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* **FACTS ABOUT CUBA.**

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FACTS ABOUT CUBA.

POPULATION.—According to the two last Spanish official censi :

| WHITES. | 1862. | | 1867. | |
|-------------------------------------|---------|-----------|---------|-----------|
| Spaniards..... | 115,114 | | | |
| Cubans..... | 602,141 | | | |
| South Americans..... | 4,203 | | | |
| Foreigners of different countries.. | 4,999 | | | |
| North Americans..... | 2,496 | 792,953 | | 764,750 |
| Chinamen..... | | 34,973 | | |
| COLORED. | | | | |
| Free..... | 225,938 | | 225,938 | |
| Slaves..... | 368,550 | 594,488 | 379,523 | 605,461 |
| Totals..... | | 1,422,414 | | 1,370,211 |

AREA.—The island, in a straight line from east to west, is about 600 geographical miles long, and in width, from north to south, varies from 21 to 135 miles.

TERRITORIAL DIVISION.—The Spanish Government has divided the island in three departments : the Western, Central, and Eastern.

According to the constitution of the Cuban Republic, it has been divided in four States : Oriente (Eastern), Camaguey, Las Villas, and Occidente (Western).

The published epitome of the census of 1866 does not give any details about the elements of the total white population, which shows a decrease of 28,203 in comparison with that of 1862. The number of the free colored population is the same in both censi ; leaving the inference either that the account was not really taken in 1866, or that the free colored people had so much increased between the two epochs, that the Spanish Government, having adopted as a rule of policy the *balance of the races*, was afraid of publishing the true amount of that class of the population.

The total of this must be actually less than in 1867, owing to different causes ; such as diminution of the immigration from Spain ; the emigration of thousands of Cubans ; the large number of slaves dead by overwork and misrule of the Spanish agents in the confiscated sugar states ; and the immense loss of lives on account of the revolutionary war.

WEALTH.—In 1862.

| | |
|---|-----------------|
| Total value of producing land..... | \$380,554,523 |
| Total value of urban real estate..... | 170,400,833 |
| Total amount of commercial and industrial pur- suits | 773,846,496 |
| | <hr/> |
| Total..... | \$1,324,801,852 |

The value of agricultural productions for the same year (1862) amounted to \$129,510,518.

To give an idea of the wealth of Cuba, the Minister of the Colonies said to the Spanish Congress in October, 1871 : “ From 1858 to 1868 (the year of the revolution) the revenues collected in Cuba have amounted to \$405,025,576 ; the surplus over the expenditures to \$9,698,701 ; the remittances of money to Spain \$34,172,693 ; the expenses of the expedition to Mexico and the war on San Domingo to \$18,000,000, and up to this date the civil war has absorbed \$62,900,000.”

The importation of sugar and molasses into the United States, in the year 1873, amounted to :

| | From Cuba and Porto Rico. | From all the rest of the world. |
|---------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Raw sugar | \$59,795,728 | \$18,157,742 |
| Molasses | 9,139,709 | 761,342 |
| Melado | 4,568,329 | 153,836 |
| Total | <u>\$73,503,776</u> | <u>\$19,072,920</u> |

The sugar and molasses imported into the United States from Cuba and Porto Rico represent 1,590,000,000 pounds weight, or in tons of 2,000 pounds, something like 750,000 tons of freight, nearly all carried by American tonnage. In 1873 American ships made from and to Cuba the following trips: 2,196 vessels entered from Cuba, and 1,772 cleared for Cuba. At the rate of only \$5 per ton, the American shipping earned nearly \$4,000,000 in this freight.

PUBLIC REVENUES.—In the general budget for the fiscal year 1871–72, presented to the *Cortes* by the Minister of the Colonies, the public revenues of Cuba were estimated at \$40,091,834 and the expenditures at \$27,481,570.

| | |
|------------------------|---------------------|
| Revenues | \$40,091,834 |
| Expenditures | 27,481,570 |
| Surplus | <u>\$12,610,264</u> |

Notwithstanding this surplus, the Minister declared to the *Cortes* that it would not suffice to cover the extraordinary expenses of the war; on which account he requested the *Cortes* to authorize him “to establish (discretionally and without consulting the Cuban people) such duties and taxes as the necessities of the war might require, and to use credit for raising money for the treasury of Cuba.”

To use the credit the Government has authorized the Havana Spanish Bank, a privileged corporation with

\$8,000,000 capital, to issue an unlimited amount of notes, which exceeds to day \$90,000,000 over what is granted by its charter. The consequence of this system has been to depreciate the notes, as everybody knows that they cannot be redeemed; to raise the value of gold to 240 per cent., and that the debt of the treasury of Cuba exceeds to day the sum of \$100,000,000.

ARMY.—General Prim, Minister of War, stated to the Cortes in 1870, that since the outbreak of the revolution Spain had sent to Cuba 40,000 men. One year afterwards, in December, 1871, that number had increased to 60,000, according to the Havana official newspaper "Diario de la Marina." This proves that each year Spain is compelled to send 20,000 soldiers, say 120,000 in 6 years, without succeeding in crushing, nor even in weakening the rebellion. Besides that, several battalions have been raised on the island, to be sent to the seat of the war. The volunteers have never been less than 30,000. Lately, Captain General Jovellar ordered a general draft of 10 per cent. to be made among all the able-bodied men between the ages of 20 and 45 years, and 1 per cent. of the total slave population. At the same time he asked that 12,000 men be sent immediately from Spain; and as it was not possible for the Madrid Government to satisfy this petition, he tendered his resignation, which was accepted, and General Concha appointed to succeed him. The same thing is repeating itself now. Captain General Concha is asking for more troops, which it is out of the power of the Madrid Government to send him; the volunteers are dissatisfied with the Home Government and with General Concha also; and in consequence, he has likewise sent his resignation.

No less than seven Captains General, invested with unlimited powers, have ruled in Cuba since the commencement

of the war. Every one of them has vied with the other in cruelty; but no one has succeeded in pleasing the ferocious mob of the volunteers, and all of them have gone back to Spain gorged with money, but scorned by their own countrymen. The actual Governor General, Jose de la Concha, has recently arrived for the third time in Cuba in that capacity. The first time he shot as pirates Mr. Crittenden and 49 others, American citizens, captured in a boat on the coast of Cuba. They had gone in an expedition under General Narciso Lopez, to promote the annexation of Cuba to the U. S. Lopez was also taken prisoner, and garroted in Havana [1851]. The second time, a plan to co-operate with the expedition prepared in the U. S. by General Quitman, was discovered: the chief, Mr. Pintó, a gentleman born in Spain, an intimate friend of General Concha, was imprisoned, and subsequently garroted [1855]. The only measures hitherto taken by General Concha have been an extraordinary contribution of 10 per cent. on all incomes; a draft among the able-bodied men from 20 to 35 years of age, and another similar one among the slaves, the last to serve as soldiers five years, at the end of which they will be free.

LOSSES.—It was stated in the Madrid papers of 26th of October, 1871, and the Government has not denied it, that from the commencement of the war up to February 1st, 1871, that is, in less than two years and a half, 29,700 men and 1784 officers of the regular army had died, or nearly 50 per cent. of the whole number which arrived from the Peninsula during that period—a fact which explains the necessity Spain is under of sending 20,000 men to Cuba every year, simply to make good the losses of her army.

NAVY.—The Spanish navy in Cuban waters has about fifty vessels of all sizes, with about 400 guns, besides the 30 gun-boats, built in New York in 1870.

ARMAMENT.—From the first of November, 1868, to the middle of December, 1871, the Spaniards imported into Cuba from New York, 83,766 Remington and Peabody rifles and carbines; and from the United States and Spain 8,500 fire-arms of other patterns. The importation of arms and ammunition has continued without interruption; and lately, it has transpired that a contract was made with Messrs. Remington & Co. for 60,000 of their improved guns.

CONDITION OF THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT IN CUBA.

The proclamations and decrees of the late Captain-General Jovellar, published in the official *Gazette* of Havana, under the date of February 7, 1874, give the best picture that could be drawn of the utter demoralization of the Spanish Government in Cuba, and of its impotence to conquer the insurrection. They are not less than ten, and, being too long to be inserted here, we will only mention their object.

The *first* orders a draft of 10 per cent. of the whole number of volunteers to be sent to the field as regular troops.

The *second*, on the movilization of the militia, prescribes that all the men, from 20 to 45 years of age, are obliged to serve in the regular militia, subject to be drafted and sent to do campaign duties, in the same way as the volunteers.

The *third* applies the same rules to the free colored people.

The *fourth* compels the slave owners to lend to the Government, until the end of the war, one slave out of every hundred, to be employed in the campaign; this per centage to be taken of the actually existing number of slaves in the cities and in the country, whatever their sex or age may be.

The *fifth* adds two companies to each battalion of the army.

The *sixth* establishes a special Service of Vigilance in the Eastern and Central Departments of the Island, having under

its charge all the persons employed as informers, detectives, guides, explorers and couriers. The most essential duty of this police will be the ascertaining of all the movements and plans of the enemy, and, specially, the most strict vigilance in the centres of population, to prevent these to communicate with, or lend any aid to the *rebels*.

The *seventh* creates a board of inspectors of the extraordinary expenses for the war.

In compliance with the *eighth*, the army is to be paid in gold, or its equivalent in bank notes.

The *ninth* increases the pay and ration of the troops.

The *tenth* gives rules for the erection, preservation and defence of new centres of population, and for the destruction of some of the existing ones.

Some, at least, of the *considerations* to justify the issue of these decrees are, we think, worth repeating :

“ Our troops (so says General Jovellar) continue overcoming the natural difficulties of a traitorous war with the same unremitting courage and unrelaxed patience of which every day bears new testimonials ; but all their endeavors and privations will be useless, as long as the insurrectionary bands are able to obtain with impunity, through their abettors and accomplices, fresh reinforcements of men and their requisites. Hence arises the extreme necessity of impressing with awe those treacherous and cunning sympathizers with our armed enemies, inflicting upon them severe punishment, in accordance with the summary procedure of the war code.”

“ Auxiliaries less direct, but for that not the least effectual and useful to the rebels, are those who, through perverse motives, or *protected under the mask of a spurious patriotism, disturb not unfrequently with crimes the tranquility of the country ; those who, bending their pen, their talents, or their audacity, to serve the passion or a bastard interest at the least dis-*

*turbance of the public order, keep the spirits in a cruel anxiety; * further, those who, under cover of an official position, impoverish the State—defrauding it of its legitimate income; finally and likewise those who, working their own discredit in the public offices they hold, aid to the contempt of our national institutions.”*

.....

“There is nothing so important to the ultimate success of military operations (especially if the enemy to be combated, as in Cuba), places the success of its aggressions upon the secrecy of its movements, and upon the sagacity and cunning of its chiefs as to have a well organized service of explorers, practical guides and spies, who, scattered in the towns and country, would disclose the position and plans of the enemy, and lead the troops through the most rapid and practical routes.”

“Unfortunately, owing to excess of confidence, based on the insignificancy of the enemy, that service has been constantly neglected, thus depriving the troops, on many occasions, of glorious victories, and *compelling them to undergo fruitless marches and countermarches with great and pitiful loss of men by fatigue and disease.*”

“The contrast is marked between the means possessed by the Cubans for obtaining a thorough knowledge of the number and quality of troops opposing them; the status of their chiefs, as well as of our plans, devices, and in fact all the resources upon which our armies depend, and the almost impossibility of acquiring similar information on our part.”

“If the enemy, without money or means to compensate favors received, and without other elements than vengeance and punishment, obtains such astonishing results, it is to be wondered that our

* General Jovellar alludes evidently to the volunteers, and to editors of the Spanish newspapers on the Island, who constantly are inflaming their savage instincts with their writings.

chiefs of operations having at their disposal all kinds of resources to remunerate important services, we should, after five years, remain yet destitute of practical guides to lead our troops, and of spies to give them information as to the position and plans of the enemy."

"But this is not all. Experience has demonstrated that seldom an attack on any town has taken place, without the enemy being in communication and accord with some of its neighbors, who, thoroughly knowing the locality, lead and protect them in their incendiary, sacking and devastating work."

The foregoing statements of General Jovellar leave not a shadow of doubt of the corruption of the Spanish rule in Cuba ; of the false patriotism of its agents and supporters ; of the crimes of its adherents ; and finally, of its dreadful isolation in the midst of the oppressed country, forced, as its highest authority confesses, to grope its way across the obstacles of a hostile or unsympathizing population. Should more proofs of these facts be yet wanting, the actual Captain-General, Concha, will furnish us with a more recent and not less convincing one, among many others, in his extra taxes of five and ten per cent. on income and capital, to meet the requirements of the war. His *absolute powers*, notwithstanding, and in spite of his manifold decrees, either coaxing or threatening and punishing the reluctant people, he has not yet succeeded in collecting the fifth part of the amount expected to be derived from those sources.

Alarmed by the severity of the decrees of General Jovellar, great numbers of persons left the Island, among them many of the boasting volunteers, who, deserting their colors, sometimes by tens, came to this country or went to Mexico ; thus showing that even those most fervid *Spanish patriots* have lost confidence in the ultimate success of their Government.

THE REVOLUTION.

Carlos Manuel de Cespedes, an able lawyer and wealthy planter of Bayamo, in the Eastern Department, raised the standard of independence in his State, Demajagua, in the district of Manzanillo, at a short distance from the town of Yara, of which he immediately took possession on the tenth of October, 1868.

During the first month of the war a provisional government was organized at Bayamo, with Cespedes at its head, who, on the thirtieth of October, 1868, published a manifesto declaring that he would not impose his government on the people of the Island, and that he was ready to submit to whatever the majority of its inhabitants decided on, as soon as they could freely assemble to make use of their right of self government.

On the 10th of April, 1869, a convention met at Guaimaro, presided over by Cespedes, composed of the delegates of the different sections of the Island. A draft of a constitution was laid before this body, which, after being discussed and amended, was finally adopted.

This constitution, and the laws successively passed by the House of Representatives (notwithstanding all the contrary statements made by the enemies of the Cuba Libre), continues to rule as regularly as can be expected from an infant republic laboring under the two-fold difficulties of constituting itself and of fighting its opponents, who commit everything to fire and sword. The Cubans hold their own from Santiago de Cuba to the district of Five Cities (*Cinco Villas*), embracing more than half of the territory of the island.

Their army is now stronger, better disciplined, better armed and equipped than ever; and if it is not more numerous, it is only for want of arms and ammunition.

It is composed of the following corps :

CAMAGUEY.—Commander-in-Chief, Gen. Máximo Gomez ;
Second Chief, Gen. J. Sanguili.

| | | |
|--------------------|-------|-------------|
| Infantry | 3,700 | |
| Cavalry | 900 | |
| | | ————— 4,600 |

LAS VILLAS.—General José Gozalez.

| | | |
|--------------------|-------|-------------|
| Infantry | 1,200 | |
| Cavalry | 340 | |
| | | ————— 1,540 |

LAS TUNAS.—General Francisco Varona.

| | | |
|--------------------|-------|-------------|
| Infantry | 1,300 | |
| Cavalry | 200 | |
| | | ————— 1,500 |

BAYAMO.—General Modesto Diaz.

| | | |
|--------------------|-------|-------------|
| Infantry | 2,400 | |
| Cavalry | 450 | |
| | | ————— 2,850 |

HOLGUIN.—Brigadier, Miguel Barreto.

| | | |
|--------------------|-------|-------------|
| Infantry | 1,690 | |
| Cavalry | 370 | |
| | | ————— 2,060 |

SANTIAGO DE CUBA.—General Manuel Calvar.

| | | |
|--------------------|-------|-------------|
| Infantry | 4,300 | |
| Cavalry | 400 | |
| | | ————— 4,700 |

| | |
|-----------------|--------|
| Total | 17,250 |
|-----------------|--------|

The liberating army increases every day in number and strength, not only with the Cubans always ready to be enlisted as fast as they can be furnished with arms, but also

with the deserters of the Spanish lines, who pass over to it with their equipments. The patriots are supplied with arms and ammunition from abroad when possible; but more frequently they capture them from neighboring towns occupied by Spanish troops, not a few of the sellers being themselves Spaniards. For so doing, a wealthy one of the latter was not long ago convicted and shot by order of General Portillo, then Spanish Governor of Puerto Principe.

The Cubans are now asking for artillery, the only thing they want to take possession of, and hold important towns and ports. In spite of this deficiency, they attack and penetrate into the towns whenever they like, to provide themselves with provisions, clothes or arms. In this manner they have entered at different times large places, such as Manzanillo, Holguin, Nuevitas, San Miguel and Sancti Spiritu, remaining there some hours, and retiring afterwards abundantly provided with all kind of supplies.

The fighting during the last twelve months has been very active, and as acknowledged by the Spaniards themselves, almost always favorable to the Cubans. The most important feat in the campaign, and the most threatening to the Spanish power, has been the invasion of Cinco Villas. This is an extensive territory in the Western Department, where the populous towns, or *Villas*, of Cienfuegos, Trinidad, Sancti Spiritu, San Juan de los Remedios and Villa Clara are located, studded all over with the finest sugar plantations of the Island and teeming with slaves. The Spanish authorities, ever since the breaking out of the insurrection, have devoted their most strenuous efforts to keep the patriots far off this territory, confining them to the cattle growing portion of the island. With this object they have cut open a wide zone across the island, building extensive fortifications along it from one coast to the other. The patriots have

lately succeeded in crossing this line : they have already entered some of the towns ; burned several plantations ; and the destruction of the rest is imminent, as they hope, by destroying the material resources of the country, that it will be impossible for Spain to carry on the war.

We will now refer to some of the most prominent engagements during the last ten months, as described by official documents, either Spanish or Cuban :

1873, Nov. 10.—Attack on Manzanillo, an important seaport, of above 5,500 inhabitants, exclusively of the garrison, always strong, as the place is one of the Spanish headquarters. The city was defended on the land side by two castles and eight fortified towers ; and on the sea side, by a steamer and two gunboats, which took part in the action. The garrison consisted of 500 regulars, 800 volunteers, and a company of firemen. General Calixto Garcia, at the head of 1,400 men, took possession of the town ; burned some buildings, and after killing 200 Spaniards, and making prisoners of 100 more, retired with a rich booty of 250 rifles, 8,000 cartridges, horses, money, and a variety of other articles. The Cubans had 18 killed and 70 wounded, rank and file.

December 2.—Battle of Palo Seco, in Camagüey. The Cubans, numbering 300 infantry and 250 cavalry, commanded by General Máximo Gomez, surprised a stronger column of Spaniards, under Colonel Vilches, and routed them completely. The first and second commander, several officers and 200 soldiers were killed. Sixteen officers and 35 men were made prisoners. Besides, the Cubans captured 257 Remingtons, 16,000 cartridges, 12 revolvers, 100 sabres, 80 horses, with their equipment, and 30 baggage mules loaded with ammunition, medicine, clothing, and some money. The loss to the Cubans was trifling—3 killed and 15 wounded.

1874, January 6.—General Julio Sanguily, heading a force of cavalry and infantry, entered the military zone of Puerto Príncipe, and finding a party of 90 foragers, near fort "Garrido," put them to flight, killing 49 and capturing 33 Remingtons and 1,200 cartridges. The Cubans approached so near the city of Puerto Príncipe, that they could see the movements of the garrison, and hear the bells ring the alarm under fear of a general assault.

January 9.—Colonel Esponda, with 650 Spanish soldiers, attacked the Cubans at "Los Melones," (district of Las Tunas) and after a severe fight, was compelled to retire, leaving behind 4 officers and 16 soldiers dead, besides 14 officers and 50 soldiers wounded. The losses of the Cubans are not known.

January 12.—Colonel Gabriel Gonzalez, in command of two brigades, penetrated by different points at the same time, into the village of Sibanicú, (Puerto Príncipe) without being molested by a single shot from the adjoining advanced forts. The object of this operation was to protect the exodus of those of the inhabitants sympathizing with the patriots. This was accomplished, about 500 persons of every sex and age leaving the village, amongst them 100 able-bodied men fit for field service. Besides, the Cubans took 10 Remingtons, 14 horses, and plenty of goods of every description, and then burned the village, under the fire of the Spanish intrenchment, without receiving any harm.

January 13.—Brigadier José Gonzalez, with 460 infantry and 80 horses, scouring the zone between Santa Cruz and El Río, burned a sugar estate, captured some rifles and cartridges, 10 horses, clothing, provisions and 40 prisoners; only one of these was executed as a highway robber, the rest were set at liberty. Forty able-bodied men joined voluntarily the column. The Spanish Brigadier, Báscones, was encamp-

ing at that time near "El Rio" with 1,500 men; but, although the Cubans took position and provoked him with some shots, he did not dare to move out.

February 10.—Brigadier Báscones and Colonel Armiñan, with 2000 men, attacked the Cuban General Máximo Gomez, with about the same number, at a place called "Naranjo," in Camaguey. The Spaniards say that the fight lasted seven hours; they lost 140 killed and 120 wounded. The Cubans had 91 killed and wounded, and captured 39 Remingtons, 3,000 cartridges, 12 horses, and sundries. Both parties claim the victory. The probabilities are in favor of the Cubans, because the Spaniards have officially confessed that, next day, as they were *retiring*, they were attacked by the Cubans at "Mojacasabe," losing 2 officers and 22 soldiers, and having 8 of the first class and 103 of the second wounded; probably these numbers were larger. The Cuban report does not mention this second engagement.

February 28.—According to Spanish reports, Colonel Esponda, with the Fourth Brigade, attacked at "El Ciego," the insurgent general, Calixto Garcia, who commanded from 450 to 500 men, and after a fight of an hour and a half compelled them to disperse, leaving behind 13 dead.

March 3.—The Spaniards report also an encounter at Jimaguayú between a strong column of 1500 infantry, cavalry and artillery, under Brigadier Armiñan, and a Cuban force of 1,000 infantry and 600 cavalry. They had only 2 officers and 10 soldiers wounded; but as they do not state the losses of the Cubans, neither do they claim the victory, it is to be inferred that they were badly beaten. The Cuban return says that their infantry did not take part in the engagement, their cavalry having been sufficient to repel the enemy.

April 15-18.—Battle of "Las Guásumas," between the Spanish troops, commanded by Brigadier Armiñan, and the

Cubans, under General Máximo Gomez. The Spanish return, being so unusually laconic, the inference is that they were severely repulsed, as it merely mentions the fact that after a bloody fight, in which both parties suffered severely, the rebels were forced back. On the contrary, the Cubans claim a decided victory. They state that when the battle began on the 15th, they were 1,500 infantry and 500 cavalry, and the Spaniards had 3,000 men of both arms, besides four pieces of artillery. The engagement continued the two following days: the Spaniards burned great heaps of their dead, and were reduced to the last extremity when they were reinforced by Brigadier Báscones, arriving from Puerto Príncipe with 2,000 men and one cannon. The fighting was then renewed at "Jimaguayú," on the morning of the 18th; but the Spaniards finding the patriots too strong for them, notwithstanding their fresh help, decided finally to retreat, harassed by the Cubans as far as Jimaguayú. The losses of the enemy are estimated at least 1,000 men, the field remaining strewed with corpses of men and horses that they could not burn or bury. The patriots had 29 dead and 113 wounded, all classes counted; and they got a good amount of horses, arms, ammunition, clothing, &c.

April 8th.—On the morning of this day—if the Spanish reports be true—a strong Cuban force of 2,000 infantry and 300 cavalry, failed in an assault on "Fort Caridad de Artega," in the vicinity of Puerto Príncipe. In the night of that day they were also repulsed from the hamlet of Cascorro, leaving 12 dead soldiers, and carrying away many more wounded.

April 12.—General Máximo Gomez, at the head of a strong body of troops, threatened to invest the important city of Nuevitas; and while the Spaniards were concentrating all their forces to protect the town, he sent a detachment of 600

men to enter San Miguel de Bagá, a village nine miles distant, which they did that night, sacking the stores of the Spaniards, and retiring with a rich booty. To carry away this booty the Cubans employed litters, causing the Spaniards to report that instead of spoils, they were removing their dead and wounded.

April 14.—Colonel Jimenez, with a strong column, crossed “La Trocha,” or the fortified line of the Spaniards, to reinforce the patriots who are operating in “Cinco Villas” territory.

April 17.—In the Eastern Department, near a place called Yaya, General Calixto Garcia attacked a corps of 1,100 Spaniards; killed 130.

April 29.—The renowned Spanish Colonel Hilario Sandoval assailed the Cubans under Col. Jimenez at “Las Delicias,” in Sancti Spiritus district. He was killed, as also 50 of his followers.

April 29.—The Cubans, commanded by General Calvar, assaulted “Mayarí (Eastern Department), but after a fight, in which the forts of Cámara and Montana took part, retired, leaving 12 dead; they succeeded, notwithstanding, in burning some houses. [Spanish report.]

April 30.—From the same source we know that General Calixto Garcia, leading 400 infantry and 200 cavalry, invested the village “El Horno,” in the Eastern Department, defended by 200 infantry, one squadron, and the volunteers of the place. The Cubans retired after a very sharp fight. No casualties are reported.

May 9.—Colonel Benitez protected the departure of 150 Cubans who remained in the village of Sibanicú, which had been destroyed on a former occasion.

June 27.—Lieutenant-Colonel La Rosa, with 600 men, attacked the Cubans at Baire, in the district of Jiguaní. He

affirms, in his report, that the patriots, numbering 500, with 40 horses, had 32 dead and many wounded; but he does not mention his own casualties.

July 20.—Commandant J. Carrillo crossed the *Trocha* with a convoy of men and ammunition, dispatched from headquarters at Camaguey, to reinforce Colonel Jimenez, operating at Las Villas. Being overtaken on the 22d at “Los Buniatos” by a Spanish column, he checked its pursuit, with some loss on both sides. He was again attacked on the 26th at Corojo; but on the 27th he reached safely his destination with the convoy.

August 12.—Colonel Jimenez, while encamped at “Los Charcos,” heard that the enemy was advancing towards him with 300 men. Although he had but 63 horses and 82 infantry, he decided to fight, relying upon the advantages of his position. A brisk and deadly engagement followed, in which the Spaniards took to flight, leaving 90 accoutred horses, 33 Remingtons, 2,500 cartridges, and a medicine chest on the battle field. Night put an end to the persecution of the stragglers. The casualties of the Cubans were 2 killed and 13 wounded.

August 14.—To sum up the results of this victory, Colonel Jimenez started with a force of cavalry; and at midnight entered into the city of Sancti Spiritu, an important place, with not less than 15,000 inhabitants. His first step was to order Captain Barrera to go directly to the residence of the General Commandant Don Francisco Acosta y Alvear, one of the bloodiest Spanish officers, although a native of Cuba; but, fortunately for him, he was absent. The Cubans possessed themselves of the streets and squares of the city, made prisoners of a detachment, took away their arms, and then released them; captured 410 rifles, and after remaining for some hours in the city, they retired without doing any

harm, nor being molested by the volunteers nor regulars stationed in the place.

On the next morning the garrison of the fort "Micaguabo" passed over to the patriots, with arms and ammunition. The fort was destroyed.

A similar result was effected on the 18th with the garrison of Fort "La Herradura."

September 4.—General Calixto Garcia Iniguez, one of the ablest and most popular of the Cubans, was taken prisoner by the Spaniards at San Antonio, in Oriente (Eastern State), of which he was in command. His captor, Lieutenant Ariza, pretends that the deed took place in a battle against 800 Cubans; but it is an established fact that General Garcia fell victim to a surprise.

September 12.—From Spanish quarters it is reported that the Cubans assailed the village of "Jumento," in the district of Trinidad; but that the garrison made an heroic defense, and repelled the patriots.

October 28.—To compensate this failure, we have the surrender of the village "San Gerónimo," in Camaguey, to Brigadier José Gonzalez. The place was defended by intrenchments and several block houses, manned by 115 men armed with Remingtons. After two days fight, the Commandant, Captain Agustin Brañas, dangerously wounded, capitulated with the garrison, on condition that their lives should be spared. They numbered 61, and were escorted to the nearest Spanish encampment at "Las Yeguas."

The casualties were to the Spaniards 60 killed, 25 wounded; to the Cubans 2 killed, 15 wounded. One sergeant and several soldiers went over to the Cubans. 450 persons were rescued. And besides that, the Cubans captured 130 Remingtons, 25,000 metallic cartridges, horses, clothing, provisions, and 50 head of cattle.

We cannot give a more reliable, although incomplete, picture of the internal condition of the revolution, than translating the following extracts from a pamphlet, entitled "Los Mambises." Memoirs of a prisoner, by the Spanish Captain of Infantry, Don Antonio De Rosal. (Madrid, 1874.)

"I spent fifty-six days among the insurgents: this prolonged visit, which, much against my will, I made them, began on the 26th of September last, on which day, while attached to the column of Colonel Diéguez, I shared in the unfortunately celebrated battle of Santa Maria, and unluckily was taken prisoner. * * * * *

"Blacks and whites, officers and soldiers, all possess constitutions to be envied. One occasionally meets people apparently weak, but really able to support an immense amount of fatigue. Sick are seldom seen, and, of these, as of the wounded, although they lack almost all resources, few die; almost all have been wounded, and some can count their wounds by the dozen. They carry loads like beasts of burden, and will travel ten, twelve, and even fourteen leagues, at more than an ordinary pace, without being fatigued or giving out, notwithstanding their scarcity of nourishment, of which I will speak further on. * * * * *

"They are so simple minded, that the chiefs make them believe whatever they choose, and rule them at their pleasure, for they are plunged in the grossest ignorance; but this does not mean that men thoroughly instructed, such as are the deputies, and some others who fill the offices of military judges and other like positions, are not to be found, nor that there are not among them a great many, who, being sons of good families, have been carefully educated, and who possess the general, although perhaps superficial, knowledge usually given to young men of this class. Others, a lesser number, although of good families, have received no

instruction whatever, on account of having joined the insurrection while still children. * * * * *

“Let it be understood that whenever our troops have the ill luck to show their backs, they are always disastrously routed, for then they are terrible; they fall like wild beasts on their enemies, without regard to their number, and with no weapon but their *machete*; and this each one does individually and in disorder. * * * * *

“They admire and greatly respect courage in their enemies; in fact, to such a degree, that I recommend to those who at any future time may have the misfortune to fall into their hands, to show themselves haughty and worthy, although they know they are going to die; in the certainty that, if they can inspire their captors with any sympathy, it will not be by humbling themselves, for they hate cowards and timid people. * * * * *

“Colonel Diéguez, fighting like a brave man, was wounded by three bullets in one foot; he was taken prisoner by the enemy, carried to the rear and transferred to the camp where he was presented to the chief, Calisto Garcia. * * * He died as a martyr, after having fought like a brave Spaniard; and almost all the chiefs of the enemy, admiring his courage, assisted at his funeral, which was presided over by my companion in misfortune, Don Andres Gallurt, and was conducted with the greatest solemnity possible under the circumstances. * * * * *

“They know how to appreciate the conduct of those of their enemies who prove themselves great in the supreme moments of life.

“They possess also the noble characteristic of extreme generosity, although their resources are so few that they are generally hungry and in want of everything. One often sees three or four of them smoking the same cigar, or dividing up

with each other a plantain or a tomato. I was entirely naked from my middle up, and the so-called Major Ruiz, who, by a strange coincidence, possessed both a jacket and a shirt, ceded the latter to me, notwithstanding my strong endeavor to decline the present. * * * * *

“ I have heard from everybody that the *Mambises* are cruel and bloodthirsty. Being new in the campaign, I never had an opportunity of witnessing any horrors committed by them, and can only state that, alike to myself and to my other companions who shared my fate, they conducted themselves generously, attentively and respectfully ; treating us even with affection. The fact of restoring us to liberty, without exacting from us any conditions, I can explain solely by attributing it to political views.

“ They are, as a general thing, good marksmen ; but this is not their chief characteristic, which is their intimate knowledge of the forests. This is such that, although they may find themselves on a spot which they occupy for the first time, and although they may be so taken by surprise as to be obliged to scatter before their chief has had time to indicate to them a spot in which to re-unite, it is truly surprising to see how these men, guided by a never failing instinct, will come in, few at a time, to the place where their chief has halted. I cannot understand this, but it is true.

“ They obey their officers blindly, although everybody is treated as an equal, and although quarrels and altercations may occur : they complain loudly when they are detailed for any service the performance of which they may think cannot properly be required of them, but they never fail to fulfil their orders. They perform certain services with a ridiculous gravity ; but all such work as outposts, and others of like importance, are performed with the greatest exactitude, vigilance and care, on which account it is very difficult to

surprise them. For their arms they entertain a real affection, cleaning them and preserving them with the greatest care; and they go into ecstasies on the subject of ammunition, always endeavoring to increase their number of cartridges, and priding themselves in economizing them. The gravest charge which can be made against an officer is that of having abandoned any arm to us, or of leaving any of their killed or wounded in our hands. The wounded, on receiving their wounds, run off as far as they can from the field, and very few of them ever require any help from their companions in their retreat. * * * * *

“The Government of the *Mambises* is a Republic, and its fundamental code is a charter or constitution, very broad in rights and liberties, and more democratic than any I know of. * * * * *

“There are two powers—one is the House of Representatives, the other is composed of the President and his Ministers, or Secretaries. The House consists of sixteen deputies, elected by universal suffrage. It has the right to make laws, to declare wars and make peace. The House nominates the President. * * * * *

“For the election of deputies everybody, not belonging to the force and having a vote, must go to the camps. * *

“The House has the power to remove from office any functionary whom it is authorized to appoint. * * * *

“There are two classes of authorities—the Judicial and the Civil. Justice is administered by a person called *preboste* (provost), and the chief civil authority is the Prefect, who has under him a Sub-Prefect and Constable. * * * *

“The force is divided into various army corps; each of them commanded by a chief called major-general. Each army corps is composed of a certain number of brigades; each brigade of two battalions, whose regulation strength is 125

rank and file, although they often do not number over 60 or 80 ; the brigades are commanded by brigadiers, who are general officers, and the battalions by colonels, who have under them a lieutenant-colonel, two majors, a captain-aide-de-camp, a lieutenant, and an ensign. Each one of the six companies which compose a battalion is commanded by a captain, two lieutenants, and two sub-lieutenants, and has besides a regular complement of sergeants and corporals. * * *

“Carlos Manuel de Cespedes had issued a decree of pardon granting liberty to all officers, prisoners of war, on the shameful condition of not fighting any more against the Mambises during the present strife ; by another law, passed on the 27th of October last, unconditional liberty was granted to all persons.

This is all I have been able to find out with respect to spies, but it is certain that I have read papers of as recent a date as they could have in Holguin ; that the insurgents know every step that any of our columns take, and that, when they attack a town, the commander receives information every half-hour before they reach the place of any new circumstance that may have occurred. * * *

“The mail service is pretty well organized : the nearest prefect takes charge of the correspondence which is frequently arriving from abroad in canoes, and is remitted from prefecture to prefecture to its address, for which service there are special employees. * * * * *

“All communications are received quite punctually, and letters or official documents are rarely lost. * * *

“Almost all their fire-arms are rifled, mostly Remingtons, with some Peabodys, and a few Berdans. They are well provided with arms and ammunition landed recently from abroad, and not the least quantity of them from ourselves.

“ The service of outposts is performed with great diligence and caution. They are placed half a league from the camp, and one is posted on each road which leads to it; its force is relative to that of the main body, but it is always sufficiently strong to check any attack for a time necessary for the main body to prepare. Each outpost places a sentry on the road, at a distance of thirty or more yards from it, and when they suspect the presence of our troops, they likewise post other sentries, in different directions, inside the wood. When the order is sounded for silence in camp, each battalion names a sort of patrol guard, composed of four or six men, of whom one alone remains awake, and who is entrusted with seeing that no noise is made, which is scrupulously observed. Although they have at this headquarters nothing more than a corporal’s guard, it is not easy to surprise them, as they sleep very lightly. * * * * *

“ Another of the important services is that of commissions and detachments. The officer to whom a commission is entrusted receives his instructions; and without enquiring, perhaps, if he will be able to find provisions on his road, and sometimes even without a guide, sets out for the locality of the nearest prefecture. On arriving there he will be furnished with a guide, who conducts him to the vicinity of the next, and so on. * * * * *

“ We all know that the war waged in Cuba is one of factions or guerillas, because such is most suited to the country; but it is not a war of factions such as we have been accustomed to in Spain from the time of Viriato up to to-day. * * * * * This does not mean that they do not know how to wage war; quite the reverse, for I think the system which they employ is the very best one they could possibly have adopted. * * * * * Thoroughly acquainted with the forests, they avoid battle whenever they please;

they hide in thick underbrush, and, unless they choose to let us do so, we very seldom can come up with them. * * *
 * * * As a general thing, the *Mambises* soldiers return, immediately on our retreat, to the camps from which we may have dislodged them. * * * * *

“The acting president, Salvador Cisneros, is of an advanced age, tall and thin ; he has one arm broken by a bullet which struck him when he was commanding the attack on the tower of Colon, which was heroically defended by the thenceforth celebrated Captain Don Cesareo Sanchez. The insurgent deputies say that Cisneros is a well-educated man, and that he is a deep and thorough mathematician ; but I can only assert that, if he is scientific, he certainly is not eloquent. His manners are agreeable, and he is highly appreciated by the insurgents.”

ORGANIC LAWS.

THE CONSTITUTION.—A copy is annexed. Its principal provisions are :

ART. 1.—The legislative power is vested in a House of Representatives.

ART. 7.—The House elect the President of the Republic, the General-in-Chief of the army, the President of the House, and other executive officers. The General-in-Chief is subordinated to the Executive.

ART. 8.—The President of the Republic, &c., are amenable to charges which may be made by any citizen to the House of Representatives, who shall proceed to examine into the charges preferred.

ART. 9.—The House has full power to dismiss from office any functionary whom they have appointed.

ARTICLES 10, 11, 12 and 13.—Prescribe the form of passing laws.

ART. 16.—The executive power is vested in the President of the Republic.

ART. 22.—The judiciary forms an independent, co-ordinate department of the government, under the organization of a special law.

ART. 24.—All the inhabitants of the Republic of Cuba are absolutely free.

ART. 28.—The House of Representatives shall not abridge the freedom of religion, of the press, of public meeting, of education, of petition, or any inalienable right of the people.

JUDICIARY.—By the law enacted on the 6th August, 1869, the administration of justice is vested: first, in a Supreme Court; second, in criminal judges; third, in civil judges; fourth, in prefects and sub-prefects; and fifth, in courts martial.

The tribunals are acting as regularly as the conditions of the war can allow it.

The House of Representatives has passed laws regulating the administrative and civil organization, prescribing the requisites of civil marriages, organizing the army, and on several other matters.

Two facts are sufficient to demonstrate the power exercised by the House of Representatives, and of the obedience paid to its decision: first, the dismissal of the General-in-Chief, Manuel Quesada, in 1870; and second, the deposition of the President of the Republic, Carlos Manuel Céspedes, who, after near five years service, was impeached for violations of the Constitution. In both cases the sentenced parties submitted to their sentence, and these were approved by the people. The deposition of President Céspedes took effect on the 27th of October last; and the same day Mr. Salvador Cisneros, formerly Marquis of Santa Lucia and President of the House, according to law was appointed President of the

Republic ad interim during the absence of the Vice-President, General Francisco V. Aguilera, who was on a mission abroad.

An official "Boletin de la Revolution" is printed regularly at the headquarters of the executive, and a constant communication maintained with the agents of the Republic abroad.

CONCLUSION.

The cane fields of Cuba are the real treasury and arsenal from which the Spaniards draw all their resources for their savage war against the Cubans. Lay waste those fields, and Spanish rule in the island were virtually at an end. Hitherto a strongly garrisoned line of posts has served as breakwater between the sugar and the insurrectionary districts. But those garrisons, for lack of reinforcements which the exigencies of civil war in Spain have made impossible to send out to Cuba, are now reduced to so low an ebb, as to be nearly impotent, or not able to withstand much longer the irruption of the patriots across the border, which is sure to be so destructive of the cane fields in its westward sweep. Therefore, let us see to what extent the American people would be affected by so possible a contingency.

In the sugar season, ending 31st December, 1873, Cuba exported some 690,000 tons of sugar, of which 64 per cent. (441,000 tons) were exported to the United States, supplying to the American people fully 30 out of the 40 pounds which they consumed that year *per capita*. For the year just ended it is known that, while the aggregate amount exported has fallen short of that of 1873 by some 70,000, there has been an increased exportation to the United States of more than 50,000 tons, or a falling off in the exportation to Europe 120,000 tons. These are startling figures for the people of

the United States to ponder, showing, as they do, their dependence on the casualties of this war for 80 odd per cent. of the sugar consumed in this country.

The value of the sugar exported to the United States in 1873 was fully \$77,500,000, or some \$43,000,000 in excess of the exports from France to this country for the same year, and only \$11,000,000 less than the exports for all the German States united.

But not alone in this sugar interest are the people of the United States thus deeply concerned in the present and future condition of Cuba. Under proper commercial relations and conditions, there would be an immediate market in the island for more than 1,000,000 barrels of Western flour, instead of the few thousand barrels which are now sold them, in consequence of the heavy or prohibitory duties imposed in behalf of Spanish grown flour. So heavy, indeed, are those duties that relatively few Cubans use flour. Throw off these duties, however, and American flour would at once find a large, ready market there—a market more cheaply reached from the mills of the West, than either Boston, New York or Baltimore.

Nor is this all. The duties imposed on cotton goods in Cuba, are directly calculated to, and do exclude the products of the mills of Massachusetts and Rhode Island; when naturally there should be a large consumption of American cotton in the island.

It remains to be noted that the sugars and molasses exported from Cuba to the United States in 1873 afforded an exceptional employment to American shipping to the amount of \$4,000,000; while the other foreign sugars used were brought in foreign ships for the most part. Further, were the Cuban market opened to American flour and cotton goods, as assuredly should be the legitimate consequence of the near-

ness of the island to the United States, whose people, in turn, are the chief consumers of Cuban products, there would be opened a further large field of employment for American shipping.

Hence, the fact should be apparent, that there is not one State in the American Union in whose industrial development and prosperity the whole people of the Union have so heavy a stake involved, as that of the Island of Cuba.

The above statements are respectfully submitted to the consideration of the members of the Congress of the United States.

MIGUEL DE ALDAMA,

JOSE ANTONIO ECHEVERRIA.

Constitution of the Republic of Cuba.

Adopted by the CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, and unanimously approved by the CUBAN CONGRESS assembled at GUAIMARO, on the tenth day of April, in the year of our Lord 1869, and the FIRST of the INDEPENDENCE of CUBA.

ART. I.—The Legislative power shall be vested in a House of Representatives.

ART. II.—To this body shall be delegated an equal representation from each of the four States into which the Island of Cuba shall be divided.

ART. III.—These States are *Oriente, Camaguey, Las Villas, and Occidente.*

ART. IV.—No one shall be eligible as Representative of any of these States except a citizen of the Republic who is upwards of twenty years of age.

ART. V.—No Representative of any State shall hold any other official position during his representative term.

ART. VI.—Whenever a vacancy occurs in the representation of any State, the Executive thereof shall have power to fill such vacancy until the ensuing election.

ART. VII.—The House of Representatives shall elect a President of the Republic, a General-in-Chief of its Armies, a President of the Congress, and other executive officers. The General-in-Chief shall be subordinate to the Executive, and shall render him an account of the performance of his duties.

ART. VIII.—The President of the Republic, the General-in-Chief and the Members of the House of Representatives are amenable to charges which may be made by any citizen to the House of Representatives, who shall proceed to examine into the charges preferred; and if, in their judgment, it be necessary, the case of the accused shall be submitted to the Judiciary.

ART. IX.—The House of Representatives shall have full power to dismiss from office any functionary whom they have appointed.

ART. X.—The Legislative acts and decisions of the House of Representatives, in order to be valid and binding, must have the sanction of the President of the Republic.

ART. XI.—If the President fail to approve the Acts and decisions of the House, he shall, without delay, return the same with his objections thereto, for the reconsideration of that body.

ART. XII.—Within ten days after their reception, the President shall return all Bills, Resolutions and Enactments which may be sent to him by the House for his approval, with his sanction thereof, or with his objections thereto.

ART. XIII.—Upon the passage of any Act, Bill, or Resolution, after a reconsideration thereof by the House, it shall be sanctioned by the President.

ART. XIV.—The House of Representatives shall legislate upon Taxation, Public Loans, and Ratification of Treaties; and shall have power to declare and conclude War, to authorize the President to issue Letters of Marque, to raise Troops and provide for their support, to organize and maintain a Navy, and to regulate reprisals as to the public enemy.

ART. XV.—The House of Representatives shall remain in permanent session from the time of the ratification of this fundamental law by the People, until the termination of the war with Spain.

ART. XVI.—The Executive Power shall be vested in the President of the Republic.

ART. XVII.—No one shall be eligible to the Presidency who is not a native of the Republic, and over thirty years of age.

ART. XVIII.—All Treaties made by the President may be ratified by the House of Representatives.

ART. XIX.—The President shall have power to appoint Ambassadors, Ministers-plenipotentiary, and Consuls of the Republic to foreign countries.

ART. XX.—The President shall treat with Ambassadors, and shall see that the laws are faithfully executed. He shall also issue official commissions to all the functionaries of the Republic.

ART. XXI.—The President shall propose the names for the members of his Cabinet to the House of Representatives for its approval.

ART. XXII.—The Judiciary shall form an independent, coordinate department of the Government, under the organization of a special law.

ART. XXIII.—Voters are required to possess the same qualifications as to age and citizenship as the Members of the House of Representatives.

ART. XXIV.—All the inhabitants of the Republic of Cuba are absolutely *free*.

ART. XXV.—All the citizens are considered as soldiers of the Liberating Army.

ART. XXVI.—The Republic shall not bestow dignities, titles, nor special privileges.

ART. XXVII.—The citizens of the Republic shall not accept honors nor titles from foreign countries.

ART. XXVIII.—The House of Representatives shall not abridge the *Freedom of Religion*, nor of the *Press*, nor of *Public Meetings*, nor of *Education*, nor of *Petition*, nor any inalienable *Right of the People*.

ART. XXIX.—This Constitution can be amended only by the unanimous concurrence of the House of Representatives.

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