires as to the writer's appointment, although he showed an active interest by means of letters and good advice ever afterward while he lived.

After the writer's appointment, the Navy Department, then under Secretary Dobbin, sent him two pamphlets setting forth the mental and physical requirements of candidates for admission to the Naval Academy at Annapolis, Md. In looking them over attentively, some apprehension was aroused that among the many defects from which the candidate must be free physically in order to secure admission, there might be some of which the candidate was not aware. Although the writer was in robust health from the outdoor life he had led and was fairly well advanced in study, he was unaware of any physical impediment; yet the anxiety in the interval of waiting was only relieved when the Board of Surgeons and the Academic Board of the academy, after careful examination, on the 20th day of September, 1856, pronounced him qualified for admission.

His life work only commenced with his admission to the academy. The course of study embraced a period of four years and was mainly technical. It was so arranged as to lead the student gradually and methodically over the various courses of instruction in mathematics, pure and applied; astronomy, theoretic and practical; navigation in all branches, including land and maritime surveying, physical geography, physics, chemistry, ordnance and gunnery, steam, shipbuilding, naval architecture, infantry and artillery tactics, history and English composition, international law, fleet tactics and maneuvers, French and Spanish.

The course of study was so arranged as to include two examinations each year—the first in February, the second in June—after which a practice cruise during the summer months was made in one of the old sailing ships of war, the *Preble* or *Plymouth*. In those days the cruise extended generally to the ports of western Europe, such as Plymouth, Cherbourg or Brest; thence to Lisbon or Cadiz, touching finally on the homeward bound voyage at the beautiful island of Madeira, the aim in view being so to regulate the cruise as to arrive home again in the Chesapeake Bay about the 18th or 20th of September, in order to be sure to reach Annapolis in time to begin the following year's course on October 1st, when the academic year began.

During the writer's probation at the academy two such

cruises were made, the first in the year 1857 in the old *Preble*, under command of Commander Joseph F. Green, Commandant of Midshipmen at the academy, and an able and skilful seaman. Owing to some delay in making repairs needed, the *Preble* did not reach the academy in time to begin the cruise at the usual time. It was extended therefore to the Azores or Western Islands, where only a few days could be spent, due consideration being given to the necessity for reaching the Chesapeake Bay in ample season to be in Annapolis before October 1st.

On the 12th of September, 1857, a violent hurricane swept along the American coast, during which the *Central America*, a passenger steamer, commanded by Commander Herndon of the Navy, foundered with nearly all on board, including the gallant Herndon himself. The *Preble*, being to the eastward of its track, escaped the heaviest of the storm, but a few days afterward passed through a vast amount of wreckage, which told the story of some great calamity, the extent of which, with all the harrowing circumstances, were heard later from the pilot on arrival off Cape Henry. As the *Preble* was known to be homeward bound, due to arrive at any time after the middle of September, great anxiety was felt lest she had encountered the same gale and some misfortune had overtaken her. Fortunately her arrival some days later dispelled all misgivings. She reached Annapolis in good season for the opening of the academic year on October 1st, having passed almost the entire three months at sea.

It would be a novel sensation for the midshipmen of these days to have to undergo the same hardships and experiences as George Dewey, or Thomas O. Selfridge, or John C. Watson, or Silas Casey, or many others who received their early training in this school—the work aloft in bad weather “reefing or furling sails,” or on deck at “the wheel” in all kinds of weather, or in the chains “heaving the lead,” or in boats; huddled together in quarters badly ventilated and crowded, but worse lighted, with hammocks to sleep in that the youngsters had to “lash and carry” to be stowed; living upon rations which at that day consisted of hard tack, salt junk, pork and beans, weevily rice, wormy cheese, rancid butter, the com-



THE NAVAL ACADEMY AT ANNAPOLIS, 1856.

monest varieties of tea, coffee and sugar. All that, however, was before the days when canned goods were known and when pies of dried apples were luxuries. An allowance of one gallon of water per day for all purposes—washing, cooking and drinking—was regarded as an abundance.

It was through these hardships and privations that the older officers of the Navy, such as Decatur, Perry, Bainbridge, Hull, Farragut, Porter and Dewey, grew into manhood and reached the fame of their careers in the after years.

In the summer months of 1858 the writer was given the customary leave of absence after two years of study. Those months were enjoyed to the full at his home near the mountains of his native State among the friends of his boyhood, and it was with much regret that he saw the time approach to return once more to study and the exacting discipline of the academy, this time for a "full due," as the course of study for the next two years was to include another cruise in the summer of 1859, ending in his graduation in June, 1860.

The cruise of 1859 was made in the old sloop-of-war *Plymouth*, under command of that splendid sailor Commander Thomas T. Craven, who had succeeded Commander Green as Commandant of Midshipmen. It began about the first week of June and embraced a visit to Plymouth, Brest, Cadiz, and the beautiful island of Madeira on the homeward bound voyage. On this cruise the writer was a first classman and with the other members of the class was given charge of the deck in turns during the daytime in order to inculcate habits of command, confidence and observation. The class was required to navigate the vessel from observations made by themselves. The honor of plotting the ship's position each day fell to that midshipman whose observations were nearest to the mean of all taken by the members of the class. During the night quarter watches were kept in the tops, as the custom in those days was to keep such watch aloft when the light sails were set. The recollection of many nights with a wet jacket on the upper yards in "reefing" or in "furling sails" is still vivid, and impressed a lesson in devotion to the work and hardy life of the sailor. It did more, it taught that sympathy with the life and endless work of the sailor which was a distinguishing feature

of the *camaraderie* of the older officers and men and which bound them together in loyal attachment to country and to each other.

This last practice cruise ended with the *Plymouth's* arrival about the third week of September, 1859. Reaching the Severn, off the academy, the midshipmen were landed and then took up the quarters assigned them in time to be shaken well down by October 1st, when the studies of the last year of the four years' course were to be undertaken.

The first meal taken after getting on shore was supper. Colonel Richard Swann was our commissary in those days, and nobody understood better what our young and lusty appetites required after living for three months on the ship's rations of those days. For the first two or three days after landing his provisions were most abundant, and the appetites of the youngsters who had learned that great lesson of the profession of arms—to feast when there was plenty and loyalty to fast when there was nothing—did full justice to the clean, toothsome, wholesome and plain fare the commissary had provided. It is to be doubted if there is any one of those who served under the administration of this good man and kind friend who does not recall affectionately many instances of his association with him at the academy.

June of 1860 came at last and with it the happy hours of commencement exercises, the examinations and the graduation. The four years of the writer's life at the academy were ended, and he with his classmates had successfully met the trying ordeal of the curriculum and its discipline. Like the fledglings of some mother eagle, they were now to be poised in mid-air to test the strength of their pinions. They were to part at last for service on all the naval stations into which the globe had been divided, to meet again in two years for the final examination which was to fix their status as officers of the Navy.

Although most of the time passed at the academy had to be given to study, we had opportunities to glance at the newspapers which told what was taking place in the world outside.

There were mutterings of ominous discontent in the political world which drifted in to us, such as the Brooks-Sumner assault, the John Brown raid into Virginia at Harper's Ferry,

the Dred Scott decision by the Supreme Court, the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, the border ruffian disturbances, the fiery debates in the halls of Congress relating to the extension of slavery in the new States. All these subjects were discussed by us youngsters. We took sides, naturally, and the State from which the youngster came determined his attitude toward a subject.

Among one or two of the midshipmen from the Southern States were heard unsuppressed mutterings of a Southern Confederacy arising, with Jefferson Davis as its President, but none dreamed then that this suggestion was more than a "bluff" to induce greater concessions from the North. It was believed by the more conservative that some common ground could and would be found upon which both sections could stand on the disturbing issues of that day. Nobody imagined that war between the States was possible, or that any of the issues under consideration could make such a result possible in a land where love of home and the traditions of Washington's career burned so brightly in the hearts of his countrymen.

Our diplomas of graduation releasing us from the control and discipline of the academy were given to us on the 10th of June, 1860. These were supplemented by a warrant as midshipman in the Navy bearing the signature of James Buchanan, and these again were soon followed by orders to sea from Isaac Toucey, Secretary of the Navy. The moment to which all of us had looked forward so longingly had come. We were to separate on service which was to carry us to the four quarters of the globe.

Recollections of the happy days spent at our alma mater and its warm friendships which had ripened after an association of four years of study, drill and work, brightened many hours afterward which the monotony of our life at sea would have made irksome as we drifted further and further apart on our way to the various fields of service assigned, to stand guard on the frontiers of civilization over the interests of our countrymen, domiciled in those far-off parts of the world under treaty rights.

The writer has always recalled with sincere pleasure the teachings and example given in the instruction in those days

at the academy, embracing such honored names as L. M. Goldsborough, Geo. S. Blake, Jos. F. Green, T. T. Craven, Samuel Marcy, W. H. Wilcox, Wm. P. Buckner, J. J. Waddell, John Taylor Wood, Chas. H. Cushman, Chas. W. Flusser, Professors Chauvenet, Coffin, Lockwood, Roget, Girault, Hopkins and many others. The careful training, the sense of honor, the high principles of fidelity and loyalty to country which were impressed on us by them from day to day at a time of life when youth is most impressionable could never be forgotten.

It was such associations with noble ideals at this great military school that set the pace in life and cultivated a chivalry which would be necessary in the officer's career afterward.

CHAPTER II

TO JAPAN WITH THE EMBASSY

1860-1861

THE writer's orders were to U. S. steam frigate *Niagara*, then fitting out at New York for a cruise to China and Japan under command of noble old Captain W. W. McKean.*

During the year 1859 an embassy from the Hermit Empire of Japan had visited the United States in return for the visit made to their country by Commodore M. C. Perry some years before. This embassy was composed of three princes of high rank and a large number of secretaries, attendants and interpreters. And better remembered, perhaps, than most others was Tommy, so called for want of a nearer synonym of his Jap-

* Following are the officers of the *Niagara*:

| | |
|---|-----------------------------------|
| Capt., W. W. McKean, Commanding. | Lieut., R. L. May, Watch Officer. |
| Lieut., I. N. Brown, Executive Officer. | Midshipman, J. D. Marvin. |
| Lieut., John Guest, Watch Officer. | Midshipman, Jas. O'Kane. |
| Lieut., W. F. Spicer, Watch Officer. | Midshipman, H. B. Robeson. |
| Lieut., J. C. P. De Kraft, Watch Officer. | Midshipman, Silas Casey. |
| Lieut., D. P. McCorkle, Watch Officer. | Midshipman, T. L. Swann. |
| Lieut., E. E. Potter, Watch Officer. | Midshipman, W. S. Schley. |
| | Midshipman, E. G. Read. |

STAFF OFFICERS

| | |
|---------------------------------------|--|
| Surgeon, Robert Woodworth. | 2d Asst. Eng., C. B. Kid. |
| P. A. Surgeon, D. B. Conrad. | 2d Asst. Eng., E. A. C. DuPlaine. |
| Asst. Surgeon, Jas. McMaster. | 3d Asst. Eng., L. R. Green. |
| Paymaster, Thos. R. Ware. | 3d Asst. Eng., A. H. Fisher. |
| Chaplain, Chas. Stewart. | 3d Asst. Eng., R. H. Gunnell. |
| 1st Lieut., Israel Green, U. S. M. C. | 3d Asst. Eng., Robert Potts. |
| 2d Lieut., Geo. Butler, U. S. M. C. | Boatswain, A. M. Pomeroy. |
| Chief Eng., W. P. Williamson. | Gunner, R. H. Hill. |
| 1st Asst. Eng., D. B. McComb. | Carpenter, H. P. Leslie. |
| 1st Asst. Eng., H. A. Ramsay. | Sailmaker, Stephen Seaman. |
| Lieut.-Col. Ripley, U. S. A., | } Passengers in charge of Government presents } to Japan. |
| Lieut. H. A. Wise, U. S. N., | |

anese name, who spoke English fairly well. He was intelligent, bright and always ready for a "lark" with anyone.

When the *Niagara* was joined on June 19, 1860, we found extensive additions were being made on the upper or spar deck abaft, as quarters in which to accommodate the large number of persons comprising the staff of this embassy, who were to return to Japan in that vessel. These alterations completed, the *Niagara*, which was the largest steam frigate in the world at that day, dropped down to an anchorage off Bedloe's Island, whereon now stands the beautiful and imposing statue of "Liberty Enlightening the World." A few days afterward the Japanese embassy, with the retinue, including a Mr. Portman, who served as Dutch interpreter, came on board. The embassy had been welcomed and entertained in a great many cities of the country with a series of festivities that culminated in a grand banquet, reception and dance in New York.

With them came a New York Herald reporter named Hollenback who was to be a passenger to China. He wore a silk hat, known in the sea vernacular as a "nail keg," and was assigned to quarters in the midshipmen's steerage. He had never been to sea before, and a sorry time he had with his new messmates. Liberties were taken with his hat. His appearance in the steerage where he was to be a messmate was the signal for general inquiries from some half-dozen midshipmen calling out in falsetto voice: "What are you doing in that hat, young fellow?" and "Now, come, get out of that nail keg." Thus saluted by youngsters whom he had never seen or known before, he removed his hat with the inquiry: "What's the matter with that hat, anyway?" Nothing more was needed to start a general attack. After a few minutes the hat became a shapeless mass, full of sword slits. Hollenback took this good-naturedly, knowing in a moment that it was the youngsters' way of taking the measure of his foot. A suitable cap was given to him afterward. We found him a good fellow and a pleasant shipmate all through the cruise afterward, and ready at all times to share our scanty fare of "hard tack" and take the softest side of a board to sleep on.

The ship being in all respects ready for her cruise, sailed on June 29th, having waited for the highest water of that day's



THE NIAGARA.

tide to cross the Sandy Hook bar, as the *Great Eastern*, the largest ship afloat, had done the same day in coming to New York on her first visit to the United States. On that day, therefore, the two largest vessels afloat were together in New York harbor. Both attracted no end of attention.

The *Niagara* had been built and designed by George Steers, whose genius produced the yacht *America*, now so noted in the yachting history of this country, and was known in the classification of that day as an auxiliary steam frigate—that is, a vessel with full power to sail, but with auxiliary engine power. She was of the class of the *Minnesota* and *Merrimac*. Her model was superb and her appearance in the water as graceful as a swan's. Her battery of 14 shell guns of eleven inches caliber, was the heaviest carried in our Navy at that day. The weight of the metal she was able to throw in one broadside amounted to nearly one ton, which was enormous for that time.

For some reason there was much feeling among older naval constructors of that day distinctly unfavorable to the *Niagara*. The gossip of the time attributed this feeling to the fact that it was believed that George Steers had refined her model to such a degree as to endanger her stability at sea; that by placing her enormously heavy battery at too great height above the line of flotation, the moment of rolling would favor capsizing. This was wholly without foundation. The weights had been so nicely calculated that the performance at sea showed her a marvel of steadiness and speed. In her run outward to Japan and then homeward, mostly under canvas, there was no moment when she was even uncomfortable, and no instance where she was ever overtaken by the fast clipper ships of that period. On the contrary, she overtook and passed everything both ways.

On her way outward the first stop after a cruise of about a fortnight was St. Vincent, one of the Cape de Verde group, for coal preliminary to a long stretch through the regions of light winds and calms off the west coast of Africa to St. Paul de Loanda, then as at this day a colony of Portugal.

The African station at that time was commanded by Flag Officer Wm. F. Inman, and St. Paul de Loanda was headquarters—that is, the point chosen for the storehouse, usual in those days, or to have all mail addressed. The flagship of the Com-

mander-in-Chief was the *Constellation*, a crack ship in her day, and which, with a number of other ships on the station, was met at this port.

All mail matter and all needed supplies of coal or provisions were sent to this rendezvous or station headquarters. The *Niagara*, direct from home, had brought a few letters for vessels on the station, but the bulk of letters and papers had to come by the monthly steam packets of those early times from England, which landed at all points along the route. Letters were always several months in reaching those who were stationed on this God-forsaken, uninteresting, unhealthy coast. The main hope of officers stationed there lay in the chance of capturing some slave ship, and their chief dream was that they might be selected as prize-master to take her to the United States, where such vessels were adjudged by the courts. It was the only way, except a medical survey, to shorten the cruise on this uninviting and forbidding coast. The prize or head money, decreed by law for each slave captured, was one of the inducements which attracted officers to this service. If lucky, their small pay was thus increased, but they were luckier still if they escaped with unbroken health.

On the way to St. Paul de Loanda, which was reached on August 6, 1860, the ship crossed the Equator, and our Japanese friends for the first time in their lives looked on the waters of the great southern ocean. Their curiosity had increased as they approached the Equator. Little Tommy, who found most genial companionship in the steerage among those of his own age, propounded many questions to the midshipmen which were not hard to answer, but in which he exhibited total ignorance of the form of the globe, and the nature of the heat about the Equator. He volunteered the information that in his country there was a legend or story that when a person reached this part of the earth's surface he was burned to death by the sun's rays, and he wondered if this was to be their fate. It perplexed him and all the embassy much to understand how we found our way over the ocean, or how we fixed our positions each day so as to know where to go the next and how to get back again. His English was defective, and this made the matter of explanation rather more difficult; but with it all we

succeeded in elucidating some things and in picturing others to Tommy's mind, so that most of the Japanese on board stayed up the greater part of the twenty-four hours the ship was in the neighborhood of the Equator in order to observe what would occur when she would cross it.

Remaining about twelve days in St. Paul de Loanda to replenish our coal and other supplies, and then bidding adieu to friends, the *Niagara* got under way on August 19th for the long cruise around the Cape of Good Hope and across the great Indian Ocean to the Straits of Sunda, and arrived at Anger Point on September 28th. Although the ship had remained a week and more in Loanda, yet when the sailing day came, the wash clothes of many officers had not been returned by the washerwomen. To the midshipman with his stipend of \$350 per annum and one ration this was a serious loss, for his wardrobe was as limited as his pay. Some comfort was found in the thought that the ship was bound to a station where things were cheap.

Passing the Cape and getting well into the "brave west wind" regions, the *Niagara* proved herself a model of comfort and speed, for she passed with ease every sail we met en route, while in the high winds and heavy seas that roll unceasingly entirely around the globe in those southern latitudes, she was swift as an arrow and as comfortable as that conventional old shoe of story. Off the Cape and through this great Indian Ocean we had our experiences with the albatross, which was caught in numbers, but only to be tagged with small copper strips, bearing the name of the ship, the date, latitude and longitude where caught, and then set free again. From among the older sailors on board came ominous warnings about injuring sea birds. They believed in the legend of the Flying Dutchman still and were sure that each albatross bore the soul of some old captain or mate who had been lost there and condemned to roam over the waters where he had practised tyrannies upon seamen in other days. They declared that injury to these birds meant sure disaster to a ship at some later time in the cruise; so none of the birds were killed, out of reverential regard for the sailors' superstition.

After a pleasant cruise of some thirty days from the pitch

of the Cape we reached Anger Point, in the Straits of Sunda, and from there proceeded around to Batavia, only a day's steaming. At that day Batavia was, as it still is, the commercial metropolis of the island of Java, an important colony belonging to Holland. As the Japanese princes spoke Dutch, they were more at home in Batavia than at any point visited outward-bound. Most of their time during the day was passed on shore at comfortable hotels. Batavia is an ideal tropical city, where work and rest have been perfectly adjusted to suit high temperatures. Creature comforts in matters of dress and living, or in social observances, were better arranged than in most other tropical cities visited afterward.

This pleasant visit of a week or more being ended, the *Niagara* bade farewell to fair Batavia, bound to Hong Kong, where we arrived on October 22d. Thence we sailed for a stretch eastward through the Bashee passage, south of Formosa, for Japan, and arrived on November 8th. The season of the passage of the China Sea was that of the change of monsoons, but the winds were light and steam was always used during light weather or baffling winds.

While at Anger Point some member of the embassy purchased a large monkey. This animal was taken care of by one of the Japanese cooks in the temporary galley erected on the forecastle and was an ugly brute, uncleanly in habits and unattractive. His curiosity was so developed that no dish, kettle, or saucepan could be left for a moment about the galley-house and escape examination. Picking from them what he wanted to eat, his habit was to capsized what remained over the clean, white deck. The profane expressions of the captain of the forecastle and his men, who had these messes to clean up, were grotesque. No end of schemes were planned to stop these tricks. One which finally succeeded was devised one morning when the ship was running before a fair breeze.

Whenever anyone tried to punish the animal, it was observed that he sprang into the rigging, out of reach of the pursuer, and taking a turn with his tail, hanging head down, would gibber and grin. The monkey's tail was greased. After the deck had been washed down and dried the monkey one morning promptly capsized some greasy mess over the beauti-

ful, clean deck. The moment had come. McNaught, captain of the fore-castle, seized a rope's end and started for the monkey, who took to the rigging. In some way, as expected, the tail-hold slipped, the simian lost his balance and overboard he went. This unfortunate circumstance was reported to Mr. Portman and by him to the Japanese themselves, and in turn it reached the captain. The writer having been on watch forward the morning of the occurrence, was expected to know all about it. In the confusion of interpreting from Japanese to Dutch and from Dutch to Japanese and then from Japanese to English, the impression was left on the captain's mind that the writer had really caused the death of the monkey.

In the investigation afterward the writer stated his connection with the matter, but as the monkey had been careless in holding on, the suggestion was made that he had committed suicide, and for this the writer ought not to be held responsible. The explanation was accepted as sufficient and closed that international incident in diplomacy. The princes were satisfied that the monkey had died by his own hands. There were a great many snakes in the water into which the monkey fell. Whether they gave him any trouble in "Davy Jones's locker" was left to speculation, as the *Niagara* cruised on through the Palawan passage, where the sea was filled with snakes lolling on its surface in knotted groups, past the Philippine Islands to Hong Kong.

The current of the Kuro Siwo, or the gulf stream of the Pacific, flowing northeast, touches the coast of Japan and aided the *Niagara* in making the passage to the mouth of Yeddo Bay, where she arrived early in November. There were no aids to navigation in these waters in those days to mark hidden dangers; no lighthouses to mark entrances to ports. On one side of the entrance lay a dangerous ledge of rocks, on the other a bluff upon which a wood fire was built as a beacon-light. For some unknown reason this beacon-light had been shifted from the upper to the lower point of this bluff a day or two before the *Niagara's* arrival. It happened, therefore, that the ship ran aground and hung there until the next tide, though without injury on account of the slow speed she was under in feeling her way in.

It was now the writer's watch again, and there were some misgivings among the old sailors. One of them named Taylor, an excellent fellow, came up in the darkness and volunteered in confidence the explanation that the accident had happened because a number of albatross had been caught off the Cape. He avowed that in all his experience at sea he had never known a ship where the captain allowing them to be caught had escaped some mishap. With a good deal of solemnity, he declared that the accident was only to remind us that the souls of old captains living in those albatross, always put a mark of bad luck on ships which allowed the birds to be caught. But he vouchsafed the comforting thought that as none of the birds had been killed when caught, he hoped nothing serious would come of the grounding.

When daylight came it brought good weather and higher water, so that the *Niagara* was freed from the rocks uninjured. She steamed up the bay, first to Kanagawa and later to an anchorage off the city of Yeddo, now known as Tokio, where she arrived on November 8th, completing the voyage from New York in four months and nine days.

The following day the embassy were landed in good health. After arrangements had been made with the authorities, the various presents from our Government to that of Japan were landed. Colonel Ripley of the Army and Lieutenant Henry A. Wise of the Navy were the representatives of the two services of our Government, sent out in charge of the several ordnance machines then used for making and preparing percussion caps, Minie rifle bullets, etc. Both were admirable shipmates and did much to relieve the monotony of those weary days in the old time at sea.

Official visits and the entertainment of the commanding officer by the Government authorities on shore followed, and these in turn were supplemented by courtesies to the officers of the ship from high officials of the empire. One of the temples of Yeddo, called Siogee, which had been occupied by Lord Elgin in 1858, was fitted up as a lodging place, where the officers were entertained in groups and carefully guarded by the soldiery and police of the city. The city was divided into several districts, and one of these was visited by the officers each day

under escort. The routes along which these daily processions moved were densely crowded with the people of the city, who were anxious to catch a glimpse of the white strangers, the like of whom very few had seen before. As the procession marched through narrow and densely packed streets on horseback, frequent halts were necessary in order to clear a passage. This was done by a single policeman at the head of the procession, who carried a long staff, on the top of which were several small bells. Striking the lower end upon the street pavement usually attracted sufficient attention from the people crowding the way to open up a passage at once. During these halts opportunities occurred for young lassies to approach the riders with extended hands and smiling faces, importuning for a brass button. Many were successful in securing them, and on the next day's route could be seen with these buttons arranged tastefully on ribbons around their necks. Doubtless there are many matrons still living in Japan who remember this first visit of the white strangers from a land toward the rising sun, which was then known to them only in legend.

During our stay on shore there were exhibitions of falconry, kite-flying, juggling, top-spinning, wrestling and other original acrobatic and athletic sports, all of which were novel to us and we thought most interesting and wonderful. The entire city and the tea-gardens that are found around it were visited and enjoyed by us all. The people everywhere were amiable, hospitable and polite. No instance is recalled where a single case of rudeness occurred to anyone. When it is remembered that this was the first occasion on which the majority of this isolated people in Yeddo had ever seen a white foreigner, it is a wonder that they should have borne themselves with such noticeable courtesy and consideration.

The *Niagara's* mission being ended after a most delightful and memorable stay of twelve days in Yeddo, she dropped down to Yokohama, then hardly more than a fishing village, where the crew were accorded liberty for a run on shore. During the stay of some ten days at Yokohama, the flagship *Hartford*, bearing the flag of Flag Officer C. K. Stribling, arrived. A few days were passed in her company when the beautiful *Niagara* sailed for Hong Kong, where she arrived on December

5th. At Hong Kong our Minister to China, Hon. John E. Ward, came on board for passage to Aden, at the mouth of the Red Sea, and thence to Europe and the United States. The passage through the China Sea to Singapore was made rapidly before the strong northeast monsoon. In the Straits of Malacca the steam sloop *Dacotah*, Commander Radford, was met and communicated with. The voyage outward through the Bay of Bengal, past Hindostan to Aden, was pleasant. That through the Mozambique Channel to Cape Town, where the *Niagara* arrived on February 22d, included some bad weather. The *Niagara's* presence in Table Bay attracted much attention, and during her stay she was visited by several thousand people, who inspected her minutely. The exquisite order of the ship was universally admired. Her powerful battery of eleven-inch guns impressed her visitors wonderfully.

With a voyage home of 8,000 miles ahead, the officers and men were indulged with shore liberty preliminary to departure. They were received with the greatest cordiality and kindness by the English and Dutch inhabitants of that remote corner of the world. For be it remembered in those days news of the world beyond one's horizon traveled slowly. There were no submarine cables as now belting the globe to flash the news of each day to the world at large to be read at the breakfast table the next morning. In those days news traveled by steam packets or sailing ships, so that the arrival of ships in those far-off ports attracted more interest than now, except in the matter of personal mails.

Above all else to the *Niagara's* officers and men, there was a desire to know what had taken place in our own blessed country. It was known before sailing from New York that Mr. Lincoln had been nominated for the Presidency, and when the day of election came a vote was taken away off in the waters of the East, with the result that Mr. Lincoln was elected on board the *Niagara*. That this election was a presage of the news to be learned a few months later from the pilot off Boston was not dreamed of at that time.

Beyond a letter received by the chaplain, Charles Stewart, from his personal friend, Emperor Napoleon III, while at Aden, nothing was known of the result at home. This letter, as now

recalled, spoke only of growing excitement over Mr. Lincoln's nomination, and a hope was expressed that this incident would lead to nothing more serious in the affairs of our Republic. But to those who knew the deep feeling at home there were anxious hours to wait.

The voyage home from Cape Town was begun in March, 1861. The beautiful weather and smooth seas of the trade-wind regions of the southern and northern hemispheres for a vessel of the *Niagara's* size and tonnage were anticipated with pleasure, for under such circumstances a quick trip was possible. We made good headway each day throughout the passage. Approaching our own waters, however, there was a noticeable absence of ships where formerly they were to be met with in great numbers. This occasioned much speculation among officers and men where the cleavage of sentiment was distinct on the issues of those days. But there was no soul on board that great ship whose heart did not devoutly hope that some common ground had been found upon which both sections could and would stand on the paramount issues of those dark days in our history.

Boston was reached in early May, and Cape Cod, as usual, was veiled in fog through which the ship proceeded at slow speed. Our aim had been to reach Boston Bay on Sunday, for the reason that the sailors of that period believed there was generally a southerly wind in Boston Bay on Sunday. With the wearing on of the day the fog lifted, and the welcome sight of a pilot-boat gladdened our hearts. It was not long before the pilot came on board with the pockets of his pea-jacket stuffed with papers. Dolliver was his name. In view of the conversation which followed his arrival on board, neither his name nor the news he brought to our anxious ship's company could ever be forgotten.

As Dolliver approached the ship the officers and men, hungry for news, instinctively moved toward the gangway. There was an impressive silence. As he stepped over the side the captain's anxiety was so great that he, too, was drawn toward this gangway, which was very unusual in those days. His first inquiry was:

“Pilot, what is the news?”

For a moment Dolliver seemed astonished, and certainly looked so. He asked before replying:

“Captain, where have you come from?”

The captain answered, “From Hong Kong.”

Dolliver queried again before answering:

“And you ain’t heard anything at all?”

“No,” said the captain, “not a word, pilot.”

Dolliver’s answer to this was in terms so memorable and so dramatic that its bluntness in words can be excused. He was telling to us as “news” things that were old to him, when he said:

“Why, captain, the country is all busted to hell!”

It is not easy at this time to describe the emotions of those to whom this portentous news came for the first time. There was hardly a dry eye in that thrilled multitude. Old Glory was flying at the peak, and almost every head was uncovered and bowed in homage to the symbol of our free land and sweet home. Resolves were immediately made by all who had heard Dolliver’s thunderbolt. As the ship sped on to Boston the dreadful news of what had taken place at Fort Pickens, at Fort Sumter, at the Norfolk Navy-Yard, the firing on the Sixth Massachusetts in Baltimore, the call for 75,000 men and other exciting incidents had been culled from the papers Dolliver brought.

As is usual in times of great excitement, rumor had preceded the *Niagara’s* arrival. It was said and believed that the Southern officers on board intended to seize the vessel and carry her into one of the Southern ports. On shore the excitement was intense, so that it was with some peril that people attempted to ascertain what had happened in the year of absence to those near and dear to them in other parts of our country. Preparations had been made by some irresponsible people looking to the sinking of schooners in the channel near Nix’s Mate to prevent supposed threats by Southern officers being carried out. Nobody had once considered how perilous to the city the presence of the *Niagara* in the harbor was, or how readily she could have destroyed Boston had the rumor of the disaffection of her officers been true.

The Government at Washington, however, in order to know

who was on its side, had decided as each ship arrived from abroad and was recalled from foreign service, to apply the test of a new oath of allegiance. This was done with the *Niagara's* officers and men in Boston Harbor. Some eight or nine officers and several men refused to renew their fealty to the old flag and were dismissed from the Navy.

The writer was from Maryland. Before subscribing to the paper which was to record anew his fealty to the flag, sufficient time was asked to read the document carefully. This done, there was no hesitation in renewing his adhesion to the old flag. When this decision was announced to Commodore McKean in his cabin, the writer by chance looked up through a windsail hatchway leading to the deck above, and there the folds of Old Glory were seen in the sunlight gracefully unfolding its beauty to a soft and gentle breeze. The writer was standing directly under it, declaring the most sacred decision of his life to his Commander.

The writer did not go on shore for any purpose at Boston, nor did he know until the ship reached New York, a few days afterward, anything of his family. The telegraph lines had been cut south of Philadelphia, the railroad bridges burned and other interruptions to travel and transportation had occurred. As soon as these were repaired and communication was again established, letters came from home and from friends, relatives and sweethearts. One from the writer's dear old father comforted him much, for it counseled him to take the step he had already done, and to devote his life to the country that Washington had given the best years of his life to win and sanctify for his countrymen.

CHAPTER III

WITH FARRAGUT IN THE GULF—ORDERED TO VERA CRUZ

1861-1862

THE *Niagara* was ordered to New York, where stores, coal and ammunition were taken to her full capacity and a few needed repairs made to boilers, engines and pumps. The orders received there at first contemplated the defence of the gateway to the capital by placing the *Niagara* off Annapolis. One or two members of the famous Seventh Regiment of New York, left behind when that excellent regiment had gone to the front, came on board for passage. But the necessity of establishing the blockade of Charleston under the President's proclamation being regarded as paramount, the *Niagara* proceeded off Charleston, and on May 12th established the blockade of that port.

In the old days of sail Charleston was a great cotton port, and the offing was filled with vessels bound in and out. Under the law of blockade, the *Niagara's* duty on arriving before the port was to board all vessels bound in and to indorse the fact of the blockade of the port on the ship's papers and to warn them off the coast. A very busy day was spent in doing this duty on arrival, as the *Niagara* was the only ship on the station. The great desire of some of the masters bound inward to communicate by signal their arrival to agents in Charleston emboldened some to attempt to do this after having been boarded and warned off; or, when the *Niagara* had steamed some distance north or south to overhaul others bound in, occasional attempts were made by others to gain entrance, although they had been already warned. A shell across their bows generally reminded such masters that it was dangerous to continue.

One vessel, however, the *General Parkhill*, whose master was a skilful navigator, and a courageous Marylander, persisted,

after being warned, in the attempt to run the blockade anyhow, and but for the fact that the wind was light he might have succeeded. One or two shots were fired across his bow and one over his vessel. It was realized that his ship was in great danger, so he concluded to haul his wind and head off shore, but it cost him the capture of his ship. The writer, then a young midshipman, was detailed, with a prize crew of twelve men, to take the *General Parkhill* to Philadelphia. The master, the first and second mates, as well as the crew, were left on board. After taking charge of the *Parkhill* a thorough search of the ship was made for arms or explosives without result. The first search made had secured everything with which injury might be done to themselves or to others.

The fact was discovered, however, that the vessel was without American colors and that her master had determined to force the blockade if he found that to be possible on reaching the offing of the port. A large Confederate flag, found on board, indicated the master's sympathy with the Confederacy and explained his determined action in attempting to gain the harbor entrance before his vessel should be overtaken.

It was decided from the outset of the voyage to Philadelphia to employ the prize crew, armed, on deck at the wheel and in handling the rigging and as guards and sentries, and to employ the ship's crew aloft and in handling the sails. This arrangement safeguarded the ship from recapture, which was further provided against by confining the officers to their rooms under armed guard. Against this latter expedient the master protested, though ineffectually, until after the ship had reached Delaware Bay and was taken in tow by the tug *America*, bound for Philadelphia, where she arrived about the last week in May and dropped anchor off the old Navy Yard, then commanded by Captain S. F. Dupont, to whom the orders given to the writer had directed him to report.*

* Herewith are the orders under which the writer had undertaken this work:

U. S. STEAM FRIGATE *Niagara*,
Off CHARLESTON, May 12, 1861.

MIDSHIPMAN W. SCOTT SCHLEY.

SIR: You will take charge of the ship, *General Parkhill*, this day captured as the property of the citizens of South Carolina, and proceed with her, under

This vessel was the first square-rigged prize captured during the Civil War. There was, at this early period of operations, some confusion and uncertainty about the forms of law governing prize cases and the legal methods of dealing with vessels so indicted. Feeling ran high with the tap of drums, the tramp of troops moving to the front, and the enthusiasm of loyal attachment to the Union, all of which suggested the thought, at times expressed in the press, that masters and crews of such vessels ought to be classed as pirates. This idea, however, soon vanished as the number of captures increased and the dockets of the courts of admiralty were filled with cases. It caused a number of uncomfortable hours to those whom the laws of war had brought before the courts, and some anxiety to those who had to search the records of our earlier wars for precedents. It ended, however, in releasing the crews after taking their evidence and examining the log-books or other papers of the ship, and in holding the ship and cargo only under condemnation and sale.

These forms having been observed by Marshal Millward of the District of Pennsylvania, to whom the ship had been delivered in due process of law and precedent, the writer was detached and ordered to the *Keystone State*, Captain Gustavus Scott commanding. Before she could be fitted out orders detaching the writer were received, and a short leave of absence was allowed. This time was passed in Frederick with his family and friends. In July following the writer was promoted to the grade of Acting Master and ordered to the frigate *Potomac** as navigating officer. On August 31, 1861, he was pro-

your command, to Philadelphia. You will be very vigilant to prevent any attempt at recapture, and to that end keep *your own men on deck* and employ the others aloft. On your arrival you will deliver the ship to the Marshal of the United States together with the papers and two Palmetto flags, found on board, which are now put in your charge for that purpose.

You will report your arrival to the commanding naval officer.

Wishing you a happy voyage and safe arrival, I am, Respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

WM. W. MCKEAN, *Captain.*

* Officers of the *Potomac*, 1861:

Captain, L. M. Powell.

Lieutenant, Saml. Marcy.

Lieutenant, L. A. Kimberly.

Lieutenant, George Law.

Lieutenant, A. V. Reid.

Master, W. S. Schley.

moted to master in the line of promotion. The *Potomac* was fitting out in New York. The captain was an officer of high character and a valiant Virginian, Levin M. Powell. The needs occasioned by a large increase of ships, officers and men were met by purchasing everything in the open market that could turn a wheel or hoist a sail. The need of officers and men was supplied from the large number of those in the merchant service that were thrown out of employment.

As the white wings of our commerce in those days were seen on every sea, the nation availed itself of this resource from which to draw many skilled officers and men to its service; and it can be said that scores of these good sailors rendered incalculable service to the Navy in its great work for the country during four long, weary years of blockading the coasts and reducing the fortified places on them, from Cape Hatteras to the Rio Grande. The history of this meritorious service, with its experiences, its hardships, its privations and its unceasing perils, will live forever in the song and verse of a grateful people.

A number of these gentlemen were appointed to the *Potomac*. They were good and experienced sailors and ready in learning the drills, discipline and routine of the Navy. They served with merit and distinction until the war ended, when they returned to their former calling in the merchant service.

The *Potomac*, with an excellent crew of officers and men, sailed in August, 1861, bound for the Western Gulf blockading squadron, then commanded by Commodore McKean. Soon after her arrival Flag Officer D. G. Farragut was assigned to this important command. It was surprising in those days to

Master, W. T. Sampson.
 Acting Master, W. N. Wood.
 Acting Master, Jerry Smith.
 Acting Master, E. D. Bruner.
 Acting Master, David Magune.
 Acting Master, George Wiggins.
 Midshipman, Merrill Miller.
 Midshipman, C. H. Humphrey.
 Midshipman, D. D. Wemple.
 Master's Mate, Kane.
 Master's Mate, Cressy.

Surgeon, T. D. Miller.
 Asst. Surgeon, G. R. Brush.
 A. A. Surgeon, A. O. Leavitt.
 Paymaster, J. D. Murray.
 Captain, G. W. Collier, U. S. M. C.
 Boatswain, C. A. Bragdon.
 Gunner, W. H. French.
 Carpenter, O. F. Stimson.
 Sailmaker, Geo. Thomas.
 Captain's Clerk, Bradley.

observe how accurately the men knew and gauged their officers. It often happened in the long hours of a watch that the deck officer would consult with the quartermasters, always old and experienced seamen, about the weather or matters touching the qualities of the ship, etc. In one of these confidences James Barney, an old and competent quartermaster, said that "the men for'd had heard that the commodore (McKean) was ill and had to be sent home." Almost immediately he volunteered the suggestion that if he had anything to do about it, he "would pick out Cap'n Davy Farragut" to take his place. He added that if "Davy Farragut" came down there, "it wouldn't be long till the fur was a-flying." Captain Farragut did come down to relieve Commodore McKean, and Barney's predictions were verified in a short time afterward, for Farragut showed himself, in all that followed, to be one of the greatest and grandest of American captains.

The *Potomac*, on reaching the station, was assigned to the blockade of Pensacola, and was present on the occasion of an attack upon Colonel "Billy Wilson's" regiment in camp outside Fort Pickens by a force of Confederates landed during the night on Santa Rosa Island. A piece of artillery and a company of blue jackets from the *Potomac* were landed, under the writer's command, to the eastward of the Confederates to cut them off. This hastened the abandonment of the island by the Confederates, who had been roughly handled by Fort Pickens and Wilson's regiment combined.

When Flag Officer Farragut joined his command in the Gulf, the *Potomac* had been attached to the blockade off Mobile. Her position was in the main channel, about four miles from Sand Island Lighthouse, where she lay at anchor for several months. It was wondered often, as she lay helpless in calms, why the Confederate steamers did not venture out for a shot or two with their longer range artillery. It was a fact at that time that the *Potomac's* battery consisted of long 32s and 8-inch smooth-bore shell guns, with two 20-pound Parrott rifles. But as this fact was not known to the Confederates, the *Potomac* lay undisturbed or unchallenged, except by winds and waves, which now and then gave the old ship many an uncomfortable night during this long vigil.

From time to time the monotony of blockade duty was broken by some vessel attempting to elude the squadron's vigilance. The excitement of chasing or that of advancing to attack any unfortunate vessel that had run aground under the guns of Fort Morgan, relieved some of the tedious hours of this wearing duty.

As the war grew apace, vessel after vessel arrived to reinforce those guarding the entrance to Mobile Bay until the fleet contained from twelve to fifteen vessels, the larger proportion being steamers. The custom was to mask all lights at night and to take up the night position after sundown nearer the beach or closer in to the channels, and just before daylight to drop off shore out of range. Many unsuspecting blockade runners ran into the web thus woven.

On the night of December 26, 1861, a schooner bound out before a fine northerly wind was forced ashore under the guns of Fort Morgan and was discovered at daylight. Signal was made at once to the *Water Witch*, Commander A. K. Hughes, commanding, to go in and destroy her, if possible. The writer asked authority to go in the *Water Witch* with two boats for any duty Commander Hughes might require. As the *Water Witch* closed in on this schooner, using her rifled gun, the guns of Fort Morgan took up the gauge and returned the fire with a long range gun, assisted by another gun east of the fort. Though many projectiles struck near the boats and the *Water Witch*, many others passing over and beyond them, neither was struck. When a point had been reached where the shoal water prevented the *Water Witch* from approaching nearer to the schooner, the boats were manned and a dash made for the vessel, but before they could reach her neighborhood her crew set fire to and abandoned her near Fort Morgan. The *Water Witch*, as well as the boats, remained in the neighborhood of the schooner under fire for quite near an hour, until she was completely destroyed. A number of shells landed very near the boats, but none was accurately enough aimed to strike.

The object of the commanding officer having been fully accomplished, the *Water Witch* and boats withdrew. This was the first instance in which the writer had ever been under fire. The sound of projectiles whistling over the vessel or boats was

an entirely novel sensation. The jets of water thrown into the air as the shells struck the surface might have been more beautiful under other circumstances, but the greater danger as they came nearer and nearer suggested that the boats turned bows on to the fort presented a smaller target, and thus minimized the chances of hits; and so this experience proved of value then.

In the month of January following (1862), a brig was discovered by the steamer *R. R. Cuyler*, Commander Francis Winslow, near the beach, some twelve miles to the eastward. Not long after the *Cuyler* had reached this brig's locality, heavy firing of guns was heard. The senior officer present in command called the *Huntsville*, within hail, to direct her to proceed to the *Cuyler's* assistance, as that vessel was some miles away and out of signal distance. The writer requested permission to accompany the *Huntsville* with two boats armed for near service. It proved later that these boats were of much service to the *Cuyler's* commander. On nearing the *Cuyler* she was found lying stern to the beach, distant some 250 yards, disabled by the parting of a hawser which her own boats had carried to the brig to pull her off the beach. In parting, the end of the hawser whipped back, was then taken up by her propeller, and a number of turns were taken around its hub, between the propeller and stern-post, completely bringing her engines up. At the same time her two boats were broadside on to the beach in a light surf, with all hands in them wounded save one or two by the rifle fire of the coast guard.

As the assisting boats approached the *Cuyler* to report for orders, her gallant commander hailed the officer in charge, stating that he would not order anyone in under such a fire, as all hands in his own boats were probably killed; but if the boat officer would secure the boats from the surf near the beach he would perform an eminently important public service. A dash was made at once through this fire from the coast guard defending the prize, though not without some loss, a sergeant of marines, the coxswain and one or two men in the assisting boats being wounded. The *Cuyler's* boats were rescued with their dead and wounded, and, though riddled with bullets, were towed back to the *Cuyler*, much to the gratification of her noble commander, who complimented the service highly.

Reaching the deck, Commander Winslow was found on the quarter-deck, and though under heavy musketry fire from the riflemen on the beach, received the report of the rescue of his boats. He remained until the officers of his ship had cleared the propeller by using a cutting spade from a boat under the *Cuyler's* stern, this boat being protected by the boats from the *Potomac* and the battery of the *Huntsville*, Commander Cicero Price. The second hawser from the *Cuyler* was carried to the prize by the *Potomac's* boats, and toward sundown the prize was pulled off the beach and captured. The assisting boats, with the *Cuyler* and *Huntsville*, returned to the blockade off Mobile about 8 P. M., and the wounded men of the *Potomac's* boats were cared for most tenderly. The prize proved to be the brig *Wilder*.

In the decree of the prize court afterward, at New York, through some error made on board the *Potomac* or in transmitting the prize list, the writer's name and those of the assisting crews were omitted, so that although this capture had been made possible by the work of the *Potomac's* boats, they did not participate in the proceeds of the prize.

For some weeks this dreary and wearisome blockade was maintained. The lack of exercise and nutritious food was felt by officer and man, and scurvy, that dreaded pest of ship-life in the olden times, was only avoided by the occasional relief which came to them afterward from the steamers bringing supplies of fresh meats and vegetables in amounts about enough for two or three days. The diet for the rest of the month was composed mainly of salted meats, cheese, hard bread, bad butter, inferior coffee and positively bad tea. It is indeed a wonder that the efficiency of the personnel was maintained at all under such conditions.

In the early part of 1862 news reached the squadrons blockading our coasts that a large fleet, consisting of English, French and Spanish war vessels, with a division of the French army, had descended upon Vera Cruz, Mexico, with the ostensible purpose of collecting debts due to the subjects of each of those countries from Mexican merchants. The *Potomac* was selected to proceed to Vera Cruz to ascertain the purpose of this expedition, as far as that might be possible, on the spot.

On her way to Vera Cruz the *Potomac* looked in at Pass à l'Outre, one of the several mouths of the Mississippi River, to inquire from the *Vincennes* the circumstances of the death of Lieutenant Samuel Marcy, who had recently been transferred from the *Potomac* to the command of the *Vincennes*. Marcy had been killed some days before in a boat attack upon a vessel attempting to force the blockade. After this information had been obtained, the *Potomac* proceeded on to South-West Pass to fill her tanks with water. While doing this, she was attacked by a river steamer, which was driven off after firing about a half-hour.

Vera Cruz was reached early in February. A large fleet of English, French and Spanish war vessels was found anchored in the harbor. Among them were such vessels as the line-of-battle ship *Donegal*, *Imperieuse*, *Guerriere*, and many others of smaller class. The combined forces were commanded by such distinguished officers as Commodore Dunlop, Admiral Graviere, Marshal Prim and General Lorenzes. Preliminary to the inquiry into the purposes of such a fleet in adjacent waters, the customary salutes and courtesies were exchanged with the several commanders.

CHAPTER IV

MEXICO, MOBILE AND PORT HUDSON

1862-1868

As Captain Powell's instructions were to ascertain the purposes of such an overwhelming fleet so near our coasts, frequent visits were made by him to the several chiefs in command. At some of these consultations the writer was present, and he recalls distinctly the appearance and bearing of Lorenzes, Graviere, Dunlop, and particularly that of Marshal Prim. Commodore Dunlop and Marshal Prim were frank in assurances of the purposes of their Governments. The latter was explicit in stating that his Government had no intention to occupy the territory of Mexico with any ulterior purpose. He declared, with emphasis, that if his Government had had other purposes it would not have selected him, who was known to be hostile to such occupation from every point of view. These assurances were faithfully and honorably kept, for as soon as the English and Spanish commanders received official assurances that all claims due from Mexico to the subjects of their respective countries would be paid, the forces of these two countries were withdrawn from Mexico.

Commander Dunlop expressed pleasure that the *Potomac* had come to Vera Cruz. He admitted, however, that he had confidently expected, in ten days after his arrival at Vera Cruz, to have had his squadron in operation against ours; but he frankly stated that his Government had no other intention than to enforce the collection of honorable debts in Mexico, and when that had been accomplished the English would withdraw, as they did soon after this assurance was given.

The French officers, however, could give no definite assurances, as they professed to be unfamiliar with the purposes of their Emperor after a satisfactory arrangement of the debt question had been reached. They were invariably courteous at every interview. The ultimate action of the French Government is known, but, as it forms no part of these memoirs, will not be discussed.

During the month of February yellow fever made its appearance at Vera Cruz and among the allied forces, several cases occurring on board their ships. Permission was asked by the allies and granted by the Mexican authorities to move their forces beyond the first line of defence as far as the high land about Orizaba, to avoid the disastrous spread and ravages of this dread disease. Toward the last of February the French forces moved toward Orizaba, and were followed in turn by the English and Spanish. The city of Vera Cruz was then guarded by the sailors from the fleet, although the Mexican flag was hoisted over San Juan d'Ulloa and the city itself.

The history of events subsequently culminating in the establishment of Maximilian as Emperor, his overthrow, capture and execution by the Mexican Government in 1866, closed an incident that had been full of menace to this country and must otherwise have involved it in war beyond all doubt or peradventure sooner or later.

During the month of May the *Potomac* had returned to Pensacola, via Key West. The old ship, after an ordinary lifetime of service on the coasts of most of the countries of the world, had succumbed to the battle of wind and wave. Strain and work in heavy seas, under the weight of heavy batteries, had weakened her fastenings, and she was "laid up" as a store-ship in Pensacola Harbor, which had fallen into our hands a few months before.

The various officers were detached, as well as the greater part of the crew, for service in the different vessels of the West Gulf Squadron, then commanded by the indomitable David Glasgow Farragut, whose name will live in history among the greatest captains.

In July, 1862, the writer was promoted to the grade of lieutenant, and later was detached from the *Potomac* and ordered

to the steam gunboat *Winona* as executive officer.* Being then in his twenty-third year, the writer was filled with the new responsibilities of this higher position, and they were assumed with much misgiving lest he might fall short of its requirements.

It was not long after reporting on board the *Winona* that official action had to be taken against the commanding officer. It was a most painful experience, but the circumstances were such that it was unavoidable, and all the more disagreeable as it concerned a commanding officer whom he admired and esteemed for his many excellent qualities of heart and mind as well as for his high manhood and courage.

This occurred in the manner to be described. For a week before the new executive officer had joined the *Winona*, her gallant commander had gone in several times and opened fire with her heaviest guns on the sea face of Fort Morgan. After the writer had joined the ship, the same operation being once or twice repeated, a respectful complaint was made to the executive officer by one or two of the other officers, to the effect that while the crew were ready at all times to fight, they did not think their lives ought to be jeopardized when no advantage could accrue therefrom. As the fort was hardly within reach of the *Winona's* guns, while she was well within the range of one or two of the rifle guns of the fort, the position taken appeared reasonable and was referred to the commanding officer only to discover that he was on the verge of delirium. The surgeon of the ship was directed to examine him and report in writing his opinion of his condition. His report confirmed the executive officer's opinion.

For a day or two about this time the weather was boisterous, so that communication between the ships was not possible by boat. On the night of the 23d the heavy sea tested the *Winona*

* Officers of the Gunboat *Winona* :

Lieut. Com. James S. Thornton, commanding.

Lieut. W. S. Schley, Ex. Officer.

Actg. Master Chas. Hallett, Watch Officer.

Actg. Master Felix McCurley, Watch Officer.

Master's Mate Frank H. Beers, Watch Officer.

Master's Mate David Vincent, Watch Officer.

Master's Mate A. H. Staigg, Watch Officer.

Asst. Surgeon, Arthur Mathewson,
Actg. Paymaster, Saml. F. Train.

2d Asst. Eng., E. S. Boynton.

3d Asst. Eng., Edward Gay.

3d Asst. Eng., R. C. Wamaling.

severely. On the 24th the wind and sea abated sufficiently for the executive officer to proceed to the senior officer's ship to report all the facts. Commander Alden relieved the *Winona's* commanding officer in the order which follows:

U. S. STEAMER, *Richmond*,
Off MOBILE, September 24, 1862.

SIR: From your report, as well as that of Asst. Surgeon Mathewson, it is clearly established that your Commanding Officer, Lt. Commander Thornton, is laboring under a fit of "delirium tremens," and is thereby rendered unfit for duty.

You will, therefore, assume command of the *Winona*, and place him under such restraint as may be necessary to prevent him injuring himself or others.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

JAMES ALDEN,
Commander and Sen. Officer, Pres.

Lt. W. SCOTT SCHLEY,
Lt. and Executive Officer,
U. S. Gunboat *Winona*.

Oral orders were received at the same time, owing to injuries sustained during the gale, to proceed to Pensacola to report the ship's condition to Admiral Farragut. This incident led to the court-martial of the commanding officer, whom Alden had relieved in the order quoted above, which culminated in dismissing this officer from the squadron. It was a great blow to a gallant fellow, and removed him from opportunities to distinguish himself for a time at least; but, notwithstanding this, before taking his departure from the *Winona* to go north, he was generous enough to tell the writer he had done his whole duty in the matter, and that if he had done less he (the commanding officer) could have had no respect for him.

There was no feeling but of regret and respect in the parting. In the *Kearsarge*, two years later, this splendid officer won imperishable glory for his country and his name. "Peace to his memory" is the tribute of one who honored, respected and admired him, but who pitied the occasional infirmity which brought him a moment of sorrow.

It was believed that service in the Mississippi River, where the *Winona* would not be exposed to the heavy strains of rolling as in blockading outside, would lessen her leak, there being no dock available south of Norfolk for repairs. She was ordered,

therefore, into the river for patrol duty between Port Hudson and Donaldsonville, early in December, 1862, where she remained, with varying incidents, for more than a year.

Not long after her arrival on this service rumors reached the admiral that the Confederates were fortifying the heights about Port Hudson with heavy cannon. An expedition to reconnoiter this position, composed of the iron-clad steamer *Essex* and the *Winona*, set out up the river from Baton Rouge in December. It must be borne in mind that the ships were without charts of the river, and had to depend upon Colton's Atlas and the river pilots, whose loyalty at that early day was a debatable question. Running the river, therefore, was limited to daylight, when its bends could be followed and its points avoided. During the night anchorage was sought. The rule generally adopted was to anchor about sundown and, after dark, to shift position some half mile. The vessels were painted an indefinable gray color, the tint being such that it was not easy to distinguish them after nightfall. This had to be done to avoid the harassing fire of riflemen or at times of field guns.

The new commander, who had been ordered to take the place of the old commander, did not observe all these precautions in making a reconnaissance of the fortifications reported to be in course of erection at Port Hudson. In company with the iron-clad steamer *Essex*, the *Winona* came to anchor abreast of the north end of Profit Island, about three miles below Port Hudson, about sundown of December 15th. After dark it was suggested to the commander to shift berth further up the river, but for some reason unknown this precaution was disregarded. The writer, who was executive officer, in turning in for the night, gave orders to be called at the first streak of daylight, and, in undressing, placed his clothes so that, in jumping from his bunk, he would almost literally jump into his clothes.

The Confederates had crossed the river from Port Hudson during the night with a battery of artillery and a supporting company of infantry, and had taken up position behind the levee, out of sight and hearing, abreast of the *Winona*. At the first streak of dawn of the day following, these forces opened a furious fire with artillery and infantry upon the *Winona*, distant about 250 yards from the levee. It was the noise of this

firing that awoke the writer, who was on deck in much less time than it takes to narrate the incident. The ship was, customarily, always cleared for action, with guns loaded, cable ready for slipping, steam at sufficient pressure to respond to signals for movement from the officer of the deck, and a watch on deck at the guns. The lapse of time from the first shot from the levee and that from the *Winona's* battery was scarcely to be estimated in seconds, the fire was so rapidly replied to.

In order to be entirely free to choose the most advantageous position to attack these forces, the cable was slipped at once. Apprehending the danger of running aground, the writer jumped to the gangway, got a cast of the lead, and was in the act of getting another when Master's Mate David Vincent approached, saying:

"You have more important work to attend to, and I will take the lead, sir, until the pilot comes on deck."

Scarcely had the writer stepped aside to hand the lead to Mr. Vincent in order to take charge of the deck to direct the fighting, when Mr. Vincent fell at his side, mortally wounded by an artillery shell. Aid was called to carry his body below to the surgeon, and quick directions were given to the helmsman. A few moments afterward the ship touched and hung for some moments upon a bar which, the pilot declared, had formed quite recently off the northwest side of Profit Island.

Unfortunately, in her position only one gun could bear upon the enemy's battery, and for ten or fifteen minutes this disadvantage continued, while a storm of projectiles from artillery and musketry swept the ship. The chief engineer was directed to let steam run up to the highest safe pressure and then to open her engines wide astern. After a few moments the *Winona* glided off into deeper water. She then steamed ahead to straighten up with head to the current. She took her position abreast the battery and for an hour poured her heaviest fire into the enemy's position, driving his forces from the field with considerable loss, notwithstanding they were behind the levee. Several of the larger eleven-inch shells pierced the levee a few feet below the top and exploded among the artillery, causing much consternation and loss.

This action continued spirited and fierce for an hour and a

half at a range of less than 300 yards. The casualties on our side were few, and when the advantage in the enemy's favor for at least fifteen minutes is considered, this was astonishing. As a rule, the Southern gunners were good shots, and in many instances were trained in the same school and had grown up under the same discipline and fellowship with ourselves in *ante-bellum* days.

The *Winona* was damaged seriously enough, however, to make necessary a trip to New Orleans for repairs. When these were completed she resumed her patrol up the river, where she was almost daily exposed to attack from guerrillas or other irregular bands of soldiers at several points. It was in this river service that the importance of the military top of modern war-ships was first made apparent. During the season of low water it was possible to command a view over the levees only from the top aloft, and to do this a lookout was stationed there to give information of the presence or movement of men behind them. To protect these lookouts from rifle fire at those points of the river where the channel obliged the ships to approach within a hundred feet or so of the bank, resort was had to plates of boiler iron so shaped that the lookout in the top was completely protected. Very often the first intimation the vessels had that danger was near was the bullet sound striking these crude military tops and the lookout's reply from his own rifle, always loaded and ready for such contingencies.

A point of menace was the bend at Manchac, below Baton Rouge, and it was rare to pass it day or night, before the capture of Baton Rouge, without being fired on by what we learned to call the river guerrillas. Another point lower down the river and below Donaldsonville, known to us as Winchester, was the scene of many attacks of greater or less formidability and sometimes of most stubborn attacks from infantry and artillery combined. Indeed there was hardly a day, from the capture of New Orleans to the fall of Port Hudson, on July 9, 1863, when the Mississippi River, from its confluence with the Ohio to the sea, was not the scene at some point of stubborn fights between the various ships in this patrol service and batteries of artillery, with infantry guards, or with both combined, in contesting the right to its sovereignty. At this distance of time it is not easy to re-

call the indifference which prevailed in the minds of all day after day, as they grew in experience and broadened under danger, when one never knew, from sunrise to sunset, whether his turn might not come to take his place alongside the great hosts who had already fallen that this nation of the free might live; but it was a strain and trial to the young man which was to fit him into the heroic mold of those great captains whose examples were to be imitated in the future struggles of this great Republic.

During the months of January and February of 1863 rumors in one shape or another reached the patrol squadron that Admiral Farragut contemplated a movement against Port Hudson, Louisiana, as the strong fortifications at that place had interrupted access to points beyond as far as Vicksburg. Whatever repairs to engines or boilers or their appurtenances could be effected by the force on board were undertaken, for in those days of war a ship's efficiency for every emergency was determined by the skill of her engine and fire room forces.

So far as spars and sails were concerned, these had been landed before beginning the river campaign, as it was easily recognized then that such things were impedimenta, useful in working a passage to far-off stations when the vessels had to pass through regions where the winds were of regular direction and force, but absolutely useless in war, where the likelihood of injury from shot and shell would make them a positive menace. It was recognized at that time that this necessary expedient in war was only the preliminary step to the mastless and sailless ship of this day. Every precaution then employed to minimize the danger from falling spars or the chances of disabling engines through fouling propellers from rigging shot away in action and trailing astern, was an argument for the supremacy of steam alone in the actions of the future. Out of these conditions grew the battle-ship and armored cruiser of this day, wherein spars are reduced in size and number and retained only as a means of signaling or for torpedo guns, but stripped of all unnecessary rigging. The close actions of those days emphasized, likewise, the employment of breech-loading guns, and out of this experience the modern high-power breech-loading artillery was evolved, together with the rapid-fire guns of smaller

caliber so destructive to the personnel at the superstructure guns.

During the months of January, February and a part of March, 1863, the *Winona* was doing patrol and convoy duty from Donaldsonville to Port Hudson. Many vessels carrying troops and supplies to various points on the river required the protection of the gunboats against attacks along its banks. A company of our cavalry, about this time, under the intrepid Captain Perkins, operated on both banks of the river, and was a terror to all irregular troops using the levees as protection in their attacks. His movements from side to side were so swift and his crossings being made usually under cover of darkness, the enemy could not know his whereabouts until he was actually upon them. The effect of these operations after a while tended to clear the river banks of danger.

In the early part of March, while lying off Plaquamine making imperative repairs to the condenser, which leaked so badly as to increase the coal consumption greatly as well as to endanger feed pumps and the engines themselves, the fleet, under Admiral Farragut, passed up the river with the purpose of attacking the works at Port Hudson, which at this time had been strongly fortified. Orders, on March 12th, from Admiral Farragut, detaching the writer from the *Winona* to report for further orders, were received on the afternoon of the 14th. The only opportunity to obey these orders occurred on the morning of March 15th, when the coal brig *Horace Boies*, in tow, passed up the river. The squadron was reached off Port Hudson that same afternoon.

The same day the writer was ordered to assume command of the *Monongahela*, as the relief of Captain McKinstry, who had been severely wounded. The same afternoon an attack was made by the *Monongahela* upon the citadel battery at 1,000 yards range for more than an hour with the splendid effect of completely silencing guns and driving gunners from them. But during the night the main work was repaired, and the *Monongahela* was directed to take position once more near this battery. On this occasion her 150-pound Parrott rifles were fired deliberately and with great precision against this fortification until its guns were silenced. A river steamer, lying at the time at a wharf further

up in the bend of the river, was driven to shelter out of range behind the point. Many of the enemy's shot and shell passed well over and beyond the ship and many fell short. The accuracy of the *Monongahela's* gunners evidently had disturbed the usual precision of the Confederate guns.

These attacks upon earthworks by ships only proved that it was hardly possible to injure them beyond what could be repaired in a few hours.

CHAPTER V

SIEGE AND CAPITULATION OF PORT HUDSON—FARRAGUT AGAIN

1863

ON March 19th Major-General Banks, commander of the Nineteenth Army Corps, came up the river with a few troops, and with Commander Alden of the *Richmond* went on board the *Monongahela* to reconnoiter the batteries along the river front. On this occasion another river steamer was lying at the wharf in the bend of the river discharging provisions and other supplies, but fled a few moments after the firing began. The *Monongahela* took a position that afforded the best examination of these works, though it was not without challenge from the Confederates. In those days it was the custom, as soon as the ships got within range of their guns, for the batteries to open fire upon them. The accuracy of the gun-fire on both sides was remarkable, but when the shore batteries were on the same level as the ships, or even a little above, the result was almost invariably that the ship's guns drove the shore gunners away from their guns. The level decks of ships favored quicker handling of guns. After this time, supplies were delivered with difficulty to the beleaguered forts by boats on the river, and, if at all, had to be delivered at night, as these river boats would be attacked by day.

After an hour or more of this reconnaissance, the *Monongahela* took a position where General Banks desired, but she was always under the fire of the batteries, to which her guns replied with good effect. When these shore batteries discontinued their practice, the *Monongahela* withdrew and assumed her anchorage below with the other ships of the fleet, just beyond the range of their guns.


On the following day the *Monongahela* and *Genesee*, Com-

mander McComb, again took position at a point from 1,200 to 1,300 yards from the same batteries. Assisted by the iron-clad *Essex*, Commander Caldwell, these three ships maintained for an hour or more a fierce and determined engagement, during which every gun on the river front in range took part, fairly raining projectiles upon the ships. Fortunately, the gunfire from this combined force of ships was so tremendous as to interfere seriously with the rapidity and accuracy of the guns on shore.

The fleet of mortar schooners, which had done much good work under Admiral D. D. Porter at the attack upon Forts Jackson and St. Philip, in the campaign against New Orleans by Admiral Farragut, were again placed in position on the left bank of the river, and in every attack made from this time until July 9th, when Port Hudson finally capitulated, joined their terrifying fire to that of the other vessels upon the besieged forces within this strongly fortified and gallantly defended post. After General Banks had invested these fortifications on the land side with his splendid corps, the plan adopted by the commanders-in-chief was to harass the enemy day and night.

Faithfully and fully did the forces on the river and those on the land side in the enemy's rear carry this plan into execution. During the day one or two or more vessels were detached to assault the river batteries in front in cooperation with attacks of greater or less fierceness by the army beleaguering the works. The roar of artillery and musketry appeared continuous for well-nigh three months night and day.

Choosing different hours every night of the siege, the mortar fleet, consisting of some eight or ten vessels, were directed to hurl their enormous 13-inch shells for an hour into the enemy's works. The effect of these great shells in curving through the air at high-angle firing, as their burning fuses turned in ever-varying directions, was picturesque and impressive. Through long practice, the officers and men acquired great nicety in cutting and timing their fuses, so that the bursting moment would coincide with that of landing in or about the batteries. These terrific night cannonades were demoralizing features to the enemy in this long siege. The continuous roar and reverberation of discharges were almost deafening, and generally awoke



THE MONONGAHELA.

all from sleep below decks, and thus attracted them to the upper or spar deck to watch the whirling shells as they curved upward in their flight and then downward upon the doomed fellows within the enemy's works. By long experience great accuracy of fire was attained and much damage done inside the works. The moral effect of this bombardment nightly was so great that the enemy within the zone of this fire resorted to bomb-proofs, tunneled into the declivities of hills inclined away from the direction of the trajectory of the shells.

After the surrender there were a number of touching incidents related where these great shells had fallen in such proximity to the points of exit of these bomb-proof tunnels that when the explosions occurred these retreats were completely filled with earth, thus suffocating and burying those who had sought safety therein.

On one occasion later, when in temporary command, an attack was made by the writer upon the citadel fortifications. There was almost no breeze beyond an occasional "catspaw," as slight, shimmering streaks of air touching the surface of water are technically known. The signal flags hung listlessly up and down from the flagship's mastheads. The great volume of smoke from our guns, as well as that from the fortifications, settled down upon the river or hung in masses about the ship, increasing the difficulty of distinguishing, much less reading, any signals. In the midst of flying projectiles and smoke, the quartermaster reported a signal flying, but he added that he was unable to read it, as there was not wind enough to blow the flags out so that he could distinguish them.

Directions were given to him to report whenever the signals could be read. As the orders had been to destroy the battery, it was not thought that the signal then flying could refer to us, as our duty under them was specific and distinct. Later, however, it was learned that the signal was intended to withdraw us from action. Not understanding this at the moment, the action was continued until every gun of the enemy had ceased firing. Then the ship lifted her anchor and dropped down with the current to her usual position, where, after anchoring, the customary visit was made to the commander-in-chief to report the result of the combat. Arriving on board, the writer found

on the quarter-deck the commander-in-chief, who, after responding to his salute, said:

“Captain, you begin early in your life to disobey orders. Did you not see the signal flying for near an hour to withdraw from action?”

The decided manner and tone in which Admiral Farragut asked this question, taken with the surprising inquiry itself, confused and embarrassed the writer, who felt that the ship's work was creditable rather than censurable. An attempt to explain, somewhat stammeringly made and to the effect that we could not read the signals, which were seen only with difficulty through the smoke, elicited the quick reply from the admiral that he “wanted none of this Nelson business in his squadron about not seeing signals.”

The writer succeeded, however, in stating to him that the lack of wind and the smoke of battle enveloping the ship made it impossible to interpret the signal, which, from the nature of his orders to destroy the citadel, could hardly have been supposed to refer to the writer, whose duty in the premises seemed clear—to retire only when that duty was done.

The admiral then invited the writer into his cabin. The moment the door was closed behind him there was an entire change in his tone and manner as he said smilingly, “I have censured you, sir, on the quarter-deck for what appeared to be a disregard of my orders. I desire now to commend you and your officers and men for doing what you believed right under the circumstances. Do it again whenever in your judgment it is necessary to carry out your conception of duty. Will you take a glass of wine, sir?”

The writer, in his career afterward, often recalled this incident in his experience with that great admiral and grand man. He has always believed that the secret of all important success was dependence upon the responsible judgment of an officer on the spot. If circumstances compelled him to disobey his orders to achieve signal success for his country, such constructive disobedience becomes a virtue in much the same sense as the great Jarvis held as a virtue Nelson's unerring judgment in that memorable victory at St. Vincent.

The *Monongahela's* commanding officer, Captain J. P. Mc-

Kinstry, having been so seriously wounded in the attack by the fleet upon Port Hudson, was sent to the hospital at New Orleans. The steam sloop *Mississippi* having been destroyed in the same action, her commanding officer, Captain Melancthon Smith, and her executive officer, Lieutenant (now admiral) George Dewey, were ordered to the *Monongahela*. The writer was then transferred to the sloop *Richmond** toward the latter part of March.

From this time until Port Hudson surrendered, on July 9th, there occurred twenty or more engagements between the vessels of the fleet and batteries in which the writer participated. The plan decided upon was to harass the enemy day and night. With General Banks's army encircling them on the land side, and with the Navy in possession of the river above and below the forts, the siege was varied by brilliant assaults by both Army and Navy. It became a question of endurance and of supplies for those within the doomed fortifications. Both opponents continued, often with stubborn courage, in the struggles for mastery of the place, and in the years to come the deeds of valor exhibited on both sides around those historic works will thrill the hearts of American readers. It was only when the forces within were decimated and ragged, their ammunition almost exhausted and their rations reduced to mule meat, that the noble fellows surrendered. The courage displayed on both sides should be a priceless heritage of honor to American youth for all time.

* Officers of the *Richmond*:

Commander, James Alden.
 Lieut. Edward Terry, Ex. Officer.
 Lieut. W. S. Schley, Navigator.
 Acting Vol. Lieut. F. S. Hill, Watch Officer.
 Acting Master Chas. I. Gibbs, Watch Officer.
 Acting Master C. W. Wilson, Watch Officer.
 Acting Ensign R. P. Swan, Watch Officer.
 Acting Ensign B. W. Haskins, Watch Officer.
 Surgeon, A. A. Henderson.
 Asst. Surgeon, John D. Murphy.
 Chief Eng., John W. Moore.

1st Asst. Eng., Eben Hoyt.
 3d Asst. Eng., A. W. Morley.
 3d Asst. Eng., G. W. W. Dove.
 3d Asst. Eng., J. D. Ford.
 3d Asst. Eng., R. B. Plotts.
 3d Asst. Eng., C. E. Emery.
 3d Asst. Eng., Robert Weir.
 Paymaster, Edwin Stewart.
 Captain, Alan Ramsay, U. S. M. C.
 Boatswain, Isaac Choate.
 Gunner, Jas. Thayer.
 Carpenter, Hiram Dixon.
 Sailmaker, H. T. Stocker.
 Master's Mate, W. R. Cox.
 Master's Mate, J. R. Howell.
 Master's Mate, T. S. Russell.

On the 27th of May communication was opened with the army on the bluffs below Port Hudson, and the cordon around the fortifications was completed. Almost daily there had been fierce fights, which resulted in driving the enemy inside the battlements built around a ravine back of the port, where the river in some remote time had passed in another channel.


During the first week in June a battery of two nine-inch Dahlgren guns, with their crews and equipments, was landed and placed in position about 300 yards from the right of the enemy's works. These guns, cooperating with the heavy siege artillery of the army, did splendid work under Lieutenant Commanding Edward Terry of the *Richmond*, an officer of rare accomplishments and dashing courage. Some casualties resulted to the crews of these guns from the peerless sharpshooters on the other side, who rarely missed anyone who thoughtlessly exposed himself. Terry's health gave way under the trying exposures on shore with this battery, and it is thought that from this unusually severe ordeal the seeds of that fell disease were laid which carried him off a few years later in the fulness of his young life.

Some time about the latter part of May dispatches from General C. C. Augur related the cheering successes of General Grant's army operating in the rear of Vicksburg. The city of Jackson had been taken. Sherman had routed and almost destroyed the army of General J. E. Johnston. General Banks's army was daily in movement and almost constantly in fights or in the skirmishes tightening the cordon about Port Hudson.

An incident which occurred on the morning of July 4th and astonished everyone was the news of the battle of Gettysburg, communicated by two "contrabands," as the colored man was called in those days. They were taken on board about daylight. When asked their names and what news they brought, one of them replied:

"Massa Lee has struck the Yankees at a place called Guttumburg—I think that's the name. But, oh, Lord! the Yankees done tore 'em all to pieces. The white folks say he done lost some fohty thousand men. Gen'ral Lee had to get away in the night, as the Yankees was all 'round him."

This news was verified a day or two later, as the battle of



THE RICHMOND.

Gettysburg, with the added intelligence, by steamer down the river, that General Grant had captured Vicksburg, with some forty thousand prisoners, after a series of brilliant and stubborn battles, which will rank with the fiercest ever fought in the world's history. Only a few days later, after this news had been sent in to the gallant General Gardner, the hero of Port Hudson, that stronghold was surrendered and added to the crowning victories of the year 1863. The great river was then in our possession from Cairo to the sea, and never again did it witness any struggle of consequence in disputing free passage to our transports or fleet.

The great dream of Admiral Farragut was realized. The stomach of the Confederacy had been severed from the main body of its force. The fact was made evident that an army could not fight unless it could be fed. The effect upon the waning fortunes of the doomed Confederacy was felt from the Potomac to the Mississippi.

It was during this long siege that the writer first met Major Agnus, who afterward, for gallantry in action, became brigadier-general. He was then a handsome and dashing young officer in the volunteer army, which did such yeoman service for our country and its glories. The rations of those days, while sustaining to life, depended for their nutritive value somewhat upon the additions which foraging parties might make to them from the country where the armies operated. The Navy being in this respect better provided for and more certain to have three good meals a day, because its commissary stores were always carried in the hold of its ships, had advantages which our Army friends from time to time were invited to share. Major Agnus was the writer's guest whenever he came on board, and from this association and companionship grew the friendship and affection which have increased with every year of the forty since it first began. Friendships which spring from associations of exposure to dangers together endure always, and thus was born that feeling which the writer has tried to express in this humble tribute to his lifelong friend and comrade in arms.

During this long and laborious siege there were incidents of heroism on both sides which deserve to be preserved, but none more daring or more original than that of Mr. E. C. Gabaudan,

the admiral's secretary. At the time both sides of the river were controlled by Confederate forces, between the *Hartford* and *Albatross* above the forts and the fleet below. The admiral desired to send dispatches to the fleet below the forts of such importance that their capture would have been likely in any attempt to go by the west bank. Gabaudan volunteered to float down the river after dark, supported on one of the many floating logs, or parts of trees, which then dotted the river in the spring flood.

The distance to be covered was several miles. The dangers were in the eddies under the bluffs and the possible lack of endurance on the part of the swimmer for so long a period in rather cold water. Fortunately, the night chosen was very dark, but Gabaudan's mettle had the finest ring. What he may have lacked in physique was more than made up by the "sand" in his splendid determination. He was successful, after a long drift, including a swish now and then in the eddies under the bluffs of Port Hudson, from which he escaped by hanging close to his log and using his unengaged hand to paddle into the current down the river. Favored by the darkness, and with an unusual presence of mind, he escaped discovery by the pickets, who, in one instance, were so near that Gabaudan heard them conversing. He reached the squadron below about 4 A. M., after several hours of exposure. When he was taken from the water and brought on board the senior officer's ship he was much exhausted and greatly fatigued. The doctor, however, took him in charge and in good time restored him. The news of his safe arrival was signaled back across the point from the *Richmond* to the *Hartford* above at daylight.

During the progress of this long and tedious siege the writer saw and was much in the presence of Admiral Farragut. As the admiral in his younger days had known the writer's family, he spoke often of the delightful visits he had made to Middletown and Frederick, and how much he had enjoyed the generous hospitality of the good people there.

The admiral was a man of perhaps five feet seven inches in height. His gait and step were those of a very young man, and in conversation he was an animated and interesting talker. His information and experience were general, and upon almost

all subjects—professional, scientific or political—he was interesting and attractive. Like all great men, he was affable and accessible. His manner was one of great mildness and self-poise. His ideas were clear and his methods of doing things were always decided. When he had made up his mind to give battle in a certain way, it was realized that his way was the best. In any of the emergencies of battle his towering genius was readiest and his cool self-possession was an inspiration to everybody.

The wide difference that was apparent between this sprightly, kind, mild and pleasing gentleman, even when under a heavy load of responsibility, and his lion-like character and presence when battle was going on, was the contrast between sunshine and storm. His judgment of men was excellent, as the choice of officers with whom he surrounded himself indicated. The unvarying and complete success he met in everything he undertook in that great war was due largely to his strong personality, unerring purpose and dashing example.

The naval history of the past presents two characters that were much alike in their restless activity, their untiring energy of purpose, their absolute personal intrepidity and self-poise in emergency, and their dogged adherence to the idea that the enemy was to be fought wherever met—Farragut and Nelson. Farragut's private life and high ideals, however, gave him pre-eminence over his great English compeer.

After the surrender of Port Hudson there was considerable detail of forces to be arranged both on the land and the river. Most of the vessels had been injured so much in service and battle during this period of nearly a year and a half, that orders were given to send the heavier ships North for repairs. In this interval of time the officers and men enjoyed some relief from the strain and exposure to which their long service had subjected them.

The *Richmond* bore quite a large number of honorable scars, the repairing of which could not be deferred longer. The same was true of many others, but as there was lack of facilities at New Orleans and Pensacola for making the extensive overhauling needed, and no docks existed for examining injuries under the water-line, several of the larger ships were sent to New York, where the *Richmond* arrived on the 8th of August, 1863.

CHAPTER VI

IN SOUTH AND CENTRAL AMERICA

1864-1866

ON August 18, 1863, while the *Richmond* was in New York, the writer was detached and granted one month's leave of absence. The opportunity afforded by this short respite from duty was improved in order to marry his fiancée, Annie Rebecca Franklin, of Annapolis. This occurred in the midst of war, but as the betrothal had existed a couple of years, both parties had had ample time to test themselves by absence, separation, change of circumstance and a lapse of time which had enabled them to feel certain they had made no mistake. The 10th day of September, 1863, was chosen to begin life together, which, in all the years since, has been one of happiness.

Their older years have been comforted in the three children who were born to them—two sons and one daughter. The oldest son, Thomas Franklin Schley, having chosen the profession of arms, is a captain in the Twenty-third U. S. Infantry and saw service in Manila during the recent war with Spain. The second son, Winfield Scott Schley, is a physician and surgeon, established in New York City. The daughter, Maria Virginia Schley, married the Hon. Ralph Montagu Stuart Wortley, a young English gentleman.

As only a few days of the leave granted remained after the wedding day, a trip to Washington was made, mainly with a view to ascertaining where the next service might be. The chief of ordnance, Captain H. A. Wise, with whom the writer had sailed on board the *Niagara* a couple of years before, was met in the corridor of the old Navy Department building. Captain Wise said it was difficult to get officers for any duty on shore beyond a few months owing to the demands for their services at sea, and that if the writer had no objection he would have him detailed for two or three months at the ordnance factory at the Washington Navy-Yard while his ship was refitting

in New York. As the larger vessels of the squadron in which the writer had served were under repairs and there was little chance of further activities for a few months, the offer was accepted, and the orders of September 11th to this temporary duty were placed in his hands.

It was during this visit to the department, the first the writer had ever made, that he had the pleasure of seeing Secretary Welles. In those busy days there was not much time for more than formal politeness. The writer being then only a young lieutenant and sensitive to his own importance, left the Secretary's office under the impression that his reception had been polite, but nothing more. Later on in life, when demands on the Secretary's time and attention were better understood by association, as a bureau chief, the wonder was as great that the Secretary had time to be even polite to anyone during his office hours.

On the 23d of September the new duties at the Navy-Yard were taken up, and as greater familiarity with the work was acquired, greater interest was taken in its details. The natural ambition to lose no opportunity for active service, however, inspired apprehensions that, in the contemplated movements in the Gulf or at Charleston in the fall, by some mischance the writer might be overlooked. But just about the moment when enough courage had been worked up to inquire what the chances might be, and recalling the risk of scant politeness at the department, orders dated December 17, 1863, were received detailing the writer to the double-ender *Wateree*, at Philadelphia, Pa.

After the usual delays, however, the *Wateree*,* under com-

* Officers of the *Wateree*:

Commander, Francis Key Murray.
 Lieut. W. S. Schley, Ex. Officer.
 Acting Master David Page, Division Officer.
 Acting Master W. H. Colley, Division Officer.
 Acting Master Wm. Nyborg, Division Officer.
 Acting Master Julius Nilson, Division Officer.
 A. A. Surgeon, Geo. T. Shipley.
 A. A. Paymaster, Geo. S. Sproston.

1st Asst. Eng., Chas. E. DeValin.
 2d Asst. Eng., E. D. Longnecker.
 2d Asst. Eng., J. O. Fairbairn.
 3d Asst. Eng., David Pace.
 3d Asst. Eng., S. A. Bryant.
 3d Asst. Eng., Peter Innes.
 Master's Mate, Wm. D. Tompkins.
 Master's Mate, Wm. A. Currier.
 Master's Mate, R. T. Sperry.
 Master's Mate, John Mack.
 Gunner, James Reid.
 Pay Clerk, Arthur Schley.

mand of Commander Francis Key Murray, arrived at Hampton Roads and proceeded thence to Washington. A proclamation had been issued by the President allowing all the old "shell-backs" then serving in the Army to return to the Navy without detriment to their service. The *Waterree's* crew being a number short of her complement, she was delayed until a number of these men could be transferred from the Army. When these old sailors had reached the familiar deck of a man-of-war there was manifest satisfaction. One of these splendid fellows, and a typical seaman, William McGurr, who had served most of his life on board ship, was greatly delighted to get back home again.

When asked why, as an old sailor, he had enlisted in the Army, he replied that he "thought the chance of service on shore would improve his health," but he "had found great trouble in managing a team of mules he had been detailed to drive." The brutes "could not learn his language, and he had discovered he didn't know how to steer anything that had its rudder in front." For this reason he came back to the only service of the two which he knew.

During the month of March, 1864, the *Waterree* dropped down to Hampton Roads to await orders, which soon came, detailing her to service in the Pacific. Her construction was peculiar. She was known at that time as a "double-ender," which, interpreted, meant that her bow and stern were alike, with a rudder at each end. The idea prominent in the construction of this type was service in rivers, where the necessity for turning would be avoided. The draught of water was small and her engines were placed in the middle of the vessel. Her rig was that of a fore-and-aft schooner. The battery was very heavy for her size—about 1,000 tons displacement. Except for passages along the coast in weather that might be chosen, such vessels were in no sense very reliable for service generally. It may have been for this reason that some of these vessels were sent on such experimental voyages as that now directed for the *Waterree*.

Notwithstanding this, the *Waterree* got under way about the third week in March and reached St. Thomas, W. I., after a stormy voyage across the Gulf Stream, during which the high winds and rough seas did much damage to her forward guards, which were repaired in that port after some delay. During

the passage it was evident to her commander that she did not possess the highest sea-going qualities of a cruiser. Her rolling was rapid and deep and, with moderate winds or in moderately rough seas, her decks were deluged with water, to the great discomfort of the crew. Her hull being of iron gave her a rigidity of frame that was her salvation in the still more boisterous weather met to the south of the Rio de la Plata and on the east coast of Patagonia, when on the passage to Valparaiso. The small coal-bunker capacity and the uncertain limit of steaming radius, which depended so entirely upon the wind and weather encountered in making a passage of great distance, were matters of continual anxiety to her commander, who realized that if the fuel should give out in traversing unfrequented routes, there would be small hope that her limited sail power could be relied upon to help her into port.

This unfortunate casualty did occur on the voyage of 3,000 miles from Montevideo, Uruguay, begun on May 9th and ending in the latter days of July in Valparaiso, Chile, causing a passage of some sixty-nine days. Notwithstanding a deckload of coal had been taken on board before leaving Montevideo to supplement that in the bunkers, yet the head winds and heavy seas encountered in this winter passage of the southern hemisphere were so frequent, though made through the Straits of Magellan and the inland passage as far as the Gulf of Peñas, that, soon after clearing the Gulf, the coal supply was found to be so short that the ship had to be brought to anchor under one of the wooded islands off the coast, where wood enough was cut to enable the vessel to steam across the open sea for some fifteen miles to reach the inshore passage of the Corcovado Gulf. This wood was so green and full of sap that it merely frittered away, making but little steam.

What has been said of the limited coal-bunker space applied as well to the hold of that vessel for storing provisions. There was a full supply to the hatches on leaving Montevideo, but as the voyage lengthened there was grave solicitude lest it also might fail. Rations were therefore reduced, as some of its elements were exhausted, such as coffee and flour; but as the tide rose and fell some fourteen feet, exposing at the lower level masses of mussels adhering to the rocks, quantities were

gathered and steamed for each meal to help out the short rations. Rain and snow were almost constant with the prevailing westerly winds of that region. Naturally there was much discomfort to all hands, but nevertheless there were no complaints heard from anyone. Everyone worked with a will cutting wood to fill the bunkers or in making sails out of the awnings for the improvised yards that were to help on if wind should favor the ship.

A day of sunshine and fair wind came at last when we had finished the sail and filled the bunkers. With these favoring circumstances, the *Wateree* started for Castro, on the island of Chiloa, distant about 250 miles, and with good luck, thanks to the sail, reached an anchorage near that port just as the wind died out and the wood was almost exhausted.

While there was no coal to be had at this point, there was an abundance of dry wood, which the natives cut into cord-wood size, under the direction of an American living among them. There was no end of chickens, eggs, and potatoes, and upon these our men lived bountifully, providing themselves also for the trip to be made beyond.

Taking advantage of favoring circumstances, the *Wateree* got under way for Ancud by the inland passage through the Chacao Narrows, a channel all the more dangerous from the swift tide-way and the uncertain surveys of that date. She reached Ancud after a few hours' run in safety. In those far-off days, in those out-of-the-way ports, supplies for ships were not always abundant. There was no coal to be had on shore, but the arrival of a coast steamer a day or two afterward enabled the *Wateree's* commander to borrow some five or six tons which, with the excellent dry wood purchased at Ancud, helped him to reach the port of Valdivia, where a small amount of coal-dust and dirt was secured at an exorbitant figure. With this the port of Lota, or Coronel, was reached. As this port was the center of Chile's coal-mining district, there was no further solicitude about fuel, most of the ports on the station being easily within the steaming radius of the ship.

In making this long voyage in tempestuous weather and rough seas, the severe strains on the great side-wheels of the *Wateree* loosened the radiating arms carrying the paddles so

much that, when rolling, the projection of these paddles would strike the guards and shake the vessel from stem to stern. This caused much discomfort to those below decks day and night. It was the cause of serious anxiety to the commanding officer. This was remedied as soon as the facilities of the machine shops of Valparaiso could be employed.

At Valparaiso letters four or five months old were received, giving a *résumé* of all that had occurred since the departure from Hampton Roads. Among other news, the *Kearsarge's* triumph over the *Alabama* off Cherbourg was learned. News, too, that the *Shenandoah*, one of the Confederate privateers, was operating against American merchantmen in China and east of Japan was received.

This news in particular hastened the *Wateree's* repairs, and when these were finished she sailed northward, touching en route at Callao, Panama, San Juan del Sur, Acapulco, San Francisco and Mare Island, where she went into dock and underwent a more general refitting, including calking of decks, the condition of which, from the beginning, had been a source of much discomfort to all on board. After a sojourn of several months at the Yard and in the harbor of San Francisco, the commander-in-chief directed the *Wateree* to proceed to Panama, where there was customarily kept a war vessel to guard the passenger and freight traffic, which in those days before the completion of the transcontinental railways passed mainly by the isthmus route to and from California.

Chronic revolutionary disturbances in the Central American States induced the department to direct a war vessel to the scene of disturbances. The *Wateree*, having been relieved by the old sailing sloop-of-war *Cyane*, Commander John H. Russell, was soon under way for Punta Arenas, Costa Rica; San Juan del Sur and Realejo, Nicaragua. Realejo was reached in the latter part of April. The news of the assassination of President Lincoln was learned there from the President of Nicaragua, who, without ceremony, came off in person to convey this distressing intelligence to Commander Murray. The national flag was displayed at half-mast and a gun fired every half-hour until sundown as a mark of respect to the memory of this great American, who had perished at the hands of a madman and at a mo-

ment when his life and calm council were so much needed by his country.

Rumors of a revolution in San Salvador, soon afterward verified, reached Commander Murray, who proceeded with the *Waterree* to La Union, in the Bay of Fonseca. It was but a short time after her arrival that the revolutionary party was forced back upon La Union. In the custom-house of this port a large quantity of American property was held for shipment. Representations for its protection, made by the U. S. Consular representative to the revolutionary commander, led to the restriction of the consul's liberty to his residence upon certain trumped-up charges of sympathy with the legitimate government and of obstruction to the cause of the revolution.

The writer, with a company of men and a Gatling gun, was sent on shore to protect the consulate against violence, if that should be resorted to, and to require a written guaranty from the authority then in charge of the town that American property and citizens would be respected. Toward sundown fighting between the opposing forces began some distance outside the town and continued until after 9 P. M., when the Government forces, under General La Vega, had driven the revolutionists back to the Plaza, where from barricades they maintained a fierce contest for quite a half-hour, until nearly surrounded by the Government troops, when they fell back, breaking up into fragments in their flight to the water to escape.

Our force of sailors and marines took position in order of battle in front of the custom-house to protect the property therein, should any attempt be made to sack it by the retreating revolutionists or by the soldiers of the successful army, as sometimes happened. As the firing approached the Plaza, which was about two or three blocks distant from the position occupied by the *Waterree's* men, a reconnoissance was made to the nearest point of fighting for observation. As bullets began whizzing about the place selected, it was thought better to fall back upon the main body of the force so as to be ready for defence if the fighting should turn that way.

Fortunately, the captors appeared satisfied with driving the revolutionists from the Plaza, which they afterwards occupied. Their commanding general took measures at once to occupy the

city and to maintain order until daylight. One of the important matters first to be attended to was to secure the custom-house, and this brought the general with an escort toward the position held by the *Waterree's* men.

As this motley squad approached it was halted. Demands were made by General La Vega to know whom this force represented and what its purpose was in invading the sovereign state of San Salvador. The writer, being fairly well acquainted with the Spanish idiom, explained that its purpose was to guard all American property in the custom-house and to obtain assurances that it would be protected. When that assurance was given the force would be withdrawn to the ship.

During this colloquy an interesting example of the American seaman's loyalty to his officers occurred. One of the men had moved to the writer's side while the colloquy was going on, with his repeating rifle cocked and ready, supposing the colloquy, which was maintained in elevated tones of voice, meant that the general was abusing the seaman's chief, and as he did so he said, sotto voce, "Just tell me, sir, at the right time, and I'll blow that big hat off him for you." When it was explained that arrangements were being made to take over the custom-house, he replied:

"Oh, I thought he was abusing and cussing you, sir, and I was going to stop that."

The assurance asked for having been accorded, the American force was withdrawn. On the way back to the ship the night was very dark. The water was literally dotted with men from the defeated army, who had waded some distance out to escape from their pursuers. These men begged pitifully to be taken on board ship, while others, more fortunate, had seized boats about the shore and had escaped on board. One of the boats overtaken contained General Dueñas, the revolutionary leader, who had been gravely wounded by several musket balls. He was accompanied by two or three officers, who implored the right of asylum under our flag to save their lives.

Returning on board to report, it was found that a number of women, children and soldiers had fled thither for safety. Some of the little ones were only a few months old. The officers vacated their apartments to the ladies and children.

Promptly on the morning following the ladies and children were landed, because assurance had been given by General La Vega that there would be no danger for them. He insisted, however, that the revolutionary leader, his officers and men, should be surrendered; but ominous reports of musketry firing coming from the shore a little after daylight that morning indicated unerringly that the prisoners taken the night before were being despatched in accordance with the brutal methods of that day. Commander Murray then peremptorily declined to give up the officers, and on the following day weighed anchor and proceeded to Realejo, Nicaragua.

The writer was despatched to Leon, some twenty-five miles in the interior, to arrange for landing the insurgent troops. The trip had to be made on the "hurricane deck of a mule," over a rough road and through some rather dense forest. Although the start was made about 7 A. M., owing to the heat, the indolence of the guide and the pace of the mule, whose flanks and back were so callous that no amount of urging by spur or whip would hasten his gait out of a slow, shambling walk, Leon was reached about 4 P. M. on the same day. The ride was a hard one for a sailor unused to this sort of navigation, and the writer's condition when Leon was reached was such that a standing attitude for a day or two was much the most comfortable. Then there was that long ride back again to be thought of, and it was not comforting.

Fortunately there was diplomatic delay in the arrangements that gave time to recover from strains, blisters and some loss of epidermis. During this time the society of the American Minister and his family was much enjoyed. In the writer's intercourse with this gentleman, the wonder was that a man of his culture and refinement should have been assigned to a post so little in accord with his tastes and talents. Better acquaintance and a friendlier footing encouraged the writer to ask a question to that effect while waiting for the message which was to be carried back. The explanation has always been interesting, and was as follows:

"Why, it is easily explained. I wrote my friend, Mr. Lincoln, asking him for the position of Marshal of Nebraska, but I wrote such a devilish bad hand that he read it 'Minister to Nicaragua.' So here I am."

The written message was in time handed to the writer at the American Legation. It was sealed and the seal stamped with the great coat of arms of the Republic. In substance, it refused permission to land the officers, but granted the request as to private soldiers, provided they were disarmed and their arms turned over to the custom-house at Realejo.

The return to the ship was in all respects similar to the trip to Leon, but Commander Murray had anticipated the despatch by landing all the privates and handing their arms over to the customs authorities. General Dueñas and the officers were turned over to Captain Dow, who commanded an American steamer, plying on this coast from Panama, and were landed soon afterward at Panama.

The *Waterree's* officers and men, somewhat run down by their service of several months on this unhealthy and hot coast, proceeded southward to Panama, Callao, Chíncha Islands and Valparaiso. While at the Chíncha Islands, where a large fleet of American vessels were awaiting their turns to take in cargoes of guano, which was shipped in large quantities at this period to ports in Europe and America, a report was brought on board by one of the captains that the *Shenandoah* had been sighted off the island and apparently was coming in.

The squadron had been advised that she was in the Pacific and might make a descent upon the shipping at the Chíncha Islands. While lying there, the *Waterree's* steam had been kept in such readiness that her engines could respond to signals in a few minutes. The anchor was weighed at once and Commander Murray proceeded to sea. Turning clear of the North Island, there, sure enough, two or three miles away, was a vessel resembling the *Shenandoah*, but with no colors flying. The *Waterree* was "cleared for action," with her crew at quarters, ready for the combat that all believed would end as gloriously as that of the *Kearsarge* and *Alabama*.

Not wishing to disclose the ship's nationality, Commander Murray delayed showing her colors until a position had been gained about six hundred yards from the supposed enemy. With every gun of the *Waterree's* heavy battery bearing upon her, Murray ran up the colors and gave the preparatory order, "Stand by!" Up went the stranger's colors coincidentally. They were

Chilean, the ship being the Chilean corvette *Maipo*. Mutual explanations revealed the fact that the Chilean supposed the *Waterree* to be a vessel from Spain, with whom the country was then at war. The *Waterree's* black hull and straw-colored topsides favored that impression. A single gun fired by mistake at this moment would have resulted in a dreadful catastrophe.

During the night of January 25, 1866, a Peruvian officer came on board to report a formidable insurrection among the Chinese laborers, who had risen and killed the guards on the middle island of the group. The writer was ordered to take a force of seamen and marines to the point of disturbance and to establish order until the Peruvian forces from Pisco could arrive. A landing was effected near midnight on the quay at the north side of the island. Ascent to the top of the cliffs had to be made by a narrow stairway, leading straight up from the quay about one hundred feet to the top of the cliffs, which the Chinese held in force. Stones and other missiles were hurled upon the advancing column as it moved up this narrow stairway, but did not check its progress. Reaching the cliffs above, the American forces were deployed and opened fire upon the rioters, driving them back into a large gowdown, which they surrounded and commanded with their guns. The Chinese leader asked for a parley, which was granted, and resulted in the ultimatum that if any further attempt was made to disturb the peace, fire would be opened upon them. This determination they were obliged to accept, as the menacing attitude of the American forces around them indicated their readiness to carry out their plans.

On the following day a force of Peruvian infantry arrived. The situation was explained to the commander, and the American forces withdrew to their ship. After they had got aboard the ominous crack of musketry from the middle island suggested that summary vengeance was being dispensed to the ringleaders.

The *Waterree* returned to Panama, when the writer was detached and ordered home, where he arrived in the latter part of April, 1866.

CHAPTER VII

SERVICE UNDER PORTER AND A CRUISE TO CHINA

1866-1870

AFTER arrival home in April, 1866, for a brief respite with his family, the writer was ordered to the training-ship *Sabine*, at New London, but this service being not to his taste, he was ordered to the Naval Academy during the month of August. In July he had been promoted to the grade of lieutenant-commander for service during the Civil War. The academy was then under the superintendency of Vice-Admiral D. D. Porter, a distinguished officer of the Civil War and a prominent figure in the country. The first year of service was in the department of discipline, the two last years in the department of modern languages. During the summer of 1867 the writer was ordered as a watch and division officer of the sloop-of-war *Dale*, Lieutenant Commander Richard W. Meade commanding. This cruise included Cherbourg, France.

Admiral Farragut was then in command of the European station, and his flagship *Franklin* and several other vessels of his command were anchored in the harbor when the practice squadron, composed of the *Macedonian*, *Savannah* and *Dale*, arrived. The addition of these vessels constituted an imposing force.

It was in this year, on July 19th, that the unfortunate Maximilian was executed by the Mexicans at Queretaro. The court of France was in mourning on that account, but notwithstanding this fact, the French imperial yacht, with her Majesty the Empress Eugenie on board, came into the harbor. Salutes were fired, the ships were dressed with flags and the yards were manned on all ships in port in honor of her visit. Admiral Farragut and his staff paid a visit of courtesy to the Empress. The day following the Empress paid a return visit to the *Franklin*,

where all the officers of the American fleet, in special full dress, were assembled in honor of her visit.

It was the first and the only time the writer ever saw the Empress of the French, and the impression made then has remained ineffaceable in his memory. Her grace of person and her manner were attractive and sympathetic as she spoke in charming voice to everyone. At this time she was in the zenith of her beauty; the demonstrations of respect and admiration from her people suggested that she was at the highest pinnacle of power and fame. There appeared on her matchlessly charming face just a trace of sadness, the writer thought, as she gazed on the scene of welcome prepared in her honor around the harbor. Though courteous in her manner to all whom she met, there was no visible exhibition of this sadness; yet there appeared to be a dreamy, far-away expression in her soft eyes which suggested some sad reflection, but it was never for a moment betrayed in her intercourse with those assembled to honor her.

The practice squadron's visit to Cherbourg having ended, its vessels got under way for Spithead, in England, where a week was pleasantly and profitably spent by the young cadets in visiting the docks, looking over the newer vessels of the English Navy at anchor or under repair, and in taking a spin up to London which the opportunity of such nearness afforded. These pleasures over, anchors were tripped and sail was made for home. The squadron, which had kept company in going over, was signaled each to make the best of its way home. The *Dale* chose the route south, across the Bay of Biscay, touching at the beautiful island of Madeira. Rough weather was met in crossing this usually boisterous sea, but it was fine experience for the youngsters, who by this time had been braced up by exposures and made hardy in physique by daily instruction and exercise on deck and aloft in the open air.

Maderia was reached after an eight or ten days' trip, but our stay was only for a few hours in order to take on board some needed supplies to the larder. Then the *Dale* stretched to the south in order to reach the trade-wind regions of the North Atlantic, where the winds blow constantly and the weather is always good. Sailing along in seas that are rarely rough, and where the sunshine is only interrupted by passing clouds of

fleecy whiteness and tufty in shape, the crew enjoyed their release from constant calls to brace the yards. The wind seldom varies in direction after this region has been reached, unless the ship's course is altered. After a pleasant run of three or four weeks, the capes of Virginia were made late in September, and in time Annapolis was reached. The youngsters, with renewed energy and new life, then resumed their grind of study and exercises for another year.

During the summer of 1868 another cruise for practice was made, this time along the Atlantic coast and up the Hudson to West Point for the first part, and later outward to Madeira again. At West Point the cadets from Annapolis met their companions of the other service, and for several days there was a round of gayety, dances and competitive drills. The battalion of Naval Cadets, in their shore drills, as infantry and field artillerymen, compared favorably with their military comrades, who were most generous in their acknowledgments. The more important practice of seamanship and drill, with heavier guns at sea, was a part of the naval cadets' education which only experience outside could teach. In early July the squadron was again upon the bounding billows, where the real lessons of sea habit, sea life, sea experience and sea emergencies were to equip them for the hardships and exigencies of their later life as officers.

The writer in this cruise served in the old sloop-of-war *Macedonian*, Lieutenant Commander T. O. Selfridge, jr., commanding, one of the captures made during the War of 1812. The English had taken her from the French in an earlier war. As public sentiment demanded the preservation of these trophies of war, the *Macedonian* was kept constantly in good repair for many years, or until the change from wood to steel in ship construction and the improvements in artillery compelled her abandonment. In the romantic days of sail she was known as a crack ship whose service under the flag had carried her into every sea of the globe. She was as comfortable as a cradle when at sea, and during heavy weather under reefed sails she was a marvel in working to windward. Selfridge was an excellent officer, and while under his command the old *Macedonian* was a model in making passages from port to port. Her arrival at

Annapolis was made in ample time to permit a shore leave of absence to the cadets preparatory to the next year's course of study and drill.

It was during this year—1869—that the writer first met General Grant, who was then President of the United States. The meeting occurred while the general was on a visit to Admiral Porter.

The academic year having ended, orders were received detaching the writer and assigning him to the *Idaho*; but on account of an accident during a typhoon in the China Seas, in which she was nearly lost, the order was revoked and another substituted ordering the writer to the new steam sloop *Benicia*, just completed at Portsmouth, N. H.* Admiral Porter, in the meanwhile, had been ordered to the department as assistant to Mr. Secretary Borie. His influence was largely directed to restoring to many vessels some of the sail power that had been stripped from them as a war expedient.

The *Benicia*, originally a bark in rig, had been changed to a ship, with increased spars and sail area, and to test her efficiency a cruise was ordered of about a month, in the depth of winter, on our coast, between Portsmouth and New York. The orders required that a test be made of her sailing and steaming qualities in a first-class gale of wind. During the month spent outside between these points the weather was boisterous and bitterly cold. The *Benicia* was driven before the wind, across

* Officers of the *Benicia*:

Commander, Somerville Nicholson.
 Commander L. A. Kimberly, last two years.
 Lt. Comdr. W. S. Schley, Ex. Officer.
 Lt. Comdr. S. H. Baker, Navigator.
 Ensign Seaton Schroeder, Watch and Division Officer.
 Ensign T. C. McLean, Watch and Division Officer.
 Ensign T. T. Wood, Watch and Division Officer.
 Ensign A. B. Speyers, Watch and Division Officer.
 Ensign W. C. Strong, Watch and Division Officer.

Surgeon, H. C. Nelson,
 Asst. Surgeon, W. A. Corwin.
 Paymaster, A. J. Pritchard.
 Chief Engineer, B. B. H. Wharton.
 1st Asst. Eng., Isaac McNary.
 1st Lieut., F. A. Mullany, U. S. M. C.
 Master's Mate, Geo. S. Sproston.
 Master's Mate, Arthur Schley.
 Master's Mate, John Swanson.
 Master's Mate, Samuel Gee.
 Boatswain, Edward Bonsall.
 Gunner, G. H. Cushman.
 Sailmaker, W. H. Rickards.
 Carpenter, G. T. Lozier.

the wind, down the wind, and on the wind; first under sail and then under steam and sail, in snow and sleet and rain. There were many frostbitten fingers and toes during this bitter weather, but even that discomfort was accepted without complaint as one of the experiences in a life that is filled with such trials for the hardy fellow whose profession it is to follow the sea.

The eminent philanthropist, George Peabody, an American of great wealth, living in London, died during the year 1869. His remains were conveyed to this country by the English turreted battle-ship *Monarch*, Captain Commerell, escorted by the U. S. corvette *Plymouth*, Captain W. B. McComb commanding. The *Monarch's* draft of water being too great to cross the bar safely at any stage of the tide in New York or Boston, her orders named Portland, Me., as the point for landing the remains. The high respect felt for this eminent American, abroad as well as at home, prompted our Government to invest the ceremony of reception and landing with impressive dignity and honors. To this end a number of our war vessels were commanded to assemble at Portland. Admiral Farragut was directed to hoist his flag and to assume command of the squadron there assembled for the funeral obsequies. The *Benicia*, then at New York, was ordered to make the best of her way, in January, 1870, to Portland. Under full power, she reached that port almost at the moment the body was being landed on the morning of January 29th. The weather was severely cold and the harbor was filled with floating ice, which tugs kept broken between ships and docks.

This was the last time the writer saw Admiral Farragut alive or held conversation with him. During the fall months of 1869 the admiral had taken a heavy cold in Chicago, which, owing to some heart complication, became the cause of his death at Portsmouth, N. H., in 1870. A conversation with him in Portland is remembered, for in it was recalled a circumstance of the admiral's activity and vigor some six or seven years before, when he was operating against the defences of Port Hudson. In paying our respects to him at the Preble House on arrival and at a public reception, the writer approached him, grasping his hand, and said:

"Admiral, I am glad to see you looking so well, after the alarming reports of your illness."

He replied, "Do you really think so? I am very far from being a well man. Do you remember our conversation, some years ago, before Port Hudson, when I bantered you about jumping over a squilgee handle?"

The writer had to admit that he did not remember the day's talk and could not recall what was said. But he recalled the fact that the admiral was much more active and agile than himself, though the difference of ages was some forty years.

"Yes," the admiral replied, "I recollect that you then said I belonged to that class of men who would preserve their vigor and vitality until ripe old age, and that when the break comes would go in a year. It looks to me now that this may be so. But I shall never forget how I was impressed by what you said."

Some complimentary observations followed, but while the writer did not indicate by any spoken word what he was apprehensive of—that what had been said in possible jest years before might now prove prophetic—the admiral's appearance to the layman's eyes suggested that his days were numbered. He died in August, 1870, about six months afterwards. A great light had gone out. A deep-toned bell was stilled. The nation lost a loyal son and a mighty warrior.

The ceremonies at Portland concluded, the *Benicia* proceeded to Portsmouth, N. H., for coal and other needed supplies for the cruise to China, via the Cape of Good Hope. The Suez Canal, opened to commerce in November, 1869, would have been a shorter route to her station, but some information was needed by the President about the Orange Free State preliminary to the recognition of its sovereignty, and as Cape Town was the most favorable point for the inquiry, the *Benicia* sailed March 2, 1870, for that place.

A few days after sailing, while crossing the Gulf Stream, that turbulent river in the ocean, the *Benicia* was overtaken by a violent southwest gale. The wind and sea increased to such violence that running even under reduced sail became dangerous from seas boarding over the rail. During the night the ship rolled so heavily as to endanger her masts. The rigging, which had been set up in cold weather, stretched so much under the strain in warmer temperature as to threaten the loss of her spars.

In addition, the violent squalls after midnight blew her reefed maintopsail away, and the part that was left lashed the yard-arms so savagely, it was deemed wise to allow it to blow away entirely rather than risk the lives of men in attempting to save it. The lower rigging had to be "swiftered in" and everything about the deck secured for the worst that might occur. The day following the sea and winds were wild, and to save the masts, beginning with the main, the heaviest purchases were got up and "set up taut." New lanyards were rove, and in an hour or two the main rigging was "taut as a harp-string." The same procedure saved the fore and mizzen masts. A new topsail was bent and sail was made on an easterly course. Toward sundown the wind had gone down considerably and the sea had moderated. In seventeen days from Portsmouth, the *Benicia* was on the equator, and from there to Rio de Janeiro encountered light, baffling winds with beautiful weather.

On entering the harbor of Rio, April 16, 1870, under sail and in light airs and a strong tideway, the *Benicia* lost steerage-way and fouled a vessel lying in the fairway, doing considerable damage to herself as well as to the vessel fouled. After making repairs, the *Benicia* proceeded to sea en route to the Cape of Good Hope, and arrived at Simon's Town on June 2, 1870. Her mission to this port was to obtain full information of the condition of the Orange Free State, which had requested the friendly right of recognition from our Government.

Completing this duty, the *Benicia* sailed in the second week of June for the Straits of Sunda. The passage across the Indian Ocean was a memorable one on account of the boisterous weather and terrific seas encountered. On June 29th, at a point about E. S. E. of the Cape of Good Hope, distant about 2,600 miles, the fiercest gale in the writer's experience at sea was encountered. During that wild day and night the wind blew with hurricane force and the sea was the mightiest in force and the greatest in height he had ever seen. The ship was boarded frequently by heavy seas in quick succession, and for an hour or more was in great peril of foundering. The dawn of the 30th brought some change in both sea and wind, which had begun to moderate. The ship rode safely through that furious gale without loss of a rope-yarn. A day or two afterwards, fur-

ther to the eastward, a French merchant vessel, dismasted, was fallen in with. Assistance was given her, jury masts were rigged and we bore away for our port. Still further on an American merchant ship, with her foremast gone, was overtaken, but she declined assistance as she was under management.

In due time the gateway to the Eastern seas was reached, and the *Benicia* dropped her anchor off Anger Point, July 18, 1870. Not long, however, did she tarry there, but taking a Straits pilot on board, got under way for Singapore, via the Straits of Banca, and arrived off that port July 29th, and found the flagship *Delaware*, bearing the flag of Rear Admiral Stephen C. Rowan, commanding, at anchor.

After our long passage from the Cape of Good Hope, in stormy weather, there was much to be done to sails, rigging and hull to make the *Benicia* shipshape and sailor-like. Advantage was taken of an inviting anchorage off the northwest coast of the island of Banca for target practice, to set-up, rattle-down rigging, square ratlines, paint and clean ship. All hands were "turned to" during the day for these duties, and in some forty-eight hours the *Benicia* looked as if she had been in port a month.

From the moment that good weather set in, after leaving the United States, it was the daily custom on board to exercise at some one of the many drills of the old sailing days with spars, sails or battery. In the open sea, under the varied circumstances of weather, a high proficiency was attained by the officers and men through those exercises. Very often a remarkable celerity was acquired in reefing or shifting sails, in sending the yards or masts up or down, in handling the great guns or shifting them from side to side, and such like exercises. Officers and men alike acquired great confidence in their ability to make the quickest possible provision for any of the emergencies of life at sea, where the rule is risk, and where every exercise was intended to promote the promptest readiness to meet dangers in any form they might assume.

The *Benicia* reached her station in the highest condition of efficiency and readiness for service. Setting out for Singapore from her anchorage in what was really the Straits of Rhio, before sundown, distant some thirty miles from her destination,

she fanned along under a light easterly breeze, and arrived in the roads off Singapore toward midnight of July 29, 1870. Through the darkness the flagship *Delaware* could be distinguished, with t'gallant masts down, and, in conformity with the rigid exactions of those days, to follow the motions and movements of the flagship, the light yards and masts of the *Benicia* were sent down. At daylight the following morning it was discovered that we had taken up a good anchorage not far from the *Delaware*, and, like her, were ready for the usual morning evolution at colors, of "crossing light yards" and "loosing sails to dry." This evolution was performed cleverly, handily and noiselessly by the *Benicia's* crew under that spirit of rivalry so common in those days when our men-of-war fell in with each other.

The usual salutes and visits were exchanged, as required by the regulations. Much news met us at this port after our long cruise of several months. The Franco-German war was well under way. Several successes of importance had been won by the Germans. A concentration of both the French and German armies was being made for the desperate struggle. The Emperor had left Paris to assume command in the field. The Empress Eugenie had been left as Regent of the empire in Paris. The excitement in Paris was intense, and much dissatisfaction was manifested by the apparent lack of readiness of the French army compared with the splendid order of the Germans, as shown in the battles fought by them on French soil.

Supplementing this exciting news was that of the massacre of French nuns at Tien-Sien, in north China. The anti-foreign feeling, so manifest at that day, gave rise to rumors of the most appalling character, of advances upon the foreign settlements in the various treaty ports, and the further slaughter of foreign residents domiciled in them under treaty right. The story of this dastardly assassination and the outrage of these good women is still remembered. Occurring as it did at a moment when the French were engaged in a terrific struggle at home, their forces in Chinese waters were placed under serious disadvantage. By agreement of the German and French authorities, the fleets of the two nations in these waters were to remain inactive in order that there should be no apparent break in the force stand-

ing together on the basis of a common cause against aggressions or outrages upon any foreigners.

It was this condition of affairs which hastened the departure of the *Benicia* to north China after a few days' delay in Singapore Roads. The season was advanced and the change of monsoons was at hand, with probabilities of dangerous typhoons which sweep these seas at these times and are so full of peril to ships in the contracted waters of that part of the world. But the *Benicia* was a well-found sloop-of-war. Her officers and crew were well trained and seasoned by the tempestuous weather met on her voyage outward, so that there was no concern felt about storm or squall to be met on her route northward. She arrived in Hong Kong on the 12th of August, 1870, and, owing to the prevalent rumors at this place of distrust and possible dangers to foreign residents in the ports north, she coaled rapidly and renewed her supplies from the storehouse there and sailed for Shanghai, where she arrived on August 23d, having looked in at Amoy on the way up as a precautionary measure.

CHAPTER VIII

TROUBLESOME TIMES IN THE FAR EAST

1870-1871

THE arrival of the *Benicia* at Shanghai was an event which brought a feeling of new security to foreign residents, but more particularly to Americans. She was moored in the river directly opposite the official residence of the Consul-General, who at that time was Hon. George F. Seward. The grasp of the situation shown and the influence of Mr. Seward at this far-off post of duty had given great satisfaction and confidence to Americans, but, reenforced by this formidable warship, there was no longer any feeling of insecurity among Americans in the settlement.

The massacre of French nuns at Tien-Sien was followed by disquieting rumors of increasing anti-foreign feeling throughout China. The gathering of Chinese about the settlements in menacing numbers and the retreat of missionaries from various interior towns to the more protected treaty ports on the coast gave rise to all manner of disquiet and solicitous unrest. Most of the foreign residents had provided themselves with arms for their defense, and were organized for protecting themselves, if that should become necessary. But it is not easy now to appreciate what the feeling of security in those far-off days was when a well-appointed, formidable warship came into a port where countless foes were ready to repeat the horrors of Tien-Sien. Only those who passed through the dark days of that time in China can realize what the danger was.

Although the *Benicia's* orders were to proceed to Tien-Sien, the unrest at Shanghai was felt to justify her in remaining at that port. Especially was this the wiser course when it was impossible for her to pass the bar at Taku or to lie at anchor anywhere within sight of Tien-Sien on account of the shallow water off the bar. There was no question where the ship would be most useful in such times, and no thought of placing her where

the moral effect of her presence would be inappreciable. Remaining at Shanghai to protect the common interests of her own and foreign citizens would repress all possibility of an uprising, thought to be probable, in view of the unreasoning excitement prevailing among the Chinese. If by any chance or for any reason the *Benicia* had been absent from Shanghai during this restless period, it is not possible to say what the result might have been.

The opportunity was taken advantage of to make some needed repairs to hull and spars and to land the ship's battalion for drill and target practice every day. This demonstration of readiness for action was witnessed by crowds of Chinese, and there is no doubt that it was of great influence in preserving order.

During September Rear Admiral John Rodgers arrived in Woosung with his flagship *Colorado*, her draft of water being too great to permit her to cross the bar at the mouth of the river in order to reach Shanghai. Accordingly, she anchored off the village of Woosung at the confluence of the river with the Yang-tse-Kiang, a distance of eight or nine miles below Shanghai. Admiral Rodgers's arrival was timely, and inspired a feeling of still greater security on shore. The admiral had been a commanding figure in the Civil War from 1861 to 1865. He had emerged from this struggle with a splendid record for gallantry and chivalric courage. In every step of his advancement from lieutenant to rear admiral he had been conspicuous in performing his duties. He was a highly educated officer, in professional matters most accomplished. Of mature and excellent judgment, as a diplomatist he knew the exact moment to supplement diplomacy with force.

It was during the *Benicia's* stay at Shanghai that the culminating news of the Franco-German war was received—the defeat of the French at Sedan and the capture of their Emperor, Louis Napoleon, together with the surrender of the army under Marshal MacMahon. While many of the officers of the squadron believed the Germans would win eventually in that war, there was scarcely any one who thought it possible that their success could be so triumphantly achieved in so short an interval of time. As the German movements in overwhelming numbers, in accordance with the splendid strategy of Von Moltke, devel-

oped day by day, it was apparent that the French were out-matched and out-generaled, though their fighting was superb and chivalric on every field contested. The Germans had only turned against the French the splendid tactics of their great Napoleon sixty years before. Again the genius of that wizard in war had won.

Under the show of force by the several foreign squadrons in Chinese waters in 1870, and from the known fact that they were ready to support each other under the general concordance of a common cause, quiet was restored, and with it came assurances from the Chinese authorities, through the distinguished and clever statesman, Li Hung Chang, then in the zenith of his influence and power, that all foreign interests would be protected.

About this time Commander Somerville Nicholson was promoted to be a captain and ordered home. His place was taken by Commander L. A. Kimberly. The *Benicia* was detailed to carry back to Teng-Chau-Foo the missionaries who had fled for safety to Shanghai from the north of China after the massacre at Tien-Sien. She reached Teng-Chau-Foo, west of Chefoo, in October, 1870, with a number of missionaries on board. These good people were received by the Towtai, or chief officer, of the city with every manifestation of welcome and with every promise of protection, which was kept for some years.

The orders which detailed the *Benicia* to this duty directed her to proceed to Japanese waters after performing it, and in compliance therewith she arrived at Nagasaki on November 2d and proceeded through the inland sea to Kobe for a short visit of a few days on the way to Yokohama, where she arrived November 21, 1870.

In the short lapse of a few years the city had grown from a small village into a populous center of large proportion. Encouraged by the progressive activity of the Japanese Government, a large foreign population had taken residence there. Many large business houses and banks had established branches in this thriving city. The port was well filled with foreign shipping, attracted by the favoring influences of the country and the security of its anchorage.

All evidence of the old Daimio days when these feudal lords

practically dominated the empire had disappeared. The Emperor and Empress, with the Government, had removed from Kioto to Tokio, and had surrounded themselves with court ceremonials, their various ministers of state and by foreign diplomatic officials invited from other lands.

The change in the national costume, so picturesque and becoming, was setting in. Foreign travel was being undertaken by the people. Young lads of promise were being sent to the military schools and other colleges of America and Europe. In fact, Japan had felt the touch and influence of foreign association. She had awakened from the long sleep of seclusion, and, with this awakening, her good-natured people appeared anxious to join in the race of Western progress, with all that this meant in the world's development.

During the winter of 1870 and 1871, passed in Japan, the *Benicia* ran north as far as Hakodati, merely to show herself as a new power on the station. The weather experienced en route was boisterous and stormy in the extreme. Although the winds were mainly from the northwest, there was not a day of sunshine during the passage. Passing in through the Straits of Tsugara, the port was found frozen up, the ground covered with deep snow, and the temperature bitterly cold. This visit and the trip to and from are remembered principally because of the discomfort to officers and men. Beyond the fact that it was a port where American interests were beginning to grow, there was not much to interest those who visited it as a matter of duty.

It was during this winter in Japan that rumors reached the *Benicia* that the affair in Korea relating to the American schooner *General Sherman* was to be inquired into by our Government. This vessel had ventured into the waters of Korea on a trading voyage in 1868 or 1869, with a cargo of "Yankee notions." The vessel, as was learned subsequently, had been burned and her crew to a man had been killed by the Koreans. She was only heard from again through the Chinese at Pekin, who communicated to our Minister, Hon. Frederick F. Low, that her crew had been murdered and the vessel burned soon after arriving within Korean waters. Before sailing from the United States there were vague rumors that this matter was to be settled by

the squadron then being prepared for Rear Admiral Rodgers. Their recurrence at Yokohama, after the matter was better understood, led to the belief that there was to be more active service before the year ended. Such was the fact.

The anti-foreign feeling prevailing in China, although to some degree it had subsided in view of the vigorous show of force by all the foreign squadrons, was more likely to revive if any one of the nations represented there should appear to hesitate to take redress in matters so seriously grave as that of the *General Sherman*. The murder of the entire crew, with the destruction of the vessel, merely because her master had ventured into forbidden waters for purposes of trade, was hardly to be justified under any code of ethics. This view was that taken by our Government in directing careful inquiry, which led to prompt action later in the year.

At all events, orders directing the squadron to assemble at Nagasaki in the latter part of May, 1871, reached the *Benicia* at Yokohama. The *Alaska*, Commander H. C. Blake, a sister ship of the *Benicia*, was lying with her in that port for quite a month. These two vessels being the same in displacement, weight of battery, size of spars and sails, and number of crew, there was that natural and amicable rivalry between them which distinguished the high efficiency of the older days. There were daily competitive drills, wind and weather permitting, with spars, sails, battery, boats and battalions. In these exercises the *Benicia* usually had the advantage, perhaps, because of more systematic routine of drill at sea, as well as in port, which nothing but very bad weather was allowed to interrupt. Out of such competitions there grew up in the service a high degree of readiness for any circumstances of service and an alertness in both officers and men that fitted them for the quickest performance of duty in all the emergencies of the profession. There could have been no better school for developing the endurance and hardening the muscles of men, and none comparable with it in quickening the perceptions and observation of officers. A faculty to see things and to see them quickly need not be explained as a war need. It was to this purpose that much of the older training tended. We shall see how useful it was in the campaign of the June following, to be described later on.

In the latter week of April, 1871, the *Alaska* and *Benicia*, then lying together in the port of Yokohama, were ordered to repair to Nagasaki. They sailed the same day, a few hours apart, and on gaining the open sea the fires were hauled from under their boilers, as sail was made to a fine breeze, which hauled to northeast, freshening with the barometer falling, which is a bad sign in those seas. Notwithstanding this unfavorable sign, sail was not reduced below royals, as the crew was unusually smart in handling sails, and the typhoon season still some two or three months off. Under such circumstances, sailors run over in their minds and draw all the comfort possible from the well-known doggerel verse relating to hurricanes, found in all treatises on the weather at sea:

"June too soon;
July stand by;
August look out, you must.
September, remember;
October, all over."

The distance to be traveled was several hundred miles against the strength of the great Japan Current, which is the Gulf Stream of the Pacific, flowing northeasterly along the coasts of China and Japan. The sea to be traversed was narrow and somewhat dangerous in bad weather or in gales on account of the outlying islands to the eastward and southward. In weather such as obliges a ship to "lie to" this close sea is an ugly place with the strong currents. All went well, however, and, though the passage was rough and wet, both ships reached Nagasaki on April 30th, only an hour or two apart.

Within a few days the *Colorado*, with Rear Admiral Rodgers on board, came in, accompanied by the *Monocacy*, Commander E. P. McCrea, and the *Palos*, Lieutenant Charles H. Rockwell. Our Minister to China, Hon. Frederick F. Low, with two secretaries, Messrs. Drew and Cowles, and two Chinese interpreters, were on board the *Colorado*. All intercourse with the Korean authorities had to take place through the medium of the Chinese idiom, and this fact explained the presence of these interpreters on the staff of the minister. It was not difficult to guess, under these circumstances, what the squadron's destination was to be, but in the many expressions of opinion about this there was some

apprehension that the presence of the minister with Chinese interpreters might indicate that there was to be only a "parley" after all. But among the more thoughtful, though the utmost secrecy of the squadron's purpose was maintained for obvious reasons, all indications set at rest definitely the rumors of the year preceding.

At this time it is doubtful if there was a more efficient, better-trained or more capable squadron afloat than the Asiatic squadron under Rear Admiral John Rodgers. Korea was, after all, the objective point. This belief gained strength from the fact that a retrospective glance over the squadron's general orders showed preference for battalion and artillery drills. The prevalent unrest of the Chinese at that time, together with occasional outbreaks, were sufficient to account for these preparations, and, while things did not justify this activity, it may be said that they did serve to mask the real purpose of the admiral. No American squadron was ever better prepared to maintain or to vindicate the honor of our country or to protect the interests of its citizens in the far East.

Those officers who knew the splendid career and high character of the admiral for courage, dash and judgment held an abiding faith in the competency of his reasoning and in the correctness of his judgment, should the Korean authorities attempt to evade the issue or avoid its adjustment. The interval of nearly a fortnight, with all the ships together, was beneficial to everyone. The rivalries of drill of all kinds were at flood-tide height.

The prospective expedition to Korea to adjust a wrong and the probable effect it would have at a time when unrest was general in China was believed to be for good. It was thought that Admiral Rodgers's attempt to open communication with the Government of that hermit kingdom would meet with suspicion and possible obstruction from its officials. The sentiment general in the squadron was that when the relations between two countries were such that the subjects of one were not safe in the territory of the other, the time had come to make them so through force of arms.

It was easy to divine that the admiral did not intend to venture into harbors that were unsurveyed or along coasts whose

outlying dangers were uncharted without preparation for every contingency. Enough was gleaned, from conversations with those nearest the admiral, to satisfy anyone that he had concluded that the moment had come when Korea must be compelled, if need be, to take up her duties as a power bound by the law of international justice and usage, lying, as her territory did, athwart the routes of the world's commerce. Especially was this held to be a paramount duty, after the ports in the north of China and in eastern Siberia had been thrown open to the nations of the world. As vessels prosecuting legitimate trade must pass and repass the coast of Korea, or, through stress of weather, at times might be driven upon its shores, the right to humane treatment had to be insisted upon. There were abundant rumors that unfortunates had been slain or cast into prisons to die of neglect.

Little was known of the country, less of its people and absolutely nothing of its form of government; but, as has always occurred in the history of progress, imagination peopled it with warlike tribes of formidable stature and ferocious instincts. The stories of those living at the treaty ports, where nothing was known of Korea, lost nothing when the dangers ahead were pictured. Krupp cannon were in the forts, needle-guns were in the hands of the troops, the people were ferocious giants; but when pressed with inquiry as to sources of knowledge, nobody could explain how these things could reach Korea without the world knowing it. This was a small difficulty, easily brushed aside by those whose love of invention exceeded any desire to be accurate in fact.

The squadron, being ready for its mission, sailed from Nagasaki on May 16, 1871, for the coast of Korea, the flagship *Colorado* leading, the *Benicia*, *Alaska* and *Monocacy* following in column, and the *Palos* on the port beam of the flagship. After passing the island of Quelpart, lying to the south of the Korean peninsula, the squadron steered northwesterly, proceeding with caution, as there were no reliable charts of the coast. All uncertainty about the squadron's destination now vanished. The only point still obscure was the exact locality to which it was bound, and this cleared away as the entrance to the Salée River was reached.

The charts used were mere reconnaissances, made from time to time by vessels happening near this unknown coast. Some years before a French squadron, under Admiral Roze, had visited the locality about the Salée River, and it was upon the surveys made by his officers, hastily at the time, that Admiral Rodgers relied. The islands, headlands, bays and rivers marked on these charts bore French names, but in no instance were the locations found reliably correct.

An anchorage near the coast being taken up, the admiral directed a running survey to be made, this task being committed to the navigators of the ships of the squadron, with the view to ascertain definitely the channel-way and the location of dangers lying in it. The ground examined, the squadron was moved into a new position the day following, and from this new position further surveys were made, until the final anchorage off Isle Boisee was reached on June 1, 1871.

The tidal current in the river ran with great strength, the rise and fall during spring tides being quite twenty feet. The depth of water was about fifteen fathoms, and in the swift current the ships were moored to avoid sheering across the tides, as would have occurred lying at single anchor. The position of the squadron as taken up was at the mouth of the Salée River, not far from the present anchorage of Chemulpo. This locality was rather exposed as an anchorage during the typhoon season then approaching. Therefore the admiral sought and obtained permission, from the officer commanding a fortification near the mouth of the river, to extend the survey a few miles further up for the purpose of locating the squadron in a more secure anchorage.

The squadron's arrival was viewed apparently with suspicion by the fishermen. Whenever the steam launches came in the vicinity of these fishing vessels while running their lines of soundings, the latter fled precipitately to the shore. As careful instructions not to interfere with them had been given, no attempt was ever made to overhaul the boats. But on the same night that the squadron reached the anchorage beacon-fires were lighted on every hilltop visible from the anchorage. It recalled the days of old when the approach of the great Armada of Spain was announced from the hilltops by beacon-fires to the people of old England when Queen Bess ruled the land.

It ought to be said that nobody in the treaty ports of the East had the faintest idea of Korea, its people or its productions. No white man had ever visited the country. Yet scores of people on shore pretended to be fully convinced that it abounded in wealth, that its inhabitants were giants in stature, that their strength was herculean, their ferocity inferior only to that of the tiger; that their guns were the latest type, and their marksmanship equaled only by that of William Tell of fable; their courage—well, that was comparable only to that of the defenders of historic Thermopylæ.

Such were the stories told on all sides about Korea before the expedition set forth. The real story will be related as the work of the expedition is unfolded.

CHAPTER IX

OPENING COMMUNICATION WITH KOREA

1871

ADMIRAL RODGERS sought to open communication with the Korean authorities at the earliest moment after reaching the anchorage just within the mouth of the Salée River. This was found to be a matter of some difficulty in a country where rural delivery was unknown and postal facilities were closed to foreigners. It was only after several attempts had been made that the official who was in command in the village opposite was finally reached. This official was assured that the squadron's visit and purposes were friendly, and that the desire to make surveys a few miles further was merely a wish to find a position of more security for the squadron during the typhoon months. This permission was granted, and, in compliance thereto, the *Monocacy* and *Palos* were directed to proceed upon this duty.

The opening despatch of the Minister and Admiral Rodgers, who acted in accord, announced to the Korean authorities the arrival of the squadron, its peaceful purpose and the object which had brought it into their waters. This despatch was taken on shore in daylight and secured to a stake, set up well beyond the high-water mark. During the night it was removed from its place and taken to the capital, a few miles away. The reply was attached to this same stake, under cover of darkness, and in the daylight was discovered and brought on board. It was evasive in tone, lofty in style and deprecatory. It referred to supplying the squadron with food if it was hungry, but the principal desire manifested was to have the squadron go away. The suggestion was made that if the squadron had come to change Korean customs, there would be difficulty in changing the prejudices of four thousand years. This despatch came from the Government at Seoul.

Other despatches informed the admiral that a man of

his nation, named Febiger, had once come to the country, communicated with it and then gone away. The admiral was asked why he did not do the same. Another despatch warned him of the fate of the French who, some years before, had attempted to pass the gates of the empire.

No courtesy proper to the Korean authorities was omitted by the Minister or the admiral in conforming to the nicest sense of international courtesy on that occasion. In view of what took place later in these waters this explanation should be sufficient to exonerate those officers from any charge of rashness in the action taken by them to uphold the national dignity by force of arms.

The *Monocacy* and *Palos*, on the afternoon of the squadron's arrival, proceeded to examine the upper channel toward Kang Hoa Island. On arriving in the vicinity of the upper forts a spirited action was begun along the river front from all the fortifications, to which the *Monocacy* and *Palos* replied vigorously and effectively. The tide being at the flood, the dangers of the channel unknown, the river too narrow to allow the vessels to turn, they proceeded on past these fortifications around the high bluff on the river, upon which a citadel fortification stood. Dropping their anchors to swing around with head to the incoming tide, both vessels got under way again and repassed the line of fortifications, at this time opening a heavy fire upon them as soon as they got into effective range.

The reverberation of heavy guns was heard on board the ships at the anchorage below, and naturally caused much excitement among the officers and men, none of whom had anticipated such results after the course taken by the admiral in assuring the commanding official of the squadron's peaceful purpose. The action had been begun by the shore fortifications in opening fire upon the vessels as they approached. As numbers of men were seen on the forts about the guns, the precaution was taken by the two vessels to "clear ship for action" and to have their crews at quarters for battle. The result was that the ships were ready for immediate reply to the challenge of battle, and with such disastrous consequences to the Koreans that the prisoners captured in the later operations reported that during the preliminary fight "not a few were killed and many tens were

wounded." The reports of the two commanders, on their return to the anchorage, were to the effect that the Korean troops had fled from their guns and abandoned the works.

It was clear that there had been no mistake in beginning the fight, as the signal gun in the Korean citadel appeared to have been the order for a simultaneous attack by all the forts upon the approaching ships. The small damage done, however, rather indicated that the enemy's guns were fired hastily and with little regard to the fact that the ships were or were not within their range. The channel was swept by a storm of missiles, but only a few of them came near the ships and none of them inflicted any real damage. It was discovered later on that most of the several hundred Korean guns had a fixed range, the guns themselves being incapable of training, as they were crudely secured to the parapet, with their breech, in a number of instances, against trees to prevent recoil.

This hostile action by the forts was an unfortunate mistake, which had to be adjusted in advance of the real question which had drawn the squadron into Korean waters. Furthermore, it complicated the situation by introducing a suspicion that Korean assurances might in larger questions still be as insincere as those which had taken the *Monocacy* and *Palos* up the river surveying. As all intercourse was cut off after this action, it became difficult to communicate with the Korean authorities. Even the village at the mouth of the river was deserted by its inhabitants, who fled to the high land of Kang Hoa Island. Resort was again had to setting up a post on the bank abreast the ships, well above the high-water mark, during the daylight. Under the strained relations this unfortunate mistake had occasioned, there was no doubt that every movement of the squadron would be under strict observation by the Koreans and that this renewed attempt to communicate with them would be observed and understood. Sure enough, on the morning following, the note we had attached to the stake disappeared. It recited the circumstances of the forts firing upon the ships after permission had been accorded them to survey further up the river. Seven days were given to the authorities to disavow the action of the commanding officer of the forts and to make suitable reparation for the insult to the flag.

Those seven days became a period of the greatest activity by the squadron. The battalions of the different ships were combined into a formidable division, with only slight changes in the command of companies; but due regard was had that sufficient force be left on board each ship to defend her against any attack while the main division was absent. Rations for several days were cooked and ammunition for small arms and artillery was carefully packed for transportation in proper boxes and caissons. The boats of the squadron were arranged for towing, and each of the companies was detailed to its proper boat, and the order given for landing under the parapets of the fort lowest down the river, the purpose being to carry this by assault.*

*The total force organized to operate against the forts on June 11, 1871, was 618 officers and men. The total force to operate on the river against the water-front on board the *Monocacy* and *Palos* was 190 officers and men. Following are the officers:

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| Commanding Expedition..... | Commander H. C. Blake, U. S. N. |
| Commanding Land Forces..... | Commander L. A. Kimberly, U. S. N. |
| Adjutant Land Forces..... | Lieut. Commander W. S. Schley, U. S. N. |
| Signal Officer Land Forces..... | Ensign N. T. Houston, U. S. N. |
| Aid to Commander Land Forces . . . | Mate A. K. Baylor, U. S. N. |
| Commanding Right Wing..... | Lieut. Comdr. Silas Casey, U. S. N. |
| Commanding Left Wing..... | Lieut. Comdr. W. K. Wheeler, U. S. N. |
| Commanding Company A..... | Lieut. Comdr. O. F. Heyerman, U. S. N. |
| 1st Lieutenant Co. A..... | Ensign C. A. Clark, U. S. N. |
| Commanding Co. B..... | Master F. J. Drake, U. S. N. |
| Commanding Co. C..... | Lieutenant G. M. Totten, U. S. N. |
| Commanding Co. D..... | Lieutenant Hugh W. McKee, U. S. N. |
| 1st Lieutenant Co. D..... | Master C. W. Chipp, U. S. N. |
| Commanding Co. E..... | Lieut. Bloomfield McIlvaine, U. S. N. |
| Commanding Co. F..... | Master J. E. Pillsbury, U. S. N. |
| Commanding Co. G..... | Master T. C. McLean, U. S. N. |
| Commanding Co. H..... | Master R. M. G. Brown, U. S. N. |
| 1st Lieutenant Co. H..... | Mate Collender, U. S. N. |
| Commanding Co. I..... | Captain McLane Tilton, U. S. M. C. |
| 1st Lieutenant Co. I..... | 2d Lieut. W. J. McDonald, U. S. M. C. |
| Commanding Co. K..... | 1st Lieut. J. B. Breese, U. S. M. C. |
| 1st Lieutenant Co. K..... | 1st Lieut. F. M. Mullany, U. S. M. C. |

DIVISION OF ARTILLERY

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| Commanding Division..... | Lieut. Comdr. Douglass Cassell, U. S. N. |
| Commanding Right Battery..... | Lieut. A. S. Snow, U. S. N. |
| Commanding Left Battery..... | Lieut. W. W. Mead, U. S. N. |

threw reports that had reached the squadron at Nagasaki and Shanghai as to the splendid armaments of Korea.

These tales were born of a natural desire to exaggerate by those who knew nothing absolutely of Korea, its people, or its resources. Sealed up as Korea was at that time against all communication with the outside world, except to a limited degree with China, nothing could be known of the empire. Large purchases of arms from powers of whose existence that Government could know nothing were only one of the crazy fancies abroad at this time in the East. It was in degree somewhat like that fancy of the ancients which filled the unknown regions they were to invade with all sorts of giant forms, such as the cyclops. And as these vanished in the olden days, so likewise in Korea. All rumors of great preparation were so many fancies of ignorance or had been gathered from the Chinese, whose information was slight, but who suffered no story to lose anything in the telling.

Several days before the final answer came to the admiral's letter, a boatload of cattle and other provisions was drifted down the river to the squadron, in charge of one or two boatmen, from whom it was learned that these supplies were intended as a present, as the people might be hungry. Pending negotiations relating to the insult of firing upon the *Monocacy* and *Palos*, it was thought to be a mistake to accept presents of any kind before ascertaining whether the Korean Government was really friendly. Hence, on the change of the tide to flood this boatload of provisions was returned with thanks, and the information added that the squadron was supplied with everything needed for many moons to come.

Finally, on June 9th, an answer was received from Seoul, the capital, virtually inquiring whence the squadron had come. If its people were hungry they would be fed; only it was desired that it should go away. But if it had come to change Korean customs and habits, it was again reminded that it was difficult to change the prejudices of four thousand years. Information was vouchsafed that a people called the French had, in the year 1865, undertaken this, and if we did not go away our treatment would be that which was accorded to the French, to whom they referred the admiral. It was their rule, so the communication

stated, "to fire upon all who attempted to pass the gates of their empire, and that the commander of the forts only did his duty."

This reply practically shut the door in our faces. It bore no apology, but rather a threat. It sustained the action of the commander of the forts and endorsed his conduct as the performance of a duty falling within the rules of the empire. It left to the admiral no other recourse than that which was usual under such circumstances when diplomacy fails to adjust issues among civilized nations. A peremptory challenge was thrown down which no self-respecting nation could refuse without discredit, especially at this time in the East when the feeling was so violently anti-foreign. It would not be possible even to venture a guess of what the consequences might have been if an American admiral had vacillated in taking extreme action in this instance. The squadron under his command, from himself down to the seamen, was officered and manned by those who had, only a few years before, emerged from the great Civil War. They were, in fact, veterans to whom the crack of rifles and the whistling of shot and shell would not be new sensations.

The admiral's purpose, in the first moments after the action between the ships and the forts, had been to land the battalion the next day, and orders to this effect were sent to the writer, who was to take command of it and reduce the forts; but upon more mature reflection he had decided upon the better and wiser course of addressing the note to the authorities, setting forth the circumstances and giving them time to repair the wrong if they were so inclined.

June 10th, the day set for operations, was ushered in without a cloud in the sky, the temperature that of midsummer. Everybody was astir early. The boats were lowered, the battalion, equipped for distant service, was ready to embark after breakfast, and the *Palos*, with steam up, Commander H. C. Blake, commanding the expedition, on board, was ready for towing the squadron of boats.

A busy scene of activity followed in arranging the order of advance up the river, to be led by the *Monocacy*, whose heavy guns were to be used upon the lower fort to dislodge the enemy. The strong ebb tide made the progress of the boats slow. Al-

though they got under way by 10.30 A. M., it was towards 3 o'clock, after an hour or two of bombardment by the *Monocacy*, when they made a dash for the beach in the order arranged, though by some misunderstanding the left of the battalion was landed on a mud flat below the lower fort, and was delayed an hour in gaining solid ground. On the approach of this force a few guns were fired from the lower fort, but it was hastily abandoned by its defenders, who fled and disappeared in the covering of woods beyond a broad morass back of the lower fort. Possession was taken at once of this point, skirmishers were thrown out across a causeway through a morass leading to these woods, and all approaches to the fort and surrounding region were reconnoitered.

These precautions being concluded, it was too late that day to attempt a further advance into a country wholly unknown, and of which there were no maps. The battalion went into bivouac on the high ground back of the fort and posted the artillery in position to sweep the causeway and the road back of the works, which were the only approaches. The flanks were protected by the *Monocacy* and *Palos*, and night fell upon the camp. The enemy's cunning and aggressiveness were in no sense underestimated. Every arrangement had been made before nightfall to give him a warm reception if perchance a night attack should be attempted.

Everything went well until midnight, when word was received from Captain Tilton that shots were being exchanged, and that the enemy was forming in the woods in his front. In accordance with his orders in such an event, his force fell back on the main body so as to be clear of our artillery fire. Some desultory firing by the enemy, the din made by the beating of tom-toms, and the hurraing of crowds of people were believed to indicate an assault. This challenge was answered by several artillery shells, which checked both the noise and the demonstration. It was fortunate for the enemy that no assault was made that night, for the battalion was alert and fully prepared for work.

Commander Kimberly took advantage of this disturbance to call a midnight council of war, at which it was decided that celerity of movement was to characterize the battalion's opera-



FORT MONOCACY.

tions. The consensus of opinion was that, whenever the enemy was met, the fight should be to the finish. Every advantage was to be followed up relentlessly. No rest was to be given to the enemy, for as long as he could retreat the battalion could be counted upon to pursue; every blow was to be pressed home or followed by one of greater power. In fine, it was decided to make war upon the foe after the most approved modern methods and to spare nothing that could be reached by shot, shell, fire or sword.

The ships were informed of this decision. The pickets were called in as the first golden streaks of dawn shot upward in the skies on that morning of June 11th. The battalion took up its line of march over the road back of the forts, throwing a strong picket force on its left flank to clear the woods and guard against surprise from the foe in this direction. The roads were so narrow and bad that the battalion in column of fours was obliged to have the sappers and miners remove obstacles from its passage. As had been surmised would be the case, the battalion fell upon the second fort, known as the Marine Redoubt, and afterward as Fort Monocacy, about 6.30 A. M., after a furious bombardment by that vessel. The enemy's surprise was complete and his retreat so precipitate that the morning breakfast was found to have been left boiling in the stew-pots. Short work was made in dismounting the guns. Fire was then set to all buildings used for military purposes in or about this fort. This fire later in the day unfortunately reached and destroyed an entire village lying to the north of this fort.

Remembering that celerity of movement when operating against these slow-going Eastern nations would demoralize and confound them quite as much as a battle, the line of march in the same order was taken up without loss of time for the main citadel, named Fort du Coude, at the elbow of the river above, distant several miles. This march was through a dense undergrowth, over steep hills and across morasses which had to be corduroyed to gain higher ground away from the river. After a tedious march in intensely hot weather, under a burning sun, on emerging into clearer ground the enemy was discovered in force on our left and front. The battalion was thrown forward into line by Lieutenant Commander Casey and a strong skirmish

line thrown forward towards the enemy's position, which was on a hill entrenched and apparently awaiting attack.

It was discovered at once that the enemy had made a serious and irreparable blunder in choosing this position. Kimberly threw the right wing forward under Casey, who, after some skirmishing, seized the stronger position on a hill which commanded the line of advance and completely controlled any re-enforcement of the enemy's forces in the forts further along toward Fort du Coude. From this position, which overlooked the entire field of operations, the military advantages were evident at a glance. Their blunder was hailed as an indication that there was lack of strategy among their officers. How much that encouraged the attacking column can be judged better from the advantage which was taken in the movement made immediately against the upper forts along the river, where the other half of the Korean army had been placed.

It was clear that the Koreans had made an irreparable military mistake in not throwing this part of their army across the line of Kimberly's advance, and thus forcing a fight for an advantage which had been gained, it might almost be said, without firing a gun. In other words, the enemy permitted his army to be cut in twain without a serious fight, and, worse still, its right wing to be left in the air. Kimberly was quick to move his left up to this position, detailing three companies, supported by three pieces of Snow's artillery, the combined force being under Lieutenant Commander W. K. Wheeler, whose orders were to hold the place at all hazards. To add strength to a position naturally strong, Wheeler quickly threw up entrenchments, and these stood to good purpose in the two assaults the enemy made later in the day.

Kimberly again threw the right wing forward under Casey to assault the citadel, whose defenders were being increased by those who fled from the rifle-pits in front of the right wing as it advanced, and those from the forts lying on the river under the higher ground back, then held by our forces. Kimberly gave the writer orders to represent him in the advance, and at the same time informed him that his headquarters would be on a prominent ridge between his divisions, where all movements would be under his observation.

On Sunday, June 11th, the sky was clear of clouds and the heat consequently intense. But these things were hardly considered when the work ahead promised to be much warmer still. It was 12.35 P. M. when the right wing of the battalion had reached its position behind a slight ridge, where it rested to fill canteens and cartridge boxes, and to be sure that bayonets were all secure and fixed. From this position a road was seen across the ravine leading down from the cliffs on which the citadel was located and then up the river. On the left was a small knoll which commanded this road. It was at once seized and Lieutenant Commander Douglass Cassell directed to occupy it with a company and one section of artillery.

The *Monocacy*, in compliance with signals, had maintained a vigorous and murderous cannonade of the forts as the battalion advanced, driving the enemy from them like rats. It was these troops that momentarily augmented those in the citadel. Upon this last fortification Commander McCrea opened a merciless cannonade, until signaled to cease firing so that the battalion could make a charge upon this work.

In the citadel across the ravine the enemy chanted a solemn dirge, but whether it was a battle song of defiance or a dirge of death was never learned. Some of the men to whom this battle was to be a sort of baptism of fire were a little disturbed by the solemnity of the weird song, but when reminded that "barking dogs rarely bite," took new determination for the fight which followed, desperate as it proved.

Open order was directed by Casey, the rear rank some six feet in rear opposite the interval of front rank. At 12.40 P. M. the order "Charge at double quick" was given. The battalion rose over the ridge and passed down the hill across the ravine and up to the parapets of the citadel amid a storm of projectiles. There were a number of casualties, but at close range the wonder was that they were not more numerous. The fighting inside the citadel was severe and stubborn.

It was here that Lieutenant Hugh W. McKee fell mortally wounded. He was among the first to reach the parapet and fell under an avalanche of projectiles into the fortification, shot through the stomach and spine. In falling he fell against the writer, but in the smoke and noise of the conflict it was thought

he had stumbled only. In the rifts of smoke a moment later, he was seen lying upon his back in the fort, with two spearmen apparently in the act of despatching him. The writer hastened to his side, and this led to a desperate hand-to-hand conflict with a native soldier, which ended unfortunately for the poor fellow, though not until he had sent his spear through the writer's left sleeve, pinning it to his coat.

It seemed a long time before the battalion reached the fort, but in reality it was only a few moments, when the work of carnage began in earnest. Captain McLane Tilton's marines, being on the right of the battalion, in closing in on the fort, gained the enemy's left flank, as did the company of Lieutenant Thomas C. McLean on his right. With Lieutenant Commander Casey in front, Captain Tilton on the right and Lieutenant McLean on the left, the enemy's ranks were enfiladed, but it was fully thirty minutes before their lines broke. Frequent charges were made and repulsed on both sides, but it was not until their men had been piled up after several bayonet charges and their quarters within the parapets had taken fire that the stampede began for the cliffs and the road leading down to the river. Many were killed in this rout, some jumped over the cliffs to the river bank, sixty or eighty feet below, and more made for the road only to meet the fire of Cassell's men and the artillery directly in their faces, which piled them up two and three deep. Many jumped into the river, where they were shot or drowned in attempting to escape.

The force confronting Wheeler, seeing the disaster to their brothers in the citadel, fled in the utmost confusion from his front, throwing away guns, gun-proof armor, clothing and all impedimenta which could have retarded their flight. It is hardly possible to comprehend at this time how tremendously demoralized this army was, but, remembering that the part of it in front of the right wing of our battalion had been practically annihilated, while that in Wheeler's front had suffered two bitter repulses, it is doubtful if better organized forces anywhere could have maintained a better morale after such sweeping defeats and destruction.

The battle ended, leaving many dead and wounded on our hands, whose suffering was painful to look upon. The surgeons



INTERIOR VIEW OF FORT DU COUDE AFTER THE HAND-TO-HAND CONFLICT.

were busy the rest of the day in administering relief to those who were injured. The dead were buried in the trenches inside the citadel, and the scene of conflict was then tidied up as well as fire and funerals could effect it. Wheeler's men were ordered to join the main body, and before nightfall a strong picket-line had been thrown out to the west of the ravine. News of the complete success of the battalion was despatched to the commander-in-chief, with a succinct report of its losses, and then the camp settled down into quiet for the night, in bivouacs upon the field of battle won by the valor of our men. There were no alarms during the night, not even any excitement on the picket-lines. Indeed, it was a question in some minds whether there was any army left in the land willing to contest another field with our victorious force.

Careful examination of the dead revealed the fact that the larger percentage of wounds were above the hips, and it spoke volumes for the superior accuracy of our marksmen, who were armed with Remington breech-loading rifles. Contrary to all rumors before the expedition sailed, there was not a modern gun of any description found in the hands of the Koreans, who attempted with gingalls and such-like superannuated arms to face modern artillery successfully. They fought, however, with desperate courage, until they were overwhelmed, and died at their posts of duty heroically and without fear. The men of no nation could have done more for home and country. The officers and men composing our battalion fought as Americans always have fought whenever and wherever they are required to fight for the flag. They sustained, in every matter of discipline, endurance, readiness and steadiness in battle, the highest traditions of their comrades in arms from Bunker Hill to Appomattox. They deserved there in Korea the highest confidence and praise of their countrymen as their comrades before them had done on other fields of honor.

The morning following, June 12th, orders were received from Admiral Rodgers to withdraw, as the object of the expedition had been fully accomplished and the insult to the flag had been fully avenged. Re-embarkation was begun after breakfast and was effected without incident or accident, but before doing so every gun in the forts was dismounted, every storehouse de-

stroyed, and every magazine blown up, which left behind the appearance of utter devastation in every direction. The punishment inflicted was great and the lesson it impressed upon that hermit kingdom ultimately brought it into fellowship with our Western civilization and made for friendship.

Unfortunately, on the night of June 10th, the *Palos*, in taking position to guard the left flank of the battalion, anchored at high water over an unknown ledge of rocks, upon which she grounded with the falling tide. She sustained grave injury from a large jagged hole in her bottom plating which involved her safety. It limited her participation to guarding the boats, and deprived her commander and his crew of the opportunities to engage in the work of the day following. It was an unfortunate accident, but wholly unavoidable.

CHAPTER X

UP THE YANG-TSE-KIANG AND IN THE PHILIPPINES

1871-1872

AFTER the battalion had returned to the squadron, the dead, except the body of Lieutenant Hugh W. McKee, were buried on Isle Boisee, abreast the anchorage at the mouth of the Salée River. There were a number of Korean wounded on board the flagship, and when they had recovered sufficiently they were landed; some, however, begged to be carried to China. During this interval of quite a month, there was no further communication, and no Koreans were ever seen. At night, however, the distant mountain-tops were lighted with beacon fires as far as the eye could see.

An account of the battle of June 11 appeared to have reached China in remarkably quick time, but was mixed, exaggerated and untrue. Two or three days after the fight the rumor was current at Shanghai that the American squadron had been completely destroyed and its personnel slaughtered to a man. So disquieting were such rumors and so persistently circulated by those who wished the news to be true, that the commander of the German frigate *Hertha*, then at Shanghai, resolved to visit the coast of Korea to ascertain for himself the status of affairs, and to give us his help if that should be needed. It was his ship which carried back to Shanghai the first authentic news of what had really occurred in the waters of Korea.

The visit of the *Hertha* was much appreciated by the officers of the American squadron. It was evidence of friendship and a desire to extend friendly assistance—sentiments which may have been felt by other foreign war vessels on the station, but by none of them was it given in such practical form.

During the early part of July, the squadron withdrew from Korean waters and proceeded to Chefoo, in north China. The *Monocacy* and *Palos* were sent to Shanghai in order to make

some repairs to their bottom plating, which had been injured on the unknown rocks during the operations against the forts. When it is considered that the squadron was without one reliable chart of the regions where it was operating, and that it was obliged to depend upon surveys, made from day to day and from tide to tide, the wonder is that one or more of its vessels were not lost in the campaign against those river works.

At Chefoo were a number of Americans who had taken a respite from the heat in the ports south, hoping to recuperate strength or health impaired by the strains of business or the excessive heat. Among them were our genial Consul-General Seward and his wife from Shanghai, and Mrs. Low and her daughter to meet the Minister, who had returned from Korea with the expedition. These good friends were the first to learn the authentic details of the operations against the Koreans. The effect produced among the Chinese, when the real facts became generally known, was magical. Their attitude of haughtiness was changed, and there can be no doubt that the event tended to allay the hostile sentiments which had grown out of the Tien-Sien massacre. Surely, every foreigner domiciled in China felt relieved by the happy result in Korea.

The *Benicia* sailed on August 20th for Shanghai on her way up the Yang-tse-Kiang River. A day or two preceding her departure there were unmistakable indications of a typhoon. Chefoo, being an open roadstead, it would have hazarded the ship's safety to have remained at anchor there. Being a new ship, with a splendid crew of officers and men, and well found in sails, gear, and engine-power, there was little danger in putting to sea to ride it out. Save for the discomfort of heavy rolling and being "battened down" in such gales, a well-equipped ship, with plenty of sea room, need apprehend no serious damage. Such proved to be the case with the *Benicia* in the gale that came on the day following her departure, doing such terrible damage to junks, ships and pilot-boats near the mouth of the Yang-tse-Kiang.

The gale came on from the northeast, increasing in force as the *Benicia* passed to the south to gain working room. The sea became confused and high, and, as the waves rolled up, their tops were blown off by the violent squalls, which are always a feature

of such storms, and driven to leeward with such velocity as to blind anyone attempting to look to windward. The first shift of wind to the eastward was about midnight of August 21st, when the *Benicia* "wore ship" and "lay to" on the starboard tack until daylight, when the sea was one wild orgy of confused, angry waves that lopped aboard from time to time without doing other damage than wetting things below decks. From 6 o'clock the wind hauled rapidly, increasing in fury and roaring with demoniac violence through the rigging, so that orders were communicated with mouth close to ear, it being impossible to hear in any other way. By noon of the 22d the wind was at northwest, blowing violently, though abating after each heavy squall, and as it did so sail was made by degrees as the ship proceeded south. By 10 P. M. the stars were out, with a strong northwest wind, before which the *Benicia* speeded like a sea-bird on her course. All through this gale she behaved like a duck, showing herself once more to be a splendid sea-boat in the worst weather.

The day following evidence of the wind's fury was apparent, the sea being strewn with junks capsized and bottom up, floating débris of all kinds, dismasted vessels drifting helplessly. Several of these vessels were taken in tow and anchored near the Show-Shan lightship, at the mouth of the Yang-tse-Kiang River. Word of these disasters was taken to Shanghai and steam-tugs were sent to their relief. On arrival, it was learned that this typhoon was one of the most severe for many years in that vicinity, the wind reaching a velocity of a hundred miles an hour. The valley of the Yellow River was inundated, and many thousands of Chinese perished in the lowland region of the coast.

The commander-in-chief directed the *Benicia* to visit the up-river ports on the Yang-tse-Kiang as far as Hankow, some 800 or 900 miles from the sea. As soon as the necessary preparation had been made and a competent river pilot was procured, the *Benicia* set forth again for a cruise that was interesting and not without an impressive moral effect upon the inhabitants of the large towns along the river. As there were no aids to assist in the navigation of the river, the pilot advised anchoring the ship about sunset each day to avoid the chance of grounding on any of the many points after night had set in and obscured marks known to the pilot. Under this arrangement no point of inter-

est was passed by, and no inhabitant along the river banks missed the opportunity of seeing pass by an imposing and powerful vessel of war whose purpose there they all understood. After a number of such anchorages had been made the *Benicia* reached Hankow in September, and was gladly welcomed by the foreign residents of that remote outpost of the China trade. Every manifestation of pleasure that could be shown was extended to the officers and men. Knowledge of the incident in Korea had penetrated to this distant point to gladden the foreigner and to impress the natives, who were courteous and polite in their dealings and intercourse.

The writer met here an old classmate from the Naval Academy, Woodhull Schenck, who had been employed in the Chinese customs service for a number of years. On the occasion of dining at his hospitable board, old times were talked over, and incidents in his life were recounted in the years since he had quitted the Navy to undertake the better financial opportunities of civil life. He was thoroughly versed in Chinese affairs, and, during his long residence among the Chinese officials and people, had acquired vast knowledge of their history, customs and methods of dealing with foreigners. The few days spent under his hospitable roof were most interesting, instructive and enjoyable.

Returning down the river, Kiukiang, near the Poyang Lake region, was visited. Nankin, the capital of the Ming dynasty, was looked over, and the site whereon the famous Porcelain Pagoda had stood was searched to secure one of the perfect bricks of porcelain which remained still among the débris. This great pagoda, up to 1859, when it was destroyed, was one of the noteworthy structures of the world. It seems that a species of vandalism then destroyed it in order to satisfy some superstition affecting the fortunes of the dynasty in power. How much the art of the world has suffered from this same spirit of frenzy it would not be possible to estimate.

At the time of this visit of the *Benicia*, the river trade was almost exclusively in steamers under the American flag, such as the *Plymouth Rock*, owned by the Shanghai Steam Navigation Company, a rich and influential corporation in those days, controlling a vast trade with its fleet of vessels trading in all directions in the waters of that vast empire. To these vessels the visit

of a man-of-war was an event of great importance, for there were yet pirates to be encountered in some of the out-of-the-way places if favorable chance occurred to them.

This service being concluded, the *Benicia* proceeded to South China and the Philippine Islands, touching en route at Ning Po, Foochow Foo, Amoy, and Hong Kong, remaining several days in each port to communicate with our consular representatives, in order to inquire into conditions in the several jurisdictions. In every port visited a marked change was reported in the attitude towards foreigners that had followed the Tien-Sien massacre. This change was believed to have been due entirely to the vigorous action of the American squadron against Korea on account of the destruction of the schooner *General Sherman*. However deplorable the resort to war may be, there are times in the life of nations when it clears the atmosphere and leads to better understandings.

Manila, so familiar nowadays, was reached on January 10, 1872. It was the most favorable season of the year for cruising among these interesting islands. The Spanish officers, wherever met, were most courteous and attentive, but their control did not extend beyond the zone under their guns. During the winter months the climate of the islands is delightful, while this inland cruising is a paradise for officers and men. At all the ports visited the kindest hospitality and welcome from the Spanish officials was experienced. Dinners and dances were given, and the hospitality of Spanish houses, in its truest and fullest sense, was extended to the officers of the ship by officials and residents. The cordial relations existing in those days between the two countries was emphasized in every attention that refined tastes could suggest, and many warm friendships grew out of this visit of the *Benicia* that are remembered pleasantly to this day.

On the Island of Mactan, not far from Cebu, stands a monument to Ferdinand Magellan, built upon the site where it is said he lost his life in 1521. As a point of interest in the biography of this famous and intrepid sailor, it was visited and found in good order. A flood of recollections of his life came into the minds of those who stood about the last resting-place of this heroic sailor. His voyages and discoveries, his courageous lead into the vast unknown regions of the world in small vessels, badly

fitted and supplied, at that early age, considered with the suffering he endured to mark out ways around the globe, make his name memorable in the history of the world's great men. In Spain's service he gave his life, and Spain, in gratitude, has marked his grave that his name and glory shall never die.

A month or six weeks were passed in this delightful winter climate, which was most grateful to officers and men after their hard service of two years' cruising on a station where the weather is usually boisterous and the climate rarely refreshing, except during the winter months in Japan. The *Benicia* returned to Manila, and there fell in with the English flagship *Iron Duke*, Vice-Admiral Shadwell, which was on the point of sailing for Hong Kong. Two or three days later the *Benicia* got under way for the same destination. After gaining the open sea a fresh monsoon was found blowing from the northeast. The *Benicia* took every advantage of it to make a quick passage over. On arriving, the afternoon of the third day out, we were astonished to find the *Iron Duke* had not yet reached Hong Kong. A few hours later, however, she steamed in, and the admiral was quite as much surprised to find the *Benicia*, which he had left at Manila, already in port with yards square, boats out, and looking as if she had been in port a week.

The American flagship *Colorado*, with Admiral Rodgers on board, was fallen in with at Hong Kong, and with him the *Benicia* spent the 22d of February. All manner of aquatic sports were in order that day among the American residents who thus observed this national holiday. The admiral's barge, built by Hippenstall, at the New York Navy-Yard and named the *Daring*, was an especially fine model, and of wonderful speed under oars. She was entered with all comers, without exception, for the races of this day. She had won such fame in her races with all classes of boats on the station, that, on this occasion, she had to contest with shell-boats over a mile and a half course. As she had done in all other races, she now distanced the shell-boats, which left her without a peer. How much money her crew won on this occasion is not recalled beyond the fact that it was a goodly sum.

In March, the *Benicia* was directed to visit the ports on the coast of China as far as Shanghai, touching at Foo Chow to carry our Consul General Legender to Formosa, if he should desire to

make the trip. The monsoon was blowing fresh, and the sea in consequence was rather rough for a landsman when General Legender came on board at Foo Chow. As the passage over to Formosa would have been directly in the trough of the sea, the general wisely decided to run down to Amoy. That night in the Formosa channel was a wild one. The wind blew up into a moderate gale, which claimed from the general the tribute Neptune always demands from the landsman who ventures into his realm.

Running this channel, which is the highway of vessels trading in those seas, a bright lookout had to be kept, especially in thick weather, as happened on this occasion. Fortunately, no bad luck overtook the *Benicia*, though at daylight a large French liner was seen to the northward, proceeding under slow speed toward Amoy with distress signals flying. Assistance was tendered and accepted, and a request was made that the *Benicia* keep the ship company, as relief might be necessary. On reaching Amoy, it was learned that the French ship had collided in the night with an English steamer, sinking the latter, with the loss of many of the passengers and crew. The liner had a large hole in her bows just above her water-line, into which hammocks and bedding had been jammed to avoid filling her forward compartment.

The weather having moderated, the *Benicia* proceeded to Shanghai, and thence to Nagasaki, through the beautiful inland sea of Japan, via the Straits of Simonoseki to Kobe, and ultimately to Yokohama, where, a month later, orders were received to return to the United States. Before this event, however, Rear-Admiral Rodgers was relieved, his term of service having ended. Rear-Admiral Thornton A. Jenkins, a distinguished officer of the old navy, relieved him. The new admiral, on arriving in the waters of Japan, asked for an audience with the Emperor of Japan at Yeddo, or Tokio, which was at once granted.

On the day appointed, the admiral, with his staff and the commanding and executive officers of the *Colorado* and *Benicia*, proceeded to the capital. When the palace-grounds were reached, the Minister of State informed the American Minister that the Emperor desired, as a special mark of honor to the Americans, to receive their admiral in a standing position. The custom heretofore had been to receive all visitors seated, with a bamboo screen concealing the Emperor's face. It was a remarkable departure,

and the beginning of a new era in diplomatic intercourse with strangers.

During this interesting audience the Emperor stood during the presentation of each of the officers, to whom he addressed some pleasing words of welcome. There was still in place the bamboo screen, which up to that time had concealed the Emperor's features from those presented. On this occasion the screen was raised, thus bringing his entire person into view. The idea of this screen, to conceal the Emperor's face, was a custom as old as time, sanctified by the general belief of his subjects that the person of his majesty was too sacred to look upon. To look upon his face meant that the person so doing might die. In the sense that all must die, sooner or later, this sophistry was true; but the idea that death would take place immediately could not last long with the wave of civilization then sweeping over this land. The admiral's visit then was the moment seized to begin a new régime in receptions which general intercourse with foreign representatives had made necessary.

This ceremony concluded the duties of the *Benicia* on the China station. The 4th of July came, and with it the day of departure from these waters for San Francisco. At noon of that day, after the national salute had been fired, the *Benicia*, dressed with flags *en fête*, got under way with her homeward-bound pennant at the masthead, amid the cheers of the crews of men-of-war and the strains of "Home, Sweet Home," from the bands, and started upon her homeward-bound cruise across the Pacific.

The feeling of joy at such times in the sailor's life, after three years of absence from home and country, can only be known by those who have experienced this species of exile from all that is near and dear in life. As the last glimpse of the land-line fades in the mists of the horizon astern, the talk of home, with new hopes and expectations, fills every mind and heart until the shores of God's country, as the sailor in his own parlance terms his home, rise out of the sea ahead. The thrill of "Land, ho!" as cried from the masthead by the lookout aloft, has a meaning of joyful delight that rings through the ship in an instant, sending all hands on deck, with hearts palpitating with pleasure at the one sight they have dreamed of and longed for so many, many weary months and years.

The *Benicia* made a splendid run from Yokohama, favored by fresh breezes and moderate seas, reaching San Francisco on August 5, 1872, twenty-four hours ahead of the Pacific Mail steamer *Great Republic*, which sailed the same day, bound for the same destination. On the trip across the North Pacific, the ship passed for two days through a sea filled with the fur seal, apparently bound north to the Aleutian Islands. The sight was indeed beautiful as they gamboled in sportive play about the ship, sometimes testing her speed with their own rapid swimming. They soon abandoned the contest, convinced, no doubt, that the power of flesh and blood had limitations not fixed for the winds and waves. No attempt was made to secure any of these beautiful animals, as sailors never harm the birds of the air or creatures of the sea which relieve the monotony of their every-day life in the solitudes of the ocean.

The *Benicia* went out of commission in September at Mare Island, and her officers and crew went East soon afterwards, to home and friends, after an eventful, active, and interesting cruise of three long and weary years.

CHAPTER XI

THE NAVAL ACADEMY, MEXICO AND AFRICA

1872-1877

ONLY a short rest was granted, and then orders were received to report in October, 1872, for duty as head of the Department of Modern Languages at the Naval Academy, commanded by Rear Admiral John L. Worden. While it was true that this duty was not such as the writer would have selected if he had been given a choice, yet the order was agreeable, for the reason that it associated him with that distinguished officer who had won undying fame in that great combat at Hampton Roads between the *Monitor* and *Merrimac* only a few years before. During the association this order brought about, it was upon rare occasions only that the admiral would talk of that great naval duel, but, whenever he did, he appeared to regard the difficulties he had to overcome, in getting the *Monitor* to Hampton Roads, quite as great as the battle itself afterward.

In a new, untried machine, hastily built and hurriedly sent to sea, it would be hard to describe the anxious experience of the officers and crew in getting her safely to the scene of her great combat at Hampton Roads. It can hardly be credited in these days what perils were escaped, or how incessantly her men worked to keep her afloat en route. Much of the work to keep her pumps free had to be done in vitiated air, for, when the blower belts got wet, or slipped, or parted, there was no fresh air below until the difficulty had been repaired. The entire voyage was a steady fight against such trials. When smooth water was reached, the officers and crew found the fight more to their liking. The world knows now how well Admiral Worden, Lieut. S. Dana Greene, and the other officers and men of the little *Monitor* did their duty on that memorable day in March, 1863.

As head of the Department of Modern Languages, which included the French and Spanish idioms, it was not easy to decide

which of the various plans proposed by the instructors was better, or which one of the several systems was best. The writer's experience, when under instruction as a student, had enabled him to decide that too much attention had been given to repetitions of unmeaning phrases, and that much time had been lost in teaching a nicety of accent which can rarely be acquired by the student. No time, or not enough, had been given to cultivate the ear to recognize and understand conversation in French or Spanish. This latter feature the writer enforced during his incumbency, and the result was that the youngster who left the Academy during this régime had had advantages that the writer himself had never enjoyed during his probation at the Academy. If they were unable afterwards to keep up conversation with foreigners in either of the two languages, the fault lay with themselves rather than with their instructors. One difficulty, however, was that too little time was given to the study of languages at the Academy.

Rear Admiral Worden's tour of duty ended after two pleasant years together. He was ordered to the European Station, and his relief at the Academy was Rear Admiral C. R. P. Rodgers, an accomplished officer of the old Navy.

The writer's third year of duty at the Academy ended in September, 1875, the length of shore duty being in accordance with unwritten custom rather than written regulations. With its termination officers in all grades were eligible for orders to sea duty. In June, 1874, the writer had been promoted to commander, and was eligible for command as well as to take service at sea. Admiral Rodgers, at this time, requested the writer to remain an additional year at the Academy, and urged it in such complimentary terms that refusal was impossible. When the year had ended the writer was ordered to command the *Essex*, just completed and fitting out at Boston. Preparatory orders had been given a few months before to command the *Huron*, which was lost afterward on the coast of North Carolina, in 1877. Nearly all her officers and men were lost, including her commander, G. P. Ryan. The reasons for changing orders from the *Huron* to the *Essex* were never stated by Rear Admiral Daniel Ammen, who was the Chief of Bureau at this period. As both ships were of the same size and class, differing only in their

rig, it was a matter of indifference to the writer which one of the two fell to his lot, although, in the difficult and arduous service afterwards which the *Essex* had to perform* on the Home Station, the west coast of Africa, and the South Atlantic stations, the writer preferred the *Essex*, with her greater sail power and ability to keep the sea for longer intervals of time.

In the beginning of the autumn, during the Centennial Exposition at Philadelphia, the *Essex* went into commission. The order assigning her temporarily to the Home Station, as the North Atlantic was then known, directed her commanding officer to touch at Philadelphia, where he arrived October 28th, to permit the officers and men full opportunity to visit this interesting exhibition *en route* to Hampton Roads to report for duty to Rear Admiral S. D. Trenchard, whose flagship was the historic old *Hartford*. The *Essex* arrived at Hampton Roads on November 28th and found the squadron lying there. The winter of this year was exceedingly severe, and the harbor was filled with heavy ice, which the strong tides carried back and forth at every change, much to the discomfort of necessary communication daily for fresh provisions, for mail, or to obey signal calls from the flagship.

Along the Hampton Bar a number of the old monitors in commission were anchored, and these vessels, with their light grappling anchors, were constantly adrift, dragging up and down among the ships, or, when carried into dangerous proximity to shoals or shore, had to be rescued by the better-found vessels of the squadron. Much of this duty fell to the *Essex*, which was always ready, but it was wearying duty that kept the officer of the watch always alert and constantly anxious, lest one of these

* Officers of the *Essex*:

Commander W. S. Schley, Comdg.
 Lt. Comdr., John Schouler, Ex. Off.
 Lieut. Asa Walker, Navigator.
 Lieut. J. K. Cogswell, Watch Officer.
 Lieut. C. K. Curtis, Watch Officer.
 Master L. P. Jouett, Watch Officer.
 Ensign S. C. Lemley, Watch Officer.
 Ensign C. B. T. Moore, Watch Officer.
 Midshipman, W. H. Allen.
 Midshipman, C. L. Bruns.

Midshipman, R. Henderson.
 Midshipman, W. G. H. Hannum.
 Midshipman, T. D. Griffin.
 P. A. Surgeon, A. K. Moore,
 P. A. Paymaster, H. T. Stancliff.
 Chief Engineer, P. A. Rearick.
 Asst. Engineer, G. B. Ransom.
 Boatswain, Francis A. Dran.
 Carpenter, W. W. Richardson.
 Captain's Clerk, Arthur Schley.

tough old vessels should drift foul, for wherever they touched a scar was left. The writer recalls a number of stormy nights when, on account of the bitter cold weather, it was not easy to carry out lines to vessels in dangerous positions. It was trying duty to those in the boats, and many suffered from frostbites in this exposure.

The election for President had occurred in the fall, and the excitement on that memorable occasion, over what was known as the Tilden-Hayes imbroglio, ran high. It resulted finally in the endorsement of the electoral commission which seated Mr. Hayes, although a majority vote of the people had been given to Mr. Tilden. General Grant was in the last year of his second term, and the squadron was assembled at Hampton Roads.

It was not usual in those days for the commander-in-chief to take commanding officers into full confidence with respect to his instructions or purposes. These matters were generally interpreted in the instructions given them, and on this occasion they were to keep their ships in readiness for any service at any moment. This was understood without further suggestion to mean that their ships were to be kept full of provisions and full of coal, with the magazine and shell rooms full of ammunition, shore leave being limited to signal distance. Such was the nature of the instructions given to the *Essex*, and under them such was their comprehended scope. Fortunately, the good sense of our people, as in every other question of national moment, found a solution of the electoral dispute that was acceptable, though it did not satisfy the Democratic party. There was, however, a state of anxious suspense for a few months, and it is certain that the people breathed freer when a way had been found to bridge over a troublous crisis that had loomed up in the highway of affairs so unexpectedly.

The state of affairs in the neighboring republic of Mexico at that time required the presence at Vera Cruz of a vessel of war to protect American interests. The *Essex*, being ready, was directed to proceed to the Gulf of Mexico, and on February 7, 1877, sailed from Hampton Roads and anchored off Vera Cruz some eight or ten days afterward. The city was found to be orderly and was held by troops said to be favorable to the accession of General Porfirio Diaz, who was expected to arrive at

any time from New Orleans. In fact, only a few days had elapsed after the *Essex's* arrival when General Diaz arrived and disembarked.

It was only a day or two after General Diaz's arrival that the Governor of Vera Cruz and the army declared for him. The wave of enthusiastic loyalty there started rolled outward and onward over the mountains to the capital as he advanced in triumph to the interior. From that day to this the Government established by General Diaz has been stable and undisturbed by serious revolt. Mexico, under his administration, has been tranquil, her resources have been developed, her wealth has increased, her industries have grown, and security has been given to foreign capital invested in the country. His rule has been one of much wisdom, firmness and justice, and as the day draws near when this capable ruler must relinquish the cares of his high office, there is some anxiety to secure a successor who will follow the way blazed out by this eminent official.

During the three months passed in this harbor, advantage was taken of the opportunity to visit Orizaba and the City of Mexico, where the climate is temperate and the nights are usually fresh, affording relief to those whose business confines them to the "*tierras calientes*" along the coasts. At that time the only railroad in the republic ran from Vera Cruz to the City of Mexico, passing over the mountains through a most picturesque country, up grades that were difficult to ascend and over chasias that required great engineering talent to bridge safely. From Orizaba to Boca del Monte the scenery is most attractive, and as the train winds up over the mountains on a well-secured road-bed, the views of valleys and plains, stretching out in various directions, are among the most beautiful in the world. Over the table-lands the route is dusty, though most interesting withal.

Good order prevailing throughout the country, the *Essex* was recalled to join the squadron at Port Royal, S. C. Sailing from Vera Cruz on the 8th of May and touching at Key West to take coal on board, she arrived at Port Royal on May 22d. On the way across the Gulf of Mexico the winds from the eastward freshened into a moderate gale, which held the *Essex* back at least a day, so that Key West was reached in the night and the harbor entered without our being able to distinguish a single

mark on account of the violence of the wind and a deluge of rain.

Commodore A. K. Hughes commanded the naval station at Port Royal, and when the commanding officer of the *Essex* reported the ship's arrival and the circumstances of her cruise and duty, the commodore handed him his orders to tow one of the monitors to Norfolk as soon as the vessel could be got ready for sea. Most of these vessels "laying up" at Port Royal had only skeleton crews on board to keep them in order, but not sufficient to handle them at sea. Only two or three days were needed to coal them and detail officers and men to handle their engines and steer them when taken out of the harbor. The first, assisting with her own engines, was towed at a nine-knot pace to Norfolk, making the passage in three and a half days, the weather being excellent throughout the trip.

Passing the flagship, anchored in the Roads, signal was received "to proceed to Norfolk without delay, fill up with coal and return to Hampton Roads for orders." As quarantine against all ports south of the capes had been established at Norfolk, when the *Essex* reached the quarantine station a delay of over two hours was enforced because the quarantine doctor was absent from the station in Norfolk. As the *Essex* had a clean bill of health from the quarantine doctor at Port Royal, showing a perfect sanitary condition, and misunderstanding a motion of the hand of the person at the quarantine station, waved toward Norfolk, to mean we could go on, the *Essex* proceeded to the Navy Yard.

The following day, when on shore procuring necessary personal supplies, the writer was arrested by the sheriff and placed under bonds of one thousand dollars to appear at court, under indictment for having violated the quarantine law of the port. It was not possible to make any explanation of the circumstances, and but for the kindness of Mr. Benjamin Loyall, a merchant of Norfolk, who gave the required bail, the writer might have been obliged to go to jail until the day of trial. However, the *Essex* happened to be in Norfolk in August, before sailing for a foreign station, and when the case was called for trial the writer appeared with his bondsman before the judge, who, in a few minutes, decided the fine to be twenty dollars with costs, and

the case was closed. The writer believed in this matter that it was a better financial investment to be found guilty to the extent of twenty or thirty dollars' fine than to be declared innocent after a lengthy contest of several days, costing him two or three hundred.

On the 16th of August, 1877, the *Essex* sailed for Monrovia, on the west coast of Africa. Her orders directed that her visit should include a number of ports in the Liberian Republic, and that her commander was to give passage to any of the officials of that state who might desire to make official visits to any of the outlying ports. The passage was made under sail, touching at Madeira, the Canary Islands and the Cape de Verde group.

She reached Monrovia, the capital city of Liberia, on the 19th day of October, after a delightful passage across the Atlantic. In crossing the Gulf Stream at any season of the year ships are liable to a disagreeable shake-up, which sailors in the old days always declared was a "farewell kick."

At Monrovia the officers were received with much courtesy by the officials, and were entertained at a banquet given by the President and colored officials of the republic. Our Minister was the Hon. J. Milton Turner, a colored man of excellent education and presence, and the writer recalls many delightful hours passed in his society. He was admirably informed upon all matters relating to the republic, its boundaries, its laws and its people, and was held in high esteem by his associates, as well as by the officials, with whom he was on cordial terms of friendship. During a passage of two or three days he was quartered in the cabin and lived at the commander's table, and was an interesting man in all matters talked over.

At Cape Palmas later, the Governor invited attention to the fact that the natives, who were living at the north end of the port, had failed to execute the terms of a treaty made some years before with Captain A. A. Semmes of the Navy, with respect to the delivery of several cannon in their possession. He was requested to invite the chiefs to an audience with himself, the writer to be present, at the Governor's house on any day most agreeable to himself. Due consideration of the distance to be traversed by the Governor's messenger and the time necessary for the chiefs to come to Cape Palmas, fixed the date of the con-

ference several days in advance. At the time appointed the commander, accompanied by several officers, all in full uniform, appeared with the Governor in the council hall. After the usual presentations in very ceremonial form had been gone through with, the Governor arose and formally read the terms of the treaty made by those chiefs some years before with Captain A. A. Semmes, and then inquired what the reasons were for the delay in complying with the treaty terms.

One of the chiefs arose and apologetically stated that the cannon were rather heavy, that the roads were bad, the cattle, for want of good pasture, had been decimated, and that on account of bad conditions generally for a year or two back his people had been obliged to have recourse to fishing for a living. This occupation had taken the men away, so that there was no possibility of his being able to comply with the terms of the treaty.

The commander informed him, in reply, that it was a very grave matter to evade the obligations of treaties solemnly made, and he was satisfied, now that all the difficulties spoken of had disappeared, that the chief could have these cannon delivered to Cape Palmas within forty-eight hours, thus avoiding any use of force. This ended the council. Within thirty-six hours the cannon were dragged in by the tribes and delivered to the Governor.

Other questions more complicated had to be adjusted. To the eastward, in the Taboo River country, the chief whom the tribesmen designated as King Nimley had consented with two foreigners to change the eastern boundary-line a number of miles to the westward in order to evade the customs laws of Liberia. In these matters an American citizen, co-operating with a German subject, was involved, the complaint being that of introducing merchandise into this village instead of through the custom house at Cape Palmas.

With the Governor as passenger, the *Essex* arrived off the Taboo River country November 13, 1877, anchoring directly in front of King Nimley's village. A note was addressed to the chief inviting him to a conference on board ship, and placing a boat at his disposal for that purpose. Very soon after a note, written in good English, was received from King Nimley to the

effect that he was very old and withal blind; therefore, he hoped the commander would visit him. A second note brought King Nimley on board in a very few minutes after it had been received, accompanied by several of the tribesmen and two of his youngest wives. The unauthorized change of the boundary-line was taken up, the treaty already in existence was read, and King Nimley was required to explain why he had undertaken even to discuss these matters, which were in no degree within any authority he possessed as a subject of Liberia.

His reply was evasive; his reasons were untenable. He was required to place the boundary mark in its original position, and a compact was signed, sealed and delivered. Several plugs of tobacco and a few naval buttons for necklaces for his young wives were exchanged in ratifying the new instrument.

In return for these the King desired to bestow one of his wives upon the commander, but he was informed that the commander, being already married, was not permitted by the laws of his country to have another wife. This rather disconcerted King Nimley. He regretted that he was unable to make the present, as the young queen was a good companion and had never been sick in all her life. He added that she knew how to manage a *kraal* perfectly.

The interview having terminated, the Governor requested the commander to arrest the American and the German who were the instigators in these violations of the law of Liberia. The commander was obliged to decline this request for two reasons: first, that under international law, he had no authority over Americans except upon the high seas, and could only arrest them there for offences against their own country; and, second, that he had no power to arrest the citizen of a foreign country in the territory of a country over which his own country had no control.

To these propositions the Governor disagreed, and submitted the matter to the government at Monrovia. Some months afterward the State Department at Washington brought the matter to the attention of the Navy Department, requesting reference of the correspondence to the commander. When the reasons for the action taken reached the State Department, the commander received a complimentary endorsement from the Secretary of State.

The *Essex* left Cape Palmas and proceeded eastward to the

island of Fernando Po, in the Gulf of Guinea, a penal station belonging to Spain. As the *Essex* needed coal to continue her voyage as ordered, and as there was none to be had at this port, a search was made for a quantity of American coal known to have been landed there during the summer of 1860. This fact was recalled from recollection of a conversation between the flag-officer and Lieutenant Commander W. E. LeRoy, overheard by chance at Loando. The flag-officer desired to know the cause of LeRoy's delay in reaching Loando, and his explanation that he felt it his duty to remain for a few days at Fernando Po to hasten the discharge of the coal-ship to avoid demurrage charges.

It happened that Jack Savage, the head krooman of the *Essex*, had served with LeRoy at that time, and when he was asked if he knew where this coal had been landed, piloted the commander and chief engineer to the spot. As the vessels of the African squadron had returned home very shortly after this, it was believed that enough coal remained to supply the *Essex*. This proved to be true, the coal being on the exact spot and easily discovered in a mound overgrown with vegetation and covered with a foot or more of soil. The pile was uncovered, and there were found several hundred tons of excellent anthracite coal in splendid preservation, from which the *Essex's* bunkers were filled. Subsequent use of this coal indicated that it was splendid steaming coal, and that, covered over as it had been for so many years, it had suffered in no degree any appreciable loss of efficiency. This "find" relieved the situation of affairs and removed all embarrassment that would have attended further cruising through a region of light airs and strong currents.

Investigation disclosed the fact that the consular agent at Fernando Po had been directed to sell this coal when the station was abandoned at the close of the Civil War, but as no purchasers wanted the coal used only by the American Navy, the pile appeared to have been forgotten and had lain there practically abandoned, with all record of the amount lost and even the whereabouts of the pile unknown. It was thought to be so valuable to American vessels visiting the port that orders were given to the consular agent withdrawing orders to dispose of it. The department at Washington was informed of the action taken with regard to it.

The island of Fernando Po is situated in the Gulf of Biafra, and distant eight or ten miles from the African coast. Its latitude is about 4 degrees north of the Equator. Its climate is perpetual summer, with the heat almost insupportably intense. Rains are almost incessant and torrential. All manner of pestilential insect life abounds there and torments existence day and night. Life there is only possible under the most favored conditions of rest, with the least amount of movement compatible with life's necessities. If there exists on this earth a spot more nearly akin to the place denominated in the new version of the Bible as Sheol, the writer has not had the ill luck to be ordered in his cruises to visit it.

The only relief comes now and then in what are known on that coast as tornadoes, which are presaged over the mainland of the coast by the appearance in the northeast of dark, straight-edged, copper-colored clouds. After these are seen, the interval of time is short before these violent squalls are upon ships or towns with almost irresistible fury. Generally their force is spent in about a half-hour, but while they continue the rains deluge everything, and the thunder and lightning are almost terrifying to the uninitiated. There is no region where thunder and lightning are seen in equal intensity, and woe be to any vessel that delays a moment too long in gathering in sail when these clouds are seen in the northeast.

CHAPTER XII

TO THE CONGO RIVER AND SOUTH AMERICA

1877-1878

THE next visit, en route to the South Atlantic Station, directed in the *Essex's* orders was the "Colonie Gabon," a French settlement in equatorial Africa. This port was reached on November 28th, after a short run from Fernando Po. The town of Libreville, near the mouth of the Gaboon River, was the seat of government, where the governor, a French naval officer, resided. At the time of the *Essex's* visit this officer was Captain Boitard, who extended every courtesy and attention to the officers of the ship. This station was also the headquarters of the settlement, where abundant supplies of all kinds were stored. There was a "stationaire," or guard-ship, moored in the harbor and several gunboats for service in the Gaboon River in surveying or in extending the area of French influence and authority in that region of equatorial Africa.

The settlement was occupied and controlled by a guard of marine infantry to maintain the French domination, and the government as established by the governor was firm, yet kind, considerate and just, so much so that the governor informed the writer that there had been no attempted revolt of the natives, although they outnumbered the French ten to one. This region was rich in palm oil, ivory, dye-woods and some gold. The exploration of the country had discovered the Gaboon to be a vast river, extending many hundreds of miles into the interior through a country diversified by hills and plains, peopled by numerous tribes, anxious to exchange their merchandise for the products of French manufacture. Until this visit, the writer had no conception of the existence of this outpost of the French, nor of its extent, importance or advantage to that nation in the ultimate occupation and division of Africa by the powers of Europe.

Captain Boitard and his officers did everything in their power

to make the visit of the ship pleasant through courtesies that are recalled at this day. Dinners were given and returned. Dances had to be omitted, primarily because there were no European ladies at the station, although if there had been the intense heat would have made that form of gayety impossible.

The American consular agent was the Rev. Mr. Bushnell, a missionary who had been assigned to this unhealthy section of the coast. He had taken the risk of having Mrs. Bushnell with him, but the effect of the climate was noticeable upon both those good people.

During the *Essex's* stay in these waters a visit was made to the grave of Lieutenant Commander W. K. Wheeler as a mark of respect to the memory of a comrade-in-arms who had shared with the writer the perils of battle in the far-off hills of Kang Hoa, in Korea. Poor Wheeler had fallen a victim to Bright's disease, which developed on a cruise in the *Alaska* to the coast of Africa a year or two before the arrival of the *Essex*. He died about the time of his arrival and was buried in a little cemetery not far from the consulate.

The salubrity of the climate of this part of the world had an ardent advocate in a French lieutenant, commanding one of the river gunboats. He declared that when he had left France, some years before, ill with what was supposed to be a pulmonary trouble, he had never expected to return alive; but when the *Essex* made her visit, he pointed with evident satisfaction to his avoirdupois of 280 pounds, of which 180 had been gained in equatorial Africa. He thought this to be incontestable evidence of the salubrity of the climate of this much-abused part of the world.

The *Essex's* mission to that coast included an inquiry into the causes of the destruction of an American schooner by the natives at Shark's Point, at the mouth of the Congo River, and to this point she proceeded from the Gaboon River to ascertain the causes and to punish the natives there for piracy, if the burning of the vessel had been unprovoked.

Going south from the Gaboon, the *Essex* crossed the Equator, and as there were a number of apprentices on board who were to cross the line for the first time, the ceremony of Neptune's visit was observed. All those on board who had never before

ventured into the domain of his majesty, were obliged to pay the tribute exacted. It consisted, in the case of the officers, of a tribute of beer to Neptune and his court, and in that of the men, of a shave and plunge afterward into a bath improvised with a tarpaulin full of salt water. On the occasion Neptune and Amphitrite were arrayed in royal robes, and each member of the court in representations of mythological characters of the realm. Neptune and Amphitrite arrived over the bow as the Equator was reached. Their reception and welcome, their direction and supervision of the ceremonies of initiating the marine tenderfoot, were interesting to the novices and entertaining to the marine graduate.

The ingenuity displayed in making up the costumes of Neptune and his court was marvelous, and the disguises of the participants, even in the perfect glare of daylight, were complete.

On the 9th of December the mouth of the Congo was reached, after several days of steaming against the strong current of the river, which sets northwardly for several hundred miles. Shark's Point was visited, but found to be a scene of desolation. The natives had disappeared, their huts were destroyed, their cocoanut trees were burned, and the whole region had been desolated and made uninhabitable. Inquiry made at Banana, across the river, elicited the fact that as soon as the destruction of this schooner was known, Commander Leicester Keppel, of the British Navy, stationed on the coast, proceeded at once with his vessel to Shark's Point and promptly avenged the outrage in the manner just described. As soon as the details of this prompt and friendly action of Commander Keppel were ascertained, it was with much pleasure brought to the attention of the Navy Department.

This event having been satisfactorily inquired into and the particulars ascertained, the *Essex* proceeded southward to St. Paul de Loando, the capital city of the Portuguese colonies in West Africa, where she arrived a day or two afterwards to remain only as long as might be required to renew stores of coal and provisions to enable her to join her station in the South Atlantic.

The delay here was improved to make the usual ceremonial visits to the governor, as required by the naval regulations. Included in the cruise of the *Essex* to join her station was an order directing her commander to run a line of deep-sea soundings

from St. Paul de Loando across the South Atlantic Ocean to Cape Frio, Brazil. An outfit of piano-wire, sounding-drums, sounding apparatus, perforated shot, deep-sea thermometers, and a score of other things the instructive experiences of Captain Geo. E. Belknap of our Navy had shown to be necessary in sounding the Pacific, had been placed on board before leaving home. It was necessary to take on board coal enough to hold the ship up to the wind while the soundings were going on, which were to be made every fifty miles, so that steam had to be kept up throughout the trip, although sail was used entirely in making this passage through the beautiful southeast trade-wind region. This duty was novel to all on board, and was found to grow in interest after the apprehension that we might fail had disappeared, as it soon did when specimens of the bottom were successfully brought up in the Brooke sounder from 2,000 fathoms, representing two nautical miles of depth.

The ship, being in all respects ready, sailed the third week in December, and reached St. Helena on the 2d of January, 1878. The soundings taken from the coast westward to St. Helena discovered a basin about 2,000 fathoms in depth between these two points. The mud, or ooze, from the bottom rather indicated that it was a deposit from the great Congo River and was without any form of infusorial life, the few minute shells found being all perforated. The temperatures recorded corresponded with those noted in Belknap's soundings along the Pacific beds, and were only a little above 32 degrees Fahrenheit. The instruments used for this purpose were the Miller-Casella maximum and minimum thermometers, approved by the scientific men of that date.

The interest of everyone increased as the work made progress; and very often, when the hour for taking the cast arrived in the night, the entire watch on deck would gather around the instrument, after taking in sails to bring the ship, under steam, head to the wind, and watch with deep interest the drum upon which the sounding wire, 22 Birmingham gauge, unwound, turn after turn, into the depths of the ocean. The wire used weighed in the air about fourteen pounds to the mile and in the water about twelve pounds. Its tensile strength was about 125 pounds, with an elastic limit of about 20 per cent. At times the sounder sank twenty to thirty feet into the bottom ooze before solidity enough

was reached to detach the sinker, and occasional delays took place in doing so. It was not possible to recover a shot from 2,000 fathoms of water, without certain loss of the wire sounding line.

St. Helena rose almost precipitously out of a depth of 2,000 fathoms to a height of 1,200 feet above the surface. Its formation indicated volcanic origin and that it was one of the peaks of a submarine mountain range extending from the Azores to Tristan d'Acunha; Madeira, the Canary Islands, the Cape de Verdes, St. Paul's Rock and Ascension being the other points of this vast range projected above the surface. All these islands are undoubtedly of volcanic formation, and the peaks of Pico, Teneriffe and Tristan d'Acunha, great volcanic cones, are evidences of it.

Situated about fifteen degrees south of the Equator, in the region where the southeast trade-winds blow unintermittingly, St. Helena enjoys a delightful climate, and for this reason its high plateau is a splendid sanitarium wherein invalids from the African coast fevers rapidly regain the health and strength that have been sacrificed to the insalubrious climate of that hot and pestilence-breeding land.

A goodly number of the crew and some officers fell victims to the noxious climatic influences of the coast, but happily, owing to the charming climate of the island, over which the soft, life-giving breezes of the southern oceans unceasingly blow, all hands were fully restored to health during the two weeks of the *Essex's* visit. Every place of interest—and there were many—connected with the historic captivity of the great Napoleon was visited. The Briars, first occupied by him, had become the property of Mr. Moss, of the firm of Solomon, Moss, Gideon & Co., and the owner, assisted by two beautiful daughters, entertained the officers most hospitably and sumptuously.

Longwood, on account of the longer period of the captivity passed there by the great emperor, is the historic mecca of all visitors. This most delightful spot was presided over by Major Marechal, an officer of the French army, who was the *gardien de tombeau*. This hospitable officer was assisted by his charming wife and daughter. The latter spoke English as fluently as an American girl in explaining the various features of interest in the captivity of the great emperor and soldier. From the

portico of the house in which Napoleon died the utter hopelessness of any attempt to escape was evident, and, in looking down over the rock-bound coast, lashed as it was with ceaseless seas, it seemed that Sir Hudson Lowe might have had in mind, when he designated Longwood, the idea that this hopelessness would always torture the prisoner, from whose view this picture was never absent, except when he sought the shade and seclusion of the Willows, where his body lay twenty years after his death.

Every moment of the time passed on this beautiful island was fully enjoyed by the officers and men. The hospitable people, from the governor down, were untiring in their efforts to give them pleasure. Every house was opened to their visits; dinners, dances and theatricals were features of nearly every day's entertainment. Almost every one on the island became known to us for some generous and gentle hospitality, and when the time came to sail onward there was long and lasting regret, so delightfully was our time passed among these hospitably kind islanders.

The parting dance, given by the officers of the *Essex* the night before sailing, brought the island society together and left a memory of pleasing enjoyment there. The governor was much interested in deep-sea soundings, and next day went out a mile or so from the anchorage to witness the operation of making a cast and picking up bottom from a depth of 2,000 fathoms. The sounding concluded, good-byes were exchanged, and the *Essex* made sail for Rio de Janeiro, continuing the line of soundings until Cape Frio was reached on the night of February 8th. In this passage from St. Helena westward, the depth of the Atlantic was found to vary more than the soundings east of that point had done. At a distance of seven to nine hundred miles west of St. Helena the lead showed only nine hundred fathoms, which indicated a submarine mountain range quite a mile high, but from that point the soundings fell away again into deeper water with unimportant variations until the plateau of the South American Continent was reached.

Rio de Janeiro was reached on February 9th, during the hot weather of the midsummer months of the south temperate zone. The entrance to the bay was plainly seen a long way off at sea. Lord Hood's Nose was in plain sight, while the Corcovada Moun-

tains, at and below the mouth of the harbor, were distinct and picturesque in beauty and coloring.

This was during the days of the Emperor Dom Pedro, when imperial Rio was the Paris of the American Continent and when Brazil's prosperity and wealth appeared greatest. Rio was the port of the South Atlantic that was the most popular with officers and men for the sprightliness of its amusements, the vivacity of its pleasure-loving people and their generous preference for Americans. Unfortunately, it was the season when yellow-fever prevailed on shore, not epidemically, but endemically, as for many years it had done, to the menace of foreign subjects whose stay there had not been sufficiently long to give immunity.

It was hardly to be expected that the commander-in-chief, Rear Admiral E. T. Nichols, would be in Rio at that season; but as the line of soundings had brought the *Essex* to the entrance of the harbor, it was thought wiser to go into the lower bay for mail or for any instruction the admiral might have left for our movements. There was therefore no communication with the shore, except for mail, which contained the anticipated instructions from the admiral, who at that time was at Montevideo, in the Rio de la Plata, directing the *Essex* to report at that point, at the same time transmitting the quarantine regulations of that country against all Brazilian ports.

It would astonish the health authorities of our country to-day to know of the absurd quarantine supervision of those days. No matter how long a ship had been away from a Brazilian port, or whether her crew were infected or free from disease on arrival, the ship had to undergo twenty-one days of quarantine. During this interval neither the health officer nor his deputy visited the ship to find out the condition of health on board, and yet no letter or matter of any kind was permitted to leave a perfectly healthful ship without undergoing a ruinous experience of disinfection which nearly or quite destroyed it. Ships in perfect sanitary condition and crews in a perfectly healthful state were anchored among those whose crews or passengers were dying with fever, utterly disregarding the fact that this action menaced the healthful vessel. The dictum was a quarantine of twenty-one days for all indiscriminately. The apprehension of the state officials being that by chance a case might slip through,

therefore they proceeded to an extreme which endangered the commercial interests of the port. Many were the protests of merchants and the agents of foreign steamship lines against detentions so ruinous in cost and so injurious to the business of the port.

The regulations promulgated by the health authorities included the time spent in making the passage. As interpreted by the quarantine officer on our arrival, the quarantine began from the moment the anchor was let go at Flores Island. The *Essex*, to avoid long detention, loitered on the way from Rio, exercising sails and at target practice, to consume as much of the twenty-one days as possible, but to no avail. Reaching the quarantine station at Flores Island, the health officer from his tug-boat alongside directed the quarantine to be the full term from the day of arrival. During the entire interval there was no visit by the health officer to ascertain her condition from the moment of anchoring until her departure.

No explanation availed to change this unreasoning, senseless decision of the health officer, which condemned the *Essex* to a quarantine practically amounting to nearly forty days, though there were no sick people on board a ship whose sanitary condition was perfect. If a more insane exhibition of unreasoning apprehension of yellow fever could be manifested the writer has never known of it.

It ought to be stated that the city of Montevideo is most cleanly. Its situation on the banks of the Rio de la Plata, on elevated ground, exposes it to the winds which in most months of the year come from the sea. With good sewerage and abundant rains, the city is unusually healthful. Nature has done so much for it that if assisted in ever so small a degree by the authorities, its healthfulness is reasonably secure against any infection.

CHAPTER XIII

ANOTHER YEAR IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC

1878-1879

At this period General La Torre was the President of Uruguay, and under his rule good order and security to life and property prevailed throughout the country. As happens with all strong rulers in these countries, several unsuccessful attempts were made upon his life, but it meant woe unto those caught in those abortive attempts. Very naturally, La Torre had a coterie of strong friends and of equally strong enemies. He was fearless in exposing himself, and quite as much so in meting out vengeance upon those who were engaged in plots against the Government as represented in himself. After two or three attempts had been made upon his life, with summary punishment of those who undertook them, his enemies abandoned all further effort to remove him as a scheme likely to be too disastrous to themselves.

During his term of office his authority was absolute, but there were security and good order even to the remotest corner of the country, and this favored the industrial and commercial development of the nation.

General John C. Caldwell was our accredited Minister to that Government and a better qualified official could not have been found anywhere. He was an excellent linguist, who spoke Spanish with considerable proficiency, and in his own tongue was an accomplished scholar. General Caldwell's influence with General La Torre was great, for the reason that the latter always found Caldwell's judgment sound and his counsel in all matters prudent and wise. General Caldwell's relations with the people were friendly and close; his interest in the public schools of the republic and his kindly words at every public function gave him a notable popularity with the people of the country. During his incumbency every commanding officer of the Navy stationed on

that coast had occasion to remember his hospitable home and his genial companionship. It was doubtless due to General Caldwell's high qualifications and tactful judgment that the relations between the two nations were so cordial at this time.

The seasons in the northern and southern hemispheres must necessarily be opposites, for, when the sun is north of the Equator, as it is from March 21st to September 21st, the months known in our calendars as the summer months—June, July and August—are the winter months there in the south, while from September 21st to March 21st, when the sun is south of the Equator, the months known to us in our calendars as winter months—December, January and February—are the summer months there. Some time must be spent in the Argentine or other republics south of the Equator before one becomes used to eating green corn, tomatoes, peas and melons that were grown in January and February.

Except under rare conditions, neither the heat of the summer nor the cold of the winter, outside the tropics, is equal to that experienced in the northern hemisphere. The greater area and amount of water in the southern hemisphere carries the isothermal curves further south, and thus modifies the winter temperature there much more than in the northern hemisphere, where these same lines lie nearer the Equator owing to the greater proportion of land. The winter temperature of the Rio de la Plata is rarely below 52 degrees and that of the summer not above 80 degrees. For these reasons, when the temperature of the ports nearer the Equator grows insupportably hot and yellow fever, cholera, smallpox and such pests increase, the foreign squadrons take refuge in the Rio de la Plata and ports to the south, where officers and men can enjoy shore leave without being exposed to the possibility of introducing infectious diseases on board their ships.

After reporting to Admiral Nichols for duty on the South Atlantic Station, the *Essex* remained a few months, during which interval pleasant visits were made to Colonia, Buenos Ayers and Maldonado. In July of 1878 she proceeded, in company with the flagship *Hartford*, to Rio de Janeiro. During her stay in that delightful port the winter gayeties were in full sway. These were inaugurated by a great state ball, attended



DOM PEDRO, THE EMPRESS, AND THEIR DAUGHTER AND SON-IN-LAW.

by the Emperor Dom Pedro and Empress, with the court and court society.

The admiral and staff having been presented officially already to the emperor, who a short time before had visited the United States, the meeting on this occasion was more in the nature of a social presentation to their Majesties by the master of ceremonies. The emperor, on these pleasant occasions of social intercourse with his people, was most genial and pleasant, and by far more democratic in his receptions and conversations than most rulers whom the writer had ever met.

On entering the ball-room, the custom of the country was to place the ladies on one side of the room and the gentlemen opposite on the other. Between these two lines all arriving guests were conducted by the master of ceremonies to make their obeisance to the emperor and empress at the head of the room. This courtesy paid, the guests were then presented to the ladies of the court.

These balls, in the imperial days, used to be the occasions when more exquisite and rare brilliants were to be seen worn by the wealthy than in any other capital of the world. The exquisite old mine white gems of Brazil were to be seen in fullest perfection and magnificence. Looking wherever one might at the women, brilliant flashes of color from hair, or necklace, or corsage, or arms, appeared in one dazzling and endless profusion and confusion. How much more dazzling this scene would have been with the brilliance of electric lights. But as that scene is recalled to-day, with the gaslights of that time, it was simply indescribably beautiful.

With this opening ball the season was considered to have begun, and following it there were endless social gayeties, with operas three nights a week, and into this whirl the admiral and his staff were drawn, owing to the cordial feeling of the people toward our own.

In the midst of this gay season a telegram from the Government at home announced the wreck of an American ship on the island of Tristan d'Acunha, with orders to send a vessel to her relief. The one invariable rule observed on board the *Essex* was to be ready at all times for any service as soon as the outstanding public bills on shore could be paid, and in this instance the

Essex sailed as soon as steam could be raised to leave port on the duty assigned, which the admiral made as agreeable as possible by extending the cruise to Cape Town, in South Africa, and to include St. Helena on the return to the coast of South America. No time was prescribed for the vessel's return beyond the proviso that when the duty had been performed she could return via St. Helena and thence rejoin the squadron, after examining a danger reported on the southwest edge of the Hotspur Bank, lying east of the Abrolhos Reef, on the coast of Brazil.

The day of sailing from Rio, September 21, 1878, was the September equinox. The weather was unusually bad and thick outside the harbor, but the urgency of the duty was such that delay was not thought of. Outside the wind blew a moderate gale from the southwest, with heavy seas and a dense fog which obscured all landmarks, though with careful navigation all dangers were avoided and the open sea was gained without other incident than a good, lively shake-up for forty-eight hours following.

A good offing from the land being made, sail was set and steam allowed to die down in the boilers, as the ship's motion was less disagreeable under sail, though only in small degree, as she worked her way southward to the region of variable winds off the Rio de la Plata, where the prevailing breezes were westerly. Those brave "west winds," as Maury calls them in his *Physical Geography of the Sea*, were reached in eight or ten days out of Rio, and before them the *Essex* scudded like a winged racer for some eight days more, when the high peak of that wind-swept, desolate island of Tristan d'Acunha, away off in the middle of the South Atlantic, was raised ahead in the gray mists of the morning on the eastern horizon, and was reached on the morning of October 10th, the only day in the previous month when it had been possible for the islanders living on its northwest side to communicate safely with passing vessels.

The day of the *Essex's* arrival was exceptionally beautiful. The sea had calmed down and the winds had lulled for a few hours. During the short stay there full advantage was taken of the occasion by the islanders to visit the ship with vegetables, chickens, eggs and sheep for sale. The governor of this forlorn outpost was an American sailor from New London or Stoning-

ton of the name of Peter Green, who was astonishingly well read and intelligent, being well-informed on topics of the day and what was going on in the great world beyond his horizon.

He explained graphically the manner in which the American ship *Mabel Clark* was lost, and the manner of discovering the fact from wreckage seen the following day drifting past the island. Great risks had these hardy islanders taken to launch their boats through the heavy surf on the beach into the high seas to reach and rescue the crew, facing great peril to save those of the crew who had clung to the cliffs after the ship sank, as she did within a few minutes after the disaster. The news of the loss of this ship had to find its way to Cape Town by some passing vessel, and then to the United States by mail, as the submarine cable had not yet reached the Cape. For this reason some months elapsed before the news of this shipwreck could reach Admiral Nichols at Rio and relief could be sent to the aid of the unfortunates. The captain of the wrecked ship had taken advantage of a passing vessel, bound to Cape Town, with as many of the rescued crew as could be accommodated, before the *Essex* arrived.

One of the crew, a fine-looking German, had decided to remain behind, a captive to the winsome smiles of the governor's granddaughter, Mary Anna Green. He had determined to cast his lot with the others on that storm-lashed island in the far-off southern seas. He was only another example of the truth that love conquers all things, great and small, and that when it fills the soul there is no wall too high, no sea too deep, no island too desolate, and no land too remote to defeat its purposes to live in the happy sunshine and smiles of the chosen one.

The commander had not been ordained in clerical offices, and there was no law or regulation giving authorization to unite anyone in the bonds of wedlock; therefore there was some doubt in his mind as to the validity of such an officiation. But the governor swept away all further delay with an assurance that anyone whom the great Government of the United States had commissioned to protect its honor was quite good enough under any circumstances, in the absence of an ordained minister, to unite his granddaughter in marriage. Accordingly, the beautiful marriage service of the Episcopal Church was read to those

affianced lovers in the presence of witnesses, and was as satisfactory to them as if an archbishop of Canterbury had been the celebrant.

The sea had calmed down considerably, though the long roll of the swell rarely ever disappears in those high southern latitudes, and in consequence it gave the ship some motion. The young lady in the case was not so good a sailor as the lusty young fellow she had chosen, and so the services were interrupted two or three times by the young lady in order to pay tribute to old Neptune. The commander's steward, anticipating such a contingency, had made all preparations to take care of this part of the ceremony.

The ceremony ended, the couple joined were warmly congratulated, but the motion of the ship was almost too uncomfortable for the wife's nerves, and so she and her husband took the first long-boat for shore. Jackie forward, in his usual impromptu way, determined that nothing should be omitted in this bride's "send-off" that custom justified in his own land, and so provided a quantity of rice to bombard her as she passed down over the gangway. Rice was literally rained on the couple as they left the ship, and much to their delight, if smiles and glad thanks are omens of its existence.

The weather was delightful, and the opportunity for good observations was excellent during the few hours of the *Essex's* stay. From those taken by Lieutenant Asa Walker, it was found that the position of the island as given on the chart was erroneous by some eighteen miles in latitude, the main island being really that distance to the north of its position on the chart. Corresponding differences were discovered in the assigned longitude which would account for the loss of the ship referred to.

During the afternoon of the day of the *Essex's* arrival, her business being completed, she made sail for Cape Town, having a fair northerly wind which increased in force after a few hours. Generally in these high south latitudes, after a few hours of light wind from the north, the barometer begins falling, the skies cloud over, and the winds increase in strength as they veer to the northwest and westerly directions. Ships, as a rule, scud before them under reduced sail, keeping a sharp lookout on the barometer, which falls as the wind increases, some-



CAPE TOWN AND TABLE MOUNTAIN.

times for two or three days before the final shift to southwest occurs. This shift is sudden and violent, striking the ship with almost sledge-hammer force. If this occurs at night in a few minutes afterward the clouds break away, giving glimpses of the brilliant stars of these high southern latitudes, and their brilliance seems intensified in the clear, crisp air coming from the Antarctic regions.

Such was the *Essex's* experience while making this passage to Cape Town, only one night being lost on account of the violence of the sea, which deluged her decks and forced her commander to "lay to" to avoid smashing things. Cape Town was reached on October 20th, but, as the roadstead was dangerous in the winter months, the ship was placed in the Alfred Docks, built by the British to protect ships engaged in commerce, as few ships could brave the heavy seas from the northwest which roll into Table Bay before the violent northwesterers in the winter season.

The visit of the *Essex* occurred during the incumbency of Sir Bartle Frere as Governor of Cape Colony; but on account of important business His Excellency was absent in Natal, although Lady Frere and his charming daughters omitted no attention to the commander and his officers during the stay. Indeed, the same was true of all the good people met there.

In years gone by the commander had visited the Cape on two other occasions, and the hospitable people of Wineberg, among them the Van Clutes and Von Renans, living in that region, famed for its excellent Constancia wines, had extended princely hospitality and welcome. No thought of the Cape could be complete in the minds of the older officers that does not include them. A delightful lunch with them on this occasion gave the opportunity for a talk of old times and of old friends, some of whom in the lapse of time had passed to the great beyond, but the mantle of hospitality was still in the old places.

A fortnight among these hospitable people was spent delightfully, and the *Essex* then turned her prow toward St. Helena on November 2, 1878. She was favored by strong southeast winds, which the "table-cloth" of clouds over Table Mountain had foretold for a day or two before her sailing day. Owing, however, to variable winds along the route, St. Helena was not reached until November 16th, but, as the *Essex* was only return-

ing to friends, her arrival gave great pleasure to those kind islanders. Entertainments of all kinds for the week of her stay were handsomely reciprocated by the officers on board. It was the last visit the *Essex* made to this island, and was one to be remembered. On November 23d she turned westward for the long voyage across the South Atlantic to rejoin the admiral at Montevideo. The commander-in-chief's orders to examine a danger reported on the southwest side of the Hotspur Bank were complied with, but no danger could be found after a most careful and critical search under the most favorable circumstances of weather and sea. The captain who reported its existence was out in his longitude, and doubtless mistook Abrolhos Shoals for Hotspur Bank.

As the *Essex* had not visited any of the ports of Brazil on this round of the station, she escaped quarantine at Montevideo on arriving there, December 22d, and her officers and men enjoyed their Christmas dinner with friends ashore; though it did seem, when green corn, tomatoes, and fresh vegetables were served, that somehow or other something of the Christmas in our northern land was missing. It was not only the snap of winter, or the glow of the fire, but the absence of loved ones gathered together that were missed. It ought, however, to be said of the friends, made in those far-off lands, that everything to give this day a home meaning was done for those exiled by their service.

Not many had been the days of rest after the round of the great Southern Ocean, when another despatch announced the loss of the sealing schooner *Charles Shearer*, hailing from Stonington, Conn., in the regions about Cape Horn. She was reported to have set out from Diego Ramirez for a cruise to the South Shetland group in the spring of 1878. The information transmitted by Governor Jewell conveyed a supposition of her loss, as she had not been heard from for nearly a year. This sent the *Essex* off on another search in these waters, on another trip of rescue, in prosecuting which she arrived at Port Stanley, Falkland Islands, on February 5, 1879. In the old clipper-ship days, Port Stanley was the haven of refuge of all vessels battered and bruised by the seas and gales off Cape Horn, and was naturally the objective in such searches for information of the unfortunates. It was the abode of hardy seamen who had grown used to stormy

seas. The gales of the middle latitudes were to these sturdy sailors merely boisterous weather compared to the stout gales so general about that stormy Cape at all seasons of the year.

Fortunately, a day or two before the arrival of the *Essex*, the American sealing schooner *Colgate* had touched at Port Stanley from a cruise in December, 1878, to the South Shetland group. The report was that it was impossible to approach that group nearer than 150 miles on account of heavy ice. Captain Willis of the schooner *Allen Gardner*, belonging to the South American Missionary Society of Ushuwuia, Tierra del Fuego, arrived a day or two after the *Essex*. The intelligence he brought of the weather about Cape Horn the day and night following the supposed departure of the *Charles Shearer* was alarming. The extraordinary severity of the gale from the northwest, with violently sudden shifts to southwest, endangered any vessel unless she was exceptionally well found and seaworthy.

The log-book of his vessel verified his statement, and this record was corroborated by the records of weather kept at the missionary station, from whence the original report had reached Washington. The admiral's instructions forbade risking the *Essex* in the ice, as her four-bladed propeller was too vulnerable, and as she was in no way equipped with sheathing, or provision, or clothing suitable for ice work, if through any bad luck she should be caught in the pack for the winter. These things, taken with the uncertainty of the schooner's destination, and the almost certain fact that she had foundered at sea, and the still more definite fact that the South Shetland Islands had been inaccessible after she was reported to have set out, decided the commander not to risk the *Essex* in undertaking what was impossible. The *Shearer* was never heard from again, and must have foundered near Cape Horn.

The *Essex* returned to Montevideo on February 17, 1879, and in April of that year she surveyed the mouth of the Rio de la Plata from Maldonado outward to Cape Polonio. The survey was extended off shore for fifty miles to include and touch the La Plata Bank. A month of work resulted in several important discoveries of depths, characteristics of the bottom and peculiarities in the hydrography of the region that made the approaches to the river safe and reliable in any kind of weather. Before this

survey was made there had been great difficulty in approaching the river, as the soundings on all charts appeared to have been made haphazardly here and there only. The chart made from this survey showed no fewer than several hundreds of accurate soundings, through which a well-defined mud-well was traced, with accurate sailing directions for entering the river.

In August of 1879 the *Essex* sailed for Rio de Janeiro, homeward bound. During this passage she experienced the most tempestuous weather of the cruise—a veritable cyclone of great violence; but, being well found and admirably manned by a splendid crew of disciplined officers and men, she rode through it without other injury than a broken bolt in her engines.

On August 26, 1879, the *Essex* sailed for Bahia, en route to Philadelphia, as directed by her orders. The occasion of her visit to Bahia was to arrange a difficulty that had taken place with the customs officers with reference to the clearing of an American vessel. This required only a day or two, after which she sailed for home all hands agog for a hearty cruise, not caring for storm or squall.

She arrived in Philadelphia on the 9th of October, 1879, after a full three years' cruise without the loss of an important spar or sail. Some who had begun the cruise with her were left behind, having fallen victims to that dreaded scourge, yellow fever. In the main, the health of the ship's company had been good throughout the cruise. The work done by the *Essex* during this commission is best described in the following letter from the Honorable Secretary of the Navy:

Navy Department,

WASHINGTON, 21st Oct., 1879.

Sir: The Department has received the report of the inspection of the U. S. S. *Essex*, made on her recent arrival at League Island from a three years' cruise on the South Atlantic Station; also your report of the qualities of that ship, and the conduct of her officers and crew.

The result of the inspection shows that the *Essex* was in a condition most creditable to the Commander and other officers, and that there was abundant evidence that throughout the cruise the most admirable discipline and thorough efficiency had been maintained.

The report of the inspection has been exceedingly gratifying to the Department, and none the less so is your own report of the excellent qualities of the *Essex*, the attention and skill of her officers and the admirable conduct and efficiency of her crew.

The *Essex*, after a cruise of unusual activity and often exposed to the severest weather both in the tropic and temperate zones, returns in an almost perfect condition save ordinary wear and tear, and could again be despatched at once on distant service. All this is most gratifying evidence of the excellent qualities of the ship, the faithful manner in which she was fitted and her able and careful management. The fact that she has sailed and steamed over 40,000 miles, without losing a spar or sail, is a high compliment to her officers and crew, especially to the apprentice boys who composed the greater part of the latter.

I am glad to know you have had a ship of which you may well feel proud, that you have had faithful, skillful officers to second you, and a crew whose conduct has left behind them a good name at all places visited and whose seamanlike qualities have been so manifestly marked and indicated in the admirable condition of the ship which they have handled.

To you and to all under your command the Department tenders its congratulations and thanks.

I am, sir, very respectfully yours,

R. W. THOMPSON,

Secretary of the Navy.

Commander WINFIELD S. SCHLEY, U. S. N.,
Commanding U. S. S. *Essex*,
League Island, Pa.

This letter was read to the officers and crew of the *Essex* at general muster, and to it was added the commander's gratification and thanks to the officers and men for their loyal help and care in earning the department's commendation for the work of the cruise just ended. On October 24th the commander was detached and the *Essex* went out of commission.

In those days the ship's company were required to strip the ship "to a gantline," preliminary to detachment, and this was done by the crew of the *Essex* prior to their discharge at the end of their long and active cruise.

CHAPTER XIV

AS A LIGHTHOUSE INSPECTOR; YEARS OF HOME DUTY

1880-1883

ONLY a short fortnight of rest was allowed after the long and arduous cruise in the South American and African waters, described in the preceding pages, when orders, dated November 5, 1879, were received to duty in Washington, on a board of which Capt. F. A. Roe was senior officer, with Capt. Oscar A. Badger as associate member. The purpose of this board was to revise and correct the allowance book for the Navy; but, before this could be done, the various types of vessels had to be classified; many obsolete supplies had to be excised and many articles which new conditions had made necessary had to be introduced to take the places of obsolete things.

The work required great familiarity with new details. Steel rigging had replaced hemp; iron had been substituted for rope in many places on yards and masts; steam had replaced sail; tacks and sheets had been replaced by coal-whips. The duty of prescribing rules to determine the sizes and strength of these was left to the board to fix rather than to the judgment of constructors at the several yards. The quantities of all things needed by the several vessels, whose capacity to stow them away had been trenched upon by the machinery and boilers, which had come to stay, had to be gauged with great care. Rules for the size of all wire rigging had to be made, if vessels were to carry sails, and were to be determined entirely by the greatest area of sail to be exposed to the effect of winds at a specified velocity upon the square inches exposed. Other questions of weight and quantity also demanded care, thought and experience.

In addition to this duty, the Chief of the Navigation Bureau directed the writer, with Lieutenant E. W. Very, to examine the

merits and investigate, experiment and report upon the value of the Bassnett Patent Sounder; that is to say, determine if the sounder presented to the examiners could take the place of the old-fashioned lead and line then in use. Its merits were apparent, in that it permitted accurate soundings to be taken from the ship while running at any speed, thus superseding the older plan of having the ship stopped in the water to facilitate up and down casts of the lead by which not only was time lost, but, when made on dark nights, some uncertainty always existed. This sounder, known now as that of Sir William Thompson, is still used with wonderful confidence and accuracy in all weathers in depths under 100 fathoms.

Duty with the board having been concluded, the writer was ordered to duty under the Lighthouse Board, of which Commander George Dewey was Naval Secretary. The district to which he was assigned was the second, which included the coast from Newburyport to Newport, R. I. Its headquarters were in Boston. The duty involved maintaining lighthouses, the buoys and light-ships in efficient, cleanly, reliable condition at all times of the year, and, in all kinds of weather, to aid the navigator using this part of the coast in prosecuting his business.

This duty was somewhat different from that required in the ordinary life of the naval officer on board ship, but it brought the inspector into touch with the seafaring class of our people, as well as with the seafaring interests of the country. In accordance with a long-established custom of the Lighthouse Board, officers ordered to duty as inspectors were required to serve as assistants for a month at least to learn the routine of inspections, the methods of business, the system observed in keeping accounts, and the regulations for the government of the establishment. In conformity thereto, the writer served as assistant to his classmate, friend, and companion, Commander Sullivan Dorr Ames, for a month, during which time a thorough inspection of the lighthouses and light-ships, buoyage and light-house depots was made. This service was an agreeable and interesting field of duty, as it gave the inspector ample opportunity to become acquainted with business men, familiar with business methods, and the commercial values of all classes of raw or finished material. As a school of training for naval men in the ways and methods of

business men, and in values of merchantable articles, there is no experience more useful in their lives.

The writer recalls no duty more pleasant nor more interesting in his long professional career. The friendships formed then have been lasting.

The new inspector, on assuming the duties of the office, discovered that there had been some friction over appointments of light-keepers between the collector of the port and his predecessor. He decided not to inherit any of the differences of his predecessor and, in fullest justice to every employee, to form his own impression of their capacity, regardless of the influence of other opinion. Rather was it held to be right that each one under his authority should establish his efficiency and worthiness in the estimation of the new inspector by his own work, uninfluenced by any predilection for or against him. With this spirit at heart, a call was made upon the collector of the port, Hon. Alanson Beard, whose office, under the regulations as Superintendent of Lights of the Second District, gave him authority to nominate for appointment all persons to fill vacancies in the lighthouses. Mr. Beard was found to be a most affable and genial gentleman, and a very reasonable man in his views and opinions. He agreed at once with the inspector that both officials were interested only in securing good and reliable men for the lighthouse service. To this end an arrangement was reached that no one would be nominated until his qualifications for the place had been determined by examination. This agreement was adhered to for the three years of the new inspector's duties and association with the collector.

Commander Ames, a life-long friend and classmate, bore with him, in retiring from the office, the kindly regard and respect of the employees of the lighthouse district.

He suggested to his successor the possible chance of some difficulty in keeping the light-ships at all times in as excellent order as the light-stations on shore, owing to the severity of weather and their greater exposure to the elements. He was of opinion that this task had engrossed his attention more than all else in the district, and intimated that this might be a field where much good work could be accomplished. The masters and crews of these vessels were all capable seamen, who had learned their

business in the hardier school of blue-water service in the years gone, and were ready to second the new inspector in all efforts to reach the highest condition of excellence at their stations. Before six months had elapsed every light-ship in the Vineyard was a yacht in cleanliness of her decks, holds and engines, and for the three years of the new inspector's service these conditions never changed.

Brookline was chosen as the residence of the inspector for the reason of its advantages in quick transit to and from the office in Boston. Many warm friendships were formed during the three years of residence there, and when the time came to go to a new field of duty elsewhere, much regret was felt by the inspector and his family. His oldest son, now a captain in the army, was a pupil at the Boston Latin School; his daughter, just in the loveliness of her girlhood, was educated carefully under competent teachers, and his youngest son, now a young surgeon of some prominence in New York, learned his letters at the public school at Coolidge's Corner, in Brookline. No thought of the days of duty of that time would seem complete to-day if it did not refer to this connection with Boston and the happy friendships made there.

After assuming the duties of inspector, an inspection was made of one of the important light-stations on the coast, which revealed the fact that the principal keeper had neglected to keep his station in the good order usual throughout the district. He was informed that another inspection would be made, in about a month, when better things would be expected, and at the same time an intimation was conveyed that, if his station were not improved, it might be necessary to refer the matter to the Lighthouse Board at Washington, but this, the inspector hoped, would at the next inspection be unnecessary. Certain particulars were pointed out where marked improvements could be made, and a record of the station's condition over the inspector's signature was made in the log-book required to be kept by regulations.

The inspection a month later disclosed the same neglect and disregard of duty, and an issue was thus distinctly made. The keeper was reminded that the matter would be referred to the board, with a recommendation for his removal. After this suggestion the keeper informed the inspector that he was not the

first person who had undertaken, without success, to run up against Gen. B. F. Butler, to whom the keeper owed his place. All the same, the keeper was reported and recommended for removal. A few days later General Butler called upon the inspector to inquire the reasons for the removal of the keeper. When the reasons were stated they were accepted as entirely satisfactory. An incident was then recalled to the general that happened during his command at New Orleans, when several men in one of the regiments refused to drill, though ordered out for the purpose by their colonel. To prevent further disaffection in his regiment the colonel, who was a splendid soldier, was forced to shoot one or two of the refractory ringleaders. A full report was made of his action to General Butler, who was said to have endorsed on the colonel's report in returning it: "Kill two more if necessary to maintain discipline." A remark was made at the same time that, while the general was known to be a good friend, he was never known to support a friend who put himself in the wrong.

His action now settled the keeper's case; he abandoned his cause, and during the inspector's term of duty the keeper was never reappointed. This was the first time the inspector had met General Butler, although as a young lieutenant he had seen him often when in New Orleans. The impression of justness and fair-mindedness left upon the inspector's mind by this interview will be his recollection of General Butler.

Early in the month of July, 1881, the Boston morning papers contained an item of news from St. John's, Newfoundland, to the effect that the Lady Franklin Bay Expedition, under the command of Lieutenant A. W. Greely, U. S. A., had sailed for the Arctic region in the steam whaler *Proteus*. This expedition had been prepared by the Signal Service, then in charge of Brigadier-General W. B. Hazen, U. S. A., in conjunction with a scheme to establish several stations around the Polar Basin, with the view to observing certain physical data at certain prescribed intervals of Gottingen time.

Not long after this item of news appeared, the inspector was at the Charlestown Navy-Yard discussing the matter with several brother officers. No one appeared to be entirely familiar with the purposes of the expedition; but it was remembered that the year

before a scheme of polar colonization for exploration and investigating Arctic phenomena had been urged by Lieutenant Howgate, of the Signal Service, and that some action had been taken by Congress, authorizing the President to accept the steamer *Gulnare*, for the purpose of establishing a station at Lady Franklin Bay. The *Gulnare* had been examined by a board of naval officers, who reported her to be in no serviceable condition for Arctic work, and some friction had taken place in consequence between the officers of the Signal Service and those of the Navy, but it resulted in the *Gulnare* not being accepted by the Government. Notwithstanding this report, the *Gulnare* started on her voyage to Lady Franklin Bay, but only got as far as Disco Island when she broke down and proved to be entirely unfit for this hard service. She then returned disabled to the United States, and Howgate's scheme for polar colonization fell through. These things, happening only the year before, had been the subject of much discussion in the press, and this much of the question had become clearly comprehended.

The inspector, at that time, ventured the suggestion that, whatever the purpose of the *Proteus's* expedition might be, it meant that at no distant day some poor naval officer would have to go after it, but there was no dream, even in his mind at that moment, that this duty of rescue was to fall to his own lot three years later. However, the effect of this conversation did stimulate a desire for further inquiry into the object of the new expedition, and that naturally led up to greater interest and research upon the subject of Arctic exploration generally. The literature upon the subject was abundant from the days of Sir Martin Frobisher and Sir Hugh Willoughby, in the time of Queen Elizabeth, to the time of Sir George Nares with the *Alert* and *Discovery*, in 1875. Nares's route being the same Greely was to pursue in the *Proteus*, was therefore most interesting and instructive.

Until the fall of 1883 the duties and cares of the post then occupied engrossed the time and interest of the inspector. The needs of the sea-going world, who used the lights and buoys in navigating that coast in all weathers, day or night, were carefully considered. The questions of supplying new lights or increasing the visible range of old ones, or augmenting the audible range of

fog-signals, or changing their characteristics for easier or readier recognition by mariners, were subjects of interesting study and research. The matter of a uniform for all lighthouse employees, at that time without designation, was suggested in a letter to the board, proposing a plan and enclosing drawings. While it was only tentative as a suggestion, it bore fruit later in the simple and neat uniform now worn by all employees at light-stations, on board light-ships and buoy-tenders. The thought which prompted the idea of uniforming the board's employees was that men in any uniform take keener interest in their work, and are made to realize more directly that they are a permanent part of the system which employs them. As a means of discipline and orderliness, there is nothing which helps so effectively to enforce and maintain these conditions. It has now proved so throughout an establishment whose employees are among the most reliable and faithful servants of the Government.

The records kept of vessels passing certain points during one of these three years showed that 225,000 vessels annually passed in navigating these waters. This gives a larger showing than the records in 1891 of the steam light-ship at the entrance to the Cattegat, which is the turning point of the commerce of the north of Europe to and from the Baltic ports. It suggests, too, the quality of alertness and high efficiency in the employees of this great establishment.

The board regulations required inspections to be made quarterly and full reports of the condition of stations and the efficiency of keepers to be forwarded to Washington for information and action. All lights were required to be lighted at sunset and extinguished at sunrise. A light reported as out by anyone was always the subject of rigid inquiry by the inspectors. The only excuse that could extenuate this offense by a keeper was that of accident beyond his capacity to repair, and during the three years passed in this duty the writer does not recall more than one or two instances of this nature and then their occurrence was due to a break-down in machinery. The three years so happily and so interestingly passed at this post of duty came to an end on October 1, 1883. Gratification was enhanced by a letter received from Vice Admiral S. C. Rowan, chairman of the board, when this duty had terminated, viz.:

Treasury Department,
Office of the Lighthouse Board,
WASHINGTON, D. C., October 3, 1883.

Sir: Your letter of October 1st, reporting that you had on that day turned over the duties of Inspector of the Second Lighthouse District to your successor, Commander Geo. H. Wadleigh, U. S. N., has been received.

The Board desires to express to you, on your leaving the Lighthouse service, its appreciation of the manner in which you have performed the duties assigned to you as Inspector.

Very respectfully,
S. C. ROWAN, *Vice-Admiral*, U.S.N.,
Chairman.

Commander W. S. SCHLEY, U. S. N.,
Lighthouse Inspector, Second Lt. Ho. District,
Boston, Mass.

On the 4th of October, 1883, the writer reported to Rear Admiral Earl English, Chief of the Bureau of Equipment and Recruiting, for duty and was assigned to the division relating to the apprentice system. The headquarters of this station was at Coaster's Harbor Island, Narragansett Bay, about one mile from Newport. The main auxiliary to the training system was the frigate *Minnesota*, at the foot of West Twenty-sixth Street, New York City, where eighty-odd per cent. of the enlistments of boys over fourteen and under eighteen were made. These boys were sent to the old line-of-battle ship *New Hampshire*, at Coaster's Harbor Island, R. I., and there trained for a year in the various rudiments of the young sailor's life. When that was concluded, they were sent to the cruising training squadron, composed of the *Portsmouth*, *Jamestown* and *Saratoga*, for six months at sea. After this cruise these youngsters were transferred to the regular cruisers for service until their apprenticeship expired on reaching twenty-one years of age.

There were but few idle moments left between revising the regulations for this service, the duty of frequent inspections of it, and the additional duty imposed by an order of November 20th to assist Captain P. C. Johnson, as a member of a board to ascertain and report to the Navy Department the amounts which should be paid to the contractors for the use of their ways by the double-turret monitors *Puritan*, *Amphitrite*, and *Terror*, and for the care thereof. Although the board had been ordered to convene at the department, the information it required in order to formulate its report, except as to the length of time these vessels had

occupied the stocks or ways of the several yards, had to be obtained at the shipyards of William Cramp & Sons, in Philadelphia; of John Roach, in Chester, and at the Harlan & Hollingsworth Company, in Wilmington. Even at these shipyards it was not easy to decide equitably to their proprietors, as well as to the Government, the proper basis upon which to begin this work; but in this matter the board met the greatest courtesy and obtained the fullest information from the several proprietors to help it to a fair solution of this vexatious question. Its recommendation was approved by the Secretary, accepted by the several proprietors of the shipyards, and the amounts awarded were appropriated by Congress and paid by the Navy Department.

The question at issue between the department and the owners of these shipbuilding plants was the occupation of their shipbuilding ways and the care of the vessels for several years, while Congress had refused to appropriate the money for their completion. It was a complex question that required most careful regard for the rights of both parties. To reach a fair settlement for each, the proprietors of these large plants gave the board every facility to examine their books, with a view to ascertaining what the ship-ways adjoining these uncompleted monitors had earned, or lost, during the interval for which remuneration was asked. The general average for the several years was taken as fair to the owner and fair to the Government, and accepted by both parties without a question.

On the 13th of September, 1883, Lieutenant E. A. Garlington informed the Chief Signal Officer, General W. B. Hazen, from St. John's, Newfoundland, of the total failure of the expedition which he commanded to relieve Greely, owing to the *Proteus* having been crushed in the pack in Kane Sea and sunk on July 23d. He reported at the same time the safety of his party, with all well, after a long and hazardous passage in open boats from the scene of the disaster, across Melville Bay to Upernavik in Greenland, where he was rescued by Commander Frank Wildes of the U. S. steamer *Yantic*.

This expedition of Lieutenant Garlington's was the second which had failed to reach the Greely party, as that of 1882, under command of Sergeant Beebe in the *Neptune*, had failed to force its way into the pack beyond Littleton Island, after re-

peated and vain attempts as late as September 4th of that year. No impression could be made upon the solid wall of ice in Kane Sea by the *Neptune*; so Beebe reluctantly returned to St. John's, where he arrived on the 24th of September to report failure.

Garlington's failure to reach Greely in 1883, from causes that were insurmountable in the ice conditions in his way, brought home to the Government a realizing sense that the expedition to Lady Franklin Bay had been abandoned, notwithstanding the efforts of its officers for the two preceding years to reach it with the abundant means provided from its resources. It was too late to attempt further relief that year, though the conclusion was reached, after much consideration, and wisely, too, not to invite fresh disaster at that season by sending another chartered vessel into regions where the ice conditions during the most favorable months of the year had been impenetrable and impassable.

When the situation thus presented had been carefully studied out, the excitement grew from day to day. The press throughout the country published the fullest *résumé* of the Lady Franklin Bay Expedition, the attempts which had been made to relieve it, their failures, with the causes thereof, with pages of editorial censure or advice added. The question was asked again and again what was to be done to save these poor fellows from starvation in that Arctic wilderness.

CHAPTER XV

THE GREELY RELIEF EXPEDITION

1884

On the 17th of December, 1883, President Arthur convened a board, composed of General W. B. Hazen, Chief Signal Officer; Captain Jas. A. Greer, U. S. N., and Captain Geo. W. Davis, Fourteenth Infantry, U. S. A., to consider the matter of an expedition to be sent to the relief of Lieutenant A. W. Greely and his party. This board was required to recommend to the Secretary of War, Hon. Robert T. Lincoln, and the Secretary of the Navy, Hon. Wm. E. Chandler, jointly, what steps it considered necessary to be taken to equip a relief expedition, and at the same time to suggest a plan for the control and conduct of such relief expedition.

This board continued in session for quite two months, examining witnesses called before it, searching all records referring in any way to the Lady Franklin Bay Expedition, and taking the testimony of Arctic experts. It submitted its report on January 22d. A day or two after the first meeting, the board suggested to the two secretaries that immediate steps be taken, looking to the purchase of two suitable full-powered steam whalers and to fit them for this service.

Three general plans were proposed to the board: one by Lieutenant E. A. Garlington, to equip an expedition of one steam whaler and a relief ship to be commanded by himself, the relief ship being commanded by a naval officer. Accompanying this suggestion was an outlined plan for the expedition to pursue, a depot being established at Cape Sabine, with positive orders to the relief ship to proceed as far as Cape Sabine. This scheme was based upon the experience of Lieutenant Garlington the year before in the *Proteus*. A second plan, proposed by Lieutenant Commander McCalla, was a purely naval expedition, composed of two steam whalers accompanied by a naval relief ship,

one of the whalers to establish a complete depot at Littleton Island, and then, if no news of the party was obtained, to pass on to Lady Franklin Bay, the second whaler being a reserve to press north of Littleton Island in the event of the first being lost or her absence so prolonged as to cause uneasiness. The third vessel was to push forward to Littleton Island, and, in case of general disaster, to serve as a second reserve, or to bring back news if the relief expedition should be detained over one season in the north. A third plan, proposed by Captain Davis, was a sort of compromise between the two others, and suggested a whaler as relief ship, with a naval ship as tender, the expedition to be under command of a naval officer, manned by men from the Navy, and each vessel to carry a detachment of soldiers, an army officer and a surgeon.

Secretaries Lincoln and Chandler addressed a joint letter to President Arthur on the 17th of January, 1884, setting forth the recommendation of the board, and on the same day the President transmitted this letter to Congress in a special message, urging prompt action to enable those officers to carry out the plan of relief. Hon. Samuel J. Randall submitted a joint resolution, with favorable recommendation to the House, granting an unlimited appropriation, which was passed with almost no debate, on January 22d. A day or two afterward it was brought up in the Senate by Hon. Eugene Hale, who explained the difficulty of fixing the exact amount, on account, first, of the fact that if fixed too low failure might ensue, and, secondly, if too high the prices of vessels would be raised proportionately. Much discussion, however, was indulged in, and a number of amendments were proposed, but, finally, after a little legislative tangle, the resolution was adopted on February 13, 1884, with an amendment restricting the service to those officers and men who should volunteer, the expedition being regarded as a sort of forlorn hope.

As time was a most important element, Secretaries Chandler and Lincoln took steps looking to the purchase of suitable vessels in the only markets available—St. John's and Dundee—before the joint resolution had passed. The *Bear* and *Thetis* were actually bought by these officers on January 28th and February 4th. It was due entirely to the prompt and decisive action of

these two energetic secretaries that the necessary vessels were secured in time to be fitted out for this memorable and successful expedition.

In the meanwhile it had come to the knowledge of Her Britannic Majesty's Government that the United States was fitting out an expedition to go into the Arctic seas to rescue the one at Lady Franklin Bay. This was made the occasion of a gracefully phrased note from Lord Northbrook, tendering the *Alert*, which had become famous under Sir George Nares in 1875, to the Government of the United States, and of an equally felicitous reply from our Minister, the Hon. Jas. Russell Lowell, accepting the ship on behalf of the United States Government.

Through this friendly and pleasing action of Her Majesty's Government, the third vessel required for the expedition was obtained. Her arrival at New York under Lieutenant Commander Goodrich, as well as the *Bear*, under Lieutenant L. L. Reamy, was prompt and timely for the refitting needed for their work.

Long before these arrangements had been completed, the President had decided that this expedition should be entirely naval, and had placed the responsibility for its successful preparation in the hands of the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy. The Secretary of the Navy, with his known energy and activity, had taken the matter of its personnel into consideration, and early in December had sent for the writer to ascertain his willingness and readiness for this service, explaining that, if there was any personal reason in the way of accepting this assignment, it should in no way militate against his record or his subsequent preferment for duty.

The writer was of opinion that the duty was rather in the nature of a forlorn hope, but that no officer could afford to refuse any demands of duty without sacrificing his own self-respect, and if it was necessary to volunteer for it, then he wished to volunteer. If it was necessary to be ordered to obtain this assignment, he wished to be ordered. The only condition suggested to the secretary, in connection with this detail, was that, as he would be responsible to the country as well as to the Government, the writer would desire to make the selection of the officers who were to help him in the task set by the department. To this the

secretary readily assented. One other suggestion was that the matter of the detail for this hazardous duty might be kept secret as long as possible, so as to shorten the days of anxiety and restlessness which he knew would be felt in his home by his wife and children.

The secretary transferred the expedition, the detail, and all business connected with its supplies, or with the work of preparing the vessels for service, into his own office, with instructions to ask for what was needed, and, with Mr. Lincoln's advice and help, the necessary commands were given. The following order, given to the commanding officer, was in his hands for a fortnight or more before it was known publicly:

Navy Department,

WASHINGTON, D. C., February 18, 1884.

Commander WINFIELD S. SCHLEY,
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Sir: Having been selected for the command of the Greely Relief Expedition of 1884, you will make immediate and full preparation for the performance of your duties. You will investigate the circumstances of Lieutenant Greely's voyage to Lady Franklin Sound in 1881 and of the attempts to relieve him in 1882 and 1883, incidentally familiarizing yourself with the whole subject of Arctic exploring and relief expeditions. You will examine the *Thetis* and *Bear*, and all other ships which may be designed for the expedition, and cooperate with the chiefs of bureaus in strengthening and equipping them, giving particular attention to all the special articles of outfit necessary in Arctic voyaging, including boats, sledges, dogs, houses, provisions, clothing, navigation instruments, and the whole material of the expedition.

You will also consider and assist in the selection of the subordinate officers and the enlistment of the crew; and on all points above indicated, and concerning any steps which ought to be taken to give success to the expedition, you will, from time to time, make to the department all suggestions and recommendations which may occur to you as useful and important.

Very respectfully,

WILLIAM E. CHANDLER,

Secretary of the Navy.

As Congress had restricted the personnel of the expedition to those who volunteered for its service, the secretaries further imposed a physical examination upon each officer, in order to be certain that all who volunteered upon this unusual service were free from bodily defects which might disqualify them for the hard and exposed duties beyond the Arctic Circle. As a number

of those who reported for examination fell below the standard prescribed by the surgeon-general for Arctic service, the list of those as finally decided was as follows:

Thetis.

Commander W. S. Schley, Commanding Expedition.

Lieut. Uriel Sebree, Executive and Navigating Officer.

Lieut. Emory H. Taunt, Watch Off.

Lieut. Saml. C. Lemly, Watch Off.

Ensign Washington I. Chambers (transferred at St. John's to *Loch Garry*).

Ensign, Chas. H. Harlow.

Chief Engineer, Geo. W. Melville.

P. A. Surgeon, Ed. H. Green.

Alert.

Commander Geo. W. Coffin, Comdg.

Lieut. Chas J. Badger, Ex. and Navigating Officer.

Lieut. Henry J. Hunt, Watch Officer.

Ensign Chas. S. McClain, Watch Off.

Ensign A. A. Ackerman, Watch Off.

P. A. Engineer, Wm. H. Nauman.

P. A. Surgeon, Francis S. Nash.

Bear.

Lieut. Wm. H. Emory, Commanding.

Lieut. Freeman H. Crosby, Ex. and Navigating Officer.

Lieut. John C. Colwell, Watch Officer.

Lieut. Nathaniel R. Usher, Watch Officer.

Ensign Lovell K. Reynolds, Watch Officer.

Chief Engineer, John Lowe.

P. A. Surgeon, Howard E. Ames.

The aim was to assign an officer to each ship who had already seen service in the Arctic, and Lieutenant Sebree, who had served with Commander J. A. Greer in the *Tigress*, in her search for the *Polaris*, and Chief Engineer Melville of the *Jeannette*, were chosen for the *Thetis*. Lieutenant Colwell, who had accompanied Garlington in the *Proteus* in 1883, was assigned to the *Bear*, and Lieutenant Hunt, who had served in the *Rodgers*, and Ensign Ackerman, who was with Wildes in the *Yantic* the summer before, were assigned to the *Alert*. These officers were further reinforced by ice pilots, Norman in the *Thetis*, Ash in the *Bear*, and Gifford, a New Bedford whaler, in the *Alert*.

So far, therefore, as this feature of the expedition was concerned, there was no neglect to provide it with the best available experience for the work ahead. A few weeks' service, however, in the ice fastnesses of the North, will convince anyone that the experience of others is principally excellent in providing the expedition's needs, but the work of navigating the ice and taking care of the ships under conditions of constant peril from the moment the ice-field is entered, must be learned in the "crow's-nest." If a commander does not come to grief in the first week or ten

days in the ice, he will have learned much that will help him to avoid ice dangers afterward.

The crews composing each ship's company were reduced to a minimum, while the ships themselves were arranged to carry the maximum of provisions and clothing. The ships, though phenomenally strong, were additionally strengthened, after their arrival at the Brooklyn Navy-Yard, in accordance with suggestions made by the Chief Constructor of the Navy, Theodore Wilson. Every advantage that could be gained in the economic use of provisions or coal or clothing, after the expedition sailed, was taken in so far as human forethought could provide before starting. Details were made of the officers of every ship, from the moment they were assigned, and lists of needed articles were required from them, of those daily delivered, or of daily inspections made of those being manufactured. In this way the commander of the expedition was familiar every morning at 11 o'clock with the progress made in every department through the reports conveyed to him as a whole from the commanding officers of the vessels.

On the 10th of March matters had made progress so satisfactorily with the ships, as well as with their outfit, as to justify the determination of a plan of campaign. The Secretary of the Navy called upon the commander of the expedition for the submission of a scheme, proposing dates of departure for the ships, which was replied to on March 17th in the letter which follows:

WASHINGTON, D. C., March 17, 1884.

HON. WM. E. CHANDLER,
Secretary of the Navy.

Sir: In reply to your letter of March 10th, informing me that it had been definitely decided that the *Thetis*, *Bear*, and *Alert* were to be the vessels of the expedition to relieve Lieutenant Greely and party at Lady Franklin Bay, I would respectfully suggest that the *Bear*, being the vessel most advanced in the strengthening needed for this service, should be despatched from New York on the 25th of April to St. John's, Newfoundland, to fill up with coal, to take dogs on board, and to inquire into the condition of the ice in Davis Strait, and at the earliest practicable moment, to proceed to the Danish settlements of Disco and Upernavik, reaching there about the third week in May, if practicable.

The *Thetis* should follow the *Bear*, leaving New York not later than May 1st, stopping at St. John's for coal, to take dogs on board, and to convoy the coal steamer to Upernavik, where she ought to arrive about May 25th.

From Upernavik the *Thetis* and *Bear* should proceed onward with the convoy to Cape York and Littleton Island. Should the ice appear too formidable for the collier to encounter so early in June, she should remain at Upernavik until the arrival of the *Alert*, which vessel would then be charged with the convoy.

The importance of convoy beyond Upernavik can hardly be overestimated in view of the circumstance that the Government may be obliged to assume all responsibility for the coal, vessel and cargo.

The *Alert* should be dispatched not later than May 10th from New York to St. John's, to fill up with coal, and then proceed onward to Disco and Upernavik, where she should arrive not later than June 1st.

Her movements should be so timed that she might reach Littleton Island, or Foulke Fiord, about the 1st of July, in order to have sufficient time to land and build the house; land provisions, coal and other supplies, to establish the station upon which the advance ship's companies could retreat in the event of disaster, and afterwards to send a sled party onward to examine the coast on the eastern side of Smith's Sound as far as Humboldt Glacier.

This duty completed by September 1st, and the *Thetis* and *Bear* not having returned to Littleton Island, or Foulke Fiord, the *Alert* should return to St. John's with news of the expedition.

I have the honor to be,

Very respectfully,

W. S. SCHLEY, *Commander*,
Commanding Greely Relief Expedition.

The *Bear* was commissioned on March 17th, the *Thetis* on April 2d, and the *Alert*, being in very good condition, was continued in commission after her arrival. The plan of sailing proposed was rigorously carried out, and the arrivals at the several designated places were as nearly coincident as the ice and weather conditions permitted. At all events, the ships were in no wise delayed by the failure of any one of them to reach designated points at the times planned and named.

On the day appointed each of the three ships left the Navy-Yard for its destination. The occasion was made one of great demonstration by the hundreds of craft passed on the way to sea, as well as by the hundreds of thousands of people lining the river fronts on the New York and Brooklyn sides. The din of whistles, mingled with the loud huzzahs of the people, wishing us a final adieu and good luck, only showed how deep the interest was that followed us outward. It was a demonstration of enthusiastic approval of the work the expedition was going to do, and a sure indication that if, in our turn, relief should be re-

quired, there were thousands just as ready as those going forth to risk all for us.

The final orders of the expedition from the Secretary of the Navy are given below, viz.:

NAVY DEPARTMENT, Washington, D. C.,
April 21, 1884.

Sir: The *Thetis*, *Bear*, and *Alert*, the ships of the Greely Relief Expedition of 1884, being ready, you are ordered to take command of them and to proceed to the coast of Greenland, or farther north if necessary, and, if possible, to find and rescue or ascertain the fate of Lieutenant A. W. Greely and his comrades.

All the officers and men under your command are hereby enjoined to perform any duty on sea or land to which you may order them. No detailed instructions will be given you. Full confidence is felt that you have both the capacity and the courage, guided by discretion, necessary to do all that can be required of you by the department or the nation for the rescue of our imperilled countrymen.

With earnest wishes and high hopes for your success and safe return, I am,
Very respectfully,

W. E. CHANDLER,

Secretary of the Navy.

Commander WINFIELD S. SCHLEY,
Commanding Greely Relief Expedition.

Among the vessels which accompanied the *Thetis* down the channel was the *Tallapoosa*, with the Secretary of the Navy and a number of department officials on board, and on reaching the Swash Channel this signal was made as she retraced her way to New York:—

“I wish you and all your comrades good health, good courage, and good luck. Good-bye!”

W. E. CHANDLER,

Secretary of the Navy.

During the past few months the work of preparing the expedition had so engrossed every moment that there had been no thought of the strain, or time to realize it, but when the *Thetis* had reached the Sandy Hook Light-ship, where the last essential thing had to be done—that of swinging ship for compass errors—the commander, when this last necessary preparation was completed, directed Lieutenant Sebree to lay a course for the Nanucket New South Shoal Light-ship, and then he laid down to rest about 4 P. M. The following day about the same hour he

awoke completely refreshed, having slept almost the entire twenty-four hours uninterruptedly, and prepared for harder and most serious work still ahead.

Congress had further reinforced its resolution of unlimited appropriation by a subsidiary one, offering \$25,000 reward to any person or persons, not in the military or naval service, who should discover and rescue, or satisfactorily ascertain the fate of Lieutenant A. W. Greely and his command, consisting of twenty-four persons, which had left the United States in July and had landed at Discovery Harbor in Lady Franklin Sound in the month of August, 1881. Unprepared vessels were warned in the proclamation of the 17th of April, 1884, of the Secretary of the Navy, giving publicity to the resolution of Congress, not to incur the extraordinary peril or risk for the sake of the reward offered, and informing all persons whom this offer might attract to the search, that the United States would in no event be involved in any future liability or responsibility beyond the said reward.

The commander of the expedition was opposed, from every point of view, to this action of Congress. He realized, too, that any objection offered to a scheme, whose purpose was to enlarge the body of searchers for the missing expedition, would be attributed to service jealousy. Notwithstanding this, he did point out that the warning of the Secretary's proclamation would be disregarded and that unprepared vessels would venture into those regions with all the more confidence, knowing that a well-equipped Government expedition was behind them to depend upon if any misadventure in the ice brought them to grief; that he did not think the best chance Greely ever had ought to be discounted by any delay which might be necessary to rescue the crew of such vessels as had been attracted into these regions only by cupidity; that Greely's safety should not be imperilled by any addition to the numbers for whom our bounty had been calculated at a time when it would not be possible to repair this; that the expedition as composed was ample without help to examine the entire ground to be searched before the winter should set in, and that it seemed unfair to increase further the strain and responsibilities of the commander by enlarging the possibilities of his work and augmenting his solicitude by throwing possible new cares upon his shoulders.

The proclamation, however, was distributed in the ports of St. John's and Dundee. Its effect was to occasion earlier departure of whaling vessels from St. John's. A great deal of useful information was obtained from those old ice kings who commanded these vessels, and it served a good purpose later.

The third day out from Sandy Hook an accident to the air-pump connecting-rod made it necessary to put the *Thetis* under canvas for a day, while Melville, who was always full of resource, forged another. The delay on this account was not great, as the ship in due course reached St. John's. The collier *Loch Garry*, with some 600 tons of Cardiff coal, was in port. As no insurance could be obtained, Ensign W. I. Chambers and two seamen were transferred to her to protect the Government's interests.

Both vessels left St. John's on the morning of May 12th, and, gaining the open sea, ran into a dense fog which increased the difficulty of threading the way through the procession of icebergs moving majestically southward in the Labrador current. One or two very close shaves were made, and as most of the officers were new to the business some concern was felt before we had grown quite up to the fact that a ship could approach these icebergs nearer than a quarter of a mile without feeling an uncomfortable proximity. Our experience later on in Melville Bay worked wonderful changes in the feeling of awe with which a berg was regarded.

The two vessels continued on the way to Godhaven, on the Island of Disco, meeting the usual alternating conditions of fair and bad weather, with occasional fields of ice here and there after passing the latitude of Cape Farewell, and arrived on the 22d day of May. A southerly gale the following day packed the little harbor full of ice, causing delay, but the time was agreeably passed with Mr. Andersen, the royal inspector, and the governor, Mr. Peterson. It was with their assistance that we secured the services of an Eskimo, David Danielson, as dog-driver, and as David had made a cruise in the *Proteus* the year before, he had learned enough English to act as interpreter.

The *Thetis* and *Loch Garry* sailed from Godhaven on the morning of May 24th, the former breaking the way through the ice for the latter. At the north fiord the solid ice-pack extended westward as far as could be seen from the "crow's-nest" with no

signs that could be interpreted by the commander. In fact, the *Thetis* and *Loch Garry* were "up against" the problems in earnest, and, after searching east and west for an opening, were obliged to lie for the night fast in the pack. Fair weather being the exception and bad weather the rule in the Polar regions, we did not have to wait long for changes to vary the monotony of one or the other condition. The following day a southerly gale came on, making it prudent to send the *Loch Garry* back to Godhaven to wait till it had blown over, while the *Thetis* forced her way into the pack to lay it out there.

The "crow's-nest," for the first week or ten days in the pack, is the best point of vantage from which to study the problem of ice work, and, if one does not fall a victim to inexperience in that interval, he is fairly safe for the task before him. When that task involved such responsibilities as the commander of the expedition was bearing, the study of every phenomena had an interest bearing upon the main purpose of the work. This held him often twelve or fifteen hours there examining, reading and trying to interpret signs in the distance. The experience of Seebree and Melville, both of whom had been in these Polar regions, was valuable in the extreme.

The fight for advantages in the open water was constant; the unceasing changes of the ice in motion required unremitting vigilance to avoid damage from "pan" and "pack ice," driven by wind or tide into one's way. From Waigat Straits onward to Upernavik progress was slow and only made by keeping on the inshore side of the ice. It was more certain withal than venturing outward into the middle pack, where the chances were even to be beset and drifted helplessly back to Davis Strait, as happened some years before to Sir Leopold McClintock.

After various mishaps with icebergs, gales, snow storms, and fogs, which obscured the land and shut out all leads, the *Thetis* reached Upernavik on the morning of May 29th, and for the first time the commander understood what was meant by the anxious strain of many consecutive hours in the "crow's-nest."

Emory came on board to report his arrival the day before from Brown Island, and gave an interesting bit of news of the condition of the Arctic whaling fleet before and behind the *Thetis*. There was a rumor current about Upernavik that five

white men were somewhere in the vicinity of Cape York, but nobody could be found who had brought the story, or who could vouch for its truth. It was decided, however, that the relief squadron should push on, no matter what the ice outlook was.

At Upernavik the *Polynia*, the *Nova Zembla*, and the *Triune* were found. The *Arctic* and *Wolf* followed the *Thetis* closely, and the *Cornwallis*, *Narwhal*, and *Aurora* were at Brown Island north of Upernavik. This comprised the Dundee whaling fleet, which was to contest the honors of the passage through the pack ice of Melville Bay with the relief squadron.

CHAPTER XVI

THE RESCUE OF GREELY AND SIX COMPANIONS

1884

EVERYONE who wishes to penetrate the gateway to the Polar seas must of necessity, as a matter of information for his guidance, carefully inspect the prepared charts, as well as the literature relating the experiences of other navigators who have preceded him into this region, when everything is left behind save hope. The entrance through which the relief expedition was now to pass had been followed by Baffin, in 1616, by Sir John Franklin, in 1845, by Englefield, in 1852, by Doctor Kane in the second Grinnell expedition of 1853, by Doctor Hayes, in 1861, by Hall in the *Polaris*, in 1871, by Nares in the *Alert* and *Discovery*, in 1875, by Greely in the *Proteus*, in 1881, and by others, as well as by Hartstene, Leopold McClintock, Sir Allen Young, and Commander J. A. Greer in the searches conducted by them for missing expeditions. The route from Upernavik to the Duck Islands had been only hurriedly surveyed and was filled with countless submerged dangers which the covering of ice completely shut out of view.

The Governor, Mr. Elborg, of North Greenland, in which Upernavik was situated, was unremitting in his courteous attentions and assistance to the expedition. His long residence in that remote settlement had afforded exceptional opportunities to become familiar with the natives, the weather and the ice conditions of a region visited from time to time by explorers or those who led expeditions for missing parties. Much profit was derived from his recital of generally prevailing conditions, but not much encouragement from the reported ice conditions further north at this early period of the season.

Nevertheless, it was decided to push northward to Kingatok Island and, if possible, to gain Tassuisak, the most northerly civilized settlement on the west coast of Greenland. The ice found

in Melville Bay was much too dangerous to risk the collier *Loch Garry*, which was left behind at Upernavik to await the *Alert*, now well on her way. Kingatok was reached by the *Thetis* and *Bear* on the afternoon of May 29th, after some difficulty, but they were driven to the north side by a southerly gale which broke up the harbor ice, destroying the ice foot on the 1st of June. The effect of this gale upon the ice beyond opened a lead which eventually reached as far north as the settlement of Tassuisak, not, however, without some damage to the *Bear*, whose energetic commander followed an opening which a submerged cluster of rocks out of sight blocked and upon which the ship struck heavily, damaging her apron and fore-foot. This was an accident to be expected in this wild and unknown region, but it did not diminish the spirit of the energetic fellows of the *Bear*, nor did it impair the confidence of the commander in the judgment of the *Bear's* officers.

From this time until the Duck Islands were passed, frequent gatherings of the captains of the several vessels were had on board one or the other of the relief ships. These were known in the whaling vernacular as "mollies," which, interpreted, meant a sort of "smoker" where experiences in the ice regions were related. As the commander's ice experience was limited to knowledge acquired from reading the literature upon this subject, he was receptive on these occasions rather than communicative. The thrilling adventures, the hairbreadth escapes, the suffering and exposures, when caught and crushed by the ice, were harrowing yet fascinating. But from these descriptions of those veritable old sea vikings much that was valuable afterward was derived. Some among the relief officers were inclined to infer that our lack of these experiences would discount the chances of success. Not so, however, with the commander, who reached the conclusion, during these conferences, that the experiences related were to be considered excellent, if the object was to catch whales; but where the purpose was to relieve Greely, risk, rather than too much caution, was to be the rule of action. The value of experience may be overestimated in this work; it sometimes begets conservatism; and nothing is more true in ice work than that they who know nothing fear nothing. This proved the dominant factor in the expedition's work.

A dangerous nip of the *Thetis* off Horse Head, west of Tas-suisak, brought new sensations in the crackling of timbers, as if the ship was being ground to pieces, but they passed off when we learned that some relief came from the use of torpedoes. The struggle onward to the Duck Islands was constant, with favoring advantages to the whalers or the relief ships as good luck in the leads occurred near one or the other until June 7th, when this goal was reached.

In crossing Melville Bay the Duck Islands are regarded as the extreme outpost for an advance. The detention there until the 11th, by the unbroken pack over the bay, was a period of anxious restlessness. This was all the harder to bear from the fact that the weather was fine for these regions, if occasional snow storms and fogs are excepted. This time was not actually lost, however, as Sebree and Crosby improved the delay to verify the accuracy of the charts, and they found the Duck Islands about six miles out of position as placed on the chart.

The outlook to the northwest was most unpromising indeed; no signs of a movement were discernible beyond small water spaces about the base of some of the icebergs, but this sign was encouraging. One learns, however, after a little experience in the Arctic, that changes are kaleidoscopic and take place quickly. On the 11th a change occurred which the relief ships and the whaling fleet sought to turn to profit. The real contest now began in this vast solitude of ice and snow, and we were to know, before reaching Cape York, which of the two contestants in this struggle was to win the honors. In this broad, unbroken field of ice it would be proved whether the conservatism which grows from larger experience in dangers, or the daring ventures which the supposed desperate straits of the Greely party justified, were finally to win.

No one who has never had experience in the ice can imagine the tension of twenty hours continuously in the "crow's-nest," and yet to take the best advantage of changes it is sometimes necessary to exceed even that interval. If the expedition had stopped to rest often, when it was sorely tempted, or if it had delayed often when it could have been excused, Greely and his comrades would never have been returned alive to friends and families.

As the needle points with unvarying constancy to the pole, in like manner the camp of Greely, wherever it might be, was the unvarying objective of the relief squadron. From start to finish there was but one resolve in these ships, and to this the lives and sacred honor of the officers and men were loyally pledged.

The battle during the 11th, 12th, 13th, and 14th of June with the ice conditions varying with the winds or tides, or the attractiveness of leads, or the channels through it, resulted sometimes in favor of one or the other. It resembled somewhat the sparring for wind between two pugilists in a boxing contest, the main purpose being to size up the opponent. Much risk had to be run to gain more or less advantageous positions, and no thought could be taken of dangers in a region where it is of no use to cross bridges until they are reached. It resulted in a division of the whaling fleet, the more conservative captains seeking safety by regaining the Duck Islands, while the more dashing, like Guy in the *Arctic*, Fairweather in the *Aurora*, and Burnett in the *Wolf*, remained with the relief ships in the pack some twenty miles northwest.

June 15th opened with more encouraging prospects, and although the *Thetis* and *Bear* had gained an advantage of some four miles over all the ships of the whaling fleet, a streak of bad luck deprived them of some of its benefits, for the break that came that day was nearer to the *Arctic* and *Wolf* than to the relief ships, and by this bad luck several hours were lost in running through a neck of ice into open water. The advantage of the *Arctic* and the *Wolf* was only temporary, however, for after a run of quite thirty-five or forty miles, they were overtaken in a bight of the ice where further progress was not possible. The last glimpse of the whalers beset to the eastward of the Duck Islands was had just after the relief ships had gained the open water leading to the northwest.

June 16th and 17th favored substantial advances. The large open water spaces about the ships forced them into constant motion to avoid the drifting floes to escape being crushed. Tentative leads opened now and then to the southward and westward, but when watched carefully with eyes which were now trained to some extent in ice movements, the relief ships were not lured into them. The *Arctic*, always dashing, could not resist the invitation,

and but for the fact that the opening closed before the *Aurora* and *Wolf* could enter, both of these vessels, like the *Arctic*, would likewise have been thrown out of the contest. She was not seen again by the *Thetis*, but the more lucky *Aurora* and *Wolf* returned to the relief ships and shared their luck with varying advantages up to a point distant about ten miles from Cape York on the morning of June 19th. At this point both the *Aurora* and *Wolf* gave up the fight after many complimentary expressions and wishes that good luck would attend the relief ships. They then started for the open water, to the southwest, en route to the fishing grounds of Lancaster Sound.

Being loath to lose any advantage that might offer in the open water to the westward, the *Bear* was ordered to proceed in that direction, and, if success resulted, to visit the Cary Islands and rejoin the *Thetis* at Littleton Island. In the meantime, a sledge party was sent over the ice to Cape York in charge of Lieutenant Colwell, with directions to rejoin the *Thetis*. A hasty breakfast was partaken of, after which the commander took his position in the "crow's-nest" to examine the situation about Cape York with a powerful telescope, always a necessary part of the ship's outfit. The *Bear* at this time was out of sight, or she would have been recalled, as ominous black lines, over which the significant "water-blink"—a reflection of water on the mists above—were seen under Cape York and to the northward. Ice anchors were tripped immediately. The ice was skirted first eastward, then north, and finally westward to a point directly under Cape York, where Colwell, seeing the ship advancing, awaited her arrival with a native Eskimo from whom he had ascertained that Greely had not reached that point. No time was to be lost, however, as the information obtained was conclusive that Greely must be looked for farther to the north. As the ice had moved bodily off the coast several hundred feet with ominous streaks ahead, the *Thetis* pushed on alone close to the land, carefully inspecting it for smoke, or signals, as she passed onward to Conical Rock, where she arrived about four o'clock the same afternoon.

As Conical Rock was the turning point to lower Smith's Sound, it was important to leave there the first message for Emory and Coffin, in order that they might know the com-

mander's movements and purposes on their arrival. One of the cardinal principles of explorers, or of those who enter the Polar regions on any purpose, is to leave at certain prearranged points complete records of movements intended, and, no matter what the difficulties in the way may be, these points must never be passed without the risk of confusion or possible misadventure to those who are to follow. So important is this rule to those who search that failure to do this may involve calamitous disaster. Sebree ascended this rock, about three hundred feet high, and built a cairn of stone, with a pole projecting through the top bearing a black flag that might easily be picked out on the white background, and buried in the ground a bottle hermetically sealed containing this record.

It must be confessed that the outlook from this high elevation was not promising, as the sea, as far as the eye could reach, appeared blocked with impassable ice rafted in many places and studded with countless icebergs of great height. But after the experiences from Disco Island through Melville Bay to this advanced position, there was no longer any obstacle that could check the restless desire to push on. The ships had been tested in ramming, as well as in squeezes of the ice floes; the officers had become accustomed to the shocks and grinding of the ice pack and their judgment had matured so fully that no timidity was apparent in the many risks they ran. Above all, confidence in their ships was now complete, and no hazard was too great which put the ship into a position nearer to our beleaguered countrymen.

Off Cape Dudley Diggs lay a string of rafted ice of great thickness across which open water was seen as far as Wostenholme Island. It cost a deal of time and hard work to pass this formidable barrier, but persistent attacks with torpedoes assisted by the indefatigable labor of the officers and crew for many hours, were crowned with success. Perhaps at no other point of the voyage was such tremendous ramming done by the stanch old *Thetis*. At times, in the "crow's-nest," it was thought her masts must go in the violent shocks against the hard, blue paleocrystic ice; but she was equal to the occasion. Passing through into the narrow lead and on between the heavy floes blocking it at intervals, the lesser shocks were hardly noticed.

She reached the western end of Wostenholme Island at about midnight, when another cairn was erected containing records for the ships following. Some little time was required to build substantial cairns, and some difficulty was had at times to find and gather the stones necessary; but, this done, the *Thetis* was off again in time to arrive at Saunders Island about 2.30 A. M. At this point a number of Eskimos were met in sleds coming off to the ship, as the nature of the ice did not allow the *Thetis* to approach the island nearer than a mile or more. From these natives, who were fine specimens physically, it was learned that Greely had not been among them, and, from the stories of their hunting parties in the direction of the Cary Islands earlier in the spring before there was danger of the ice breaking up, they had seen no signs on these islands to indicate the presence of anyone.

This information was conclusive that Greely was still farther north, and that no delay must occur in continuing the search. Therefore, as soon as Lieutenant Colwell returned, the *Thetis* again got under way for Cape Parry, about thirty miles away, at 4.30 in the morning of June 20th. The ice met en route presented occasional difficulties where the hummocks were just low enough to pass under the boats swinging at the davits, but the leads through it were so marked that the ship following them sustained only rude shocks at times, though now and then the propeller would fetch up all standing against the spurs of hummocks projecting from them under water. Cape Parry was reached at about 2 P. M. the same afternoon, but some little delay was caused by having to follow a lead off shore which eventually led up near enough to the beach to effect a landing and to build a cairn to contain a record for the ships following and to ascertain that Greely had not reached this point.

From Cape Parry to Northumberland and Hakluyt islands, the way across Whale Sound was through loose ice-floes, broken somewhat by the tidal action. After getting clear of the ice about Cape Parry, the *Thetis* struck a rock in the lead she was following, though without material injury, as she was going at slow speed. Between Northumberland and Hakluyt islands the ice lay jammed, but not to such extent as to prevent the *Thetis* passing through to search the shore lines for signals or other evi-



THE *THETIS*.

dences of the missing party. Being fully satisfied upon this point, the *Thetis* pushed her way on through the ice to the north. During the night the wind increased to a moderate gale from the southwest, with flurries of snow which interfered with making the passage through this belt of icebergs of great size, extending to the westward many miles. This belt was twenty miles in breadth, and many of the bergs were at least three hundred feet in height.

This formidable belt proved to be the last barrier met on the passage to Littleton Island, and after passing through it the *Thetis* emerged into open water free from ice as far as could be seen from the "crow's-nest." It was the long-looked-for "north water," which, at this early season, had only begun its movement southward. The wind increased to a gale, before which the *Thetis* sped, with steam and sail, for Littleton Island, which was reached at 2.30 A. M. on the morning of June 21st, but not without having run upon a submerged rock not marked on the chart. She hung for five or ten minutes and tore off some sheathing, but not enough to cause worry. On her way to this point, every inch of the coast between Cape York and Littleton Island had been swept with telescopes for signs, signals, or smoke sure to be made by the missing party. The passage from Disco, through quite seven hundred miles of ice, to Littleton Island, had been a severe trial for the ship and a trying test of endurance to the personnel. The commander did not spare himself, so he felt fully justified in requiring of all others what he imposed as a duty upon himself in that ceaseless combat, and his officers and men loyally did their duty.

From the 17th of June to the 21st there was hardly a moment of relaxation from the strain and anxiety of work in the perils of the ice packs. The commander was rarely out of the "crow's-nest" during these days of danger. The one hope which animated all hands was to reach and rescue the lost expedition before it was too late. It was a race with time.

On the afternoon of June 21st the wind had increased to a heavy gale, with blinding snow squalls, which made the work of the searching parties on shore most difficult; but, notwithstanding these hindrances, they succeeded in finding evidences in the undisturbed *caches* of provisions left there to indicate that

Littleton Island had not been visited by any of the missing expedition.

The delay, however, caused by this stormy weather, brought new anxieties. The *Bear*, which had been parted from at Cape York, had not yet rejoined the *Thetis*, as was hoped, and the enforced delay of twenty-four hours was one of restless impatience.

Kane Sea was now to be entered to continue the search further north, and it would not have been prudent to set out from Littleton Island without knowing whether the *Bear* had escaped the dangers besetting her route from Cape York. The next day, Sunday, at noon, after notices had been deposited on McGarry Island for Emory and Coffin, the lines of the *Thetis* were being cast off from a grounded berg, just north of Littleton Island, to set out for Cape Sabine, when the commander saw from the "crow's-nest" the *Bear* coming up through the rifts in the snow squalls. It was a moment of great delight.

Emory came on board the *Thetis* upon arrival to report the incidents of his cruise after separating from the commander at Cape York on the 19th. As no open water to the northwest had been found, he was obliged to retrace his steps during the day to Cape York, which he found beset with heavy ice, closing all passages of the morning, as the pack had drifted back closing up the lead so opportunely seized that morning by the *Thetis* to reach Conical Rock. The *Bear* had two or three narrow escapes while battling with the dense pack off Cape York, and when she did succeed in passing that point she saw the *Aurora* was in trouble and had lowered her boats as if the danger were serious; but she was too far away for Emory to get to her, so he continued toward Littleton Island, touching en route, as his orders required, at the Cary Islands.

By a piece of good luck the leads along the land had closed up, leaving a bit of open water off shore, and this fact facilitated somewhat his passage to the Cary Islands, where, on his arrival at 8 P. M., June 20th, he found the *caches* of provisions undisturbed, thus verifying the information given the *Thetis* by the Eskimos at Saunders Island. Emory's voyage through the ice to open water was one of much peril, but the gale felt by the *Thetis* had evidently done its work further south, as three hours

after the *Bear* left the Cary Islands she ran into open water and arrived at Littleton Island a little after noon on Sunday, June 22d.

The objective point was now Cape Sabine as the next in the line of search, and, although the weather was very bad and the wind blowing with fury during the snow squalls, the sea was tolerably clear of heavy ice. The start was made by the relief ships at or near 2 P. M. for Cape Sabine, where both vessels arrived about 9 P. M., impeded a good deal by heavy pack ice extending two or three miles off the land. A passage, however, was forced after some heavy ramming into the harbor ice of Payer Harbor, where both ships made fast with ice anchors to the ice which had not yet broken up. Parties were detailed to examine simultaneously the cairns on Brevoort Island, Stalknecht Island, the coast line around the bay and Cape Sabine. When these parties had left the ship it was blowing heavily from the southward, with biting snow squalls, which impeded somewhat the search.

In the meanwhile the commander had gone to his room to take some rest to prepare for the battle through Kane Sea if perchance the search about Cape Sabine should reveal no tidings of the missing expedition. His berth against the ship's side was near the water-line, or, more properly, the ice-line. While no sound could be heard on deck because of the roaring of the wind through the rigging, he distinctly heard what appeared to be cheering. Hastening on deck to inform Lemly, who was the deck officer, he learned from him that he had heard nothing and could see nothing for the falling snow, which shut out the islands and the cape. The commander returned to his room, leaving instructions to keep a sharp lookout. A second time cheering was distinctly heard, and this time unmistakably. The sounds had been borne by the ice against the ship's side almost to the ear. A little thought recalled the excellent conducting qualities of ice and explained all. Returning again to inform Lemly that there was no doubt about hearing cheering, a rift in the squall disclosed seaman Jewell running over the ice from Brevoort Island toward the *Thetis*, holding up and waving a package. A few minutes later Harlow signalled that Greely's records had been found on Stalknecht Island.

The excitement in both ships when this fact became known was most intense, and when seaman Jewell came over the side to deliver the package Taunt's party had found on Brevoort Island, with the information added that the records showed that Lieutenant Greely and party were at Cape Sabine, no words could express the surpassing emotions of joy which filled every soul on board. Realizing that he who rejoices last rejoices best, these records were carried below to the cabin to be carefully read over to the officers left on board. To the horror of all, they bore date of "Sunday, October 21, 1883," the last visit made to this cairn by members of the Greely party. This was eight months before the relief ships had arrived. The most disturbing information in the records was that the party would winter under desperate circumstances and in danger of starvation, having only forty days of available rations! Could they be alive on June 22, 1884?

The story told in these records was a wonderful one, and so affected most present that there was hardly a dry eye. The next move was a pressing issue only to be solved by immediate action, and to this there was but one answer. No time could be wasted.

The general call of three long whistle blasts from the *Thetis* was sounded to recall all searching parties. The commander went on board the *Bear* to hasten on to the wreck camp *cache* near Cocked Hat Island, about six miles away around Cape Sabine, though in an air-line across the ice-covered mountains it was hardly more than three. The *Thetis* was left to follow after picking up all the searching parties.

The *Bear*, followed closely by the *Thetis*, arrived off the wreck camp *cache* about 10 P. M., and there found Lieutenant Greely and six of his comrades in a tent which the violent gale had blown down over the party as they lay in their sleeping-bags. The other eighteen of his party had perished, some while seeking relief toward Cape Isabella; some drowned while sealing; some had starved to death. The graves of a number were on a little ridge hardly two hundred feet away.

The condition of the survivors was desperate in the extreme, while the squalor of the camp as found was heartrending and distressing. One of the whistle blasts, blown to recall the searchers, was heard in the camp, and Brainard and Long went out to the cliff overlooking Kane Sea to learn what it might mean. To

their joy, the promise was real: for not long afterward the heralded ships were in sight.

All those rescued were at the last limit of their endurance, as their swollen joints and great weakness indicated only too plainly. Life was a question of a few days at most to that noble band. It is a matter of grave doubt had the relief ships been delayed forty-eight hours whether a living soul would have been found of the party. It is even more certain that if their rescue had depended upon the whalers they could not have been reached in time.

There were many touching incidents of this memorable night's work in the bleakness of that awful night in the Arctic, and the commander hoped then that he might never again have to look upon a scene of such suffering and sorrow. Doctors Green and Ames nursed these suffering ones back to strength, life and further usefulness.

The success of the relief ships in 1884 was made possible in the fullest measure by the officers and men who shared the dangers and exposures with the commander, and who were willing to undergo any privation or to undertake any risk to reach and rescue their imperilled countrymen.

They did so with much credit to themselves and with much renown to the Navy and to the Nation.

CHAPTER XVII

THE RETURN OF THE EXPEDITION

1884

THE search having been completed, the relief ships returned to Cape Sabine with the living and the dead of the Lady Franklin Bay Expedition on board. After the strenuous work of the past twenty-four hours, a rest of six hours was ordered for all hands.

The day following the rescue the *Bear* was directed to return to the wreck camp with Seabee, Melville, and Crosby, to make a second search, covering a wider area to the eastward and westward of the camp, with a view to recovering anything that the search of the day before might have overlooked. This was necessary, as none of the rescued party had sufficiently recovered from their deplorable physical and mental state to give any definite idea of their belongings, or whether any material matter had been left behind. This second search did not add a scrap of information, nor an additional article to those found and brought on board through the thoroughness of the first day's search under Emory's direction. The region searched, however, embraced an area of more than two miles outside the camp and the snow-house that had been occupied by Greely and his party since October of 1883.

The gale of the past two or three days had subsided somewhat, and the ice in Kane Sea, held to the northward of Cape Sabine, began moving south; so that the *Bear*, in returning, had a fortunate escape from the crush of ice as it impinged upon that rocky headland just after she had passed to join the *Thetis* at Payer Harbor. The moment Emory reported the result of this second search both ships were forced to hurry to Littleton Island to escape being cut off by the densely packed ice fast closing down on them from Kane Sea.

At Littleton Island six of the dead were transferred to the *Bear*, and directions were given to prepare their bodies for trans-

portation home. In both ships this was carefully and tenderly done by the surgeons and a detail of officers, who identified perfectly each body from the last photograph taken of the party before it had sailed from home on this ill-fated journey. The probable effect of a change of temperature in going south suggested their preservation in alcohol as the best means of getting them home safely to friends. Before this operation could be completed the ominous "ice blink" to the north indicated the sure approach of the pack moving south. This warned the commander that another retreat must be made past Cape Olsen to Foulke Fiord, but on arriving there the ice in the bay had not yet broken up.

It was evident, therefore, that the relief ships must begin to retrace their course toward Northumberland and Hakluyt islands to watch for a break in the pack in the direction of Cape Parry. Much the same ice conditions met by the *Thetis* were again encountered by the *Thetis* and *Bear*, now in company, and, that Emory might know the commander's intentions, he was instructed to keep as close to the *Thetis* as wind, weather and ice would allow; but if any misadventure separated the ships he was to proceed to Upernavik, which was the appointed rendezvous. Just north of Northumberland Island, the same broad belt of icebergs was again fallen in with, but the weather was a little more favorable at this time for passing this formidable barrier, yet, in passing through, it was necessary once or twice to brace the *Thetis's* yards "sharp up," to squeeze by one or two of these immense mountains of ice.

Arriving in the vicinity of Northumberland Island, the ice appeared to be closed up as if it had never been open. The *Bear* was beset about a half mile north of the position chosen by the *Thetis* in the pack between the two islands. A change of tide and wind later loosened the ice about the *Bear*, thus permitting her to work in near the *Thetis* and await further developments. These came early on June 25th, when small openings to the southwest of Hakluyt Island tempted the relief ships to a position that was not altogether safe, if the tide and wind had set the ice toward the land. Fortunately, the changes that did occur disclosed patches of open water six miles from Cape Parry, and another ramming experience past the south side of Northumberland Island enabled the ships to reach that cape about 10 P. M.

The records left at this point were taken up, and a new one left, informing Coffin of the successful rescue, with directions to return to Upernavik, the appointed rendezvous. This same course was pursued at Wostenholme Island and at Conical Rock, as the relief ships in time and turn reached and passed them.

Soon after midnight of June 26th, as the relief ships were steaming south through the leads near Saunders Island toward the looser ice, several whalers were sighted from the masthead. It was 3 A. M. when the relief ships came up with them and announced the successful rescue of Greely, with full details of the incident. This point was more than two hundred miles below Cape Sabine, and was the most northerly point that any of this Dundee whaling fleet had reached six days after the *Thetis* passed north. If, by any chance, the relief ships had been disabled in the struggle, it would have been too late when the whaling fleet arrived at Cape Sabine to have saved Greely or any of his party alive, for their lease of life on June 22d was not more than forty-eight hours, according to the most liberal estimate of the surgeons of the relief ships.

On reaching Saunders Island the weather outlook was bad, with the barometer only a little above 29 inches. It was decided to remain a few hours in this better anchorage to await developments from the moderate northerly gale then blowing. The weather continuing the same, notwithstanding the low barometer, a further advance was made toward Conical Rock, but before arriving there the wind changed to the southward, packing the ice so densely that some unimportant mishaps occurred to the *Thetis*. After some delay she arrived on the morning of June 27th. After a short sojourn at that point, the ships were off again for Cape York and the passage of Melville Bay to Upernavik. Approaching the vicinity of Cape York, dense fog and snow enveloped the relief ships, compelling them to follow leads wherever these appeared to offer the least obstruction up to Cape York, where the ice pack had jammed in against the coast, forcing a detour of about eighteen or twenty miles to reach the Bushnan Islands, which lie east of the headland.

The passage across Melville Bay was confronted with almost as much difficulty as in going north. It was realized that as much care was to be taken to reach and hold a place in the open water

as when passing the other way. Icebergs had lost their terror, however, for us now, as we had used them so often as a barrier against the drifting floes, or as secure moorings when all else appeared to be moving. Ramming the ice was of daily occurrence. The *Thetis* and *Bear* had shown great capacity for this work, but an experience of the *Thetis* on the afternoon of June 29th, when about sixty or seventy miles to the southeast of Cape York, in attempting to force a passage through some stubborn ice, resulting in knocking everyone down on deck and nearly throwing the commander from the "crow's-nest," suggested that it would be wiser to wait for the winds and tide to do their work. Sebree resecured the rudder-head, injured in clearing a false lead in Melville Bay on the way north during the delay this stubborn obstruction occasioned.

On the following day, June 30th, the change of wind to the east caused the ice to ease off to the westward, leaving open leads in which, however, there were strings of tough ice through which the relief ships rammed their way toward the Devil's Thumb and the Sugar Loaf Mountain, in sight on the Greenland coast north of the Duck Islands. It was felt that the worst of the dangers had been passed, although there were yet two hundred miles or more of ice to be worked through.

Late on the afternoon of June 30th the *Alert* and *Loch Garry* were sighted from the "crow's-nest," beset in the pack off the Devil's Thumb, in latitude 74° 30' north, exposed to the dangers of the Melville Bay ice. It was early in the season for a vessel of the *Alert's* small engine power to have worked so far along in the pack, hampered as she was by the iron collier, *Loch Garry*. Much credit was due to Commander Coffin for the energy and courage he had shown in venturing so early within this zone of danger with a vulnerable collier. Commander Coffin's report to the commander on his arrival near the *Alert*, showed how continuous the work of himself, his officers and men, had been to advance safely in the face of such difficulties, and often how rapidly ice-docks had to be resorted to, in order to save the *Loch Garry* from being crushed in nips.

As soon as all details of the rescue had been explained, and the plans for the return of the vessels arranged with Coffin and Emory, the relief squadron set out for Upernavik with the *Thetis*

leading. The wind being from the southward, and the tide flooding, all leads were closed up, and to these difficulties a dense fog was added, which arrested any further movement to the south. This fact obliged the squadron to anchor to the floe ice until the conditions should change.

From this moment until the squadron's arrival at Upernavik in the forenoon of July 2d, there had been several changes in the *places* of the ships, with a view to facilitating their passage of the ice. The *Thetis*, being the most powerful ice-breaker, was in the lead of the column, the *Bear*, usually next, was assigned to different positions, as the *Alert* or *Loch Garry* was found to do better following closely the *Thetis*, or, if jammed by the ice closing in the wake of the leader, the *Bear* could best break them out. After a tedious passage, winding in and out among icebergs and through leads in the floes over this dangerous uncharted region, the *Bear* had the misfortune to strike another group of rocks and to injure her sore fore-foot still further; but after a couple of hours of work she was pulled off by the *Thetis* and *Alert*. Her leak had increased only a very small amount from this second misadventure, so it gave no serious concern.

During the passage from Cape Sabine to Upernavik the rescued members of the Greely party improved with each day, except poor Elison, whose condition grew graver. The manifestation of symptoms of blood poisoning, originating in the limbs that had been frozen, gave the attending surgeons serious alarm. The hope to be able to bring him home alive, alas, was not to be realized. On the passage through Melville Bay, as strength was gained physically and mentally little by little, the story of the experiences of the sufferers during those last months at the wreck camp *cache* was gathered together. It was a wonderful story of heroic incidents, and still more heroic deaths, in the face of Arctic desolation.

Whether the Lady Franklin Bay expedition accomplished much or little, or whether it was wise to venture beyond regions ordinarily accessible, matters not; the heroic courage with which its brave fellows faced all perils, even that of the last enemy, will live in the song and verse of the language.

On arriving in the vicinity of Upernavik, where the anchoring ground was limited, the *Alert* and *Loch Garry* were directed to

proceed onward to Godhaven to await the arrival of the *Thetis* and the *Bear*. In going north, a quantity of coal had been landed at Upernavik as a reserve, and as soon as this was taken on board and the Eskimo pilot discharged, a good-by was said to Governor Elborg and the settlement at Upernavik on the afternoon of July 3d. As the relief ships steamed out of the harbor, the Governor honored their departure with a salute of six guns, which had to be acknowledged by steam whistles and by dipping the colors as there were no cannon on board.

Although the ice had not disappeared, the passage south was not much interrupted as far as the Waigat Straits. The day following was July 4th, our natal day as a nation, and at noon, although it was snowing, the national flags were displayed at the mastheads. Passing Waigat Straits the ice was left behind, and with it the sensation of striking and butting the pack ice to which all hands had grown so accustomed in the 1,300 miles of work in the ice-fields which had been passed through. It must be admitted that it took some time to become used to the ships in passing into the open sea, where the rising and falling of waves was a more familiar and agreeable movement. The *Thetis* and *Bear* arrived at Godhaven on the early morning of July 5th, and rejoined the *Alert* and *Loch Garry*. At this time, poor Elison's condition had become so grave that the surgeons, after consultation, decided that the only chance for his life was to amputate his feet first and, after a sufficient interval, when the patient had recovered from the shock, his hands. Exposure to extraordinary conditions for the long interval at Cape Sabine, together with the depletion of his reserve of strength owing to lack of proper food, had done its fatal work, and, despite the skill and care of the surgeons, poor Elison died quietly and apparently unconscious the third day after the operation.

Christiansen, the Eskimo, who had perished during the winter at Cape Sabine, was buried at Disco in accordance with the desire of Inspector Andersen, who received the body at the landing, accompanied the funeral cortege to the little church and afterward to the little cemetery, where an Eskimo minister committed the body to the tomb after an eloquent and beautifully simple discourse.

The injury to the rudder of the *Thetis* had been repaired

only temporarily in Melville Bay and was too serious to venture to sea without shipping in its place the spare one on board. The smooth water in the completely landlocked harbor of Godhaven facilitated the operation of unshipping the old and shipping the spare rudder and was improved for this purpose while certain necessary repairs to the *Alert's* engines were being made by her own mechanics. The 9th of July, the day appointed for the departure for St. John's, came and, at six o'clock in the morning, the relief squadron, after delivering some two hundred rations to the inspector to relieve a stress brought about by the non-arrival of the usual supply ship from Denmark, bade farewell to the kindly Greenlanders and sailed away.

Passing the latitude of Cape Farewell and over on the Labrador side in the polar current, which sets south, the squadron fell in with and passed a large number of stately icebergs, as they floated majestically onward to the warmer waters of the Atlantic about Cape Race. During clear weather the scene was superb, as the glints of sunlight were reflected in prismatic colors in the halo of the mist about them. But during foggy weather these monsters constituted a danger which required constant vigilance to avoid. Fortunately, however, we had learned something about icebergs during the weeks passed in their company in the ice regions, where, as they were moved about, it was observed that they dropped off patches of ice which strung out from them and were known as "tailings." When these "tailings" were met going south in fogs a sheer of the helm always carried the ships clear.

Off the Funk Islands a gale sprang up in the night, accompanied by a heavy fog, separating the *Thetis* and *Bear* from the *Alert*. Although the speed of the squadron had been reduced to two or three knots an hour, and the steam whistles were sounded to keep touch with each other, the *Alert* fell astern and could not be picked up the next evening at the appointed rendezvous, twenty-five miles northeast of Cape Spear. From the Funk Islands onward to St. John's the fog was dense. The course of the relief squadron carried it directly on to a rock-bound, dangerous coast, and this fact obliged the most cautious navigation.

On the morning of July 17th the town clock in St. John's

was heard striking nine, and as there was only one place immediately opposite the narrow opening where the clock could be heard outside, the *Thetis* was headed directly for this opening. Within ten minutes she was in the entrance within plain sight of the town and passed in out of the dense fog bank.

Before sailing from New York, it was realized that the news which the relief squadron was to bring back would be anxiously awaited. An arrangement had been made through Mr. Cyrus W. Field to the effect that if the squadron should return in the fall, or if it should be sighted to the north of St. John's at any time, the cable to New York should be held by the agent at St. John's so as to give despatches to the Government the preference over all others referring to the squadron's work, or the news it was to bring of the missing expedition. This arrangement was made and faithfully kept. The first telegram sent that morning was one to Washington, as follows:

ST. JOHN'S, N. F., July 17, 1884.

HON. WM. E. CHANDLER,
Secretary of the Navy,
Washington, D. C.:

Thetis, *Bear*, and *Loch Garry* arrived here to-day from West Greenland, all well, separated from *Alert* yesterday 150 miles north. At 9 P. M., June 22d, five miles west of Cape Sabine, in Smith Sound, *Thetis* and *Bear* rescued, alive, Lieutenant A. W. Greely, Sergeant Brainard, Sergeant Fredericks, Sergeant Long, Hospital Steward Bierderbick, Sergeant Elison, and Private Connell, the only survivors of the Lady Franklin Bay Expedition.

Sergeant Elison had lost both hands and feet by frost bite, and died at Godhaven, July 8th, three days after amputation, which had become imperative. Seventeen of the twenty-five persons composing the expedition perished by starvation at the Point where found; one was drowned while seeking to procure food. Twelve bodies of the dead were recovered and are now on board the *Thetis* and *Bear*. One Eskimo, Frederick, was buried at Disco in accordance with the desire of the Inspector of North Greenland. Five bodies buried on the ice foot near the camp were swept away to sea by winds and currents before my arrival and could not be recovered.

Names of the dead recovered with date of death as follows: Sergeant Cross, January 18, 1884; Frederick, Eskimo, April 5th; Sergeant Linn, April 6th; Lieutenant Lockwood, April 9th; Sergeant Jewell, April 12th; Private Ellis, May 19th; Sergeant Ralston, May 23d; Private Whistler, May 24th; Sergeant Israel, May 27th; Lieutenant Kislingbury, June 1st; Private Henry, June 6th; Private Schneider, June 18th. Names of the dead buried on the ice foot, with date of death, whose bodies were not recovered, as follows: Sergeant

Rice, April 6, 1884; Corporal Salor, June 3d; Private Bender, June 6th; A. A. Surgeon Pavy, June 6th; Sergeant Gardiner, June 12th. Drowned by breaking through newly formed ice while sealing: Jens Edwards, Eskimo, April 24th. I would urgently suggest that bodies now on board be placed in metallic cases here for safe and better transportation in a seaway. This appears to me imperative.

Greely abandoned Fort Conger August 9, 1883, reached Baird Inlet September 29th following, with party all well. Abandoned all his boats and was adrift for thirty days on ice floe in Smith's Sound. His permanent camp was established October 21, 1883, at point where he was found. During nine months this party had to live upon a scant allowance of food brought from Fort Conger, that cached at Payer Harbor and Cape Isabella by Sir George Nares, in 1875, but found much damaged by lapse of time; that cached by Beebe at Cape Sabine in 1882; and the small amount saved from the wreck of the *Proteus* in 1883, and landed by Lieutenants Garlington and Colwell on beach where Greely's party was found camped. When these provisions were consumed, party was forced to live upon boiled sealskin strips from their sealskin clothing, lichens and shrimps procured in good weather when they were strong enough to make exertion. As 1500 shrimps were required to fill a gill measure, the labor was too exhausting to depend upon them to sustain life entirely.

Channel between Cape Sabine and Littleton Island did not close, on account of violent gales, all winter; so that 240 rations at latter point could not be reached. All Greely's records and all instruments brought by him from Fort Conger are recovered and are on board.

From Hare Island to Smith's Sound I had a constant and furious struggle with ice. Impassable floes and solid barriers were overcome by watchfulness and patience; no opportunity to advance a mile escaped me, and for several hundred miles ships were forced to ram their way from lead to lead through ice ranging in thickness from three to seven feet and, where rafted, much greater.

Thetis and *Bear* reached Cape York June 18th after passage of twenty days in Melville Bay, with two advance ships of the Dundee whaling fleet, and continued to Cape Sabine. Returning seven days later, fell in with seven others of the fleet off Wostenholme Island, and announced Greely's rescue to them that they might not be delayed from their fishing grounds nor tempted into the dangers of Smith's Sound in view of the reward of \$25,000 offered by Congress.

Returning across Melville Bay, fell in with *Alert* and *Loch Garry* off Devil's Thumb, struggling through heavy ice. Commander Coffin did admirably to get so far along with transport so early in the season, before an opening had occurred. Lieutenant Emory with the *Bear* has supported me throughout with great skillfulness and unflinching readiness in accomplishing the great duty of relieving Greely. I would ask instructions about the *Loch Garry* as the charter party held by her master differs in several important particulars from mine.

Greely party are much improved in health since rescue, but condition was critical in extreme when found and for some days after. Forty-eight

hours' delay in reaching them would have been fatal to all now living. Season north is late and closest for years. Kane Sea was not open when I left Cape Sabine. Winter about Melville Bay most severe for thirty years.

This great result is entirely due to the prompt action and unwearied energy of yourself and Secretary of War in fitting this expedition for the work it has had the honor to accomplish.

W. S. SCHLEY, *Commander.*

This telegram was transmitted to the Secretary of the Navy, who, at the time, was at West Point, on the Hudson, and replied to it as follows:

July 17, 1884.

Commander W. S. SCHLEY:

Receive my congratulations and thanks for yourself and your whole command for your prudence, perseverance, and courage in reaching our dead and dying countrymen. The hearts of the American people go out with great affection to Lieutenant Greely and the few survivors of his deadly peril. Care for them unremittingly and bid them be cheerful and hopeful on account of what life has yet in store for them. Preserve tenderly the heroic dead; prepare them according to your judgment and bring them home.

WILLIAM E. CHANDLER,
Secretary of the Navy.

The news of the expedition's successful search was soon flashed over the country and throughout the world, and before the sun had set that day hundreds of telegrams from the chambers of commerce of the several large cities and from many prominent national and State officials were received congratulating the expedition upon its splendid work. All day long the ships were visited by the kind people of St. John's, anxious to say one word to the rescued of the pleasure they felt that good fortune had favored the expedition in reaching them in time. Sir John Glover, the governor, and Lady Glover, together with the other officials and principal residents of St. John's, were bountiful in their courtesy and attention. During the week of the relief ships' stay in port, it would have been impossible to find time to accept the many invitations to dinners, dances, receptions, and teas tendered to the officers and men by those hospitable people. Our consul, Mr. Molloy, and his wife took Greely under their hospitable roof for a few days.

On the 26th, when the squadron sailed from St. John's for home, it was escorted out of port by a fleet of steam vessels of

all sizes loaded down with the kind islanders, who took this method of testifying their great interest and respect for those who had been rescued. When the relief ships were well out toward Cape Spear, the accompanying fleet passed in succession around the relief squadron, sounding their whistles, dipping their flags as a salute, and giving it a farewell cheer on its way home.

It was the intention to reach Portsmouth, N. H., on the 2d of August, reasonable allowance having been made for the contrary southwesterly winds, usual in the summer along the North American coast; but after passing Cape Race the wind shifted into the east and, blowing fresh for a day or two, set the squadron a day ahead of the time announced to arrive. Nearing the harbor, it was observed that the North Atlantic Squadron, Rear Admiral S. B. Luce, commanding, reinforced by the Training Squadron, were at anchor in the lower harbor. On arriving within the port, it was learned that the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief Signal Officer of the Army were present to greet and give official welcome to the survivors. The presence of the North Atlantic Squadron was to give evidence of the honor felt throughout the service at the distinguished success of its representatives in the relief squadron.

During the brief stay of three or four days the relief ships attracted much attention from the many visitors from all parts of the country. The city of Portsmouth honored the occasion by extending the freedom of the city to the officers and men of the relief ships, and by giving a grand civic reception to the rescued and rescuers, which grew into an enthusiastic ovation as the procession of bluejackets and marines and citizen soldiery passed through its streets. At night a formal public reception was tendered the officers and men of the relief squadron by the city officials. Senator Eugene Hale, General B. F. Butler, Secretary W. E. Chandler, and other distinguished officials present made eloquent and touching addresses of welcome and congratulation.

On August 5th the squadron sailed for New York under the secretary's instructions, and not long after passing Cape Ann was enveloped in a dense fog which lasted almost without interruption until Fire Island light was sighted, in consequence of

which the squadron was delayed more than twenty-four hours in reaching New York, where it arrived on the morning of August 8th. As the squadron approached Governor's Island, the military headquarters of the Department of the East, it was received with a salute of twenty-one guns from Fort Columbus. The bodies of the rescued dead were delivered to Major General Winfield Scott Hancock, commanding; the Secretary of War, the Hon. Robert T. Lincoln; Lieutenant General Philip H. Sheridan, Brigadier General Wm. B. Hazen, Commodore T. Scott Fillebrown, and many other distinguished officers being present. The bodies were received by a battery of the Fourth and one of the Fifth Artillery, and a salute of minute guns.

The work of the relief ships having been concluded, they proceeded to the Navy-Yard, where they were put out of commission, the officers detached, and the crews discharged.

During the year 1886 the Legislature of Maryland spread upon its journal a "joint resolution of thanks," and voted a gold chronometer watch, bearing a beautiful inscription of its appreciation of this service of the commander, who was a resident of that commonwealth. The Massachusetts Humane Society awarded the commander a first-class gold medal, to express its approval of the duty done in saving life.

CHAPTER XVIII

CHIEF OF BUREAU IN WASHINGTON

1885-1889

A FEW days before the relief ships went out of commission President Arthur came to New York, taking quarters at the Fifth Avenue Hotel, where the commander and other officers of the three relief ships were received in special audience, being presented to his Excellency by the Hon. Wm. E. Chandler, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Hon. Robert T. Lincoln, Secretary of War, under whose joint supervision the expedition had been equipped for the work it had just completed so triumphantly. President Arthur thanked the officers and men, and added those of the nation, for their zealous devotion, and for their successful performance of the duties with which he had charged them. After a pleasant chat of a half hour, he informed the commander that he had directed the secretary to promote him to the position of chief of the Bureau of Equipment and Recruiting in the Navy Department, just vacated by the assignment of Rear Admiral Earl English to the European station. At the same time, the President informed the commander that he had instructed the secretary to give to Commander Coffin and to Lieutenant Emory any duty they preferred as most pleasing to them commensurate with their rank.

This information, so far as it related to the commander, came with so much surprise that, in thanking the President, he stammered in effect the suggestion that he was being rewarded far beyond what his services merited. The President, with great courtliness and dignity, replied that he believed he was the better judge, and that he only wished the law permitted him to reward the commander more substantially.

Coffin asked assignment to equipment duty at the Navy-Yard, New York, in order to afford to his beautiful young daughter

just budding into sweet maidenhood the advantages of the superior schools of that great metropolis.

Emory asked assignment to the command of the *Despatch*, used at that time as the President's yacht, but urged the point that he did not wish the command until the term of duty of his friend, Lieutenant Reeder, had expired.

Both assignments were ordered by the secretary as nearly coincident as possible with the commander's assignment as chief of the Bureau of Equipment and Recruiting. When the relief ships had been put out of commission, the officers and men were granted the respite they so much needed after the taxing strain and trying exposure of their duties in the fields of ice and snow in high northern latitudes.

The new field to which the President had assigned the commander embraced duties that were new and almost unknown to him. They were approached with some misgivings, lest this post of honor, with its multifarious ramifications, might transcend the business capacity of the new appointee; but some comfort was derived from the secretary's assurance that he had full faith that the new duties would be fulfilled as acceptably as those which had passed into history with such credit to the Navy. The duties, as well as the personnel, of the bureau had to be studied with some care before changes could be made, or its systems of business modified in any particular. In time, however, the laws governing the administration of its business had become familiar and the scale of worth of the clerks had been decided. Some changes in duties took place for the better transaction of the bureau's business, but no changes in the personnel were necessary.

A notable feature which first impressed the new chief was the absence of any plan of indexing, recording and filing the bureau's large correspondence of many thousands of letters received annually, embracing almost every subject, with a view to readily recall what had been done. It was not possible to remember the action taken in many thousands of cases; therefore a system had to be devised, or borrowed, by which the settlement reached in all cases could be expeditiously turned to, with all the papers referring to the subject.

Some months of inquiry and examination resulted in the adop-

tion of a scheme which made the indexing, numbering, filing and recording of this voluminous correspondence so simple that only a few moments were necessary to decide what the bureau's action upon any matter had been, and the exact spot where hands could be laid upon it.

In the fall of the year 1884 the presidential election took place, the contest being between the Hon. Grover Cleveland, Democrat, and the Hon. James G. Blaine, Republican. The contest was one of unusual activity and excitement, and much as it was to be regretted, personalities and abuse of both candidates increased as the campaign advanced. The result was a defeat of the Republican candidate, whose brilliant, magnetic personality and commanding connection with the policy and politics of his party for thirty years had made him hosts of friends as well as enemies. Mr. Cleveland was inaugurated on the 4th of March, 1885, and the Hon. W. C. Whitney succeeded the Hon. W. E. Chandler as Secretary of the Navy. Long control of the Government by the Republican party and the supposed excesses growing up under it, led to an investigation of the affairs in the Navy Department, but revealed nothing wrong in the administration of its responsibilities.

The construction of the new Navy, begun in 1882 under the Republican administration, was advanced and given additional impetus under President Cleveland, during whose administration a number of formidable vessels were added to the Navy list. The bureau's connection with these new vessels embraced everything relating to their rigging, galley and furniture, anchors, chains, sails, awnings, hangings and furnishings of officers' quarters, coal, enlistment of men, and many other details connected with the outfits of naval supplies and stores for them.

With the demand for increased space in the new vessels came also the need of reducing the weight of outfits carried and a decrease in the sizes of all rigging supporting spars which forced the substitution of steel where iron had formerly been used. The specifications setting forth the physical characteristics of this newer material, possessing the minimum of size with the maximum of strength, occasioned some friction between the department officials and the manufacturers, who, in some instances, expressed the belief that what the department demanded could not

be produced in the United States. Some ventured the opinion that the department officials did not know anything of the difficulties to be met in making what was required under the high standards specified. In plainer English, some thought these department officials "didn't know what they were talkin' about." It resulted that the manufacturers produced the material required, and it was not long before they were asking for harder conditions still, and met them with the same skill and promptness.

Under the administration of Mr. Whitney the matter of uniforming the men of the service was suggested, the idea prominent in the suggestion being to cheapen the outfit to the men as well as to standardize the colorings of cloths used in the Navy uniform, and to simplify the system of the grade marks that the ranks of the non-commissioned petty officers might be more easily distinguished; in other words, to adopt a smart uniform for the men as a means to better discipline to grow out of their increased self-respect in wearing it. A board of officers was ordered by Mr. Whitney to consider the matter and to report the conclusions reached, which were in effect in accordance with the suggestions made at the outset of the matter. A fully illustrated book of regulations of the uniform was published, containing plates, grade marks, colors of all articles, and every essential needed to standardize the uniform for officers and men.

On the 26th of June, 1885, President Cleveland directed the chief of equipment and recruiting to perform, in addition to his own duties, those of the chief of the Bureau of Provisions and Clothing. This assignment naturally brought under review the living conditions of the men on board ship and the consideration of the component elements of the Navy ration, which for many years had varied little. The improvements and variety in the systems of preparing and preserving meats, vegetables, flours, milks, etc., then in vogue, gave larger scope to interpret what was meant by preserved meats, or flours, or vegetables, in the law which specified these elements. The purpose in view was to include many things which the newer preparations made available, in order that the diet supplied by the Government to its sailors might be more palatable and nutritious because it was more varied. It was not alone in this one direction that inter-

est was manifested in the sailor's welfare. The law which allowed honorably discharged men the advantage of three months' pay, as if continuously in service, reënlisting for three years within three months from the date of discharge, appeared to justify the effort to secure for such men the privilege of living on board receiving-ships whenever they might elect during this period, subject to existing regulations, a ration to be authorized each day while so living.

To encourage the habit of thrift and saving among the crews of ships, and, as well, to throw around them the protecting care of the Government, Congress was asked to and did enact the law authorizing enlisted men to deposit all earnings they might save with the paymaster of the ship in which they were serving, the Government allowing interest at 4 per cent. per annum upon all sums so deposited, to be paid upon discharge of the men. To encourage the young apprentice who entered the service intending it to be his career, and to avoid the discouragement of a load of debt for outfit of clothing in beginning his service, Congress granted an outfit of clothes not to exceed in value \$40. This amount was sufficient to clothe the lad on beginning his service. Supplementing this by one ration a day, the beginner immediately began to earn a small daily stipend.

It was held, too, that in a republican government there should be no discrimination against the advancement to any position the lad might be able to attain; that the restriction which limited the promotion of seamen to the grade of warrant officer should be removed, to permit the worthy to pass from the fore-castle to the quarter-deck annually in certain limited numbers. This view was sustained by the fact that, in the monarchical countries of Europe, it was possible for the enlisted man to attain commissioned grades through some heroic devotion to duty whereby the country's glory was enhanced.

In the Army this recognition of merit had long been the rule; hence the discrimination against the Navy appeared only the more unjust. Letters were written to the chairman of the Naval Committee, at that time the Hon. Hilary A. Herbert, afterward Secretary of the Navy, with the approval of President Cleveland and Secretary Whitney, advocating legislation to this end; but service opposition to the measure at that period overthrew action

and it was not until the Spanish-American war occurred and the splendid work of the "men behind the guns" became world-renowned, that the needed legislation was had removing the barrier. It was suggested, too, in the interest of a higher efficiency, and to attach men to the Navy in that same sense of loyalty as the officer, to pension them after a certain term of continuous service when no longer able to work. This was all the more important from the fact that their companions in arms in the Army enjoyed this bounteous provision of a grateful Government when full of years honorably served for home and country. This legislation occurred as well after the war of 1898 had attracted the nation's attention to the value of the sailor's service to his country. Be it said to the honor of these noble public servants that the flag in their keeping has never gone down in defeat from 1776 to 1898.

These things, to the advantage of the men, were advocated a little before the Navy, usually conservative, was ready for them; but there was so much confidence felt in the spirit of fairness of the American people and their dignified common sense in adopting all questions when fairly presented that the earlier advocate felt sure that success was merely a matter of time.

With the new ships building for the Navy, wherein "coal-whips" had replaced "tacks and sheets," it was apparent that a change in the system of educating men for this change was at hand. To meet this new condition, a school of instruction was established at the Washington Navy-Yard, and at the torpedo station at Newport. One hundred and fifty men annually were sent to these schools, to become familiar with gun construction and to acquire skill in the manufacture and handling of auxiliary engines used for so many purposes on board modern ships. At Newport their instruction embraced high explosives, torpedoes, the management and control of dynamos, electric lighting, the care, preservation and manufacture of gun-cotton, nitro-glycerine, etc. The year of instruction being concluded they were graded in merit as seaman-gunners, passing back into the general service, where farther advancement depended upon practical competence, reliability and good conduct.

From this beginning infinite good to the service has resulted

and much of the high efficiency of its enlisted personnel is due. It is a matter of deep satisfaction, in the later years of life, to have been identified with measures of such vital consequences in bettering some of the conditions in the life of the enlisted men of the service, and to have helped in improving the status under which they serve; for, after all, it is on their skill behind the gun, or before the furnace, that we are to depend for victory in the combats of the future.

The business connections of the bureau and a residence in Washington necessarily brought its chief into personal and official relations with many of the prominent men of that period. It broadened the horizon of observation and enlarged opportunities for observing men and motives in the great arena of political life. As a center, Washington is the Mecca of all Americans. Most of the distinguished statesmen of the country and men of eminence in the various professions, as well as the noted men in the naval and military services, are met in the Capital. Kings and queens of other countries are not visitors, though princes representing the royal houses of Europe have visited the city.

Foreigners of almost every other grade have been visitors to study our methods and customs and to contrast them with those of older peoples of Europe. The science of popular government in full operation is there to be witnessed by them, and from time to time it has been discussed in the foreign monthlies, not always in fairness. But the nation has grown so phenomenally great in numbers, in wealth and in culture, that it invites critical comparison with composure.

It surely is the one place in America where discussions of business, or the price of stocks, are fully intermixed with all the other subjects that are interesting to the people. As an intellectual center it attracts the scientific men of the nation and world. Its museums and galleries are replete with subjects for the student of art and science and literature.

It was the chief's privilege to meet and know at different times the notable men of civil and military life living in Washington or who visited it. The list included a large number of those who had been prominent in Congress, in the Cabinets, in the great departments, and in the sister military service.

Among these latter were Generals Sherman, Sheridan, Hancock, Schofield, Miles, Johnston, Longstreet, Gordon, and many others who had distinguished themselves in the great Civil War; and, in his own profession, its foremost captains, like Admirals Porter, Worden, Jouett, Roe, Rodgers, and many others who had won renown. At close range all these men were accessible, pleasing in conversation, interesting in relating experiences, simple in their modes of life, and forceful in character. At their entertainments there were gathered about the tables the most distinguished men and women of the day.

On one occasion an incident recalled to General Sheridan the anniversary of the battle of Five Forks, and his charmingly simple admission astonished one of the party. He was asked what his sensations were in that fierce onslaught when the air seemed filled with whizzing bullets. This lion-hearted little warrior, the Murat of the Civil War, replied that "if anybody supposed he liked it, or was undisturbed in that or any other fight in which he had taken part, it was a mistake! 'Why, my heart used to thump pretty hard, and I think it was about the same with us all!'" Bayard Taylor says, "The bravest are the tenderest, the loving are the daring." He could have said, the real hero is always simple, always modest, always truthful.

During the writer's service in Washington he had frequent opportunities to meet and to know and admire General Sheridan, as did every one who came within his range; and when he passed over into the shades of the other shore at Nonquit, Mass., in August, 1888, the nation was in mourning, so profoundly had he graven his name and his fame on the hearts of the people.

In the term of service in Washington, another presidential election came round, with President Cleveland the Democratic and General Benjamin Harrison the Republican candidates, resulting in General Harrison's election. Being in the caldron of politics at that time, though in no way connected with the issues, the writer saw political excitement run up to the high-water mark. The personalities of the previous campaign were discarded and discouraged, much to the satisfaction of the leaders of both factions; and when the election was decided all excitement disappeared the day following and the people quietly returned to business.

On the 4th of March, 1889, President Harrison was inaugurated, and General B. F. Tracy, of New York, replaced Mr. Whitney as Secretary of the Navy. Mr. Tracy was a distinguished lawyer of New York; his great reputation and high personal character had preceded him. Like most laymen, in taking up the cares and responsibilities of a technical department, he entertained some misgivings as to his capacity to master the duties of this important place, except with the loyal help of his commodores, as chiefs of bureaus were then known. During a call made upon him at the Hotel Arno the day after his arrival, he intimated this doubt, but when the suggestion was made that he would find no difficulties in his way, if he studied to be as good a judge as he was an advocate, he seemed to derive more confidence. Mr. Tracy, like Mr. Whitney, was an excellent secretary, and left an abiding impression upon the Navy, which they both did so much to build up to a greatness commensurate with that of the nation.

As the chief of the Bureau of Equipment had striven hard, working with conscientious devotion to the duties of his office for more than four years, helping three secretaries with all his energy to equip and fit for active service the new vessels appearing from month to month, the desire to get back to the sea life and in touch with the changing conditions developing in it impelled him to ask for service on that element where so many years had been spent. His desire was supplemented by considerations of a personal nature which were pleaded for the relief sought. The secretary kindly considered them.

The writer had been promoted in April of 1888 to the lineal grade of captain by President Cleveland, and in September of that year was renominated and confirmed as chief of bureau for another term of four years. But after the accession of Secretary Tracy a high sense of loyalty to him prompted a retention of the office until the new secretary had acquired perfect familiarity with the duties of the bureaus, before carrying into effect the understanding reached when the new assignment was requested.

On June 21, 1889, the following letter was addressed tendering resignation of the office:

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Bureau Equipment and Recruiting,
WASHINGTON, D. C.,
June 21, 1889.

Sir: For reasons of a personal nature already explained to you, I have the honor to tender my resignation as Chief of this Bureau, to take effect July 31, 1889.

I avail myself of this occasion to thank you for the uniform courtesy and confidence accorded to me during our association, and to wish your administration the best and fullest success.

With high regard,

Your obedient servant,

W. S. SCHLEY,
Chief of Bureau.

Hon. B. F. TRACY,
Secretary of the Navy.

Four days after this communication had reached the secretary the latter addressed the following letter to the chief of bureau:

NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.,
June 25, 1889.

Sir: I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 21st instant, tendering your resignation as Chief of the Bureau of Equipment and Recruiting in the Navy Department, to take effect July 31 next.

In complying with your wish to leave the Navy Department for personal reasons which, in conversation, you have fully explained to me, I hereby accept your resignation as Chief of the Bureau of Equipment and Recruiting, to take effect July 31 next.

In so doing I wish to express to you the kindly feeling which has attended our mutual relations and duties, and to assure you of my regret that an intercourse so pleasantly begun should be so soon terminated.

If you have any choice as to your immediate future employment, I shall be glad to meet your views, so far as practicable, in your assignment to duty.

With every wish for your success in the various positions to which your future naval career may carry you, and with renewed assurances of my esteem and respect,

Believe me, my dear Commodore,

Very truly yours,

B. F. TRACY,
Secretary of the Navy.

Commodore W. S. SCHLEY, U. S. N.,
Chief Bureau Equipment and Recruiting,
Navy Department.

In a conversation a few days afterward the secretary stated that he was not as familiar then as he hoped soon to be with

the officers of the Navy, intimating his desire for a suggestion from the retiring chief as to whom he had been considering a suitable successor. Without question or reserve, Captain George Dewey was named on account of his merit as an executive officer of long experience and his high professional character. His familiarity with business methods and his acquaintance with business men, growing out of his service as naval secretary of the Lighthouse Board, fitted him in an especial degree for this post. Whether the suggestion was influential or had any weight is unknown, but Dewey was named for the place and relieved the retiring chief on the 31st of July, 1889.

In the interval between the date of the retiring chief's first conversations with the secretary and his letter of resignation several interviews were had with him relating to the assignment most preferred. The cruiser *Baltimore*, then nearing completion at the William Cramp & Sons' shipbuilding works at Philadelphia, having been named for the commercial metropolis of Maryland, it was believed that it would gratify the people of the State if a son of Maryland was assigned to command her. Mr. Tracy assented immediately to this view, and supplemented the decision with the statement that, as the *Baltimore* was in all respects an up-to-date ship, she should make the cruise preferred by her commander. As a new vessel of high power and great speed, it was thought wiser to keep her on the Atlantic coast for a few months to test thoroughly her machinery, guns and equipments before leaving for a cruise around the world, as originally intended. Orders to her commander were issued the day following the secretary's letter accepting the retiring chief's resignation, as follows:

NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.,

June 26, 1889.

Sir: Upon the termination of your duties as Chief of the Bureau of Equipment and Recruiting on the 31st of July next, you will proceed to the works of Messrs. Cramp and Sons, Philadelphia, Pa., and report by letter to the commandant of the Navy Yard, League Island, Pa., for the command of the U. S. S. *Baltimore*.

Very respectfully,

B. F. TRACY,

Secretary of the Navy.

Commodore W. S. SCHLEY, U. S. N.,
Chief Bureau Equipment and Recruiting,
Navy Department,
Washington, D. C.

CHAPTER XIX

ERICSSON'S BODY TAKEN TO STOCKHOLM

1890

IN conformity with the secretary's order, the newly appointed commander of the *Baltimore* proceeded to Philadelphia on August 1st, and reported by letter to Captain H. B. Seeley, commandant of the League Island yard, for her command. In the interval before relinquishing the bureau, several informal conversations were had with Secretary Tracy, referring to the detail of the officers who were to serve in the cruiser. While the secretary was disposed to leave the matter of their selection to the commander, he suggested that, if it would be entirely agreeable, he would like to have Lieutenant Jas. H. Sears, son of his intimate friend, Mr. Charles Sears, of Binghamton, included in the list of the *Baltimore's* officers.* As Lieutenant Sears was an officer of excellent reputation and character, there could have been no objection to his detail. The executive, or aid to the commanding officer, being in closer touch and communication with the commander, was Lieutenant Commander

* Officers of the *Baltimore*:
Captain, W. S. Schley, Commanding.
Lt. Comdr., Uriel Sebree, Ex. Officer.
Lieut., Edward Sturdy, Navigator.
Lieut., Sidney H. May, Watch Officer.
Lieut., Henry McCrea, Watch Officer.
Lieut., Robt. M. Doyle, Watch Officer.
Lieut., Jas. H. Sears, Watch Officer.
Lieut., (Jr. grade) H. O. Dunn, Watch Officer.
Ensign, B. W. Wells, Captain's Secretary.
Ensign, W. S. Cloke.
Med. Ins., John H. Clarke, Surgeon.
P. A. Surgeon, Oliver Diehl.


Asst. Surgeon, E. R. Stitt.
Paymaster, W. W. Woodhull.
Chief Eng., Chas. E. DeValin.
P. A. Eng., C. P. Howell.
P. A. Eng., Wm. Rowbotham.
Asst. Eng., Geo. R. Salisbury.
Chaplain, J. P. McIntyre.
Captain, H. Clay Fisher, U. S. M. C.
Naval Cadets, J. B. Patton, W. D. McDougall, Philip Williams, Julius Prochazka, George L. Fermier, John R. Edie, L. H. Everhart, L. H. Moses, C. B. Price.
Gunner, P. Hanley.
Carpenter, J. S. Waltemeyer.

Uriel Sebree, who had served as executive officer of the *Thetis* in the Greeley relief expedition of 1884. His great ability and good judgment contributed in no small degree to success on that occasion. The cruise in the *Baltimore* added new laurels to his worth as an officer; the excellent order and happiness of the ship were due in large measure to his tact and sound judgment.

Sebree reported for duty soon after the commander. Together, with overalls, we inspected the ship, studied and familiarly learned it from double bottoms to the military tops. For several weeks daily examinations were continued until the ship, her construction, every detail in her fittings, the lead and purpose of every pipe, the steering engines, with the lead of the steering-gear, the dynamos, including the electric system, the steam capstans, engines, boilers, distillers, magazines, draining systems, and in fact every feature of the ship was known absolutely and completely. In plainer English, the commander and Sebree knew the ship before she sailed from the shipyard as perfectly as an eel knows the channels of a river. It was believed then, as it is believed now, that a ship can not be efficiently commanded except her captain knows her absolutely from stem to stern, from keel to truck.

From the moment the commander came into contact with the members of the firm of Wm. Cramp & Sons, they were constant in their attention and kindnesses. They appointed the foreman of each of the departments of the work to accompany him daily in his inspections to point out and explain any matter needing explanation. Any suggestion from him which tended to increase her efficiency, or to simplify the details for easier handling of the ship, was accepted and acted on at once by the firm. They were proud of the ship, as they had every reason to be, for she was splendidly built and had been fitted out with unsparing hands. The remembrance of many kindnesses from this splendid firm will last among the pleasing memories and pleasant experiences of the commander's life.

The *Baltimore*, being completed before her battery had been entirely finished, was ordered into commission and left Philadelphia, January 13, 1890, for the navy-yard at Norfolk, where she arrived a day or two afterward. Her main battery had been sent from the gun factory at Washington, but there was



THE BALTIMORE.

some delay in its arrival, the cause for which was never ascertained. The moment the guns and carriages did turn up, little time was lost by the *Baltimore's* crew in getting them on board and in place. The secondary battery, having been manufactured by outside firms, got lost for a while in the official turns of red tape, though after a little search was found at the New York yard, possibly because somebody had forgotten to inform the manufacturer where the *Baltimore* was to be fitted out after she left the Cramps' shipyard.

When all these matters had been adjusted, the *Baltimore* went to sea on April 26th, with her battery, ammunition, and all stores on board, to make her final trial at sea off Cape Henry, Va., with the Board of Inspection. The first admiral's flag that she wore was that of Rear Admiral L. A. Kimberly, president of the board. She developed excellent seagoing qualities, carried her weights easily, and showed high speed. Returning to Hampton Roads, Va., orders were found directing her to proceed to Baltimore, in response to the request of Mayor Davidson, General Agnus, and other prominent citizens, that the people might be permitted to see and visit the cruiser named after their city.

On the 8th of May the *Baltimore* arrived in the harbor and anchored off Fort McHenry. From that day until the 14th of the same month, when she sailed, the ship remained open to the public, and it was estimated that one hundred thousand persons improved the opportunity to inspect the vessel. At the same time the citizens entertained the officers and men at banquets of unsurpassed magnificence, receptions, theatre parties, drives, excursions, etc. It was a gala week in the city, which is world-wide in fame for its generous and hospitable reception of guests. Surely no officer or man of the *Baltimore's* crew could ever forget the delicate attentions or the refined elegance of the entertainments formulated for their pleasure and extended so boundlessly by the good people of the Monumental City. Afterward it always marked an incident in the cruise from which most others were reckoned in fixing dates.

This delightful experience over, the *Baltimore* sailed for Key West, under orders for temporary service in the North Atlantic Station, arriving in that port on the 20th of May.

Admiral Gherardi shifted his flag to the cruiser on May 24th, and the following day sailed for Port Royal, S. C., spending a day off Jacksonville, Fla., in quarterly target practice, and arrived at his destination on the 28th; passing, after a few days' stay, to Charleston, S. C., off which port the squadron lay until the 8th of June. It was the first visit the commander had ever made to this historic city, so that there was much in the surrounding forts and defenses and the city itself to excite attention and interest. The ravages of war had disappeared, the city had regained its activity, its people were prosperous, happy, and unfailingly courteous in their warm and enthusiastic reception of the squadron's officers. Nothing was omitted by them to make the squadron's stay delightful and memorable in the short time spent among them.

During the passage to New York, where the squadron arrived the 12th of June, squadron evolutions were practised while good weather lasted, as it did for two or three days until after Cape Hatteras was passed. After that the weather became lowering, culminating in squally weather, accompanied by unusual manifestations of electric discharges, with violent rain, making it impossible at night to see anything except in the terrific flashes of lightning. Toward morning fog settled down over the waters, but soundings every half hour at slow speed brought the squadron, led by the flagship, up to the Sandy Hook lightship. From that point in to the anchorage off Tompkinsville was easily accomplished by a skilful New York pilot. Reaching the anchorage about 7 A. M., the anchor was eased down so noiselessly that the admiral was not awakened by it. Everything was so shut out by the fog and things were so quiet on board that when he did awake he had to inquire where the ship was.

Two of the eight guns of the *Baltimore's* main battery had been unfinished at the moment of sailing from Norfolk; hence orders were awaiting the admiral to send the ship to Norfolk to take them aboard. By the 22d of June this duty had been completed and the ship was back again in New York ready to continue her cruise along the coast to Bar Harbor, touching en route at Portland and Bath. At both these cities the squadron's arrival was an occasion of many festivities and much

rejoicing. The ships were open daily to visitors, who from 10 A. M. until late in the afternoon improved the occasion to visit and inspect the several vessels. Their arrival at Bath, on the Kennebec River, on July 12th, almost made a holiday. A welcome was rung out from the church bells of the city, the steamers in the river and the manufacturing establishments along its banks saluted with whistles and sirens, and the people along the water-front joined their huzzas to the chorus of joy over this stately squadron anchored within its hospitable harbor.

Several days were passed in this beautiful port enjoying the courtesies of its people, among whom General Thomas Hyde and General Sewall, afterward a candidate for the Vice-Presidency, the mayor, and others are recalled with delightful memories of those days.

Bar Harbor, the summer paradise of the coast, was in turn visited on the 18th, amid the same manifestations of pleasure. The season being at its height, this delightful resort was crowded with visitors from all parts of the country; and the invitations to entertainments included officers of the squadron. So kind and generous were the attentions extended to them, it was almost impossible to find time to keep up with the social demands of these hospitable entertainers.

From July 18th to August 4th the good people at Bar Harbor omitted no attention that would enhance the pleasures of the squadron. Amid all this gaiety orders came to proceed to New York to carry General Harrison, President of the United States, from that port to Boston. Only a short time after the *Baltimore* left Bar Harbor she ran into one of those dense fogs so common on that part of our coast in summer months; but as the date was specified when she must arrive at New York in order to coal up for her trip to Boston, it was necessary to maintain high speed, fog or no fog. All that night was passed on the bridge. Fortunately no accident from collision occurred, although one or two close shaves did take place. The cruiser reached New York safely on the 6th of August, coaled up and was ready to leave on the 9th, with the President and two or three members of his Cabinet, who reached the vessel about 3 o'clock that afternoon.

The President preferred the route through Long Island

Sound and over Nantucket Shoals, rather than outside around the South Shoal lightship, to Boston. This made necessary a passage through Hell Gate, which was considered a little dangerous for so large a ship; but, with twin screws to handle the vessel, there was no thought of danger. The passage was made as easily as a tug could have made it, and the *Baltimore* arrived off Nantucket at 7 A. M. Sunday, August 10th. On Monday morning, August 11th, at 9 o'clock, the cruiser was again under way, passing out of the sound by the south channel past Long Point, and arrived off the bar at Boston at 3 P. M., to await high water, an hour or two later, when she passed up the harbor amid great demonstrations of the people.

On the night of the cruiser's arrival the commander-in-chief and the commander dined with the President and his Cabinet at the Vendome. It was at this dinner that Secretary Tracy communicated to the commander the information that the *Baltimore* had been selected to carry the remains of John Ericsson back to Sweden, and that the date set for her departure was August 23d.

To prepare the *Baltimore* for the cruise it was necessary to sail at once for New York, where she arrived on August 15th, having made the passage through Long Island Sound and Hell Gate in order to gain every possible hour for filling up with coal, stores, etc., and to exchange all short-service men for those having longer terms to serve. The weather was tryingly hot; the sun beating down upon the steel sides of the vessel heated her to an almost insupportable degree. Men working in the bunkers, shut off from air, had to be relieved at short intervals to avoid exhaustion or prostration. Never, however, did a crew work with more will, or more earnestly, to get the ship ready in time for the duty assigned.

On the 22d of August, the day before that appointed to sail, the *Baltimore* dropped down to an anchorage off the Statue of Liberty. On the afternoon of August 23d the remains of John Ericsson were delivered to the commander for transportation to Sweden by Secretary Tracy, Colonel Church, Rear-Admiral John L. Worden, Rear Admiral Daniel L. Braine, and a deputation of Swedish citizens. Colonel Church, in a graceful address, extolled the services and career of the deceased in committing

his body to our care, which the commander received with expressions of the high sense in which the honor confided upon the officers and crew of the *Baltimore* was regarded.

The squadron of Admiral Walker, which had been directed to join in honoring the occasion, took up its position south of the *Baltimore's* anchorage in column, and, as the cruiser passed outward to sea, each ship of Admiral Walker's squadron fired a salute of twenty-one guns. The ships composing the squadron were the *Dolphin*, *Pensacola*, *Enterprise*, *Chicago*, *Atlanta*, *Yorktown* and *Despatch*. The noise of many guns, with the screaming of whistles and sirens of the river craft filling the harbor, and the drifting clouds of powder smoke, combined to produce a spectacle of wonderful effect. It was surely a worthy tribute to the distinguished inventor and builder of the *Monitor*.

The trip across was without special incident; the weather was mild, the sea smooth, and the winds were moderate. After reaching the waters of Denmark, it was necessary to anchor every night, as the pilots refused to be responsible after sundown, and from this cause the voyage to Stockholm was lengthened several days. Finally the cruiser reached her destination on September 12th, and cast anchor on the afternoon of that day in Stockholm harbor, not far from King Oscar's palace. From the sea to the city, a distance of fifty miles or more, the cruiser passed through a labyrinth of straits, some of which were narrow, winding her way to the "Venice of the North." The cruiser's sojourn was from September 12th until September 23d.

On the Sunday following arrival Eriesson's remains were formally delivered to Vice Admiral Peyron, who received them in behalf of Sweden with imposing ceremonials. A catafalque especially prepared and draped with black velvet ornamented with golden stars, was used to receive the casket, and as the funeral cortège passed from ship to shore, escorted by the cruiser's boats, with colors at half-staff, a salute of twenty-one minute guns was fired from the *Baltimore*. When the cortège reached the shore, the casket was received with royal honors by the Crown Prince, the Ministers of State, the Diplomatic Corps, various Swedish societies, the military about Stockholm and many thousands of citizens, and in this presence was reverently placed upon a draped catafalque erected to receive the remains. Here

an impressive funeral service was held in the presence of many thousands of the people, after which a military band played the national hymn of Sweden amid the salvos of a minute-gun salute fired near by.

When these beautiful and simple services were concluded, the casket, bearing all that was mortal of John Ericsson, was borne to the railway station to be placed upon a special train in waiting to carry it back to his native town. The route to the station was lined by thousands of people, who had gathered to pay the last earthly tribute of respect to their great countryman. Many years before Ericsson had left his country to seek his fortune and fame in the land of the stranger. He was poor and untitled, but ambitious. He was received back almost with royal honors, to be buried in the native soil, surrounded forever by the scenes of his younger days.

The day following King Oscar received the commander and his officers in special audience, during which he expressed the great satisfaction felt by himself and his people that the Government of the United States had so honored this great and eminent Swede and had so complimented his countrymen and country by sending his remains back to his home, with such graceful thoughtfulness, in the magnificent cruiser *Baltimore*. He invited the Minister, the Hon. W. W. Thomas; the commander, and all officers who could be spared from duty to dine with the royal family at Drottningholm the next day; the royal yacht to convey us from the city through the beautiful Lake Malar to this splendid palace built on its shore. King Oscar, with members of the royal family, accompanied by the Ministers of State and the United States Minister, visited the *Baltimore* on the 18th and lunched with the commander and his officers. Following this an exquisite banquet was tendered to the officers by the King's Cabinet, at which several hundred officers of the Army and Navy and many distinguished civilians were present, all of whom manifested the high appreciation felt throughout Sweden for the generous and courtly act of our Government in acceding so handsomely to the universal wish of the Swedish people to have the remains of the great Swede within the soil of his native land, honored by his fame and his eminent achievements as an engineer and inventor.

Every day the *Baltimore* remained in the harbor thousands of people visited her to inspect the place where the remains of their honored countryman had rested during the voyage over and to add their gratitude to that of the king's for this splendid tribute of honor from America to their nation.

On the 23d of September, just before the cruiser sailed for Kiel, the king presented a gold medal to the commander, a silver medal to each officer, and a bronze medal to each man of the *Baltimore's* crew, which he had caused to be struck to commemorate this occasion and this service. Two years afterward Congress, by resolution, authorized their acceptance. The run through the Baltic to Kiel was short, the cruiser arriving on the 25th of September, being detained by fog, so general in these waters during the summer and fall months.

On the way over to Stockholm it was found that the cruiser's bottom had fouled up considerably since her last docking, in March, the visit to Kiel having in view the facilities of that port, where every courtesy was met at the hands of the German Government and its officials. Only a day or two after the *Baltimore's* arrival, Prince Henry, the emperor's brother, opened his castle at Kiel to receive and entertain the commander and his officers during their stay. On the 28th he received the commander and his officers in special audience and entertained them at luncheon after calling in person on the 28th. A round of entertainment by the officers and civilians of Kiel followed while the *Baltimore* was in dock. It became the pleasure of the officers to meet his royal highness and the princess on several occasions and to entertain them on the cruiser before sailing. Both spoke English as fluently as we did ourselves and without any trace of accent whatever, which induced the suggestion that their royal highnesses must think in English. To this, Princess Irene replied that she wrote weekly letters to her majesty the Queen of England and Empress of India, her grandmother, and, in order that her children might be conversant with English, she and the prince usually talked to them in English, as they spoke German to their associates and to their governess at all times. There was no apprehension manifested that their German speech might be affected by this accomplishment in another language.

Captain von Diederich, then in daily anticipation of being

advanced to higher rank, was the superintendent of the dock yard, and entertained the commander and his officers at a handsome luncheon, where a number of prominent Germans were met. The occasion was conspicuous for the good feeling and kindly expressions of the host and his guests toward the great nation whose empire was far off towards the setting sun.

The United States consular agent, Mr. Sartori, a wealthy merchant of Kiel, extended every hospitality to the officers in his delightful home, where they were permitted to meet and mingle with German residents who were not of the official or military class. The canal, then being pushed forward, was inspected for a considerable distance.

To the commander, whose progenitors in the long ago were Germans from the principality of Bavaria, this visit to Kiel was an especial pleasure. It gave an opportunity to meet and know specimens of the brawn and muscle possessed by his German ancestors, who brought to the new home in America that striking sense of economy and love of order that made them influential citizens.

The *Baltimore's* stay at Kiel was terminated by orders to proceed to Copenhagen. She sailed on the afternoon of October 8th through the Belt past Elsinore, arriving off Copenhagen on the evening of October 9th in time to participate in a handsome reception given that evening by our Minister, Hon. Clarke E. Carr.

The King, Christian XII, received the commander and officers of the cruiser quite informally the day after her arrival, improving the occasion to invite them to dine with the royal family the next day at Bernstoff, their summer palace near Copenhagen. This dinner was simple but sumptuous, served in faultless taste, and lasted but little over an hour. When the repast was concluded the King and Queen, with the royal family, withdrew to the salon, where general conversation for a half or three-quarters of an hour was indulged with them, the King and Queen exchanging some pleasant words with each guest. The charming simplicity of this royal family was impressive; the grace and ease manifested by every one in their presence was that usual to this charming home, where every guest was made to feel the simple elegance noticeable in cultivated society everywhere.

The Queen suggested that it would be pleasing to visit the *Baltimore* at any time most agreeable to the commander, and was informed that their majesties need only appoint the day, when it would afford the officers much pleasure to receive them on board. At the same time it was suggested, if their majesties would lunch with the commander and officers on the occasion of their visit, it would give them great pleasure.

On the morning of October 14th the Maréchal de la Cour addressed a note to the commander naming October 16th for the visit of the royal family, and thoughtfully mentioned the number who would compose the royal party to lunch with the officers.

The weather on the day appointed was, fortunately, fair. The royal party was prompt to arrive on the minute named. The honors accorded were those established by international usage for the reception of the sovereign heads of all nations—the officers and men in full dress, the crew at quarters, and a salute of twenty-one guns, with the Danish flag at the main.

The stay of the royal party was so delightful that they remained on board for quite four hours, during which a minute inspection was made of every part of the ship. The culinary arrangements and the exquisite cleanliness of the ship everywhere attracted the attention and praise of the Queen again and again. She complimented Sebree, whose work it was to keep house, most heartily, and, on leaving the ship, almost her last words were that the *Baltimore* was a perfect model of order and cleanliness. A day or two afterward the commander received an autograph photograph of the King and Queen and the Crown Prince and Princess as a souvenir of their visit.

On the 18th the cruiser sailed from Copenhagen under orders from Washington, bound for Lisbon to await orders. The weather was threatening, but a storm did not develop until the Skaw lightship in the Cattegat was reached. Most of the day the cruiser was accompanied by a German torpedo boat bound for Williamshaven, but the wind and sea increased so much before gaining the open ocean that her commander was obliged to seek refuge on the Swedish coast. As it was the first good opportunity she had had in bad weather, the *Baltimore* was pushed to sea to test her qualities in a gale, which increased to

great violence during the night. She was under full boiler power, except force draft, for the trial, and, notwithstanding the heavy sea, she showed herself a perfect sea boat, her heaviest roll not exceeding 26°. As a gun platform, she demonstrated that wild night her ability to have fought her guns with ease and safety had that been necessary.

In forty hours after leaving Copenhagen she reached the Straits of Dover, after a rough and boisterous passage across the North Sea, where in high winds the sea is unusually turbulent on account of its comparative shallowness. The passage through the English Channel was made with fair weather and comparatively smooth sea, and that across the Bay of Biscay was unexpectedly fine.

Lisbon was reached on the morning of October 23d, after a passage of five days, during which the engines were in no way forced to their full power, though the *Baltimore* easily passed the many steamers encountered en route.

For the first few days after the cruiser's arrival the King was absent from the capital, but on his return the commander and his staff were presented at a special audience on October 28th. His Majesty expressed the warmest wish to visit and inspect the *Baltimore* when he returned the call, if that should be agreeable. As at Copenhagen, he was informed that the day which might be selected by him would be agreeable to the officers. Accordingly, on November 1st, the King, with several members of his Cabinet, visited the cruiser and was received with the honors of a sovereign. These included his reception, with a salute of twenty-one guns, the royal standard at the main, the officers and crew in full-dress uniform at quarters, and the band playing the national hymn of the country; the same ceremonies being observed as the sovereign leaves the ship for the shore as is done when similar visits are made by the President of the United States to national vessels.

Lisbon is a picturesque city, built on the right bank of the Tagus, covering a large area. The city rises from the river up the hills bordering the river. During the night, with lights glittering in its streets, public squares, palaces and houses, it presents a beautiful appearance. During the day its varicolored buildings are attractive, the Portuguese being noted for

their taste and neatness as a people. The season of gaiety had begun. Operas and other amusements afforded the officers and men much diversion and enjoyment. Cintra, a fashionable resort in the mountains back of Lisbon, overlooking the sea, was visited and enjoyed by all visitors to the capital. Its refreshing temperature constitutes an attraction in the warmer months, while the grand view from its high altitude overlooking the country and the sea is unsurpassed.

From Lisbon to Port Mahon, through the Straits of Gibraltar, was the next voyage of the cruiser, which was begun under easy steam, and ended on November 13, 1890, in this ideal landlocked harbor of the Balearic Islands. In those days the relations between Spain and the United States were most cordial. The cruiser's arrival in that port was the occasion of much pleasure to the people.

In years gone by Port Mahon had been the headquarters of the American Mediterranean Squadron, and so popular was this port among the seamen of those days, that whenever vessels were bound there the refrain usually sung on deck, or hummed below, was :

“At Cape de Gatte I lost my hat,
And where do you think I found it?
At Port Mahon under a stone
With all the girls around it.”

CHAPTER XX

REVOLUTION IN CHILE

1891

ONLY a few days had been passed in that beautiful harbor of Port Mahon, in order to make the usual visits of ceremony to the island officials, when the *Baltimore* was off again for the Bay of Naples, so famed in the song and harmonious verse of all languages. The course across to Naples was laid to pass south of the beautiful island of Sardinia, in sight of Cagliari, and thence through the Tyrrhenian Sea directly for the Bay of Naples, where the cruiser arrived on November 20th.

At early daylight land was made, with Mt. Vesuvius outlined in the golden colorings of the sunrise before the mists of later morning hours had dimmed the view. The wind was light from the northeast and blew the cloud cap of smoke from the crater southward, permitting the cone of this noted volcano to be seen in the gorgeous colors of the background streaked with the rays of the rising sun. As the cruiser drew nearer and nearer the coast, point after point rose as if from the sea into the splendor of a panorama of great beauty. On the left Ischia was seen and on the right beautiful Capri. As the coast was neared, villas and villages grew in distinctness until the city of Naples itself, nestled upon its hills with its villas extending from the water's edge upward and outward, presented a scene of charming beauty as the *Baltimore* moved in to her assigned anchorage behind the mole.

Some repairs needed to the steering engines and boilers detained the cruiser until December 11th. Advantage was taken of the delay, after the usual visits of ceremony to the officials, to visit the several places of interest in and about Naples, a list of which would be incomplete without Pompeii and the island of Capri. So much has been written and sung of these

interesting places that no words could be added to what has been so delightfully written by many others, for nothing could add to the descriptions already given of these repositories of art and wonders of former ages. Roaming through the deserted streets of Pompeii, exhumed from its ashes, amid the evidences left behind of the customs and life of that period, the thought kept rising that Vesuvius had really preserved Pompeii, and that modern excavations were really destroying it by leaving its treasures exposed almost without care to the rude elements. Rain, dust and neglect were effacing the colorings upon the interior walls and destroying the walls, atriums and pavements.

Capri, with its old villas and walls, and the deeply worn steps in its rock stairways, with the bewildering charm of its grottos, will always attract and hold the admiration of wondering visitors.

The great museum at Naples, with its numberless treasures of art brought from the world of the ancients, will always be the Mecca of students, who can discover in its wonders the truth that after all human thought in all ages has been about the same; that human skill develops on about the same lines; and that human civilization is an evolution rather than a creation. A day or two can be profitably passed among the treasures stored in this great repository, and the impression left after doing so will likely be that, while much has been learned, much still can be copied profitably from the handiwork and graceful creations of a few thousand years ago. Turning from these associations, made more delightful by the hospitalities of friends, the *Baltimore* sailed from Naples for Spezzia on the morning of December 11th. Steaming north along the Italian coast, when abreast of Civita Vecchia the dome of St. Peter's and the entourage of Rome came into plain sight until after the falling shades of night had encircled the Holy City on its hills. The ship's course was laid to pass inside the island of Elba, the scene of the great Napoleon's first exile and from whence he escaped to France, only to reach defeat at Waterloo after a hundred days.

Spezzia was reached on the 12th of December, and six days were profitably passed there inspecting those monster iron-clads, the *Lepanto*, *Dandolo* and *Duilo*. These great leviathans

were armed at that time with the hundred-ton gun. The mechanism for handling this ordnance seemed complete, though it was noticeably slow in operation, while the "jim-cracks" employed for interior communication during an action would have been put out of commission in the first fifteen minutes of battle under the concentrated rapid gun-fire of quick-firing guns of two swift protected cruisers. Such was the opinion of the *Baltimore's* officers. The admiral commanding, as well as the captains and officers of the fleet in port, extended every courtesy and afforded every opportunity for minute and complete inspection of these great ships, which were in admirably good order.

This great arsenal was strongly defended by fortifications of great power, well located, and, when supplemented by a well-planned torpedo defense, supported by interior ships, would present a barrier to the entrance of an attacking fleet that would be almost impassable, except with the greatest sacrifice of both ships and men to attacking squadrons.

On the afternoon of December 18th the *Baltimore* sailed for Ville Franche, where she arrived the morning following. Her arrival gave great pleasure to the officials and citizens of the town, where, in former years, a large storehouse for the American squadron had been located as a sort of headquarters. The traditional friendship of the two nations constituted a bond of interest and sympathy between the two peoples that gave zest to the welcome extended to the officers in the round of dinners, dances and receptions extended to them. The winter season on the Riviera, being rather mild, attracts people from the harsher climate of northern Europe, who bask there in the sunshine and softer breezes of the Mediterranean. One meets all nationalities and all classes, from prince to peasant, and hears the languages of the world spoken along the thoroughfares of Nice, Monaco and Mentone. There is, perhaps, no region of the world where Nature has been so lavish in distributing her beauties, nor where the hand and taste of man have been more generous in augmenting the loveliness of nature by the superb creations of his genius in the homes and palaces stretching along the shores and hills of this enchanting winter resort. Hospitality rules and reigns everywhere, and to any one who has enjoyed it a memory is

left that is as ineffaceable as the beauteous surroundings in which it was dispensed.

Awaiting the *Baltimore's* arrival was a cablegram from Secretary Tracy granting the commander a month's leave, with permission to return to the United States to be present at the marriage of his daughter, to take place in January of 1891. Arrangements were at once made through Lieutenant Aaron Ward, naval attaché to the American Legation in Paris, to take passage in the steamer leaving Havre on January 8th. The time to Paris, with a day or two in that city, was calculated with care, so as to give opportunity to accept a dinner or two with friends before the day of sailing. The steamer scheduled for that date was the *Bourgogne*, and she sailed promptly on a cold day in January for her winter trip across the Atlantic with a fair list of passengers. To those accustomed to going to sea the voyage over meant little more than life at sea generally; but to those whose duty or business required them to venture at this inauspicious season there was much misgiving lest old Neptune might demand severer tribute than at more favored times of the year. The voyage over was made without other incident than a shake-up now and then, only to remind the landsman that if "old England ruled the seas, she didn't rule them straight." The ship arrived on time and landed passengers and cargo safely.

Before returning to Europe, as intended, on January 31st, the commander ran over to Washington to pay his respects to the secretary and to thank him for this unsolicited favor of leave. On the day of arrival in Washington the morning papers contained an account of a revolution in Chile, with information that the navy of that country, together with a number of members of Congress and other prominent persons, had organized a revolutionary movement, and had withdrawn from Valparaiso to seize, occupy and organize a government at Iquique, in the province of Tarapaca, the nitre district of the republic. Official advices from our Minister, Hon. Patrick Egan, had confirmed the press despatches.

During the interview had with Secretary Tracy, he said he was sorry to learn this unfortunate news, but that Admiral McCann had been cabled to proceed to Valparaiso to protect the interests of our countrymen there, should that be necessary.

He expressed a wish to have another vessel, but as none was near enough he would await developments. The suggestion was made that the *Baltimore* was not far away; that she ought to be where the department needed her, rather than in the Mediterranean, where things were undisturbed. To this the secretary replied that he wanted her to go round the world. But when it was intimated that she could do this as well by going west as by going east, he replied, "If you prefer that, you can go by way of Chile. When can you start?" The reply was, "As soon as the return trip to Europe can be made." It was explained to the secretary, as the cruiser needed coal and other supplies for this long voyage, and that she would be without docking facilities for a long time, it might be well to dock her at Toulon, where the facilities were excellent, preliminary to leaving Europe. This was done, and when the commander arrived at Toulon, on the 11th of February, 1891, the *Baltimore* was ready to start on her long voyage to South America. Her charts, however, for the new cruising ground had not reached Toulon on February 15th, the day of sailing for Gibraltar.

On the morning of February 19th, while the *Baltimore* was at anchor in the harbor of Gibraltar, the English Channel Squadron, commanded by Sir Michael Culme Seymour, Vice-Admiral, arrived. This great squadron was composed of the battleships *Anson*, *Rodney*, *Howe*, *Camperdown*, and several large cruisers. Outside the wind was fresh from the westward, with a rough sea, but this did not interfere with the squadron's sea evolutions, nor with anchoring in line formation simultaneously at distance. To the seaman's eyes this evolution was cleverly executed.

Gibraltar is impressive as a stronghold, with its galleries of guns advantageously located for defense and so placed as to sweep every approach. Naturally the position is strong, and bristling with the heaviest modern artillery and provided with ample supplies of both food and ammunition, the task of capturing it would prove a most difficult problem, as many early attempts proved; but, with possession of it since 1783, England's sovereignty has never since been disturbed, although she guards it with jealous care. In the parlance of modern days, the strength of any defensive work is better comprehended when

compared to the real Gibraltar, a word which has become a synonym of impregnability. On the road leading from the landing-place to the upper town is located the little cemetery where many of the dead of Trafalgar lie buried. What a flood of memories this interesting spot recalled! Standing in that presence, with head uncovered, the thought would rise that these worthies had fallen with Nelson on a day forever memorable in the annals of England's glory.

After a few days pleasantly spent in viewing the stronghold, the *Baltimore* set out for the island of St. Vincent, where she arrived a few days later. This point is the great coaling station for all South American and South African steamers going and returning. The trade-winds which sweep these islands perennially were very fresh during the cruiser's sojourn, but coaling was not interrupted, even though a heavy swell was rolling in the harbor. This operation being finished, Montevideo was the next point, and the *Baltimore* arrived there on March 14, 1891, after a pleasant voyage up to the mouth of the Rio de la Plata, where a fresh southerly gale sprung up, lasting for two or three days. The roadstead at Montevideo being open to violent seas, much time is lost whenever bad weather prevails. Especially is this true when the winds are from seaward directions, which embrace at least an angle of 180 degrees of the horizon. The bottom being of soft, tenacious mud, the anchorage is safe for all vessels well found with anchors and stout chains.

Every opportunity was profitably employed when lighters could lie alongside to take coal; but some caution had to be observed to avoid risks of damage when the sea was too heavy to handle them safely. From this cause the *Baltimore* was delayed until March 22d, when she took her departure for Valparaiso. En route through the Straits of Magellan a short call was made at Sandy Point, where the settlement was garrisoned by a detachment of Chilean soldiers. Owing to the revolution going on at home at the time, there was some restlessness among the troops, and the commanding officer for that reason intimated a wish that the cruiser might lie over for twenty-four hours, for the salutary moral effect her presence would produce. As a matter of courtesy to a friendly power, the cruiser's de-

parture was delayed until early daylight the day following, to facilitate the passage through the straits during daylight. The cruiser made her first bow to the great Southern Pacific Ocean at 6 P. M. on March 29, 1891, and, sweeping on through its great waves, shaped her course to the northward about twelve miles off the coast and passed the Evangelista Rocks about dark, or 7.30 P. M. In this tempestuous region of the globe the winds and sea are rarely ever at rest; but, with twin screws and full-powered engines, the *Baltimore* pushed her way against heavy northwest winds and seas until the morning of April 3d, when she arrived at Talcahuano, having accomplished the run of over 9,000 miles from Toulon in thirty-four steaming days, during which her engines were never forced.

A day or two before reaching port a joint in the main steam-pipe of one set of her engines gave some trouble, but, as the matter of a new gasket was involved, a delay of a day or two became necessary to replace the old one, after which the cruiser set out for Valparaiso, where she arrived on the morning of April 7, 1891, completing the instructions received.

The flagship *Pensacola* was found in port with the flag of Rear Admiral W. P. McCann, to whom the commander had been directed to report. From him the latest developments of the revolution were obtained. The *Baltimore's* arrival gave the admiral and the American residents great satisfaction in the strength she added to the effective American force in those waters. Her presence added materially to the feeling of security among Americans in those troublesome days.

The admiral transferred his flag to the *Baltimore* on April 24th, and, in her larger quarters and better office accommodations and conveniences of every kind for the care of his official family, made a pleasant cruise for about two months. On the 16th of May the *Baltimore* arrived at Iquique and found the *San Francisco*, bearing the flag of Rear Admiral George Brown, in port. As the revolution made progress, the insurgent government, seeking arms and ammunition to maintain the struggle for supremacy, sent the steamer *Itata* to San Diego, Cal., for a cargo of arms collected there for shipment by their agent. In an unfortunate moment those in charge of her eluded the vigilance of the customs authorities of the port and proceeded to the island

of Catalina off the coast, where a schooner was met. The arms were transhipped and the *Itata* proceeded towards Iquique.

Our Government having declared neutrality, the escape of the *Itata* with arms and ammunition, taken on board within neutral territory, was declared to be a violation of our laws, and her arrest was ordered. It ought to be said in all fairness that, as soon as the insurgent authorities at Iquique learned of the action of the *Itata's* officers at San Diego, they agreed at once to surrender the vessel to Admiral McCann the moment she arrived, as was done on June 4th, when she reached Iquique. Although she had reached a port south of Iquique, she was ordered by Señor Errazuris, the Minister of State of the insurgent government, to proceed to Iquique without removing any of the warlike stores on board. In the meantime the cruiser *Charleston*, Captain Geo. Remy, commanding, had been ordered to pursue the *Itata* and arrest her. Remy arrived at Iquique on the same day as the *Itata* and sailed with the fugitive in convoy for San Diego on June 13th.

The incident of the *Itata* being closed, so far as the Navy was concerned, Admiral McCann sailed soon afterwards for Callao and reached that port on the morning of June 20th, having passed the Chilean cruiser *Esmeralda*, bound south, just off the entrance. Personal salutes were exchanged between the two ships; but this was thought to be an error, as the *Esmeralda* represented the insurgent government, which our own had not yet recognized, but, as it represented merely personal politeness between two officials on the high seas, it was not really improper.

At Callao Admiral McCann was ordered to resume his command of the South Atlantic and to proceed thence, via the Isthmus of Panama, to New York.

During the delay in waiting for a steamer bound north, the opportunity was improved to visit the summit of the Andes, over the Oroya Railroad, then completed as far as the tunnel which pierced the Andes leading to the valley of the Amazon. This road followed the valley of the Apurimac River, along which the Inca Indians of Pizarro's time abode and their descendants abide to this day. The work is a wonder in engineering, as it follows the windings, spans the chasms, bridges the

defiles, and tunnels spurs in passing on through villages and past the same irrigating ditches, apparently as useful now as in the olden days for fertilizing these same phenomenally rich mountain sides, 12,000 feet above the sea.

In the rare atmosphere of that altitude a sensation of dizziness was felt, as well as some discomfort in breathing on making any exertion. With rest and quiet, however, these disagreeable sensations passed away, but it was regarded unwise to attempt to pass the night at that high elevation, lest one might suffer from what was known as "siroche," a mild form of asthmatic disturbance, due to the rarity of the atmosphere at such heights. The scenery of this wonderful railroad through the mountains was grandly picturesque, and, after passing above the cloud-belt, the azure blue of the heavens revealed the high peaks of the Andean range for miles and miles to the north and south. The tint of sky was only comparable to that of the ocean on the clearest and calmest days. The trip required one day, but it well repaid the effort.

On July 11th the President of Peru visited the cruiser with members of his Cabinet and other distinguished civilians. He was received by the admiral and his officers and men, in accordance with the regulations governing the reception of the sovereign heads of governments. His inspection of the ship, her battery and equipments was thorough, and his delight at the excellent order, and the discipline of the crew, found fullest expression; but the manifest strength exhibited in modern artillery impressed him more than all else. His admiration for the great country the cruiser represented was boundless in expression and manifestation.

On July 14th Admiral McCann hauled down his flag to take passage for Panama. His departure from the station occasioned much regret to the officers and crew of the flagship, where he was much beloved for his sterling qualities of heart and head. The short cruise together had been much enjoyed, and its memories are among the most pleasant experiences of a long professional career.

Before leaving, the admiral directed the commander to proceed to Iquique, on the way south to rejoin Admiral Brown, to insist upon the right to use the American cable from Galveston

to Valparaiso, one of its connections extending from Mollendo, in Peru, to Iquique, in Chile, thence bighting out to Valparaiso. The office at Iquique was under control of the insurgent government, or the revolutionary government of Chile. The insurgents had seized and closed the office at Iquique, except for their own communications northward; and had refused the right to our Government to use the Valparaiso end for cable messages to our Minister. This made it necessary to communicate by way of the trans-Andean route to Buenos Ayres, thence to Europe by cables and thence to Washington. The route was long, the rates enormous, and the certainty of mutilation made messages slow and their meaning uncertain.

The privilege of using the more direct American cable for messages was sought, under any censorship or surveillance the insurgent government might impose, except the right to revise or to know the contents of Government messages, which were held to be privileged. If the Iquique Government refused this concession, the admiral's orders were to cut the cable off that port and join the Mollendo end to that of Valparaiso in the open sea outside their marine jurisdiction.

On the *Baltimore's* arrival at Iquique, on July 19th, the effort was made to obtain this privilege, but the insurgent authorities would not entertain the request. Orders were therefore given to the cable steamer *Relay* to connect the Mollendo and Valparaiso ends outside the marine league, and she did so that same night. Apprehending that a mistake might be made in the distance, the *Baltimore* got under way and measured the distance of 5.9 miles from the coast and directed the cut to be made at that point. The *Baltimore* remained to watch the *Relay* and to protect her during the night, if any attempt was made to interfere with her. On the morning following the cable was spliced and the *Relay* returned to Callao, and the *Baltimore* to Iquique to notify the authorities of what had been done. She then proceeded to Coquimbo, touching on the way at Caldera, or Copiapo, also held by the insurgents, to examine the wreck of the *Blanca Encalada*, destroyed by the torpedo boats *Admiral Lynch* and *Condel*, whose commanders were loyal to the Balmaceda government. Coquimbo was reached on July 24th, and the *San Francisco* was found at anchor there. A full

report was made to Admiral Brown of what had been done at Iquique and the instructions exhibited to him which directed the *Baltimore's* action.

From July 24th until August 21st the *Baltimore* remained at Coquimbo. This port was in possession of the Balmaceda government and was held by about 6,000 regular troops, said to be the flower of the Chilean army. Here the Secretary of War, Señor Aldunate, was in supreme command, although not in actual command of the troops. The civil and military authorities had always been friendly and cordial. But in compliance with the orders of strict neutrality from our Government, the officers refrained from any expression of opinion upon matters relating to the forces, resources, or purposes of either army.

Several opportunities were improved to witness the military maneuvers of the army at Coquimbo. The troops were well armed, well clothed, and apparently well contented. In all the exercises there was conspicuous handiness and smartness, but it was not quite clear to the American officers why so large a force was held at a point which was not menaced by the insurgents, or which, if taken by them, would oblige a division of their forces to hold it. The danger to this outpost lay in the control of the sea by the insurgent navy, largely superior to that of the Balmaceda government. Any movement, therefore, to the south by the insurgents would leave the Coquimbo division in the air and beyond the possibility of assisting the Valparaiso defenders. The vulnerable point was along the Aconcagua, eighteen miles north of Valparaiso, which the military advisers of the Balmaceda government had taken no steps to occupy and fortify. This position was deemed to be the weak point in the Government defense, and why it was neglected could not be understood.

But not so with the insurgent chief, who promptly seized it as a landing place for the insurgent army on August 20th, to begin its operations in the rear of Valparaiso. There were no Government forces at hand to oppose the landing, beyond those in and about Valparaiso, eighteen miles away, under Generals Alcerraga and Barbosa, numbering about 7,000 men. These were moved out to the north the afternoon of August 20th, and met the insurgents on the south bank of the Aconcagua River

on the following day, August 21st. In the battle which ensued, known as the Conceon, the Balmaceda forces were beaten and routed, and fell back on Valparaiso dispirited, disorganized and demoralized.

The *Baltimore* arrived at Valparaiso on the afternoon of August 21st, from Coquimbo, having passed Quinteros Bay about 4 P. M. Her course down was necessarily along the coast, carrying her within plain sight of the insurgent ships in that bay. Although the commander's orders were to look in at Quinteros, it was thought that the motive of such a visit might be misconstrued at such a time, and it was decided merely to pass on to Valparaiso.

On reaching the anchorage, it was learned that Admiral Brown the day before had gone with the *San Francisco* to Quinteros Bay on the proper mission of ascertaining for himself and for his Government the truth or falsity of rumors with reference to the landing of the insurgent army at that point. Admiral Brown was assailed in the Chilean press for having gone to Quinteros Bay at all, declaring that the only purpose of his visit had been to spy out the details of this landing for the Valparaiso officials. While this was maliciously untrue, as a matter of fact the disordered state of the public mind was such that the motive of every act of the foreign officers was misconstrued. Admiral Brown's first information of the landing of the insurgent army came from the Valparaiso authorities and was complete in every detail as to the number of troops, transports, and convoying men-of-war, before he visited Quinteros Bay. The authorities of Valparaiso needed no details of the landing and none were communicated to them by any American authority.

It should be said in connection with this matter that there were so many rumors afloat, from the beginning to the end of the revolution of 1891, of battles said to have been fought, of movements said to have been made on both sides, that commanders of squadrons, or ships, could only keep themselves *au courant* with what was going on by actual personal inspections made on the spot, and to do this ships were obliged to visit many localities while operations were in progress. It was realized that in time of war, especially in a civil war, the sus-

ceptibilities of both parties would be unreasonably inflamed and quick to misunderstand the motives or actions of foreign officers. Great care, therefore, had to be observed in everything that was to be done to protect the interests of American residents wherever they might live under the jurisdiction of either party. Any insistence that their interests must not be put in jeopardy on either side was misconstrued into partiality for the other. Any such thing as neutrality depended, from the Chilean point of view, entirely upon whether the interests of foreign residents clashed with one or the other side in their issue.

The week following the battle of Concon was one of intense excitement in Valparaiso. Provisions, which had been abundant the day before the landing, became scarce at once, extortionate in price and poor in quality. There was every evidence of the siege in the manifest gathering of stores. Business was at a standstill, with many business houses closed. The activity of the two loyal gunboats was increased in their attacks upon the insurgent forces on the hills near Viña del Mar. The insurgent squadron bombarded the forts around Valparaiso once or twice, with absolutely no effect beyond demonstrating that on both sides the shooting was lamentably bad.

About 7.30 A. M., of August 28th, the roar of artillery firing, with the rattle of musketry, was heard coming from the south-east direction, over the range of hills back of Valparaiso. The battle of Placilla had begun, and it continued for an hour or two with no appreciable change in the volume of firing, and no indication that either side was gaining or losing ground, as practised ears easily distinguish a situation from the increasing or diminishing detonations on the firing lines when shut out from view by intervening obstructions. Suddenly there was a lull in the firing, then a cessation, and finally silence. Who had won soon became evident (about 10.30 A. M.) in the advance of the insurgent forces over the hills and the rush of many thousands of both sexes from Valparaiso to welcome them.

CHAPTER XXI

ADJUSTMENT OF THE CHILEAN DIFFICULTY

1892

ABOUT the same hour (10.30 A. M.) Admiral Viel, Intendente of Valparaiso, informed Admiral Brown that the Government forces had lost the day, and that he was prepared to surrender the city unconditionally. At the same time he requested the senior officers of foreign warships to go to the front to announce the fact to the commander of the insurgent army and to arrange with him for the security of the life and property of foreign residents. The three foreign admirals and the senior English naval officer met at the intendencia, accompanied by an orderly bearing the national flag of each, and also with an aid. Before any arrangement had been made to go to the front, the movements of the victorious army had been so rapid that a flag of truce escorted by cavalry had already appeared before the intendencia building. A short parley only was necessary to secure from the officer commanding the escort complete assurance that the lives and property of all foreign residents in the city would be safe and their protection guaranteed.

So long after the occurrence it is not easy now to describe the welcome which met the insurgent army, as it marched into the city with every manifestation of favor, enthusiasm and relief from 90 per cent of the population, who were first, last and all the time in sympathy with it. The Government army, being in complete demoralization, threw away arms, belts and cartridge boxes, while many turned their coats wrong side out to indicate their sympathy with the congressional cause. The principal officers of the Government in Valparaiso, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Interior, and many officers of the defeated army and navy, fled to the protection of the foreign men-of-war in the harbor.

The congressional army, occupying the Arturo Pratt plaza, opened fire on the torpedo-boat *Lynch*, moored near the mole, and was replied to for a few moments by the crew with a few shots before surrendering. Some of the shots from shore struck the *Baltimore* in the harbor, but as her anchorage was in the line of fire it was thought only accidental.

A guard of about one hundred bluejackets and marines, under Lieutenant Commander Tilley and Lieutenant McCrea, were landed in the afternoon to protect the American Consulate during the confusion and disorder attending the rout of the Government forces. The steadiness and readiness of these men for immediate service was a matter for admiration and pride. Their presence did much to prevent the effusion of blood in the locality where they were stationed. Their appearance on the streets going to and returning from the consulate inspired much respect from the crowd along the route.

When night set in over the scene, musketry fire was general until daylight. Conflagrations occurred in many parts of the city, destroying much valuable property. Numbers of houses on the hills were pillaged and reported to have been sacked; while several attempts to rob business houses were reported. From the harbor, lighted up by conflagrations on shore, it was thought the city had been handed over to what is known in Spanish countries as "saqueo," or, in English, pillage.

The following morning the streets of the city presented a sad and deserted aspect after this night of terror, with many dead bodies lying here and there where they had been shot. The best authority estimated that quite three hundred had lost their lives during that dreadful night. It is not easy to understand the implacable hatreds that make such things a possibility.

The Chilean squadron arrived in the harbor on the afternoon of the 28th, after the congressional army had captured the city, and, beyond acting as a convoy for the transports, did not participate in the fighting which led to the success of the insurgent cause. During the week of operations culminating with the battle of Placilla, the ships did not venture within range of the forts, and it was not until they had been abandoned that they entered the harbor. The movements and fighting of the

army from Concon to Placilla were aggressive, bold and creditable.

Admiral Brown sent the refugees from his own ship to the *Baltimore*, directing her commander to proceed to Mollendo to land them in neutral territory. This duty was completed on September 9th, and the *Baltimore* returned to Valparaiso on the forenoon of the 14th to report the fact to the admiral.

Reporting on board the flagship, to give the full details of the trip out and back, Admiral Brown informed the commander that his instructions were to proceed to San Francisco, and that the commander of the cruiser was to remain as senior officer in the South Pacific waters.

Affairs on shore had quieted down and public order had been restored, leaving the admiral free to sail that same afternoon. Hardly had the admiral disappeared when the fires of excitement were relighted through a maliciously false report circulated on shore that Balmaceda, the deposed President, had escaped in the flagship. The authorities on shore knew this to be untrue, but no steps were taken by them to correct this mischievous falsehood. It was denied from the *Baltimore* whenever the story was repeated, but it was not until Balmaceda's suicide, at the Argentine Legation, in Santiago, on the morning of September 19th, that the denial was substantially verified.

The public excitement was kept alive and intensified by the men who had served on the insurgent transports and who had been discharged after the revolution had successfully overthrown the Balmaceda government. Until these men had found employment, it was deemed wiser to withhold shore leave from the *Baltimore's* crew, and to limit that granted to officers to sundown until order had been completely restored and public confidence more completely gained. In view of what is now to be related, it should be stated *ab initio* that, when the *Baltimore* returned to Valparaiso from Mollendo, on September 14th, the usual visit was made to her by the senior Chilean naval officer present, as well as by the captain of the port, also a Chilean naval officer. These officers extended a welcome and the usual offers of the courtesies of the port, and they are understood among nations at peace to include the privileges and hospitalities of the port to officers and men of visiting men-of-

war. The visits of these officials had been returned within twenty-four hours, as required by the regulations, in order to return thanks for the courtesies extended.

The one unsettled question that still remained to be adjusted between our Minister, Hon. Patrick Egan, and the Government of Chile, related to the refugees of the Balmaceda government who had sought asylum in the American Legation. The main insistence of our Minister was the right of domicile, until then unassailed, for those who were only political offenders, and the hitherto conceded right of safe conduct out of the country as a necessary adjunct to the conceded right of domicile, until such time as political acrimony and passion should subside. This right was finally conceded by the Government of Chile, and Mr. Egan was notified that it would be carried out, as was done to the letter. This action practically closed the incident before the *Baltimore* had sailed from Valparaiso.

A long interval had elapsed since the *Baltimore's* crew were granted leave, and as every foreign man-of-war in Valparaiso at this time gave their men liberty, quiet and order appeared to have been completely restored. There was no sufficient reason to withhold this privilege any longer from the men of the *Baltimore*, as quite three months had elapsed since they were last on shore. Before granting liberty, however, a visit was made to the Intendente, Señor Arlegui, to ascertain if there could be any objection to the step. He could see no reason why the *Baltimore* might not enjoy the same privilege as other foreign men-of-war in port. This decided the commander to grant leave for twenty-four hours to about 115 men on the afternoon of October 16, 1891.

About 3 o'clock the same afternoon the commander and the executive officer, Lieutenant Commander Sebree, as they customarily were in the habit of doing, went on shore for a walk of an hour or two. During this walk many of the men on liberty were met strolling about the city, or riding in carriages, apparently enjoying themselves. It was observed, with much gratification, that they saluted officers in passing, whether foreign or their own; that they were neat in appearance, tidy in dress, and up to the hour of 5.30 P. M., when the commander and the executive officer went on board again, not one of the

men fallen in with was in the slightest degree under the influence of drink.

At about 8 o'clock in the evening an American captain of a merchant vessel in port came on board the *Baltimore*, accompanied by a young Chilean, to report that the liberty men of the ship had been attacked about 6 o'clock at a number of points about the city by vast crowds of longshoremen, boatmen and others; that one of the men had been brutally murdered and many others were viciously stabbed in their backs; that the police had not attempted to interfere, and in some instances had joined in the assault; that a large number had been arrested and dragged to the police stations without any regard to whether they were wounded or not; that he saw men nipped with cat-gut, dragged along by the police, and beaten with swords if they failed to keep pace with them.

In fine, the captain characterized the assault as the most shameful, brutal and inhuman he had ever witnessed upon sober, unarmed and peaceful men. The captain's sense of fair play revolted against this treachery and he labored under great excitement and indignation as he related the details of this unprovoked attack upon the *Baltimore's* men. He was inclined to think the commander ought to proceed to the extreme of opening the cruiser's guns upon the city; but when it was pointed out that such action would involve the lives of thousands of innocent women and children who were in no way responsible, he confessed it would be as inhuman as the scenes he had just witnessed. When it was made clear to him that the responsibility for this great outrage must be fixed first beyond any doubt and without mistake, he agreed it would be quite time to act afterwards.

It was not long after the captain had left the cruiser when a message was received from an officer on shore that quiet had been restored, but that in the *mêlée* Chas. W. Riggins had been killed and a number of the men had been dangerously stabbed.

Believing in the old French proverb that "sleep brings counsel," a night of sleep resulted in ordering a court of inquiry to elicit all the facts from the men themselves who had been victims, as well as from parties on shore who had been eyewitnesses of this unfortunate tragedy. This court, composed

of Lieutenant S. H. May, Lieutenant Jas. H. Sears, and Passed Assistant Surgeon Stephen S. White, assembled on the morning following the assault, and rendered its report on October 19th, three days afterwards. Chas. W. Riggins was buried with military honors on October 19th, in the foreign cemetery at Valparaiso. On the 17th of October the following letter was addressed to the Intendente of the city:

U. S. S. *Baltimore*,
VALPARAISO, CHILE,
October 17, 1891.

Sir: I regret extremely to inform your Excellency that while my men were on liberty yesterday afternoon to enjoy the hospitality of a port with which my nation is upon the most friendly terms of amity, an unfortunate disturbance occurred, in which one of my petty officers was killed and six of my men seriously stabbed. I feel that it will only be necessary to request your Excellency to institute a most searching investigation into the circumstances leading to this affair in order to establish the culpability for the unfortunate collision.

I can say in advance that if my men have been the instigators in this affair they will be dealt with most severely under the laws of my country, and I feel certain that if it should be otherwise your Excellency will bring to justice all offenders.

Regretting extremely the unfortunate occurrence and the duty it imposes upon yourself and myself, I have the honor to be,

W. S. SCHLEY,
Captain, Commanding.

Señor J. DE DS. ARLEGUI,
Intendente,
Valparaiso.

This communication was answered promptly the same day as follows:

REPUBLICA DE CHILE,
INTENDENCIA DE VALPARAISO,
October 17, 1891.

Sir: I have received your communication of this date in which you refer to the unfortunate incident that occurred yesterday between a number of Chilean sailors and others belonging to the ship under your command.

Before receiving your polite despatch, the fact had already been brought to the notice of the Department of Justice, which will investigate the culpability of the promoters of the said disturbance.

I have the honor to be, sir, etc.,

J. DE DS. ARLEGUI.

Captain W. S. SCHLEY,
U. S. S. *Baltimore*,
Valparaiso.

The report of the court ordered on board the cruiser was the first official information of the extent and enormity of the assault upon the men of the *Baltimore* on October 16th. The testimony given by the men examined, who were in different parts of the town widely separated at the time of the assault, strongly implied premeditation. The fact that the Criminal Court Judge, Foster Recarraban, had tried the cases of men arrested as early as October 22d and discharged them as individually guiltless sustains the conclusion of their innocence in originating the assault. The return by the Intendente this same day of several penknives and the money taken from the men when arrested refutes the charges absolutely that the men were armed. The attempt to create the impression that the *Baltimore's* men were drunk and that the row was a drunken brawl of American sailors was malicious and untrue. The Sisters of Charity at the General Hospital, to which the wounded men had been carried, declared without reservation that these men were sober when they reached that institution. The testimony of foreigners who had witnessed the assault corroborated the Sisters of Charity as to the sobriety of the men. If this had not been so, it is difficult to believe that the police authorities would have failed to make more arrests; or, if the men were drunk, it is equally difficult to understand why they ought not to have been objects of more solicitude to the police. Surely their condition, even if drunk, could not have justified their murder anywhere in Christendom.

Turnbull, the second victim, who had been stabbed some twenty times in the back, was buried in the foreign cemetery with military honors on October 27, 1891.

A correspondence, almost too voluminous for place here, relating to the methods of procedure to obtain the testimony of the *Baltimore's* men, followed the letters exchanged with the Intendente at the beginning of the difficulty. It was insisted upon that, as the *Baltimore's* men did not understand Spanish, they should be accompanied to court by an interpreter; that their testimony should be given in their own language, a copy to be furnished the Government for its consideration; that the men were to be accompanied to the court by an officer of the *Baltimore* and to be returned to the ship under the officer's care

and in his charge; that the men should be in the custody of the court only while giving their evidence, and when that was completed to return to their ship, whose commander would be responsible for any necessary reappearance.

The feeling ran high against the Americans, as the press from day to day published what purported to be testimony elicited by the judge in the process of the trial. Much of what was written was drawn from the imagination to serve the purposes in view. In the meanwhile several incidents occurred which required notes to be written to the senior Chilean naval officer in port, or messages to be sent to the agent of the "Compania Sud Americana" line of steamers carrying the Chilean flag. The first of these related to the discourtesy of their men-of-war boats to those of the *Baltimore*, and this led to the following letter:

U. S. S. *Baltimore*, 1st Rate,
VALPARAISO, CHILE,
November 23, 1891.

My Dear Captain: My officers complain to me that on Saturday when going on shore, at 1.15 P. M., one of the boats from your ship, conveying officers, when near the dry dock, pulled out of her course to the mole directly across the bows of my boats, obliging them to lay on their oars to avoid collision. Again to-day when my steam whale boat was going into the mole, a steam cutter from the *Esmeralda* speeded up and, going out of her course, crossed her bows, forcing my boat to stop again to save collision. On this latter occasion a coxswain was in charge of the *Esmeralda's* boat.

To avoid such discourtesies as this to boats of your ships, I always keep an officer in charge of mine going and returning from shore, and I hope the two occasions referred to were accidents which may not occur again.

Very truly yours,
W. S. SCHLEY,
Captain, Commanding.

Captain A. FERNANDEZ VIAL,
Senior officer present.

This note was sent by Lieutenant Henry McCrea to the *Almirante Cockrane*. As soon as Captain Vial had received this note, he hastened on board the *Baltimore* to apologize for these discourtesies, and to give assurances that if any similar discourtesy should occur he would see to it that those so offending should be brought to a court-martial. This interview closed the incident, and it should be stated that no similar manifestation occurred during the *Baltimore's* stay at Valparaiso.

Some days afterwards it was observed that a Chilean steamer of the Sud-Americana Company entered the harbor from the south and, passing into the harbor, dipped her colors to the German, French and English men-of-war anchored there. Passing the *Baltimore* the courtesy was omitted, and, as the incident was only one of many other occasions when this disrespect had taken place, Lieutenant Sidney H. May was sent on shore to the agent of the line to explain that, while merchant vessels were not obliged to dip their colors to men-of-war, the custom was universally observed, but where such courtesy had been shown to other men-of-war in the harbor, and withheld from the *Baltimore*, it was thought to be a discourtesy that the agent should know. He expressed great regret at the occurrence, and his assurance was that it was entirely without his knowledge and that he would send the offending captain on board the cruiser to apologize. This was done. Ever afterwards these steamers in leaving or entering port were careful to salute, waiting always for the return dip from the *Baltimore*. This closed another unpleasant incident.

On the afternoon of November 30th, about 5 o'clock, the *Yorktown*, Commander Evans, came into the harbor. Reporting the circumstances of the passage, as well as the incidents and difficulties of the voyage from New York through the Straits of Magellan, he was asked to remain to dinner, during which the entire subject of the pending diplomatic difficulties with Chile were explained. At closer range, he was better able to comprehend the situation, and to learn all that occurred in the interval he had passed at sea. It was the only authentic information he had received of the disturbances of October 16th. He expressed great surprise at the time at the serious wrong done to the *Baltimore's* men.

On December 6th, after notice of the *Yorktown's* arrival had reached the department, the secretary ordered the *Baltimore* to proceed with despatch to San Francisco, but he was informed that the testimony of the men before the court had not yet been concluded. Some days before directions had been received from the department to submit the list of repairs needed by the cruiser, to be transmitted to Washington, and a duplicate of the same to be sent to Mare Island to facilitate repairs after her

arrival. On December 11th the order to San Francisco was repeated with an added request to know the day when the *Baltimore* could arrive.

Anticipating these instructions from prior communications from the department, the following letter was addressed to the Intendente:

U. S. S. *Baltimore*,
VALPARAISO, CHILE,
December 9, 1891.

Sir: I have the honor to request that you will inform me whether his Honor the Judge of the Criminal Court will require any further testimony from the men of the *Baltimore* in the process now pending relative to the disorders of the 18th of October.

I would be greatly obliged if your Excellency will favor me with this information at the earliest practicable moment.

I have the honor to be, sir,

Very respectfully,

W. S. SCHLEY,
Captain, Commanding.

To the Intendente,
Valparaiso, Chile.

On the same day the following reply was received from the Intendente:

REPUBLICA DE CHILE,
INTENDENCIA DE VALPARAISO,
Dec. 9, 1891.

Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your official letter dated to-day, in which you are good enough to ask this intendencia if there will be any necessity for further testimony of other sailors with respect to the disorders which took place on the 16th of last October.

Notwithstanding not having received an official reply from his Honor the Judge of the Criminal Court, to whom I have transmitted your official note, I am able to anticipate to you, without prejudice in transmitting later the reply which I am expecting from the Court, that I believe there will be no further need of the appearance before the Judge of the sailors of the *Baltimore*, inasmuch as all the citations referring to them are completed.

God guard you.

J. DE DS. ARLEGUI.

Captain W. S. SCHLEY,
Commanding, U. S. S. *Baltimore*.

When this communication was received, the letter which fol-

lows was addressed to Commander Evans for his information and guidance:

U. S. S. *Baltimore*,
VALPARAISO, CHILE,
December 10, 1891.

Sir: I have the honor to inform you that in obedience to orders received from the Honorable Secretary of the Navy, I will sail with this vessel for San Francisco, Cal., on Friday morning at nine o'clock.

My instructions from the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Squadron are enclosed for your information and guidance. Supplementing these instructions, the Secretary of the Navy directed me to avoid as far as possible giving offense to Chilean authorities.

My orders are, to proceed to San Francisco with despatch. I shall stop at Callao for coal and news and will go from there direct to San Francisco.

The report of the attack upon my men, with copies of all correspondence I have had with the Intendente of Valparaiso, are in the Minister's possession at Santiago, as I was directed by the Secretary of the Navy. I would advise you to put yourself into communication with the Minister at the earliest moment after my departure.

In leaving this port I shall take with me the Captain and his family, and also five sailors, from the American ship *Rappahannock*, burned at Juan Fernandez, all of whom are destitute; but I will not allow any political refugees to take passage in the ship. If such should be reported, as doubtless will be the case after I sail, you may authoritatively deny it.

Very respectfully,

W. S. SCHLEY,
Captain, Commanding,
Senior officer present.

Commander R. D. EVANS, U. S. N.,
Commanding U. S. S. *Yorktown*, 3d Rate.

It was explained to Commander Evans that the stop at Callao was mainly to ascertain the state of affairs, and that the *Baltimore* would return if matters grew worse after she had departed.

Other letters were written saying farewell to our Minister, Mr. Egan, and to our Consul, Colonel W. B. McCreery, a sterling American and an able assistant to our Minister in those dark days. Colonel McCreery was a veteran of the Civil War, and to him the sounds and excitements of war revived old sensations. Like the Minister, he was a tower of strength to the country in such times. One other fearless and noble American in Valparaiso was Mr. Frederick May, of Washington, a nephew

of Colonel Charles May, a distinguished officer in the war with Mexico. He was true as steel, brave as a lion, and gave great assistance to the *Baltimore's* men the night of October 16th, and afterwards.

On the morning of December 11, 1891, the *Baltimore* sailed from Valparaiso. As she steamed out of the harbor she was cheered by the *Yorktown* and the foreign vessels there. The German, French and English flagships hoisted the international code signal wishing her a pleasant passage, and each of these was acknowledged by a signal from the same code expressing thanks. It was not until a year or more afterwards that the fact of the Chilean senior officer having made the same signal was made known. Whether the background of the Chilean ship obstructed, or whether the delay in making the signal until the distance was too great to distinguish signals was the cause, is not known; but the Chilean signal was not seen, and, therefore, was not answered, as otherwise it would have been.

Within four days the *Baltimore* arrived at Callao, from which port the following telegram was sent in cipher by her commander:

EVANS, Steamer *Yorktown*, Valparaiso:

The *Baltimore* arrived yesterday. What is the news?

SCHLEY.

The reply received was that all was quiet as when the *Baltimore* had sailed. There was some difficulty and delay in getting coal at Callao, owing to the small number of lighters available, but the *Baltimore* got under way at noon of December 19th, and, after a pleasant run through the pleasantest part of the Pacific, sighting the Gallapagos Islands and Cape St. Lucas in Lower California, reached San Francisco at 9.30 on January 5, 1892, the date given in a despatch to the secretary for her arrival at that port.

Orders were found at San Francisco directing the cruiser to proceed at once to the Mare Island Navy Yard, where she arrived and went into dock at sundown the same day. When the usual official call was made on the commandant, Rear Admiral John Irwin, he stated that Colonel W. B. Remey, judge advocate-general of the Navy, had arrived the same morning

from Washington with orders from the secretary directing an inquiry into all the circumstances connected with the attack upon a number of the crew of the *Baltimore* at Valparaiso on October 16, 1891. United States Commissioner J. S. Manley was also to be associated with the judge advocate-general in prosecuting the inquiry.

The commandant was informed that the bodies of Riggin and Turnbull had not been brought to the United States because the sanitary regulations of Chile did not permit bodies to be disinterred for a year after their burial. At the same time he was informed that Riggin's and Turnbull's shipmates had placed a handsome marble shaft over their graves.

XXII

THE INQUIRY AT MARE ISLAND AND SHORE DUTY

1892-1894

THE inquiry instituted by the secretary began its session on January 7, 1892, in the administration building at the Mare Island Navy Yard and continued until January 18th. In this interval of time the judge advocate general and Commissioner Manley examined seventy-two witnesses with the greatest minuteness. Every detail and circumstance connected with the unfortunate occurrence, or which may have led up to the attack of October 16th, was gone into. A summary of the evidence given each day was transmitted to the President for his information and examination.

Reading the testimony over to-day, one can not fail to be impressed by the wonderful agreement in the evidence given by different men widely separated from each other when the attack was made at several points in the city. The remarkable agreement of witness after witness, as to the time when the assault began and ended, and the striking accuracy in describing scenes or incidents where two or three or more were together at the moment, is convincing proof of the truthfulness of the account as related by these witnesses.

The further fact that the testimony given by these same men before the inquiry at Mare Island differs in no essential degree from the testimony given by the same witnesses before the court convened in October, 1891, at Valparaiso, conclusively establishes its truthfulness.

While the investigation was in progress the repairs to the *Baltimore* were pushed rapidly forward as far as that was possible in the dock. As the dock was needed for other vessels, the cruiser was floated out after a few days, but before undertaking to do this the commandant was advised that the hawsers of the

vessel would be found unreliable after quite two years' use, if through any circumstance it should become necessary to warp against tide. As the cruiser's engines had been taken apart, it was proposed to handle her with a tug, as was done by all steamship lines in berthing their big ships or in clearing them from the docks when going to sea.

It happened that a lot of mud had silted up in front of the dock-gates, which required almost a half hour's delay to be cleared away. In the meanwhile the tide had begun to ebb with some strength and the current was believed to be too strong to handle so large a vessel as the *Baltimore* with hawsers alone in "winding her" at the buoy in the middle of the river.

Although the stoutest hawser on board, a nine-inch hemp, was used to do this, the moment the cruiser swung broadside to the current this hawser parted as a cord would have done, leaving the ship adrift and unmanageable. Both bower anchors were let go, but without effect, as the swift current swept the cruiser with both anchors down across the river to the Vallejo side, where she was secured to a dock until the tide changed to flood.

As the tide fell, the cruiser grounded in the soft mud, but careened some fifteen degrees off shore until dead low water; then with the incoming tide she gradually righted until near midnight, when she was warped off to a mid-channel buoy, and the day following, with the assistance of a tug, was shifted to the Navy-Yard wharf. Fortunately the mud was soft and no injury was caused by the accident, but the fact of the accident was telegraphed by some person with fanciful distortions added and some theories of injury that caused some uneasiness in Washington. When the request by telegraph from the secretary to be informed of the particulars was received, the *Baltimore* was secure alongside the wharf at the Navy-Yard with no evidences of injury or strain.

On January 20th telegraphic orders from Washington directed the commander to report in person to the Secretary of the Navy. This obliged a trip on the transcontinental railroad, which was made with despatch, ease and in much comfort in the modern-day Pullman car.

Within six days of the receipt of orders Washington was

reached, and the report called for was made to the secretary, Hon. B. F. Tracy, who then informed the commander of the purpose of his orders. A call was made upon President Harrison in company with an old friend, Senator Chas. F. Manderson, of Nebraska. During the interview with the President it was manifest that he had been perfectly and accurately informed of the situation in Chile, and that every fact with relation to the attack upon the *Baltimore's* men at Valparaiso on October 16, 1891, was understood. He only desired to have one or two points made more clear and precise in his mind, and it was with this in view that he had desired the commander's presence in Washington.

The message referring the entire correspondence upon the Chilean difficulties, together with the testimony elicited at the inquiry at Mare Island relating to the *Baltimore* incident, was transmitted to Congress on January 25, 1892, and published as an executive document by the Government Printing Office in 1892.

It was a source of great gratification to the officers and men of the *Baltimore* to know that the President, himself an able lawyer, with the full testimony of both sides before him, had formulated a demand upon the Government of Chile similar in effect to that transmitted on October 23, 1891, which had been based upon a summary of the evidence taken before the court of inquiry at Valparaiso. The very able and exhaustive review by the President, in his message to Congress referring the matter to that body, was a state paper of remarkably forceful power and reasoning. Its logic was lucid, its deliberations were decided, its conclusions were unanswerable. The Government of Chile, with sensible promptitude, expressed regret at the occurrence, promising full and complete reparation for the wrong. The clouds of war which had been gathering were swept away by the manly attitude of the Chilean authorities. The activity of preparations for war ceased and the squadron gathered at Montevideo was recalled to the United States. The incident was closed, save for a naming of the actual amount of indemnity, which a little later was fixed at \$75,000, to be paid to the families of those killed and to the survivors who had been injured in the assault.

The term of service of the commander having expired, he was informed by the secretary that his next duty would be as inspector of the Third Lighthouse District, with headquarters at Tompkinsville, Staten Island. Preliminary to this announcement, the secretary stated that somebody had informed him that this assignment would be agreeable to the commander, though he had not learned this fact from him. The reply was that such duty would be acceptable, provided it did not displace the incumbent at that place. To this the secretary replied that these orders would be regarded as fixed, and he handed the commander his orders to return to San Francisco.

Before leaving on the afternoon train, on February 1st, Captain H. L. Howison called at the Shoreham Hotel to offer his congratulations to the commander upon his new assignment to duty. He informed him that he had just forwarded Captain H. F. Pickens's detachment from lighthouse duty, wherein the commander of the *Baltimore* was named as his relief. He suggested that the Lighthouse Board had recommended himself for the place and jestingly observed that "he had been weathered in the deal." It was the first intimation that the order had already been issued and it came with some surprise, as no suggestion had been made by the secretary during the interview of that morning that he had already promulgated the order.

After his return to California, the commander received the order referred to above through the commandant. The date named in it for relinquishing the command of the cruiser was that upon which his relief should report. The relieving officer named was Captain William Whitehead, a friend, classmate and companion from boyhood.

On February 24, 1892, the cruiser was turned over to the new commander and "good-by" was said to officers and men of the ship at muster. They were thanked for their loyal help during the cruise, which had been full of incident and varied in station and not without some danger. At the same time, their splendid discipline and unvarying steadiness were commended to the new commander. As their old commander was about to pass over the side, the master-at-arms stepped forward and said:

"Captain, the boys wished me to present in their name this

little souvenir of their service with you and of their affection for you. You know, sir, when you were captain we couldn't make you a present, but now that you are a plain gentleman we want you to have something to remind you of us and to remember us by."

Enclosed in a beautiful case was an exquisite gold-headed cane, made and finished by San Francisco artisans. Its inscription was as chaste as the present:

Captain W. S. Schley, U. S. N.,
from the Crew of the *Baltimore*,
February 15, 1892.

Among the many gifts received afterwards from his countrymen, this precious souvenir has a high place in the heart of the recipient.

The trip home across the continent was in the nature of an ovation. Everywhere when the train stopped large crowds of our people had assembled to give expression of their approval of the commander's action in protecting his crew and in standing for the rights and honor of the Nation in far-off countries.

At Harrisburg a despatch was received from the naval secretary of the Lighthouse Board directing the commander to proceed to Washington for consultation. This duty accomplished, he proceeded the same afternoon to New York, where he was met by the assistant inspector, Lieutenant Commander Clifford H. West, and proceeded with him direct to Tompkinsville, where he assumed the duties of the new assignment on March 3, 1892.

The general depot of the lighthouse establishment of the United States is located at Tompkinsville. The duties of the inspector of the Third Lighthouse District were twofold in scope; the first being to supply the necessary stores, to inspect all stations and to maintain them in the highest state of efficiency whether the lights were stationary or floating. In addition, there were several hundred buoys and beacons included in the waters embraced in the district, which extended from Narragansett Bay to the Highlands of Navesink, with the river lights on the Thames, in Connecticut, and on the Hudson River, with those in Lakes Champlain and Memphremagog added. The second of these duties was to classify, advertise for, contract for, receive

and inspect, and to distribute the supplies needed in the other districts, that similar efficiency might be maintained in them.

The duties at the general depot relating to supplies were new, but, withal, instructive; because they familiarized the incumbent with business methods and with business men. At the same time an opportunity was furnished to become acquainted with trade prices of every article bought or sold, from shoe lacings to catadioptric lenses.

The assignment to this duty presented the opportunity to simplify older methods of accountability in receiving and distributing stores, as well as to arrange the duties of the various clerks, with a view to distributing the work among them more uniformly.

During the preparation for the great exposition at Chicago in the year 1893 the Lighthouse Board had been requested to light up the water-front from the Casino wharf to the mouth of the Chicago River, that the lake steamers might safely carry people at night between these points. The problem was referred to the inspector of the Third Lighthouse District for suggestions and for a working plan. Before any system could be suggested the situation had to be carefully looked over to ascertain the electric facilities on the ground. This made necessary several visits to Chicago and Pittsburg, accompanied by the electric experts of the Bishop Gutta-Percha Company and the General Electric Company. It was mainly to these gentlemen that the success achieved was due in utilizing the high-tension system already installed and in operation on the exposition grounds.

A system of electric buoys, similar to that in use in Gedney Channel, New York, was installed and in full operation within one week of the time mentioned in the contract, and from that day, during the entire continuance of the fair, no accident occurred to interrupt its operation, or the night trips of the steamers engaged in passenger service to and from the fair grounds. This attempt was the first made by the Lighthouse Board to use the high-tension system of alternating currents through submarine cables in its service. The experience gained at Chicago led to its substitution later in the system of lighting the Gedney Channel in the lower New York Bay.

The duties at the lighthouse depot at Tompkinsville were confining, but time was found in the three years spent there for other matters relating to the naval service to which the inspector belonged. He was relieved of much of the duties of inspecting the material and supplies received under contract for the establishment by the assistant inspector, and this gave opportunities for consideration of other important interests.

The indemnity fund of \$75,000 paid by the Chilean Government on account of the injuries inflicted upon a part of the crew of the *Baltimore* at Valparaiso on October 16th had been received by our Government, and the distribution of the sum had to be made. To that end, Secretary Tracy directed a board, composed of the inspector, Lieutenant Commander Sebree and P. A. Surgeon Edward R. Stitt, to convene at the general lighthouse depot, at Tompkinsville, on January 9, 1893. The inspector had been in command of the *Baltimore* on the occasion of the attack; Lieutenant Commander Sebree had been the cruiser's executive officer, and Dr. Stitt had been one of the surgeons of the vessel and had treated the injured men professionally.

The board examined all the official reports, the official log-book of the *Baltimore* relating to the assault, the medical records showing those who were under treatment after the assault, the official testimony given before the court of inquiry on October 19th, the sworn official testimony taken by the judge advocate-general at Mare Island, and the claims submitted through attorneys from a number of the injured men.

These records were supplemented by the personal knowledge of the members of the board, all of whom were present on the occasion, and therefore cognizant of the facts which were to be considered. After a most careful examination and the fullest consideration of the records and documents submitted for review, the board was able to arrange and classify the casualties which resulted from this assault into four classes, as follows:

The first class embraced those who had been killed or who had died subsequently from wounds inflicted.

The second class comprised those who had been seriously, but not fatally, wounded during the disturbance.

The third class included those who had been assaulted and

injured, or who had been arrested and detained in prison after the assault had been made.

The fourth class contained the names of those who had been arrested, or abused or slightly injured and detained in prison without sufficient cause.

The board next proceeded to consider and arrange the names of the men who came under these different classifications, giving in each case a brief *résumé* of the injuries sustained by each one of them during the assault. Its next duty was to assign specific sums to be paid to each one directly, instead of through attorneys representing them, for the reason that none of these attorneys had given any assistance to the Government or to the men concerned in obtaining the indemnity paid for this purpose by the Chilean Government. This closed the incident, and happily for Chile averted any recourse to war.

The command of the *Baltimore* for over two years on a cruise that embraced every variety of climate and weather, and which had extended from 60° of north latitude to 55° of south latitude in the North and South Atlantic and Pacific oceans, gave the commander exceptional opportunities to observe the excellences and the defects of the new cruiser. It pointed to the commander as one whose experience might be used to suggest improvements in fitting out the new vessels then building, or to govern the specifications being drawn up for others as authorized by Congress to be constructed.

Accordingly, Hon. Hilary A. Herbert, Secretary of the Navy, addressed a letter, under date of October 23, 1894, to the inspector setting forth several matters upon which he desired his views with respect to those matters then under consideration by the department officials. One of the subjects for consideration referred to the retention of woodwork in ceilings and bulkheads on board modern ships.

In view of what happened in the combat off the Yalu and, still later, in Manila Bay, and off Santiago de Cuba, in 1898, it may be well to quote from the reply the inspector made on October 27, 1894, to the Secretary of the Navy, to indicate how clearly the dangerous and disastrous effects of modern gun-fire were foreseen and what their results in action would be in his opinion :

1st. Under the action of modern artillery and high explosives there is grave danger of fire from the lodgment and explosion of shells behind or near such ceilings or bulkheads, etc.

2d. When in action there is serious danger to officers and men from splinters driven inboard by the rapid machine and other gun-fire, and no one who has ever had the experience of battle in wooden ships can ever forget the casualties from this cause, often at points remote from that struck by shot or shell.

3d. The saving of weight by omitting ceilings and bulkheads could be better utilized if given over to the coal supply, so as to increase the steaming radius of the new vessels, as well as to increase the interior accommodation for stores and personnel.

Several other suggestions looking to the better sanitary condition of the new vessels were ventured, and the recommendation was made to substitute light corrugated steel bulkheads for wood everywhere when possible in the new vessels.

During the incumbency by the inspector of the post at Tompkinsville the great review of ships took place to celebrate the Columbian Anniversary in New York Harbor, under Rear Admiral Bancroft Gherardi. In order to place these vessels, which included a number of foreign men-of-war invited to participate, in safe and secure anchorages in the North River, the request was made to mark such anchorages with spar-buoys. This duty was deputed to Lieutenant Commander Sebree, and the arrangements were made so thoroughly that there was not the least difficulty for any of the vessels of the double column in taking positions on the day of their arrival in New York Harbor. This pageant was most imposing and brilliant, and with those who witnessed the majestic fleet of war-ships, as they moved up the harbor on that beautiful day of sunshine, the impression will last.

It was the privilege of the inspector several times in the years 1893 and 1894 to accompany President Cleveland back and forth from Gray Gables, his summer home, in one of the lighthouse tenders.

The closer range this association permitted with the President and his family was to give a privileged glimpse of the beautiful home life of the chief of the nation. The honor of the friendship formed through this opportunity will always be remembered. Mr. Cleveland was scrupulously particular to meet every expense of such trips.

During the earlier part of the inspector's incumbency Rear Admiral Jas. A. Greer was the chairman of the Lighthouse Board. No one who served under his authority in that position, or on board ship under his command, could fail to be impressed by his sterling business qualifications and integrity, and his splendid equipment of common sense and excellence as a typical sailor-gentleman.

Lieutenant Colonel D. P. Heap was the engineer associate for over two years at the general depot. His industrious originality found full employment in devising many useful appliances for economies in the contrivance of electric lighting, boilers, lenses, and constructions of the Lighthouse Board. This association was most agreeable personally, and it was productive of the most beneficial results in carrying forward the board's designs and work at that important station.

During the latter months of the tour of duty there Colonel Peter Hains relieved Lieutenant Colonel Heap. His reputation as a great engineer whose name and fame are so inseparably connected with the works on the water-front of the capital was fully sustained at the general depot.

There is no duty of naval officers more agreeable, or where more opportunity is afforded to acquire, develop and adjust themselves to the methods of business, and to business men, than with the Lighthouse Board. At the threshold of this duty the officer assigned realizes, almost for the first time in his career, that the board relies upon his judgment and clothes him with financial responsibility of no ordinary kind, and then trusts him implicitly with the expenditure of large amounts of money to maintain in his district the high efficiency of its service. It is not difficult for a class of men brought up in boyhood in the two great military schools at Annapolis and West Point, where the first lessons impressed are those of honor and honesty in every purpose and in everything, and where the last is that of duty to sacrifice if need be even life itself to maintain the right against the wrong, to adjust themselves readily to this new trust in them.

As disbursing officers, they are not under bonds, because the honored commission they hold from the President of the United States represents a standard of integrity outweighing

any money value. And it can be said, to the credit of both services, whose officers have performed this duty under the Lighthouse Board for quite sixty years, that there has been no instance known to the writer of any abuse of this high confidence. The service traditions of honor would impel a merciless pursuit of any one who was tainted by any stain of dishonor in handling his expenditures of public money. To the honor of the Army and the Navy there have been no delinquents in all these years in this service!

So far as the personnel employed under the lighthouse establishment is concerned, a perfect system of civil service prevailed long before the civil-service law was passed. No efficient person in its service is ever displaced for political reasons, except he should become an offensive partisan. Once appointed, the employee retains his place and is promoted as his efficiency grows in the performance of his duties. The regulations of the board require attention to duty and competent care of its lights, machinery and property from all of its employees. Any neglect at light stations, or any reported irregularities, are carefully inquired into before action is ever taken. If any light on the coast is reported to be out during the hours when it should be lighted, the keeper must explain the reason. The only excuse ever accepted under such circumstances must lie in the fact of a breakdown of the apparatus or the machinery beyond the keeper's ability to repair.

The service has always been in such a condition of efficiency that the nautical world relies confidently upon these aids in navigating the coast of the United States on dark nights or in tempestuous weather, to reach the different ports safely with valuable cargoes and lives.

During the service of the writer for the past forty years he has never hesitated to approach our coast at any time, or in any weather, so certain did he feel that the men at the stations were on the lookout at these beacons of safety. In all that time he never found a light that was not burning brightly at any hour of the night.

After a pleasant term of duty for three years as inspector of the Third Lighthouse District, the time came to relinquish this post for duty in another field, and with it came a pleasing

letter from the Lighthouse Board transmitted by the Naval Secretary, as follows:

TREASURY DEPARTMENT,
Office of the Lighthouse Board,
WASHINGTON, D. C.,
February 27, 1895.

Sir: In acknowledging the receipt of yours of February 26, 1895, taking leave of the Lighthouse Service, the Board begs to say that it regrets the necessity for losing your services, and that it assures you of its high appreciation of the prompt, zealous and thorough manner in which you have performed the onerous and important duties of inspector of the Third Lighthouse District.

Respectfully,

GEO. F. F. WILDE,
Commander, U. S. N.,
Naval Secretary.

Captain W. S. SCHLEY,
Inspector 3d Lighthouse District,
Tompkinsville, N. Y.

CHAPTER XXIII

SEA DUTY AND PROMOTION

1895-1897

THE order detaching the inspector of the Third District directed him to report to Commodore T. O. Selfridge, president of the Board of Inspection. The duties of this board were performed more directly under the supervision of the Secretary of the Navy, who depended very largely upon its reports to keep advised of the efficiency of ships fitted under his orders for sea service, or of those returning from different stations after such service had been performed. Its duties in the larger sense comprehended not only these inspections, but the trials made by new ships over measured distances in order to decide whether the specifications of contracts had been met, and as to the general condition of new vessels after they had been completed for the Government's acceptance.

The board was composed of experts in construction, in machinery, in equipment details, in the management of old as well as the new types of vessels. Its opinions and reports were, therefore, of great value to the secretary, who, however brilliant or capable he might be in the civil administration of his department, could not become, in a few years as its head, an expert in the technical intricacies of shipbuilding, or an expert authority upon many questions involved in the preparation of great war machines, their proper tactical distribution, or their best use under battle conditions.

To the officers and men in service the fact that this board was to pass upon their proficiency at the end of a cruise helped the secretary to maintain that splendid condition of efficiency which has always distinguished the American man-of-war. It helped officers and men in their work and duty to win the approval of their chief, after service abroad in cruisers wherein

there had been abundant occasion to excel in all that tended to the efficiency of the great machines committed to their control and care.

The scope of the board's duty embraced the Atlantic and Gulf coasts, and this fact made the selection of a temporary home for the family of the officer assigned to this duty a matter of considerable importance. The most imperative question to be decided mainly related to his pocketbook, which, after all, had the deciding influence.

New York City was chosen on account of its central location and its multiplied systems of communication, which favored leaving under quick orders. The advantage of its educational institutions also had some influence in the decision reached. During intervals when board duties did not require members to assemble for the inspection work assigned as their specific work, it was the custom of the secretary to utilize the services of members for duty as members of courts of inquiry, or of courts-martial, convened at or near the points chosen by the officers for their temporary residences.

During the writer's service on this board, from March to October, 1895, he was ordered as a member of the general court-martial, assembled at the Navy-Yard, Brooklyn, with Rear Admiral John G. Walker as president, and, on one other occasion, as president of a court of inquiry. In both instances the officers under investigation were of high rank in the service and were on important duty. Both were defended by able counsel who conducted their clients' cases with infinite skill and adroitness. One of these lawyers was the Hon. Joseph H. Choate, the estimable and eminent Ambassador of the United States at the present time to the Court of St. James.

The writer's preference during his active career was always for service afloat, as it was held to be the best school in which to keep touch with the life of his profession, the only place where it was possible to keep abreast of the changes taking place in the evolution of modern-day machines; the only arena where the man and the machine could be brought to act as one; the only place where the sea habit could be kept alive and the officer habituated to the sea life. For ships are worth just as much and not a whit more than the men who command them.

Preparatory orders to command the *New York* came on September 28, 1895, as if dropped from the sky. Only a few days before the recipient had repacked his sea dunnage with a view to being able to respond within twenty-four hours to any demand of duty. This may have been in compliance with one of those psychological undulations of thought-coincidence which appear in the experience of almost every one without reasonable explanation of the why or the wherefore. It enabled the writer, however, to leave without delay when the order of October 1st reached him, to proceed to Hampton Roads and report to Rear Admiral F. M. Bunce for the command of his flagship *New York*.

The new orders were agreeable, as they were the occasion of pleasant official and personal relations and associations for a year and a half with Admiral Bunce, an accomplished and skilful officer.*

There had been short time in which to prepare, but happily a little forethought had made the time sufficient.

It was thought that the officer of detail in the department, where the tenure of duty is for four years, rarely considered the

* Officers of the *New York*:

| | |
|---|--------------------------------------|
| Captain, W. S. Schley, Commanding. | Naval Cadets: J. V. Gillis, Provost |
| Lt. Comdr., Duncan Kennedy, Ex. Officer. | Babin, C. S. Bookwalter, J. V. Klee- |
| Lieut., Wainwright Kellogg, Navigator. | man, D. P. Sellers, E. L. Barnett, |
| Lieut., Jesse M. Roper, Watch and Division. | A. T. Chester. |
| Lieut., John F. Parker, Watch and Division. | Medical Ins., Michael Drennan, Surg. |
| Lieut., Thos. M. Brumby, Watch and Division. | P. A. Surgeon, G. H. Barber. |
| Lieut. (Jr.), Homer Poundstone, Watch and Division. | Asst. Surgeon, F. C. Cook. |
| Ensign, F. K. Hill, Watch and Division. | Pay Ins., Geo. W. Beaman, Pay- |
| Ensign, H. V. Powelson. | master. |
| Ensign, A. A. McKethan. | Chief Engineer, Cipriano Andrade. |
| Ensign, Leon S. Thompson, Secretary. | P. A. Engineer, F. J. Schell. |
| Ensign, T. L. Sticht. | Asst. Engineer, G. W. Danforth. |
| | Engineer Cadets: R. C. Moody, M. A. |
| | Anderson, Walter Ball, Emory |
| | Winship. |
| | Captain, A. W. Russell, U. S. M. C. |
| | Lieutenant, R. H. Lane, U. S. M. C. |
| | Chaplain, H. H. Clark. |
| | Boatswain, Wm. Anderson. |
| | Gunner, Hugh Sinclair, |
| | Carpenter, J. B. Fletcher. |

embarrassment of the chap who goes to sea on orders suddenly given and sometimes unanticipated, but the rule of being always ready is nevertheless a good one.

The squadron gathered at Hampton Roads was composed mostly of new vessels, although there was a combination of the race-horse and land-terrapin in its make-up, the *Columbia* representing the first, and the turreted monitor *Amphitrite* the second. Nevertheless, a drill ground had been laid out eastward of Cape Charles, and another southeast of New York Bay. The line connecting them lay about twenty-five miles off shore outside the usual track of coasting vessels. On these two grounds this squadron was put through its paces for a week or more at a time, during which every evolution of modern tactics was practised over and over until fair perfection had been attained. No detail of drill was too minute to be neglected by the admiral, whether it related to the visible range of day and night signals made with flags, the Ardois electric night code, or the search-lights for scouts.

Every exercise of a modern war vessel, and every problem of modern warfare, from quick coaling to target practice under battle conditions, engaged Admiral Bunce's attention. The new ships being equipped with twin screws and high-powered engines, the winds and waves at sea presented no greater obstacle to their maneuvers than valleys and mountains do to similar movements of troops on land. Ships and squadrons could wheel, or half turn, or countermarch, or change front, or, in fact, could do every mortal thing a regiment or an army corps could do.

The last service under this command was the blockade of Charleston, S. C. This was undertaken because of the shoal water off the port, the exposed position of the squadron to weather and seas, and the several entrances to the harbor. The purpose was to test the value of searchlights in this necessary operation of war.

During February of 1897 the squadron proceeded to Charleston, to put into practice what had been done from 1861 to 1865, but with new appliances which were unknown in military uses at that time. The date of sailing from Hampton Roads was February 5th, a beautiful day with a good winter barometer. After the squadron, composed of the *New York*, *Maine*, *Indiana*,

Columbia, *Marblehead* and *Amphitrite*, had gained the open sea, there was some swell from the northeast, but, as the wind had been fresh from the northward the day and night before, it was thought to be due to this circumstance. The course of the squadron was such that the *Indiana* rolled so heavily that Captain H. C. Taylor appeared to apprehend that the locking-gear of her turrets might be carried away and thus take charge of her decks. Admiral Bunce directed Captain Taylor to return to Hampton Roads and later to rejoin the squadron at Charleston.

The squadron then continued to the southward, passing Cape Hatteras with the wind veering to the eastward and increasing in force up to Cape Lookout. During the first watch (8 P. M. to midnight) of Friday, February 5th, the barometer fell considerably and the wind and sea became heavier. The skies were wild looking, the clouds were greasy in appearance, with sharply outlined irregular edges giving unmistakable evidence of a rapidly approaching cyclonic disturbance, which the veering wind indicated to be moving northward.

The squadron was some twenty-five miles from the coast-line, which left no option to move westward, while to change the course to the eastward would have carried it into the turbulent seas of the Gulf Stream, where the smaller vessels would have experienced rough handling on that wild night. The admiral directed, by signal, a course south under slow speed until daylight as the better and safer course for the smaller vessels, though it was realized that in doing this the squadron would pass nearer to the center of the disturbance. In the days of sail this would have been a dangerous move on account of the possibility of being dismasted in the sudden and violent shifts of wind at the center, but in these days of steam, with twin screws and high-powered engines, the storm center has lost its terrors for the seaman. During the midnight watch (12 to 4 A. M.) the seas had risen so much that life-lines were rigged on board the *New York* to prevent her people being washed overboard by the seas, which from time to time lopped on her decks. From daylight of February 6th until 9 A. M. the gale was at its height, during which the squalls of wind and rain shut out the vessels following from view.

When these squalls subsided, a shift of wind came from the

south, changing quickly to the westward, indicating that the storm center had passed northward of the position of the squadron. Although the wind blew hard, it soon brought clearing weather, and there was seen ahead of the *New York* a large coast-wise steamer, whose commander had evidently pursued the same tactics as the admiral. But feeling some solicitude for the smaller vessels, the *New York* was put about on a course to the northward, and soon picked up the *Columbia*, *Maine* and *Marblehead*, this latter vessel "lying to" under a sea anchor. She had been boarded by a sea over her bows, which had dismantled her searchlight installed there, throwing it inboard with such violence as to seriously injure several of her men. The *Maine* had been boarded by a furious sea which dashed one of her men against the turret, killed him instantly, and washed his body overboard.

On every such occasion there are brave fellows who hazard everything to save a shipmate, and this occurrence was no exception, for several sturdy fellows jumped overboard into a boiling sea to save their shipmate. But for the prompt action in lowering a boat with Ensign Walter R. Gherardi, son of Admiral Gherardi, in charge, those poor fellows would have lost their lives also. In the other vessels of the squadron there were no accidents, but, as the *Amphitrite* could not be found, the admiral cruised back and forth until Sunday between Cape Hatteras and Cape Lookout in fine weather, but without result, when he turned the cruiser towards Charleston. There he arrived the day following and found the vessels anchored in the offing.

If the *New York* had been alone on this passage, it is doubtful if she would have been delayed, owing to her great size and great engine-power. And, while the sea was rough, and the wind violent, she weathered the gale without mishap of any kind except a good shaking up.

The time spent in testing the effectiveness of the blockade of Charleston was profitable and instructive to officers and men. Many attempts were made by tugs and by the *Vesuvius* to pass the blockading line, but they were discovered and checked. The searchlights invariably picked them up at such distances from the ships that their destruction by the machine-guns would have been certain before effective torpedo range could have been

reached. Many other instructive exercises were engaged in during the squadron's stay, and an ample field was presented for thought upon war problems and modern ships through the operations off Charleston.

Such was the character of the work of Rear Admiral F. M. Bunce during his last command afloat in preparing the squadron for the actualities of operations against an enemy. It is beyond question, because of the systematic and painstaking work of this admirable officer at that time, added to the genius and patient work of Rear Admiral Montgomery Sicard in preparing the guns for the Navy in the years preceding, that the Navy achieved new laurels for the nation in the war of 1898 with Spain.

While the squadron remained off Charleston the officers were the recipients of kind and courtly attentions from the city officials, the Chamber of Commerce, and from the entire people. The city was given over to holiday observance, and with the receptions, dances and banquets tendered by its estimable people, full opportunity was afforded to meet and to know them. It required a good digestion to withstand the palatable gastronomic feasts prepared in their cuisines, and a stouter head still to stand in range of the choice vintage of wines stored in family cellars; but a still stouter heart was needed by the unpledged to resist the graces of the fascinating fair women.

The squadron was visited by large numbers of people on days when the winds and seas allowed this to be done, and it is certain that the squadron left behind reciprocal impressions of warm friendships. To those who had never visited Charleston, its historic surroundings were interesting as places where American manhood on both sides had bequeathed to the generations to come a legacy of valor comparable only to Waterloo and Trafalgar. More than that, these places were evidences that the poet spoke truly when he wrote,

"There was a sweetness in the natal
Soil far beyond the harmony of verse."

After twelve days of work and pleasure in agreeable proportion, the squadron sailed on February 21, 1897, for Hampton Roads, and arrived there two days afterwards, having experienced weather just as fair as that of the outward journey

had been foul. So fickle is the weather! For the commander of the *New York* the cruise was nearing the end. It was his second trick at the wheel as captain, and it was counted among the privileges of a long career to have served under Admiral Bunce at this crucial period of preparation for the distinguished work done by the Navy afterwards.

The Navy Department in a few days transferred the writer to another field of duty, indicated in the order given below:

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON, D. C.,
March 1, 1897.

Sir: Upon the reporting of your relief, Captain Silas Casey, U. S. N., on the 18th instant, you will regard yourself detached from the command of the U. S. flagship *New York*, and will report, by letter, to the Honorable Secretary of the Treasury, Treasury Department, Washington, for duty as a member of the Lighthouse Board, on March 20, 1897, as the relief of Rear Admiral John G. Walker, U. S. N.

This employment on shore duty is required by the public interests.

Very respectfully,

H. A. HERBERT, *Secretary.*

Captain WINFIELD S. SCHLEY, U. S. N.,
Commanding U. S. F. S. *New York.*

In compliance with this order, Captain Silas Casey relieved the commander of the *New York* on March 18th, at the Brooklyn Navy-Yard, and on the 20th the writer reported, as directed, to the Secretary of the Treasury, who, in turn, directed him to report in person to the Lighthouse Board in Washington, D. C., and this was done on March 23, 1897.

The Lighthouse Board, as constituted by law, consisted of three naval officers, three army officers, two distinguished civilians and the Secretary of the Treasury, *ex-officio*, president; one of the naval members to be naval secretary, one of the army members to be military secretary. This board as thus constituted was required by statute to select one of its members as chairman. The two secretaries, associated with the chairman, were to compose an executive board for the work of the establishment in accordance with the regulations it had established with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury.

The duties of the lighthouse establishment being to safeguard

the interests of the mercantile marine, there was some solicitude felt by the boards of trade, chambers of commerce, pilot commissioners and pilot associations of the larger cities to secure a chairman whose professional life would bring about a closer sympathy with the wants of the great seafaring community, and a better appreciation of difficulties in the way of navigation. This anxiety took the form of petitions to the Secretary of the Treasury from these bodies, and this only became known to the new member after his arrival in Washington to report for duty as directed by the Secretary of the Navy. Beyond a letter to his friend, Brigadier General John M. Wilson, one of the army members of the board who had been promoted to be chief of engineers of the army, no personal part had been taken. In that letter a frank statement was made of the new member's desire to be chairman of the board, and the hope was expressed that the new duties of General Wilson's office might be found too full of cares to justify him in assuming those of the Lighthouse Board in addition.

General Wilson replied at once, in a most cordial note, stating, in effect, that he would be unable and unwilling to undertake the responsibilities of the two posts of duty; that he had only remained on the Lighthouse Board after his promotion that he might have the pleasure of casting his vote and that of the army members for the new member as chairman; that done he had intended to ask to be relieved from duty with the Lighthouse Board. This was quite like that manly, frank and excellent officer, who, throughout his long and meritorious career, has been a distinguished soldier.

At the first meeting of the board, after the new member had reported, General Wilson proposed him for chairman in a few gracefully expressed words, and requested his unanimous election. This was adopted and so recorded in the minutes of the lighthouse establishment. Secretary Gage then conducted the new chairman to his seat, congratulated him, and withdrew.

The duties of the board embraced the entire coast of the United States and its navigable waterways, which were divided into sixteen different lighthouse districts. To comprehend the needs of each one, and to be able to decide upon applications from the maritime world for new aids to navigation whenever made,

the board would be better able to decide their expediency if its members should become acquainted, through inspections, with the localities where new aids were sought. The vast increase of commerce on the Great Lakes, with the additional needs of safeguards for navigating the waters through which it passed, suggested the importance of a visit of inspection during the open summer months of 1897, from Ogdensburg, N. Y., to Duluth, Minn. Many points of danger along that great chain of lakes were inspected and much valuable information was gained during this extended trip. The requests for additional helps made by the Great Lake carriers to facilitate their business were found to be only fair and reasonable. That some benefit came out of this inspection by the chairman is certain.

On the 27th of November, 1897, the chairman, being at the head of the active list of captains, was directed to appear before the examining board at Washington, Rear Admiral L. A. Beardslee, president, as required by statute law, preliminary to advancement to the next superior grade, in this instance that of commodore. The primary step was to appear before the board of medical members, who scrupulously overhauled the person and, as well, the medical history of the chairman. This ordeal having been gone through, the mental, moral and professional competency was inquired into as established by the reports of superiors under whom he had served in the grade below.

The commission as commodore, forwarded on March 8, 1898, bore the date of February 6th, as the actual date of rank as commodore on the active list of the Navy. This was the department's method of notifying the officer that he had met all the requirements of law. The commission transmitted had been confirmed by the Senate. The rank reached after forty-two years of service was that of a flag officer.

For a year or more prior to this a revolution headed by General Gomez had been going on in Cuba against the Government of Spain. Reports of conflicts between the two opposing forces every now and then found their way into the columns of the American papers, until the story of Spanish rule and the frequent struggles of Cuban patriots in the cause of liberty were known to every man, woman and child from the Atlantic to the Pacific coast of our country.

The general policy pursued by Spain under the several captains general in Cuba, considered with the method of concentration of the islanders in horrible stockades without conveniences or protection, exposed to rain and noxious diseases on a scant allowance of food, shocked the sense of humanity of the American people. The spirit of sympathy naturally awakened throughout our country went out in fullest measure to the people on a neighboring island so close to our shores, where peace, prosperity and plenty abounded. The distance separating this beautiful island from the continent lying north, of which it was geographically a constituent part, was such as to invite the assistance of sympathetic adventurous spirits, ready at such times to aid and assist those whom they believed to be oppressed.

To avoid violating the good faith of a neutral, and to maintain the principle of non-interference with the internal government of Spain in her colony, our Government had been obliged to employ its armed power to prevent the fitting out of expeditions destined to Cuba from various points on the Atlantic and Gulf coasts. Notwithstanding the measures adopted by our Government for more than a year, in watching its several ports to prevent the escape of vessels with material clandestinely collected for surreptitious shipment to Cuban shores, it was not possible to suppress the traffic.

To many thoughtful people the determined resistance of the Gomez revolution was believed to be that moment in the destiny of Cuba when it must be decided for all time whether two nations, so different in racial characteristics, customs and aims, could live in close proximity, except under the most perfect terms of reciprocity, without clashing sooner or later.

Froude has laid down as a rule in the life of nations who colonize other lands that, unless the parent nation extends to the colony the same laws, the same rights, the same guaranty of protection as are enjoyed by those living under the home government, the seeds of discord will soon grow up in discontent; that appeals to the parent government sooner or later take the form of resistance to discriminations, and as time grows split the colony irrevocably from the mother country.

From day to day the excitement of the Cuban struggle grew among our people, spreading to every hamlet, village, town and

city throughout the broad expanse of the republic. The position taken by our Government, in its demands for the amelioration of the unhappy struggle going on so near our borders, was resisted until it became apparent that, when two nations were so far apart in their views of policy as to fail to reach diplomatic adjustment, recourse to war was the only means left, unhappy as that must be, to secure enduring peace.

Preparations to this end were being made by the Government. Selections of the most suitable vessels of the merchant service were being made. Agents were busy in the markets of Europe to purchase available vessels to augment the national fleet. Vessels were recalled from foreign service, except the Asiatic station, to be prepared for that unhappy contingency which, after all, is the final arbiter of nations.

As chairman of the Lighthouse Board, whose fleet for buoy and supply service contained a number of small modern steamers, a call was made by the writer upon the Secretary of the Navy during February, 1898, for the purpose of offering these vessels for service with the navy, during the war, if war should have to be resorted to. It was explained that these vessels were in excellent order, that most of them could make twelve knots an hour, that they could be readily and quickly fitted to carry four or more guns, and that, when so equipped, they would constitute a formidable addition of modern-built vessels to the fleet.

The secretary manifested much pleasure in learning that this important addition to the squadron could be made the moment he signified his desire for the transfer to take place. While the secretary may have had these vessels in view prior to this interview, he did not so intimate to the chairman, but the impression left upon the mind of the chairman as he withdrew was that the secretary was agreeably astonished at this unexpected find so ready at hand.

These vessels were accepted, and during the war with Spain did yeoman service for the flag and country.

CHAPTER XXIV

THE FLYING SQUADRON SAILS FOR CUBAN WATERS

1898

FROM this time onward, day by day, it became evident, from the diplomatic phases of the controversy between America and Spain, that no peaceful ground could be found upon which the two nations could stand. In the meanwhile excitement over the questions at issue grew to immeasurable proportions in both countries; but while there were many Americans who favored any honorable compromise to maintain peace, there were none to be found who were willing to admit that our Government ought to recede from its insistence that the war being carried on by Spain against the Cubans should be humane, and not made upon defenseless women and children, as the order concentrating them in stockades to starve virtually did.

To allay public feeling somewhat, the *Maine* undertook a friendly visit to Havana, where her appearance caused some suspicion on the one hand and a feeling of satisfaction on the other. During her stay there the Spanish officials were officially polite in extending the usual official courtesies to her commander. The Cubans, in their innermost souls, were gratified at the visit of this vessel of war of a power known to be friendly to their cause. There were few people in the United States willing to believe that this visit would end as it unhappily did, and fewer still who could conceive that there could exist, anywhere in Christendom, any one capable of intimating, suggesting, or executing a tragedy of such a monstrous nature as shocked the whole world on the 15th of February, 1898, when the news was flashed out from Havana that the *Maine* had been blown up by a torpedo!

The *Viscaya* was at that moment on her way to New York, sent by the Spanish Government to return the visit of the *Maine*. Before the unfortunate tragedy of the *Maine*, or the *Viscaya's*

arrival, it was suggested that she be so guarded in our ports as to make any attempt upon her by any ruthless, restless or revengeful persons simply impossible. It ought to be gratifying to our people to remember that, when the *Viscaya* reached our shores and the excitement over the *Maine's* destruction was intense, the indignation of our people intense almost beyond description, there was no demonstration, incivility or hostile manifestations towards her officers, while this vessel remained a guest in our waters. Although it was evident to everybody that the tragedy in Havana, by whomsoever consummated, had made peace between the two nations impossible, there was on all sides evidence of the supreme self-control of our people, who awaited patiently until the President and Congress should act, as they knew they would do as soon as the responsibility for this terrible tragedy had been established.

About March 20th a messenger from one of the customs revenue offices of the Treasury Department, on the same floor as the lighthouse offices, informed the chairman that the Secretary of the Navy desired speech with him over the telephone. The secretary's request was that the chairman call upon him at once at the office in the Navy Department. Presuming, very naturally, that the secretary wanted further information upon the lighthouse vessels which had been tendered, no time was lost in reaching his office.

Almost as soon as the chairman had been ushered into the secretary's office, prepared to give the minutest details of the several vessels already referred to, the secretary informed him that the President had selected him to command the Flying Squadron, to be assembled at Hampton Roads immediately, and desired to know when the chairman would be ready to take command. The chairman's reply was that he could proceed the next day to Hampton Roads. The secretary then explained that it would not be necessary to do so for two or three days at least, and that the orders would follow in a day or two.

This interview with Mr. Long was the first intimation the chairman had had that his name was being considered for this assignment. He had not intimated, or suggested, or authorized the suggestion of his name in connection with this matter to any one. The assignment came to him without solicitation in any

form on his part. If it was made in deference to the wishes of his friends, it was without his knowledge, and he is unable at this time to give definitely the name or names of such friends, whosoever they may have been. Conformably to Mr. Long's assurance, the order which follows was issued :

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON, D. C., March 24, 1898.

SIR: You are hereby detached from duty as chairman of the Light-house Board, Treasury Department, Washington, D. C., and from such duty as may have been assigned to you. You will proceed to Hampton Roads, Virginia, and assume the command of the Flying Squadron, composed of the U. S. S. *Brooklyn*, the U. S. S. *Columbia*, the U. S. S. *Minneapolis*, and such other vessels as may be directed to report to you.

Upon assuming command, hoist your pennant on board the U. S. S. *Brooklyn*,* which is designated as your flagship.

Respectfully,

JOHN D. LONG, *Secretary*.

Commodore WINFIELD S. SCHLEY, U. S. N.,
Chairman Lighthouse Board,
Washington, D. C.

In compliance with this order, the commander of the Flying Squadron proceeded to Hampton Roads, thence to Newport News,

* Officers of the *Brooklyn* (flagship).

July 3d, 1898.

Bearing Commodore Schley's Broad Pennant.

| | |
|--|---|
| Capt., F. A. Cook, Commanding | Chief Engineer, J. L. Hannum. |
| Lieut. Comdr., N. E. Mason, Executive Officer. | P. A. Engineer, T. F. Carter. |
| Lieut., A. C. Hodgson, Navigator. | P. A. Engineer, J. B. Patton, |
| Lieut., T. D. Griffin, Watch and Division. | Asst. Engineer, J. P. J. Ryan. |
| Lieut., W. R. Rush, Watch and Division. | Asst. Engineer, E. T. Fitzgerald. |
| Lieut., Edward Simpson, Watch and Division. | Asst. Engineer, G. B. Rice. |
| Lieut., Jas. G. Doyle, Watch and Division. | Captain, P. St. C. Murphy, U. S. M. C. |
| Ensign, Chas. Webster, Watch and Division. | 2d Lieut., T. S. Borden, U. S. M. C. |
| Medical Inspector, Paul Fitzsimmons. | Naval Cadets, John Halligan, Jr., |
| P. A. Surgeon, C. M. DeValin. | R. N. Marble, Jr., W. P. Cronan, |
| Pay Inspector, I. G. Hobbs. | C. A. Abele, J. A. Hand, Jr., |
| | N. S. Macy, F. L. Sheffield, W. B. Wells. |
| | Boatswain, W. L. Hill. |
| | Gunner, F. T. Applegate. |
| | Carpenter, G. H. Warford, |
| | Pay Clerk, O. J. Hancock. |

and hoisted his broad pennant on the United States flagship *Brooklyn* on March 28, 1898. His staff was composed of Captain F. A. Cook, Lieutenant Jas. H. Sears, Lieutenant B. W. Wells and Ensign Edward McCauley.

The old elevating gear of the turret-guns of the *Brooklyn* was then being renewed and that of a newer pattern was being installed in place. The executive officer, Lieutenant Commander N. E. Mason, was engaged under Cook's orders in painting the *Brooklyn* the war color, a sort of drab, adopted for the ships of the fleet. At this same anchorage the battleship *Massachusetts* was found making some repairs, which the proximity of the ship-building yard with its ample facilities at that point enabled her and the *Brooklyn* to make quickly and expeditiously. The *Massachusetts*, in addition to the repairs under way, was engaged in cleaning her bottom, as well as that could be done in the smoother water of that more protected anchorage, this vessel not having been in the dock for this necessary cleaning for quite a year.


As soon as the repairs had been made on both ships they got under way and proceeded to the anchorage off Fortress Monroe, where the *Texas* was found at anchor. Subsequently the *Minneapolis* and *Columbia* joined the squadron, but later they were detached and sent off the northeast coast of the United States to the waters of Maine and Massachusetts, thought by Mr. Long to be endangered, in view of certain mischievous rumors transmitted from different points of the appearance of Spanish vessels at various places. The *New Orleans*, purchased in England, and the *Scorpion*, a purchased yacht, took the places of the two cruisers detached, and still later the collier *Sterling* reported.

Time was taken to organize the squadron and put it upon a war footing. Pickets and patrols were thrown out towards the capes of Virginia; lights were masked; officers were required to be on board at sundown; leaves of absence beyond signal distance were withdrawn; sea watches were ordered and a surveillance maintained day and night. Gun practice with the sub-caliber guns was ordered and was maintained every day regardless of the weather, leading up to very great precision and skill, as attested later in action. A short cruise of a few days off the

capas was made to exercise the squadron in technical maneuvers, to inculcate alertness, quick signaling, and to hold their places in battle order near each other for mutual support or attack.

The squadron was held in readiness for any movement or service, so far as coal and other supplies were concerned. It was explained to commanding and other officers that a plan of battle could not be contrived for emergencies that could not be foreseen, but the general plan of the squadron would be to cruise in the line of battle, and the general principle would be to attack the head of the enemy's column, concentrating the fire upon his leading vessel, with desultory firing upon the following ships, first, for the moral effect produced upon the ships following in seeing their leaders disabled or destroyed, and, secondly, to secure all the advantage such confusion would bring about in making victory more certain and complete. Under the tactics of Hawks, Jervis, Rodney, Howe and Nelson of other days, when the motive power of ships gave them no such mobility as a modern fleet of high-powered steam vessels possesses, it was usual to plan to break through centers, to attack the rear, or to double on front or rear. With newer machines it appeared wiser to employ a newer method of attack upon the head of the squadron to ensure quicker destruction of the whole. The result at Santiago, later, would bear out the wisdom of this plan of attack, as it resulted in the absolute annihilation of Cervera's fleet.

Notwithstanding every day's delay was improved to increase the efficiency of the Flying Squadron, there was naturally a restlessness for service nearer the field of operations. A study of the steaming radius of each of the Spanish vessels showed that, if their commanders were unwise enough to venture on to the coast of the United States, they could reach only its northern portion, and then with coal practically so depleted as to make their situation precarious. It was their arrival in West Indian waters which released the Flying Squadron on May 13th, and little time was lost in getting to sea with the *Brooklyn*, *Texas*, *Massachusetts*, *Scorpion*, and the collier *Sterling*, bound for Charleston, where the order directed the squadron to wait for further instructions. For some reason, to this day unknown,



ADMIRAL SCHLEY'S FLAGSHIP, BROOKLYN.

the *New Orleans*, which had been attached to the Flying Squadron, was detached to remain at Hampton Roads.

The squadron, except the *Sterling*, arrived off Charleston on May 15th, and was met off the bar by Commander Conway H. Arnold, lighthouse inspector, who delivered new orders to proceed to Key West, Fla., and report to Commodore Geo. C. Remy. The squadron arrived at Key West about midnight of May 17th, taking up an anchorage outside the reef, as the heavy draft of the larger ships would not permit them to anchor with safety anywhere inside. There were no vessels anchored off this port except the *St. Paul* and a coal schooner from which the *St. Paul* was taking coal.

On the morning of May 18th a call was made on shore upon Commodore Remy, after saluting his broad pennant, to report for instructions, as the order received off Charleston had directed. During the interview with Commodore Remy he exhibited a despatch from the Secretary of the Navy directing the Flying Squadron to take station off Havana and blockade it. After a conference of some length with Commodore Remy, during which many matters were gone over, a number of Cubans residing in Key West were interviewed with reference to the locations of Spanish troops in and about Havana. Their information was that the province about Cienfuegos and to the westward of Havana was completely occupied and that great care must be exercised in opening communication with the Cubans, who were mainly in the mountains further back on the island. Hastening off to the *Brooklyn* to carry out the orders to Havana, the *New York*, bearing Acting Rear Admiral Sampson's flag, was seen approaching the anchorage from the eastward. A call was made upon Admiral Sampson to pay respects, and to talk over the situation, with the purpose of making matters clearer about the situation of his command, the disposition of his vessels, the location of pilots, and any arrangements he may have made for communication with the insurgents, all these matters being entirely unknown to the commander of the Flying Squadron. At the same time, the orders to blockade Havana were explained, but these Admiral Sampson countermanded.

The *New York* had just returned from the bombardment of San Juan, and the admiral seemed to be much worn and appar-

ently anxious; in fact, his appearance was that of a sick man. A number of telegrams were shown, in one of which two squadrons were directed to be organized, one on the south coast and the other on the north coast of Cuba. The choice of commands was left to the admiral by the department. When asked which of the two squadrons he would choose, Sampson replied that he would hold the Havana or north coast squadron. He stated that whichever side the Flying Squadron should take, to remember that the fortifications were heavily armed, as he had discovered at San Juan, and that his confidential instructions were not to risk our ships against them until after the Spanish squadron had been disposed of. When asked if there were any pilots to be had, or if any system of signals for communicating with the insurgents had been arranged, his reply was no; but that, when later he had the situation better in hand, he would communicate on these matters. He appeared anxious to get the Flying Squadron off to the blockade of Cienfuegos at the earliest moment, and it was then suggested by the commander of the Flying Squadron that the order to report to Remy was felt necessarily to include one of ceremony to him, and that, at the outset of duty together, he might feel assured of unreserved and absolute loyalty to the cause both represented.

Returning to the flagship *Brooklyn*, Commodore Remy transmitted by the steamer *Algonquin* an order from the Secretary of the Navy to proceed off Havana. Signal was made to the admiral on the *New York* to ascertain if he knew the Flying Squadron's orders were to Havana. Admiral Sampson's reply was that he understood his arrival at Key West modified the Flying Squadron's orders, and that the squadron should be prepared to carry out the orders to Cienfuegos agreed upon earlier in the afternoon.

The ships were coaled as rapidly as the imperfect facilities of that early period of the war permitted, but were unable to fill up their bunkers entirely before sailing. Early on the morning of May 19th, a young officer from the *New York* came on board bearing the following order:

U. S. Flagship *New York*, 1st Rate.

KEY WEST, FLA., May 19, 1898.

SIR: I send you a copy of a telegram received last night from Secretary Long, concerning a vessel which was to sail on the 15th, and carrying a large

amount of specie, and is supposed to be going to land it at Trinidad, or to the east of Cienfuegos. This may be a blind, however, and the vessel may be bound for Cienfuegos, or even Havana.

The two cruisers will be sent out to-day, and with the torpedo boats following them. As soon as the *Iowa* is coaled she will follow you.

It is unnecessary for me to say that you should establish a blockade at Cienfuegos with the least possible delay, and that it should be maintained as close as possible.

Should the Spanish vessels show themselves in that vicinity and finding you on the lookout attempt to come around the island, whether east or west, please send me notice by the best vessel you have for that purpose as to their direction that I may be prepared for them at Havana.

I shall try and increase the number of light vessels at your disposal in order that you may have them to send with messages to me in case you desire to do so.

After I have the situation more in hand I will write you and give you any information that suggests itself.

Very respectfully,

W. T. SAMPSON,

Rear Admiral, Comdr.-in-Chief U. S. Naval Force, N. A. Station.

In compliance with this order, the Flying Squadron, consisting of the *Brooklyn*, *Massachusetts*, *Texas* and *Scorpion*, sailed from Key West between 7 and 8 A. M., May 19th, for Cienfuegos via the Yucatan Channel. Towards 11 A. M. the Flying Squadron passed the *Marblehead*, bound east, but several miles to the north of the course of the squadron. A small auxiliary was seen approaching the squadron, afterwards ascertained to be the *Eagle*, when the *Scorpion* was directed to communicate with her to avoid delaying the squadron. Lieutenant Commander Marix reported the following information given by the *Eagle*:

“Sent by Captain McCalla from Cienfuegos to report *Nashville* following about twenty-five miles in rear to westward. Starboard high-pressure cylinder disabled; proceeding slowly. *Cincinnati* and *Vesuvius* off Cape Antonio about fifteen miles and to the northward. All blockading squadron has left Cienfuegos for Key West. No news of the Spaniards.”

This was the message megaphoned from the *Eagle* to the *Scorpion* and so recorded in her log-book in quotation marks. It was delivered to Commander Marix, and by this officer to the commander of the Flying Squadron. No other message was delivered, and no addition whatever was made at the time. That

there may be no question in the matter, it may be added that the Navy Department afterwards directed the following telegram to Admiral Remy for use before the court of inquiry to be convened in September, 1901:

WASHINGTON, D. C., August 11, 1901.

REMEY, MANILA:

See Marix. You obtain an accurate statement of information communicated through *Eagle*, May 19th. Did he communicate information Schley. Give date of. All messages to be in cipher. HACKETT.

And to this telegram Remy replied as follows:

CAVITE, P. I.,
August 14, 1901.

SECRETARY NAVY, WASHINGTON:

Referring to telegram August 11th, Marix has deposed as follows: The message communicated by the commander of the *Eagle*, May 19th, was to Schley from McCalla to the effect that McCalla had left Cienfuegos with the ships. Did not believe Spanish fleet had arrived there when *Marblehead* left. The message was communicated to *Brooklyn* and *Scorpion* by hail.

REMEY.

Reinforcing this cipher despatch, Remy transmitted a sworn statement by Marix as follows:

Office of the Commander-in-Chief
U. S. Naval Force in Asiatic Station,
Flagship *Brooklyn*,
CAVITE, P. I., August 13, 1901.

Replying to cipher cablegram from the Navy Department, Commander Adolph Marix, U. S. N., deposes as follows:

The message communicated by commanding officer of *Eagle*, May 19th, was from Captain McCalla to Commodore Schley to the effect that Captain McCalla had left Cienfuegos with his ships and did not believe that Cervera's fleet had arrived there when *Marblehead* left. This message was communicated to *Scorpion* and *Brooklyn* by hailing.

I do hereby swear the foregoing to be a true statement.

A. MARIX,
Commander, U. S. N.

Sworn and subscribed before me this 13th day of August, nineteen hundred and one, on board the U. S. flagship *Brooklyn*.

GEO. C. REMEY,
Rear Admiral, U. S. N., Commander-in-Chief U. S. Naval Force, Asiatic Station.

It is not possible to reconcile Lieutenant Sutherland's sworn testimony before the court of inquiry, in 1901, upon the subject of this message he delivered in May, 1898, with this sworn testimony of Marix, whose official record sustains his memory.

The following morning (May 20th) the smoke of two vessels was seen ahead, and later proved to be from the *Cincinnati* and *Vesuvius*, cruising to the north of Cape Antonio, watching the Yucatan Channel. These vessels were reached about 10 A. M., when Captain Chester of the *Cincinnati* came on board to ascertain the news of all that was going on. During his stay, all the information in his possession about the ports on the south side was discussed, though his information was found to have been derived mainly from the published charts. Chester expressed a wish to accompany the Flying Squadron to Cienfuegos, but, as his vessel did not belong to that squadron, the commander could not interfere with the arrangement Admiral Sampson had made of the ships of his own squadron. Other matters, referring mainly to coaling his ship from a collier expected to pass, and the feasibility of coaling ship at sea on the south side, were talked over, but Chester knew no more about the latter than did the commander of the Flying Squadron.

This interview over, the Flying Squadron proceeded on to Cienfuegos and arrived at a point ten to twelve miles from the entrance about midnight of the 21st of May. As the land back of the coast was high about Cienfuegos, it was not easy to make out the coast line, and the squadron was stopped until daylight with the *Scorpion* on picket. At daylight on the 22d position was taken off Cienfuegos, near the entrance, and the port was thus blockaded.

While the *Brooklyn* was approaching Cienfuegos on the afternoon of May 21st a number of guns were heard apparently with the cadence of a salute. There was no manner of doubt whatever of this fact, as the commander of the Flying Squadron was on the bridge at the time.

During the interview with Admiral Sampson on May 18th, before leaving Key West, there was no mention made of the fact that on May 16th, at 12.30 A. M., as his squadron was returning from the fruitless bombardment of San Juan, the torpedo-

boat *Porter* joined the *New York* at an arranged rendezvous off Cape Haitien, with despatches from Curaçao via Puerto Plata, as follows:

"*Maria Teresa* and *Viscaya* in harbor; arrived Saturday; *Oquendo*, *Cristobal Colon*, *Terror*, and *Pluton* outside; only two admitted at time; short of coal and provisions; dirty bottom."

And supplemented by another telegram from Curaçao, via Cape Haitien, as follows:

"Inform Admiral Sampson Spanish squadron will sail 6 Post Meridian; destination unknown."

One other despatch, bearing similar information from the department, was received, as follows:

"Five vessels supposed to be men-of-war observed off Port de France, Martinique, May 14th, afternoon.

"Spanish fleet from Cape de Verde off Curaçao May 14th; *Viscaya* and *Maria Teresa* entered into port as reported and to leave Curaçao on May 15th."

On May 16th, at midday, the squadron, composed of the *New York*, the battleships *Iowa* and *Indiana*, the *Amphitrite* and *Terror*, the cruisers *Montgomery* and *Detroit*, with the torpedo-boat *Porter* and the auxiliary tug *Wompatuck*, on its return from San Juan, was about the middle of the Windward Passage between Haiti and Cuba, distant about 130 miles from Santiago de Cuba. This squadron was proceeding to Key West, under orders, through the Bahama Channel. Had it returned via the south side of Cuba, as the information from Curaçao would have suggested, an opportunity to have looked into Santiago and for a possible encounter with Cervera's squadron might have occurred. If it was good policy for Sampson, who knew where Cervera was, to return to Key West, several hundred miles away, it could not have been reprehensible in Schley, who knew absolutely nothing of Cervera's whereabouts, to do the same thing under unreliable information.

Although the destination of the Spanish squadron was not cabled, the fact was indicated by official despatches that it was bearing munitions to Cuba, and had imperative orders to reach

Havana, or some port in railroad communication with Havana, at all hazards, and that Cienfuegos was its objective. There is no doubt of this impression in the Navy Department, as is indicated in its letter of May 16, 1898, to Admiral Sampson, the P. S. of which is:

"The last telegram received concerning the Spanish fleet is as follows:

"'Fleet has munitions essential defense Havana. Orders imperative reach Havana, Cienfuegos, or railroad port connected Havana at all hazards.'

"Commodore Remy was directed to send you this immediately by a fast vessel as per copy of telegram we send him herewith:

"'Sampson due vicinity of Lobos Key, 17th, so send instantly your fastest vessel to inform him that department has just heard that Spanish fleet has munitions essential to defense of Havana, and the Spanish orders are imperative to reach Havana, Cienfuegos, or railroad port connected with Havana at all hazards, and as Cienfuegos appears the only port fulfilling the conditions, Schley, with *Brooklyn, Massachusetts, and Texas*, to arrive Key West morning 18th, will be sent to Cienfuegos as soon as possible, so Admiral Sampson take or send his heavy ships to Havana blockade.'

It was this latter letter that impressed Sampson with the importance of Cienfuegos as the objective of the Spanish fleet. It certainly had impressed Mr. Long, or his advisers, to the same effect. But the inexplicable fact remains that the commander of the Flying Squadron was subjected to official complaint and inquiry for being impressed in similar manner by this department information!

The conformation of the land about Cienfuegos, and the tortuous channel leading into the port, made it impossible to see into the harbor from the outside.

Although the subject of signals that had been arranged with the Cuban insurgents was discussed at the interview of May 18th, no such arrangements were known to the commander-in-chief at that time, and it was not until the *Marblehead* joined the Flying Squadron, on May 24th, that the fact of such arrangement came to the knowledge of the commander of the Flying Squadron.

There were no signals made from the hills east or west of Cienfuegos, except on the night of May 23d; and whether the lights seen then were made by Cuban insurgents or Spaniards never has been known. The inquiry, in September, 1901, pro-

ceeded upon the assumption that the Cubans had made these signals, and the commander of the Flying Squadron was arraigned under this bold assumption!

The only officer who professed to know the significance of these signals did not think them important enough at the time to communicate them; and, strange as it may seem, the official log-book of his ship, the *Iowa*, contains no record that these hill signals were seen at all from that ship on the night of May 23d. It was fortunate for this officer that the commander of the Flying Squadron did not know at that time, 1898, that this officer knew and had withheld information which he testified to having possessed when he was before the court of inquiry, three years after the occurrence!

On May 23d the British steamer *Adula* approached the blockade from Jamaica, and was boarded and carefully examined. She was found to be duly authorized by the State Department at Washington to enter Cienfuegos for the purpose of carrying away all neutrals from that port. She brought, also, a war bulletin from Jamaica stating that the Spanish squadron had arrived at Santiago on May 19th and that it had sailed on the 20th. This information, considered with the report of guns heard on the late afternoon of May 21st, was strongly presumptive of the presence of the fleet in Cienfuegos. Reinforced as this presumption was by the impression emphasized in Mr. Long's telegram, that the orders to reach Havana, Cienfuegos, or some port in railroad communication with Havana, were imperative, it was a fair inference that Cervera, after all, had eluded our movements and had reached Cienfuegos.

The situation was involved, moreover, in some uncertainty by the receipt of letter No. 7 on the 22d. This letter only found its way to publicity in February, 1899, in "Executive Document C," published by Congress. It was no part of the duty of the commander of the Flying Squadron to forward this paper to the department until the end of the cruise, although it was the duty of somebody on board the *New York* at the time it was written; but, unfortunately, it appears to have been overlooked. It was transmitted to the department from the commander of the Flying Squadron after the cruise had ended. It is reproduced on next page:

FLYING SQUADRON SAILS FOR CUBAN WATERS 269

U. S. Flagship *New York*,
KEY WEST, FLA., May 20, 1898.

No. 7.

DEAR SCHLEY:

The *Iowa* leaves this morning at 11 o'clock bound for Cienfuegos. The *Marblehead* and the *Eagle* will both be ready to depart to-night to join you. Enclosed is a telegram received at Key West, May 19th, marked A. After duly considering this telegram I have decided to make no change in the present plans, that is, that you should hold your squadron off Cienfuegos. If the Spanish ships have put in to Santiago, they must come either to Havana or Cienfuegos to deliver munitions of war which they are said to bring for use in Cuba.

I am therefore of opinion that our best chance of success in capturing their ships will be to hold the two points, Cienfuegos and Havana, with all the force we can muster. If later it should develop that these vessels are at Santiago, we could then assemble off that port the ships best suited for the purpose and completely blockade it. Until we, then, receive more positive information we shall continue to hold Havana and Santiago [this evidently should be Cienfuegos].

I enclose a telegram received at Key West, dated May 19th, marked B. With regard to this second telegram, in which the Consul at Cape Haitien says that a telegram from Port de Paix, on May 17th, "reports two ships, etc.," it is probably of no importance and the vessels referred to may have been our own ships.

The statement made by the U. S. Minister to Venezuela, contained in a cablegram of same date, is probably not true, because these ships are reported to have left Curaçoa at 6 P. M. on the 16th. If they were seen on the 17th, apparently headed for the French West Indies, they could not possibly be at Santiago as early as the 18th, as is reported.

From the first cablegram, marked A, it will be seen that the department ordered the cruiser *Minneapolis* and Auxiliary No. 461 to proceed to Santiago de Cuba to join you. Please send the *Scorpion* to communicate with these vessels at Santiago and direct one of them to report to department from Nicholas Mole, or Cape Haitien, the change which I have made in the plan "strongly advised" by the department. As soon as this vessel has communicated with the department, let her return to the vicinity of Santiago de Cuba, learn the condition of affairs and immediately report at Havana or Cienfuegos as he may think most advantageous.

Very respectfully,

W. T. SAMPSON,

Rear Admiral, U. S. N., Commander-in-Chief U. S. Naval Force, N. A. Station.

Commodore SCHLEY,

U. S. Navy, Commanding Flying Squadron.

This was the situation up to May 23d, when the *Hawk* arrived at Cienfuegos carrying the translation of a cipher telegram sent from the department on May 20th, and received at 12.30 A. M. by Admiral Sampson:

INCLOSURE A.

The report of the Spanish fleet being at Santiago de Cuba might very well be correct, so the department strongly advises that you send word immediately by the *Iowa* to Schley, to proceed off Santiago de Cuba with his whole command, leaving one small vessel at Cienfuegos, and meanwhile the department will send the *Minneapolis*, now at St. Thomas, W. I., Auxiliary 461, proceed at once off Santiago de Cuba to join Schley, who would keep up communication via Mole Haiti, or Cape Haitien. If *Iowa* (has not left yet) had gone send orders Schley by your fastest despatch vessel.

The order containing this "Inclosure A" was received on May 23d, 1898, and was as follows:

U. S. Flagship *New York*,
KEY WEST, FLA., May 21, 1898.

SIR: Spanish squadron probably at Santiago de Cuba. Four ships and three torpedo-boat destroyers. If you are satisfied that they are not at Cienfuegos, proceed with all despatch, but cautiously, to Santiago de Cuba, and if the enemy is there blockade him in port. You will probably find it necessary to establish communication with some of the inhabitants—fishermen or others—to learn definitely that the ships are within port, it being impossible to see into it from the outside.

When the instructions sent by *Iowa* and *Dupont* (duplicates) were written, I supposed that the two fast scouts would be in the vicinity of Jamaica, but I have since learned that they have been ordered by the department to get in touch with the Spanish fleet on the north coast of Venezuela. I have just telegraphed them to report for orders at Nicholas Mole. Report from Nicholas Mole.

Very respectfully,

W. T. SAMPSON,

Rear Admiral, U. S. N., Commander-in-Chief U. S. Naval Force, N. A. Station.
The Commodore,
U. S. Flying Squadron.

Accompanying this was the following memorandum:

It is thought that the enclosed instructions will reach you by 2 A. M., May 23d. This will enable you to leave before daylight (regarded as very important), so that your direction will not be noticed, and be at Santiago A. M. 24th.

It is thought that the Spanish squadron will probably be still at Santiago, as they must have some repairs to make and coal to take.

The *St. Paul* and *Minneapolis* have been telegraphed to scout off Santiago, and if Spanish squadron goes outward, one to go west and attempt to reach you. If the squadron goes east one will keep in touch and the other go into Nicholas Mole to telegraph me at Key West. If you arrive off Santiago and a scout meets you, send a vessel to cable at Nicholas Mole and get informa-

tion to be left there by scouts as to direction taken by Spanish in case they have left Santiago de Cuba.

The *Yale* had been ordered to cruise in Bahama Channel until May 24th. *It is thought possible that the Spanish, hearing of your departure from Cienfuegos, may attempt to go there.*

If this word does not reach you before daylight it is suggested to mask your real direction as much as possible. Follow the Spanish squadron, whichever direction they take.

W. T. SAMPSON,

Rear Admiral, U. S. N., Commander-in-Chief U. S. Naval Force on N. A. Station.
The Commodore, Flying Squadron.

Written in ink on the margin was the following in an unknown hand:

Our experience has been that ships can be traced by their smoke from twenty to thirty miles, and it is suggested in case you leave in the daytime, to stand a good distance to the westward before turning southward.

One who reads these despatches impartially to-day can not but be impressed by them as uncertain in tone and undecided in information. With no knowledge whatever that a system of signals had been agreed upon until May 24th; with orders practically requiring the commander of the Flying Squadron to be satisfied before sailing that the Spanish squadron were not at Cienfuegos; with what appeared to be more recent intelligence of the movements of the Spanish squadron from the *Adula's* information from Jamaica; with the significant detention of that vessel in Cienfuegos after being permitted to enter; with the implied doubt of the "probable" presence of the Spanish squadron at Santiago, it is quite evident that the Flying Squadron would not have been justified in leaving Cienfuegos any sooner than it did. It is even more certain that it would have been a military mistake in view of what was unknown of Cervera's actual whereabouts at that time!

What was learned afterwards definitely, and only through the operations of the Flying Squadron itself, has been made use of to censure its commander, when it ought to have been held, in any consideration of the equity of the question, that this knowledge acquired after the fact could not be used or justly applied to a situation unknown at the time to the commander.

It could be added at the same time that the only party who was not at the end of a telegraph line, nor apparently in the secrets of the war, was the commander of the Flying Squadron. His conclusions had to be reached through all the doubts and surmises of those sending him messages or orders, but who were in no sense nearly so certain then as they pretended to be after everything had been made plain for the first time on May 29th, when Cervera's fleet was definitely located by the Flying Squadron.

The blockade of Cienfuegos was close and effective, for no vessel save the *Adula* ventured to pass in or out of the port while the Flying Squadron was before it. And none could have done so!

CHAPTER XXV

ARRIVAL AT SANTIAGO

1898

It is not possible to read these despatches to-day without the conclusion that they were uncertain and indecisive in both knowledge and expression. One fact, however, is apparent, that the onus of mistake, in any movement of the Flying Squadron, was to be assumed by its commander. Six or eight months after every movement of Cervera had been made plain, the later reasoning of six or eight persons was to assume a perfect knowledge of his actual whereabouts, which the despatches, telegrams and orders of the time do not sustain. To the impartial reader it must appear that Mr. Long and Admiral Sampson were impressed alike that Cervera's destination was Cienfuegos, as the following telegram of May 23, 1898, would indicate:

"The information of the department all goes to indicate the principal aim of the Spanish fleet and government is to introduce a supply of munitions of war and of food to Blanco and Havana by Cienfuegos. This for your information."

It is hardly just to bring the commander of the Flying Squadron under censure, as was done, for believing the same thing on that same day off Cienfuegos. This, taken in connection with the order of May 21st from Sampson, in which he said,

"Spanish squadron probably at Santiago. . . . If you are satisfied that they are not at Cienfuegos, proceed, etc., etc.,"

which was received on the same day, May 23d, goes clearly to impose a plain discretion to set out from Cienfuegos only when satisfied that Cervera was not in that port.

Surely it sweeps away the certainty, pretended afterwards, of Cervera's presence at that time in Santiago, upon which nobody was willing to predicate positive orders!

There were only three defended ports in Cuba that this Spanish division could have entered, Havana, Cienfuegos and Santiago. Why two were blockaded and the third left open is not easily explained. There were ships enough in the American fleet to have blockaded each port with a force equal to the Spanish.

During the last two days, from May 22d to May 24th, passed by the Flying Squadron off Cienfuegos, the torpedo-boat *Dupont* arrived, and then the *Iowa*; on May 23d the *Hawk* arrived with despatches, also the *Castine* conveying the *Merrimac*; on the morning of May 24th the *Marblehead*, the *Eagle* and the *Vixen*, all short of coal except the *Vixen*, though just from Key West, where there was a supply. With the *Marblehead* came the first intimation that a code of signals had been arranged with the insurgents about Cienfuegos, and, as soon as it had been definitely decided that same afternoon that Cervera's squadron was not in that port, the Flying Squadron took up its formation a little after 6 P. M. for movement eastward to Santiago.

At about 7 P. M., as soon as despatches could be prepared to send to Admiral Sampson, it got under way as a unit, the *Brooklyn* leading the column, composed of the *Massachusetts*, *Texas*, *Iowa*, *Marblehead*, *Vixen*, *Eagle* and the *Merrimac* on the flanks. On clearing the land in the bight, both wind and sea increased, and the squadron took up its gait to conform to the speed of the slowest vessel, as is the universal tactical rule everywhere, for otherwise no squadron of dissimilar vessels could be kept together in battle formation, and no commander who failed in this respect could justify his conduct in war if, through disregard of this principle, the enemy should capture any vessel left behind, or abandoned, for that is the Anglo-Saxon of it, on account of a lack of speed. In time of war, moving a squadron from place to place with uncertain knowledge of the whereabouts of the enemy's fleet, it would be criminal neglect, militarily unwise, and an invitation to disaster, to proceed in other formation than as a unit. The principle that useful auxiliaries and necessary supplies should ever be abandoned, except under the most imperative military necessity, is something unknown in war, and in the cold, clear light of reason it is a debatable

question if any commander-in-chief would dare take the risk of such a military blunder.

There is abundant proof from the log-books of the squadron that the sea was rough, and the winds were fresh, which retarded the smaller vessels up to the time of the squadron's arrival at Santiago. Coaling from a collier at sea was simply impossible under the circumstances, and to have attempted it would have been to invite disaster. No matter if there had been a hundred thousand tons of coal in colliers with the Flying Squadron, if it could not be got out of them it might as well have been in the mines.

The choice of Guantanamo Harbor for coaling after June 1st, when the squadrons had been so augmented as to permit ships to be withdrawn from the blockade without reducing the force remaining to an inferiority numerically to the Spanish fleet held in Santiago, sustains every action taken by the commander of the Flying Squadron with respect to coaling at sea. It admits the acquiescence of Admiral Sampson in the view that coaling in the open sea off Santiago was uncertain, and even dangerous, and never to be depended upon. If it had been otherwise, it would be difficult to explain the reason for sending vessels forty miles away to do what might have been done without risk on the blockade.

Very shortly after the squadron arrived off Santiago the intermediate valve-chest of the *Merrimac's* engine broke down, to the great annoyance of her officers, as well as of the commander of the Flying Squadron. The conditions of wind and sea are better attested by the fact that the *Yale's* officers were nearly twenty-four hours in taking her in tow.

The detachment of the *Eagle* to Port Antonio on the morning of May 26th was due to the commanding officer's report that he had less than a day's coal on board. There was no protest about leaving, no request to coal; for if her commander was fit to command he ought to have known it was impossible. His only expression was regret that he was unable to remain with the squadron.

In the meanwhile Captain Sigsbee came on board to report the situation as he viewed it. There is no doubt of what the captain thought at that time, nor of what he said, for that has

been testified to by Ensign Marble, Mr. Geo. E. Graham, and the orderly of the commander of the Flying Squadron, all of whom sustained that officer's recollection of the conversation. If anything further is needed to sustain this fact a letter, written off Santiago, as follows, would do so:

U. S. S. *St. Paul*,
Off Santiago de Cuba,
May 26, 1898.

SIR: This morning I boarded the British steamer *Jason* bound for New York. She transferred to me a colored pilot, named Eduardo Nuñez, recently employed by the Spanish navy at Santiago de Cuba. Also, a Cuban recently employed as clerk in the U. S. Consulate at Santiago de Cuba. I send you two letters from the U. S. Consul at Kingston, Jamaica, bearing upon the matter.

Captain W. C. Wise, senior officer, directed me to transfer those men to the *Minneapolis*, and later he revoked this order. I note that the consular letters have not the consular seal attached. Still, I assume they are genuine.

I had 1,200 tons of coal on board at noon. Yesterday I captured prize the British steamer *Restormel*, of Cardiff. She had touched at Puerto Rico and Curaçoa. I send you a memorandum copy of a letter I wrote to the Navy Department and the prize commissioner at Key West, Florida, where I sent the prize. The captain and crew seemed to be glad to be captured. She had twenty-four hundred tons of coal on board.

I captured her very close to the Morro of Santiago de Cuba in broad daylight. *No news here. I have seen absolutely nothing of the Spanish fleet.*

Very respectfully,

C. D. SIGSBEE,
Captain U. S. N., Comdg.

Commodore W. S. SCHLBY, U. S. N.

When the captain came on board the *Brooklyn* he was much impressed with the great size of his own ship, the *St. Paul*, as he called attention to the fact that she was a tenth of a mile long, and recalled it several times, with the information added that it took one hundred and fifty tons of coal a day to turn her engines over. With the last paragraph of his letter in view, the captain was asked, "Have you got the Dons here, or in here?" His reply was, "No! They are not in here, they are only reported here," and he followed this statement with the explanatory observation that he had been in close the day before sketching and saw nothing unusual about the harbor. Asked if any of the other vessels had seen them—the *Yale* or the *Minneapolis*—his reply was, "No, they have not, they have assured me." If

any one present on that occasion off Santiago was possessed of information reliably acquired of the presence of the Spanish fleet and did not do his utmost to inform his superior officer, he violated his duty.

If the commanders of these scouts were so sure of the situation of the Spanish fleet on May 26, 1898, as they testified before the inquiry in 1901, it is simply inconceivable that they should have failed to communicate this information during the twenty-four hours the squadron was within easy signal distance.

If the commanders of these scouts knew on May 26, 1898, from department telegrams, that Cervera's fleet was in Santiago, as they claimed to have known when testifying before the inquiry three years afterwards, then it is simply astounding that this information should have been withheld. But, as the department itself was uncertain at the time, it is not easy to understand how any definite information could have been sent from it of Cervera's actual whereabouts.

It is most fortunate for these officers that the facts testified to before the inquiry in 1901 were not known to the commander of the Flying Squadron in May, 1898.

Happily, however, on May 29, 1898, three days afterwards, one of these officers, in a letter to the secretary from Nicholas Mole, where he had been sent to report the Flying Squadron's discovery of the Spanish fleet in Santiago, wrote that "this morning, while in towards the coast, after chasing, I saw the smoke of quite a number of vessels to the westward, and I at once made for the Santiago entrance, believing it possible that the strangers were the Spanish squadron approaching that port"!

This officer, in a letter dated February 24, 1899, volunteered to the department, by reason of a letter written to the Senate by the commander of the Flying Squadron, says "that every officer on board the *St. Paul* knew that I believed Cervera to be in Santiago (meaning on May 26th)."

How all these statements can be made to agree must be puzzling. If the captain believed that the Spanish ships were in port on May 26, 1898, how could it be possible on May 29, 1898, three days afterwards, that he thought the ships of this squadron were outside "approaching that port"? Or, how is it possible to explain his letter of May 26, 1898, in which there is the state-

ment, "No news here! I have seen absolutely nothing of the Spanish fleet!"

After Captain Sigsbee had left the *Brooklyn*, Edouard Nuñez, the pilot whom he had delivered on board, was interrogated closely, as he was an expert in such matters, having served for many years in the waters about Santiago de Cuba. Nuñez did not hesitate to express the opinion that vessels of the size and draft of the *Teresa*, *Oquendo*, *Viscaya* and *Colon* could not pass through the channel into the harbor, except at the top of high water, and then on the smoothest days only with the assistance of tugs. Nuñez testified to this opinion before the court of inquiry convened three years afterwards.

This, taken with the information, or non-information, from the scouts; taken with the strong possibility of the truth of the Jamaica bulletins; taken with the possibilities that the Santiago telegrams of the presence of the Spanish might well be ruses to draw the Flying Squadron from its objective; taken with the implied doubts in the orders of the commander-in-chief; taken with the uncertainty of Mr. Long's information and the known fact that Sampson's fleet was at Cay Francis, in the Bahama Channel to the east of Havana, suggested the move to the westward at 9.50 P. M. on the night of May 26th, with the purpose in view of blocking the passage to the westward to bar any effort of the enemy to reach Havana by a dash through the Yucatan passage in Sampson's rear.

It was quite twenty-four hours before the collier's engines could be functioned, and then only under reduced speed. The fleet engineer had been sent on board the *Merrimac* to examine and report the extent of damage, and it is to the credit of the engineering force of the *Brooklyn* that the completely smashed valve-gear was so well repaired that it worked well when it was installed a day or two later off Santiago.

At 9.30 A. M., about, on May 27th, the *Harvard* (scout) joined the Flying Squadron, bearing a despatch from Mr. Long as follows:

WASHINGTON, May 25, 1898.

HARVARD, ST. NICHOLAS MOLE, HAITI:

Proceed at once and inform Schley, and also the senior officer off Santiago, as follows: All department's information indicates Spanish division

is still at Santiago de Cuba. The department looks to you to ascertain facts, and that the enemy, if therein, does not leave without a decisive action. Cubans familiar with Santiago de Cuba say there are landing places five or six miles west from the mouth of the harbor, and that there insurgents probably will be found, and not the Spanish. From Santiago heights can see every vessel in port. As soon as ascertained notify department whether enemy is there. Could not squadron, and also *Harvard*, coal from *Merrimac* leeward Cape Cruz, Gonoives Channel, or Mole, Haiti? Report without delay situation at Santiago de Cuba.

This despatch was sent from Washington before the department knew the Flying Squadron had reached Santiago, or had gone west, and in the letter sent to the Senate on February 6, 1899 (Executive Document), a significance was given this despatch which it does not import, as "directing Schley to *remain at Santiago and ascertain whether the enemy is there or not*"! The secretary may have had that in his mind, but the despatch, sent before he knew anything to the contrary, could hardly bear the interpretation afterwards given it.

That despatch, coldly read, is characterized by the same uncertainty that prevailed in all the despatches with respect to Cervera's whereabouts.

The despatch of May 27th, from the commander of the Flying Squadron to the secretary, "Much to be regretted, can not obey orders of the department; forced to proceed for coal to Key West, by way of the Yucatan passage; can not ascertain anything respecting enemy, positive, etc," did not reach the department until May 28th, on the evening of which day the squadron was before Santiago blockading. The weather having moderated, and the sea having smoothed down, permitted coal to be taken on board to equalize the steaming efficiency of two or three of the vessels, enabling them to continue with the squadron.

Everybody knows, now, that the enemy was in Santiago Harbor; and everybody knows as well that, whether the Flying Squadron had proceeded forty miles or four hundred miles, it could have got back in time, as it did, for it is now known that the Spanish squadron could not leave the harbor on account of the lack of facilities for getting coal and water and other needed supplies, and making necessary repairs that were hardly within the capacity of the port.

The outcry about this movement to the westward was not thought of until all the facts were subsequently known about Cervera's division. It was not dreamed of while every one was in doubt. Even after the Spanish squadron was located the despatch, dated June 8, 1898, to Admiral Sampson, would seem to indicate that there was still some doubt about it. Its last paragraph reads: "Are you sure all four Spanish armored cruisers are at Santiago? Six hundred marines, *Panther*, started for you last evening, convoyed by Auxiliary No. 596 (*Yosemite*)."

The whole theory of this tempest in a teapot was built upon what might have happened, and not what actually did. The undisputed fact remains that the Flying Squadron did locate, for the first time positively, the whereabouts of Cervera's squadron, and it was a most important factor afterwards in destroying absolutely this Spanish division in the battle later on, of July 3d, 1898.

A pertinent incident in connection with these matters, and which may not be recalled by every one, is that Sir John Jervis, one of England's great sea-fighters of a hundred years ago, despatched Nelson, in May, 1798, to intercept the Great French Armament, prepared under Napoleon Bonaparte's guidance to reach Egypt in order to menace England's route to India. Nelson's fleet, crippled by a gale, reached Toulon too late. The French squadron eluded Nelson and reached Aboukir Bay July 1st. In seeking the French squadron, Nelson divined its purpose to be to reach Egypt, and he arrived at Aboukir Bay on June 28th, three days before the French arrived. Believing the enemy still at sea, Nelson made a circuit of Crete to the shores of Sicily and back again to the shores of Greece, where he learned that the French had made good their landing in Egypt. He set out from the Gulf of Coron, and, on August 1st, just one month after the French arrived at Aboukir Bay, Nelson descried them in that port. The battle which took place on that memorable night in 1798 history accords rightly to Nelson, though his command was a division of Sir John Jervis's fleet.

From that day to this no military man has ever claimed that the glory of Aboukir Bay, or, as better known, the Battle of the Nile, was in any respect shared by the grand and great Jervis, who was Nelson's commander-in-chief. It made no dif-

ference then, and it makes none to-day, whether a commander-in-chief be eleven miles, or eleven hundred miles, away from the scene of an action in which he did not participate; history will always accord the guerdon of victory to that commander who fights and wins the battle!

The plan of an active, mobile and moving squadron, blockading in battle formation ready for action, established before Santiago on May 28th, with the relative strength of the two squadrons then facing each other equal, needs no defense. The recent experience of the Japanese fleet before Port Arthur against the Russian squadron anchored there is an unqualified exemplification of the tactical correctness of the blockade of the Flying Squadron before Santiago de Cuba.

The form of a circular blockade, with the ships in stationary position, afterwards adopted, was not possible for the Flying Squadron with its five ships, even if it had been held wise to have so established it with any number of vessels. But the success that attended it was due mainly to the fact that the enemy was not aggressive in torpedo attack upon it. That the blockade of the Flying Squadron was effective and efficient is attested better by the fact that, up to June 2d; no vessel passed in or out of Santiago and none could have done so with safety.

The next incident of importance was the discovery of the *Colon* lying well inside the mouth of the harbor at daylight on the morning of May 29th. The *St. Paul* was sighted to the eastward about 7 A. M., and in the next half hour arrived near the Flying Squadron. Her commander was called on board the flagship and given a despatch with orders to proceed to Nicholas Mole to transmit its contents to the department and to Admiral Sampson. In proceeding on this mission, the *St. Paul* swept to the westward in making her turn and then saw the *Colon*. She had been discovered an hour or two before the *St. Paul* had been sighted at all.

As soon as possible after the presence of the Spanish ships had been discovered, the commanding officers of the ships of the Flying Squadron were summoned on board the *Brooklyn*. The fact of the enemy's presence was announced, the form of blockade was explained, the method of attack, if the Spanish

fleet should attempt a sortie, was declared. The Flying Squadron being in line of battle, cruising slowly before the entrance to the harbor, the plan was to charge in upon the Spanish ships as they filed out, concentrating our fire upon their leading vessels, with a few guns to work upon those following; if they escaped this cyclone of gun-fire, to pursue them as far as coal would permit.

One of the commanding officers asked if the purpose was to dash into the entrance if the enemy attempted to escape. He learned, with some emphasis, that such was the purpose and order.

On May 31st the *Harvard* arrived from Jamaica, where she had been sent, as her commander had reported, on May 27th, that his coal supply was so depleted after he had delivered the despatches which became so important in Mr. Long's estimation that he was unable to reach any home port. Captain Cotton brought back Pilot Nuñez from Jamaica, where he had requested to go to obtain important papers left there. Nuñez was sent in the *Vixen* to Asseradores to communicate with the insurgents who were said to be at that point on the coast. He bore a note from the commander of the Flying Squadron to General Cervereco looking to the establishing of a code of signals for communications, and was given verbal instructions to ascertain if all of Cervera's squadron were at Santiago. On his return, on June 2d, Nuñez reported that he had been obliged to make a trip of thirty miles into the mountains back of the coast to find the insurgent general, but with the result that he had learned that the entire Spanish squadron was in the harbor of Santiago. Nuñez was sent immediately to report this information to Sampson. The suggestions of the despatch delivered on May 27th were thus fulfilled.

On May 31st a reconnaissance of the fortifications was made. The *Colon* was lying in the upper reach of the channel, about one thousand yards from the entrance, where her log-book shows she had been since May 25th, and just clear of Punta Gorda battery.

The intention to develop these fortifications was explained to several officers the evening before, when the instructions of Mr. Long not to risk hazarding the ships of the American fleet

against the fortifications until the Spanish fleet had been disposed of were discussed.

The range for this reconnaissance was chosen at seven thousand yards, and for a day or two afterwards was thought to have been that distance. This range was determined by Lieutenant Potts, but was about as inexact as his memory was after three years had elapsed. The enemy had no trouble at all in reaching our ships, for a number of their shells fell well outside them. The conclusion must be that their guns were superior in range to ours if the range, apparently guessed at by Mr. Potts, was so much in error.

Clouds of powder smoke were seen to arise from the harbor, lying back of the hills, which was interpreted to mean that the Spanish ships were in port, and this assumption was correct, as we now know that the vessels were there at that time.

The reconnaissance, at whatever range, settled definitely and for the first time two vital points, first, that Cervera's fleet was in Santiago, and, second, that the fortifications had some good long-range guns well placed and capable of injuring the ships on the blockading lines whenever the enemy desired to become aggressive. It was a perfectly well-known method in military operations to ascertain the location of batteries and to test their strength from the moment when gunpowder and guns became known in warfare. Why a commander should be brought under censure for not risking his ships or the lives of his men in such operations, when the purpose to be reached could be accomplished without doing either, is another of the anomalies of this incident.

On June 1st Admiral Sampson arrived off Santiago and, in the call made upon him, the entire situation was explained. The *Colon* was pointed out, and he was thanked for his telegram of congratulation upon the Flying Squadron's success in locating and blockading Cervera's fleet. No complaint was made of the blockade as found, no fault was expressed with the operations as reported, and no manifestations of disapproval in any form were suggested by Admiral Sampson at that time. The situation of the *Colon* had not changed on the morning when the *New York* arrived, for her log-book records that she did not shift her position until 10.35 A.M. The fact that the com-

mander-in-chief took no further action that day against the batteries or against the *Colon*, then in plain sight and remaining so for several hours after his arrival, must be construed to mean that he was fully satisfied with the situation as found and as explained. Any theory that he was not satisfied must involve censure for failing, with the better opportunity an augmented squadron permitted, to repair a situation of which he had disapproved.

Further, at 5.55 A. M. of June 2d, the *New York* left the blockade and steamed rapidly to the southwest in chase of a steamer on the horizon, and did not return until 1.40 P. M., after an absence of nearly eight hours. If the blockade by the Flying Squadron was ineffective as found, can it be possible that the chance of a prospective prize was regarded of greater importance? Suppose Cervera had been able to take advantage of that opportunity to escape and had gone eastward?

The circular form of blockade was adopted on the evening of June 2d, after the *New York* had returned from the chase after a possible prize. The *Brooklyn* was assigned a position in the west quadrant of the semicircle, the *New York* took position in the eastern quadrant of the semicircle of six miles radius; the two flagships were almost as far apart as it was possible to place them. On the clearest days only was it possible to read signals from the *New York*, and generally some intermediate ship had to repeat them.

Suggestion was made through Captain Philip, to Admiral Sampson, that it would facilitate operations if the *Brooklyn* and the *New York* should lie nearly south of the entrance, for the obvious reason that both flagships ought to be in position to know first any movement of the enemy as well as to hold the two squadrons under better signal control. Victory, or defeat, may result from the proper, or improper, interpretation of signals. This was intended to help the commander-in-chief, whose mind, absorbed in the other responsibilities of duty, might overlook the small essentials that so often help operations and hinder mistakes. The form of semicircular blockade was in no sense novel, but had come down from the past, with features of weakness that any active compact squadron might turn to advantage in any vigorous sortie. Its success was due entirely to the fact

that it was never menaced by the enemy until July 3, 1898, when it was broken through.

On May 31st the *New Orleans* arrived off Santiago to report for duty. Captain Folger brought orders from Admiral Sampson to sink the collier *Sterling* in the mouth of the harbor, but he conveyed verbally a message from Sampson that the details were left to the commander of the Flying Squadron. On this same day a telegram was brought from Port Antonio by Mr. Wright, in the press boat *Dandy*, from Mr. Long, as follows:

Unless it is unsafe for your (our) squadron, the department wishes you remain off Santiago de Cuba ; so can not you take possession of Guantanamo, Cuba, occupying as coaling station? If you must leave are authorized to sink collier in the mouth of harbor of Santiago de Cuba if you obstruct thereby. But if not so used, and if not necessary to you, it would be very desirable to leave her at Mole Haiti, or vicinity. You must not leave the vicinity of Santiago de Cuba unless it is unsafe for your squadron, or unless Spanish division is not there.

LONG.

There can be no doubt after reading this despatch that the matter of sinking a collier to obstruct the passage was conditioned upon the Flying Squadron being forced to leave its position off Santiago. As it was a later despatch than Sampson's, it clearly left the matter to the discretion of the commander of the Flying Squadron. This despatch indicates, too, that the department was in no sense sure when the despatch was sent that the Spanish division was in Santiago de Cuba.

CHAPTER XXVI

THE BOMBARDMENT OF DEFENSES AT SANTIAGO

1898

ADMIRAL SAMPSON, for reasons he deemed sufficient, decided to sink the *Merrimac* in the mouth of the harbor and forthwith directed her to be prepared for this purpose. Assistant Naval Constructor R. P. Hobson was chosen for her commander, and a call for volunteers to man her was made. It is to the honor of the men of the navy that every one in the squadron was ready to embark on this service. There was no trouble in getting volunteers; the chief difficulty was to select from the great number the few needed to man the collier. Those finally chosen to represent the navy were as follows:

Naval Constructor R. P. Hobson, in charge.
Chief Master-at-Arms D. Montague, from the *New York*.
Gunner's Mate Geo. Charette, from the *New York*.
Coxswain R. Clausen, from the *New York*.
First Class Machinist G. F. Phillips, from the *Merrimac*.
Water Tender F. Kelley, from the *Merrimac*.
Coxswain O. Deignan, from the *Merrimac*.
Coxswain J. E. Murphy, from the *Iowa*.

During the midnight watch (12 to 4 A. M.), June 3d, the commander of the Flying Squadron was awakened from sleep by his orderly, who had been directed by the officer of the deck to report that the *Merrimac* was lying near by and had requested to be informed what the exact bearing of the mouth of the harbor was. The commander of the Flying Squadron went on deck at once and gave the course in as N. E. by N. The night being very dark, the opening into the harbor had faded into the background of hills, giving the coast the appearance of a continuous unbroken line. With the direction given, Hobson started ahead, and it was not long afterwards when the artillery fire from the hills and the rattle of musketry on both sides of

the entrance announced that the *Merrimac* had been discovered. It is not easy now to describe the emotions which filled the hearts of those who looked on that thrilling scene of noble men going to duty which their honor required them to face in an unarmed and defenseless vessel. Nor would it be easy to picture in words the sleepless impatience, that continued until the dawn of day after the firing had ceased, to know the result of this intrepid attempt of that noble band of gallant fellows.

Memory was searched for examples with which to find its parallel in history. Thermopylæ with her one messenger to tell the calamity; the Alamo with no survivors; the famed charge of the Six Hundred in the Crimea; the intrepid dash of Decatur at Tripoli; the daring of Cushing in sinking the *Albemarle*, were all passed in mental review only to place Hobson and his brave fellows, whatever their fate, among the galaxy of great names of other days.

Daylight came at last to many eyes peering and straining through glasses only to realize that the *Merrimac* was sunk. Her funnel was seen above the waters, well up in the entrance, apparently on the right side of the channel looking in from seaward; but what the fate of those gallant fellows had been was unknown. This was only to be revealed later in the afternoon when the knightly Cervera sent out a flag of truce with the information that they were safe, accompanied by expressions of admiration of this daring attempt of his foes.

In the light of subsequent events, it is a matter of congratulation that this bold attempt to block the passage was abortive. If the attempt had been successful in closing the harbor against ingress or egress, the problem of its ulterior effect upon the navy is full of speculation.

Commander J. M. Miller had been forced, reluctantly, to surrender his command of the *Merrimac*. Here was the opportunity of a lifetime for distinction, and its loss can well be sympathized with by his professional associates. He was a skilful, intelligent and gallant officer, and it is possible that, under his guidance and expert familiarity in handling vessels, a success might have been scored. But it was not to be, and in it all there was a Power above that shaped events to the end that came in this attempt.

On June 4th a council of war was held on board the *New York*, before which the question of attack upon the fortifications, to be made the day following, was outlined, but some one, as now remembered, suggested that the day following would be Sunday and that it might be well to postpone the attack until Monday. This view was acceded to. The fleet off Santiago was divided into two squadrons in accordance with the following order:

U. S. Flagship *New York*, 1st Rate,
Off Santiago de Cuba,
June 2, 1898.

The fleet off Santiago de Cuba will be organized during operations against that port and the Spanish squadron as follows:

First Squadron (under personal command of Commander-in-Chief)—*New York, Iowa, Oregon, New Orleans, Mayflower, Porter.*

Second Squadron (under Commodore Schley)—*Brooklyn, Massachusetts, Texas, Marblehead, Vizen.*

Vessels joining subsequently will be assigned by the commander-in chief. The vessels will blockade Santiago de Cuba closely, keeping about six miles from the Morro in the daytime, and closing in at night, the lighter vessels well in shore. The First Squadron will blockade the east side of the port, and the Second Squadron on the west side. If the enemy tries to escape the ships must close and engage as soon as possible, and endeavor to sink his vessels or force them to run ashore in the channel. It is not considered that the shore batteries are of sufficient power to do any material injury to battleships.

In smooth weather the vessels will coal on station. If withdrawn to coal elsewhere, or for other duty, the blockading vessels on either side will cover the angle thus left vacant.

In the order named the vessels of the two squadrons were arranged in a semicircle around the mouth of the harbor, and in this form maintained the blockade up to the morning of July 3d. On one or two occasions there were subsequent modifications of the distance off shore to a distance less than six miles, and the establishment of an inner line of smaller vessels. Later still, the plan of lighting up the channel at the port entrance was directed during the dark hours of the night with the searchlights of the battleships. While this measure was effective, so long as it was not interfered with by the enemy's batteries, it would have been the means to a nightly contest before any well-fortified port of an aggressive enemy. During the great Civil

War no vessel was ever permitted to approach within range of the Confederate batteries without challenge, day or night, and it was well understood by the commanders of the vessels that any opportunity taken to examine these batteries at any time at closer range than the usual blockading distance subjected them to the ordeal of a fight, with damage to vessel, or loss of life, or both. The supineness of the Spanish in this respect, as well as their lack of aggressiveness, was constantly commented upon, and, owing to this, the blockading squadron took many liberties in lying generally within easy range to maintain a more rigid blockade, which made a sortie all the more dangerous for the squadron inside.

Monday morning, June 6th, came, and with it, at 7 A. M., the two squadrons moved into position about four thousand yards from the fortifications for the attack agreed upon the Saturday before. The battleships *Texas*, *Massachusetts*, *Iowa* and the *Oregon*, in the order and distance named, took up position on an east and west line. The *Brooklyn*, *Marblehead* and *Vixen* were assigned to an enfilading position west of the entrance to the harbor at the same distance. The *New York*, *New Orleans* and the *Yankee* were assigned to a similar position and distance eastward of the entrance. As soon as the distance appointed had been reached, a ferocious assault upon the fortifications was made by the squadron, lasting for well nigh two hours, during which there was a terrific bombardment of Estrella Point, the Socapa battery and the Morro batteries east of the castle. Directions were given to avoid the possibility of injury to the *Merrimac's* crew confined as prisoners of war in Morro Castle.

Vigorous reply was made from the forts for a period of ten or fifteen minutes, but the firing of the squadron was too severe and too well maintained to be withstood by the Spanish gunners, who abandoned their guns to seek safety in the traverses prepared behind the breastworks, where they were safe from harm. On the west side every structure near the enemy's works took fire from the shell explosions, while the parapets of the Socapa were swept with shells, which made it impossible for the defenders to live anywhere near their guns. Vast quantities of ammunition were expended; but the earthworks were not injured beyond what a few hours could repair. The squadron

had things all its own way and during the action was not struck by a single projectile of the enemy, although many of their shells fell beyond our vessels. When the signal to withdraw was made, and the movement in doing so became apparent to the enemy, they remanned their guns and fired a few shots at the ships, but with a lamentable lack of accurate aim. So the first engagement of the combined fleet ended with little apparent damage to the forts and with no injury to the ships.

Resuming the blockading positions, there were many weary and monotonous days of waiting and hoping for activity. The weather happily continued exceptionally good but excessively hot, sticky and oppressive, which was slowly sapping the strength and energy of all. To those splendid fellows before the furnaces and standing ready at the engine throttles below decks, where the heat was almost insufferable, the task of duty was most severe. There were no complaints or murmurings heard above the protective decks, and up to the crucial moment, on July 3, 1898, they were as true as steel and as unchangeable as the needle to the pole. Occasional mails from home bearing messages from loved ones and friends solaced many hours that would otherwise have been weary, and the anticipation aroused when steamers arrived on the blockade was one of the features which filled in the days of this duty with some pleasure.

The press steamers coming and going from the lines afforded many opportunities to send our letters and to learn the news in the world beyond our horizon. These gentlemen of the press were always mindful of the value of a few bushels of potatoes, a few dozen eggs and a little fruit thoughtfully brought to us by them from Port Antonio. Such things did add a lot of relish to the herrings and "hardtack" of our larders, while such kind attention set up memories and friendships that can never be forgotten.

Tired of the monotony, the commander-in-chief decided to bombard the works about the port once more on June 16th, believing that the Spaniards had been adding to the defenses to the east and west of the entrance. It was determined to bombard both the batteries at daylight. There was no special formation for this action beyond the direction to carefully adjust the position of blockade distance (three miles), then to go quickly

to quarters and move towards the entrance of the harbor at a speed of five knots to a position three thousand yards from the forts; the *New York*, *New Orleans*, *Oregon* and *Iowa* to turn with port helm; the *Brooklyn*, *Texas* and *Massachusetts* to turn with starboard helm, to present their broadsides to the forts. Firing was to begin when the signal was made from the flag-ship, and after that the ships were to maintain their position, or to close in if the targets to be fired at could be better seen for effective firing.

At early dawn the bombardment began and continued quite an hour, but with no greater visible effect than on June 6th. Reduced charges were used in all guns of eight-inch caliber and above to increase the angle of fall of the projectile in the hope thus to destroy the enemy's batteries. As in the previous bombardment, the enemy's fire was vigorous for ten or fifteen minutes, after which the gunners again fled to the protection of their traverse ditches, to remain until the squadron withdrew, when they remanned their guns and fired a few shots, which fell wide of their mark beyond the ships. This bombardment, like the first, did little damage to the works, but it was excellent practice for a more vital occasion.

The nights were enlivened now and then by the *Vesuvius* going close in shore under the cover of darkness, to throw into the works two or three aerial torpedoes from her pneumatic guns. The detonation of these charges was terrific and their effect on shore must have suggested to the defenders something in the nature of an earthquake, as the concussion was sensibly felt on the *Brooklyn*. While the effect was not known at the time, there must have been a widespread demoralization among the enemy, and this is worth a great deal in war. Choosing a different hour each night, as Commander Pillsbury did, left the enemy uncertain when or where the attack was to be made, and it must have disturbed many hours of needed sleep.

The seizure and occupation of Guantanamo Bay and the landing of marines there took place during the second week in June. By this important movement a base for supplies was secured and the necessity for coaling at sea no longer existed. While it is true that the defenses of that port were of little consequence, the marine battalion, under Colonel Huntington, had

one or two sharp fights with the enemy on the high ground near the entrance, during which the enemy was forced back with considerable loss. The ground gained by the battalion in these fights was never retaken, but was held until the end of the war. The attack upon the fort up the river, towards Caimanera, on June 15th, by the *Texas*, *Marblehead* and *Suwanee*, resulted in driving the enemy out of it with no known loss. The main incident of this affair was the picking up of torpedoes by the screws of the *Texas* and *Marblehead* while in the shoal water near the mouth of the river. These torpedoes had been in the water so long that it is doubtful if they were serious menaces. In the first place, they were imperfectly made and so hastily laid that their value as a defense was inconsiderable.

On the 21st of June, the North Atlantic fleet, under Admiral Sampson's command, was divided into two squadrons, to wit:

First North Atlantic Squadron, Commodore J. C. Watson.

Second North Atlantic Squadron, Commodore W. S. Schley.

The squadron operating against Santiago had been separated into two squadrons, the first under Admiral Sampson, the second under Commodore Schley, for action against the fortifications, for blockading, and for battle with the Spanish squadron. This arrangement was maintained until the end of hostilities.

On June 20th, the transport fleet, bearing the Fifth Army Corps, under Major General W. R. Shafter, arrived off Santiago convoyed by a small squadron of war vessels. Some delay in the departure of this fleet had been caused by a report made by Lieutenant Southerland, of the *Eagle*, that he had seen several strange men-of-war and had been chased by a torpedo-boat on the night of June 7th. This report was supplemented by a similar report of the commander of the *Resolute* that his vessel had been chased a short time afterwards by four vessels. Both commanders hastened to Key West to report these occurrences to Washington. There was nothing in the report, however. It turned out to be a "will of the wisp" easily distorted into a mysterious Spanish vessel. In all probability the vessel seen was the English cruiser *Talbot*, on a cruise, but there was no torpedo-boat in chase of the *Eagle*. These reports had their effect, however, upon the sailing of the transport fleet, as the following telegram shows:

WASHINGTON, June 8, 1898.

The Spanish armored cruiser, first class, torpedo destroyers are reported by *Eagle* and *Resolute* yesterday and last night and therefore the army expedition is stopped temporarily. Convoy is distributed to scour the straits and reinforce the blockade of Cuba. Send two of your most fast armored vessels to search through Nicholas Channel, Cuba; . . . at Key West, and thence reinforce convoy too. We mean to start this as soon as strong enough, the delay being only temporary.

Are you sure all four Spanish armored cruisers are at Santiago? Six hundred marines, *Panther*, started for you last evening convoyed by Auxiliary No. 596 (*Yosemite*).

ALLEN,

Acting Secretary.

Before a suitable place to make a landing could be chosen, General Shafter made an examination of the coast from Daiquiri on the east to Asseradero on the west of the entrance to Santiago. The former was chosen, and the arrangement of war vessels to bombard the coast from Daiquiri to Cabañas to clear it of any Spanish force prepared to resist the landing was as follows:

At Cabañas—The *Scorpion*, *Vixen* and *Texas*.

At Aguadores—The *Eagle* and *Gloucester*.

At Altares—The *Hornet*, *Helena* and *Bancroft*.

At Daiquiri—The *Detroit*, *Castine*, *Wasp* and *New Orleans*.

The vessels thus assigned were to be in position at daylight on the morning of June 22d.

The *Brooklyn*, *Massachusetts*, *Oregon* and *Iowa* were required to maintain their blockading positions before the entrance in order vigilantly to guard against any attempt of the enemy to break through and escape while the opposing squadron was so widely dispersed on duty to cover the army landing. Captain C. F. Goodrich, of the *St. Louis*, was chosen to take charge of the operation of landing the army, and all the launches and boats of the squadron, some fifty in number, were sent to him for this purpose. This officer worked with such energy and skill that the army, with most of its supplies and many of its necessary animals, was put on shore in forty-eight hours. It was a work of much merit and deserved more than the niggardly mention made at the time. Effected as it was in the midst of every conceivable difficulty, it was a triumph of decision over every difficulty and demonstrated again that for a sailor's work there is

no one so good or so full of expedients in times of difficulty as the reliable sailor. There was no sort of doubt on the question in the minds of our comrades in the sister service on that eventful occasion.

The duty assigned to the *Texas* at Cabañas, west of the entrance, to make a feint at landing on June 22d, was challenged by the Socapa battery, which fired quite a number of shells, and did succeed for once in scoring a **hit**. One shell landed on board of her, killing one man and wounding eight others, but it was the first successful shot up to that time fired at the squadron in front of Santiago. It could hardly be expected that the enemy's firing would fail of purpose all the time.

The landing of the army having been effected, its advance, as well as that could be seen, or known from signals, was watched with intense interest from the blockading ships. At times, when the atmospheric conditions were favorable, the rattle of musketry or the reverberations of artillery would roll up over the tablelands skirting the coast and out to the squadron. To the practiced ear each time these sounds reached the ships they were interpreted in their greater distinctness to mean that every clash of arms brought our army closer to Santiago. This was indeed the case, after the manner of our interpretation.

From Daiquiri, Altares or Siboney, and Aguadores, the enemy's forces at these points were driven back by the spirited charges of our gallant army. Slowly but surely the army was extending its lines to enfold in its vigorous coil the doomed Santiago with its defenders. Fight after fight had resulted in demonstrating the superior morale of our army. With each setting sun its ranks were found in advanced positions nearer to its fated objective. And, although it trudged on over muddy roads, through morasses, drenched with rain, the ardor of these brave fellows failed not. At last it had gained a position where its next move must of necessity be against the last lines of defense guarding Santiago. This was after a brilliant series of movements and attacks ending about June 30th. On that day General Shafter indicated his purpose to attack the next morning in a communication from his headquarters on the San Juan River to Admiral Sampson, as follows:

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY CORPS,
CAMP NEAR SAN JUAN RIVER,
June 30, 1898.

SIR: I expect to attack Santiago to-morrow morning. I wish you would bombard the forts at Aguadores in support of a regiment of infantry which I shall send there early to-morrow, and also make such demonstration as you think proper at the mouth of the harbor, so as to keep as many of the enemy there as possible.

Very truly yours,
W. R. SHAFTER,
Major General, U. S. V., Com'd'g.

In conformity with this request, a formidable bombardment of the forts to the east and west of the entrance was begun by the squadron at 5.45 A. M. and continued until 7.45 on July 2d. During the terrific onslaught of our army the day before the enemy was driven back at all points, though with heavy loss to our men; and, although the bombardment of the forts produced no visible injury, yet from the squadron's position it could be seen that the moral effect of these operations had been disastrous to the enemy. His forces began to withdraw from their outposts on the high hills west of the harbor on the morning of July 2d, with the purpose of retreat to the defenses about the city before the right wing of our army could be extended to cut them off in its investment. On the morning of July 2d Admiral Sampson received this telegram from General Shafter:

Terrible fight yesterday, but my line is strongly entrenched three-quarters of a mile from town. I urge that you make effort immediately to force the entrance to avoid future losses among my men, which are already very heavy. You can now operate with less loss of life than I can. Please telephone answer.

W. R. SHAFTER,
Major General.

Accordingly the following message was telephoned:

GENERAL SHAFTER:

Admiral Sampson has this morning bombarded forts at entrance of Santiago, and also Punta Gorda Battery inside, silencing their fire. Do you wish further firing on his part? He began at 5.50, finished at 7.30. Your message to him here. Impossible to force entrance until we can clear channel of mines—a work of some time after forts are taken possession of by your troops. Nothing in this direction accomplished yesterday by the advance on Aguadores.

LIEUTENANT STAUNTON.

A rejoinder was made to this message from the army headquarters as follows:

It is impossible for me to say when I can take batteries at entrance to harbor. If they are as difficult to take as those we have been pitted against, it will be some time and a great loss of life. I am at a loss to see why the navy can not work under a destructive fire as well as the army. My loss yesterday was over 500 men. By all means keep up fire on all things in sight of you until demolished. I expect, however, in time and with sufficient men to capture the forts along the bay. SHAFTEE.

To this communication from the general the communication which follows was made by Admiral Sampson:

U. S. FLAGSHIP *New York*, 1ST RATE,
Off Santiago de Cuba, July 2, 1898.

No. 7.

MY DEAR GENERAL:

I have your note of this morning, just received at 11.30. An officer of my staff has already reported to you the firing which we did this morning, and I must say, in addition to that, he has told you that the forts which we silenced were not the forts which would give you any inconvenience in capturing the city, as they can not fire except to seaward. They can not even prevent our entrance into the harbor of Santiago. Our trouble from the first has been that the channel to the harbor is well strewn with observation mines which would certainly result in the sinking of one or more of our ships if we attempted to enter the harbor; and by the sinking of a ship the object of entering the harbor would be defeated by the preventing of further progress on our part.

It was my hope that an attack on your part of these shore batteries, from the rear, would leave us at liberty to drag the channel for torpedoes.

If it is your earnest desire that we should force the entrance, I will at once prepare to undertake it. I think, however, that our position and yours would be made more difficult if, as is possible, we fail in our attempt.

We have in our outfit at Guantanamo forty countermining mines which I will bring here with as little delay as possible, and if we can succeed in freeing the entrance of mines by their use I will enter the harbor

This work, which is unfamiliar to us, will require considerable time.

It is not so much the loss of men as it is the loss of ships which has until now deterred me from making a direct attack upon the ships within the port.

W. T. SAMPSON,
*Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Naval Force,
North Atlantic Station.*

At the western end of the blockade, held by the *Brooklyn*, a critical moment was deemed to have arrived. The falling back of the enemy from his outposts on the high hills west of the

Socapa battery, and the ascending columns of smoke in the harbor from the Spanish ships, showed clearly that they were dropping down towards the entrance, preparing to make a sortie. The commander of the Second Squadron was so much impressed by these unmistakable evidences of the enemy's intended purposes that the *Vixen* was called alongside about 5 o'clock in the afternoon of July 2d and sent with a verbal message to the commander-in-chief that the movements on the hills west, together with those indicated in the harbor, were suspicious in the extreme of the enemy's purpose. This message to the commander-in-chief must have been received by some one on board the flagship, for a reply was brought back from the *New York* to the *Brooklyn* directing a sharp lookout to be kept for any movement of the ships of the enemy.

We know now, what was unknown at the time, that during that very afternoon Cervera had summoned his captains on board his flagship to discuss the plan of sortie and to give them his instructions. From a signal made afterwards by one of his ships, "mejor de dia," which, interpreted, meant "it was better by day," the question appears to have been settled in favor of a sortie by day rather than by night.

After darkness had set in, the Cuban forces advanced upon the blockhouses abandoned by the Spanish in the afternoon and burned them in succession. Strangely enough, their number was six, the number corresponding to the ships in Cervera's fleet. Several of his officers construed this coincidence of numbers to be a signal from the insurgents to the American squadron out-side that a sortie was to be made by Cervera with six ships.

The fact was that no system of signals arranged with the insurgents about Santiago had ever been made known to the commander of the Flying Squadron during the blockade and operations in that vicinity. The glare of the burning blockhouses had no other meaning to us than the evident abandonment of the enemy's outer lines.

How often little things shape fortune! The mistake of choosing daylight instead of darkness for the sortie decided the fate of Cervera's squadron. If he had risked darkness for his movement, the action might have been different; at all events that question is full of ground for speculation.

CHAPTER XXVII

THE BATTLE OF SANTIAGO

JULY 3, 1898

AT about 8.45 A. M., of July 3, 1898, the flag orderly of the *Brooklyn* reported that a signal had been made from the *New York* to "Disregard movements of the commander-in-chief," and that the flagship had gone eastward at high speed; also, that the *Massachusetts* had withdrawn from the blockade during the middle watch (12 to 4 A. M.) and had gone eastward. Where either ship had gone, or for what purpose, had not been vouchsafed to the commander of the Second Squadron, whose flag, thus left on the blockading lines, in accordance with the naval regulations, constituted the commander of the Second Squadron the senior officer present in command.

The regulations of the navy settle that beyond any doubt, by fixing the responsibility of such officer when the service exigencies impose such duties upon him. The unwritten customs for centuries for governing or for controlling such matters have been gathered into a written code for the service guidance. The theory upon which all military organization is based, whether a squad or a squadron, is that no element of such organization can ever be left without a responsible commander, and no military exigency can occur in war when such a force is ever left without some one in control. The dates of commission held by officers is for the purpose of fixing this very question. The different gradations in the non-commissioned ranks are but the continuation of the line of command, in case the ravages of battle remove one after another in the commissioned grades. There must be some one upon whom the responsibility of success or defeat can be imposed.

From a confidential document under the title, "Executive C, Third Session, 55th Congress," a communication by Mr. Long respecting "advancements in the navy," it is seen that the

commander-in-chief's movements to Siboney on that morning were *under orders from the department to meet General Shafter*. This order then furnishes an explanation of the commander-in-chief's signal and subsequent movements eastward on July 3d. It supplies, too, evidence of temporary assignment to a new duty, taking him on shore to the headquarters of the army. It fixes incontestably, also, the status of the commander of the Second Squadron as senior officer present in command before Santiago after Sampson's withdrawal.

If the battle here related had miscarried, or if through mismanagement Cervera or any of his ships had escaped that day, there would have been no difficulty whatever about who was in command, or who would have had to bear the censure. It is as certain in that event that there would have been no effort to prove that the *New York* was within signal distance, no claim that it was a captains' battle, nor any other of the sophistries that were invented in the aftermath of controversy about this great victory.

No instance is recalled where great success was won in battle where every participant was not anxious to share in the glory, but no instance is remembered where any subordinate ever desired to share with his superior the odium of defeat. Santiago alone would be unique as one of the world's great battles won without anybody being in command. If defeat had occurred the commander of the Second Squadron would have had to take his medicine just the same.

While the squadron's strength was thus reduced, we know to-day, from the contributions of the Spanish officers, published afterwards by the Office of Naval Intelligence, and, therefore, official, that Captain Concas made a reconnoissance at the mouth of the harbor on the morning of the battle in order to learn the disposition of the American fleet. The absence of the *New York* and *Massachusetts* must have impressed him as giving Cervera the most opportune moment he had had for the sortie he made at 9.35 A. M. on July 3, 1898, when the Spanish squadron, regardless of the torpedoes in the channel, was discovered filing out.

The day chosen was beautiful, with occasional clouds passing across the skies. The land breeze seemed to have continued a little longer than usual off shore that morning. After break-

fasting, a little after 8 o'clock, a walk of a few moments was taken on deck to survey the situation with glasses. The *Brooklyn* was lying at this time about 6,000 yards from the Morro, on a line bearing northeast by north and southwest by south, her assigned position.

Going below for a few moments to change into Sunday rig, then returning on deck to a seat under a small awning spread on the after part of the quarter-deck to protect the officers from the great heat of the sun as it mounted higher and higher in its course across the sky, a more careful survey of the situation was made by the commander. Only a little while afterwards a call was heard from the forward bridge to the after one to "tell the Commodore that the Spanish fleet are coming out!" The time of this call from the forward bridge is fixed by the fact that it was Sunday morning, and that, as customary, the crew had been called to inspection at 9.30 A. M., and that the crew had assembled. It could not have been later than 9.35 A. M. that the sortie was reported.

The *Brooklyn's* head at this moment was in the direction of Cabañas Cove, to the westward of the entrance to Santiago, or to the westward of north. The enemy's ships were seen from the starboard side of the *Brooklyn's* quarter-deck coming out. The *Texas* was approximately a point or more abaft the *Brooklyn's* starboard beam, heading to the eastward. The *Iowa* was slightly ahead of the *Texas*, or, looking from the *Brooklyn*, to the left of the *Texas* and eastward. The *Oregon* was east again of the *Iowa*. The *Indiana* was still east of the *Oregon*, while the *Gloucester* appeared to be lying near Aguadores, and the *Vixen* near Cabañas. The *New York* was out of sight and signal distance, even with glasses from the forward bridge. She was in the bight at Siboney, ten or eleven miles eastward of the Santiago entrance. There is no doubt about this fact, which had to be decided in order to determine the authority the commander of the Second Squadron had to exercise in the action then to be fought.

Position was taken on a wooden platform, caused to be built some weeks before around the conning tower and raised about three feet above the deck, in order to be in touch with Captain Cook during battle and for better observation of the field. Only

a few moments had elapsed when Captain Cook joined the commander of the Second Squadron. Mr. Hodgson, the navigating officer, sang out from the bridge to the captain something about being connected up, and to the commander of the Second Squadron, "Commodore, they are coming right at us!" He was directed to "go right for them!" As the helm had been put apart, to bring the *Brooklyn's* head towards the Spanish squadron, the order was given to Cook: "Ahead, full speed!" and to the flag lieutenant to signal, "Clear ship for action," that being done to get rid of temporary railings and awnings and to protect the crew, following that signal with "Close up," or "Close action," explaining quickly to Cook the nature of these signals, and directing him to maintain the action at about 1,000 yards, so as to be a little outside the effective torpedo range of the Spanish vessels. Much was to depend upon the *Brooklyn* that day, in the absence of the *New York*, which was the only other ship with sufficient speed to have kept up if our lines had been broken through, as indeed did happen.

Captain Cook replied that "we should soon be in the cross-fire of our own ships." His attention was called to the possible dashes of torpedo boats, and it is recalled that he directed Lieutenant Commander Mason to detail two or three rapid-fire guns for especial use against them if any such attempts were made. The first gun from the *Brooklyn* was fired by Lieutenant Simpson from the forward turret, almost directly over the bow.

✕ The leading ship, *Teresa*, evidently intended to ram, and we now know that this was the Spanish plan of battle; but, being driven off by the rapid fire, she made a sudden rank sheer to the westward, leaving a small gap between herself and the ship immediately following, which was recognized afterwards as the *Viscaya*. The distance at this time was reported to be 900 yards, but for some reason the *Viscaya*, also intending to ram, gave up the idea and sheered westward to follow the *Teresa*.

The *Brooklyn* was steering a course diametrically opposite to that steered by the Spanish fleet, and it was apparent that the original plan, to rush in upon the enemy as his squadron was emerging from the channel and sink it, had failed. The Spanish squadron had practically broken through and passed the battleship line, thereby creating a new situation in the fight,

and one that had to be met at once to prevent their escape. A new disposition, therefore, had to be made instantly in order to meet the new condition after the failure of the first plan. Cook, under his general instructions, had perceived the situation and gave the order "Hard aport!" anticipating by a few seconds a similar order the commander of the Second Squadron would have given. Flag Lieutenant Sears was ordered to hoist signal, "Follow the flag," which Clark saw, obeyed and repeated.

The *Brooklyn* swung rapidly and continuously around to the westward through a little more than half her tactical diameter, to W.S.W.—the full tactical diameter being the diameter of the circle she would have turned through if she had returned to the course N.E. by N., from which she was started. The order to port the helm was not given by the commander of the Second Squadron, though it was the proper military maneuver under the circumstances. It met with his approval, and saved the day beyond any doubt. But, observing that the *Brooklyn's* bow was swinging rapidly to starboard, the inquiry was made of Captain Cook whether the "helm was hard aport!" The proximity of the *Brooklyn*, at the time of the turn, to the second ship, afterwards recognized as the *Viscaya*, is remembered distinctly from the fact that a number of men were running on her decks between the superstructure and her forward turret, and that daylight was observed by the naked eye between their legs as they ran.

There was no colloquy of any kind, or of any character, with any one at the time about the turn, and none would have been permitted with any officer. That was one of many fictions that grew up among others six or eight months after the fight. Among them was the *Texas* incident. That ship was never for a moment in the least danger from the *Brooklyn*. During the turn, her distance was never nearer than five or six hundred yards from the *Brooklyn*. Some testimony before the court of inquiry, in 1901, placed her at much greater distance. During the turn the starboard side of the *Texas* was never seen from the *Brooklyn* at all.

As recalled to-day, the leading ship of the Spanish squadron was a little abaft the port beam of the *Brooklyn* before the turn began, and, when the half-circle had been turned through, that

vessel was ahead on the *Brooklyn's* starboard bow. All four of the Spanish ships and the Socapa battery were firing at the *Brooklyn*, for it is remembered distinctly that the jets of water from impinging shells around the *Brooklyn* were countless, and the unbroken roar of projectiles passing over her was akin to that of a passing train of cars. Up to this moment of the action there was not the slightest evidence perceptible that the enemy's ships had been injured. It was apprehended that, notwithstanding our vigilance and waiting, those ships had broken through our lines and would escape.

It was felt and remarked at that time to Captain Cook that we were alone in the fight and would, perhaps, have to bear the brunt alone, as it was not thought that any of the battleships could develop speed enough to keep up. There was hardly any hope that the *Brooklyn* alone could withstand the continuous artillery fire of the Spanish fleet; nevertheless it was determined to stay with them, be the consequences what they might. After a few moments, the enemy's ships appeared to have broken up a little, though still in some formation. Looking astern at this moment, the *Oregon* was seen breaking through the cloud of smoke enveloping the entire field of battle. She had what sailors call "a tremendous bone in her mouth," and was following the flag, as Clark had seen the signals "Follow the flag" and "Close up." This brought a change in the situation, and from that moment the result was in no degree doubtful.

For the next fifteen minutes, with Clark on the *Brooklyn's* quarter, the fighting was terrific. Both ships were a sheet of flame fore and aft, and what rapid gun-fire meant was truly realized. Not many minutes had passed in this terrific onslaught before the leading ship of the enemy was observed to be badly hurt and wabbling like a bird wounded, and apparently lagging. Smoke was seen issuing from her ports, and, but a few minutes afterwards, from her hatches, in columns mounting straight into the air. It was ominous of her end in the fight, and clear that one of the enemy had been knocked out. It was remarked to Cook, standing near, that "We have got one. Keep the boys below informed of all the movements. They can't see, and they want to know." Cook did this every few moments throughout the action, and the cheering that reached the bridge

indicated the delight of those below. The *Teresa* turned in for the beach, on fire fore and aft, and ran ashore about six miles west of the entrance to Santiago.

It appeared to be only a short interval of time afterwards when a second ship, the *Oquendo*, was observed to be on fire. She, too, had suffered severely, and, like the first, wobbled for a while and then turned inshore on fire, and was beached about half a mile west of the *Teresa*. She had been riddled with shells. This left the *Viscaya* and *Colon*. The former took a position in the lead to the westward, on the *Brooklyn's* starboard bow, appearing for a while to outfoot the *Brooklyn* and *Oregon*; but it was not so, in fact. The *Colon* worked more inshore towards the beach out of the fire, and from the time the first two ships had dropped out of the fight until the *Viscaya* had turned in to the beach, on fire and beaten, was perhaps thirty minutes. During this duel the *Brooklyn* and the *Oregon* had so gained on the retreating ships that the *Viscaya* was abeam, or nearly so. She had been savagely punished in the interim, and, only a moment before turning in, she appeared to turn as if coming towards the *Brooklyn* and *Oregon*, but at this moment a heavy explosion under her port bow took place, doubtless from a shell from one of the opposing ships. Then she turned inshore, with a list to port so marked it was thought she would capsize in deep water. Her colors were hauled down and she fled in her turn inshore, on fire fore and aft, and was beached on the reef at Asseraderos about fifteen or sixteen miles west of Santiago.

During the terrific onslaught of the Spanish column, after the *Brooklyn's* turn, all the signal halyards were shot away, and in the solicitude felt for the safety of the *Viscaya's* people, the signal officer, Ensign Edward McCauley, was directed to make signal to the *Texas* to save the people of the *Viscaya*. In a few minutes McCauley returned and reported that, during the ferocious onslaught of the Spanish ships to the eastward, the signal halyards had been shot away and that the *Texas* was so far astern he had been unable to attract her attention with the "wig-wag," as the army code is known on board ship.

The observation was made to him, "Never mind, Philip is always sensible; he needs no instruction about such things." During the onslaught referred to, the iron speed-cone fell,

striking the rail of the bridge where the commander of the Second Squadron was standing. Its halyards having been shot away, the cone fell from the signal yard-arm, and, if it had struck any one, serious if not fatal injury would have resulted from the blow.

During the engagement with the *Viscaya*, the smoke at times was so dense that inquiry was made of one of the marines in the forward military top as to the effect of the fire upon that ship. His reply, that he could see none of the shots striking the water, left the impression that they must then be striking that ship. It proved to be correct. Being anxious, too, about the ranges, that neither the *Viscaya* nor the *Colon* should get out of good fighting range, descent was made to the platform on the deck below, around the outside of the fighting tower, where Yeoman Ellis was stationed to give the ranges shown by the stadimeter to the captain, who communicated them from time to time during the battle to the different divisions. Ellis reported that the *Brooklyn* was maintaining about the same range, but, to eyes sensitively trained in judging distances, it appeared that the interval was growing somewhat.

Ellis went towards the side a second time to verify the range. He had advanced only a few feet when he was struck in the face by a large shell, and fell, instantly dead, only a few feet away. It was a shocking scene to those who had never before witnessed such things. Ensign McCauley and Dr. DeValin, who were near by, picked up the headless body and carried it to the ship's side. At that moment, happening to look in that direction and divining their intention to throw the body overboard, of course thoughtlessly, the order was given, "No! Do not throw that body overboard! One who has fallen so gallantly deserves the honors of Christian burial!" The body was reverently laid beside the turret and covered over till place and time could be found to bury it with the honors of war after the battle was over.

The *Colon* was left, and had worked her way in close to the *Brooklyn*, apparently as if seeking some favorable place to run aground to save the crew and escape. It was surmised that the *Brooklyn* crew had witnessed astern, as one after another of the ships of the second squadron had been vanquished and had fled to the


beach, had suggested to her commander the utter uselessness of attempting further resistance when he could end matters at once. Signal was made to cease firing, and instructions were given to let the men have a hasty luncheon in the cooler air above decks, after the *Viscaya* had been driven from the combat, it being evident that the *Colon* could not escape. Before the end came to the *Colon*, in the chase outward to the Tarquino River, directions were given to get up a number of extra rounds for the battery, so that, should the remaining ship venture out of the light to escape, she must pass very close, when the *Brooklyn* would be able to pump iron into her for a few minutes, which would end her in short order. Cook suggested also, that even if she did, unluckily, escape, the victory already gained was overwhelming; but when Nelson's disappointment over the escape of two ships at Aboukir Bay was recalled, he agreed with the commander of the Second Squadron that, if necessary, the *Brooklyn* should chase her to Cadiz.

It was noticed, also, that the motion of the ship in rolling was not natural, and this suggested an examination of the compartments below by the carpenter, which developed the fact that the after compartment was full of water, thought to be due to some injury below the water-line. As the extent of the damage or its cause was not known, it was held to be wiser to wait until the ship could reach smoother water, to facilitate better handling, if the damage should be found to be under water.

As ship after ship fell out of the line of battle, they were disregarded, as it was felt that those vessels which were unable to keep up the pace of the *Brooklyn* and *Oregon* would take care to save the prisoners.

After the first few moments of the battle, the field was so covered with smoke that the *Indiana* and *Gloucester* could not be seen, except occasionally. They were seen advancing and were believed to be doing good work, but the battle changed so rapidly westward that their share in the work of the day was not immediately under the eye of the commander of the Second Squadron.

About 12.50 P. M. the *Brooklyn* and *Oregon* had overhauled the *Colon* so much as to have her in range of the thirteen- and eight-inch guns of both ships. Signal was made to the *Oregon* to try her thirteen-inch guns, with the result that the first shell



SKETCH SHOWING EXTERNAL INJURIES SUSTAINED BY THE *BROOKLYN* DURING THE ACTION WITH THE SPANISH SQUADRON OFF THE SOUTHERN COAST OF CUBA, JULY 3, 1898

fell apparently close under the *Colon's* stern. Another passed over and beyond her. An eight-inch shell from the *Brooklyn* passed over her, and others from both ships fell close. One of the eight-inch shells from the *Brooklyn* fell beyond, as the jet of water when it impinged was seen plainly from the bridge beyond the *Colon*. This firing appeared to convince Captain Morou of the *Colon* that further resistance was hopeless, so he caused a gun to be fired to leeward, a signal of surrender, hauled down his flag and ran his ship ashore, at 1.15 P. M., on the bar at the mouth of the Tarquino River, distant about forty-three miles from the entrance to Santiago, off which the *Virginus* had been seized, some twenty-five years before, and carried into Santiago, where many of her crew were shot by General Burriel's orders.

Signal was made to "Cease firing; the enemy has surrendered." Both the *Brooklyn* and *Oregon* bore down upon the *Colon*, and were within a few hundred yards of her about 1.30 P. M., with the batteries of both ships trained upon her. A boat was lowered as quickly as possible, and Captain F. A. Cook was sent on board to demand unconditional surrender. The flag lieutenant, Lieutenant B. W. Wells, Ensign Halligan, and Boatswain Hill accompanied Captain Cook to assist him in the ceremonies of the surrender.

The fight having ended at 1.15 P. M., a natural interest in the vessels following prompted a survey of the horizon with glasses. The masts of two ships and the smoke only of a third were descried away on the horizon. Later, the first two were discovered to be the *Texas* and *Vixen*. The third, whose smoke was visible, proved to be the *New York*, which arrived on the scene at 2.23 P. M., one hour and eight minutes after the battle had ended. If the *New York* was making at that time the speed of seventeen knots, as Captain Chadwick reported in his letter dated July 29, 1898, to the commander-in-chief at Guantanamo, then at the time of the *Colon's* surrender she could not have been nearer than about nineteen miles—too far to be within seeing distance, and too far away to be anywhere within signal distance when this great battle ended.

A conspicuous figure on board the *Brooklyn* in that day's fight was Mr. Geo. E. Graham, of Albany, N. Y., the correspondent of the Associated Press. Though short in stature, Mr.

Graham was long in courage. In the smoke and din of battle he fearlessly sought the best point of observation to record the incidents of the action. He was the only correspondent with the fleet who witnessed the combat under fire from beginning to end, or whose account of the battle was written from observation of its details from the very commencement to the final gun fired.

The grand result of the day was that the *Brooklyn* and the *Oregon* won a renown which can not be "impugned by disappointment, or mitigated by jealousy, or contemned by envy as long as justice holds empire in the reason of our countrymen!"

CHAPTER XXVIII

AFTER THE BATTLE

1898

As the *New York* was approaching the final scene of the tragedy, signal was made from the *Brooklyn*, "We have gained a great victory; details will be communicated." This signal was kept flying quite a half hour before it was answered by the *New York*, but the omission was thought to arise from the fact that the signal could not be read at the distance the *New York* was. When it was answered, however, it was in the form of an order to "Report your casualties." It is to be regretted that no word of congratulation, so much valued by men and officers on such occasions, issued from the flagship. Notwithstanding this, at 2.15 P. M., while the *New York* was still some two miles away, another signal was made from the *Brooklyn*, "This is a great day for our country!" This signal was merely acknowledged with an answering pennant, but no answer otherwise was made.

At 2.23 P. M. the *New York* arrived and steamed into a position between the *Brooklyn* and the *Colon*. Cook had been detained for some time on board the *Colon* in arranging the surrender; when this was concluded, he was returning as the *New York* arrived and was ordered on board that ship to make a report. As Cook's orders were given by the commander of the Second Squadron, it would have relieved the official records of an error if the latter officer had been able to say that no orders had been given by him that the Spanish officers in surrendering unconditionally should retain their effects. It would have given the opportunity to state that the *Oregon* did not take a "front position in the chase." The *Oregon's* services on the day of battle were superb; her position was always close to the *Brooklyn* from beginning to end, but she was at no time ahead. Clark's testimony at the inquiry, three years afterwards, is conclusive upon this point, and settles for all time the *Oregon's* position as well

as the part taken by the two ships in the result of the day's battle.

As soon as Cook returned from the *New York*, the commander of the Second Squadron went in the same boat to the *New York* to report, as customary. As this boat shoved off from the ship's side, with the commodore's pennant flying from a staff in the bow, the crews of the *Brooklyn*, *Oregon*, *Texas* and *Vixen* manned the rail, shouting in tumultuous huzzas that fairly shook the air. It was a tribute of confidence, an expression of approval in the very smoke of battle, that can not be dimmed or diminished by envious disappointments shown afterwards.

Arriving on board the *New York*, the commander-in-chief received the commander of the Second Squadron. Very naturally, he appeared to be disappointed that an unfortunate circumstance had prevented the *New York* from participating in the glories of that day's work. After running hastily over the events of the battle, the suggestion was made to hoist our flag over the *Colon*, coupled with the offer of the boat flag of the *Brooklyn's* boat for that purpose. This was declined by Captain Chadwick, who had a flag of the *New York* brought up from below for this duty. Several officers of the *New York* were on the opposite side of the quarter-deck, and appeared anxious to hear the incidents of the battle.

While they were being narrated, the chaplain came over to that side and said, "Commodore, your work is not over yet! The *Resolute* has just arrived. Captain Eaton reports that there is a Spanish battleship on the coast and the admiral wants to see you." Going immediately to where Admiral Sampson was sitting, Captain Clark was met. Sampson directed the *Brooklyn* and *Oregon* to go eastward to meet this supposed newcomer and engage her. Before leaving the *New York*, the suggestion was made to the admiral that all preparations had been made on the *Brooklyn* before his arrival for sending a force of mechanics, marines and seamen to take possession of the *Colon* in order to prevent injury. This suggestion arose from the fact that, on approaching the stranded ship, there had been seen perceptible evidence that things were being thrown overboard. The absence of a number of breech-blocks from the battery afterwards clearly indicated that this inference was correct. It was believed that

this destruction would not be confined to the guns alone, but that, in the state of demoralization at that moment on board her, advantage would be taken to destroy piping, pumps and other things easily injured or broken in the engine compartments.

The incident of the visit made to the flagship on that 3d of July after our signal victory recalls another made after the great battle of St. Vincent, more than a hundred years before, when the immortal Nelson went on board the flagship *Victory* to present to his commander-in-chief, Sir John Jervis, the sword of the Spanish admiral. Nelson, in that battle, "wore ship," turning away from the Spanish fleet, and thus increased his distance from it by the tactical diameter of his vessel, instead of "tacking" and turning in towards the enemy. Grand old Jervis took Nelson in his arms, saying he could not thank him enough, but insisted that Nelson should retain the sword he had so valiantly won. The sequel is a matter of history, also, that Captain Calder of the *Victory*, chief of staff, suggested to Admiral Jervis, that night in the cabin of the flagship, that Nelson had rendered himself liable to a court-martial for disobeying the "order of battle." The valiant old admiral is reported to have replied, "If you ever disobey orders in the same way, I will forgive you."

But more significant still is the fact that this selfsame chief of staff, who had suggested to the admiral the liability of Nelson to court-martial for doing what was thought proper at St. Vincent, as a vice admiral, afterwards, in 1805, was deprived of his command of a fleet of some nineteen ships for failing to improve the opportunity on June 22d, of that year, to destroy the fleet of Villeneuve, which Nelson met, overwhelmed and almost annihilated four months later at Trafalgar.

The victory of July 3d, at Santiago de Cuba, was even more decisive than St. Vincent or Trafalgar, in that every ship of the enemy was destroyed and the entire personnel, from the admiral to the least of the seamen, with few exceptions, was captured. It resulted in the expulsion of the Spanish flag from the waters of the American continent. It was a means to peace.

After receipt of the admiral's order to seek and engage the Spanish battleship reported on the coast, a hasty call was made alongside the *Texas* to obtain the services of her chaplain to

bury poor Ellis. The commander of the Second Squadron then proceeded to the *Brooklyn*, which Cook soon had under way. Signal was made to the *Oregon* to "follow the flag," and the *Brooklyn* proceeded at high speed eastward. It was observed in a short time that the *Oregon* did not follow, the inference being that she had been detained for some service by the admiral, who considered the *Brooklyn* quite sufficient for the work. It was held to be a high compliment to her officers and men, always ready and enthusiastic for any duty. If, as was stated afterwards, it was known on the *New York* at the time that the reported stranger was not an enemy, then the question is pertinent why the *Brooklyn* should have been sent away at all.

About an hour after the *Brooklyn* left the Tarquino River, a vessel was descried to the eastward hastening to the westward. She proved later to be the *Vixen*, with Flag Lieutenant Staunton on board. She came alongside within close hailing distance, when Mr. Staunton reported that the smoke seen ahead to the eastward was that of the *Pelayo*; that he had gone close enough to distinguish her colors, and that he was sure she was this Spanish battleship. He was directed to go west and report to the admiral that the *Brooklyn* would go on to the eastward, meet and engage the *Pelayo*. While approaching this supposed enemy, with the crew at quarters for battle, the guns of the battery trained upon her, it must be confessed it was not easy to distinguish the colors she wore at the stern or masthead, the Spanish and Austrian flags being similar, the only difference existing in the color of the middle horizontal stripe, which in the Spanish flag is yellow and in the Austrian white.

Both ships were well in to the coast, and as several guns and gun-mounts of the *Brooklyn's* starboard battery had been disabled in the three or more hours' fight in the morning, it was decided to fight the port battery, and, as the *Kearsarge* and *Alabama* had done, in a circle. To do this, distance had to be gained offshore by putting the helm again to port, to bring the enemy on the *Brooklyn's* port side, when, lo and behold, the enemy put her helm to starboard with the same intent, that is, to gain distance from the coast in order to meet the *Brooklyn's* move for more room in which to maneuver. This movement appeared to fix the fact that she was looking for the *Brooklyn*.

As it was near dark, it was observed that the search-lights of the stranger were projected upward to her flags at the masts-heads. But the *Brooklyn* being in good point-blank range, no time was to be lost in giving the first blow. Accordingly the order was given to Cook to "stand by to begin firing." At this critical moment, the signal officer, Ensign Edward McCauley, called out, "Commodore, she is making a signal!" This occurred not a moment too soon. The order to Cook, "Avast," averted a dreadful calamity, for a second later every gun of the *Brooklyn's* port battery would have hurled its message of death into another *Infanta Maria Teresa*, but this time of the friendly power of Austria!

As soon as the vessel's nationality had been discovered, the *Brooklyn's* guns were trained off, and she approached the friendly ship, whose commanding officer came on board, explaining that he had run the gantlet from Daiquiri to seek the commander-in-chief in order to obtain permission to go into Santiago to carry out Austrian subjects. Though there was no objection to this, the presence of foreign warships at such times was an embarrassment to those who had to fight. It was suggested that it was doubtful if the enemy would permit him to enter the harbor, owing to the torpedo mines in the channel, and that it would be wiser to withdraw to sea during the night and not attempt to approach the line of the blockade, as the ship could not be furnished with the night-signal countersign, and if the commander should attempt to do so without it, he would surely be fired upon. The ship withdrew some twenty miles to sea for that night, and the next morning the enemy refused to allow it to pass the channel.

One of the incidents of the approach of these two vessels was that, as soon as the stranger's hull became visible, it was perceived that she was a turreted ship of the class of the *Cisneros*, or *Carlos V*. As the *Pelayo* was a barbette ship, there was some relief that the *Brooklyn* would have an easier job. When her nationality became known, there was some disappointment among the splendid crew of the *Brooklyn*, for having lost a chance to prove their worth when alone.

Proceeding eastward, as it was felt that, with the commander-in-chief at the wreck of the *Colon*, the proper place for the

second in command was before Santiago, the torpedo-boat *Dupont*, Lieutenant W. W. Kimball commanding, was met proceeding to the westward in quest of the commander-in-chief. From a signal at 4.25 from the *New York* to the *Brooklyn*, "Will remain in charge of prize," the information was given Kimball that the flagship was at the Tarquino River.

The *Brooklyn* continued eastward, and about 10 P. M. passed the *Viscaya*, still in flames. Just as the *Brooklyn* was abreast of her a heavy explosion occurred on board, which was thought at the time to come from one of the magazines. It was her last salute to her old enemy.

Captain Taylor inquired the fate of the *Colon*, and when the answer was returned that she had surrendered at 1.15 that afternoon, his ship's company cheered heartily. Captain Evans of the *Iowa* reported that Cervera and a number of prisoners were on board his ship. A call was made upon Admiral Cervera about midnight. During this interview it was suggested that he had lost all, except his honor; that if he would make use of the wardrobe, or the purse, of the commander of the Second Squadron, both were at his disposal. The admiral appeared to be much touched at this offer of assistance, and replied that the officers and men of the *Iowa* had taken care to provide them with clothing, and added that he "had never met a sailor who was not a gentleman"! He stated that he would like authority to send a despatch to the captain general announcing his disaster. This despatch was as follows, and was sent as he had requested:

CAPTAIN GENERAL, HAVANA:

In compliance with your excellency's orders, I went out from Santiago yesterday morning with the whole squadron, and after an unequal battle against forces more than three times as large as mine my whole squadron was destroyed. *Teresa*, *Oquendo*, and *Viscaya*, all with fire on board, ran ashore. *Colon*, according to information from Americans, ran ashore and surrendered. The destroyers sunk. Do not know as yet loss of men, but surely 600 killed and many wounded (proportion of latter not so large). The survivors are United States prisoners. Gallantry of all the crews has earned most enthusiastic congratulations of enemy. Captain of *Viscaya* was allowed to retain his sword. I feel very grateful for generosity and courtesy with which they treat us. Among dead is Villamil, and, I believe, Lazaga. Concas and Eulate wounded. We have lost everything, and I shall need funds.

CERVERA.

PLATA DEL ESTE, July 4, 1898.

After leaving the *Iowa*, a call was made upon Commodore J. C. Watson, who had proceeded from Guantanamo with the *Marblehead*, to take charge of matters during the absence of the commander-in-chief. The great enthusiasm of everybody over the magnificent victory of the day kept sleep from the eyes of almost every one until the dawn of the following day, July 4th, which was a day near and dear to Americans. The flag seemed more beautiful at sunrise for the new glories won under its folds the day before.

Weary with fatigue, and with the mucous membrane of throat and nose sore from ammonia gas released in the powder smoke of battle, it was some time before the commander of the Second Squadron fell to sleep, but it seemed only for a short period, when the flag lieutenant, a little after daylight, aroused him to announce the presence on board of the commanding officer of a British corvette, just arrived on the blockading line from Jamaica, who desired to pay his respects. While the interview was limited to a few minutes only, it was improved by the visitor to add his congratulations upon the result of the day before, as well as to express his assurance that he had never for a moment regarded the Spanish Navy as in our class.

From the signal made to the *Brooklyn*, as she set out from Tarquino River, the purpose of the commander-in-chief to remain by the *Colon*, in order to transfer her crew to the vessels left there, was clear. Therefore, after the duty assigned had been completed, the *Brooklyn* proceeded to Santiago, her proper station under the circumstances. The absolute annihilation of the Spanish squadron, with the capture of its entire personnel, was so full of consequence and so important to the nation that the thought occurred that it ought to be cabled home, with the added information that the commander-in-chief was at the time with the *Colon*, but would transmit details later, on his arrival.

With this idea in view, Flag Lieutenant Jas. H. Sears was sent to the cable station, at Siboney, with a telegram to that end. His instructions were that if no message from the admiral announcing the victory had been sent, he was to send the one he bore; but if such message had already been sent he was to return without sending the one entrusted to him. The message referred to was as follows:

SANTIAGO, July 3, 1898.

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, WASHINGTON:

Spanish squadron came out of Santiago Harbor this morning, July 3d, at 9.30, and were all captured or destroyed in a running fight to the westward of about three and one-half hours.

Very few casualties in our fleet; Ellis, chief yeoman, killed, and one man wounded on the *Brooklyn*. Reports from other ships not yet in. Commander-in-chief now superintending transfer of prisoners from *Cristobal Colon*, which surrendered to the *Brooklyn* and *Oregon* at 1.15 P. M. Victory complete. Details later. Several water-tight compartments of the *Brooklyn* filled with water. Probably pierced or strained.

SCHLEY.

When Lieutenant Sears returned he brought back the above telegram and reported that he had met Lieutenant Staunton on the beach with a telegram from the commander-in-chief, and had accompanied him to the cable station, at Siboney, and that, under the writer's instructions, he had not sent the one entrusted to him.

When Mr. Staunton read the telegram, which was afterwards so much criticized, Mr. Sears suggested a correction in the time of the *Colon's* surrender, which occurred at 1.15 P. M., instead of 2 P. M., as was named in this despatch. Sears also suggested that Ellis, the only man killed in the American squadron in the action, ought to be mentioned, but how entirely these suggestions were ignored is shown in the telegram sent:

No. 156.

July 3, 1898.

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, WASHINGTON:

The fleet under my command offers the nation as a Fourth of July present the whole of the Spanish fleet. It attempted to escape at 9.30 A. M. this morning. At 2 the last ship, the *Cristobal Colon*, had run ashore 75 miles west of Santiago and hauled down her colors. The *Infanta Maria Teresa*, *Oquendo*, and *Viscaya* were forced ashore, burned and blown up, within 20 miles of Santiago. The *Pluton* and *Furor* were destroyed within 4 miles of the port.

SAMPSON.

Commodore Watson, impressed alike with the commander of the Second Squadron, felt that the victory was of such magnitude and importance to the nation, that he ought to transmit, as he did earlier in the day, the following telegram:

PLAYA DEL ESTE,
July 3, 1898.

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, WASHINGTON:

At 9.30 A. M. to-day, Spanish squadron, seven in all, including one gun-boat, came out of Santiago in column and was totally destroyed within an hour, excepting *Cristobal Colon*, which was chased forty-five miles to westward by commander-in-chief, *Brooklyn*, *Oregon*, and *Texas*, surrendering to *Brooklyn*, but was beached to prevent sinking. None of our officers or men were injured, except aboard *Brooklyn* Chief Yeoman Ellis was killed and one man wounded. Admiral Cervera, all commanding officers excepting of *Oquendo*, about seventy other officers and 1,600 men are prisoners. About 350 killed or drowned and 160 wounded; latter cared for on *Solace* and *Olivette*. Have just arrived off Santiago in *Marblehead* to take charge while commander-in-chief is looking out for *Cristobal Colon*.

WATSON.

It ought to be stated that the first intelligence which reached Guantanamo on the morning of the fight was to the effect that Cervera's squadron had outwitted the American squadron blockading Santiago and had escaped. There was much regret expressed then for those who would have had to answer for that bit of bad luck, and not a little relief was felt that no official censure could include those who were not present off Santiago at the time.

The *New York* returned from Tarquino to the blockading line off Santiago on the morning of July 4th, and reported the total loss of the *Cristobal Colon*, which had capsized on account of her under-water compartments having filled with water, this being due to injuries done to her piping in the engine and fire rooms and believed to have been the work of her own crew.

As the *Brooklyn's* injuries needed to be looked after in smooth water, she was directed to proceed to Guantanamo, but before starting finally for that place on the afternoon of July 4th, a preliminary report of the action of the day before, giving fuller details, was addressed to the commander-in-chief, in order to enable him to make a more detailed report of this great victory. It was all the more important that fuller details should be in his hands, from the fact that the battle of the day before, from beginning to end, took place out of signal distance from the *New York* and could only have been observed on that vessel from the smoke rising far beyond her horizon. This report, reproduced from the official press copybook of the *Brooklyn*, is as follows:

NORTH ATLANTIC FLEET,
SECOND SQUADRON,
Flagship *Brooklyn*, off Santiago de Cuba,
July 3, 1898.

SIR: I have the honor to make the following preliminary report of the engagement this morning:

(1) At 9.30 o'clock Admiral Cervera, with the *Infanta Maria Teresa*, *Viscaya*, *Almirante Oquendo*, *Oristobal Colon*, with the torpedo-boat destroyers, attempted to escape from Santiago Harbor.

Signal was made at once for "close action," which was promptly responded to by the *Brooklyn*, *Indiana*, *Oregon*, *Iowa*, *Gloucester*, *Texas*, and *Vixen*.

The squadron, after clearing the harbor, stood to the westward, but was engaged at close range (from 1,100 to 3,000 yards for most of the time), and in about twenty minutes the *Oquendo* and *Viscaya* * were set on fire by shells of the squadron and were forced to run ashore, where they burned and blew up later in the night. Of the destroyers, one was sunk and the other set on fire by our shells and burned on the beach.

(2) The flagship * *Infanta Maria Teresa*, with Admiral Cervera, and the *Colon* were engaged in a running fight with the *Brooklyn*, *Oregon*, *Texas*, *Iowa* for some thirty-five minutes when the Spanish flagship was set on fire, the Spanish being obliged to beach her. The *Brooklyn* and *Oregon* continued the chase and fight, gradually drawing away from the other ships, until 1.15 p. m., when the *Colon* was beached and struck her colors to the *Brooklyn* and *Oregon*.

(3) The *Brooklyn* was exposed for some twenty minutes to the fire of the four Spanish ships until the other vessels of the squadron could get up into good range. I can not speak with too much praise of the conduct of the officers and crews of the vessels engaged; their spirit and enthusiasm were such as I have rarely seen in action.

(4) I would especially mention Captain Philip, Captain Evans, Captain Taylor, Captain Cook, and Captain Clark for exceedingly meritorious conduct on the occasion; their ships were handled superbly, and their officers and crews responded nobly. Lieutenant Commander Wainwright, commanding the *Gloucester*, and Lieutenant Sharp, commanding the *Vixen*, acted with conspicuous gallantry, and, though not able to engage the heavier ships, they were close in on the battle line.

(5) Admiral Cervera and his officers, with about 1,200 men, were captured, and he informed me that his loss in killed was about 450. Our casualties were one killed and one wounded on board the *Brooklyn*, and no one else was hurt in the squadron, although this ship was struck † twenty-five times.

* The similar rig, size, and appearance of the *Viscaya* and *Teresa* made it difficult at the time to distinguish one from the other.

† Later examination discovered thirty shot had struck the *Brooklyn*.

(6) In order to make a complete and additional report, I would suggest that you direct the commanding officers of vessels of the First Squadron to send copies of their reports on the engagement to me.

Very respectfully,

W. S. SCHLEY,

Commodore, U. S. N.,

Commander Second Squadron.

The Commander-in-Chief,
U. S. Naval Force, N. A. Station.

This preliminary report the commander-in-chief asked to have withdrawn, with the suggestion that some reference might be made to the *New York*, and intimating that the *Indiana* and *Gloucester* were nearest the *New York*.

The report speaks for itself, as merely a preliminary mention of details, to be followed by fuller and more complete data. If it had been dreamed at the moment that the sentiments of generosity prompting its modification, as requested, were to be made use of later in other hands to minimize the writer's participation in the fight, no persuasion could have induced a change in a line. But generosity sometimes leads to mistakes, and in this instance it is admitted it did.

If Clark and Cook be excepted, the only officer competent to report the victory from personal observation, covering the entire period of action, was the commander of the Second Squadron, for no better reason than that none of the other commanding officers had been engaged from the beginning to the end of the battle, because, as it shifted to the westward, their vessels were distanced by the *Brooklyn* and *Oregon*.

The suggestion for copies of the reports of the officers of the First Squadron was distinctly for a fuller credit for the work done by them, in the complete report to be made subsequently to the commander-in-chief.

With these facts stated, the preliminary report, cited above, stands as its own justification.

The *Texas* and *Vixen* were in sight of the leading ships during the battle, but too far away to be reached by signals after the *Teresa* and *Oquendo* had been forced to flee on fire to the beach. They were the first vessels to reach the final scene of the victory.

The *Brooklyn's* next move was to Guantanamo, where she

arrived on the afternoon of July 4th, near sunset. En route, she fell in with the battleship *Massachusetts* proceeding westward, and, in passing, her crew cheered the *Brooklyn* rapturously, heartily, sincerely. Had not inopportune circumstances taken her from the battle-line before Santiago, a scant six hours before the battle began, on that day above all other days of the campaign against Cervera's squadron, the crew of that ship would have given a good account of themselves, as all others did. There was much sympathy felt by the splendid fellows of the *Brooklyn* for their old comrades of the Flying Squadron, and it was untainted by any spirit of selfishness. It was regarded as a bit of the hardest bad luck that their former comrades had to be absent on that day of such glorious work for their country.

At sundown on the evening of the arrival at Guantanamo, the remains of Ellis were reverently laid to rest in the little burying ground on the hillside not far from our lines. His body was carried to his grave by his comrades and surrounded by his mess-mates, when the last sad rites of respect were paid to him who had fallen in honor doing his duty to his country. As the sun was setting in the far west the earth closed over him as he was laid beside those who were sleeping in ground hallowed by their valor.

The examination made of the compartment on the *Brooklyn* supposed to have been injured revealed the fact that the outer valve had been jarred open by the heavy concussion of the guns on the decks above. This was easily remedied by the carpenter and his crew.

CHAPTER XXIX

REPORTS OF THE BATTLE

1898

DURING the *Brooklyn's* short stay at Guantanamo the occasion was improved to call upon Admiral Cervera and his captains, who were prisoners of war on board the *St. Louis*, anchored at that time in the harbor. Admiral Cervera explained that his purpose had been to concentrate the fire of his ships upon the *Brooklyn*, as well as to ram her, believing that this plan would increase the chances of escaping with the others, the *Brooklyn* being regarded as the fastest vessel of the American squadron then in his front. If he had been successful in disabling the *Brooklyn*, and the *New York* being absent, it is an open question what the result might have been. Fortunately, his plan was frustrated, and the result everybody knows.

On the 6th of July the report of the battle, mainly prepared on the way to Guantanamo, was ready for transmission by the flag secretary, Lieutenant B. W. Wells. In this report some corrections were made in the names and positions of the Spanish ships as they emerged from the harbor, which the similarity in type and size had confused in the first moments of the battle.

As the scope of the victory was considered, its importance grew in consequence, compared with the decisive actions of other days. It was believed then, and it is thought now, to be unique, and will so live in the nation's history, as the one battle where the enemy's squadron was beaten, destroyed absolutely, and its personnel captured almost entirely. Its consequence was the expulsion of Spanish power from the waters of the Western Continent. The work begun by General Simon Bolivar in expelling the Spanish from Venezuela, in 1822, was completed on July 3, 1898, at Santiago de Cuba, when Cuba was rescued from the Spanish yoke. These two incidents will live in the history of the American continent side by side. It is esteemed, therefore,

to have been no ordinary honor to have been connected with this latter event, however remotely, and it was in this spirit that the concessions were made in the report of July 6th, which is reproduced below, together with a copy of the notes, as written and handed to the commander of the Second Squadron by Lieutenant Sharp of the *Vixen* on the day after the battle was fought:

NORTH ATLANTIC FLEET, SECOND SQUADRON,
U. S. Flagship *Brooklyn*,
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba,
July 6, 1898.

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report of that part of the squadron under your command which came under my observation during the engagement with the Spanish fleet on July 3, 1898:

At 9.35 A. M. Admiral Cervera, with the *Infanta Maria Teresa*, *Viscaya*, *Oquendo*, *Cristobal Colon*, and two torpedo-boat destroyers, came out of the harbor of Santiago de Cuba in column at distance and attempted to escape to the westward. Signal was made from the *Iowa* that the enemy was coming out, but his movement had been discovered from this ship at the same moment. This vessel was farthest west, except the *Vixen*, in the blockading line. Signal was made to the western division, as prescribed in your general orders, and there was an immediate and rapid movement inward by your squadron, and a general engagement at ranges beginning at 1,000 yards and varying to 3,000 until the *Viscaya* was destroyed, about 10.50 A. M. The concentration of fire of the squadron upon the ships coming out was most furious and terrific, and great damage was done to them. About twenty or twenty-five minutes after the engagement began two vessels, thought to be the *Teresa* and *Oquendo*, and since verified as such, took fire from the effective shell fire of the squadron and were forced to run on the beach some six or seven miles west of the harbor entrance, where they burned and blew up later. The torpedo-boat destroyers were destroyed early in the action, but the smoke was so dense in their direction that I can not say to which vessel or vessels the credit belongs. This doubtless was better seen from your flagship.

The *Viscaya* and *Colon*, perceiving the disaster to their consorts, continued at full speed to the westward to escape, and were followed and engaged in a running fight with the *Brooklyn*, *Texas*, *Iowa*, and *Oregon* until 10.50 A. M., when the *Viscaya* took fire from our shells. She put her helm to port, and with a heavy list to port stood in shore and ran aground at Asseraderos, about twenty-one miles west of Santiago, on fire fore and aft, and where she blew up during the night. Observing that she had struck her colors, and that several vessels were nearing to capture and save her crew, signal was made to cease firing. The *Oregon* having proved vastly faster than the other battleships, she and the *Brooklyn*, together with the *Texas* and another vessel, which proved to be your flag-

ship, continued westward in pursuit of the *Colon*, which had run close in shore, evidently seeking some good spot to beach if she should fail to elude her pursuers.

This pursuit continued with increasing speed in the *Brooklyn*, *Oregon*, and other ships, and soon the *Brooklyn* and *Oregon* were within long range of the *Colon*, when the *Oregon* opened fire with her thirteen-inch guns, landing a shell close to the *Colon*. A moment afterwards the *Brooklyn* opened with her eight-inch guns, landing a shell just ahead of her. Several other shells were fired at the *Colon*, now in range of the *Brooklyn's* and *Oregon's* guns. Her commander, seeing all chances of escape cut off and destruction awaiting his ship, fired a lee gun and struck her flag at 1.15 P. M., and ran ashore at a point some fifty miles west of Santiago. Your flagship was coming up rapidly at the time, as were also the *Teasas* and *Vixen*. A little later, after your arrival, the *Cristobal Colon*, which had struck to the *Brooklyn* and *Oregon*, was turned over to you as one of the trophies of this great victory of the squadron under your command.

During my official visit, a little later, Commander Eaton, of the *Resolute*, appeared and reported to you the presence of a Spanish battleship near Altares. Your orders to me were to take the *Oregon* and go eastward and meet her, and this was done by the *Brooklyn*, with the result that the vessel reported as an enemy was discovered to be the Austrian cruiser *Infanta Maria Teresa* seeking the commander-in-chief.

I would mention for your consideration that the *Brooklyn* occupied the most westward blockading position with the *Vixen*, and was exposed for some minutes, possibly ten, to the gun-fire of three of the Spanish ships and the west battery, at a range of 1,500 yards from the ships and about 3,000 yards from the battery; but the vessels of the entire squadron closing in rapidly soon diverted this fire and did magnificent work at close range. I have never before witnessed such deadly and accurate shooting as was done by the ships of your command as they closed in on the Spanish squadron, and I deem it a high privilege to commend to you, for such action as you may deem proper, the gallantry and dashing courage, the prompt decision and skilful handling of their respective vessels, of Captain Philip, Captain Evans, Captain Clark and, especially, of my chief of staff, Captain Cook, who was directly under my personal observation and whose coolness, promptness and courage were of the highest order. The dense smoke of the combat shut out from my view the *Indiana* and the *Gloucester*, but as these vessels were closer to your flagship no doubt their part in the capture was under your immediate observation.

Lieutenant Sharp, commanding the *Vixen*, acted with conspicuous courage. Although unable to engage the heavier ships of the enemy with his light guns, nevertheless he was close into the battle line under heavy fire, and many of the enemy's shells passed beyond his vessel.

I beg to invite special attention to the conduct of my flag lieutenant, James H. Sears, and Ensign Edward McCauley, Jr., aid, who were constantly at my side during the engagement and who exposed themselves fearlessly in discharging their duties; and also to the splendid behavior

of my secretary, Lieutenant B. W. Wells, Jr., who commanded and directed the fighting of the fourth division with splendid effect.

I would commend the highly meritorious conduct and courage in the engagement of Lieutenant Commander N. E. Mason, the executive officer, whose presence everywhere over the ship during its continuance did much to secure the good result of this ship's part in the victory.

The navigator, Lieutenant A. C. Hodgson, and the division officers, Lieutenant T. D. Griffin, Lieutenant W. R. Rush, Lieutenant Edward Simpson, Lieutenant J. G. Doyle, Ensign Charles Webster and the junior divisional officers were most steady and conspicuous in every detail of duty contributing to the accurate firing of this ship in her part of the great victory of your forces.

The officers of the medical, pay, engineer and marine corps responded to every demand of the occasion and were fearless in exposing themselves. The warrant officers, Boatswain Wm. L. Hill, Carpenter Geo. H. Warford and Gunner F. T. Applegate were everywhere exposed, in watching for damage, reports of which were constantly conveyed to me.

I have never in my life served with a braver or worthier crew than that of the *Brooklyn*. During the combat, lasting from 9.35 A. M. till 1.15 P. M., much of the time under fire, they never flagged for a moment, and were apparently undisturbed by the storm of projectiles passing ahead, astern and over the ship. The result of the engagement was the destruction of the Spanish squadron and the capture of the admiral and some thirteen to fifteen hundred prisoners, with the loss of several hundred killed, estimated by Admiral Cervera at 600 men.

The casualties on board this ship were: G. H. Ellis, chief yeoman, killed; J. Burns, fireman, first class, severely wounded. The marks and scars show that this ship was struck about* twenty-five times, and she bears in all forty-one scars as the result of her participation in the great victory of your force on July 3, 1898. The speed cone halyards were shot away and nearly all the signal halyards. The ensign at the mizzen was so shattered that in hauling it down at the close of the action it fell to pieces.

I congratulate you most sincerely upon this great victory to the squadron under your command, and I am glad that I had an opportunity to contribute in the least to a victory that seems big enough for all of us.

I have the honor to transmit herewith the report of the commanding officer, and a drawing in profile of the ship showing the location of hits and scars; also a memorandum of the ammunition expended and the amount to fill her allowance.

Since reaching this place and holding conversation with several of the captains, viz., Captain Eulate, of the *Viscaya*, and the second in command of the *Colon*, Commander Contreras, I have learned that the Spanish admiral's scheme was to concentrate all fire for a while on the *Brooklyn*,

* Examination made later discovered five more hits upon the *Brooklyn*, making the number thirty in all.

and the *Viscaya* to ram her, in hopes that if they could destroy her the chance of escape would be increased, as it was supposed she was the swiftest ship of the squadron. This explains the heavy fire mentioned and the *Viscaya's* action in the earlier moments of the engagement. The execution of this purpose was promptly defeated by the fact that all the ships of the squadron advanced into close range and opened an irresistibly furious and terrific fire upon the enemy's squadron as it was coming out of the harbor.

I am glad to say that the injury supposed to be below the water-line was due to a water valve being opened from some unknown cause and flooding the compartment.

I beg to enclose a list of the officers and crew who participated in the combat of July 3, 1898.

I can not close this report without mentioning in high terms of praise the splendid conduct and support of Captain C. E. Clark, of the *Oregon*. Her speed was wonderful and her accurate fire splendidly destructive.

Very respectfully,

W. S. SCHLEY, *Commodore, U. S. Navy,*

Commanding Second Squadron, N. A. Fleet.

To the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Naval Force, North Atlantic Station.

Supplementing this report is given the account, as observed and written at the time on board the *Vixen*, and handed to the commander of the Second Squadron next day by Lieutenant Sharp, as the official record of the action as viewed from that ship. It settles the question absolutely of the *Brooklyn's* part in the glories of that memorable day for our country. There is no possible doubt of its accuracy, or of its value as testimony in all future considerations of the battle.

(As written in *Vixen's* log-book, and sent by Lieutenant Sharp to Commodore Schley.)

At 9.45—Quartermaster reported a tug coming out of the harbor. Upon examination it was discovered to be a Spanish cruiser flying a large Spanish flag, with a smaller flag at the masthead, which was taken to be the admiral's flag, as it was on the leading ship. The *Vixen* at this time was lying about two miles off shore, and four miles to the westward of Morro Castle, and, from this time to the end, was never out of sight of the chase, and was within two miles of the destruction of the three armored cruisers. Word was at once sent to the commanding officer; all hands were called to quarters; full speed was ordered, and the helm put to port, to stand further off shore and leave the line of fire of the *Brooklyn* unobstructed.

The *Brooklyn* had hoisted a signal that the enemy was attempting to escape, and the *Vixen*, noticing that the leading ship was turning westward, hoisted a signal that the enemy was attempting to escape to the westward.

The fleet, which at that time had resumed their day stations, began rapidly to close in towards the mouth of the harbor, concentrating a terrific fire upon the fleet, though at long range. There was no doubting the fact that the enemy was coming out, but there were several anxious moments as to his intentions—whether he would disperse and attempt to break through the fleet or keep his ships together. The leading vessel had about changed her course to the west when the second appeared, followed shortly afterwards by the *Cristobal Colon*. It was easy to identify this ship from the fact that her mast is placed between the two smokestacks. The first two were not so easy to identify, as the *Viscaya*, *Oquendo* and *Maria Teresa* are practically identical in appearance. The fleet meanwhile was closing in towards the mouth of the harbor, and, when the fourth vessel appeared, and turned to the westward, it became apparent that Admiral Cervera had carefully reconnoitered the field, and selected the west as the weakest part of the blockade, as the strong easterly current had drifted the heaviest ships considerably to the eastward of their customary positions. The western portion of blockade chanced to be defended by the *Vixen* and *Brooklyn*. The *Brooklyn* headed to the northward, apparently intending to intercept the head of the enemy's column. Simultaneously with the appearance of the leading ship of the enemy the western battery opened a heavy fire; but, apparently, directing it upon the eastern and central ships of the blockading squadron.

At 10 A. M.—The *Brooklyn* was the nearest to, and was engaging, the two leading ships. The two ships were quite close together, with an interval of perhaps three-quarters of a mile between the second ship and the *Colon*.

At 10.05—The *Brooklyn* began to turn with the port helm, and made a complete turn to the eastward, continuing around, so that when again heading west the two leading enemy's ships bore well on her starboard quarter, with the fourth vessel coming up rapidly astern. The *Vixen* at this time was well to the westward of the leading ship, and was steering a parallel course. For the next fifteen minutes the *Brooklyn* received and returned the fire of the two leading ships, with an occasional shot from the *Colon*. The first two shots from the leading enemy's ship were evidently aimed at the *Vixen*, as they passed directly over her, striking the water a hundred yards or so beyond.

At 10.30—The chase was well formed, with the positions as follows: Enemy's ships were in column between Cabañas and Guayacabon, with the *Brooklyn* steering a parallel course about a mile distant from them; the *Oregon* southeast of them, about two miles distant; the other vessels of the squadron were obscured by smoke.

At 10.32—The *Colon* and leading enemy's ships were close together, just clear of the *Brooklyn's* bow, as viewed from the *Vixen*, the *Colon* evidently gaining in speed and closing up. At this time it was apparent that the vessel that had heretofore been leading was disabled and on fire, as she dropped rapidly astern. She apparently was headed for the shore off Juan Gonzales. The *Oregon* was apparently forging rapidly ahead, en-

gaging the fourth ship as she passed. Two smaller vessels, probably the torpedo-boat destroyers—the *Furor* and *Pluton*—were to the westward of Cabañas, engaged by the *Iowa* and *Texas*, and apparently on fire; but the leading vessels had gone too far to the westward to be able to exactly identify either of them accurately. The *Indiana* was in sight a little to the westward of Morro.

At 10.34—The *Colon* was still gaining and reserving her fire. At this moment the only United States vessels in sight from the *Vixen* were the *Brooklyn* and *Oregon*, with the *Texas* and *Iowa* in the rear of *Oregon* about five or six miles. The *Indiana* was apparently about four miles astern of the *Iowa*.

At 10.37—The *Colon* and other enemy's vessels opened a heavy fire again. The second vessel was just clear of the *Brooklyn*, and about five miles distant from the *Vixen*. The *Oregon* was gaining rapidly. The *Colon* was apparently using smokeless powder. The firing of the enemy was very high, and many of their shots passed over the *Brooklyn*, falling close ahead, astern and around the *Vixen*, a piece of the shell going through the flag at the mainmast.

At 10.46—The *Brooklyn* forged ahead, and the *Oregon* fired her forward thirteen-inch gun at the leading vessels of the chase.

At 10.47—The *Texas* was in lead of the *Iowa*, and gaining rapidly. The fire of the *Brooklyn* at this time was both steady and deadly, shell apparently striking or bursting alongside the chase.

At 10.49—The *Texas* passed Juan Gonzales, and what was apparently the *Indiana* was off Cabañas at the same time.

At 10.50—The *Vixen* veered in close, heading about north-northwest. The *Texas* was gaining rapidly. The *Iowa* appeared off Juan Gonzales. A small vessel, evidently a yacht, appeared off Guayacabon, hotly engaging some of the enemy's ships.

At 10.54—It was apparent that another of the enemy's vessels was on fire, and heading for the beach, with a heavy list to port. This vessel proved to be the *Viscaya*, and she was evidently making for the reef at Asseradero.

At 11.01—She ported, evidently heading east, as if seeking for the entrance to Asseradero. The *Texas* and *Vixen* directed their fire on this vessel until 11.07, when, as her colors were evidently down, the order was given to cease firing.

At 11.09—There was a sudden burst of smoke from her after end, and all ships reserved their fire on passing the doomed vessel, now hard and fast ashore on Asseradero reef.

At 11.16—The vessels in sight from the *Vixen* were the *Brooklyn*, *Oregon*, *Texas*, *Iowa*, and *Indiana*, the *Indiana* at least ten (10) miles from the *Colon*. The impression on board the *Vixen* was that the vessel ashore at Asseradero was the flagship.

At 11.25—The *Iowa* had evidently stopped. The after end of the vessel ashore at Asseradero was a sheet of flame.

From 11.26 to 11.42 there was a succession of explosions on board of

her, apparently from loose charges about the guns. They resembled huge chrysanthemums with ribbons of smoke, as burning powder grains fell from the end of the petals.

At 11.45—The chase had resolved itself into the *Colon*, close in shore, distant about seven miles from the *Vixen*; the *Oregon* about one point on the starboard bow, distant about one mile and a half; the *Brooklyn* one point on the starboard bow, distant about three miles; the *Texas* on the starboard quarter, distant about one mile; the *Iowa* two points on starboard quarter, distant about eight miles; the *New York* one point on starboard quarter, distant about ten miles. These last two vessels were apparently off Boca del Rio, but they were too far off to identify them with certainty in thin haze of smoke that was left behind the leading ships. No other vessels were in sight. The smoke from the ships destroyed at Juan Gonzales and to the eastward could be seen, but their hulls could not be made out.

At 12 M.—The relative positions were practically the same, except that each had changed its position relative to the *Vixen*. When the *Vixen* was abreast of Sevilla, thirty miles west of Santiago, the *Texas* bore three points on the starboard quarter, a little less than a mile; the *Oregon* and *Brooklyn* one point on the starboard and port bows, respectively, distant about four and five miles, respectively, while the *Colon* bore two points on the starboard bow, distant fully ten miles. According to the official pilot on board the *Vixen*, the latter vessel was off a place called Bayamita. It may be said that all localities and estimates of distances were referred to him in connection with the opinions of four or five of the officers of the *Vixen*.

At 12.05—The *New York* was in line with the burning ship (the *Viscaya*) at Asseradero, distant about nine miles.

At 12.15—The *Texas* was on the starboard quarter; *New York* two points on the starboard quarter, evidently gaining; the *Oregon* a half point on the starboard bow; *Brooklyn* one point on the port bow; the *Colon* one point on starboard bow, still distant about ten miles.

At 12.20—The *Oregon* fired a shot, which fell short. The *Colon* at this time was about hull down from the *Vixen*. During the next half hour there were occasional shots fired from both the *Oregon* and *Brooklyn*, many of which struck near the chase.

At 12.50—The *Texas* was one point forward of the starboard beam, and steadily gaining.

At 1.15—The *Oregon* and the *Brooklyn* headed in shore about four points.

At 1.23—*Texas* hoisted the signal, "Enemy has surrendered." This signal was repeated to the *New York*, but not acknowledged. The *Colon* was distinguishable by the aid of glasses, lying close in shore, and, according to the pilot, was lying at Rio Tarquino. Opinion was divided on board the *Vixen* as to whether a white flag was displayed on the *Colon* or whether it was steam escaping from the forward steam pipe. Subsequently this proved to be steam.

At 2—A boat from the *Brooklyn* and *Oregon* was seen to go alongside the *Colon*.

At 2.25—The *Vixen* stopped off Rio Tarquino, in the neighborhood of the *Brooklyn* and *Oregon*. The *New York* arrived from three to five minutes later, and intercepted the boat returning from the *Colon*.

NOTE.—In all these observations the time was accurately noted, but the watch used was five minutes slow of the deck clock, which agreed very nearly with the times indicated by the bells on other vessels.

The notes as they appear in the appendix to the Bureau of Navigation report published in 1898, and also in the Confidential Document to the Senate dated February 6, 1899, published as "Executive C—Fifty-fifth Congress, Third Session," stop at 1.23 p. m., July 3, 1898. This was one hour before the *Vixen* arrived at the Tarquino River, and hence are omitted many important details which the original notes contained. The *Vixen's* official log-book contains an account of the battle, in absolute accord with the one contained in the notes handed to the commander of the Second Squadron by Lieutenant Sharp. As these notes continue up to 2.25 p. m., the time of the *Vixen's* arrival, it must have been the fact as recorded that the "*New York* arrived from three to five minutes later, and intercepted the boat returning from the *Colon*" that was objectionable, and therefore omitted from the documents cited above.

The drawing in profile of the *Brooklyn*, submitted with the official report of the combat and referred to above, is reproduced to show the injuries inflicted by the enemy. (See page 307.) Closer inspection, made later, discovered several hits from the smaller projectiles of one-pounder guns of the Spanish ships.

This irrefutable testimony settles beyond any question the *Brooklyn's* proximity to the enemy's ships during the battle, and settles at once the silly twaddle that, in turning outward for tactical advantage, she separated herself to any appreciable extent from the battle-line.

Curiously, too, the "Confidential Document C" submitted to the Senate omits any mention of the report of a board of which Lieutenant Commander R. P. Rodgers was senior member, ordered by Admiral Sampson on July 6, 1898, to report, among other things relating to the destruction of the Spanish vessels, "the effects upon them of gun-fire"!

The report of this board was made on July 13th, off Santiago de Cuba. It showed the caliber of the shots and the exact location of every hit scored upon the hulls of the *Teresa*, *Oquendo*, *Viscaya* and *Colon* which had not been effaced by the force of explosions or the effects of the conflagration afterwards, which obliterated many marks of injury.

This report showed that every Spanish vessel examined bore the marks of five-inch shells, a caliber carried by no other ship of the American squadron except the *Brooklyn*.

The excellent work done by this distinctive gun would sustain the inference that the marks noted of other calibers, eight-inch, six-pounders, one-pounders, common to all the ships but the *Texas*, were fairly shared in by these same guns of the *Brooklyn*, as their crews were in every respect as proficient in marksmanship as those of the five-inch battery.

CHAPTER XXX

SURRENDER OF THE SPANISH FORCES AND THE ARRIVAL IN NEW YORK

1898

THE *Brooklyn* rejoined the blockade off Santiago on the 7th of July and in time to begin the bombardment of the city over the cliffs at Aguadores, as requested by General Shafter and directed by the commander-in-chief on July 10th. Commodore Watson, in the *Newark*, proceeded to Guantanamo on the 10th, leaving the *Brooklyn*, *Texas* and *Indiana*. These vessels took position off Aguadores and began a slow bombardment upon the city, for the space of some two hours, but, owing to the fact that some difficulty was had in getting back the report of the fall of the projectiles, it was regarded as more prudent, in view of the proximity of our army to the Spanish lines, not to risk the possibility of our projectiles falling anywhere within the zone of danger to our men.

The day following the *New York* and *Brooklyn* resumed the bombardment with some good effect, as fires were reported by signal to have broken out in several parts of the city. From the correspondence then going on between General Shafter and the Spanish commander it was evident that capitulation of the forces within the beleaguered city was being considered, and this led to truces now and then between the opposing forces, during which all hostile operations were suspended.

As early as July 6th General Shafter proposed the forcing of the harbor by the navy. Some correspondence occurred between Admiral Sampson and the commanding general of the Fifth Army Corps as to the advisability of this step, which, as appears, was referred to the President. At all events the following telegram, referring to such a movement, was sent to Admiral Sampson:

WASHINGTON, July 13, 1898.

The Commanding General of the Army urges, and the Secretary of the Navy requests, that navy force harbor. Confer with commander of army, wishing to do all that is reasonably possible to insure the surrender of the enemy. I leave this matter to your discretion, except that the *United States armored vessels must not be risked.*

LONG.

This despatch again confirms the position taken by Mr. Long in the confidential instructions to the commander-in-chief dated April 6, 1898, the second paragraph only being quoted:

(2) The Department does not wish the vessels of your squadron to be exposed to the fire of batteries at Havana, Santiago de Cuba, or other strongly fortified ports in Cuba unless the more formidable Spanish vessels should take refuge within these harbors. Even in this case the Department would suggest that a rigid blockade and employment of our torpedo boats might accomplish the desired object, viz., the destruction of the enemy's vessels, without subjecting unnecessarily our own men-of-war to the fire of the land batteries. There are two reasons for this:

First, there may be no United States troops to occupy any captured stronghold, or to protect from riot and arson, until after the dry season begins, about October 1st.

Second, the lack of docking facilities makes it particularly desirable that our vessels should not be crippled before the capture or the destruction of Spain's most formidable vessels.

Again, when Admiral Sampson's squadron was on its way to bombard San Juan, Porto Rico, as it did on May 12, 1898, we meet the same anxious solicitude of Mr. Long in his telegram to Cape Haitien, Haiti, repeating the injunctions of March 23d and April 6th, viz.:

WASHINGTON, May 5, 1898.

SAMPSON (*care U. S. Consul*), *Cape Haitien, Haiti.*

Do not risk so crippling your vessels against fortifications as to prevent from soon afterward successfully fighting the Spanish fleet composed of Pelayo, Carlos V, Viscaya, Oquendo, Colon, Teresa, and four torpedo-boat destroyers if they should appear on this side.

LONG.

But to a better comprehension of this matter the instructions issued to the commander-in-chief, dated March 23, 1898, at Washington, wherein Mr. Long defines the department's views at some

length upon what is regarded as an efficient blockade, ought to be stated. Before giving these instructions, Mr. Long evidently had had a conversation with some one whose mind was affected with torpedophobia, for he suggests three lines of blockade of all important points.

First, an inner line to consist of small, fast vessels, either torpedo-boats, or revenue cutters, tugs, and the like, improvised to act as torpedo-boat destroyers and scouts, close to the harbor mouth.

Second, a line placed about two or three miles outside of this inner line to consist as nearly as possible of vessels of the class of the *Cincinnati*, or *Detroit*, whose duty it would be to go to the support of the inner line if need be.

Third, outside this second line the battleships were to cruise at a distance of twenty-five miles from the blockaded port. This distance was considered to be near enough if a change of position was made after nightfall to minimize the chance of successful attack against them by the enemy's torpedo-boats.

Reading these repeated orders of the department in the calmer judgment of to-day, it is hardly possible to avoid the conclusion that from March 23, 1898, to July 13, 1898, after the fleet of Cervera had been destroyed, the policy of the department was not to permit the risk of crippling the battleships against fortifications.

Mr. Long's telegram to the commander-in-chief, referring to the matter of forcing the harbor of Santiago after the overthrow of Cervera's squadron, was dated July 13, 1898, and incontrovertibly shows that there had been no change of heart upon this matter up to that date.

But the reconnaissance of May 31st was another matter. When that was made, with the view to develop what was in these batteries, or what was behind them, in accordance with the first of these instructions, and possibly in some sympathy with the latest, the operation was made the subject of censure, and three years later the basis of an inquiry.

In more compact Anglo-Saxon, the commander of the Second Squadron was brought under official inquiry and censure for not doing on May 31st that which Admiral Sampson had been specifically forbidden to do in orders reiterated from March 23d

to July 13, 1898. It would be charitable to denominate such action an inconsistency.

The mail of July 10th brought many newspapers from home to the squadron, and in all of them were fuller details of the battle of July 3d. Almost without exception those dailies gave the credit of the victory to the commander of the Second Squadron and ignored the *New York* as a factor in it.

In that same spirit of generous fairness to share the honors and glories of that great victory with all who helped to achieve it, no matter how little in degree, the telegram which follows was transmitted the afternoon of that day, through Admiral Sampson, to the Secretary of the Navy.

FLAGSHIP *Brooklyn*,
OFF SANTIAGO DE CUBA, July 10, 1898.

Feel some mortification that the newspaper accounts of July 6th have attributed victory on July 3d almost entirely to me. Victory was secured by the force under command Commander-in-Chief, North Atlantic Station, and to him the honor is due. The end of line held by the *Brooklyn* and the *Vixen* was heavily assailed, and had the honor, with the *Oregon*, of being in the battle from the beginning to the end. And I do not doubt for a moment full and proper credit will be given to all persons and all ships in the official report of the combat.

W. S. SCHLEY.

This telegram was handed in person to Admiral Sampson, who, after reading it carefully, said: "Schley, this is kind and generous; I will transmit it at once." The admiral and the commander of the Second Squadron had been friends for forty years, and during their official association there had been no break or misunderstanding. Surely no expression of disapproval of the military operations or actions of the commander of the Second Squadron had ever been made by him. Until the communication of Mr. Long, on February 6, 1899, to the Senate, seven months after the battle, in which was published for the first time Sampson's letter of July 10th containing reflections upon the conduct of the commander of the Flying Squadron, there had been no manifested expression of disapproval from the department or Admiral Sampson. It was the first intimation that "reprehensible conduct" had been charged, but how this could be reconciled with a telegram received from Sampson on May

31st, a month or more before the battle, indorsing the work of the Flying Squadron and congratulating its commander for locating and blockading Cervera's ships, would not be easy literary navigation to-day. This telegram explains itself.

Congratulate you on success. Maintain close blockade at all hazards, especially at night; very little to fear from torpedo-boat destroyers; coal in open sea whenever conditions permit; send ship to examine Guantanamo with view to occupying it as base, coaling one heavy ship at a time; appraise captured coal, use it if desired, and afterwards send ship in as prize.

SAMPSON.

The commander of the Second Squadron from that time to this has always felt that the language employed in this communication of July 10, 1898, was unlike Admiral Sampson, and that in the pressure of official correspondence at that time this expression, in the copy prepared by others for his signature, escaped his attention.

As the utter hopelessness of the situation impressed itself upon the Spanish General, who realized that the American forces on land and sea had enveloped his army and shut it out from all chance of supplies in either direction, there were evident indications of a desire to capitulate. The following telegram from Army headquarters on July 12, 1898, to Admiral Sampson, was only the precursor of this end:

A truce exists and negotiations are now pending with Spanish commander. All firing must be discontinued during cessation of hostilities. Due notice of the commencement will be given you.

SHAFTER, *Major General.*

At 9.05 A. M., July 13th, or the day following, this telegram was sent to the Army headquarters:

As commander-in-chief of the naval forces engaged in joint operations, I expect to be represented in any conference held to arrange the terms of surrender of Santiago, including the surrender of the shipping in the harbor. Questions are involved of importance to both branches of the service.

SAMPSON.

At 2.40 P. M. of this same day the following message was received by Admiral Sampson from Army headquarters:

I shall be glad to have you represented, but difficult to let you know. Conference may take place at any hour. I should recommend that you send an officer for that purpose to remain at my headquarters. Should it not be convenient for you to do so, I will endeavor to give notice and see that an officer can be present when final terms are agreed.

SHAFTER.

And again at 6.45 P. M. of July 13th a message from Army headquarters to Admiral Sampson was received in the terms following:

We will send important despatch by Mr. Hobson to you this evening. Please have boat for him. He leaves at 6 o'clock.

MILES.

At 1.15 P. M., July 14th, another message from Army headquarters was received by Admiral Sampson:

I will be glad if you will send to these headquarters an officer to represent you during the negotiations for evacuation.

MILES.

This message followed, at 2.25 P. M. the same afternoon, from Army headquarters, and was received by Admiral Sampson:

The enemy has surrendered; will be down and see you soon.

MILES.

On July 16, 1898, the following message was received by Admiral Sampson from the Army headquarters:

Enemy has surrendered. Will you send some (one) to represent navy in the matter?

SHAFTER.

Also the following despatch from the commander of the Army:

HEADQUARTERS 5TH ARMY CORPS,
ON BOARD *Yale*, OFF SIBONEY, July 16, 1898.

SIR: There appears to be a little delay in the full surrender of the Santiago garrison, which I attribute more to formalities than anything else. There can be no doubt of the purpose of the Spanish to surrender. They did so, in fact, in a formal positive manner. The terms of capitula-

tion were agreed to and have been signed by the commissioners of both armies. At the request of the Spanish officials delay has been granted until they can hear from Madrid, which they seem positive will soon be a matter of fact, and am glad that the Navy has been able to contribute such an important part.

A copy of the agreement of capitulation signed by the commissioners is herewith enclosed for your information.

Very respectfully,

NELSON A. MILES,
Major General Commanding.

The officer detailed to represent the Navy was Captain F. E. Chadwick, notwithstanding the flag of the second in command was flying in the squadron. Chadwick arrived too late at the front to take any part in the negotiations; so that no mention was made in the stipulations of the shipping in the port. This led to some disagreement between Sampson and Shafter, but will not be further referred to, as all the facts leading to the dispute were not known to the commander of the Second Squadron.

Actual hostilities against the Spanish forces in and about Santiago terminated on July 16th, but it was not until the morning of July 17th that the actual surrender was made manifest to the squadron off the port in the hauling down of the Spanish flag from the Morro, Socapa and Punta Gorda batteries at 9 A. M.

On that morning the *New York*, *Brooklyn*, *Vixen* and the other vessels of the squadron moved into a position near the mouth of the harbor. The commander of the Second Squadron went into the lower harbor in his steam launch accompanied by Lieutenant Sears, Ensign McCauley, Mr. Geo. E. Graham, and a correspondent of a New York newspaper whose name is not now recalled. At the small wharf the Spanish officer who had commanded the Socapa battery was met. This officer was anxious to ascertain what disposition was to be made of himself and his men, but was more solicitous still that some effort should be made to feed his men, who were without supplies of any kind.

The *Suwanee*, Commander Delahanty, with the assistance of Lieutenant Araouca of the enemy's army, began removing the mines from the channel way at this time. There occurred no accident in doing this duty, as most of these torpedoes were inactive.

The admiral shifted his flag to the *Vixen* on the morning of July 18th, and from that vessel a signal message was received requesting the commander of the Second Squadron to accompany him to Santiago.

Passing into the harbor, a number of merchant steamers and one small gunboat, the *Alvarado*, were found at anchor. On landing at the principal wharf of the city and proceeding thence up the main street to the palace, there was every demonstration of welcome from the Cuban inhabitants of Santiago to the admiral and the commander of the Second Squadron. Joy beamed on every face, and many were the expressions of delight in the glad salutations of the people.

General McKibben had taken possession of the city by General Shafter's orders, and was found at his headquarters in the palace, with his staff, making every arrangement to maintain order and to guard the city against excess or disorders from the lawless who at such times take advantage of changes in commands. The general gave a most graphic description of the campaign, the difficulties encountered, and the splendid fighting of our comrades of the sister service. Under his command, good order, quiet and security were soon assured to the people of the city.

On July 20th, at 4 o'clock in the morning, the *New York* left her place before the port and steamed to the eastward, leaving the *Brooklyn* off the harbor. What the commander-in-chief's purposes were had to be guessed, for the reason that no orders had been left for the *Brooklyn's* guidance or movements, though it was clear that her presence was no longer needed anywhere in the vicinity of Santiago. About 10 A. M. a number of merchant vessels began filing out of the harbor with the American flag hoisted at their flagstuffs and the Spanish flag at the fore. Inquiry established the fact that Captain Evans of the *Iowa* had been directed to superintend this operation of the transfer of these vessels from Santiago to Guantanamo as prizes, to be returned, however, to Santiago under Army control a few days later. If the commander of the Second Squadron, who was the senior officer present at that time, had been disposed to be captious, he might have insisted upon their detention until the commander-in-chief had indicated his wishes with regard to these vessels.

Three days afterwards, on July 23d, the commander of the Second Squadron, still off Santiago, received a note from Captain Chadwick, chief of staff, stating that the commander-in-chief would like the *Brooklyn* to come to Guantanamo. In compliance with this note, the *Brooklyn* left her station and arrived about 10 o'clock the same night at Guantanamo.

From the 23d of July until the 14th of August the squadron remained at Guantanamo coaling, repairing engines, or boilers, where needed, and substituting new five-inch guns and gun-mounts on the *Brooklyn* for those injured during the battle of July 3d. In the interval of this delay the department had created an Eastern Squadron under command of Commodore J. C. Watson, a distinguished and excellent officer, who selected the *Oregon* as his flagship and whose squadron was to embrace the battleship, the *Brooklyn*, one or two of the auxiliary yachts, and a collier or two. The purpose announced was to threaten the coast of Spain, or to meet and beat the squadron of Admiral Comara, reported, through the press despatches, to be en route to Manila, composed of the *Pelayo* and the odds and ends of the Spanish fleet left after Manila and Santiago. This squadron was to be convoyed to Gibraltar by the commander-in-chief. The *Brooklyn* was to accompany the convoying squadron, leaving no flagship for the commander of the Second Squadron, and as no announcement had been made of the extent of the command to be left under his orders, there was some uncertainty about the vessel from which to fly his flag. Later it developed that the *Newark* was not to be included, on account of her limited bunker capacity, for the eastern movement, and this solved the question.

Before the Eastern Squadron was ordered to set forth the news of overtures from Spain looking to peace was flashed to the squadron in Guantanamo Bay. It was satisfactory to the squadron, for if any one supposes that men in the profession of arms like war because their training teaches them better how to make war, such a supposition is erroneous. They accept war much as a patient does some nauseous nostrum, as a drastic means to a quick cure.

The news that a protocol looking to peace had been arranged in Washington a day or two afterwards released the squadron

from blockading, or the necessity of further hostilities against the Spaniards. It secured to Cuba the independence her patriots had striven for years to achieve. It compelled Spain to withdraw her flag from the waters of the Western Continent. The islanders at last realized their independence, and let us hope for them under the providence of God the fullest happiness in its enjoyment.

On the 14th of August the squadron got under way bound for New York. The passage home was made in good weather and smooth seas. Its speed as a unit had to be regulated by that of its slowest vessel, the *Indiana*, which fixed its gait at about nine knots. On the morning of August 20th the Highlands of Navesink were made on the port bow, and soon afterwards the squadron passed Sandy Hook and entered the harbor of New York.

As the squadron approached the harbor it was welcomed with a salute of thirteen guns, and was met by a fleet of steamers, yachts, and tugs loaded with people almost to the gunwales. There was some delay off Tompkinsville in arranging the order of the ships in passing up the harbor and up the North River as far as the tomb of General Grant on Riverside Drive. During this delay the manifestations of joy on the part of our people found expression in deafening huzzas and applause. These, added to sounding of whistles, the ringing of bells, and the tooting of horns, rang out a welcome as sincere as heart could wish. There was no intimation in the squadron that such an overwhelming ovation had been prepared for it, until the Narrows had been reached, when the dazzling splendor of countless vessels in gala rig burst upon our vision. It was a surprise indeed, but it was generous and as grand as the great victory it was intended to commemorate.

Passing up the harbor, wharves were seen crowded with people, windows and housetops on each side of the river were filled with enthusiastic men and women gathered together to witness the pageant of a lifetime, and to do homage to officers and men who had represented them in their war for humanity. Reaching Riverside Drive, the hillsides from the water to their tops were packed with enthusiastic people, women and children being clad in raiment of every variety of summer colors, which

gave to the slopes the appearance of having been padded with flowers. The effect from the ships as they swung past was entrancingly beautiful in the bright sunshine of that beautiful summer day. It was a sight that will live in the memory and the hearts of those whom this demonstration was intended to honor. It deserves to be remembered along with pageants of other days when strong men and fair women joined in honoring those who had wrought dutifully for the home, country and flag they loved well. And long afterwards this demonstration of loyal affection will live in the lives of those who witnessed it, and in the history of the generations to come, as one of the grandest the world has ever known.

On August 10, 1898, the President of the United States advanced the commander of the Second Squadron six numbers, which carried him into the grade of Rear Admiral, for "eminent and conspicuous conduct in battle." This commission was forwarded to the *New York* at Tompkinsville, to be delivered when the squadron arrived on August 20th. The commission was not delivered from the *New York* until August 27th, and then only after it had been dug out of a mass of other papers in the flag office of that ship.

CHAPTER XXXI

COMMISSIONER TO PORTO RICO

1898

THE ceremonies of the squadron's reception being over, the *Brooklyn* returned to an anchorage off the lighthouse station at Tompkinsville. The commander of the Second Squadron left the ship and went the same evening to Saugatuck, Conn., to pass a few days with his wife and children, who were spending the summer months there. The day after arriving the Cuba malaria developed and compelled the patient to remain in bed for two or three days under medical treatment. During the campaign, exposed to heat and rain as the officers and men had been, many were stricken down, but force of will, added to excellent treatment from the medical officers of the ships, restored them. The commander of the Second Squadron was fortunate in not falling a victim to this pernicious fever while the siege was being maintained; perhaps his preoccupation during the campaign may have stayed the infection, but when all strain had been removed in this quiet and healthful New England home and surroundings, its development was rapid. From this cause a few days had to be passed in bed before being able to proceed to Washington, in obedience to instructions received to report in person to the President.

On the morning of August 26th the commander of the Second Squadron set out from Westport, Conn., for Washington, where he arrived at 3.30 P. M. Along the entire route people had gathered in vast crowds to greet and pay their respects. As the train passed further south these crowds augmented, only, however, because longer notice had been given them of the commander's presence on the train. At Jersey City, Trenton, Philadelphia, Wilmington, Baltimore and Washington the enthusiastically warm reception of the people was a touching tribute of affectionate regard. At the depot of the Pennsyl-

vania Railroad at Washington the commander was received by an almost countless multitude of his fellow countrymen, whose enthusiastic applause constitutes a delightful memory. After he was seated in his carriage, and had reached Pennsylvania Avenue, a corps of bicyclists numbering over a hundred, formed an escort on each flank of the vehicle as it was driven to the Shoreham Hotel. Outside the hotel a large number of people had gathered to greet the commander, and their tribute of affection as manifested in their welcome, and with the same kind expressions of the people met all along the route, was deeply appreciated. It was felt that these demonstrations were in no sense personal, but rather an outburst of the people's admiration for the Navy, whose good work in the war just ended had touched their gratitude profoundly.

The commander proceeded at once to the Navy Department, where he was received by the assistant secretary, Mr. Charles H. Allen, the secretary being absent from Washington. Mr. Allen conducted the commander at once to the executive mansion, where he was received with marked cordiality by President McKinley. His Excellency explained that he had chosen the admiral as a member of the High Commission to proceed to Porto Rico to arrange and superintend the details of the evacuation of the Spanish forces, the other members being Major General John R. Brooke, U. S. A., and Brigadier General W. W. Gordon, U. S. V., with Lieutenant Colonel Edward Hunter, U. S. A., secretary.

As the terms of the protocol arranged between the United States and Spain required the commission named by both contracting parties to meet in San Juan, Porto Rico, in one month after the said protocol had been signed, the President had had prepared the following commission to this duty. At the same time he gave authority, and directed orders to be issued, to hoist the admiral's flag on his arrival on board the steam cruiser *New Orleans* as flagship, Captain Wm. M. Folger, then lying in the harbor of San Juan, Porto Rico, the President's thoughtful purpose being that the admiral should not suffer in pay on account of this assignment in duty, for this otherwise would have occurred. The commission was forwarded in the following communication from the Navy Department:

WASHINGTON, D. C., August 20, 1898.

SIR: The President of the United States having appointed you a commissioner on the part of the United States to meet commissioners on the part of Spain, for the purpose of arranging and carrying out the details of the immediate evacuation by Spain of Porto Rico and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies, excluding Cuba and the adjacent Spanish islands, for the evacuation of which other commissioners have been appointed, I have the pleasure to enclose herewith your commission, dated the 19th instant.

Please acknowledge receipt.

Very respectfully,

A. S. CROWNINSHIELD,

Chief of Bureau.

REAR ADMIRAL WINFIELD S. SCHLEY, U. S. N.,

Commanding Second Squadron, North Atlantic Fleet,

Tompkinsville, N. Y.

The commission referred to in the above communication, bearing the great seal of the United States of America, was enclosed as follows:

WILLIAM MCKINLEY

PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

To all who shall see these presents, Greeting:

Know ye, that reposing special trust and confidence in the integrity and ability of Rear Admiral Winfield S. Schley, U. S. N., I do appoint him a commissioner on the part of the United States to meet commissioners on the part of Spain, for the purpose of arranging and carrying out the details of the immediate evacuation by Spain of Porto Rico, and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies, excluding Cuba and the adjacent Spanish islands, for the evacuation of which other commissioners have been appointed, and do authorize and empower him to execute and fulfil the duties of this commission, with all the powers, privileges, and emoluments thereunto of right appertaining, during the pleasure of the President of the United States.

In Testimony Whereof, I have caused these letters to be made patent, and the seal of the United States to be hereunto affixed.

Given under my hand at the city of Washington, the 19th day of August, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and ninety-eight, and the 123d year of the independence of the United States of America.

WILLIAM MCKINLEY.

By the President,

[GREAT SEAL.]

J. B. MOORE, *Acting Secretary of State.*

The commissioner to Porto Rico, under the instruction of this letter patent, returned to New York on the morning of the

28th, and along the route from Washington to that city the same manifestations of affectionate greetings were met from his countrymen assembled at the various stations where the train stopped. At Jersey City and on the New York side there were found large assemblages of the people to greet and welcome the commissioner, and many were the expressions of "God bless you" wafted to him from the hearts of the people.

On August 29th the new commissioner returned on board the *Brooklyn*, hoisting his flag as rear admiral, which Cook saluted with thirteen guns. Among officers and men of the flagship there was wild satisfaction when the blue flag, bearing two white stars, was broken to the breeze at the main. The delight of many men was exhibited by tossing caps in the air, that of others by embracing each other. Many of the officers and petty officers came to the cabin to shake hands and congratulate their old commander-in-chief upon his new rank and honors. It was a tribute of affection from brave comrades who had stood unflinchingly by his side on that memorable July 3, 1898, off Santiago, and it went deep into the heart of the recipient.

During the two days passed on board the *Brooklyn* before sailing she was visited by thousands of our people attracted to her by the conspicuous part she had borne in the battle of Santiago. Each one of the honorable scars she had received was eagerly scanned and interestingly examined by these visitors, whose enthusiastic admiration for the splendid fellows who had stood amid such dangers was universally expressed. Nothing which occurred afterwards in the unnecessary controversy over the honors of the battle, which were big enough for every one, could ever efface the memories of the affectionate reception extended to her officers and men on this occasion. And while nothing more than was done by the other ships is claimed for the *Brooklyn*, she did her part fully as well and surely as acceptably as any of her sister ships in that famous combat.

On August 31st the transport *Seneca*, under orders from Washington, stopped abreast the *Brooklyn's* anchorage to receive on board the newly appointed commissioner and his staff, Lieutenant Jas. H. Sears, Lieutenant B. W. Wells and Ensign Edward McCauley, for transportation to San Juan, Porto Rico.

The leave-taking from the officers and men of the *Brooklyn* occupied a few minutes, when the admiral's flag was hauled down and transferred to the *Seneca* amid the thunder of the *Brooklyn's* guns.

The *Seneca* was not long in gaining the open sea, which was smooth and favorable to her passage south. On board the *Seneca* General W. W. Gordon, U. S. V., with his aid, Captain Gordon, U. S. V., was found, and during the voyage of about six days the two commissioners held a number of conferences with relation to the new duties to which the President's orders assigned them.

The *Seneca* was an old vessel, belonging to one of the coast steamship lines, and had been kept at work almost up to the limit of her usefulness. Her boilers, engines, and piping were in such bad condition that the steam pressure had to be much reduced. On the way outward several stops had to be made to repair leaky joints in her piping in order to keep her going. But, fortunately, though it was the hurricane season, she did not have to meet one of those fierce tempests common on our coast in the months of August, September and October. She arrived at San Juan on the 7th of September, and there the other commissioner, Major General John R. Brooke, was met. The day following the three American commissioners, Major General John R. Brooke, U. S. A.; Rear Admiral W. S. Schley, U. S. N.; Brigadier General W. W. Gordon, U. S. V.; Colonel Edward Hunter, U. S. A., secretary, made an official call at the palace upon Captain General Macias, who introduced them to the commissioners on the part of Spain: Major General Ricardo Ortega, Rear Admiral Eugenio Vallarino, Colonel Jose Sanchez del Aguila, Captain Rafael Ravena, secretary.

The same afternoon the captain general of the island and the commissioners on the part of Spain returned the call. During the call upon the captain general the offer was made by him of the audience hall of the palace as the place to hold the meetings of the commission. It was explained that the palace, being in telegraphic communication with the several military headquarters of the island, would facilitate the work of the commission in transmitting the arrangements made directly to those concerned. This was accepted by the American commission and

thereafter its sessions were held in that spacious and comfortable hall of the palace.

The next step to be taken, preliminary to the meeting of the commissioners in joint session, was to suggest to the captain general that, as the American commission represented the authority of the President as decreed under the letters patent, issued in accordance with the terms of the protocol, the American flag would be hoisted over the headquarters occupied by the American commissioners in San Juan. This suggestion, after some discussion, was acceded to by the captain general as a necessary measure to preserve the co-equality of the commissioners on the part of both countries as directly representing the sovereign authority of their rulers.

To assist the commission in its work of investigating the Spanish code of laws, the court practise, the system of punishments, the system of finance, and the system of civil procedure in general on the island, the American commission requested the detail of an officer from the staff of the Department of Justice at Washington to investigate these matters. The Attorney General of the United States detailed to this duty Mr. Charles W. Russell, and the report of the commission was greatly aided by the careful and thorough manner in which this officer performed this duty.

On September 10, 1898, the commission as constituted by the two governments met at the palace. Each commission being furnished with interpreters, it was decided that careful minutes of each day's proceedings should be kept; those for the American Government to be in English, and those for the Spanish Government to be in Spanish, but both records to be exact prototypes. To the end that there might be no variation in either record, a careful comparison by expert translators was made before the minutes of the previous day's proceedings were read to the commission for approval or correction on the following day. As the instructions of the commission were clear-cut and complete, the American commission proposed to their Spanish associates to outline their scheme for consideration of the matters that would come before the commission for determination. It was thought to be important, at the outset of these deliberations, to understand the attitude of the Government of Spain



COMMISSION TO ARRANGE THE EVACUATION OF PORTO RICO, SEPTEMBER, 1898.

as laid down in the instructions given to its commission. The Spanish commission accepted this proposition and requested an adjournment for several days to formulate such plan.

Within a few days this paper was submitted at great length to the American commission. It embraced every matter relating to the affairs of the island from a business, financial, municipal, religious, judicial and social standpoint. The matter of evacuating the island was suggested in such form as to delay the operation to the last moment possible. As the instructions of the American commission only permitted it to consider the one question of evacuating the island, and that promptly, its reply, on the 13th day of September, in which this one matter was set forth as the only question it was authorized to consider, became in all the proceedings of the joint commission afterwards the basis of its discussion. It should be said, however, that the proceedings were characterized to the end of the joint sessions by great dignity and circumspection on the part of the Spanish commission.

Very naturally, many matters were suggested by its members, but the inflexible reply of the American commission that the evacuation of the island was the only subject its instructions permitted to be discussed usually brought the commission back to that one operation and how to effect it most expeditiously. To facilitate this, a large map of the island was hung on the wall of the chamber where the commission sat. Several points thereon showing where the forces of each nation were located were marked by pins bearing the American and Spanish colors. During each day's session, the points selected to be occupied by noon of the following day were indicated by the American commission, but, as a rule, objection was made by the Spanish commission, one of whom was always ready with argument of its impracticability. These arguments were invariably met with the assurance that, should the evacuation of any point be impracticable, instructions would be sent to the American officer to entertain the Spanish garrison as the nation's guests until such time as evacuation of the selected points could be effected by them. Generally these assurances were accepted. At the next day's session the map would show the American flag at the points selected the previous day. A glance at the map each

day would indicate clearly the relative position of each force. It was interesting as an exhibit of the gradual daily falling back of the Spanish force towards San Juan, the point chosen originally for the embarkation of the Spanish troops.

The lack of steamers to facilitate the Spanish embarkation occasioned some delay, and when these were supplied there was a disposition to overcrowd them with women and children, who always made a large proportion of Spanish garrisons in the provinces. But for this fact the evacuation of the island would have been hastened. Notwithstanding this defect in accommodation in their system of transportation, the island was practically evacuated by October 18th. The few troops remaining at the time were regarded as the guests of the United States for a day or two afterwards, to await one of the transatlantic liners.

About the 7th or 8th of October the American commission addressed a telegram to the President setting forth the general condition of the island and the troops still remaining to be sent to Spain. It suggested that a specific day, October 18th, be named when the island would be taken over to the control of and government by the United States. This suggestion was approved by the President, in a telegram received the same day, naming the 18th as the date when the island was to pass over to the control and authority of our Government. These instructions of the President were at once transmitted to the Spanish commission and were accepted with some manifestation of irritation, but when it was explained that, if the evacuation was not entirely completed on the date named, those remaining would be regarded as guests and afforded every security and protection as such until a steamer then en route from Spain should arrive, they reluctantly accepted the situation and as gracefully as possible.

A careful program of ceremonies to be observed on the occasion of the formal occupation of the island was prepared by the commission, and at noon on October 18, 1898, absolute occupation was consummated. The event being one of vast importance to the inhabitants was commemorated by a parade of American troops, the hoisting of the American colors over the public buildings and fortifications of San Juan, and a salute of

twenty-one guns to its sovereignty. At San Juan the public plaza was occupied by a battalion of blue-jackets and marines from the men-of-war in the harbor. The boulevard leading to the palace was occupied by a regiment of infantry, and the fortifications by detachments of artillery. The consuls of foreign nations at San Juan were invited to witness the transfer of the island, and were present with the American commission at the palace, at which point the interesting ceremony of the transfer could be witnessed with more comfort and with less to obstruct their outlook.

Precisely at noon the American colors were rounded up to the flagstaff of the palace, the public buildings of the city, and the fortifications around the port. As the first gun of the salute from San Cristobal was fired, it was taken up by the fortifications around the port, and by the men-of-war in the harbor. Amid the strains of the Star Spangled Banner, rendered by the regimental bands, were mingled the loud huzzas of the populace. In a moment the islanders had pinned on the lapels of coats, or on the breasts of the ladies, miniature American flags. The troops assembled stood at present arms during the rendering of the national hymn, while the vociferous applause of the assembled crowds marked only too plainly the joyous satisfaction felt that at that moment was severed the control of Spain over the island and the transfer of it was made to the care and guardianship of the great republic.

With all this consummated, the commission's duty terminated, and the authority vested in it under the letters patent of the President of the United States passed to Major General John R. Brooke, U. S. A., who then exercised the functions of Military Governor of the Island.

During the sessions of the commission the staff officers of each of its members were assigned to various fields of investigation and inquiry in order to enable the commission to submit a full, complete and accurate report of affairs relating to the political, financial and social status of the island for the information of the President.

As the naval member of the commission, the naval station at San Juan, all land from low-water mark one hundred feet inward and all lighthouses which under Spanish rule had been

under control of their senior naval officer, were recommended by the writer to be retained under the same control in the transfer to the United States and, as the senior naval representative present, authority was requested from the department to put the naval station in good order for occupancy. With authority granted for this purpose, the work of cleaning up the filth of years was begun and finished by native employees who removed from sheds, outhouses, and other buildings nearly a thousand cartloads of refuse which, as a breeding center for pests, would, if left, have been a constant menace to public health under the sweltering sun and torrential rains of the island.

The cruiser *Newark*, Captain C. F. Goodrich, had replaced the *New Orleans*, which had sailed for the United States, in order that her officers might be able to answer the summons of the prize court, before which an important case was being considered and which depended upon the evidence they were to give.

The duties of commissioner being ended, the department directed the admiral to remain in charge of the naval station and its duties until Commander A. S. Snow could arrive at San Juan to assume command of the naval station. The weather being very warm on shore, the admiral took up his quarters on board the *Newark*, bearing his flag, in order to be more comfortable. He remained in the port about a fortnight, when Commander Snow arrived.

On the day of Snow's arrival the command of the naval station was turned over to him. This ceremony concluded, the *Newark* sailed for New York and arrived a few days afterwards. After delivering the commission's report to the President in Washington, the admiral was detached, placed on waiting orders, and took up temporary quarters in that city.

CHAPTER XXXII

THE NAVIGATORS' CHART

1898

ON the 2d of September, 1898, quite two months after the battle of July 3d, and three days after the commissioner had sailed from New York for Porto Rico, a board, known as the Navigators, composed of the navigating officers of the several ships, was convened to plot the positions of the ships engaged at several moments of the combat. It was made their duty to reconcile, as far as possible, all discrepancies in the data obtained, and to state their reason for the locations given to the vessels.

The commissioner to Porto Rico was never informed that such a board was contemplated, nor did he know, except through the press, until after his return in November from the duties assigned him by the President, that this board had met and had submitted its report. At no time was he consulted or requested by any one to give any opinion or information that could have assisted the board's deliberations or helped it to reach the conclusions submitted.

He learned, after his return, that no commanding officer, except Captain Chadwick of the *New York*, and possibly Captain Cook on the last day of its session, had been consulted by this board. As there were at least three of the members of this board who had not witnessed the battle from beginning to end, the conclusions they arrived at and presented in the form of a chart of the battle could only have been reached from hearsay information. This fact probably accounts for the inaccuracy of the chart submitted with the report made on October 8, 1898, and which the judge advocate general of the Navy was forced to abandon before the court of inquiry in 1901 as inaccurate and, therefore, unreliable.

Commander Heilner, who was a member of the board of navi-

gators which produced this chart, could not reconcile his testimony before the court of inquiry in 1901 with the position of the *Brooklyn* at the time she turned. His testimony placed the *Brooklyn* across the bow of the *Texas*. The chart he submitted as a member of the board, three months after the fight, showed the *Brooklyn* some half mile away at that time.

To aid in a better understanding of the chart submitted, the order creating the board, and the report submitted, are here given:

U. S. FLAGSHIP *New York*, 1ST RATE,
NAVY YARD, NEW YORK, N. Y., Sept. 2, 1898.

SIRS: You are hereby appointed a board to plot the positions of the ships of Admiral Cervera's squadron and those of the United States fleet in the battle of July 3, 1898, off Santiago de Cuba.

You are empowered to call for such data from any ship concerned as may be necessary, forwarding a copy of this letter as authority.

It will be your duty to reconcile, as far as possible, all discrepancies in the data so obtained.

The board, in submitting the chart with the plotted positions, will report fully their reasons for locating the positions as they have.

Very respectfully,

W. T. SAMPSON,
Rear Admiral, U. S. N.

Comdr-in-Chief U. S. Naval Force, North Atlantic Station.

Lieutenant S. P. COMLEY, U. S. N.

Lieutenant L. C. HEILNER, U. S. N.

Lieutenant WM. H. SCHUETZE, U. S. N.

Lieutenant ALBON C. HODGSON, U. S. N.

Lieutenant W. H. ALLEN, U. S. N.

Lieutenant E. E. CAPEHART, U. S. N.

Lieutenant HENRY P. HUSE, U. S. N.

In conformity with the order given, this board submitted its report, with the chart it had made, as given below:

U. S. FLAGSHIP *New York*, 1ST RATE,
NAVY YARD, NEW YORK, N. Y., October 8, 1898.

SIR: In obedience to your order of September 2, 1898, appointing us a board to plot the positions of the ships of Admiral Cervera's squadron and those of the United States fleet in the battle of July 3, 1898, off Santiago de Cuba, we have the honor to submit the following report, accompanied by a chart, showing the positions of the ships at seven different times.

These times, as taken by the United States ships engaged, with the incidents noted, are as follows:

- No. 1— 9.35 A. M. *Maria Teresa* came out of the harbor.
 No. 2— 9.50 A. M. *Pluton* came out.
 No. 3—10.15 A. M. *Maria Teresa* turned to run ashore.
 No. 4—10.20 A. M. *Oquendo* turned to run ashore.
 No. 5—10.30 A. M. *Furor* blew up and *Pluton* turned to run ashore.
 No. 6—11.05 A. M. *Viscaya* turned to run ashore.
 No. 7— 1.15 P. M. *Colon* surrendered.

The chart selected by the board for plotting is Hydrographic Chart No. 716—1885, West Indies, eastern part of Bahama channel, with part of Cuba and north coast of San Domingo. This selection was made after a careful comparison with all other charts at hand, as the positions of the principal headlands and inlets and the distances between them on it agree more nearly with the observation of members of the board than those given by any other.

The positions of the United States ships were established by known bearings and distances from the Morro at No. 1, with the exception of the *New York*, whose position is plotted by the revolutions of her engines during a run of forty-five minutes east from her position, S.E. $\frac{1}{2}$ E. of the Morro, 6,000 yards.

No. 2 is plotted by all ships according to their bearing from each other, the operations of their engines from 9.35 to 9.50, the evidence of the officers on board them, and the ranges used in firing at the Spanish ships.

Position No. 3 is plotted from observation of the officers of the United States ships with regard to their nearness to each other and relative bearings of themselves from the *Teresa*, with ranges in use at the time, the performance of the engines, and general heading of the ships.

Position No. 4—Same as No. 3, substituting *Oquendo* for *Teresa*.

Positions Nos. 5 and 6 and 7 are plotted on the same general plan.

Before plotting these positions the board took each ship separately and discussed her data for the position under consideration, this data being obtained from the report of the commanding officers, notes taken during the action, and the evidence of the members of the board.

In reconciling differences of opinion in regard to distances, bearings, ranges, etc., full liberty was given to the representative of the ship under discussion to bring in any argument, or data, he considered necessary, and the board submits this report with the feeling that under the circumstances it is as nearly correct as is possible so long after the engagement.

Very respectfully,

RICHARD WAINWRIGHT,

Lt. Commander, U. S. N., Senior Member.

S. P. COMLEY, Lieutenant, U. S. N.

L. C. HEILNER, Lieutenant, U. S. N.

W. H. SCHUETZE, Lieutenant, U. S. N.

A. C. HODGSON, Lieutenant, U. S. N.

W. H. ALLEN, Lieutenant, U. S. N.

E. E. CAPEHART, Lieutenant, U. S. N.

The Commander-in-Chief.

NOTE.—Lieutenant H. P. Huse, U. S. N., whose name appears in the order of the Commander-in-Chief as a member of the board, attended but one meeting, that of September 8th, the first one, and, therefore, as he has not been present at any of the meetings where different ships have been under discussion and important questions have been decided, his name does not appear in the signed report of the board.

EDWARD E. CAPEHART,
Lieutenant, U. S. N., Recorder.

Until the Appendix to the report of the Bureau of Navigation, collated, arranged and edited by Ensign H. H. Ward, under the direction of that bureau, had been published on December 1, 1898, the context of the report given above was not known, except through the press, to the commander of the late Second Squadron. It was never communicated to him by any one in the department.

From the date and caption of this report it would appear that the board held its sessions on board the flagship *New York*, at the Navy Yard, New York, as the report seems to have been submitted from that ship.

It can well be suggested that, with the commodious accommodation afforded by the buildings of the Navy Yard—and permission could easily have been obtained to use them—it would have been more discreet to have convened this board where its deliberations would have been removed more directly from the sympathies or influences of any one ship that might be affected by them.

The chart, as explained in the board's report, was submitted "with a feeling that, under the circumstances, it is as nearly correct as is possible so long after the engagement." Think of it! The interval was three months and five days after the battle! The chart had to be abandoned afterwards as unworthy of confidence; nevertheless it was made the basis of attack upon the commander of the Second Squadron. This same chart that had to be abandoned by the judge advocate before the court of inquiry as worthless in 1901 is republished and repeated in Mr. Long's history of the Navy, published in 1904!

Now as to the proof of its incorrectness in two or three particulars only, although others exist.

First. The so-called "loop" of the *Brooklyn*, as known on this chart, is 1,056 yards in diameter. In September, 1901, the

department directed Admiral Remy, then commanding the Asiatic Station, by telegram, on the same day the court of inquiry met, to determine the *Brooklyn's* tactical diameter (that is, the diameter of a circle she would make with full helm angle 35° , starting, for example, as she did on July 3, 1898, from a course N.E. by N., continuing on around to the same course again). With a speed of ten knots, Remy reported this complete tactical diameter to be 675 yards. Now, as the *Brooklyn* on the day of the battle turned from a course N.E. by N., with full helm, at a speed of twelve knots or more, she turned only a little more than one-half circle to S.W. by W. She described only a little more than one-half the full tactical diameter. At ten knots this would represent 337 yards, or a difference of over 700 yards as shown on this chart. Happily, however, on August 30, 1903, somewhere off Lisbon in latitude 37.44° N., and longitude $0^\circ 28'$ W., this same tactical diameter of the *Brooklyn* was determined at a speed of twelve knots with full helm angle and with port helm as on the day of the battle off Santiago to be only 530 yards. One-half this circle, therefore, represents 265 yards, leaving a difference from that shown on this chart of the navigators of 791 yards less.

With this incontrovertible evidence it is pertinent to inquire what becomes of the 2,000 and 3,000 feet testified to by some of the witnesses three years afterwards? The distances mentioned were not even good guesses.

Second. The chart of the navigators, referred to, shows further that the *Brooklyn*, which started ahead towards the enemy's vessels at rapid speed, only passed over a distance of about seven-tenths of a mile from her first to her second position, while the *Iowa*, with steam for five knots only, as Captain Evans states in his report of the battle, written on July 4, 1898, is made to pass over a distance on this chart of one and seven-tenths miles, and the *Indiana*, whose boilers were in bad shape for the need of extensive repairs, is made to pass over a distance of one and eight-tenths miles in the same interval of fifteen minutes. The *Oregon*, which from first to last easily outfooted and distanced these latter ships, is made to pass over the same distance in this same interval of fifteen minutes from her first to her second position.

Third. The *Iowa*, from her fifth to her sixth position, is made to pass over a distance of eight and one-tenth miles in thirty-five minutes, or at a rate of speed of about fourteen miles an hour, while the *Brooklyn*, which easily outfooted and distanced her in the chase, passed over in the same interval of time only seven and nine-tenths miles an hour.

The instances cited are sufficient to show the utter valuelessness of the chart, but there are others equally as glaring to sustain that legal maxim which declares that "false in one respect is false in all." Much could be said of the position of the *New York* on this chart, but as that has been fixed by the affidavit, to be given later, of Mr. O'Shaughnessy, at Siboney, or Altares, as indicated on the chart, nothing more need be said.

But another feature of interest on this same chart is the loop outward made by the *Gloucester* at the beginning of the battle for the same reason doubtless that the *Brooklyn* made hers—to gain a better position of vantage. Nelson did the same thing at St. Vincent, more than a hundred years before, and what was right then in beating the enemy could not have been wrong in 1898 to achieve a victory still more complete. If Nelson was right, as history has so decided, and Wainwright was right, as all believe, then Schley can not be wrong, as the result must always certify.

One of the strange things about the *Brooklyn's* loop was that nobody on the other ships made any official note of the fact on the day of the fight, but there is abundant evidence that the smoke was too thick to have done so! The *Indiana's* commander claims to have seen the *Brooklyn's* movement four or five miles away; but the same movement of the *Gloucester*, hardly more than a mile away with no smoke intervening, escaped him entirely! The *Iowa's* commander claimed to have seen the movement of the *Brooklyn* a half mile or more away, but came within an ace of running into the *Oregon* because, in the dense smoke hanging over the field of action, he could distinguish nothing a hundred feet away.

This same commander did not know a day or two afterwards which ship had made the turn. He thought it was the *Texas* until he was corrected! The *Texas* was the next ship to the eastward of the *Brooklyn*—according to the navigator's chart of the

battle, 2,600 feet away. Her deck officer was Lieutenant Bristol, whose eyes were so excellent that he claimed before the court of inquiry in 1901 to have seen everything, and nothing appeared to have escaped him on the morning of the battle! From 8 A. M. to noon of July 3d the log-book remarks appear over his signature and give an account of the battle as he saw it with memory entirely fresh. Let us see what he said then :

8 A. M. to meridian (12 o'clock). Cloudy to clear. Light breeze from north. At 9.35 the enemy's ships were sighted coming out. Signaled 319; went ahead full speed, headed in. Went to quarters and at once engaged the enemy, closing in. The ship leading was of the *Viscaya* class and the flagship. Four ships came out, evidently the *Almirante Oquendo*, *Viscaya*, *Cristobal Colon*, and *Infanta Maria Teresa*. Besides these there were two torpedo-boat destroyers. These two latter were compelled to run ashore by this ship and the *Gloucester*. This ship was warmly engaged with the third in the enemy's column until she ran ashore on fire. Went ahead for the second, which engaged with the *Oregon*. She sheered in for shore at 11.10, and we opened fire at long fire. A few moments later she was on fire, and struck her colors running in for the beach. At 11.30 she blew up. Remainder of watch chasing the *Cristobal Colon* to the westward, the *Brooklyn* and *Oregon* ahead and closing. Steam four boilers forced draft. This ship was struck three times; by a 5.5 inch shell through the starboard forward superstructure, exploding and carrying away part of ash-hoist engine and blowing large hole in uptake, besides several small holes; one passing through pilot-house, and the other striking starboard turret. D. Schworm (sea) was knocked over by the concussion of the twelve-inch gun, and falling down the ammunition-hoist had right leg broken. Ammunition as per list.

MARK L. BRISTOL,
Lieutenant, U. S. N.

More than this, his account in the log-book of the *Texas* bears, at the bottom of the page for that day, the following indorsement of the navigator of the ship :

Examined and found to be correct.

L. C. HEILNER,
Lieutenant, U. S. N., Navigator.

It will be observed, therefore, that both these officers, at a time when their memory was fresh, omitted any mention of the *Brooklyn's* turn, or that in turning she passed anywhere near

the *Texas*, or, more important still, that the *Texas* was stopped or her engines were backed, or that she was in any danger whatever from the *Brooklyn*. It is hardly possible to conceive that, if such had been the case, these officers would have falsified the log-book by omitting to mention incidents which three years afterwards they testified were so menacing to the safety of the *Texas*.

What must always appear equally remarkable is that no official record at the time and no official report written at the time of the battle contains a line, or even a suggestion, that any one had seen the *Brooklyn* turn, or that the *Texas* was in the least danger from it. If such had been the fact, it can not be doubted that there would have been a chronicler at hand.

Mr. Heilner, as a member of the Board of Navigators, affixed his signature to the report of this board accompanying the chart of the battle three months and five days after the fight had occurred. On that chart he affirmed that the *Brooklyn's* nearest approach to the *Texas* was 2,600 feet, the nearest point of the loop. Three years afterwards he testified before the court of inquiry that this same distance was from "100 to 150 yards," or 300 to 450 feet.

With respect to the Appendix to the Bureau of Navigation's report, collated, edited and arranged by Ensign Ward and published under date of December 1, 1898, with the professed view to supplement it with fuller information, the department issued two circular orders, No. 505, dated January, 1899, and No. 543, dated March, 1900, directing officers to submit further details relating to the campaign against the Spanish fleet. At the latter date the writer was in command of the South Atlantic Station and transmitted from that post of duty the reply which is given below to the department:

SOUTH ATLANTIC STATION, U. S. FLAGSHIP *Chicago*,
MONTEVIDEO, URUGUAY, June 13, 1900.

SIR: 1. In compliance with Circular Orders Nos. 505 and 543, I have the honor to suggest the following changes, corrections, and additions to the Appendix to the report of the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation for the year 1898. There are transmitted by same mail the replies of the officers attached to the *Chicago* and *Wilmington*.

2. Pages 402 and 443: Telegram dated Mole Haiti, June 4, 1898, to

department, as follows: "Some observations made to-day by a reliable Cuban, in accordance with my instructions, made four armored vessels, and two torpedo destroyers at Santiago. At this time repairs and more coal needed by them.

"SAMPSON."

The Cuban was sent out by me without instructions from Admiral Sampson, who was informed, upon his arrival at Santiago, of that fact, and that the Cuban would report on the coming Friday to me. Admiral Sampson then directed that the Cuban upon return should be sent to him on board the *New York*.

3. To my report of May 30, 1898, beginning on page 402, the following may be added:

"The captain of the steamship *Adula* informed me when his ship was boarded that he was to take all neutral refugees in Cienfuegos on board and return at once to Kingston; that he would probably leave Cienfuegos the day following, and that these refugees would be able to give me further information of the Spanish fleet.

"Before the *Adula* came out, the *Marblehead*, the *Vixen*, and the *Eagle* arrived from Key West, and upon my inquiring, Commander McCalla informed me that the lights observed by me on shore the previous night were signals prearranged with the Cuban insurgents.

"It appears that the *Marblehead* and *Eagle*, while blockading off Cienfuegos for quite a while without any knowledge of the presence of insurgents, were approached by a boat containing several Cuban officers who had passed some forty hours in an open boat in order to bear a communication from the Cuban military chief to the westward of Cienfuegos. This was the beginning of communication on the south side of Cuba, and the first knowledge of the fact having been obtained from Commander McCalla on May 24th, he was immediately sent to ascertain all information possible of the Spanish fleet while delivering munitions he had arranged to bring with him on his return from Key West."

4. On the voyage to Santiago every auxiliary was a drag on the movements of the squadron. Stops were made for the *Merrimac*, the *Eagle*, and the *Vixen*, which was completely disabled for several hours. These necessary auxiliaries, all that accompanied the squadron, could not be abandoned while the enemy was presumably free to act in the immediate vicinity.

5. Page 404, 16th par. The signal made by the *Indefatigable* was intended and thought by her captain to be "thanks for courtesy," and was not "no harm done for courtesy" as reported, and has since been ascertained from her commanding officer.

Incidents of July 3, 1898.

6. In Rear Admiral Sampson's report of the battle of July 3, 1898, page 508, first line, the statement is made that "the *Oregon*, steaming with amazing speed, from the commencement of the action took first place." This is not a fact, for at no time from the beginning of the action until

its conclusion at 1.15 P. M., or during three hours and forty minutes interval of its continuance, was the *Oregon* ahead of the *Brooklyn*, which took and maintained throughout the first place in the battle line of that day.

7. The sketches on pages 532 and 533, furnished by the *Indiana*, are inaccurate. The positions of vessels are wrongly plotted at the beginning. The track and position of my flagship, the *Brooklyn*, are unauthorized and incorrect.

8. On page 547, ninth line from the bottom, Lieutenant Usher states that *Viscaya* was seen to strike to the *Iowa*. This is not a fact, as she hauled down her flag, put her helm to port, and started for the beach at Asseraderos, on fire fore and aft, at 10.56 A. M., at which moment she was about one half a point forward the *Brooklyn's* starboard beam. The *Oregon* was at this moment on the starboard quarter of the *Brooklyn*, about 500 yards away, the *Texas* being next to the *Oregon* but too distant from the *Brooklyn* to read a wigwag signal to look out for the *Viscaya*. The *Iowa* was considerably in the rear of the *Texas* and to the eastward, the *Vicen* being astern, distant possibly three or four miles from the *Brooklyn*.

9. A number of extracts from log-books and signal records have been incorporated in the Appendix. I would respectfully suggest, in the interest of historical accuracy, that further and fuller use should be made of the logs. The publication of the full text for the day of these vessels taking part in the engagement of July 3, 1898, could not fail to add to the value of the Appendix and might dispel some of the illusions founded on hearsay or misapprehension.

10. Perhaps, though hardly within the scope of the order, but pertinent from the fact that reference is made to it in the *Brooklyn's* log-book, is The Century Magazine article of Rear Admiral Sampson's, which states, on page 900, that "During this period it had been the custom of our vessels to retire from the coast at night for a distance of twenty-five miles." The period here referred to being from May 26th to June 1, 1898, and the vessels those of the Flying Squadron. This statement appears from the context to have been based upon an inspection of the log-book of the *Brooklyn*. I am so sure of my memory that I can not believe the log-book of the *Brooklyn* bears out an assertion which is not a fact.* So much has been written from the flimsiest information that I am convinced that only a full publication of all authentic matter can clear up this subject.

11. Further, referring to Rear Admiral Sampson's remarks concerning the closeness of the Flying Squadron's blockade, a perusal of the log-books of the vessels there would show that the blockade was closely maintained by the heavier vessels in battle formation, cruising slowly before the port, with the two lighter vessels on the flanks a little further inshore, thus closing the approaches completely. No vessel passed this

* The log-book of the *Brooklyn* shows no entry upon which the statement made could be based.

blockade either way, and it is confidently believed and asserted that no vessel could have safely attempted to do so. With the limited number of vessels at my command it was the only practicable form of blockade at the time. No suggestion as to any means of improving the method emanated from any source. The commander-in-chief was so satisfied with the efficiency of the blockade as he found it on June 1st that he withdrew almost immediately in pursuit of a steamer on the southern horizon, and was absent for a number of hours.

12. The sketch accompanying Rear Admiral Sampson's article is purely fanciful. When at Guantanamo after the battle the artist showed me his sketches of the ships engaged I saw so many errors that it was useless to attempt to put him straight. He himself informed me that it was impossible to reconcile the statements made to him, and that if he had accepted them he would frequently have had to put several vessels in one position at the same time. If the history of a combat is so inaccurate a few days after its occurrence, what reliance ought to be placed upon accounts written years afterwards with the original errors accentuated?

13. On page 593 occurs the report of a Board of Navigators appointed by Admiral Sampson to plot the positions of vessels during this combat on July 3, 1898, and facing page 593 is the chart embodying the results of this board's deliberation. I did not know of the formation of such a board until its deliberations were published, or I might have added some facts within my own knowledge and observed from a commanding position during this battle which would have freed this chart from many discrepancies existing in it and which impair its accuracy historically.

14. The *Brooklyn* was provided with two stadimeters, which were in constant use. The people charged with determining distances and furnishing ranges were fully competent observers, and had been individually furnished with necessary data, such as the heights of enemy's masts, military tops, and funnels, and had had unlimited practice in obtaining distances. It should be a well-known fact to all seafaring men that nothing is more liable to error than the estimate of distance and relative bearings of objects which are outside of the observer's vessel.

15. The *Brooklyn's* position and distance relative to the enemy on the 3d of July have been variously commented upon in some public prints and in one official communication. On board my flagship it was frequently observed by those who made no allowance for error in judgment that the vessels farthest to the eastward were usually out of position, it being apparent to myself, however, that those vessels were usually in position. This error of judgment has been applied so strongly to the *Brooklyn* that I refer to it as a matter that is unjust to her officers, who were among the best of the squadron.

16. The chart previously referred to puts the *Brooklyn* at a position 2,200 yards from the *Viscaya*, and is in this respect entirely in error. Further, it shows that the *Brooklyn*, which started ahead at good speed, only passed over about seven-tenths of a mile distance from her first to her second position, while the *Iowa*, with steam for five knots, in Cap-

tain Evans's report, page 537, is made on the chart to have passed over one and seven-tenths miles; and the *Indiana*, whose boilers needed much repairs, passed over a space of one and eight-tenths miles in this same interval of fifteen minutes. The *Oregon*, which from first to last easily distanced these latter ships, is made to pass over about the same distance in the same interval of fifteen minutes from her first to her second position. These facts put another construction upon what has been termed the *Brooklyn's* loop, the comments upon which I should not recall but for recent statements of alleged historians and others.

17. In my judgment, formed from an unobstructed view of the entire field of action during the combat, the *Viscaya* was not more than one thousand yards distant. My flag lieutenant, standing at my elbow, reminded me that the distance between the leaders of the Spanish squadron and ourselves was approaching our tactical diameter. The stadimeter at this instant indicated nine hundred yards. The *Brooklyn* then swung to starboard to meet what proved to be the last attempt to ram the *Brooklyn*, for the *Viscaya* then turned square to starboard and followed the *Maria Teresa* until the latter's destruction. These facts admit of no contradiction, for they are based upon the independent judgment and observation of two or more persons, and upon the stadimeter in the hands of a person skilled in its use.

18. The statement widely quoted that there was danger of a collision at any time between the *Brooklyn* and the *Texas* is without foundation, as there was at no time any danger of such collision. The movement of turning to starboard was begun to meet the acknowledged threatened attack by the *Viscaya*. It was continued for the grand final results of the battle and with complete success. To hold the contrary it must be established by some process at present wholly unknown to me what the result would have been had the *Brooklyn* executed any other maneuver, surrendering the advantage she had at that moment of this remarkable combat.

19. At 1.15 P. M. the *Cristobal Colon* fired a gun to leeward and surrendered to the *Brooklyn* and *Oregon*. At 2.23 P. M., or one hour and eight minutes afterwards, the *New York* arrived on the scene. If her speed was that stated by Captain Chadwick, her commander, on page 522, as sixteen or seventeen knots, allowing for foul bottom, then at the conclusion of the fight she must have been distant at least over seventeen miles from the *Colon*. The chart of the navigators places her ten and four-tenths statute miles away. Either the board or Captain Chadwick has made a mistake in this instance, for both can not be correct. This instance is mentioned merely as another of the inconsistencies of the chart of the battle, of which I have only pointed out a few, and I would suggest that there are others of equal importance which may develop when the sources of information are fully exhausted.

20. Such signals were made from my flagship as the occasion called for, as is shown by the record of signals herewith enclosed. These were no doubt inadvertently omitted from the Appendix, and are therefore forwarded herewith.

21. I would also transmit an account of the battle as observed by the commanding and other officers of the *Vixen* while the battle was in actual progress, and I am sure, though I speak from memory, that it is a part of the official log of the *Vixen* for that day. In certain features there are slight discrepancies between this paper and that given on pages 545 and 546 of the Appendix. One error is apparent, where the *Massachusetts*, which was at Guantanamo, is brought into the battle; and another where the account is closed at 1.23 P. M., while the account referred to closes at 2.23 P. M. This is merely referred to in the interest of historical accuracy.

22. I would further suggest, in order to enhance the historical completeness of the Appendix, that Senate Document, Executive C, should be embodied therein, including as it does Rear Admiral Sampson's letter No. 7 to me and also my telegram to the Secretary of the Navy, dated July 10, 1898, which appear on pages 165 and 135 respectively of the last-named publication.

23. I would add that in view of the fact that fuller information will without doubt become available in the future, I must reserve the privilege of adding further to this paper matters pertinent to the subject.

Very respectfully,

W. S. SCHLEY,

Rear Admiral, U. S. N.,

Comdr.-in-Chief U. S. Naval Force, South Atlantic Station.

The Secretary of the Navy,

Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

COPY OF SIGNAL RECORD, U. S. FLAGSHIP BROOKLYN

July 3, 1898

F—Flagship *New York*; V—*Brooklyn*; A—Iowa; Y—Oregon; Z—Texas.

A. M.

9.00 F to fleet—Disregard motions of commander-in-chief.

9.15 V to Z—What is your theory about burning of blockhouses?

9.34 A to V—Enemy's ships escaping.

9.34 V to fleet—Enemy's ships escaping.

9.36 V to fleet—Clear for action.

9.45 V to fleet—Close up.

P. M.

12.30 Y to V—Is the flag of the strange vessel Italian?

12.34 V to Y—She was built in Italy.

(While chasing the *Colon* the *Oregon* fired a number of shells at her, and the *Brooklyn* wigwagged her where each one struck. A number of other unimportant messages were exchanged.)

1.15 (*Colon* fired a lee gun and hauled down her flag).

1.25 V to Y—The enemy has surrendered.

1.26 V to Y—Cease firing.

1.26 V to Y—Keep your guns loaded and trained on the enemy.

1.30 V to Y—Congratulations on the grand victory. Thanks for the splendid assistance.

1.35 Y to V—Thank you more than words can express.

*1.45 V to F—We have gained a great victory; details will be communicated.

*1.50 F to V—Report your casualties.

*1.55 V to F—One killed, two wounded.

*2.15 V to F—This is a great day for our country.

This letter was called for during the court of inquiry in 1901 and was placed on the record at that time. The account of the battle as observed and recorded on board the *Vixen* has been given in Chapter XXIX.

In 1901, when suit was entered in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia on behalf of Admiral Sampson and his officers against the *Maria Teresa* as a prize, it is found that this navigators' chart was among the official papers submitted to the court! As this chart had to be abandoned before the court of inquiry as untrustworthy and unreliable as evidence, Sampson's attorneys or somebody should have withheld it from the court, or its doubtful value should have been explained by them! The writer was out of the United States at that time on public duty!

*The first signal was made to the *New York* a long way off, the last when she was quite a mile or more from the *Brooklyn*.

But one signal was made during the battle of Trafalgar by Nelson. The world is uncertain to-day whether that quoted is correct.

CHAPTER XXXIII

PROMOTION AND ADVANCEMENT

1898

PRESIDENT MCKINLEY advanced and promoted the two squadron commanders and a number of other officers of the ships of their squadrons for "eminent and conspicuous conduct in battle" for the part taken in the action of July 3, 1898. These commissions bore date of August 10, 1898, but having been issued during the recess of Congress it was necessary, under a provision of the Constitution, to submit the persons so nominated to the Senate for the advice and consent of that body when the Congress assembled in December, 1898, in order to validate the appointments.

The *ad interim* commission of Admiral Sampson advanced that officer eight numbers, promoting him into the grade of rear admiral; that of the commander of the Second Squadron advanced him six numbers, promoting him likewise into the grade of rear admiral. The effect of these promotions was to advance Admiral Sampson over the head of the commander of the Second Squadron, who had been his senior in rank for forty-two years.

In the interval from the battle to the date when these nominations were submitted an unfortunate controversy arose over the question of these advancements. From day to day it grew in acrimony as the fuller details of the battle became more widely understood through the press of the country. There was a natural alignment of opinion, as there is on most questions, and this resulted in the non-confirmation of the appointments in the order named.

From the moment this controversy began the commander of the Second Squadron did not open his lips upon the question, nor did he by suggestion or intimation, except in the Hodgson letter, take any part in the controversy until he was required

to do so at the request of the Committee on Naval Affairs of the Senate in February, 1899, and then only after that body had received a confidential communication from Mr. Long relating to the advancements proposed and which the Senate by resolution had adopted for use in executive session under date of February 23, 1899.

To aid in a more comprehensive understanding of this matter, the communication of Mr. Long was transmitted to the writer after the Senate had removed the seal of secrecy. This communication was accompanied by voluminous data, and many despatches and maps, which it would be merely cumbersome repetition to reproduce here, and, as most important matters have been given and reviewed in the chapters going before, the main communication of Mr. Long, together with the reply made by the writer to the Senate, in compliance with the committee's request, will be given.

Mr. Long's communication was that of an advocate, and it lacked the characteristics of a judge. All through it there were manifest evidences that he viewed the matters discussed from the standpoint of the influences about him and that he was determined to win his case. The broader and larger view, aiming at fair judgment of one who had done his duty, got lost in that desire.

[CONFIDENTIAL]

55TH CONGRESS, 3d Session.

EXECUTIVE C.

ADVANCEMENTS IN THE NAVY

LETTER

FROM

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

IN RESPONSE

To the Senate Resolution of January 23, 1899, submitting facts and military records affecting the proposal that certain officers in the navy be advanced according to the nominations sent to the Senate on December 7, 1898.

FEBRUARY 8, 1899.—Ordered to be printed in confidence for the use of the Senate.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON, February 6, 1899.

SIR: In compliance with the Senate resolution of January 23, 1899, which is as follows:

"IN EXECUTIVE SESSION, SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,

"January 23, 1899.

"*Resolved*, That the Secretary of the Navy be, and he is hereby, directed to furnish the Senate with the facts and military records in the possession of his department affecting the proposal that, under section 1506 of the Revised Statutes, Commodore Sampson be advanced eight numbers and Commodore Schley six numbers; and the same information with respect to other nominations for promotion under same section and section 1605, which were sent to the Senate along with the above nominations on December 7, 1898.

"Attest:

WM. R. Cox, *Secretary.*"

I have the honor to submit herewith numbered copies of the military records in the possession of the department affecting the proposal that certain officers be advanced under sections 1506 and 1605, Revised Statutes, according to the nominations sent by the President to the Senate on December 7, 1898.

The following are facts in the possession of the department called for in said resolution:

On April 22, 1898, Captain W. T. Sampson, who had previously commanded the United States naval forces on the North Atlantic Station, as a captain and commander-in-chief, hoisted the flag of a rear admiral, in obedience to orders from the department.

Commodore W. S. Schley was given command of the Flying Squadron at Fortress Monroe. At the same time he was verbally informed by the Secretary of the Navy that if his command and Admiral Sampson's came together the latter would have command of the whole. He expressed ready acquiescence in this arrangement.

At the outbreak of the war Admiral Sampson was directed to establish a blockade of the coast of Cuba from Cardenas to Bahia Honda, and to blockade Cienfuegos as soon as the strength of the force under his command would permit.

This blockade was immediately established, and was later extended to take in the whole coast of Cuba (some 1,200 miles), and was effectively maintained until the close of hostilities. San Juan, Porto Rico, was blockaded from June 22d.

On May 19th the Spanish force under Rear Admiral Pascual Cervera entered Santiago Harbor. This force had previously been reported at Martinique and Curaçoa, and Commodore Schley's force had been brought from Hampton Roads, first off Charleston and then to Key West, to reinforce Admiral Sampson. On May 17th the department telegraphed the naval base, Key West, directing that Admiral Sampson should despatch

the Flying Squadron, with such reinforcements as he might consider necessary, to Cienfuegos, that the remainder of his force should blockade Havana, and that he himself should command at Havana or at Cienfuegos, it being directed that Commodore Schley should remain with his own squadron. Admiral Sampson on May 19th, in accordance with the instructions of the department, directed Commodore Schley to sail with his command—the *Brooklyn*, *Texas*, *Massachusetts* and *Scorpion*—for Cienfuegos, and to blockade that port.

In accordance with the orders of Admiral Sampson, the *Iowa* sailed from Key West on May 20th with the *Castine* and the collier *Merrimac*, the last having 4,500 tons of coal on board. The *Iowa* joined Commodore Schley at Cienfuegos on May 22d and the *Merrimac* and *Castine* joined on May 23d.

On May 24th the department issued orders formally attaching Commodore Schley's command to that of Admiral Sampson. Telegrams sent to Commodore Schley on May 13th and May 14th had directed him to report to Commodore Remy, who, under Admiral Sampson, commanded the naval base at Key West.

About this time the department and Admiral Sampson were informed that the Spanish force was at Santiago. On May 21st Admiral Sampson sent instructions to Commodore Schley to proceed with all despatch, but cautiously, to Santiago, if satisfied that the Spanish squadron was not at Cienfuegos, and to blockade the enemy in Santiago, if there; and suggested that communication be established with the inhabitants, to learn definitely that the ships were in the port of Santiago. These instructions were sent by the *Marblehead*, and also, to make sure, a little later by the *Hawk*. The *Hawk* arrived at Cienfuegos at 7.30 A. M., May 23d, and the *Marblehead* arrived on May 24th, and at 8 A. M. reported with the *Vixen* and *Eagle* for duty under Commodore Schley. These instructions were acknowledged under date of May 23d. Commodore Schley reported that he was not satisfied that the Spanish squadron was not at Cienfuegos, and held his position there until 6.05 P. M., May 24th. Before 3.30 that afternoon he had been positively informed by the *Eagle* and *Marblehead* that Admiral Cervera's squadron had not been and was not at Cienfuegos. Commander McCalla having asked permission to communicate with the Cuban force located thirteen miles west of Colorados Point, stating that he could ascertain definitely what ships were then in the harbor of Cienfuegos, Commodore Schley directed him to proceed upon that duty. Commodore Schley had been at Cienfuegos for thirty hours without having taken any initiative to procure this information from the natives before Commander McCalla's arrival.

Upon leaving Cienfuegos the Flying Squadron, composed of the *Brooklyn*, *Iowa*, *Massachusetts*, *Texas*, *Marblehead*, *Vixen*, *Eagle*, with the collier *Merrimac*, steamed eastward, Commodore Schley making signal that the destination was Santiago. The squadron was frequently slowed to allow the *Eagle* to hold her position, the average speed during the 25th being about six knots. The *Eagle* was of small importance as a fighting force

compared with the rest of the force. She was allowed to reduce materially the speed of the squadron.

On the 26th the *Eagle* was directed to proceed to Port Antonio for coal. On that day the speed was about $6\frac{1}{2}$ knots.

Commodore Schley reached a point about twenty-two miles to the southward of Santiago late in the afternoon of May 26th. He immediately communicated with the three scouts — *Minneapolis*, *St. Paul* and *Yale* — receiving the reports of their commanding officers, as also the reports of two pilots brought from Jamaica by the *St. Paul*, but he did not make further effort to establish communication with the inhabitants—fishermen or others—to learn definitely that the ships were in port, it being impossible to see them from the outside, as suggested in the orders of the commander-in-chief, dated May 21st. Three hours after his arrival at this point the commodore turned and stood to the westward, signaling to his squadron that the destination was Key West, and proceeded with it in that direction for three hours, making about eighteen miles, when he again stopped.

On the morning of May 27th the *Harvard*, coming from the eastward, delivered to Commodore Schley the department's despatch of May 25th, directing him to remain at Santiago and ascertain whether the enemy was there or not. Thereupon he replied by telegraph that on account of shortage of coal, bad weather, and difficulty in coaling, he would be obliged to proceed to Key West and disobey the department's orders, at the same time acknowledging the department's orders of May 25th to remain off Santiago. That afternoon at 4 he again proceeded westward until he had made about twenty-five miles, when he again stopped until between 1 and 2 o'clock on the afternoon of May 28th, coaling in the meantime.

No mention of the speaking of the *Harvard* or of the delivery of this despatch is made in Commodore Schley's written report of the operations of this time. It contains, however, his statement of the considerations which prompted him to disregard the department's instructions.

With reference to his coal supply, the facts are that his effective fighting force at this time was the *Brooklyn*, *Massachusetts*, *Iowa*, *Texas*, and *Marblehead*. The *Vixen* and *Eagle* had also accompanied him. The *Eagle*, however, was detached and sent to Port Antonio, Jamaica, for coal, although, as shown by her log, she had yet on board three days' supply (27 tons). During the twenty-four hours in which Commodore Schley signaled that his destination was Key West and telegraphed the department that he would be unable to remain at Santiago, there was still on board the *Brooklyn* between ten and twelve days' coal supply, being 940 tons, for full steaming in squadron; between eight and ten days' supply, or 789 tons, on board the *Massachusetts*; between five and six days' supply, or 394 tons, on board the *Texas*; between three and four days' supply, or 116 tons, on board the *Marblehead*; between eight and ten days' supply, or 762 tons, on board the *Iowa*; and 4,300 tons on board the collier *Merrimac*, from which during the two following days his vessels were coaled. The department had suggested the possibility of a near coaling base, but

no effort was made to reach it, although Commodore Schley had sent the *Eagle* to Port Antonio for coal. There was coal enough to return to Key West and therefore to remain at Santiago till further supplies came. He could also have counted on the department's sending him a further coal supply.

At 4 P. M. of the 27th, the squadron having been stopped since midnight, it steamed westward until 8 P. M., when it again stopped to coal the *Texas* and *Marblehead*. The weather conditions becoming more favorable, and having gone west about forty-eight miles in all since the evening of the 26th, between 1 and 2 o'clock on the afternoon of the 28th Commodore Schley again turned and shaped his course back for Santiago, being twelve miles off that port at 8 P. M. Up to this time there had been nothing to prevent the escape of the Spanish fleet, but the scout *St. Paul* was ordered to remain off Santiago.

At 11.15 A. M. on May 28th Commodore Schley signaled, "Rendezvous in Gonaives Bay;" at 11.30 A. M., "In case of separation, fleet will rendezvous at a place which will be designated by signal—Lat. 19° 24' N., Long. 73° 03' W.;" at 4.05 P. M., "While off Santiago the general meeting-place will be twenty-five miles south of that place."

At 7.40 A. M. on May 29th, the Flying Squadron having approached nearer to Santiago, the *Cristobal Colon* was sighted in its entrance. Before noon two vessels of the *Viscaya* class were sighted near the entrance, and between 4 and 6 P. M. a torpedo-boat was sighted. It was not, however, until May 31st that an attack on the *Colon* was ordered. This attack was ordered at a range of 7,000 yards, at a speed of ten knots, and under instructions for the *Iowa* and *New Orleans*, which latter vessel had joined on May 30th, to follow the *Massachusetts*; but it is reported by the commanding officer of the *Massachusetts*, to which vessel Commodore Schley had shifted his flag, as having taken place at ranges varying from 7,500 to 9,500 yards, and by the commanding officer of the *Iowa*, which was ordered to follow as above, as at ranges varying from 9,500 to 11,000 yards. Commodore Schley's signal to the fleet was to fire at the *Colon*. Under date of June 1st Commodore Schley reports this engagement as a reconnaissance.

On June 1st Admiral Sampson, who had been guarding Bahama Channel and covering Havana from the west, arrived off Santiago with the *New York*, *Oregon*, and *Mayflower*, and at once instituted the blockade described in his report.

During the period from May 30th to July 3d, Santiago and the Spanish ships in the harbor were several times bombarded, a close blockade maintained, and the army convoyed and landed by the navy.

On July 3d, when the Spanish ships came out of the harbor of Santiago, Admiral Sampson, under orders from the department, proceeding to meet General Shafter at Siboney, was between six and eight miles to the eastward of the Morro, but in plain view of his command. He moved at once towards the scene of the battle, and at the close had gained three miles on the *Brooklyn* and was within two miles of the *Texas*. In passing

the Morro he sustained the undivided fire of the batteries there at a range of 3,800 yards.

The battle which ensued was begun by each commanding officer doing his part as prescribed in the standing orders of Admiral Sampson, and, subject thereto, was fought as each individual commander directed his ship.

The report of Commodore Schley to Admiral Sampson states that "Signal was made to the western division (composed of the *Brooklyn*, *Texas*, and *Vixen*) as prescribed in your general orders;" and the report of Captain Chadwick, commanding the *New York*, and chief of staff of Admiral Sampson, that signal was made by the *New York* to the eastern division, composed of the *New York*, *Iowa*, *Oregon*, and *Indiana*, "Close in towards harbor entrance and attack vessels," as prescribed in Squadron General Order No. 9, of June 7th.

The only other signals of which mention is made in the reports of commanding officers are a signal "The enemy is escaping," made by the *Brooklyn* at 9.35 P. M., which, according to the *Brooklyn's* signal record, was first received by her from the *Iowa*, and three signals noted in the report of the commanding officer of the *Oregon*; the first, "*Oregon*, well done," at the time when the *Viscaya* went ashore, and second, "Cease firing," and "Congratulations for the grand victory; thanks for your splendid assistance," sent as the *Colon* went ashore and her flag came down. No commanding officer of any ship speaks in his report of any signal from the *Brooklyn* except the above. From the reports no command over the fleet and no order of command except the above appears other than the original commands and orders of the commander-in-chief. The log of the *Brooklyn* notes two other signals made at 9.36 A. M. and 9.45 A. M., respectively: "Clear for action" and "Close up," but, as indicated above, no commanding officer reports having seen them, and at the time when they were made the ships were independently clearing for action and chasing at full speed.

In following Sampson's order of battle of June 2d, requiring "If the enemy tries to escape, the ships must close and engage as soon as possible and endeavor to sink his vessels or force them to run ashore in the channel," the *Brooklyn* at the beginning of the battle stood for the enemy's ships, using port helm to close with them. After the leading Spanish ship, the *Maria Teresa*, had passed to the westward, and the *Viscaya* had clearly indicated her intention to escape, the *Brooklyn's* helm was put hard aport, and she was turned in a circle around to the southward and then to the westward, and in doing so, increased her distance from the Spanish ships by her tactical diameter of 800 yards.*

The orders of Admiral Sampson issued in the beginning of June to prevent the escape of the Spanish vessels, and to make the blockade effective, are pertinent facts. They provide for a close watch night and day, for picket boats, search-lights at night, guard against torpedo-boat attack, nearness to the harbor entrance, readiness of engines, for keeping

* This distance is not a fact.

the ships always headed towards land instead of away from it, and for signals to be used in case of attempted escape.

The foregoing statement has been verified upon careful comparison with the records by a board of naval officers, consisting of Captain Robley D. Evans, who commanded the *Iowa*; Captain Henry C. Taylor, who commanded the *Indiana*; and Lieutenant James H. Sears, who was Commodore Schley's flag lieutenant on board the *Brooklyn*, assisted by Ensign Henry H. Ward, who report that the facts as stated therein correspond with the facts and military records in the possession of the department.

The advancement of Admiral Sampson was proposed in recognition of his services in the execution of his duties as commander-in-chief of all our ships engaged in the campaign in the West Indies; in the supervision of all its details wherever distributed; in the blockade of the island of Cuba; in the convoying and landing of the army and cooperation with its movements, and in the pursuit, blockade, and destruction of the Spanish fleet, which destruction, on the 3d of July, by our fleet under his command, was the consummation of his orders and preparations, beginning on the 1st day of June. In this connection the despatch of Commodore Schley, dated July 10th, is a pertinent fact.

The advancement of Commodore Schley was proposed in recognition of his services as next in rank at the victory at Santiago. Where so much was achieved in this culminating battle and where his ship was such a conspicuous force in the fight, his conduct while in independent command prior to June 1st, the record of which has been given above and which by reason of its unsteadiness in purpose and in push and failure to obey orders did not meet the approval of the President and the department, was yet not permitted to stand in the way of his nomination for promotion to a higher grade for the part he took in the final triumph. In this connection, a pertinent fact is the letter of Admiral Sampson in which, while not overlooking Commodore Schley's reprehensible conduct above referred to, he asks that ample justice be done him for his part in the action of July 3d.

It is just to both these officers to say that each of them was selected for his command in the war without solicitation or suggestion on the part of himself or of any one in his behalf. The head of the department, under the approval of the President, is responsible for these selections, which were made under the responsibilities of the war situation and in the exercise of the corresponding discretion in the assignment of officers which is authorized by law. This discretion was exercised solely with a view to the best interests of the public service, whether wisely or not results show. Neither of these officers was then the senior of his grade. In the case of Admiral Sampson he was, just before the breaking out of the war, second in command to the then commander-in-chief of the North Atlantic fleet, and, upon the illness of the latter, became its senior officer. He had been with it during all its evolutions and practice of the previous year, possessed the confidence of its officers to a very high degree, was familiar with its workings, and had had special experience and training in ordnance.

To retain him in command was, therefore, in the judgment of the department, the best thing to do.

The advancements of Captains Philip, Evans, Taylor, Cook, Clark, Chadwick, Lieutenant Commander Wainwright, Lieutenant Commander R. P. Rodgers, John A. Rodgers, James K. Cogswell, William P. Potter, Giles B. Harber, and Newton E. Mason, Lieutenant Sharp, and Chief Engineer Robert W. Milligan were proposed upon the recommendation of the commander-in-chief and in recognition of the service of each during the campaign against Admiral Cervera, including the bombardments and blockade of Santiago and the battle of July 3d.

The advancements of Captain Higginson and Lieutenant Commander Seaton Schroeder were proposed upon the recommendation of the commander-in-chief and in recognition of their services during the bombardments and blockade of Santiago.

The advancement of Lieutenant Harry P. Huse was proposed in recognition of his part as executive officer in the conspicuous conduct of the *Gloucester* in the battle of July 3d.

The advancements of Chief Engineers McConnell, Hannum, Bates, Rae, Cowie, and Passed Assistant Engineer McElroy were proposed in recognition of their part in the campaign against Admiral Cervera and in the battle of July 3d.

The advancement of Chief Engineer Bayley was proposed in recognition of his services on board the *Massachusetts* during the bombardments and blockade of Santiago.

The advancement of Commander Bowman H. McCalla was proposed in consideration of his eminent and conspicuous conduct in command of the naval base at Guantanamo and in directing the cable-cutting expedition at Cienfuegos on May 11th.

The advancements of Lieutenant Cameron McR. Winslow and Lieutenant Edwin A. Anderson were proposed in recognition of their extraordinary heroism when engaged in cable-cutting expeditions at Cienfuegos on May 14th.

The advancement of Captain Charles D. Sigsbee was proposed in consideration of his conduct in command of the *Maine*, and of the *St. Paul* when repelling the attack of the torpedo-boat destroyer *Terror* and the cruiser *Isabel II*.

The advancement of Lieutenant Victor Blue was proposed upon the recommendation of the commander-in-chief in recognition of his extraordinary heroism in scouting around Santiago to determine what Spanish ships were in the harbor and how they were placed.

The advancements of Lieutenants Benjamin Tappan, Thomas M. Brumby, Ensigns Harry H. Caldwell, William P. Scott, and Naval Cadet William R. White were proposed in accordance with the recommendations of Rear Admiral George Dewey.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully,

JOHN D. LONG, *Secretary*.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE.

Notwithstanding all this, the fact remains that the commander of the Second Squadron was nominated again for promotion and advancement by the President of the United States on February 19, 1901.

When this document was sent to the Senate the writer had gone to New York to attend the banquet of that year at Delmonico's to celebrate the birthday of the great and immortal Lincoln. The first intimation received that this communication had been sent to the Senate came in a telegram from his personal friend, Senator A. P. Gorman, the senior Senator from the writer's own State, Maryland. Unfortunately, the great blizzard about that date cut off all communication for two or three days with New York, thus delaying the writer's return to Washington, as well as his reply, which was made to the Senate on February 18, 1899.

[SENATE]

55TH CONGRESS, 3d Session.

EXECUTIVE D.

Communication from Rear Admiral W. S. Schley to the Committee on Naval Affairs in reference to the letter from the Secretary of the Navy of February 6, 1899.

FEBRUARY 20, 1899.—Ordered to be printed for the use of the Senate.

WASHINGTON, D. C., February 18, 1899.

The Chairman of the Committee on Naval Affairs, Senate Chamber.

SIR: Complying with the request of the committee, I beg to submit the following in reference to the communication of the honorable Secretary of the Navy under date of February 6th to the Senate (Executive C) in "response to the Senate resolution of January 23, 1899, submitting facts and military records affecting the proposal that certain officers in the navy be advanced according to the nominations sent to the Senate on December 7, 1898."

I wish, in the outset, to disclaim any purpose of controversy with the Navy Department: First, because my ideas of proper subordination of all officers of the navy to its official head forbid; and, second, no officer can be upon such terms of equality with that head as will enable him to do so.

The letter of the department (so far as I am concerned) can be divided under these heads:

First, the alleged delay off Cienfuegos, Cuba;

Second, the alleged slow progress towards Santiago de Cuba from Cienfuegos;

Third, the retrograde movements on the 26th and 27th of May.

Fourth, the battle of Santiago and the destruction of Cervera's fleet.

As to the first: My orders from Rear Admiral Sampson of May 19th (No. 5, p. 11) were to blockade Cienfuegos. Sampson says: "It is unnecessary for me to say to you that we should establish a blockade at Cienfuegos with the least possible delay, and that it should be maintained as close as possible." This I proceeded immediately to do.

I had no knowledge that there were any insurgents about Cienfuegos who were friendly to us until the *Marblehead* arrived, on the 24th, when I learned from her commander, for the first time, that there were such; and even had I known it on the 23d of May, the surf would have prevented communication. I immediately sent Commander McCalla to make such communication, the result of which was made known to me at 3.40 P. M. of May 24th, and by which I learned definitely that the Spanish fleet was not at Cienfuegos. Within two hours—at 5.15—I started my fleet for Santiago de Cuba. What possible ground for criticism adverse to me there can be in all this I do not see. I was on the spot, acting under orders which gave me entire discretion, and yet clothed me with the responsibility of going to Santiago, only after I was satisfied that the Spanish fleet was not at Cienfuegos.

In addition to this, I desire to call special attention to a letter (No. 7) of Rear Admiral Sampson to me, under date of May 20th, in which he encloses telegram of 19th (p. 44, Ex. Doc., at top) from the department and says:

"After duly considering this telegram, I have decided to make no change in the present plan—that is, that you should hold your squadron off Cienfuegos. If the Spanish ships have put into Santiago, they must come either to Havana or Cienfuegos to deliver the munitions of war which they are said to bring for use in Cuba. I am, therefore, of the opinion that our best chance of success in capturing these ships will be to hold two points—Cienfuegos and Havana—with all the force we can muster. If later it should develop that these vessels are at Santiago, we can then assemble off that port the ships best suited for the purpose and completely blockade it. Until we, then, receive more positive information we shall continue to hold Havana and Cienfuegos."

This letter is not printed either in the Appendix or the Executive Document C, but I received it on the 23d, and, together with No. 8, received same day, it shows that at that time I was expected to "hold my squadron off Cienfuegos."

Second. The alleged slow progress towards Santiago de Cuba.

The secretary assumes that I was in fault for allowing the *Eagle*, which "was of small importance as a fighting force compared with the rest of the force," to "reduce materially the speed of the squadron."

In respect to this, I have to say that she was a part of the force which Admiral Sampson had thought proper to send me, together with the

Iowa and the collier. I had no right to abandon her without a necessity not then apparent to me. The speed of a fleet must necessarily be regulated by that of its slowest vessel. The *Eagle* was not the only slow vessel in that fleet; the *Vixen* and the collier were others. The weather at sea was such that much greater speed could not have been kept up. Captain Higginson, of the *Massachusetts*, reports (p. 15), "Weather rough and squally;" Captain Evans, of the *Iowa* (p. 26), says, "May 25th, squally and rainy, long sea from E.S.E.;" Captain McCalla, of the *Marblehead* (p. 18), says, "May 25th, rough and moderate sea, fresh to stiff breezes, with wind from E.N.E. to S.E. by S." (which were head winds); and my own report from the *Brooklyn* (p. 22) says, "The run to Santiago was marked by rain and rough weather." I was ordered to proceed to Santiago "cautiously" (see above). If I had known that the Spanish fleet was in the latter port, I trust that it is not necessary for me to assure this honorable committee that no consideration of the *Eagle* or anything else would have prevented me from getting there at the earliest possible moment with the larger vessels, but the weather and sea and the slow-moving vessels made it impossible to do better than I did.

Third. The retrograde movements of May 26th and 27th.

These are what the honorable secretary (adopting the language of the letter to him from Admiral Sampson, to be found on p. 135) characterizes as "reprehensible conduct."

In reply to this I can only say that never before in a professional life of more than forty-two years was any such language used to characterize conduct of mine, and I can see no reason for its use now.

An officer's conduct should be judged, first, in the light of his known character for professional zeal and ability. The honorable secretary pays me a high tribute when he says (p. 6) that I was "selected for command of the Flying Squadron without any solicitation or suggestion on my part, or that of any one in my behalf, and solely with a view to the best interests of the public service." I trust that there is no doubt in the mind of any member of your committee that in all I did while in command of the Flying Squadron, I was animated by the sole desire to do my duty, fully and completely, to my country, and to deserve the high compliment that had been paid to me in assigning me to that command.

Acting in accordance with my best judgment, in view of the circumstances; without any certain knowledge of the whereabouts of that Spanish fleet; after having been informed by the "scouts," commanded by such officers as Sigsbee, Jewell, and Wise, that, although they had all been off Santiago de Cuba for a week, they had seen nothing of it and knew nothing of its movements or its whereabouts since it had left Curaçoa; after having been assured by Sigsbee, that he did not believe it was in Santiago, and by the emphatic declaration of the pilot Nuñez; and, knowing that, as the sea and weather then were, it would be impossible to coal my squadron off the port, I deemed it best to take the action I did, the final result of which was the location of the enemy's fleet in Santiago Harbor.

The department's despatch under consideration (p. 34, No. 27, Execu-

tive C) speaks of insurgent Cubans to be found "five or six miles" from the mouth of the harbor. Through Pilot Nuñez, whom I caused to be landed west of the harbor, I learned, on June 2d, of the presence of the entire Spanish fleet in the harbor, and he was directed by me promptly to report the fact to Rear Admiral Sampson, who was then in command. I would call attention to the exploits of Lieutenant Blue, as reported by Commander Delehanty (see p. 333 of the Appendix), wherein he says that on June 11th he received from Admiral Sampson an order to get in immediate communication with the insurgents and secure without delay reliable information as to what ships, if any, of the Spanish navy were in Santiago Harbor. Delehanty says: "Believing that reliable information could not be secured through the insurgent forces, I detailed Lieutenant Blue for this duty, landing him in uniform at Aserraderos, and directing him to request Colonel Cebereco to furnish him with horses and guides in order to reach the hills near the harbor." And Blue reports the difficulty he was under in getting a sight of Cervera's fleet from those hilltops. From this it will be seen that it was not so easy to secure this information, even ten days after Admiral Sampson had arrived there, as the Cubans in Washington, of whom the department speaks, thought it would be; and Aserraderos, where those insurgents were, was not "five or six miles" but twenty miles to the west of the harbor; and it took Lieutenant Blue more than three days to do his work.

Fourth. The battle of Santiago and destruction of Cervera's fleet.

As to this, I have nothing to say here. The facts of that contest speak for themselves.

In my official report, made to Admiral Sampson July 6th, of that battle (p. 98), I said:

"I congratulate you most sincerely upon this great victory to the squadron under your command, and am glad that I had an opportunity to contribute in the least to a victory that seems big enough for all of us."

I have treated the subject of the battle more fully in the accompanying detailed statement.

The department has done me the honor to refer to my despatch of July 10th (p. 135), wherein I say: "Victory was secured by the force under command of commander-in-chief North Atlantic Station, and to him the honor is due," etc.

I am quite willing, gentlemen of the committee, to have you contrast the spirit of this with the spirit that breathes through the letter beginning, "My Dear Mr. Secretary," at the close of the same page, wherein the commander-in-chief speaks of me.

As to all this criticism of my course prior to the discovery by me on May 29th of Cervera's fleet, whether from Admiral Sampson or the department, none of it has ever been made by either to me; and I never heard a word of it from any one until after the battle with that fleet, although more than five weeks had passed since the alleged "reprehensible conduct"

had occurred. Although Rear Admiral Sampson used this language to the secretary concerning me on the 10th of July (just one week after the battle), he has never to this day, in any manner or to any extent, intimated to me any disapprobation or made to me any criticism of my conduct of the Flying Squadron.

In conclusion, I ask the attention of your honorable committee to the detailed statement herewith submitted, and

I have the honor to be, very respectfully,

W. S. SCHLEY,

Rear Admiral, U. S. N.

DETAILED STATEMENT

THE EVERETT, 1730 H STREET,
WASHINGTON, D. C., February 18, 1899.

SIR: In compliance with your letter dated February 16, 1899, I have the honor to state that on May 19, 1898, at 8 o'clock A. M., the Flying Squadron sailed from Key West for Cienfuegos, with orders to blockade that port, and consisted of the *Brooklyn*, the *Massachusetts*, the *Texas*, and the auxiliary *Scorpion*. At this time, owing to the press of orders and the difficulty of coaling off Sand Key anchorage, the *Massachusetts* and *Brooklyn* left lacking about 100 tons or more of coal to fill their bunkers. Admiral Sampson informed the commander-in-chief of the Flying Squadron that he would send the *Iowa* and a collier to follow the Flying Squadron the next day. The *Iowa* did reach the Flying Squadron off Cienfuegos on May 22d, the day following the arrival of the Flying Squadron, and reported for duty. The *Scorpion* was sent east with despatches for scouting squadron off Santiago.

Lieutenant Commander Rodgers reported on board, as Captain Evans was slightly unwell, and stated that owing to the press of orders to get away from Key West, and the distance of the anchorage there from Key West, the *Iowa* had to sail to join me before she could entirely fill her bunkers, but that with reasonably fair weather his ship's company, a most excellent one, could take on board about 260 tons during the daylight from a collier expected to arrive. On the morning of May 23d the *Castine* arrived, convoying the collier *Merrimac*; and the *Iowa*, *Castine* and *Dupont* took some coal from this collier. On May 24th the *Marblehead*, *Vixen* and *Eagle* joined the squadron off Cienfuegos. During the night of May 23d there were displayed at a point six or eight miles east and west of the port three horizontal white lights, placed equidistant on the hill, but as I had not been informed before leaving Key West that the insurgents were in the vicinity, or that any arrangements had been made to communicate with them, though I asked the question, it was thought that these lights were signal lights of the enemy. The nature of these signals was not understood until the arrival of the *Marblehead* on the morning of May 24th, when Commander McCalla was sent at once with the *Marblehead* and the *Eagle* to the westward, some twelve miles or more,

to communicate with the insurgents for information and to supply them with dynamite, clothing, arms, etc. He returned about 4 P. M. to Cienfuegos with the information, obtained from the insurgents, that Cervera's fleet was not at Cienfuegos. On the morning of May 23d the following communications were received from Rear Admiral Sampson:

UNITED STATES FLAGSHIP *New York* (1st RATE),
KEY WEST, FLA., May 19, 1898.

SIR: I enclose a copy of a memorandum from Commander McCalla.

You will take steps to prevent the enemy from continuing work on the new fortifications mentioned therein.

There is a rumor by way of Havana that the Spanish squadron has put into Santiago.

Very respectfully,

W. T. SAMPSON,
Rear Admiral, U. S. N.,

Commander-in-Chief United States Naval Forces, North Atlantic Station.
The COMMANDING OFFICER, *United States Flying Squadron*.

Accompanying these instructions was the following letter, which confused the situation and threw grave doubts over the location of the Spanish fleet:

[No. 7.]

U. S. FLAGSHIP *New York*,
KEY WEST, FLA., May 20, 1898.

DEAR SCHLEY: The *Iowa* leaves this morning at 11 o'clock bound for Cienfuegos. The *Marblehead* and the *Eagle* will both be ready to depart to-night to join you. Enclosed is a telegram received at Key West May 19th, marked "A." After duly considering this telegram I have decided to make no change in the present plans; that is, that you should hold your squadron off Cienfuegos. If the Spanish ships have put into Santiago they must come either to Havana or Cienfuegos to deliver the munitions of war which they are said to bring for use in Cuba. I therefore am of opinion that our best chance of success in capturing their ships will be to hold the two points, Cienfuegos and Havana, with all the force we can muster. If later it should develop that these vessels are at Santiago we could then assemble off that port the ships best suited for the purpose and completely blockade it. Until we, then, receive more positive information we shall continue to hold Havana and Santiago. (This evidently should be Cienfuegos.—W. S. S.)

I enclose a telegram received at Key West, dated May 19th, marked "B." With regard to this second telegram, in which the consul at Cape Haitien says that a telegram from Port de Paix on May 17th "reports two ships," etc., it is probably of no importance, and the vessels referred to may have been our own ships.

The statement made by the United States minister to Venezuela, contained in a cablegram of the same date, is probably not true, because these

ships are reported to have left Curaçoa at 6 P. M. on the 16th. If they were seen on the 17th, apparently headed for the French West Indies, they could not possibly be at Santiago de Cuba as early as the 18th, as is reported.

From the first cablegram, marked "A," it will be seen that the department has ordered the cruiser *Minneapolis* and Auxiliary No. 461 to proceed to Santiago de Cuba to join you. Please send the *Scorpion* to communicate with these vessels at Santiago, and direct one of them to report to the department from Nicholas Mole or Cape Haitien the change which I have made in the plan "strongly advised" by the department. As soon as this vessel has communicated with the department, at her return to the vicinity of Santiago de Cuba, learn the condition of affairs and immediately report at Havana or Cienfuegos, as he may think most advantageous.

Very respectfully,

W. T. SAMPSON,

Rear Admiral, U. S. N.,

Commander-in-Chief United States Naval Force, North Atlantic Station.

Commodore SCHLEY,

United States Navy, Commanding Flying Squadron.

ENCLOSURE A.

Translation of cipher telegram received at 12.30 A. M. May 20th.

"The report of the Spanish fleet being at Santiago de Cuba might very well be correct, so the department strongly advises that you send word immediately by the *Iowa* to Schley to proceed off Santiago de Cuba with his whole command, leaving one small vessel off Cienfuegos. And meanwhile the department will send the *Minneapolis*, now at St. Thomas, West Indies, Auxiliary No. 461, proceed at once off Santiago de Cuba to join Schley, who would keep up communication via Mole Haiti, or Cape Haitien. If *Iowa* (has not left yet) had gone, send orders Schley by your fastest despatch vessel.

"LONG."

Also enclosed and received May 23d:

UNITED STATES FLAGSHIP *New York*,
KEY WEST, FLA., May 21, 1898.

SIB: Spanish squadron probably at Santiago de Cuba. Four ships and three torpedo-boat destroyers. If you are satisfied that they are not at Cienfuegos, proceed with all despatch, but cautiously, to Santiago de Cuba, and if the enemy is there blockade him in port. You will probably find it necessary to establish communication with some of the inhabitants, fishermen or others, to learn definitely that the ships are in that port, it being impossible to see into it from outside.

When the instructions sent by *Iowa* and *Dupont* (duplicates) were written, I supposed that two fast scouts would be in the vicinity of Jamaica, but I have since learned that they have been ordered by the

department to get in touch with the Spanish fleet on the north coast of Venezuela. I have just telegraphed them to report for orders at Nicholas Mole.

Report from Nicholas Mole.

Very respectfully,

W. T. SAMPSON,

Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,

Commander-in-Chief United States Naval Force, North Atlantic Station.

The COMMODORE, United States Flying Squadron.

Attached to this order were:

COPIES OF LATE TELEGRAMS

WASHINGTON, D. C., May 18, 1898.

SAMPSON, *Key West, Fla.*:

Owing to absence of your armored vessels, Flying Squadron will coal and sent off Havana, Cuba. Therefore you will coal your ships and carry out the department's telegraphic instructions of 17th, addressed to naval station, Key West, and beginning with the cipher words apporcam economical. Leave a suitable defense for Key West, and use utmost despatch to get force off Cienfuegos, Cuba. *Oregon* arrived to-day at Barbados, West Indies.

WASHINGTON, D. C., May 19, 1898.

SAMPSON, *Key West, Fla.*:

United States consul at Cape Haitien says that telegram from Port de Paix, Haiti, on May 17th, reports the Spanish ships cruising off Mole every night two weeks. The United States minister to Venezuela says that cable employee reports confidentially the Spanish men-of-war were May 17th apparently headed for French West Indies.

LONG.

Attached to a duplicate order of the same date was this:

UNITED STATES FLAGSHIP *New York* (1ST RATE),

OFF HAVANA, CUBA, May 21, 1898.

MEMORANDUM

It is thought that the enclosed instruction will reach you by 2 A. M. May 23d. This will enable you to leave before daylight (regarded as very important), so that your direction will not be noticed, and be at Santiago A. M. 24th.

It is thought that the Spanish squadron will probably be still at Santiago, as they must have some repairs to make and coal to take.

The *St. Paul* and *Minneapolis* have been telegraphed to scout off Santiago, and if the Spanish squadron goes westward one is to go west and

attempt to reach you. If the squadron goes east, one will keep in touch and the other go into Nicholas Mole to telegraph me at Key West. If you arrive off Santiago and a scout meets you, send a vessel to cable at Nicholas Mole and get information to be left there by scouts as to direction taken by Spanish in case they have left Santiago de Cuba.

The *Yale* has been ordered to cruise in Bahama Channel until May 24th. It is thought possible that the Spanish, hearing of your departure from Cienfuegos, may attempt to go there.

If this word does not reach you before daylight, it is suggested to mask your real direction as much as possible. Follow the Spanish squadron whichever direction they take.

W. T. SAMPSON,
Rear Admiral,

Commander-in-Chief United States Naval Force on North Atlantic Station.
The COMMODORE *Flying Squadron*.

Written in ink on the border is the following:

"Our experience has been that ships can be traced by their smoke from twenty to thirty miles, and it is suggested in case you leave in the daytime to stand a good distance to the westward before turning to the southward."

Coincident with the receipt of these orders on May 23d a British steamer, *Adula*, arrived off the port with duly authentic papers from the United States consul, Dent, from the State Department, authorizing her to carry out neutrals wishing to leave Cienfuegos. She was carefully searched for any contraband matter, and finding nothing on board she was permitted to go in. Her captain informed me that a war bulletin, published at Kingston, announced the arrival of Cervera's fleet at Santiago May 19th, and that his squadron had sailed on May 20th from Santiago.

It was a curious coincidence that being on the forward bridge of the *Brooklyn* on the afternoon about 6 o'clock of May 21st, as we approached Cienfuegos, and distant perhaps some thirty miles from the harbor, a number of heavy guns were heard in the direction of the port and fired with the regularity of a salute. Not knowing the whereabouts of the Spanish fleet, it was thought that this firing might indicate their arrival at Cienfuegos, and this opinion was on May 22d signaled to the squadron for their information. (See p. 29, Confidential Ex. Doc. C.) This view was the stronger from the generally accepted theory that this fleet was bound for Cienfuegos with guns, ammunition, etc., to be run by rail to Havana, as Cienfuegos was in railroad communication with Havana. This information of the *Adula* directly from Jamaica strengthened my belief of Cervera's presence in Cienfuegos, and convinced me of the propriety of delay to satisfy myself, until the evening of the 24th, when it was definitely decided, through information of Commander McCalla, that the Spanish fleet was not at Cienfuegos.

The *Dupont* arrived at Cienfuegos the morning of May 22d, and, being without sufficient coal to return to Key West, the flagship undertook to coal her with boats, but there was so much motion that it was not possible to put more than ten or twelve tons on board in bags during the day. It was not until the arrival of the collier, the day following, that coal sufficient to enable her to get back to Key West could be put on board. During this time the heavy surf on the beach made communication impossible until the 24th, when Commander McCalla joined the squadron.

Commander McCalla reported on board on his arrival on May 24th, asking me if we had seen any signals on the shore. I informed him that on the night of May 23d lights were seen on the hills east and west of the harbor. He stated then that they were signals from insurgents for communication. This was the first intimation I had ever received that any arrangements of any kind had been agreed upon. Commander McCalla was sent immediately westward with instructions to ascertain, if possible, if Cervera's fleet was in Cienfuegos, and reported about 4 P. M. that it was not. That fact established, the Flying Squadron moved at dusk eastward for Santiago, leaving the *Castine* off Cienfuegos, as directed.

The squadron, consisting of the *Brooklyn*, the *Massachusetts*, the *Iowa*, the *Texas*, *Marblehead*, *Vixen*, *Eagle*, and collier *Merrimac*, left Cienfuegos at dusk May 24th for Santiago at a speed of nine knots, that being the best the smaller vessels could make in starting out. For the two days the squadron was off Cienfuegos the winds were fresh, with rolling seas; but as the sea was gained, after leaving, the winds freshened up, with rain, and the sea became so rough that the small craft could not keep up with the larger vessels, but were tossed about to such extent that it was necessary to slow down, so that they might hold position. At least two or three times the squadron had to stop to make minor repairs to the steering gear of the collier and to allow the *Eagle* and *Vixen* to gain and hold their positions. The weather continued varied by wind squalls and occasioned much delay, as the squadron had to be slowed down at times to four or five knots. On the 26th the *Eagle* reported about a day's coal, more or less, on board, and there being no prospects of being able to coal her, as the sea was too rough, she was sent to Port Antonio, some seventy miles away, with orders, after coaling there, to return to Key West, so as to avoid any complications about the neutrality of the port—the regulations governing such supply in neutral ports confining the amount of coal given to enough only to make the nearest home port, which was Key West.

The squadron, after these various delays, arrived off Santiago de Cuba about 4.30 P. M. of May 26th, and sighted several vessels to the northward and eastward, which proved to be the scouts *St. Paul*, *Yale* and *Minneapolis*. Not knowing definitely of their presence, the squadron was cleared for action, and closed in with these vessels should they have proved enemies.

Shortly after coming up with these scouts the machinery of the *Merrimac* was disabled by breaking of her intermediate pressure valve and the cracking of the stuffing box. This unfortunate accident to the *Merrimac* embarrassed the squadron's movements, and as she was the only collier at

hand, it was necessary to have her taken in tow, and this proved to be very difficult on account of the wind and sea. In her disabled state no thought of abandoning her or the scouts could be entertained. Indeed, it required some fifteen to twenty hours to get a line to her that would stand the great strain of towing, and no end of hard work all night and part of the next day, 27th, during which the squadron drifted with the wind and sea to the westward of port. It was during this operation that the *Harvard* brought the department despatch, as follows:

"COTTON, *Harvard*, *Nicholas Mole*. (Received at Nicholas Mole 8.30 A. M. and delivered May 27, 1898.) Proceed at once and inform Schley and also the senior officer off Santiago de Cuba as follows:

"All department's information indicates the Spanish division is still at Santiago de Cuba. The department looks to you to ascertain the fact and that the enemy, if therein, does not leave without a decisive action. Cubans familiar with Santiago de Cuba say there is a landing-place five nautical miles west, or six from mouth of harbor, and that there probably insurgents will be found and not Spanish. From surrounding heights can see every vessel in port. As soon as ascertained, notify the department whether enemy is there. Could not squadron and also *Harvard* coal from *Merrimac* leeward Cape Cruz, Cuba; Gonaives, Haiti Channel; or Mole, Haiti? Report without delay situation Santiago de Cuba."

Captain Sigsbee stated verbally that he had been close into the port several times and there were no indications of any kind that the enemy was present, and, indeed, he doubted his presence. Pilot Nuñez, an experienced Santiago pilot, who was sent on board the *Brooklyn* by Sigsbee, was emphatic in his belief that the squadron was not able to enter, on account of their size, without the assistance of tugs. He stated that owing to the narrowness of the channel such large ships could not enter the port. Sigsbee also confirms this. (Appendix to Report Bureau Navigation, p. 413.)

The commanding officer of the *Harvard* reported that he did not have coal enough to reach any home base and could not steam beyond twenty-four or thirty hours, which forced me to send him to Kingston. The commanding officer of the *Yale* reported that he could reach Key West, with some margin for bad weather. The *Minneapolis* reported his engine in bad order and his coal supply about enough to reach Key West. The commanding officer of the *St. Paul* reported that he could remain at most off the port some two days, when he ought in prudence to start for his base.

The *Brooklyn*, *Iowa* and *Massachusetts* were fairly well off with coal, but the *Texas*, *Marblehead* and *Vixen* were very considerably reduced, owing to the difficulty of coaling the *Texas* in the swell off Cienfuegos, and the arrival of the two latter, both short of coal, at Cienfuegos on May 24th, the squadron sailing therefrom on the evening of that date. The projecting sponsons of the *Texas* and *Marblehead* made it dangerous to coal them alongside the collier with any swell in the open sea.

It was this situation, coupled with the conclusion that the Spanish squadron might have touched and then moved west, as reported at Cienfuegos, and reinforced by the fact that Sigsbee had not seen them, and that the pilot Nuñez, an experienced Santiago pilot, was strongly impressed with the doubt that this squadron could enter the port, which occasioned my telegram of May 27th. The chief engineer of the collier, after much hard work, disconnected the broken engine while being taken in tow. The weather and sea having moderated considerably and the commanding officer of the collier reporting that he could make six or seven knots in moderate sea and weather, orders were given to cast off the tow lines after about three hours' steaming west.

As to the difficulty of coaling off Santiago at that time, the following extract from the report of Captain Sigsbee of May 31, 1898 (p. 414, Appendix Bureau's Report), is pertinent. He says: "Just before leaving Santiago I told Commodore Schley that the weather then prevailing (May 29th) was far more favorable for coaling outside than any I had observed in my eight days' continuous cruise off the entrance."

The *Texas*, *Marblehead* and *Vixen* having taken coal enough to equalize the squadron's working efficiency, I decided, before going farther west, to satisfy myself by close examination of the port of Santiago. If it should be discovered that the enemy was not in that port, the squadron, being equal in steaming radius (with the *Texas*, *Marblehead* and *Vixen* coaled), could then make the best speed towards Key West via Yucatan Passage.

By the *Yale* my despatch of May 28th was sent to the department and to Admiral Sampson to inform them that, collier having been repaired, I would endeavor to coal *Texas* and *Marblehead* in open sea and hold my position off Santiago.

The squadron then turned east and took up position in the afternoon about 5.30 of May 28th, and invested Santiago de Cuba. Forming the squadron in line of battle, with the *Marblehead* and *Vixen* on the flanks as pickets, the squadron in column steamed slowly east and west before the harbor in line of battle, ready for any emergency, about six miles offshore, as shown by report of Captain Evans dated July 4th (p. 419, Appendix), wherein he says: "Works at entrance to Santiago de Cuba in plain sight latter part first dogwatch" (4 to 6 P. M.). On May 29th, the day following, shortly after daybreak, on steaming closer in past the harbor we discovered the *Cristobal Colon*, with another of the enemy's vessels and two torpedo-boats, moored well inside the Morro and partially concealed, except the *Colon*, which was lying well inside of Cay Smith and towards Punta Gorda and head on.

The *St. Paul* rejoined the squadron from the eastward on May 29th about 8 o'clock A. M., and was despatched with cablegram announcing the discovery of several vessels of the enemy's fleet in port to the department and Rear Admiral Sampson.

The telegram of May 29th to the department and Admiral Sampson was sent by *St. Paul* to Nicholas Mole.

"Enemy in port. Recognized *Cristobal Colon* and *Infanta Maria Teresa*, with two torpedo-boats, moored inside Morro, behind point. Doubtless others are here. We are short of coal, using every effort to get coal in. *Vixen* blew out manhole gasket. Have sent boiler maker to repair. Collier repaired, machinery being put together. Have about 3,000 tons of coal in collier left. Not easy to get on board here. If no engagement the next two or three days, Sampson's squadron could relieve this one to coal at Gonaives or vicinity Port au Prince. Hasten me despatch boats for picket work. *Brooklyn, Iowa, Massachusetts, Texas, Marblehead, Vixen*, and collier compose squadron here. Am sending the *St. Paul* to communicate with Sampson."

On May 31st, leaving *Brooklyn* and *Texas* coaling in offing, I made a reconnaissance in afternoon with the *Massachusetts, Iowa, New Orleans* and *Vixen* to develop the enemy's position, and incidentally to injure or destroy, if possible, the *Colon*, moored well up in the harbor. The result of the reconnaissance determined without question the presence of the Spanish fleet in the harbor. That question decided, it would have been unwise to risk, until reinforced, any chance of serious disablement of the ships that would have rendered the squadron numerically inferior to the enemy. This, my judgment, was in line with the judgment of the Navy Department, set out on page 171, Appendix to Bureau's Report, in Secretary Long's instructions to Rear Admiral Sampson, in these words:

"The department does not wish the vessels of your squadron to be exposed to the fire of the batteries at Havana, Santiago de Cuba or other strongly fortified ports in Cuba unless the more formidable Spanish vessels should take refuge within those harbors. Even in this case the department would suggest that a rigid blockade and employment of our torpedo-boats might accomplish this—the destruction of the enemy's vessels—without subjecting unnecessarily our men-of-war to the fire of the land batteries;" and gives the reason that lack of docking facilities made it particularly desirable that our vessels should not be crippled. This was substantially repeated on April 26, 1898 (p. 177, Appendix), and May 5th (366, Appendix), as to "not risking or crippling the vessels against fortifications."

The *Harvard* joined the squadron May 31st from Kingston, with following despatches:

"COTTON, U. S. S. *Harvard, Kingston, Jamaica*:

"Return to Schley with this message: Hold on at all hazards. *New York, Oregon* and *New Orleans* are on way. *St. Louis* and *Yankee* are leaving *New York* for *Santiago* via *Nicholas Mole*. Two more colliers en route; torpedo-boat destroyer reported at *San Juan* said to be damaged.

"LONG."

The *Harvard* was sent on the same evening to Nicholas Mole with the following telegram to the secretary:

"Made reconnaissance this afternoon, May 31st, with the *Massachusetts*, *Iowa*, *New Orleans*, to develop fortifications with their character. The range was 7,000 yards. Reconnaissance was intended (to) principally injure (or) to destroy *Colon*. Fire was returned without delay by heavy batteries to the east and to the west (of) entrance, large caliber and long range. Reconnaissance developed satisfactorily the presence of Spanish squadron lying beyond island near inner forts, as they fired over the hill at random. Quite satisfied that Spanish fleet is there. I shall send pilot to-morrow morning in *Vixen* to ascertain fully, and I shall report. In great need of smaller vessels for picket duty. I would suggest that it is most important to send with collier a large number of coaling bags holding about 600 pounds, as all coaling must be done in such a manner. Can you send *Solace* here in order to give relief to exhausted and injured in any operation? Owing to extreme heat the suffering for all hands is great, particularly (in the) engineers' department. We are coaling squadron in the face of the enemy every good day. United States ships were not struck this afternoon."

During the early morning of June 1st, the *Colon* changed her position into the harbor behind the land, preventing any further operations against her, had they been deemed wise.

On May 31st I wrote the following note:

FLYING SQUADRON, UNITED STATES FLAGSHIP *Brooklyn*,
OFF SANTIAGO DE CUBA, May 31, 1898.

SIR: I send to communicate with you Pilot Nuñez, to arrange a system of signals to indicate your desire to communicate with me. I would suggest three lights at night, equidistant and horizontal; and during day three white flags, moved to right three times simultaneously. Please inform Nuñez of your acquiescence, and oblige,

Yours truly,

W. S. SCHLEY,

Commodore, U. S. Navy, Commander-in-Chief Flying Squadron.
To General MINUET or General CEREBECO.

A note was sent the morning following by the *Vixen* with Pilot Eduardo Nuñez to General Cerebeco to arrange a general system of signals for communication by day or night. Pilot Nuñez was landed by *Vixen* some fifteen miles west of the port to communicate with Cuban general some thirty miles in the interior. The *Vixen* returned to the squadron after landing Nuñez and went back for him the next afternoon. The insurgents confirmed the fact that the Spanish fleet was in Santiago, as my telegrams of May 29th and 31st had reported.

On June 1st, about 6.30 A. M., the *New York*, with Rear Admiral Sampson, arrived off the port, and he assumed command.

The contents of the despatches which follow were all communicated by me to Admiral Sampson during my visit.

It will be seen that the telegrams to Cotton at Kingston reached me at Santiago May 31st, three days, nearly, after the port had been blockaded, and on the same day and at the same hour the following was received, through the courtesy of Mr. Wright, of the Associated Press, on board the press boat *Dandy*, from Port Antonio:

(1) "Deliver following to next American war vessel to arrive: Proceed immediately and deliver the following to Schley as soon as possible; the utmost urgency.

"Unless it is unsafe for your (our) squadron, the department wishes you remain off Santiago de Cuba. So can not you take possession of Guantanamo, Cuba, occupying as coaling station? If you must leave, are authorized to sink collier in the mouth of harbor off Santiago de Cuba if you obstruct thereby. But if not so used, and if not necessary to you, it would be very desirable to leave her at Mole Haiti or vicinity. You must not leave the vicinity of Santiago de Cuba unless it is unsafe for your squadron, or unless Spanish division is not there."

Also received May 31, 1898:

(2) "The following was sent to you 27th to Nicholas Mole:

"The most absolutely urgent thing now is to know positively whether the Spanish division is in Santiago de Cuba Harbor, as, if so, immediate movements against it and the town if it has not been made by the navy and division of about 10,000 United States troops, which are ready to embark. You must surmount difficulty regarding coaling by your ingenuity and perseverance. This is a crucial time, and the department relies upon you to give information quickly as to the presence of Cervera and to be ready for concerted action with the army. Two colliers have been ordered to Mole Nicholas. Your vessels may coal singly there or in Gonaives, Haiti Channel, or leeward Cape Cruz, Cuba. Sampson will convoy army transports, probably around by Windward Passage, Cuba. Orders have been issued to commander Auxiliary No. 592 (*St. Louis*), and the *Minneapolis* will go north. Cervera must not be allowed to escape.

"LONG."

Received June 1st, off Santiago de Cuba, by tug *Triton*, from Port Antonio, forwarded from United States consul:

"SCHLEY, *Port Antonio, Jamaica*:

"It is your duty to ascertain immediately if the Spanish fleet be at Santiago de Cuba and report. Would be discreditable to the navy if that

fact was not ascertained immediately. All naval and military movements depend upon that point.

"LONG."

Received by *Harvard* from Kingston 31st May:

"Deliver Schley following: Where are other two armored cruisers (of Spanish fleet when discovered? Please report promptly. Commander-in-Chief North Atlantic Squadron has started to join you.

"LONG."

Received June 1, 1898:

[Translation of telegram.]

"General Miles states that if you can communicate with Cuban insurgents, request Garcia to assemble force at the rear of Santiago de Cuba and our army division will take with them to Santiago de Cuba 5,000 stand of arms and ammunition for Cubans.

"LONG."

Received on June 1, 1898:

"It has been suggested that an alternate line of communication could be opened with General Garcia, as follows: Landing Maceo Inlet, about thirty nautical miles west of Santiago de Cuba, not far from Jucaro anchorage. A messenger would find the neighboring country in possession of insurgents, and Garcia would probably be found at Daire, thirty-three miles to the north over the mountains. An outpost of Garcia's force will probably be found at the northern foot of the mountains and about half-way from the sea to Daire. The highest point of the road is Naranjo, from where there are two paths over to Matias Auras, Fors Negros, the other by Banas Calientes and Ojo de Agua. Our army wishes Garcia to close down on land side of Santiago de Cuba, as previously telegraphed.

"LONG."

Received on June 1:

"The *New Orleans* will meet you at Santiago de Cuba May 29th with important despatches. The Spanish squadron must be blockaded in Santiago de Cuba at all hazards. Immediate communication with persons on shore must be entered upon. You must be sure of the Spanish squadron being in port. I suggest communication with Spanish-American Company pier at Daiquiri Bay, at a distance of fifteen miles east of Santiago de Cuba. One collier for you left Tuesday. Shall send another as soon as possible. If Spanish squadron has left Santiago immediate pursuit must be made.

"SAMPSON."

The *New Orleans* did not arrive until May 30th, and the despatch announcing her coming only reached me June 1st.

The department's orders dated May 25th (No. 27, Executive Document C), and received by me on May 27th, were as follows:

"All department's information indicates the Spanish division is still at Santiago de Cuba. The department looks to you to ascertain fact, and that the enemy, if therein, does not leave without a decisive action."

In obedience to the above order, and without any further order or instruction from any one, I did ascertain the fact that the enemy was at Santiago de Cuba, as reported in my telegram of May 29th to the department, and the enemy did not leave without a decisive conflict.

With reference to the battle of July 3d, the *Brooklyn's* movements are brought under review by Secretary Long in Executive Document C.

At 8.45 A. M., July 3d, Admiral Sampson made signal from his flagship, "Disregard movements of commander-in-chief," and steamed eastward to Siboney.

This left me the senior officer present, and necessarily clothed me with the responsibility of command.

The *Brooklyn's* blockading position was then about S.W. by W. from the Morro, with her head that day to the eastward. When the enemy's vessels came out the harbor, at 9.35 A. M., signal was made from the *Brooklyn* to the fleet to "Clear ship for action," then followed the signal, "Close action," and this was followed by the signal, "Enemy escaping to westward."

Following the appearance of the Spanish squadron coming out there was a general inward movement of the American fleet, closing in and engaging it.

General firing began at once. The tactics of the Spanish admiral soon made it evident that he intended to escape west. The rapidity with which the *Brooklyn* approached the head of the Spanish column coming westward under high speed and changing course more to westward, brought the *Brooklyn* heading eastward to meet it into a position where she would have blanketed the fire of the eastern vessels of our force, now changing their courses to the westward, and between them and the Spanish vessels. Instant decision was therefore necessary to avoid interfering in any way or cutting off any of the fire of our vessels, as would have occurred if she had turned towards the Spanish fleet, now approaching the *Brooklyn*. Turning outward left the enemy's ships unmasked by the *Brooklyn* and exposed them to the concentrated fire of our squadron, now changing its course to the west. The result of this maneuver was that, in thirty minutes from the opening of the combat, four of the enemy's vessels were on fire and riddled with projectiles. Two torpedo-boats were destroyed; one reached the beach about three miles from the mouth of the harbor; the *Teresa* and *Oquendo* were beached about six miles from the harbor. Every vessel of the enemy's fleet destroyed and surrendered were

a little forward of the *Brooklyn's* beam when they turned towards the beach on fire.

At the final capture of the *Colon*, at 1.15 P. M., the *Brooklyn* was nearest, and the *Oregon* next, and then the *Texas* and *Vixen*. The *New York* arrived at 2.23 P. M., and the commander-in-chief assumed command of the forces present. Signals were made from *Brooklyn* to the squadron until all signal halyards were shot away, then by the Meyers army code.

This turn of the *Brooklyn* in the battle of July 3d was the crucial and deciding feature of that combat. If the advantage gained by the *Brooklyn's* turn outward, to permit the concentrated fire of our squadron upon the enemy without interruption, had been surrendered to a turn made inward that would have interfered with this fire, so imperatively necessary at this vital moment, the results might have been quite different.

Viewing the situation from my position, on a platform built around the conning tower, with unobstructed observation of the ships of both fleets, there was no question in my mind that the results of the battle were aided largely by this maneuver of the *Brooklyn* at that decisive moment. It is a mistake to say that her distance from the enemy was increased by her tactical diameter 800 yards in this movement, for the enemy's ships were speeding westward at much greater speed than the speed of the *Brooklyn*, which was somewhat retarded by the backing of her starboard propeller to shorten this circle. Though this may not be of record, it is a fact, nevertheless.

The chart of the board of navigators (p. 84, Ex. Doc. C) shows that the *Brooklyn's* position was nearest the enemy at the beginning of the combat; she was nearest during every stage of the battle, as shown in the various points of it on this chart, and was closest to the *Colon* when she surrendered at 1.15 P. M., when the battle ended which practically destroyed the sea power of Spain this side of the Atlantic.

The report of the board of executive officers (p. 573, Appendix) indicates that every ship of the enemy examined by them showed the marks of eight-inch, five-inch and six-pound guns. All these guns were in the battery of the *Brooklyn*. She was the only vessel in our fleet which carried five-inch guns, and it is only fair to assume that the five-inch gun-marks on these vessels favored the belief that the eight-inch marks and the six-pounder marks, in fair proportion, were made by the *Brooklyn's* guns also.

The *Brooklyn* was struck some twenty-six times (p. 98, Ex. Doc. 6), and bore some forty odd wounds from the enemy's projectiles. We lost the only man killed in our fleet in the action, and had two of our crew wounded; one seriously, the other less gravely.

In my official report of the combat, dated July 6th, I make no mention of this maneuver, as its effect upon the battle was never a question with me. I regarded it only as an incident of the action which had achieved an advantage; but as the results flowing from it were so brilliantly successful for our forces, I did not imagine it needed, or could need, any explanation, as might have been required if defeat had occurred from the maneuver.

On May 31st I received a telegram from the commander-in-chief congratulating me upon success in locating and blockading the enemy's fleet at Santiago. If it was worthy of commendation at that time, I am at a loss to understand how it could have grown into reprehensible conduct, as suggested by Admiral Sampson in his letter of July 10, 1898, some six weeks later.

Very respectfully,

W. S. SCHLEY,

Rear Admiral, U. S. N.

Hon. EUGENE HALE, *Chairman, etc., Washington, D. C.*

The further answer to this letter by Mr. Long was not submitted to the writer, but it dealt in the main with excuses about letter No. 7, which somebody had suppressed. Mr. Long's reply sought by insinuation to convey the impression that it had been withheld by the commander of the Second Squadron, when he knew, or ought to have known, that the naval regulations require copies of all orders issued by the commander-in-chief to be forwarded to the department when issued, and at the end of the cruise all official papers received by subordinate officers are required to be sent likewise. This the commander of the Second Squadron did. If the officer who wrote it failed to transmit a copy it was unfortunate. If the officials who compiled the documents failed to include it, there can be no doubt it was a grave blunder.

CHAPTER XXXIV

COMMAND SOUTH ATLANTIC SQUADRON

1899-1901

NOTWITHSTANDING the communication from Mr. Long, the Senate of the United States did not confirm the promotions as sent in, giving precedence to Admiral Sampson. This was clearly and distinctly a vindication of the commander of the Second Squadron, whose friends had insisted that, if his conduct on July 3, 1898, had been such as to justify his advancement and promotion for "eminent and conspicuous conduct in battle," as had been done by the President, he deserved equally to hold his original place on the navy list. Furthermore, they contended that, to advance over him an officer who had not shared the dangers of that day, or who had not contributed one single blow to achieve that great victory, would in effect degrade the officer who had been recommended for promotion because of his conspicuous conduct in the battle. These friends maintained, still further, that to advance another over the head of the commander of the Second Squadron, when it had been admitted that his conduct had been so conspicuous in battle, would be unfair, and that he ought of right to maintain his place in the navy, as he had held it for forty-two years, as the senior in rank to Rear Admiral Sampson, and that he should not be forced to surrender it to any officer, however able he might have been, who was not even in signal distance of any ship of the squadron while the battle was in progress.

Whatever the reasons may have been which influenced the action of the Senate on these nominations as submitted, the advice and consent of that body was withheld and the specious sophistries of Mr. Long were disregarded.

In the meanwhile Congress had passed a bill known at the time as the Personnel Bill, wherein certain rearrangements in the grades of officers were authorized. It abolished the time-honored grade of commodore and merged those officers holding that grade

into an enlarged list of rear admirals, comprising two classes, one with the assimilated rank of brigadier general, the other with that of major general; both these grades to receive the pay and allowances of the army grades with which they took assimilated rank. This bill was approved by the President in March, 1899, and its provisions were immediately carried into effect by the nomination of the officers affected in their regular order of rank as shown in the Naval Register of January, 1898. This action shows incontestably that the President had accepted the situation as viewed in the Senate and had agreed with its conclusions in the nominations he had submitted in their regular order. The nominations thus submitted were confirmed at once without sacrifice of lineal seniority by the commander of the Second Squadron.

Before the officers so confirmed could receive their commissions it was necessary to appear before the Statutory Board, created years before, in order to establish their mental, moral, professional and physical fitness to perform the duties of the higher grade.

Acting Rear Admiral Sampson, who in lineal rank was still a commodore in command of the North Atlantic Squadron, was directed to convene a board to examine and pass upon himself and the officers of his squadron affected by the provisions of the new law. The commander of the late Second Squadron, who had been placed on waiting orders on his return from his duties as commissioner in Porto Rico, was ordered to appear before the Regular Statutory Board, at Washington, where he underwent careful scrutiny successfully and qualified for the higher rank.

On the 14th of April, 1899, he was commissioned a rear admiral, ranking with major general, and awaited orders in the new grade until April 26th, when he was appointed president of the Retiring Board in Washington.

The fact that the Examining Board which Congress had created did examine into the professional, moral, mental and physical fitness of the commander of the Second Squadron to perform the duties of the next higher grade, rear admiral, and did pronounce him qualified; the fact of the receipt of his commission as a rear admiral to take rank from March 3, 1899, confirmed

by the Senate; and the further fact of the assignment to duty on April 26th, must be conclusive evidence that Mr. Long stood upon untenable ground in his confidential communication to the Senate, as already given. When it is further stated that the data used in preparing that communication were furnished in the main by officers junior in rank to the writer, and who would profit by any adverse action in the Senate, Mr. Long neglected to protect the writer against the influence of such motives.

During the summer of 1899 Admiral Dewey returned to New York in his flagship *Olympia*. He was received with every mark of honor and respect by the Mayor, the city authorities and the people of the great metropolis. The ceremony of reception embraced a parade on the river, and on the day following a grand civic parade, beginning on Riverside Park, at the tomb of General Grant, thence through Seventy-second Street to Eighth Avenue, thence to Fifth Avenue and south as far as Washington Square. At the junction of Broadway and Fifth Avenue a grand triumphal arch had been erected in honor of the event. There, upon a grand-stand, Admiral Dewey was received by the city officials, with whom he reviewed the great pageant prepared in his honor.

Upon invitation of the municipal authorities of the metropolis the writer assisted them in doing honor to that great American commander, who had been for over forty years his comrade in arms.

The route followed by this imposing parade was literally packed with people from all parts of our country, who occupied every available foot of the pavements, steps, windows, and platforms erected at a number of points along this route. Those who were in this vast procession as it moved on to its destination appeared to be passing through a cañon of humanity.

The tumultuous enthusiasm which distinguished the occasion as this cortège passed onward found expression in almost deafening applause. The shower of flowers from fair hands, beginning on Riverside Park, ended only at Washington Square.

From Thirty-fifth Street and Fifth Avenue to Madison Square a bombardment of flowers from housetops and windows, from doorsteps and pavements, was kept up. How many of these fell in Dewey's carriage the writer could not know, but

those which reached his own carriage literally filled it, almost snowing him under, as it were. The air seemed to be filled with flowers, as if they were being rained down upon this vast procession.

Along the route the thought of other-day pageants offered to men who had returned in triumph from fields of duty would arise. The millions who had gathered to honor the great Dewey with their tribute of affection could find no grander prototype in the days of Imperial Rome, for no such pageant had welcomed even the Cæsars.

It was greater, grander, more imposing than others, for it meant to every one an offering of love from a nation of freemen to all who had wrought well for the honor of home and for the glory of country. It was a red-letter day in their lives. And their hearts will never forget it.

An event which took place afterwards, was when the commander of the late Second Squadron, then a rear admiral, was assigned in November, 1899, to command an important foreign station, for the reason, as stated to his friends, that an officer of tact and judgment was needed to command the South Atlantic Station, the territory in South Africa where war was being waged by the English against the Boers being included in its limits. Then every vestige of the arraignment in Mr. Long's confidential communication was swept away.

And when the nomination of the commander of the late Second Squadron for advancement and promotion for "eminent and conspicuous conduct in battle" was submitted again by the President, in February, 1901, that act virtually ignored and renounced every expression of Mr. Long's disapprobation, previously expressed in whatever form.

When the flag of rear admiral was broken at the main of the flagship *Chicago*, on November 18, 1899, off Tompkinsville, N. Y., in conformity with the department's orders, it was an official indorsement that the professional record of the rear admiral was approved and stood unblemished and unblameworthy. This incident is recalled merely that it may be contrasted with Mr. Long's subsequent action in the court of inquiry in 1901.

Between the date of hoisting the flag on the *Chicago* and that of the sailing on November 25, 1899, the Hon. Garrett J. Hobart,

Vice President of the United States, died. In order to pay the proper respect to this distinguished citizen, the *Chicago's* sailing was delayed in order to fire a salute of twenty-one minute guns at noon on the day of his funeral. This ceremony of honor to his memory being completed, the *Chicago* sailed for her station in South American waters.

The voyage outward included a stop for coal at St. Lucia in the windward group of the Antilles, and also at Bahia in Brazil. Good weather and smooth seas prevailed throughout the passage. The flagship arrived in the roads off Buenos Aires on the morning of December 24th, after a pleasant passage from New York of twenty-two steaming days under little more than half-boiler power. She was placed in quarantine for five days, in accordance with the regulations of the health authorities of the port, the restrictions against Brazilian ports being rigidly in force during the summer months.

It was only necessary to address a note to the senior American naval officer, then in the docks at Buenos Aires, explaining that there had been no communication with the shore at Bahia; that the coal taken on board had been received from hulks in that harbor; that there was no infectious disease at Bahia; and that the flagship was entirely free from sickness of any kind or character. The health authorities recognized these facts immediately by releasing the *Chicago* from quarantine the following morning.

This prompt consideration of the health authorities permitted many of the officers and men to spend their Christmas Day with friends on shore. The day was bright, with warm, balmy temperature, and the novelty of a Christmas dinner with fresh vegetables and tropical fruits, which abounded in the markets, gave a relish much enjoyed after the diet of shipboard for the weeks passed on the passage.

Our wives and sweethearts had sent on board, before the ship sailed, packages carefully marked with the injunction, "Not to be opened until Christmas," and it would be needless to add that this injunction was carefully observed by all. When the day came these packages were opened with all the delightful sensations and anticipations of the days of our youth at home, when the happy illusion of Santa Claus filled the mind and heart.

The happy association with the loved ones at home was missing, but, though absent in the flesh, our thoughts went back to them and all that this happy season meant there in "Peace on earth and good will towards men."

Between the two great American republics the most cordial relations of friendship then existed. This gave to the interchange of the usual civilities observed between the official representatives of both a cordiality that was marked by a sincere welcome extended to the commander-in-chief and his officers.

To our countrymen residing in the republic the visit of the flagship was especially gratifying, and in many ways their pleasure was expressed in their courteous reception and attentions. It is certain that all who had the opportunity to enjoy these courtesies and hospitalities will recall pleasant memories that lapse of time and change of circumstances can never efface.

Not long after the *Chicago* arrived the commander-in-chief was waited upon by a committee of his countrymen to ascertain the date when he could be present at a reception to be given to him and his officers by their fellow countrymen resident in the Argentine capital. January 23, 1900, was named, for the reason that, after an official inspection had been made of the vessels of the squadron, it was found necessary to proceed to Montevideo for consultation with the American Minister with respect to some unrest in the republic of Uruguay, due to the prevailing rumors of a revolutionary force being assembled to overthrow the Government of that country. A few days were spent at Montevideo, and during this interval the usual ceremonious interchange of civilities took place, including a call upon and presentation to President Cuestas and his Cabinet. Here, as at Buenos Aires, the commander-in-chief and his officers were received with marked courtesy and deference from every one, from the greatest to the least of the inhabitants. The *entente* inaugurated on this occasion widened as our sojourn lengthened on the station. The commander-in-chief and his officers were made as welcome in the homes of the executive as in those of the citizens, while the men of the squadron were made to feel at home whenever on leave, which was granted almost daily.

With the situation there in better hand, the flagship returned

to La Plata, in easy railroad communication with Buenos Aires, on January 20th, when the commander-in-chief with his staff proceeded to Buenos Aires to call upon President Roca and to be present at the reception tendered by his fellow countrymen on the evening of January 23d, at St. George's Hall. A large company, composed of Americans, foreigners and natives, had assembled to meet, greet and welcome the officers of the squadron. The occasion was emphasized by the presentation of an exquisitely bound album containing beautiful views of the city with its entourage and bearing the autographs of the American residents. The outer cover of this beautiful album was surmounted by a magnificent coat of arms of the United States in solid silver graven with the inscription following:

To
Rear Admiral Winfield Scott Schley, U. S. N.,
from his countrymen in Buenos Aires,
January 23, 1900.

Until the ceremony of presenting this beautiful album had begun, there was no idea in the mind of the recipient that the charming reception and banquet tendered by his countrymen had other purpose than to greet and welcome himself and the officers of his squadron. The surprise was so complete, the honor so unexpected, the testimonial so beautiful, that it was not easy on the moment to frame a reply that should suitably convey to his countrymen how deeply this souvenir of their affection had touched the recipient. The occasion formed an epoch in the recipient's life that will live and last among its precious memories.

During the short stay at Buenos Aires on the occasion of the *Chicago's* first visit the President of the republic, Lieutenant General Julio A. Roca, entertained the commander-in-chief and his staff at dinner in the executive mansion to meet the members of his Cabinet and other distinguished citizens of the city. The cordiality of the reception by the President on that occasion was further shown in the high regard, admiration and good-will he expressed on behalf of himself and the citizens of Argentina towards our country and our countrymen. He embraced the occasion to extend every use of the docks, machine shops, store-

houses and supplies which the ships of the American squadron might need when visiting the ports of the republic.

On the 25th of January President Roca visited the flagship *Chicago*, being received with the honors accorded to the chiefs of nations, and was entertained at luncheon by the commander-in-chief, after which the officers of the squadron were presented to his excellency on the quarter-deck, the crew being paraded in his honor.

During the cruise, lasting until April of 1901, the kindest attentions and courtesies were met everywhere, from Para on the Amazon River to Puerto Militar in Argentina. At Bahia and Rio de Janeiro, where the squadron spent more time than at other ports in Brazil, the manifestations of welcome to the officers of the squadron, as expressed by receptions and entertainments, evinced a feeling of friendship for our country most gratifying to its naval representatives, as well as to our countrymen domiciled there.

To meet this kindly feeling the custom was established to entertain and return courtesies by receptions and dances on board the flagship from time to time, which brought the officers and these kind people often together for two or three hours. It was a means to much reciprocal pleasure for our friends and the officers of the squadron in the several ports on the station, and surely it promoted good feeling and a better acquaintance between the residents and the squadron officers.

In the month of March, 1900, while on a cruise to visit ports on the northern part of the station, we had reached a point between the Abrolhos Reef and Bahia when the flagship *Chicago* fell in with the French steamer *Bretagne*, disabled by a broken shaft. For a week or more this large steamer had been drifting helplessly at sea, a little outside the usual track of steamers plying along the coast of Brazil, and when fallen in with was under short sail and making poor progress. The *Chicago's* arrival occurred at a moment when provisions were exhausting and considerable discontent was being manifested by the steerage passengers.

In compliance with the captain's request, the steamer was taken in tow by the *Chicago* and conveyed to Bahia, where she was delivered over to the agent of the line. Very naturally, her

rescue was assumed by the agent to involve a question of salvage, and his visit to the *Chicago* to arrange the amount followed within a few hours the anchoring of the ships. When he was informed that there were no charges for the service rendered, and that it had been a pleasure to have been able to perform this service for a vessel bearing the flag of France, between whose Government and our own there was cordial friendship and sympathy, he asked if there would be any objection to bringing this valuable service to the attention of his company at Marseilles.

Very soon after the agent's departure for shore the French Consul came on board to extend his thanks for the service rendered and to make known his purpose to bring this friendly assistance to a French vessel in distress on the high seas to the attention of his Government.

A few months later, while the *Chicago* was at Montevideo, the commander-in-chief was notified that a large box had been received by the Custom House authorities addressed to him and requested to be informed when and where it should be delivered. This box contained a magnificent statue in bronze from Barbadienne's atelier representing a helmeted warrior of the Middle Ages clad in the habiliments of war of that period and bearing on the base an inscription as follows:

La Société Générale de Transports
Maritimes à Vapeur à Monsieur
l'Admiral Schley, Commandant
le Croiseur *Chicago*
Souvenir Reconnaissant
Mars 1900

Accompanying the statue the president of the company transmitted a letter of acknowledgment phrased in graceful complimentary expressions. And, still later, an official letter was forwarded through the regular diplomatic channels from the President of the French republic expressing the thanks of his Government to the commander-in-chief for the friendly help given to a vessel of the merchant marine of his country. This letter was transmitted to the commander-in-chief by the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Long.

In the month of July, 1900, the commander-in-chief shifted

his flag to the cruiser *Wilmington* for the purpose of visiting Asuncion, the capital of Paraguay. At Rosario, where a short stop was made, the officers of the ship were received with much courtesy by their countrymen and the people of the city. The river channel beyond Rosario was unmarked by lights or other aids to navigation; therefore it was necessary to run during daylight and to anchor at night to avoid the risk of grounding upon bars or other obstructions. The season chosen for the trip was that of the highest water. The day following the *Wilmington's* departure from Rosario in some unaccountable way she lost one of the blades of her starboard propeller, so that the vibrations of the ship under way became disagreeable and made her most uncomfortable. Notwithstanding this, she continued onward until a point had been reached about two hundred miles from Asuncion, where two or three dangerous bars had to be crossed, when the river fell suddenly and rapidly, leaving less water on them than the ship drew. The first of these bars was approached as near as the pilot thought safe and there the ship was anchored for a day or two to watch the changes which should occur, but only to be disappointed, as the river continued to fall until it would have been impossible with safety to have attempted a crossing.

As the visit was merely one of ceremony and not one of necessary duty, it was thought unwise to risk injury to the ship or, still worse, to put her in such position that the falling water would cut off her return for six months with the loss of her services until the rise of the next season should release her. Reluctantly, she was forced to abandon the trip, and returned to Montevideo, where, a few weeks afterwards, orders were received to send her to Manila.

While in Rio de Janerio in the fall of 1900 an invitation was accepted from several members of the Brazilian Congress to visit San Paulo and the coffee district of Brazil. This visit was made under the most pleasant auspices and with much profit and instruction to the officers of the squadron. At San Paulo they were the recipients of marked courtesy from the officers and management of the Light and Power Company, composed mainly of intelligent, industrious and progressive Americans, who were worthy representatives of the push and purpose so characteristic

of our people everywhere. There was great need for better and quicker transit and traffic in that thriving, growing interior city, which this enterprising company seized, improved and developed to great advantage.

The coffee district adjacent to San Paulo was interesting as the region from which the largest percentage of the coffee consumed in the United States comes, and it was most instructive to learn there on the spot that all grades of coffee grow on the same tree, and that its separation into Java, Mocha, White Rio and Santos results from a mechanical separator constructed in the United States. This region lies at an altitude of 2,500 or 2,600 feet above the sea level, and when modern up-to-date facilities for reaching the coast markets are provided, the region will be capable of almost indefinite extension, so vast is the area available for this important industry.

Again, during the month of February, 1901, the squadron visited Puerto Militar, or, as it is better known geographically, Bahia Blanca, about four hundred miles to the south of the Rio de la Plata River, where the Argentine Government had established a great military arsenal, with large repair shops and storehouses, for the use, care and repair of its fleet. At this point there was in course of construction, but since completed, under the direction of Señor Luis Luigi—an eminent and distinguished Italian engineer—one of the largest dry docks on the American continent and capable of accommodating the largest ships afloat. The harbor defenses, which included a carefully planned system of mines, had been practically completed at the time of the squadron's visit, and were so formidable as to challenge the stoutest assault from an enemy and calculated to stand off successfully the most stubborn challenge of an attacking squadron.

The most modern high-powered guns of large caliber were installed in emplacements constructed in conformity with the most modern systems of Europe and North America. Every artifice was resorted to to conceal their location and to secure the guns and gunners against the shell fire of modern artillery. These formidable batteries were so located as to cover and command every part of the narrow channel leading from the sea to the port beyond. Señor Luigi took great pleasure in conducting the officers over these works, to inspect and explain their

construction, zones of fire, methods of construction and range of action. His work had been so carefully thought out and appeared so complete as to leave nothing to be suggested. This visit, not without interest, afforded a field for much thought along professional lines and was regarded of such value as to be made the subject of an interesting report afterwards to the Navy Department.

Returning to Montevideo, application was made to be relieved from command, as the commander-in-chief was to retire from active service in the fall of 1901, by reason of then reaching the age limit fixed by statute for service on the active list. The repairs needed by the *Chicago* were of such nature as in the judgment of her officers could be more expeditiously and economically made at home, particularly as the facilities on the station were limited and uncertain. Authority was asked to return home with her, but this was promptly declined by the department in the authority granted to the commander-in-chief to return, which contained directions to make the repairs on the station.

Complying with these instructions to return, the commander-in-chief hauled down his flag in April and took passage on the Royal Mail steamer *Clyde* for Southampton and thence to the United States in the magnificent steamer *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse*, arriving in New York in the latter part of May. Hardly had the commander-in-chief reached home when the *Chicago* was transferred to the European station to reestablish that squadron, which had been discontinued during the war with Spain.

While in London, where a short stay had been contemplated, an urgent telegram summoned the commander-in-chief to the bedside of his son, who had undergone a serious operation on account of having been infected accidentally during an operation he had performed on a patient under his professional care.

The dreadful anxiety of the week passed in crossing the ocean on board the transatlantic liner *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* could hardly be related in words. Not knowing the nature of the operation or its extent, there was grave apprehension lest on arrival the worst news might be met.

There were kind friends, however, whose interest had seen

to it that the latest bulletin of the patient's condition should be received on reaching the quarantine station. The writer will never forget Mr. W. R. Hearst's thoughtful kindness in anticipating the steamer's arrival at Quarantine by sending one of the staff of the American there to bear the latest report to him.

The customs officers in the port did everything in their power after the steamer had docked to expedite the examination of the writer's baggage that he might hasten to the hospital. There were many warm hand grasps, many whispered greetings of good wishes for the patient's recovery that reached the writer from those assembled on the dock to meet returning friends.

CHAPTER XXXV

THE COURT OF INQUIRY

1901

DURING the months of June and July, 1901, while the writer was watching for some hope at the bedside of a beloved son, who was desperately ill with blood-poisoning, resulting in a mysterious way from an accident during an operation to relieve a patient under his professional care, and with mind and heart under that strain of anxiety known only to those who have gone through similar experience, a large number of press clippings were transmitted to the writer from all parts of the country. These clippings were reviews of a so-called History of the Navy, published by the Appletons, and written by one Maclay, who it appeared was at that time a per diem laborer on the pay-rolls of the New York Navy-Yard.

All these reviews were savage criticisms of this unknown author of this so-called history and a severe arraignment of his utter disregard of truth in that part of his book which related to the battle of Santiago. In many of these reviews the charge was squarely made that this unknown slanderous author had been inspired in this task, and that he had had assistance from a small coterie of official partisans. This, whether true or not, never has been denied to this day.

In view of the summary action taken by Mr. Long in the case of Chaplain McIntyre, who in a lecture had severely reflected upon the conduct of Captain Evans during the battle of July 3, 1898, off Santiago, when Mr. Long promptly ordered the chaplain before a court-martial, which dismissed him from the navy, there was widespread wonder expressed in many articles afterwards that Mr. Long had not officially rebuked this libelous employee by dismissing him likewise.

The reasons attributed to Mr. Long, and promulgated in his

defense, for retaining this person on Government pay after his offense were flimsy in the extreme. The fact that he was so retained until President Roosevelt's accession, when he was peremptorily dropped, gave ample pretext to many writers for the suspicion widely entertained that Mr. Long himself was in sympathy with the sentiments as published in the libelous pages of this so-called history. However this may be, the writer has no knowledge, but the retention of this employee, who had sought to inject into history what was in reality only a scurrilous paraphrase of the gossip of envious partisans, was a wrong that ought to have been righted at once by a fair judge.

Up to this time the controversy had grown in bitterness from day to day, and it was promoted by irresponsible and cowardly innuendo, which the writer could not with dignity or self-respect notice any more than a Royal Dane could heed the snarls of the little cur at his heels. Though convinced that history in its truest sense is never written except by those who bring to the task a nicety of judicial fairness, a refinement of judgment which eliminates hearsay, a fairness which expels prejudice and discounts falsehood, malice or envy, it was deemed proper now to appeal to the secretary. Not that a court of inquiry was necessary, or that any scrutiny of official conduct during the operations leading up to the destruction of Cervera's fleet was necessary, as these had culminated in so much honor for the nation, but rather as an appeal to the protection of the secretary against the low flings of an employee under the department. With this in view, the letter which follows was addressed to Mr. Long:

GREAT NECK, LONG ISLAND, N. Y., July 22, 1901.

SIR: Within the past few days a series of press comments have been sent to me from various parts of the country of a book entitled "The History of the Navy," written by one Edgar Stanton Maclay. From these reviews it appears that this edition is the third volume of the said history, extended to include the late war with Spain, which the two first volumes did not contain and were in use as text-books at the Naval Academy.

1. From excerpts quoted in some reviews, in which the page and paragraph are given, there is such perversion of facts, misconstruction of intention, such intemperate abuse and defamation of myself as subject Mr. Maclay to action in civil law. While I admit the right of fair criticism of every public officer, I must protest against the low flings and

abusive language of this violent partisan opponent, who has infused into the pages of his book so much of the malice of unfairness as to make it unworthy of the name of history, or of use in any reputable institution of the country.

2. I have refrained heretofore from all comment upon the innuendos of enemies muttered or uttered in secret and therefore with safety to themselves. I think the time has now come to take such action as may bring this entire matter under discussion under the clearer and calmer review of my brothers in arms, and to this end I ask such action at the hands of the department as it may deem best to accomplish this purpose.

3. But I would express the request in this connection that, whatever the action may be, it occur in Washington, where most of my papers and data are stored.

Very respectfully,

W. S. SCHLEY,
Rear Admiral, U. S. N.

The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, *Washington, D. C.*

Within four days of the date of the above communication there was forwarded to the applicant a copy of the precept convening a court of inquiry addressed to Admiral George Dewey, U. S. N., as given below:

To Admiral George Dewey, U. S. N., Washington, D. C.

Upon the request of Rear Admiral Winfield S. Schley, U. S. N., made in a letter dated July 22, 1901, copy herewith, a court of inquiry, of which you are appointed president, Rear Admirals Louis A. Kimberly and Andrew E. K. Benham, U. S. N., members, and Captain Samuel C. Lemly, U. S. N., judge advocate general, judge advocate, is hereby ordered to convene at the Navy Department, Washington, D. C., at 1 o'clock P. M. on Thursday, the 12th day of September, 1901, or as soon thereafter as may be practicable, for the purpose of inquiring into the conduct of the said Schley, commodore in the navy, during the recent war with Spain and in connection with the events thereof.

The court will thoroughly inquire into all the circumstances bearing upon the subject of the investigation hereby ordered, and to this end, besides examining orally all proper witnesses whose attendance can be secured, will call upon the department for all documentary evidence in relation thereto in its files.

Upon the conclusion of the investigation the court will report its proceedings and the testimony taken, with a full and detailed statement of all the pertinent facts which it may deem to be established, together with its opinion and recommendations in the premises. While the department relies upon the discretion of the court to make its examination into the matter full and complete, as requested by the officer at whose instance

it is convened, the report should show the conclusions reached upon certain important points, to which attention is specifically directed, as follows:

1. The circumstances attending, the reasons controlling, and the propriety of the movements of the "Flying Squadron" off Cienfuegos in May, 1898.

— 2. The conduct in connection with the Santiago campaign.

3. The circumstances attending, the reasons controlling, and the propriety of the movements of the said squadron in proceeding from Cienfuegos to Santiago.

— 4. The circumstances attending the arrival of the "Flying Squadron" off Santiago, the reasons for its retrograde turn westward and departure from off Santiago, and the propriety thereof.

— 5. The circumstances attending, and the reasons for, the disobedience by Commodore Schley of the orders of the department contained in its despatch dated May 25, 1898, and the propriety of his conduct in the premises.

6. The condition of the coal supply of the "Flying Squadron" on or about May 27, 1898; its coaling facilities; the necessity, if any, for, or advisability of, the return of the squadron to Key West to coal; and the accuracy and propriety of the official reports made by Commodore Schley with respect to this matter.

— 7. Whether or not every effort incumbent upon the commanding officer of a fleet under such circumstances was made to capture or destroy the Spanish cruiser *Colon* as she lay at anchor in the entrance to Santiago Harbor May 27th to 31st, inclusive, and the necessity for, or advisability of, engaging the batteries at the entrance to said harbor, and the Spanish vessels at anchor within the entrance to said harbor, at the ranges used, and the propriety of Commodore Schley's conduct in the premises.

— 8. The necessity, if any, for, and advisability of, withdrawing at night the "Flying Squadron" from the entrance to Santiago Harbor to a distance at sea, if such shall be found to be the case; the extent and character of such withdrawal; and whether or not a close or adequate blockade of said harbor, to prevent the escape of the enemy's vessels therefrom, was established, and the propriety of Commodore Schley's conduct in the premises.

— 9. The position of the *Brooklyn* on the morning of July 3, 1898, at the time of the exit of the Spanish vessels from the harbor of Santiago; the circumstances attending, the reasons for, and the incidents resulting from the turning of the *Brooklyn* in the direction in which she turned at or about the beginning of the action with said Spanish vessels, and the possibility of thereby colliding with or endangering any other of the vessels of the United States fleet, and the propriety of Commodore Schley's conduct in the premises.

— 10. The circumstances leading to, and the incidents and results of, a controversy with Lieutenant Albon C. Hodgson, U. S. N., who on July 3, 1898, during the battle of Santiago, was navigator of the *Brooklyn*, in relation to the turning of the *Brooklyn*; also the colloquy at that time

between Commodore Schley and Lieutenant Hodgson and the ensuing correspondence between them on the subject thereof, and the propriety of the conduct of Admiral Schley in the premises.

The foregoing specific directions are given primarily for the information and guidance of the court, but do not limit or restrict the scope of its inquiry into the entire matter, the investigation of which is asked by the officer concerned.

Rear Admiral Schley has been informed of his right to be present, either in person or by counsel, during the investigation, to cross-examine witnesses and to offer evidence before the court, should he so desire. The court may at any time grant to others interested and entitled thereto like privileges.

The investigation will be held in open court.

This employment on shore duty is required by the public interests.

Given under my hand, at the Navy Department, Washington, this twenty-sixth day of July, 1901.

JOHN D. LONG,
Secretary.

Rear Admiral Kimberly, named in the precept, was too ill to be able to serve and was replaced by Rear Admiral H. L. Howison, U. S. N., to whom there was manifest objection, as the said Howison had expressed publicly opinions upon the subject matter to be investigated indicating a prejudgment of the case, and therefore was disqualified to sit in the case. Howison was objected to and was excused from service, and his place was filled by Rear Admiral F. M. Ramsay, U. S. N.

In acknowledging the receipt of the precept of the court exception was taken to the fifth paragraph, in which the department had expressed its opinion, as the correspondence following indicates:

GREAT NECK, N. Y., July 27, 1901.

SIB: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of the department's communication of July 26th instant enclosing copy of an order "Convening, pursuant to the request contained in (my) communication of the 22d instant, a court of inquiry."

Inasmuch as the court is directed to "investigate, and, after such investigation, report a full and detailed statement of all the pertinent facts which it may deem to be established, together with its opinion and recommendations in the premises," I would respectfully suggest to the department that paragraph 5 of the department's precept, which is as follows, viz.: "5. The circumstances attending and the reasons for the disobedience by Commodore Schley of the orders of the department contained in

its despatch dated May 25, 1898, and the propriety of his conduct in the premises," be modified so as to omit the department's expression of opinion, and thus leave the court free to express its own opinion in that matter.

Very respectfully,

W. S. SCHLEY,
Rear Admiral.

To this communication the department replied on August 1, 1901, declining to modify or change the plan originally mapped out, but to give to the public an impression of perfect fairness all letters to the applicant were published in the press before reaching him. It sought to explain the reasons for inserting in the precept certain matters as established when the very purpose in convening the court was that it was to find or not on these very things. If any one follows the judge advocate's contentions in the court of inquiry in 1901, whenever the applicant's counsel attempted to widen the scope of the inquiry to include every fact of the campaign, it becomes apparent that he resisted every attempt to inquire into any matter outside the specified precept. There was no purpose to allow any latitude in the inquiry, except where it might concern the motives or instructions of the applicant, and to this narrow view the judge advocate devoted all his energy and quoted all the legal precedents he knew.

The letter following, in accordance with the custom, appeared in the press columns before it reached the applicant, and its perusal will show why this course was taken:

NAVY DEPARTMENT,

WASHINGTON, D. C., August 1, 1901.

SIR: The department has received your letter of the 27th ultimo, in which you acknowledge the receipt of a copy of the order convening, at your request, a court of inquiry to investigate your conduct during the war with Spain, and suggest that paragraph 5 of said order directing the court to inquire into the circumstances attending and the reasons for the disobedience by Commodore Schley of the orders of the department, etc., "be so modified as to omit the department's expression of opinion and thus leave the court free to express its own opinion in the matter."

In reply, you are advised that the precept calls for an inquiry by the court and the ascertainment of pertinent facts. For the purpose of setting on foot this inquiry the precept treats certain matters as established, such, for instance, as the arrival of the "Flying Squadron" off Cienfuegos

and off Santiago, the retrograde movement westward, the turn of the *Brooklyn* on July 3, 1898, and the fact that you disobeyed orders as reported by you in your telegram dated May 28, 1898, in which you say: "Much to be regretted, can not obey orders of the department."

Inasmuch, however, as it is the department's purpose that the court shall be absolutely free to report, if such shall be found to be the case, that you did not willfully disobey the orders, or that you were justified in disobeying them, and that this may be clearly understood, your letter of the 27th ultimo, with copy of this reply, will be duly forwarded to the court.

Very respectfully,

F. W. HACKETT,
Acting Secretary.

Rear Admiral WINFIELD S. SCHLEY, *U. S. N.*,
Great Neck, N. Y.

Comparing the several paragraphs of this precept with the many scurrilous attacks which occurred in one of the daily newspapers, it is almost impossible to resist the inference that there was sympathy with, and inspiration from, Washington. The arraignment in the newspaper and the indictment in the precept cover the same ground identically and are singularly alike in character.

The court as composed contained one member, Rear Admiral Benham, who had served as a member of a board on the subject of medals voted by Congress for the campaign against Cervera's squadron. This board was to decide the design of this medal, though it is not quite clear that it was to decide upon whom it was to be bestowed, but in one of the reports, made on May 29, 1901, Admiral Benham recommended that if the medal was to bear the effigy of any one it should be Admiral Sampson. But he was really not in the battle of July 3, 1898, at all! As the writer was on foreign service away from the United States, he did not know that such a board had been created, or the names of its members, until his return near the time its report was made. The exception is believed to be fair that Admiral Benham would have been ruled off any civil jury for expressing official opinion upon any matters he was called upon to try. As the question of temporary command on July 3, 1898, was in issue, owing to Sampson's absence "*under orders from the department,*" the opinion expressed in the report of May 29th raises a question as

to his competency as a juror. Had the nature of Benham's recommendation been known in September, 1901, objection to him would have been entered as a member of the court.

While the writer did not expect to have a court composed of those entirely in accord with his views of the questions to be passed upon, he surely had the right to protection against those whose bias had been already officially expressed—a right as old and as time-honored as practice in courts of law!

Although the request for any action the department might deem necessary was made in the broadest terms, and invited an exhaustive examination that might include every hour of the official association of the two flag officers from May 19 to July 17, 1898, when the final surrender of the Spanish forces took place, the construction given to it by Mr. Long limited the inquiry to the official conduct of the commander of the Second Squadron alone. The precept as drawn was so framed as to justify the judge advocate general in bringing under inquiry every official signal made, every official report, every official action and every official or private conversation had or overheard, during the campaign; but where anything referred to the other flag officer the judge advocate general rigidly excluded that from the inquiry. He did in effect actually shut out everything which proximately or remotely touched the other flag officer, and it was impossible not to do this at every point of the inquiry, owing to the closeness of the official connection of the two officers. Whenever the applicant's counsel referred in the examination of witnesses during the trial, for it was really nothing more or less, to any matter affecting the other flag officer, Judge Advocate General Lemly interposed immediate objection on the ground that Admiral Sampson's conduct was in no way under review!

The applicant's counsel were Hon. Jeremiah M. Wilson, Hon. Isador Rayner and Captain James Parker, assisted by Mr. Merrill A. Teague. While the examination was in progress Hon. Jeremiah M. Wilson was stricken down by sudden death on the twelfth day of the inquiry. No advocate possessed higher accomplishments or a more unblemished character than this distinguished friend of many years' standing. His loss was a deep grief to the applicant. His mastery of every detail of the issue made his loss to his associates at the outset a grave misfortune,

though the cause suffered in no sense in the able hands of the two distinguished counselors who were left to conduct the case to the end. Their able services, advice and conduct of the inquiry afterwards merited endorsement from lawyers everywhere, who gave them distinct and manifest approval and praise.

During a session lasting over forty days the judge advocate general and his assistant examined witnesses of every grade from rear admiral to seaman, with the apparent purpose of impeaching every motive, every movement of the Flying Squadron, every signal, and, indeed, every action of the applicant. Throughout the entire procedure his purpose was manifest to spread upon the records of the court every conversation had with, or overheard by, any witnesses during the entire campaign. At the same time so much ill-temper was shown by this officer whenever the court decided certain points in the case against him that the inquiry, as conducted by him, soon lost all semblance of a purpose to elicit facts in a manifest morbid desire to enforce his own mis-constructions of intentions in the actions, movements, signals or purposes of the commander of the Second Squadron.

On December 13, 1901, the court submitted a divided opinion, one representing the majority, the other representing the minority, each signed by the president of the court, Admiral George Dewey. The opinions of the majority and minority are given below:

OPINION

Commodore Schley, in command of the Flying Squadron, should have proceeded with utmost despatch off Cienfuegos and should have maintained a close blockade of that port.

He should have endeavored on May 23d, at Cienfuegos, to obtain information regarding the Spanish squadron by communicating with the insurgents at the place designated in the memorandum delivered to him at 9.35 A. M. of that date.

He should have proceeded from Cienfuegos to Santiago de Cuba with all despatch, and should have disposed his vessels with a view of intercepting the enemy in any attempt to pass the Flying Squadron.

He should not have delayed the squadron for the *Eagle*.

He should not have made the retrograde turn westward with his squadron.

He should have promptly obeyed the Navy Department's order of May 25th.

He should have endeavored to capture or destroy the Spanish vessels at anchor near the entrance of Santiago Harbor on May 29th and 30th.

He did not do the utmost with the force under his command to capture or destroy the *Colon* and other vessels of the enemy which he attacked on May 31st.

By commencing the engagement on July 3d with the port battery and turning the *Brooklyn* around with port helm Commodore Schley caused her to lose distance and position with the Spanish vessels, especially with the *Viscaya* and *Colon*.

The turn of the *Brooklyn* to the westward was made to avoid getting her into dangerous proximity to the Spanish vessels. The turn was made towards the *Texas*, and caused that vessel to stop and to back her engines to avoid possible collision.

Admiral Schley did injustice to Lieutenant Commander A. C. Hodgson in publishing only a portion of the correspondence which passed between them.

Commodore Schley's conduct in connection with the events of the Santiago campaign prior to June 1, 1898, was characterized by vacillation, dilatoriness, and lack of enterprise.

His official reports regarding the coal supply and the coaling facilities of the Flying Squadron were inaccurate and misleading.

His conduct during the battle of July 3d was self-possessed, and he encouraged, in his own person, his subordinate officers and men to fight courageously.

GEO. DEWEY,

Admiral, U. S. N., President.

SAM. C. LEMLY, *Judge Advocate General, U. S. N., Judge Advocate.*

MINORITY REPORT

In the opinion of the undersigned the passage from Key West to Cienfuegos was made by the Flying Squadron with all possible despatch, Commodore Schley having in view the importance of arriving off Cienfuegos with as much coal as possible in the ships' bunkers.

The blockade of Cienfuegos was effective. Commodore Schley in permitting the steamer *Adula* to enter the port of Cienfuegos expected to obtain information concerning the Spanish squadron from her when she came out.

The passage from Cienfuegos to a point twenty-two miles south of Santiago was made with as much despatch as was possible while keeping the squadron a unit.

The blockade of Santiago was effective. Commodore Schley was the senior officer of the squadron off Santiago when the Spanish squadron attempted to escape on the morning of July 3, 1898. He was in absolute command, and is entitled to the credit due to such commanding officer for

the glorious victory which resulted in the total destruction of the Spanish ships.

GEORGE DEWEY,

Admiral, U. S. N., President.

SAM. C. LEMLY, *Judge Advocate General, Judge Advocate.*

RECOMMENDATION

In view of the length of time which has elapsed since the occurrence of the events of the Santiago campaign, the court recommends no further proceedings be had in the premises.

GEORGE DEWEY,

Admiral, U. S. N., President.

SAM. C. LEMLY, *Judge Advocate General, U. S. N., Judge Advocate.*

The specification of the indictment contained ten (10) counts! The verdict of the majority report was that that number was not sufficient, so they found thirteen had been violated!

The President of a Court of Inquiry is compelled by Regulations to sign the opinion reached by a majority of the court even though he should not agree to one word of such conclusion; his remedy is a minority report as in this instance. In fact the disagreement recorded in this issue proceeded from the highest naval authority of the land!

CHAPTER XXXVI

THE APPEAL FROM THE REPORT OF THE MAJORITY

1901

FOLLOWING this opinion of the majority of the court, a statement of exceptions to the findings was addressed to Mr. Long. Notwithstanding the fact that he had organized the court; that he had directed the judge advocate general of the Navy to conduct its proceedings; that he had caused the judge advocate general to review the record; that he had approved the unfavorable findings of the majority, and had disapproved the favorable findings of the minority, it was believed to be within the military rights of the commander of the Second Squadron to file an appeal from such flagrant disregard of unimpeached testimony given by a score or more favorable witnesses as had been shown in the majority report.

It must be confessed that it was not done with any idea or hope that Mr. Long would or could review favorably the appeal from the action he had caused to be taken in a matter where his views, as set forth in his confidential communication to the Senate and his interviews in the press, had shown him to be influenced by his departmental surroundings, but to reserve the right to appeal later to higher and superior authority.

What a travesty of the rights of justice it would be if in civil procedure the judge could indict, could appoint the jury, could really try the case, could review his own proceedings on appeal, and could execute judgment; and yet the case under consideration presents these very anomalies. It is not difficult, therefore, to understand, where such power is possessed, how futile would be an appeal for relief from its operation.

As Mr. Long has set forth his views upon the question in a book recently published, and has reproduced the originally formulated errors, it is within the rights of the writer to show wherein, to say the least, he has been inconsistent. And to do

so the writer does not propose to be harsh or undignified in his use of words. The following statement of exceptions to the majority report was transmitted to the Secretary of the Navy :

THE RICHMOND,

WASHINGTON, D. C., December 18, 1901.

The Honorable, the Secretary of the Navy :

Winfield Scott Schley, Rear Admiral, U. S. N. (retired), the applicant before the Court of Inquiry, of which Admiral George Dewey, U. S. N., is president, and Rear Admirals Andrew E. K. Benham and Francis M. Ramsay, U. S. N., members, and Captain Samuel C. Lemly, U. S. N., Judge Advocate General, Judge Advocate, objects to the approval of the findings of the court upon the ground that the opinion rendered and the report of facts made by the majority of the court are in conflict with the overwhelming weight of evidence, and that the majority of the court in their said opinion have ignored the testimony of the applicant and of the whole of the applicant's witnesses and all that portion of the evidence given by witnesses for the Government which was favorable to the applicant, and have thus deprived him of rights guaranteed to him by the laws of the land and the Constitution of the United States; and the applicant now assigns the following ground in support of his said objection:

1. The majority of the court have given their opinion that Commodore Schley should have proceeded with the utmost despatch off Cienfuegos when there was no specification covering this subject, and when the applicant did not have sufficient opportunity to bring in proper and convincing evidence in reference thereto, and when the only evidence taken by the court on this subject was directly contrary to the opinion rendered.

2. The majority of the court have held that the applicant should have endeavored to open communication with the insurgents at the place designated in the memorandum by Commander McCalla, delivered to him on the morning of the 23d of May, when in fact there was no place mentioned in said memorandum as being a place at which a camp of insurgents was located.

3. The majority of the court have arrived at the opinion stated in the foregoing paragraph without regard to the fact, which was proven by an overwhelming weight of testimony, that the said McCalla memorandum was sent to Commodore Schley only for use in connection with the information it contained relative to certain batteries at or being constructed in the vicinity of the entrance to the harbor of Cienfuegos as is attested by the Order No. 6, dated May 19, 1898, and sent to Commodore Schley by Admiral Sampson.

4. The majority of the court, in the opinion rendered, hold that Commodore Schley should have maintained a close blockade of Cienfuegos, when by overwhelming testimony it was proven that a close and effective blockade of that port was maintained, the judge advocate having substantially abandoned any charge to the contrary.

5. The majority of the court, in the opinion rendered, have entirely ignored the uncontradicted testimony proving that the British steamer *Adula* was permitted to go into the harbor of Cienfuegos in order that information might be obtained through her as to whether the Spanish fleet was then in that port, it having been clearly established that the captain of the said British steamer *Adula* promised and agreed, before permission was given him to enter the port, that he would bring his ship out in fewer than twenty-four hours and furnish the information desired.

6. The majority of the court, in the opinion rendered, have entirely failed to refer to Despatch No. 7, admitted to have been sent by Admiral Sampson to Commodore Schley, the construction of which was agreed upon in the argument of the case, to wit: That it was an imperative order for Commodore Schley to hold his squadron off Cienfuegos whether the Spanish fleet was or was not in that port.

7. The majority of the court, in the opinion rendered, have entirely ignored the admitted fact that the commander of the *Eagle* failed to communicate the situation at Cienfuegos to Commodore Schley.

8. The majority of the court, in the opinion rendered, have entirely ignored the uncontradicted evidence in the case that Captain Robley D. Evans, knowing the meaning of the signal lights on shore at Cienfuegos, failed to communicate his information concerning them to Commodore Schley.

9. The majority of the court, in the report of facts submitted, declares that the signal lights on shore near Cienfuegos were seen by Commodore Schley on the night of May 22, 1898, when, in fact, the overwhelming weight of both oral and documentary evidence proved that Commodore Schley saw and had knowledge of these lights only on the night of May 23d, and at no other time.

10. The majority of the court, in the opinion rendered, are silent on the subject of the following charge preferred by the judge advocate against Commodore Schley during the progress of the investigation, namely, that he did not mask his movements in operating from in front of the port of Cienfuegos, but by using Ardois signals he revealed the destination of his squadron to the enemy on shore, despite the fact that by overwhelming weight of testimony this charge was entirely disproved.

11. The majority of the court have based their opinion in reference to the retrograde movement upon a statement made in their report of facts that Commodore Schley, before sailing from Cienfuegos, received reliable information that ships could be coaled in the vicinity of Cape Cruz and Gonoives Channel, and it is now respectfully denied that there was any such positive testimony in this case. Every witness, with one exception, who was examined on the subject disavowed all knowledge in reference thereto, and the uncontradicted testimony of Captain F. A. Cook establishes the fact that the official charts with which the Flagship *Brooklyn* was supplied, and upon which Commodore Schley was compelled to rely for information, showed coaling at Cape Cruz to be neither feasible nor practicable, and the records clearly show that not until the 27th of

May, three days after leaving Cienfuegos, when Captain Charles S. Cotton visited the Flagship *Brooklyn*, did Commodore Schley receive any definite information concerning the feasibility or practicability of coaling his ships from a collier in Gonoives Channel, all of which facts have been wholly ignored by the majority of the court in formulating their said report of facts.

12. The majority of the court, in stating in its report of facts that Commodore Schley received no positive information from the scout ships as to the presence of the enemy's fleet in the harbor of Santiago, utterly ignores the overwhelming testimony in proof of the fact that Captain C. D. Sigsbee did actually report to Commodore Schley and to others that the Spanish fleet was not in the harbor of Santiago.

13. The opinion of the majority of the court and the report of facts is entirely silent on the subject of the proven and admitted failure of Captains Wise and Jewell to communicate the information they had received in reference to the presence of the Spanish fleet in the harbor of Santiago to Commodore Schley.

14. That the report of facts submitted by the court stated that the conditions of wind, sea and weather from noon on May 26th to June 1st were favorable for taking coal from a collier at sea off Santiago, when this statement has been directly controverted by the evidence of the witnesses for the Government.

15. The letters prepared by Government experts and submitted in evidence before the court showing the coal supply of the vessels of the Flying Squadron with reference to their chasing capacity, proceeding with full speed with forced draft, have not even been adverted to in the report of facts.

16. There has not been the slightest reference made by the majority of the court to the orders of the honorable Secretary of the Navy, offered and proved in evidence, forbidding the hazarding of American ships against those batteries, and the court has decided against the applicant upon the seventh specification of the precept without in the slightest degree referring to this important evidence.

17. The majority of the court have entirely failed to give any opinion as to the character of the blockade, although the same was included in the eighth specification of the precept, and by specific direction the court was obligated to give an opinion thereon.

18. The majority opinion of the court that Commodore Schley should have endeavored to capture or destroy the Spanish vessels at anchor near the entrance of Santiago Harbor on May 29th and 30th, and that he did not do his utmost with the force under his command to capture or destroy the *Colon* and other vessels of the enemy on May 31st, is wholly at variance with the orders under which Commodore Schley was acting before Santiago, said orders, as is attested by No. 8, dated May 21, 1898, and sent by Admiral Sampson to Commodore Schley, restricting his operation to the establishment and maintenance of a blockade of the port of Santiago, if the enemy should be found therein; and also said opinion is

utterly and absolutely at variance with the overwhelming weight of testimony, which clearly established the fact that the affair of May 31st was predetermined upon and executed as a reconnaissance, and not as a formal attack upon the Spanish vessels, nor upon the land batteries at the entrance to the harbor of Santiago.

19. The majority opinion of the court is ambiguous and indeterminate in that the court holds the turn of the *Brooklyn* to the westward was made to avoid getting her into dangerous proximity to the Spanish vessels without stating whether evasion of such dangerous proximity was due to personal fears of Commodore Schley, or to a desire on his part to preserve the ship intact and ready for further work in the effort to win a victory from the enemy.

20. The majority of the court have entirely ignored the overwhelming testimony submitted in the case in arriving at the opinion that Commodore Schley erred in commencing the engagement on July 3d with the port battery, the evidence in the case already establishing the fact that in the execution of the standing order to "close in and attack in harbor entrance," it was impossible for the *Brooklyn*, without turning away from the enemy, to open the engagement except with her port battery; and the evidence also clearly establishes the fact that the turning of the *Brooklyn* in the manner and direction in which she did turn did not cause her to lose either distance or position with the Spanish vessels, the contrary opinion of the court upon this subject being arrived at only by disregarding all of the evidence offered in behalf of Commodore Schley.

21. The majority opinion of the court is ambiguous and indeterminate in that, while stating that the *Brooklyn's* turning caused the *Texas* to stop and "back her engines to avoid possible collision," said opinion does not state whether the danger of such collision as comprehended by the ninth specification of the precept was real or imaginary, whereas the overwhelming weight of testimony clearly established the fact that at no time was there danger of collision between the *Brooklyn* and the *Texas*.

22. The testimony of Captain F. A. Cook, a witness called by the judge advocate, in reference to the proximity of the *Brooklyn* to the *Texas* at the time of the *Brooklyn's* turning, has been ignored and not even adverted to in the statement of pertinent facts.

23. The majority of the court have assumed that the testimony of Lieutenant Commander A. C. Hodgson, notwithstanding its repeated contradiction, in reference to the alleged conversation regarding the proximity of the *Texas* at the time of the *Brooklyn's* turning, is true, and have entirely ignored the testimony of Commodore Schley and Captain F. A. Cook to the contrary, without even referring to it in their statement of pertinent facts.

24. The majority opinion of the court that Commodore Schley's conduct in connection with the events of the Santiago campaign prior to June 1, 1898, was characterized by "vacillation, dilatoriness and lack of enterprise," is in no wise justified by the evidence submitted in the case,

and could only have been arrived at by the action of the court in wholly ignoring all of the evidence of Commodore Schley, all of the evidence of witnesses summoned in his behalf, and all that portion of the evidence of the witnesses called by the judge advocate which was favorable to the said Commodore Schley.

25. The majority opinion of the court is inconclusive in that it is entirely silent upon a charge preferred by the judge advocate during the course of the public investigation and claimed by him to come within the province of the first specification, to wit, that the said Commodore Schley was derelict in the discharge of his duty and unmindful of the regulations for the government of the Navy of the United States in that he did not prescribe and promulgate anticipatory orders of battle.

26. The majority of the court have entirely failed to determine as to who was in command of the American naval forces engaged in the battle of Santiago, the finding of which fact was absolutely necessary in order to determine properly the first specification of the precept as to the conduct of Commodore Schley in connection with the events of the Santiago campaign.

27. The majority of the court have rejected the whole testimony offered in behalf of the applicant, and have not adverted to such testimony, and have entirely ignored the testimony of the applicant himself, who was on the stand for many hours and subjected to the most searching examination, and by so doing they have perverted the ends of justice. That if this testimony was all false they should have so announced; and if all or any part of it was true, the said applicant was entitled to the benefit of it, and by declining to consider or pass upon it they have deprived him of his common-law and constitutional rights.

28. That the majority of the court have found the applicant guilty upon specifications which were substantially abandoned by the Judge Advocate, as will appear from the argument in the case.

29. That the whole proceedings show that the majority of the court, in the opinion and report of facts rendered, have selected the testimony of a few hostile witnesses, and upon that testimony have based the said opinion and report of facts, discarding all the other testimony in the case without making the slightest reference to it, as they were directed by the precept to do.

30. The applicant, besides the reasons herein given, hopes to be able during the further investigation of this inquiry to adduce other serious and important reasons why the majority opinion of the court should not be approved.

31. The applicant is prepared to show that the whole proceedings upon the part of the majority of the court have been entirely irregular; that his rights have been prejudiced and ignored; that his testimony in many more particulars than have been herein cited has not been considered, and that the evidence is absolutely insufficient to sustain the opinion which has been rendered by the majority of the court; that a grave injustice has been committed, which would become irreparable and be

perpetuated unless this opinion of the majority of the court should be disapproved.

Wherefore the said applicant most respectfully prays that approval of the opinion of the majority of said Court of Inquiry be withheld and that said opinion be disapproved, and that he may be afforded the opportunity to have the testimony of record of himself and his witnesses properly considered and passed upon, and that the proceedings be remitted to the court for that purpose, and that he be given such other and further relief as he is entitled to in the premises.

W. S. SCHLEY,
Rear Admiral, U. S. N. (Retired).

ISADOR RAYNER,
JAMES PARKER,
Counsel for Applicant.

This statement of exceptions taken to the report and the opinion of the majority of the court were submitted by Mr. Long for reply to the judge advocate general, who had been the prosecuting officer of the court. Very naturally, this officer, ambitious to have his view of the proceedings approved, reinjected much of the essence of his argument into his reply.

In view of the animus of that officer in his conduct of the case, it surely would have been more in line with a proper consideration of the evidence in this case to have submitted the proceedings to an entirely impartial advocate whose legal training would have qualified him to give a nicer discrimination in dealing with the evidence offered by several hostile witnesses.

But this consideration of the matter was ignored entirely, and on the 20th day of December, 1901, just one week after the report of the court had been submitted, and only two days after the receipt of the applicant's statement of exceptions, Mr. Long approved the proceedings in the following letter:

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON, D. C., December 20, 1901.

The department has read the testimony in this case; the arguments of counsel at the trial; the court's findings of fact, opinion and recommendation; the individual memorandum of the presiding member; the statement of exceptions to the said findings and opinion by the applicant; the reply to said statement by the judge advocate of the court and his assistants, and the brief this day submitted by counsel for Rear Admiral Sampson traversing the presiding member's view as to who was in command at the battle of Santiago.

And after careful consideration, the findings of fact and the opinion of the full court are approved.

As to the points on which the presiding member differs from the opinion of the majority of the court, the opinion of the majority is approved.

As to his further expression of views by the same member, with regard to the questions of command on the morning of July 3, 1898, and of the title to credit for the ensuing victory, the conduct of the court in making no finding and rendering no opinion on these questions is approved—indeed, it could with propriety take no other course, evidence on these questions during the inquiry having been excluded by the court.

The department approves the recommendation of the court that no further proceedings be had in the premises.

The department records its appreciation of the arduous labors of the whole court.

JOHN D. LONG,
Secretary of the Navy.

The view taken by Mr. Long in approving what was desired by him, and disapproving what he did not wish, can not be squared with what he said in 1899 in the confidential communication to the Senate, when he desired to excuse Sampson's absence from the scene of battle, referred to already as Senate Executive Document C. In that document Mr. Long stated specifically that on the morning of July 3, 1898, *Admiral Sampson was proceeding, under orders of the department, to Siboney to confer with General Shafter*, leaving the inference that the general was at that point. He ought not to have omitted to state that the general was at his headquarters, four or more miles back from Siboney, at the time, and that to obey this order Admiral Sampson would have been obliged to go on shore; in fact, horses had been sent to Siboney and were waiting, saddled, to convey him to the Army headquarters. He ought in all fairness to have stated that the practical effect of his order was temporarily to assign Admiral Sampson to another duty. This, therefore, necessarily obligated the court to express an opinion on the subject of the command on the day of battle.

It should be stated also that Mr. Long was not correctly informed of the New York's actual position when the fight began at 9.35 A. M. At least, there is no record in the official log-books of any vessel off Santiago that day to sustain the statement that any one saw the *New York*, or that they saw, or received, or

answered any signal made from her until the fight was practically over!

The affidavit of Mr. O'Shaughnessy, given below, fixes the actual whereabouts of the *New York* when the battle began:

STATE OF ILLINOIS, }
 COUNTY OF COOK, } ss.:

I, James O'Shaughnessy, Jr., being duly sworn, doth depose and say that I am a citizen of the United States and of Chicago in the county and State aforesaid, and that in the year of 1898 I was employed as a reporter and correspondent of the Chicago Chronicle. In that capacity I went to Cuba with the military expedition which left Tampa, Fla., June 14, 1898. I landed at Daiquiri, Cuba, June 22, 1898, and remained in Cuba watching the operations of the army about Santiago until after the capitulation of that city, July 17, 1898. On July 2d I was informed that Admiral Sampson was to come on shore to confer with General Shafter. On the following day, July 3d, I was at the beach at Siboney, Cuba. While waiting there that morning I saw the U. S. Cruiser *New York* approach from the direction of Morro Castle. It came directly into the bight of Siboney and approached nearer to the shore than I had ever before observed approach a large war-ship in that bight. A launch was let down into the water from the *New York* when it stopped and three officers from the *New York* entered the launch. While the launch was still alongside the *New York* I heard the report of a heavy gun coming from the direction of Morro Castle. Immediately there seemed to be a commotion among those on the decks of the *New York*. The ladder was quickly drawn up on the side of the *New York*. The officers in the launch were gesticulating to somebody on the cruiser. The firing off towards the mouth of Santiago Harbor increased, and I could hear the heavy guns booming at close intervals. The distance was too great to hear any but the heavier guns. I was afterwards informed it was the reports of the twelve-inch and thirteen-inch guns only which were audible at Siboney. After the ladder was drawn up the *New York* began to move. It began to swing around, moving slowly, as it had to turn around in the bight, in which were a number of army transport ships. On the western horizon the smoke of the ships, which was plain enough at first, was becoming less distinct, and the sound of the guns was fast becoming fainter. A torpedo-boat which had accompanied the *New York* got turned around first and was steaming away to the west. The *New York* was slower in its movements as it brought its bow around to the west, but when it was headed towards Morro Castle it went away at a fast pace. The launch with the three officers in it came to the temporary dock at Siboney. I waited on the dock for their coming, and talked with them for some time. Those officers who were left in the launch seemed greatly chagrined when they came on shore, and appeared as if they were at a loss to know what to do. I questioned them about the meaning of the fire and the

precipitate departure of the *New York*, but they were reticent, although at that time those thereabout were evidently in no doubt that a considerable sea fight was going on then somewhere below the western sky-line, and later in the day I learned of the destruction of the ships of the Spanish fleet by those of the United States Navy. That was then the explanation of the failure of Admiral Sampson to visit General Shafter after having come to Siboney. My reason for noticing this much was that it was my intention and desire to talk with Admiral Sampson when he came ashore to obtain some statement from him for the benefit of the paper I represented.

JAMES O'SHAUGHNESSY.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 7th day of July, 1899.

FRANCIS J. HOULIHAN,

[SEAL.]

Notary Public.

CHAPTER XXXVII

VISITS TO THE WEST, SOUTH AND EAST

1902-1903

THANKS to the intelligent, untrammelled, free press of the country, there was no fact connected with the history of the campaign against the Spanish fleet that was not known to, or that had not been observed by, some one of the clever representatives on the ground. It was through their agency that the correct version of all that took place during the operations against the enemy reached the public. In many instances afterwards, in visiting the various parts of our country, the writer was astonished at the complete acquaintance shown by every one with every detail and circumstance of the campaign against Cervera's squadron.

If these things proved any one thing more than another, they indicated that among the people there was a love of fair play and honest dealing which no perversion of truth or malicious distortion of facts afterwards could shake or overthrow. The unshakable facts that the *Brooklyn* was in the fight from start to finish; that she was nearest to the enemy from the beginning to the end of the action at every stage of the battle; that she was struck by thirty out of the forty-two projectiles which struck the American vessels engaged; that she inflicted quite 50 per cent of the damage sustained by the ships of the enemy, although she constituted but one-fifth of the attacking American force; that she and the *Oregon* completed the battle by capturing the *Colon*; that the only casualties on the American side occurred on board the *Brooklyn*—these facts were sufficient to fix an unalterable judgment of the issues.

The Senate of two Congresses had refused to perpetuate the injustice of advancing Admiral Sampson over the head of his senior, and the people everywhere, from the Great Lakes to the Gulf of Mexico, from the Atlantic to the Pacific, applauded with great unanimity this decision. From all parts of the country,

north, south, east and west, thousands of letters and telegrams came to the writer, expressing in affectionate terms the people's approval of the Senate's action, as well as their assurances of confidence and regard. For three years or more following the battle the daily mail brought hundreds and thousands of letters that could only be opened and read in turn as they came. It was intended to reply to every person whose kind interest had suggested a line of encouraging assurance, and indeed many were so answered; but it soon became evident that it would not be possible to comply with so pleasant a task, and with much reluctance the purpose had to be abandoned. These matters are mentioned only because of a desire to acknowledge the kindnesses of many thousands of friends whose expressions of confidence helped the writer to feel that, in all the vicissitudes and trying situations of his service of forty-five years under the flag, he had done his whole duty to his beloved country as a soldier, sailor and gentleman should.

Although it may be considered a touch of vanity to recall the many manifestations of high regard and affection of friends from one end of our country to the other who presented him with many souvenirs of priceless value in testimony of their affection, the writer feels that he would be remiss in grateful appreciation if he should fail to record in these memoirs the tributes of honor which his friends in almost every State of the Union so generously and affectionately presented to him. The pleasure in doing so transcendently outweighs any apprehension that he will be misunderstood, or that the proprieties may be questioned.

The wishes of the people to testify to their esteem and confidence took form in many States almost coincidentally. As the form of the testimonials varied with the taste or wishes of the contributors, more or less time was necessary in order to fashion and finish them in conformity with the designs finally selected, but in all cases the result was a masterpiece of art, faultless in taste, design and workmanship.

These exquisite souvenirs, presented in the name of the people from every part of the country, in Philadelphia, New York, Baltimore, Atlanta, Chicago, Louisville, Nashville, Knoxville, Memphis, Laconia, Fort Smith (Ark.), Dallas, Waco, San Antonio,

Galveston, Cincinnati, Binghamton, Boston, and many other places, were graven with complimentary words expressing the love, admiration and esteem of the people.

The joint resolutions of thanks, or the invitations from the Legislatures of a number of the States to visit those commonwealths, were testimonials of honor that were gratifying and complimentary. More than this, they bore the indorsement of the representatives of the people, who had chosen that method to record in the archives of their great commonwealths the imperishable fact of their confidence in one whom they believed had wrought well for his country and theirs.

The great honors paid by the Governors and Legislatures of many States formed the highest tributes of distinction that could be paid to a fellow citizen. The writer's reception by those exalted officials of States was impressive and significant. His welcome enthusiastically accorded on these occasions was a distinct rebuke to the few who had sought to minimize the credit for glory honorably won on a day that will be forever great in the annals of our country.

The enthusiastic greetings of the people from Bangor, Me., to San Francisco, and from the Great Lakes to the Rio Grande, along the routes of travel, with requests to accept thousands of kind invitations from mayors and city authorities, chambers of commerce, boards of trade, various clubs, German and Swedish societies, and friends in almost every city all over the country, were in their nature ovations of love and honor from a people who revere justice and prize fair dealing, and it touched the guest profoundly. It was these things which brought to the recipient satisfaction that, in all the trying experiences of a long professional career, his conduct had stood approved by the people of his country.

Beginning his service at a time when the transition from sail to steam had begun, he has lived to see the evolution from the auxiliary steam vessel completed in the mastless battleship of this day. As step by step has been taken along this route leading to complete change from old conditions, he has seen obstacles that were scattered over the way by conservative opinion vanish before the advancing demand for machines independent of wind and weather at sea.

From the contests of old days with wind and weather, when the battle between the elements and man was always uncertain, he has lived to see the final triumph of man in these high-powered vessels of to-day, which defy winds and weather and run almost as railway trains on schedule time.

The change from old muzzle-loading, oddly shaped, smooth-bore guns to the graceful, modern, high-power, breech-loading cannon, and from the black powder of low initial velocity with enormous internal pressures to the smokeless powder of this day with a decrease of internal strain and a vast increase in the foot ton energy of the projectile on striking—all this has taken place in the professional life of the writer.

All those changes which have led to better ventilation, more perfect sewerage, complete draining, better lighting of living quarters, and, therefore, to the improved sanitation of modern ships, have had to force their way against opposition of one kind or another. Now that they have come, with all their benefits, the wonder is how could any one have survived the discomforts or have endured the life below decks in the old days when decks were deluged daily with water, rooms lighted with tallow candles, the air vitiated for lack of proper ventilation, the sunshine never reaching decks below.

It has been a privilege in this long career of public service to give youth, sword and honor to the country in helping for the defense of the legacy of liberty bequeathed by the Fathers of the Republic. And throughout all there has been one watchword, one lodestar, one purpose—duty; whether in that greatest of wars, the Civil War, or in the frozen fields of ice and snow of the Polar Ocean, or amid the exposures to pestilential fevers of the starlit tropics; whether amid the threatenings of riotous crowds in the far-off Pacific waters, defending the good name of his men, or on the heights of Kang Hoa in the far-away Orient, side by side with others avenging the wrongs of his countrymen; whether in the day of battle on the bridge of his flagship amid dangers that come to only few men, or in the storm of vituperation so unnecessary afterwards—thank God there has been no thought of self, no fear of consequences, no selfish desire to claim honors in which others were believed to share.

Better still, it is counted among the privileges of a long ser-

vice to have lived to see the day when all can realize that the gory fields contested for so gloriously in those far-off times are to be held up to generations to follow as legacies of American manhood in its highest development, those days when men who wore the blue and those who wore the gray can mingle around the same camp-fire in proud admiration of the prowess of each as Americans. It is but the echo of every soul that shared those dangers to say in earnest thankfulness, "God bless our country."

And in penning these memoirs there has been no wish to detract from the services of others, no desire to utter unkind, undignified or rude words of those who may have differed in their views, but to set forth the facts and services of a life that has been clean in its devotion to home and to country and steadfast in its purpose from youth to its meridian in giving the best years to duty conscientiously done for all that is near and dear to man—honor, home, country.

These pages would be incomplete if the writer should fail to record in them his acknowledgment of the assistance he has had in every work he has done from officers and men who served with him in the varied service of his long life. It was the loyal help of those who stood out with him in the storms of the elements, or of war, whether below behind the guns or before the furnaces, that made the accomplishments of his professional life possible. It is to them that the meed of praise which has come to him is largely due, and it is in grateful recognition that he perpetuates this acknowledgment to them.

Neither the lapse of time nor the change of circumstances has wrought any change of faith in the expression from the heart penned in those first moments of the great battle of July 3, 1898:

"I am glad that I had an opportunity to contribute in the least to a victory that seems big enough for all of us!"

THE END.

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