THE EXODUS FROM REVOLUTIONARY CUBA (1959-1974): A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS

By

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A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE COUNCIL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

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1975

Juan M. Clark .

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To all of those who have died, and to all of those who have suffered for the cause of freedom and justice, in Cuba, my native homeland.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This dissertation represents the accumulation of several years of research effort involving the help of many persons from its conception to its completion.

I would like to acknowledge first of all my most sincere appreciation for the chairperson of my supervisory committee, Dr. Ruth E. Albrecht. Her unending patience and guidance made possible the conclusion of this work, which constituted a unique and fruitful learning experience. To Daniel E. Alleger, Associate Professor Emeritus, is extended my deepest appreciation for his guidance and help throughout my academic work at this university. His assistance was invaluable in the completion of this dissertation. Thanks are also due to Dr. T. Lynn Smith for his initial guidance in my doctoral work until his retirement.

I also wish to thank Dr. Gerald R. Leslie, Chairman, Sociology Department, for serving as a committee member and for providing financial support through part of my doctoral program. To Dr. William E. Carter, Director, The Center for Latin American Studies, I offer my sincere appreciation for the support he helped provide in the form of an NDFL Title VI Fellowship which was highly instrumental in the completion of my graduate work. Dr. Joseph S. Vandiver and Dr. E. Wilbur Bock, who served on my supervisory committee, deserve my sincere thanks for their cooperation.

Many others were extremely helpful in the course of this research effort. The following deserve special mention. To Dr. Carmelo Mesa-Lago

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of the University of Pittsburgh, I extend my appreciation for his encouragement to work on this subject and for his valuable suggestions. The same is true for Dr. Luis V. Manrara, Dr. Jose I. Lasaga, and Mr. Paul Bethel.

Without the assistance of the Cuban Refugee Program this effort would have been incomplete. To its late director, Howard T. Palmatier, as well as to the former Refugee Center director, Errol T. Ballanfonte, my thanks for their cooperation. The collaboration always received from Manuel Rodriguez Fleitas was not only crucial, but highly effective. Considerable help was also rendered by Clifford H. Harpe, Mariano Vallejo, Jean Castle, Josefina Noroña and Amalia Ramos of that program.

The assistance in interviewing by Carlos de Varona, Frank Diaz Pou, Jose Font and Angel Alvarez will always be appreciated. Roberto Fabrico and Luis Bueno from <u>The Miami Herald</u> were very cooperative in facilitating my research in the newspaper library, making possible a better perspective on the escapees. Humberto Cruz from <u>The Miami News</u>, and Tomas Regalado and Esteban Lamela of Channel 23, were also helpful sharing data with this researcher.

Jean Holzer, Dr. Donald Myers and Dr. Richard L. Sheaffer rendered invaluable assistance in computer programming and statistical analysis. Considerable bibliographical help was given by Dr. Rosa Mesa at this campus, and by Dr. Rosa Abella and Dr. Archie L. McNeal at the University of Miami, which allowed the use of its library, and by Regina Suarez.

My appreciation to colleagues and friends Himilce Esteve de Campos, Juan Figueras, Joan Colebrook, Alejandro Portes, Manuel Carvajal, Roberto Hernandez, Maria C. Herrera, Greg Grigoruk, Rafael and Rosita Villaverde, George Welsch, Manuel Mendoza, Eve Sherouse, Manuel Fernandez, Maria Comella, Antonio Jorge, Jose Heredia, Fermin Perez, Danilo Mesa, Ofelia

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Sanchez and Jorge Sosa for their criticism on portions of this manuscript and/or helping in various ways.

Special recognition is due to Dr. Alejandro Portes for his permission to use data from the project under his direction, <u>Assimilation of Latin</u> <u>American Minorities in the United States</u>.

Dozens of Cuban exiles of all walks of life gave this researcher their minutes or hours that were also crucial in this effort. It is impossible to name them all, but the assistance rendered by Dr. Rene F. Huerta, Dr. Alberto Gonzalez, Rolando Perez Cerezal, Bruno Danenberg, Hector Caraballo, William Prado, Luis Zuñiga and Rodolfo Camps has to be acknowledged. The two latter are prisoners in Cuba as a result of returning to rescue their families.

To U.S. Coast Guard officials George Johnson, John Zeigler and Cdr. Duanne P. Gatto, as well as to Immigration and Naturalization Service Deputy Commissioner James F. Greene and Ray Brooks, I give my recognition for their cooperation with data pertaining to the escapees and the exiles.

Miami Dade Community College, South Campus, was also highly instrumental in the completion of this work through the granting of a study leave.

Thanks are also due to Celia Bugallo, Sue Hopkin, Vivian Figueras, Maria C. Pando and Sylvia Whitman for their typing work, and especially to Elizabeth Harvey who struggled effectively with the final version. Bob Knabb and George Gonzalez, and Nilo Couret from this campus, rendered assistance with the graphs.

Last, but not least, my family was always helpful and encouraging through these years. To my mother and father, who also assisted in many ways, my deepest appreciation, as well as to my in-laws. And, to my

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wife, Clara, my deepest appreciative recognition, who besides helping as interviewer, codifier and "research assistant" was also encouraging, understanding and patient throughout my years in school, and throughout this writing. Without her support, this dissertation would not have been possible. I hope finally that my sons Johnny and Jose will understand that the time withdrawn from them due to this work was for a worthwhile cause, for which they may feel proud in the future.

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Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate Council of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

THE EXODUS FROM REVOLUTIONARY CUBA (1959-1974): A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS

By

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August, 1975

Chairman: Ruth E. Albrecht Major Department: Sociology

This is a study of the exodus from revolutionary Cuba between 1959 and 1974. It is an analysis of the conditions that prompted that migration, its magnitude, and the time periods into which it was subdivided. It describes what happened to the would-be refugees once they left the island, their major socio-demographic characteristics, and how those characteristics compared to those of the parent Cuban population. Both primary and secondary data, collected mostly through the survey method, were variously analyzed.

The Cuban exodus, as determined, was essentially politically motivated. In magnitude it reached close to three quarters of a million persons. Most of the exiles came to the United States. They used not only conventional and legal means of transportation, but also illegal and clandestine means in various forms. The Cubans, as a whole, were subjected to increasing degrees of restraint to prevent them from leaving their country. In exile, they received different forms of reception and assistance in the various countries to which they migrated, even temporarily. The U.S. Cuban Refugee Program was the largest of such a cooperative effort, and was unique in American history.

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The flow of the Cuban emigration varied concomitantly over the years with the restrictions against departure imposed by the Cuban government. Over time the socio-economic composition of the exiles exhibited an increasingly greater resemblance to the parent population, at least at the levels of comparison made in this study. It is highly relevant that those choosing the most perilous means, the escapees, were precisely the ones more closely similar to the Cuban population, especially at the working class level. These findings impinge finally upon the nature of the revolutionary process, questioning the proclaimed support of the Cuban people to that government.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Cuba, in the course of events which followed the overthrow of Fulgencio Batista on January 1, 1959, became the only communist state in the Western Hemisphere. Fidel Castro, with his charismatic appeal, immediately filled the power vacuum opened in Cuba's political structure. He inspired the Cuban people like no other leader in the course of that nation, and his pledge to keep peace, restore political freedom and democracy, and bring about social justice were believed by the majority. But scarcely two years later, Cuba had become a totalitarian state patterned after the communist model, and was about to become an ally of the Soviet Union.

Individual rights had been practically abolished; all land, industries and businesses fell under state control. Individual initiative, which had brought Cuba to its relative high standard of living, was suppressed in a drastic way. By 1962, shortages in all food items and manufactured goods resulted in an unprecedented rationing that eventually included sugar, Cuba's principal agricultural crop.

Because these circumstances not only caused substantive frustration and discomfort, but great fear of the future, masses of Cubans began to flee into exile. By the end of 1962, more than a quarter of a million had fled the island, mostly by legal means, and apparently represented all sectors of the Cuban population. This migration constituted an intriguing factor within the entire revolutionary phenomenon on that

nation since visitors were normally reporting how much better off the Cubans were, especially those in the lower socio-economic echelons. But if that were so, why did these appear so desperate to leave? What were the real circumstances prompting their decision to depart? Was this just another conventional emigration where the individuals were rather free to leave their country? Who really were these Cuban emigrants, or exiles? How representative were they of the population left behind? These questions were revolving in our mind by the late 1960's, since no study had approached them in a comprehensive manner.

To answer those questions, this research effort was conceived. Being of Cuban origin, this endeavor appeared to be easier to handle, but it also posed an extra challenge to one who is learning to be a social scientist, that of being objective. Special consideration was given to avoid subjectivity. But it still was an ambitious project, handicapped by the complete lack of research funds, only overcome with a great amount of voluntary cooperation of friends and family.

This study will analyze the Cuban exodus between 1959 and 1974. The conditions that prompted this migration will be ascertained first, followed by the determination of its magnitude and stages in which the exodus was subdivided. It will also consider the process of reception and resettlement of the Cuban exiles at their main points of arrival, followed by an in-depth study of the escapees, or those who left by illegal means. Finally, the socio-demographic attitudes of the exiles, the escapees and the Cuban population will be analyzed in a comparative fashion in order to determine their differences and similarities.

CHAPTER II

METHODOLOGY

The exodus from revolutionary Cuba from its beginning in 1959 through 1974, a fifteen-year period, is our subject matter. Special attention is given to the socio-historic background that prompted this migration, focusing on the changes occurring during the revolutionary process headed by Fidel Castro, and on the radical transformations that affected the island as factors determining the exodus. Attention is also given to the magnitude of the exodus and how the means of exit and obstacles against it changed over this period. The way in which the exiles were assisted at their immediate points of arrival is also covered, with special emphasis being placed upon the United States, Spain and Mexico, in this order. Specific attention is given to those Cubans who fled from the island (escapees) by unconventional or illegal means, describing their methods of escape, how their departures varied throughout this period, the obstacles encountered, and the assistance they received. The main sociodemographic characteristics of the exiles are analyzed by comparing the escapees and the total refugee population who left mostly by conventional means; both groups, in turn, are compared with the characteristics of the Cuban population as a whole.

Objectives

The specific objectives of this research were to:

- 1. Determine the conditions that necessitated this exodus.
- 2. Determine the magnitude of this emigration and how it changed over the years.

- Ascertain what happened to the legal migrants once they left their native land for another.
- Determine the pattern of both public and private help given to assist the refugees.
- 5. Ascertain the conditions surrounding the escapees, or illegal emigrants, and what happened to them.
- Determine the basic socio-demographic characteristics of the exiles and compare them with the Cuban population as a whole.

Research Questions and Hypotheses

The following research questions will help bring into sharper focus the objectives outlined above:

Which are the essential factors prompting the emigration from Cuba? What is the role played by the political and economic changes on the island in the decision to emigrate? What is the magnitude of the Cuban exodus and how did it vary over the years? Are there clearly identifiable stages in this migratory process? What exit procedures were required in order to leave the island and to what extent did the government hinder departures? Which were the main reception points immediately open to the departing Cubans and which were their ultimate settlement places? Which means were used by the escapees to leave the island? How has this escape flow varied through the years? To what deterrents were these illegal emigrants subjected? . How were they aided? Who are the legal and illegal Cuban emigrants-those using conventional and non-conventional means--in socio-demographic terms? How do these two groups contrast with their parent populations and as between themselves? Has their sociodemographic composition changed over time? Geographically speaking, how

representative are they of the Cuban population? What are the main implications of this migration phenomenon upon the revolutionary process? Can any inference be derived from the analysis of the exodus regarding the degree of acceptance by the people of the revolutionary phenomena?

Even though this study is mainly descriptive, the following hypotheses seem warranted:

- In the earlier years of the exodus Cuban exiles were mainly those from professional and related occupations while those who migrated at the later stages were principally from working class occupations.
- As a sector of the Cuban exodus, escapees are closer, in their overall demographic characteristics, to those of the parent Cuban population than are the total exiles as a unit.

Research Design

This sociological study of the Cuban exodus is essentially of a descriptive nature. It attempts to understand this migration process throughout a fifteen-year period and, in doing so, presents some tentative explanations of this phenomenon. This approach required the use of a variety of sources of data. Consequently, different analytical procedures were needed to accomplish the objectives stated earlier. Thus, methodologically speaking, this report might be considered a case study of a particular form of migration which originated from a political transformation, and analyzed in great depth and intensity from various angles.

The main research design employed was the survey method. It applied to both individuals who were personally interviewed, and to those on file at the Cuban Refugee Center. For each category a different sampling technique was used. Univariate and bivariate analyses were utilized to

interpret the data secured. Surveys of the literature were also used covering books, government records, journals and newspaper materials. These types of data were examined, relying heavily on content analysis. The combination of these two types of surveys were applied throughout this entire work, often simultaneously for a given objective. In order to present in a clearer way this varied methodology, its use will be described under the subdivisions of Survey of the Literature and Surveys of Individuals, showing how they applied to each of the objectives that were synthesized for practical purposes into:

- 1. Background information on Cuban social conditions.
- 2. Evolution and results of the exodus.
- Socio-demographic descriptions and comparisons of the refugees with the Cuban population.

Survey of the Literature

Among the more important secondary data surveyed were publications (or reports) of the Cuban Refugee Program, U.S. government publications, Hearings before the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate, the 1943, 1953 and the 1970 Cuban Censuses, journal articles, accounts, and hundreds of newspaper articles, especially those released by <u>The</u> <u>Miami Herald</u>, <u>The Miami News</u>, the <u>Diario Las Americas</u>, and clippings on file at The Miami Herald Library. Several books have also been published which bear upon the background of the Cuban revolution, and issues related thereto.

Other researchers, particularly at the University of Miami in Florida, and Stanford University, in California, have released substantial findings bearing upon the Cuban exodus. Official reports and publications by the Cuban Refugee Center (Program) cover in considerable detail records of

all refugees registered with the Center, and these records were referred to repeatedly. An official Cuban government pamphlet is a valuable source of data relating to the Bay of Pigs invasion and, consequently, to the early exodus. It lists, among other details, the names, places of birth and occupations of 1,151 invaders who were made prisoner after their defeat and capture in 1961, as well as the sentences imposed upon them.

Analytical procedures. Data pertaining to the background objectives were organized topically, classified into sub-topics, and recorded on cards for analysis. Historical data were organized to present a coherent sequence of events outlining changes in the revolutionary process. Data pertaining to social conditions were subjected to content analysis in which items relevant to the exodus were selected as units of analysis. Among these were forms of privilege, regimentation, oppression, and material deterioration. Instances of these occurrences noted throughout the books surveyed were classified under the above mentioned units of analysis. Special emphasis was given to the works of those writers who had extensive experience on the island, and to factual matters--not opinions---subject to verification.

The description of the evolution and results of the exodus were derived primarily from material published by the various agencies of the U.S. government dealing with the Cuban exodus, and articles in journals and newspapers. All of this material was reviewed and pertinent items were classified in the same manner as were the historical and social data in order to produce a dynamic picture of this portion of the exodus process. Special emphasis was given to material written by certain officials of the agencies and programs involved.

The analysis of the data pertaining to the description of the escape process deserves special mention. Since newspaper releases were a crucial source of information not yet explored, an extensive survey was conducted on this matter. Besides clippings on this matter collected by this researcher on an availability basis since 1965, a systematic survey was conducted at the library of The Miami Herald under the entry "Cuban arrivals to the U.S."; this entire file consisting of hundreds of clippings was scrutinized. Similarly, a survey was conducted on the available chronologies of Cuban events, the records of the U.S. Coast Guard since 1967, and the "clippings file" of the Cuban Refugee Program starting in 1961. A content analysis followed this survey having as main units of analysis date of event, type of escape, number of persons involved by sex and age breakdowns, point of arrival or rescue, and other relevant characteristics. Tallies were made on 11" x 17" recording sheets for each of these items (when available) from 1959 up through 1974. Partial summaries were also computed by year. In this way a fifteenyear picture of escape from Cuba emerged in a visual way.

The available characteristics of the members of the 2506 Brigade were studied in order to be considered as possible indicators of unknown attributes of the early exiles. Such traits as age, occupation, and place of birth were coded and punched on machine data cards and subjected to computerized univariate and bivariate analyses. An excellent profile was obtained from these analyses, although only one variable was ultimately utilized in our findings.

Surveys of Individuals

The need for primary data was vital in the analysis of the annual changes experienced by the exiles in their basic demographic characteristics

throughout the period of analysis. By the same token these data were crucial in the description of current aspects of Cuban social reality. Four different surveys were utilized to accomplish these objectives, as described below.

<u>Basic demographic survey</u>. A major demographic survey on both the total exiles and the escapees was the first one made. The data furnished early in 1971 for this purpose came primarily from an anonymous survey of 192,133 cases registered with the Cuban Refugee Emergency Center (CREC) on computerized records of heads of household or "principal applicants." In order to observe the annual variation of the characteristics of these two groups a systematic non-proportional sample was requested for each year from 1961 through 1970. The sample was designed to yield a 97 per cent degree of precision with 95 per cent reliability per year of registration. This means that 95 out of 100 times the true value will fall within the tolerated margin of error of \pm 3 per cent. A sample for the total exile and boat escapees was furnished to this researcher early in 1971 in the form of machine data cards.*

The sample initially requested was not identical in size to the one received from the Refugee Center. Table 1 shows the breakdown of the sample by year of arrival for the total exile population. The discrepancy between the requested and obtained sample was not as significant as it was for the boat arrivals. It should be pointed out that the sampling was actually based on the number of cases registered with the Refugee Center, rather than on the total number of individuals included in each family. Selection procedures were carried out in a systematic random

^{*}The general formula utilized and the description of its use is presented in APPENDIX A.

	Number of	Sample	Sample
Year	Registrants	Requested	Received
1961	41,375	671	645
1962	41,871	671	659
1963	8,062	629	627
1964	3,138	561	539
1965	3,516	607	611
1966	20,114	660	668
1967	18,222	658	672
1968	17,417	657	667
1969	21,336	661	666
197 0	17,082	656	656
	192,133	6,431	6,410

Table 1. Cuban Exodus Registrants at the Refugee Center Plus Study Sample by Year of Arrival.

fashion according to a predetermined interval that varied according to the size of the population per year.

Table 2 indicates the sampling breakdown for the arrivals of boat escapees furnished in 1971 and 1975. Since some boat cases had been incorporated with other existing "family nuclei"* the actual initial sample (1971) for this population was smaller than the one requested. Some years are thus more heavily represented than others. Nevertheless, Refugee Center authorities indicated that the sample was representative and picked in a systematic random fashion from the available cases on file. As a whole, it still represented a sizable 20 per cent sample of the entire escapee population. In spite of this deficiency it was considered sufficient for use as a sample for further analysis, although it did not fulfill the precision level initially desired. In order to update the sample of the 1971 boat escapees, an additional one was requested and

*A term used at the Refugee Center to depict a family unit.

	Number of	Sample	Sample
Year	Registrants	Requested	Received
1961	1,801	495	87
1962	2,274	525	119
1963	1,953	506	115
1964	1,521	471	292
1965	950	397	494
1966	1,036	411	399
1967	456	273	233
1968	547	303	186
1969	300	208	166
1970	247	_ a	113
1971	179	_	44
1972	65	-	38
1973	29		26
1974	20	-	7
	11,378		2,319

Table 2. Boat Escapee Registrants at the Refugee Center Plus Study Sample by Year of Arrival.

^aAll available cases were requested for these years.

furnished by CREC early in 1975 for the 1971-1974 period. At this time all the available cases on file were included. Thus, the total sample of the boat population covers all years from 1961 through 1974, as indicated in Table 2.

These two samples were subjected to bivariate analysis. All the available characteristics, either continuous or discrete, were crosstabulated with year of arrival using the corresponding SPSS (Statistical Package for Social Sciences) computer "canned" program. Due to its versatility, and since certain variables such as age of arrival to this country were calculated from birth dates, this computer package was well suited to handle the situation. Besides tables, the analysis also produced indicators of strength of association in the form of Chi Squares (X^2). Discrete data, such as age and education, were initially categorized in smaller intervals for computer analysis, being collapsed by hand in the final analytical stage. Histograms as well as trend curves were derived from all the resulting tables in order to better visualize possible comparisons and associations.

Survey on Cuban social conditions. Mainly in order to ascertain social conditions in Cuba related to the development of the exodus, a survey of arrivals in 1971 was conducted. A questionnaire was devised to elicit basic demographic data and to cover factual and objectively verifiable aspects of Cuban social conditions which were within the immediate grasp of the common citizen at the neighborhood level. The design of the questionnaire followed the methodological approach used by the Center for Russian Studies at Harvard University in the early 1950's, namely, Alex Inkeles and Raymond Bauer, The Soviet Citizen (New York: Atheneum, 1968), and was adapted to our study by extensive contact with refugee arrivals between July 1970 and March 1971. A tentative satisfactory estimation of their degree of objectivity was ascertained by comparing their responses to certain items with those given by observers with extensive experience on the island. Nevertheless, an "objectivity test" was designed and employed with our 1971 sample to empirically verify our initial informal estimation of the exile's objective perspective about social conditions in Cuba. (See APPENDIX B.)

Two pretests of the schedule designed for this study were made, resulting in a 178-variable questionnaire which could be administered in about forty-five minutes. As a result of these pretests, the decision to have it administered rather than self-administered was reached for practical reasons. What prompted this decision was the rather low educational attainment of many of the arriving refugees and the logistic problems posed by place and timing. In turn, the complete lack of funds

to pay interviewers presented another serious problem. Hence, there was no alternative but to rely on volunteers with some experience in surveys to interview the exiles. Four individuals with college training and some experience in interviewing were recruited. They were willing to cooperate in this effort on a voluntary basis. They were nevertheless trained and supervised in the use of the questionnaire under our direction.

The survey finally took place between April and May of 1971 after a delay to procure the necessary official authorizations. A total of 266 questionnaires were administered using the formal schedule plus fifty in-depth interviews covering more material with those cases that offered significant information. The subjects were selected on a random basis from the arrival lists of the two plane loads making the trip between Varadero and Miami five days a week. The ones chosen were mainly male heads of household, but some were housewives and students as principal applicants. Teams of two or three interviewers, including this researcher, were formed for the daily operation of the survey. Interviewers were individually introduced to the newly arrived refugee by . members of the voluntary agencies handling the case after he (or she) had been processed by both federal and state agencies. The voluntary cooperation of the refugee was requested by the interviewer who emphasized the non-governmental and academic nature of the study, as well as its completely anonymous nature. Excellent cooperation and rapport was normally established during the interview that took place within the refugee Reception Center, before he or she had established contact with relatives or friends in Miami, and while he or she still avaited the handling of the case by the voluntary agency.

Between May and June of 1971 the 266 questionnaires completed were coded, processed on machine data cards, and subjected to univariate analysis. Again the SPSS package was utilized to obtain the marginal results for the 178 variables. Of immediate concern was the analysis of the objectivity questions which were to be compiled in an objectivity index. (See APPENDIX B.) Tests of representativeness of the main demographic variables in the 1971 sample were also conducted.

Survey on arrivals from Spain. A major national research project, is still going on and entitled <u>Assimilation of Latin American Minorities in</u> <u>the United States</u>, under the direction of Dr. Alejandro Portes (University of Texas, Austin) and the sponsorship of HEW. It includes the study of assimilation patterns of Mexican and Cuban migrants into this country. Between 1973 and 1974 the Cuban portion of the study completed the interviewing on an availability basis, of 590 male heads of household who had arrived from Spain, using a formal schedule. Permission was granted to utilize in this dissertation portions of the data gathered. The demographic information collected for the 1974 arrivals was subjected to univariate analysis following the same computerized procedures described above for the 1971 survey.*

Other surveys. Unstructured in-depth interviews of particular interest were conducted with individuals arriving during the 1971 survey period. In many instances their responses were recorded on tape while in others only as notes. This approach was also used with refugees who had arrived at earlier time periods, especially when we tried to ascertain conditions surrounding departures in the early 1960's. Informal inter-

^{*}Only 351 of these, who arrived in 1974, were utilized as indicators for that year. They were selected from lists of arrival and interviewed by paid experienced interviewers.

views were conducted after 1971 (and up to April 1975) aimed at updating the findings from the surveys of the literature and the 1971 survey pertaining to Cuban social conditions. Content analysis was performed on these informal interviews following the main research areas contained in the 1971 questionnaire.

Furthermore, unstructured interviewing was conducted in a survey with persons whose expertise was connected with our subject matter. These ranged from officials of the Cuban Refugee Program to university professors. Their opinions and advice were always valuable in the refinement of our research design as well as in the analysis and interpretation of our data.

CHAPTER III

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

There is little literature covering the exodus from revolutionary Cuba analyzing the migration process as a whole. Most of what has been printed is on a fractional basis, covering only segments of that entire process. It would be practical then to analyze the literature covering the areas under scrutiny using the following subdivisions: background of the exodus, and characteristics of the exodus.

Background of the Exodus

To understand the factors prompting the exodus from revolutionary Cuba, one must bear in mind a historic as well as a social perspective. In the first, interest will center upon the sequence of events that led to the transformation of a humanistic revolution into a communistic one. It was this political transformation and the resulting change in the island's social conditions that made life unbearable for many. In this section we review the existing literature covering these two perspectives throughout a fifteen-year period, emphasizing those aspects which had a direct bearing upon the exodus.

The simplest description of the events that marked the change of the revolutionary process is contained in the available chronologies on the subject. Two are of particular importance: the one by Leovigildo Ruiz, and Cuba, the U.S. and Russia 1960-1963.

The chronologies of Cubań events by Leovigildo Ruiz constitute an important source of information for the exodus process as well as for its background. So far, he has published the volumes according to

four years: 1959, 1960, 1961 and 1967.¹ Data for these chronologies are based on Cuban as well as American news reports about events on the island and abroad as part of the revolutionary process. The role played by key political figures, mainly Fidel Castro, is made more evident. His gradual change in position is well evidenced by his own words and deeds. Other leaders are also presented when they made news headlines, often in a very revealing way. Thus, the radical change that gradually took place is clearly and factually observable on a daily basis. The record of political prisoners, executions and other forms of repression that appeared in the news are succinctly mentioned.

<u>Cuba, the U.S. and Russia 1960-1963</u> is a more synthesized yearly chronology assembled by main types of events occurring during those years as units rather than on a daily basis as in Ruiz's.² It is wider in the sense that it covers in more detail incidents in relation to Cuba taking place in the United States and Russia. As in Ruiz's works, this one does not acknowledge its immediate source of information, but on the other hand it provides more detail and greater coherence of flow since events of a similar nature are grouped as a unit.

Besides chronologies, histories are other important sources dealing with the revolutionary change that had an impact on the exodus process. Indeed the most complete work so far is the monumental and detailed account of more than two centuries of Cuban history, <u>Cuba, the Pursuit</u> <u>of Freedom</u>, by the British historian, Hugh Thomas. It covers objectively Cuban events up to 1970 with a level of documentation that makes it a vital source describing the major changes which occurred in that island. before and after 1959.³ A number of monographs on various aspects of

Cuban economy and society enrich even more this historical account, due to the unpublished material that this work included.

Although not intended as a historical analysis, Carmelo Mesa-Lago's most recent work, Cuba in the 1970's, brings valuable and highly documented information about the changes taking place on the island since 1970, which also had a bearing on the exodus. He summarized in a skillful way the entire fifteen years of revolutionary economic processes which are subdivided in five stages. These are 1959-1963 which feature the attempts to introduce the Soviet system; 1963-1966 where debate and experimentation were taking place with alternative systems; 1966-1970 which characterized the adoption of the Sino-Guevarist system; and finally 1970-1973 with the return to Pragmatism and the Soviet System. As in his edited previous major analysis, Revolutionary Change in Cuba, Mesa-Lago, probably the most outstanding scholar on Cuban affairs-to whom permission was denied recently to visit the island-analyzed changes on the island along the political, economic and social lines; in this earlier analysis, the period covered was 1959 to 1970.⁴ This work is a collection of essays by distinguished students of the revolutionary process, including others by the editor, especially one on labor conditions, a topic on which Mesa-Lago is an expert. The deterioration of labor conditions, mainly from the point of view of basic rights is clearly presented here. Secondary data were used primarily in all of these works.

An earlier work by a team of Cuban scholars which described the changes on the economic institutions up to 1963 was <u>Un Estudio Sobre Cuba</u>, covering Cuban economic history since mid-nineteenth century. A group of outstanding Cuban economists compiled this 1,703 page volume with vast documentation. It is very useful in understanding the initial

revolutionary transformations and how these may have adversely affected vast sectors of the population by showing contrasts with pre-revolutionary standards.

A good personal account of the crucial initial months of the revolutionary process was offered by Rufo Lopez Fresquet in his book My 14 Months with Castro.⁶ As Secretary of the Treasury, the author, a prestigious economist, had considerable insight about the subtle transformations that were being implemented. For example, the gradual elimination of those political figures not "yes men" for Castro. This was the case of the first post-Batista President, the former judge Manuel Urrutia, actually deposed by Castro through a T.V. "coup d'etat" on July 17, 1959. Lopez Fresquet also described in detail the elimination of other nondocile cabinet members, as well as the crucial one-in an onerous mannerof the anticommunist provincial military head Major Huber Matos. Through them, Castro was gradually assuming dictatorial power, leaning in the communist direction. Lopez Fresquet also presents facts about Cuban-American relations that are significant in understanding the interpretations of the revolutionary process. A good example of an unnecessary provocation to U.S. interests in Cuba was the case of the law proposed by Che Guevara imposing a 25 per cent tax on the gross value of minerals mined in Cuba and exported; it was aimed at making the American mining companies close their production. Furthermore, Castro's refusal to ask or receive any economic aid from the United States at the time of his trip to this country in April 1959, is another fact pointing to a planned confrontation with this country. "If the U.S. had helped Cuba, he could never have presented the American as an enemy of the revolution," said the former Treasury Minister.7

Other early works deserve mention concerning the description of events that led to the communist takeover of the island. Among these was Alberto Baeza Flores, a pioneer in the analysis of the Cuban revolution in his (1960) book <u>Las Cadenas Vienen de Lejos</u>.⁸ While of Chilean origin, he lived in Cuba for many years, which enabled him to gain great understanding in Cuban affairs. He traces in journalistic style the origins of the Communist takeover in Cuba to that party's struggle for power in Latin America as well as in the island.

Probably the best account and explanation of Castro's "conversion" to communism is presented in the works of Theodore Draper and Andrés Suárez. The former, an American writer, was a pioneer in the interpretation of the revolutionary phenomenon, who rejected in his two books, <u>Castro's Revolution: Myths and Realities</u> (1962) and <u>Castroism: Theory and Practice</u> (1965),⁹ the thesis that Castro was pushed into communism due to the inept American foreign policy. He exposes some myths and vital realities of Castro's revolution extraordinary ability to maneuver politically in a shrewd manner. The main bearing of these works on the exodus is the discussion of the fact that the transformation to the communist system was an imposition from the top, without real popular demand.

Andrés Suárez fundamentally shares Draper's line of thought in <u>Cuba</u>: <u>Castroism and Communism, 1959-1966</u>.¹⁰ Unlike Draper, he uses a thorough academic style with vast documentation. He adds that sheer pragmatism, aimed at the survival in power, determined the alliance with the communists, quite unpopular in the Cuban political arena. Thus Suárez emphasized, referring to Castro, "that we are not facing an extremist, but on the contrary, a consummate opportunist, gifted, it is true, with the audacity

and courage to act with the most exaggerated radicalism if this serves his purposes."¹¹ Suarez is aware of Castro's youth gangster-like background and detects similarities between his earlier conduct and the consumated opportunistic tactics used in his power consolidation. More than a true communist, that author feels that Cuba's "maximum leader" is actually a "castroist" who has intelligently taken advantage of the local "old communists" and the confrontation between the superpowers to permit his survival in power.

A review of the literature which describes the impact of the revolutionary transformation upon the Cuban population indicates that this subject has not been dealt with in a significant manner. Yet, one of the approaches followed in this study is well documented in <u>The Soviet</u> <u>Citizen</u> by Alex Inkeles and Raymond Bauer, one of the works resulting from the Harvard Project on the Soviet Social System, which was an initial source of inspiration for this research.¹² The writers relied upon post World War II Russian refugees in Western Europe to make descriptions of the multiple patterns of social life in that country after ascertaining the acceptable degree of objectivity of their informers. Hundreds of questionnaires and interviews were completed. The former included a "distortion" or objectivity scale along with a "flattery" scale to ascertain the reliability of the sample. A number of other books and monographs resulted from that research project of the early 1950's.

The lack of exposure to conditions similar to those experienced by the population is the main obstacle for this kind of work about conditions prevailing in Cuba. Nevertheless, two sympathizers who had made extensive visits to Cuba have written significant works pertinent to

conditions prompting the exodus. The most comprehensive is Rene Dumont's Is Cuba Socialist?¹³

Dumont's Socialist-Marxist background plus his extensive contact with the Cuban population as consultant to the Cuban government make him a highly reliable source about social conditions on the island. He is a French agronomist and visited Cuba four times, the last in 1969. He was and probably still is a sympathizer of the revolution. But these facts do not prevent Dumont from criticizing what he feels are serious mistakes that have affected quite adversely the majority of the Cuban population. He fundamentally questions the socialist nature of the Cuban revolutionary phenomenon in view of the extremely personalistic form of government exercised by Castro with no real popular participation. He said about this:

Traveling with Castro I sometimes had the impression that I was visiting Cuba with its owner, who was showing off its fields and pastures, its cows if not its men. The impression was not wholly erroneous, since Castro is in fact the overall manager of an enormous production enterprise, a role of which he is profoundly aware, as his speeches show.¹⁴

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In the final analysis Fidel Castro has confidence only in himself and is unable to delegate full responsibility. He remains the sole leader and feels that he has to see and fix everything by himself. . . . He wants to do everything by himself, and he has too many simultaneous ideas—every day and every moment—that he would like to put into action without examining the difficulties involved.¹⁵

This has resulted in gross mismanagement and innumerable economic disasters. As an example of this fact he points out that:

As early as 1926 the first soil studies made in Cuba had concluded that these black soils [Cauto Valley] were unsuitable for anything but pasture and rice paddies. They were finally converted into paddies after many errors that could easily have been avoided by consulting the experienced agronomists on hand, or more simply by asking the peasants.¹⁶

This has seriously hampered the standards of living of the Cuban people. Dumont witnessed with chagrin the unfair strict rationing, commenting

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that:

. . . these sacrifices, which have been going on since 1961, have become unbearable for the Cubans. [And reasons:] To what extent has the ruling group the right to impose its single-minded conception of the future--and to impose it in so disorganized manner that the results are further aggravated? The question seems especially fair when one observes that these leaders do not themselves live in austerity (as their Chinese counterparts). If there were true democratic participation in decision making, one could talk of voluntary sacrifices. But this does not appear to be the case.¹⁷

Castro's semifeudal and autocratic system of government not only generated unnecessary economic deprivation, but also an apparent "new class" which according to Dumont, enjoys visible and irritating privileges.

The delegation of power [for example] to those whom Castro trusts is rather feudal in nature. The Party is still suffused with that Spanish-American mentality which willingly conceded all powers to the leader, the Caudillo. Castro, "le grand seigneur," lives very comfortably; he understands that his aids have extensive needs, and he sometimes recompenses them in a lordly fashion. His faithful were recently given free Alfa Romeos [Luxury 1750]: a modern conception of the feudal grant, or a sort of socialist plus-value. In July 1969 it was said that there were six hundred of these cars in Cuba and that the man who drew up the list of recipients would be in a position to know who really held the reins of power that year. . . . But it is not just a matter of cars. There are also the beautiful villas [at] the magnificent Varadero Beach where [army] officers and their families vacation free of charge. . . . To all this must be added the sexual privileges of the "new class" and these are important in Cuba. . . . 18

This obviously has not gone unnoticed by Cubans who reacted through

absenteeism, negligence, theft, low productivity and

. . . the passive resistance of an increasing faction of the farming, rural and urban masses [which] seems to stem largely from a disappointment with this state of affairs which almost equals the wild enthusiasm of 1959-60 that had engendered such unprecedented hope.¹⁹

In turn, the regime resorted to greater repression in the form of increasing militarization of labor, and even of the educational system, in order to extract productivity from the masses. He saw how

. . . the Cuban population was more and more under the control of the Party and the army, and it became increasingly difficult to distinguish between the two groups since both wore uniforms and carried revolvers. $^{20}\,$

Cuban agriculture is certainly more and more militarized. From the beginnings of the agrarian reform, the army has played an essential role, and agriculture is now directed from a national command post--puesto de mando. All important jobs are entrusted to the army; all important enterprises are headed by a major, a captain or a first lieutenant.²¹

Like other previous cases of serious criticism, Castro dismissed Dumont by questioning his moral integrity as a CIA agent.

Karol's work, <u>Guerrillas in Power</u>, also published in 1970, reflects many of Dumont's viewpoints but he is more theoretical, and uses extensively his vast experience on Russia to compare it with the Cuban phenomenon.²²

The descriptions of Cuban social reality by this Polish writer, also of socialist background and sympathizer of the revolution with extensive residence on the island, are extremely important in understanding recent developments. Besides corroborating Dumont's findings, Karol adds some insights that he witnessed. Concerning militarism and repression Karol says that they "had ceased to be exceptional measures; they had apparently become a permanent remedy for curing the recalcitrance of certain strata or misconduct of a group of young people."²³ And he adds about the use of new police methods:

. . . prisoners are no longer beaten in police cells, but more subtle methods of psychological pressure are still in use, and not only against CIA agents. Thus prisoners are kept in tiny cells, prevented from sleeping, or prevented from communicating with their families.²⁴

Those within the elite have also suffered the nature of this police system:

I learned the full circumstances of the arrest, detention, and fifteen-year prison sentence of Gustavo Arcos, a Moncada veteran and a former ambassador to Belgium. Arcos was subjected to iniquitous police methods before sentenced for a crime that cannot possibly figure in the penal code: he was alleged to have said that Fidel was "crazy in the head" and to have sent part of his own earnings to emigre friends and relations. For

these "crimes" he now languishes in prison--a semi-invalid who has never recovered from the wounds he received during the Moncada attack, fighting at Fidel's side.²⁵

The people were deprived of the outlet permitted in Russia and China--of a small free legal market so they resorted to a huge illegal black market in order to survive, generating a double standard comparable to the one prevailing in the USSR. Karol saw housewives spending entire nights in line to get their meager rations. It was impossible to supplement their diets by eating at the restaurants available due to their exorbitant prices.

Another work that somewhat resembles Dumont's is Lowry Nelson's latest book on the island: <u>Cuba</u>, <u>The Measure of a Revolution</u>. Nelson had the advantage over Dumont of having extensive pre-Castro experience on Cuba through his research on the island for his 1950 <u>Rural Cuba</u>.²⁶ This was a landmark in the sociological analysis of Cuban society, even cited by Castro as inspiration to the revolution due to the criticisms as well as the suggestions to improve the island's conditions. In spite of that background, Nelson was not permitted to visit Cuba in order to evaluate the revolutionary change. Deprived of a first-hand impression, Nelson used secondary data including statistics released by the Cuban government as well as accounts of visitors to the island, and factual descriptions by recent Cuban refugee arrivals. This enabled him to present a highly factual picture of the entire Cuban social reality. Nelson's effort is enriched, though, by his contrasts with the conditions of prerevolutionary Cuba that he knew so well.

He thus feels that "the revolution should be measured by what development would have taken place without it. This factor is, of course, unknowable, but it should not be forgotten that an important pace of

development was under way in the 1950's."²⁷ He cites from reliable sources the advances of pre-Castro Cuba, and in this way he contradicts the myth often repeated that the revolution had to start from zero. His analysis of the various areas of social life pointed to the setbacks of Cuba's development, concluding that:

. . . it is a sad story, an unhappy story--unhappy for the more than 600,000 who left the country, were imprisoned, or served in labor camps. It is an unhappy story too for the people of the islands who have endured a decade of privation and hard labor and who have been fed on promises delayed of fulfillment.²⁸

Two other recent works which show in a lesser degree prevailing Cuban social conditions that had a possible impact on the exodus are Juan Arcocha's <u>Fidel Castro en Rompecabezas</u>, and Jorge Edward's <u>Persona</u> Non Grata.

Arcocha's 1973 book is a personal narrative in journalistic style centered on his relation with Fidel Castro.²⁹ It is particularly valuable due to his participation in the revolutionary government and his personal contact with the top elite. He confirms what Dumont and Karol said in general about social conditions, including privileges of the elite, citing concrete examples of the highly irritating and unfair use of their official positions which contrasted with the deprivation of the masses. He also coincides in the description of the popular reaction to this situation. In addition, he corroborates Karol's views on the ruthless role of the police, also citing the case of Gustavo Arcos, Castro's former companion at the Moncada attack. Arcocha confirms what was said by others in the sense that Castro's main concern is the preservation of power by all means; for that, his charismatic power has been one of his main tools, surrounding himself with "yes men" whom he likes to discard

at pleasure. Castro, he says, epitomizes his arbitrariness by paralleling the saying about General Motors and the U.S.: "what is good for him is good for Cuba." Finally, Arcocha does not see any possibility for a true democratic-socialistic Cuba--thathe advocates--with Castro in power. He concludes stating ironically that because of Fidel's negative doings, he is the "worst anticommunist on the island."

Jorge Edward's <u>Persona Non Grata</u> presents another valuable testimony of a writer and a sympathizer of the revolution who happened to have been the first Chilean diplomatic envoy from the socialist regime of the late president Salvador Allende.³⁰ Surprisingly, his four-month stay in Cuba (December 1970-March 1971) constituted an agonizing experience in which he had to face the close surveillance and two-faced hypocritical harassment by the Cuban government, mainly through its Internal Security Police. This treatment stemmed from his participation in the 1968 literary jury for the Cuban Casa de las Americas. His decision was not liked by the Cuban government, and he became a suspicious character. On top of this, his friendship with Cuban writers--not in good esteem either at the time of his arrival--reinforced even more that suspicion. All of this, plus his unfavorable reports to his government on Cuban conditions, made him an unofficial persona non grata with its painful consequences.

Furthermore, he shows how he himself and other diplomats were kept under surveillance by sophisticated electronic devices in an effort to know all their movements. The element of fear due to the feeling of always being spied upon experienced by his colleagues and by common citizens is clearly depicted in his work, as well as the main features of the unlimited power enjoyed by a totalitarian regime. And, as it usually happens with that kind of power, it is accompanied by unlimited

privileges. Concrete examples of these are cited, adding that total submission to Castro's will appears to be the most "healthy" attitude for anyone living in Cuba. He noticed that there were apparently two kinds of Cubans on the eyes of the regime: the <u>integrados</u> willing to always go along the government line, and the counter-revolutionary "worm" guided by the CIA.

Finally, a very important point transpires from this recent work: that the picture of the Cuban revolution is quite different when it is experienced by one living there, as opposed to the view of one seeing it as a tourist. Edwards learned that reality the hard way, by facing it himself during four months, but he also points to cases of other Chileans who went wholeheartedly to work for the revolution, ending by being completely disappointed after actually living on the island. They were then desperate to return to Chile, but some faced difficulties in doing so; in other cases they were expelled when their criticisms were interpreted as subversive. Unfortunately, Edwards says, most of those who left remained silent after their dramatic experiences. This situation contrasted in a significant way with the views of the Chileans then visiting the island as tourists or guests, always being guided to see a nice facade. They finally left the country with a rosy, but unreal, revolutionary picture on their minds. As a sign of last harassment, this diplomatic envoy was seated with the "worms" (the would-be exiles) in the plane in which he was leaving the country.

Ironically, one of the most adulatory books written about Castro and the Cubar revolution contains also one of the most significant clues about the kind of opposition that the Castro regime was experiencing. Lee Lockwood's 1967, <u>Castro's Cuba</u>, <u>Cuba's Fidel</u> presents a unique fact: a view of the social composition of the political prisoners.³¹ He was

allowed to visit a rehabilitation prison camp and all in there, he said, were of peasant background. This enables one to speculate about the composition of the entire political prison system and the degree of popularity of the regime.

In a number of reliable sources, some of the earlier works of the 1960's dealing with the negative revolutionary impact are examined. Among them was another product of the Cuban Economic Research Project of the University of Miami prepared by Carmelo Mesa-Lago and Roberto Hernandez Morales in 1963, <u>Labor Conditions in Communist Cuba</u>.³² This highly documented source describes in great detail, the conditions of oppression to which vast sectors of the labor sector were subject to as a result of the totalitarianization of the country. It shows clearly how most of the hard-earned social benefits enjoyed by the pre-Castro unions were eliminated, and to top it off, new burdens in terms of heavier taxation were imposed upon them. These were the initial steps of even higher degrees of controls and deprivation that were to come for the entire population, such as rationing and unpaid compulsory labor.

Another early work generated by the same group of researchers but emphasizing primarily the impact of the agrarian reform was <u>Cuba</u>: <u>Agriculture and Planning, 1963-1965</u>* prepared by Alberto Arredondo.³³ This was a scholarly analysis of that initial revolutionary milestone and its effects upon the population. Pertinent to the development of the exodus, this book related the severe rationing of food--lower than that allowed to the colonial slaves³⁴--to the chaos produced by the several agrarian reforms that were actually implemented since 1959. Also related to this process was the creation of the so-called "volunteer

^{*}Later published in Spanish by Alberto Arredondo as <u>Reforma Agraria</u>, <u>la Experiencia</u> Cubana (San Juan: Editorial San Juan, 1969).

labor" system which was supposed to solve the agricultural labor shortage generated by the reform, but served only to cause further economic or social disruption within the island. Its end product was greater discontent and frustration on the part of the population.

Paul Bethel's book, <u>The Losers</u>, published in 1969, contains a considerable amount of anecdotes about living conditions and episodes of the anti-Castro movement in the early 1960's, resulting from the negative impact of the revolution.³⁵ This eyewitness illustrates both the rebellious attitudes on the part of the people as well as the harsh repressive and often vindictive measures taken by the government in order to eliminate all opposition. This, of course, had a direct bearing upon the motivation to leave the country.

An important work centering on the analysis of the judicial system in early revolutionary Cuba was the 1962 report by the Commission of International Jurists of Geneva.³⁶ <u>El Imperio de la Ley en Cuba</u>, the Spanish version of this analysis, compiles the most flagrant violations to the legal codes prevailing on the island, using the testimonies of witnesses on the subject. This report gives evidence of violations to the basic human rights such as those of free press, education, property, association and political asylum, by summarizing the repressive system ranging from detention to various forms of torture, including thirty-year prison sentences and executions.

Characteristics of the Exodus

Our concern here is with those works dealing with the evolution of the exodus, the reception process of the exiles as they left the island, and their immediate settlement mainly in the United States.

The most comprehensive study of the Cuban exodus was conducted by Richard Fagen et al., Cubans in Exile: Disaffection and the Revolution, 1968.³⁷ This book contains the results of a 1962 survey of Cuban exiles in Miami, and aims mainly at explaining who they were and why they left at that time. They attempt to answer these questions through analyses of a systematic "roster sample" of 1,096 cases of employable refugees taken from the Cuban Refugee Center files and a smaller sample (for interviewing purposes) of 209 heads of household extracted also from those files. This example of political sociology seems to have been successful in answering those two crucial questions up to 1962. Their early demographic characteristics were updated with 1966 and 1967 cumulative data furnished by the Refugee Center, but this was not the case for the attitudinal variables for later arrivals and did not explain their decisions to leave. While the demographic analysis performed seems to be impeccable, it is interesting to point out how the boat escapees were not analyzed at all in spite of their sizable number by 1962. Furthermore, the conclusions derived from the attitudinal part of the study in relation to the revolution appear to be highly speculative. This detracts somewhat from an otherwise early excellent study on the exodus, which remains a major landmark in the study of this phenomenon.

Government publications are probably the best source of information concerning the evolution and immediate outcome of the Cuban exodus. Two congressional hearings are of significant importance in this respect. <u>The Cuban Refugee Problem</u> (1966) was an extensive three-part Senate hearing dealing with the entire refugee situation conducted a few months after the beginning of the Varadero-Miami airlift.³⁸ It contained descriptions of the development of the new refugee flow and

the entire processing of refugees in this country. It also included pertinent data about the magnitude of the exile movement into the United States, as well as testimonies from each of the directors of the major voluntary agencies handling the refugee flow, plus that of the director of the federal refugee program at the time, John F. Thomas. Information about the nature of the program being conducted was included, as well as details about costs. Parts 2 and 3 of this hearing dealt mostly with the refugee problems of New York and New Jersey, respectively. Testimonies from mayors of cities in these areas were also included as well as from political, civil and religious personalities; it also contained opinions from Cuban exiles themselves.

The report of another important hearing, <u>Cuba and the Caribbean</u>, shorter than earlier ones, was conducted in 1970 by the House of Representatives, reviewing to a great extent the Cuban refugee situation.³⁹ It dealt primarily with the status of the Cuban Refugee Program in its Airlift or Family Reunion stage. A number of very relevant tables concerning stages of arrival to the United States, plus demographic characteristics, such as age and occupation up to 1970, were included. Most of the information presented here was offered by the late director of the Cuban Refugee Program, Howard H. Palmatier. Refugee Program costs were reviewed as well as the status of airlift arrival lists. A few other Miami-based community personalities also testified on this occasion about the Refugee process. The text of two important documents affecting both the refugee flow as well as the entire Cuban situation were included. These were the "Memorandum of Understanding" between the Cuban and American governments regulating the Airlift and the 1962

"Joint Resolution of Congress" expressing the determination of the United States with respect to the situation in Cuba.

The Cuban Refugee Program itself is one of the most important sources of information concerning the entire exodus through their various publications. Their one-page Fact Sheet gave periodic cumulative information about the most important data concerning the entire refugee operation. It consisted primarily of demographic data such as number of registrations by agency, and resettlement account, as well as the breakdowns by occupation and age of those registering with the Refugee Center. On a less frequent basis and with a more limited circulation they also published periodically a detailed cumulative resettlement summary containing breakdowns by state and cities. Two periodic bulletins were also issued by this program: Resettlement-Recap and Oportunidades. These offered to the American public information concerning the evolution of the resettlement process as well as orientation to Cuban refugees concerning the program. They have also edited sporadic publications dealing with particular aspects of the program, such as Professional Manpower, Cuba's Children in Exile and Life Begins Anew. 40 No formal evaluation of the significant role played by the Cuban Refugee Program on the Cuban exodus process has yet been done.

The assistance given to the Cuban refugee children, a special section of the Refugee Program, was covered in detail by its pioneer, Msgr. Bryan O. Walsh. His article "Cuban Refugee Children" in the <u>Journal of Inter-</u><u>American Studies and World Affairs</u>, describes the origin and evolution of this humanitarian effort that helped more than ten thousand unaccompanied children sent by their parents to this country who feared for their fate if they should remain on the island.⁴¹

Another aspect of the Refugee Program was a Master's thesis which dealt with the unaccompanied woman who had registered with the Refugee Center. John Charles Mayer's <u>Women without Men</u>: <u>Selected Attitudes of</u> <u>Some Cuban Refugees</u>, studied 445 of 3,700 women so circumstanced.⁴² Their basic demographic characteristics were determined as well as their attitudes towards participation in a rehabilitation program of some form.

The former director of the Cuban Refugee Program, John F. Thomas, has been a frequent writer about various aspects of the exodus. His 1963 article "Cuban Refugee Program" describes the objectives of that program as well as its implementation, in the most comprehensive way. In his "U.S.A. as a Country of First Asylum" (1965), and "Cuban Refugees in the United States" (1967), he updates the 1963 article with additional information on the background of previous refugee migrations to the United States.⁴³ Those migrations had influenced to a great extent the format of the Cuban Refugee Program, making it a unique one in this country.

A government publication which has provided information on the Cuban exodus has been <u>I&N Reporter</u> of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. A brief but excellent article, "The Cuban Refugee" by Robert Woytych, Miami director of that government branch, offered a view of the evolution of the exodus.⁴⁴ It emphasized the role played by that department in this process, supplying also other valuable information and statistics for the entire migration up to 1967. Other issues of this periodical have offered statistics on Cuban arrivals to the United States.⁴⁵

A number of other works likewise cover the exodus process. The unpublished University of Miami Master's thesis by Laureano Batista, Political

<u>Sociology of the Cuban Exile, 1959-1968</u>, provides a good amount of detail about the development of this migration. In the first chapter the magnitude, stages and exit pattern were considered.⁴⁶ This serves as an introduction to the core of the study, the political culture of the exiles in the Miami area.

The 1967 University of Miami study on the impact of the Cubans on the Miami-Dade area dealt also with aid given to the refugees as well as with their demographic characteristics.⁴⁷ One chapter is devoted to the assistance received by the refugees in the United States, covering private as well as public sectors. It emphasized the latter through the Refugee Program, including a summary of the resettlement process. The demographic analysis, up to 1967, is based on secondary data from various official sources and covered such variables as age, sex, race, education and occupation. Over all, it is a landmark in the study of the impact of Cubans in the United States.

A large number of articles of the American press covered the 1965 boat exodus from Cuba authorized by the Cuban government as a result of Castro's free exit offer. This Dunkirk-like exodus was produced with exiles coming in boats from Florida in order to pick up their relatives from the Cuban fishing port of Camarioca. Mary Louis Wilkinson of <u>The</u> <u>Miami News</u>, ⁴⁸ Don Bohning from <u>The Miami Herald</u>, ⁴⁹ as well as Harvey Aronson of <u>Newsday⁵⁰</u> were the main journalists covering in detail this two-month unprecedented event. But the most comprehensive account of this episode is contained in the excellent article "Cuban Exodus" in the <u>U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings</u>, by Capt. William F. Cass, a U.S. Coast Guard Commander in Miami at the time. He was personally involved in the deterrent and rescue efforts conducted by the Coast Guard during those

weeks of difficult and intensive work.⁵¹ The role played by that military unit is emphasized but a number of insights to what occurred in Camarioca as well as within the Miami exile community are also presented. Along the same line, but in a shorter version, there is an article by H.R. Kaplan, "The Cuban Freedom Shuttle" in Navy.⁵²

The escapee sector of the Cuban exodus has been covered mostly by the Miami press through innumerable news releases and occasional journalistic accounts of this process. Some of these deserve special mention. Probably the first report mentioning the high death or failure rate concerning this type of exit was done in 1964 by Ian Glass of <u>The Miami News</u>. In this article it was pointed out how Cuba's northern coast had become a sort of "death or machine gun alley."⁵³ Carlos Martinez, a <u>Miami Herald</u> frequent reporter on the subject also emphasized that same point, also in 1964, presenting the case of a single survivor out of 18 who left from the Oriente Province.⁵⁴ Martinez plus several other reporters covered the worst tragedy in record for this type of exit when, in October 1966, a total of 44 refugees perished attempting to leave the island.⁵⁵ Al Burt, also from <u>The Miami Herald</u>, exposed at that time the occurrence of the clandestine ferry service operating for years to help Cubans flee their homeland in "They Come Silently through Dark Nights."⁵⁶

The late 1960's witnessed dramatic cases that were picked up by the press, such as the 1968 <u>Miami Herald</u> report "Autopsy Says Death Due to Dehydration," when a refugee was found dead on a raft.⁵⁷ Frank Soler and Roberto Fabricio also from this paper, frequently reported on the subject. One of the best reports of Soler was the description of the audacious 1971 rescue of their families from Cuba by two refugees. He also analyzed in 1970 the cut in the boat escapee flow in a short article, "Refugee

Boat Traffic from Cuba Down Sharply."⁵⁸ Fabricio, on the other hand, has been covering more recently the same topic for that newspaper. Among his reports, probably the most interesting has been the narration of another rescue operation in a long and daring voyage described with vivid overtones in "All We Wanted from God Was a Shove."⁵⁹ His in-depth accounts of escapees arriving in Grand Cayman, revealed significant aspects of their lives in Cuba and their motivations for leaving.

A few overall journalistic assessments of the escape process have been conducted throughout time. A major early summary of the escapee situation was written in 1964 by Jack Anderson in "Escape from Cuba" for The Miami Herald, emphasizing the dramatism of this escape route.⁶⁰ In 1965 this newspaper presented the same issue in the "Viewpoint" page article by Henry Taylor, "The Awful Arithmetic of the Small Boat Escapee from Cuba," where the role of the U.S. Coast Guard was also summarily described.⁶¹ Probably the best article in the Miami-Spanish press, covering this subject, was done in 1965 by Benjamin de la Vega, in his extensive report "6 Mil Cubanos Salvados por los Guardacostas de EE.UU." in the Diario Las Americas. Five years later, Evaristo Savon, from the same newspaper, had a similar view in "Rescatados 15 Fugitivos Cubanos por Guardacostas de EE.UU." Both articles offered annual breakdowns on boat arrivals.⁶² A more recent summary about boat arrivals was done by Robert D. Clark from the Herald in his article, "Airlift Off, More Cubans Expected to Take to Sea."63

Another congressional hearing, <u>Communist Threat to the United States</u> <u>through the Caribbean</u> (1970), contains good summarizing information on the escapees.⁶⁴ It presents statistics about this type of refugee as well as abundant photographic documentation of the escape means and rescue

instances. The dual role played by the U.S. Coast Guard in the straits of Florida is described including prevention raids on Cuba, and the rescue of fleeing refugees.

Leovigildo Ruiz's chronologies are also important in relation to the exodus, especially concerning the escapees.⁶⁵ In his four volumes there is a detailed systematic account of persons reaching the United States and other nations by using illegal means of departure from Cuba. He mentions the means used, ranging from boats, airplanes, stowing away in ships and/or defecting from them to rafts and escapees through the Guantanamo base. It also included attempts that failed but were recorded in the press.

Overall information on the escapees is offered in <u>Exilio</u>, a book by two journalists Jose Jorge Vila and Guillermo Zalamea Arenas.⁶⁶ They cover in journalistic style, various aspects of the Cuban exodus, especially dealing with its impact in Miami, underlining exile accomplishments. Elements of background to the exodus are contained in the book.

The Guantanamo escape route has normally not been very explicitly mentioned in the press. The famous January 1969 escape of more than eighty using a truck made national headlines. <u>The Miami Herald</u> had as a top front page headline "80 Escape from Cuba through Guantanamo," reported by William Montalbano, who later probed this route in his comprehensive article, "On Inner Tubes They Ride to Gitmo and Freedom."⁶⁷ The Spanish Press, mainly in the <u>Diario Las Americas</u> has also mentioned sporadically this avenue of escape in connection with isolated cases.

The only systematic analysis of the demographic characteristics of the Cuban boat-escapees was completed by this writer in two related works: "The Cuban Escapees," and "Selected Types of Cuban Exiles Used as a

Sample of the Cuban Population." An analysis was made of an anonymous sample of 500 boat escapee cases provided by the Cuban Refugee Center covering annual arrivals between 1961 and 1969.⁶⁸ The basic characteristics of the escapees were compared with those of the total exile population and the parent Cuban population. The demographic comparisons in this small sample showed great resemblance between the escapees and the parent Cuban population, being actually over-representative of Cuba's working class sector. The youthfulness of this group was also another significant and intriguing finding.

The exit from Cuba through Spain has been also covered by Roberto Fabricio. In a 1972 article series he exposed the problem of those exiles that were concentrating in Spain, often in desperate conditions.⁶⁹ An immigration restriction was actually discriminating against those refugees leaving the island this way, having to wait more than a year to obtain an American visa. This contrasted with those coming through the Varadero-Miami airlift who had no red-tape from the U.S. side to get into this country.

This means of exit was also covered in an excellent 1971 extensive article by Manuel Fernandez in "Aproximacion al Problema de los Exiliados Cubanos en España."⁷⁰ This study dealt with the situation of the Cubans in Spain, using survey data collected by the author. It enabled him to describe the characteristics of this type of refugee, his life there as well as his aspirations and problems. Fernandez also provides some overall statistics about this flow of Cubans through the years. Being a Cuban himself, with long residence in Spain, he enriched the survey findings with valuable personal insights about the problem. The only work located on the departure of exiles via Mexico was a 1965 article in The Miami

<u>Herald</u> by Jackie Paterson.⁷¹ She described the exit procedure and the obstacles faced in Cuba by the would-be exile.

This review of the literature pertinent to the Cuban exodus included the work of a variety of writers. Some of these writers had direct contact with the conditions on the island while others dealt solely with the migration flow. The chapter that follows, Socio-Historic Background of the Exodus, summarizes findings concerning background conditions prevailing on the island which are pertinent to the exodus, and includes other findings that were revealed in this study. The latter is based primarily on our survey of arriving refugees from 1959 up through 1974.

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CHAPTER IV

SOCIO-HISTORIC BACKGROUND OF THE EXODUS

The collapse of the regime headed by dictator Fulgencio Batista on January 1, 1959 opened a totally new era for Cuba. In the past, dating back to the first president of the republic, a long series of political frustrations--due mostly to inept leadership--had marked the Cuban political scene. This was accompanied as well by a history of various degrees of significant and often crucial American influence on the island. Yet, by the end of 1959, an exodus from revolutionary Cuba had started in huge proportions. This was indeed an unprecedented phenomenon in Cuban political history, since even during the harsh repression of colonial times, or during previous dictatorships after independence, Cubans went into exile in small numbers but did not leave their country in the massive way they did from 1959 onwards. Political leadership in Cuba and American influence on the island seem to have been crucial variables in determining the island's present and past history. An understanding of these factors provides a good explanation of the background of much of what preceded and to a great extent determined the course of the exodus.

From Discovery to Independence

After the discovery by Columbus in 1492, Cuba, as it was called by the Indians, experienced a very slow colonization. It remained a Spanish colony for more than four hundred years, until 1898, and was ruled by governors (capitan general) who were mainly military officers

appointed by Spain. Its beauty, fertile land, mild climate and strategic geographical position were not strong enough incentives for settlement by the early <u>conquistadores</u>. Yet by mid-eighteenth century, the island had been fairly well settled by whites, a few Indians survived, and thousands of Africans had been "imported" to do slave labor. Sugar, tobacco and cattle were the island's main sources of income. The city-harbor of Havana played a key role as a vital stop in the transportation system of the Spanish empire. This empire, as contrasted with the British, had imposed a highly centralized economic and political structure, allowing little independent trade and selfgovernment to the growing native (criollo) population.¹

The capture of Havana by the British in 1762 brought a relaxation of economic controls to the island, but very little in terms of <u>criollo</u> control of the government. By the early nineteenth century, Cuba began to develop its agriculture with great impetus. It took advantage of its suitability for sugar production and became the leading producer by 1820. By then, the increasingly powerful United States also began to exercise a larger economic role, mainly through trade. They were aware of Cuba's importance, geographically as well as economically, and this is why later in the century, key figures in the U.S. preferred to see Cuba either as Spanish or as an American possession. They disliked the idea of independence due to the risk of it falling into the hands of a third power.²

By the mid-nineteenth century the island had grown economically in spite of an excessive centralized administration. But the <u>criollos</u> saw this with concern, and, influenced by the independence of most other countries in the hemisphere, began to look toward similar goals.

The struggle for independence from Spain that ensued was the longest in America, comprising two wars: 1868-1878 which failed, and 1895-1898 which eventually led to independence. Leadership conflicts were the main reasons for the failure of the "ten-years war." After that, American economic influence became more important, especially in the sugar industry, and annexation to the U.S. constituted an issue for many Cubans. As a result of the "ten-years war" a substantial part of the <u>criollo</u> elite was ruined, and ceased to play a leading role. Meanwhile, Spanish stubbornness prevented the Cubans from exercising the autonomy cherished by many. This failure became a crucial reason for the final war which started in 1895, spurred by the unique leadership of the outstanding poet-writer, Jose Marti.³

The Spanish-American War (1898) interrupted and actually ended the Cuban War of Independence (1895-1898), constituting a crucial landmark in the history of American influence on the island. It is debatable whether the Cubans could have become independent without American intervention, due to internal dissentions and military weaknesses within the rebel forces, but it is a fact that they were prevented by the Americans from even being seated at the peace table. They were not allowed to enter the cities as victors and last but not least, American economic influence became increasingly important. Independence arrived in 1902, restricted by the Platt Amendment which gave the U.S. the right to physically intervene in Cuban affairs in various ways, a right which was exercised until 1934.⁴ United States tutelage seems to have played a negative influence, since it reinforced the immature political attitudes of Cuban leaders. Thus, reliance on the U.S. from the economic, political and military angles became an important thread crisscrossing

Cuban life up to the present time. In spite of that, a slow process of political maturation seems to have been painfully taking place following independence, interspersed by major failures and frustrations.

The Republican Frustrations and Hopes

Frustrations in leadership also came in various forms and degrees. The first Cuban president (and probably the most honest one, Don Tomas Estrada Palma) called for American intervention in 1906 to put down an uncontrollable uprising, which showed the inability of Cuban leaders to compromise at that time. Political corruption in the form of graft and bribery became prevalent -- imitating colonial vices -- but there were also efforts for improvement. Unfortunately though, many Cubans became used to the caudillo form of leadership, one which places too much hope and trust on single individuals. Thus, President Machado (1925-1933), who promised radical improvements, actually became a dictator after a rather constructive initial four-year term.⁵ A revolutionary period followed with considerable bloodshed, and flights into exile, but brought young new faces into the political arena, the so-called "1930 generation." Examples of the new leadership were Sergeant Batista, Dr. Grau-San Martin, and Prio Socarras, who were to play vital roles in the events which followed.

A brief revolutionary government took power on September 4, 1933, after Machado's overthrow in August, where American diplomacy played a key role. That new government was the result of an unusual "coup" combining non-commissioned officers and university students as allies. It enacted radical measures, evidently displeasing the U.S., which reacted by denying it diplomatic recognition. This prompted the fall of the revolutionary government headed by Grau-San Martin through

Batista's maneuvers. Batista, a man of very humble origin, became "colonel head of the army" after the 1933 coup, and the new military <u>caudillo</u>.⁶ After the overthrow of Grau-San Martin, he emerged as a "king maker" from Camp Columbia. The new Cuban government he sponsored immediately received the blessing of the U.S. which quickly granted it diplomatic recognition. Nevertheless, the Platt Amendment was officially abrogated in 1934 as a result of the pressure of the new Cuban government and the "new deal" policy of President Roosevelt. Meanwhile, Cuban leaders seem to have been learning how to reach significant compromises--a sign of greater maturity--when a constitutional assembly was duly convened later through a democratic process, and which produced the advanced Constitution of 1940. Presidential elections were subsequently held which Batista won against Grau-San Martin, and he was thereafter inaugurated as president.⁷

By 1952 the balance sheet for Cuba's accomplishments as a nation was a mixed one. On the economic side, the nation as a whole was enjoying one of the highest standards of living in Latin America. Indeed the preferential price paid by the U.S. for Cuban sugar was a factor here. But Cuban entrepreneurs had shown great ability in gaining control of Cuba's first industry and were rapidly diversifying the nation's economy.⁸ However, prosperity was not equally distributed and sharp contrasts existed between the urban and rural sectors. By then, a fast growing middle class indicated that the dichotomy of the rich versus the poor was not the main feature of Cuba's social class structure. Unfortunately though, the economic elite seemed to have been too concerned in the advancement of their interests and paid little attention in improving the political situation.

On the political side, it is true that three presidents had been elected (Batista, Grau-San Martin and Prio) through rather democratic elections. It is also true that a substantial amount of important legislation complementing the 1940 Constitution had been enacted by the Autentico governments that took over after Batista's term expired in 1944. He had democratically surrendered power, and there is no doubt that the popular vote was being respected by the new governments. But on the other hand, sinecures (botellas), graft, bribery, gangsterism and other forms of corruption were rather popular.⁹ This was so prevalent that the honest politician or high government official was often considered naive if not stupid. Again, there were efforts to improve this situation, and the Orthodoxo Party headed by a popular leader of the 1930 generation, Eduardo Chibas, aroused the hopes of many for radical improvement, and gained considerable support among the young, including a young ambitious lawyer named Fidel Castro Ruz.* Chibas' sudden death in 1951 could be considered an important set back in the change for the better. In the meantime, elections were scheduled for June 1, 1952, and the leading candidates (among which Batista was not included) were men of proven integrity that represented definite hopes for better government.¹⁰

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^{*}Fidel Castro Ruz received his elementary and secondary education with the Christian Brothers and the Jesuits. The son of a rich Spanish (Galician) immigrant and rapacious landowner, he was born out of wedlock along with his brothers and sisters which appears to have made a definite imprint on his personality. With a great urge to be outstanding, he joined the "action groups" (gangsters) at the University of Havana where he unsuccessfully ran for student government office. In 1950 he obtained a law degree being supported most of the time by his family, even after graduation. By the time of the ill-fated 1952 elections he was a candidate for the House of Representatives.

Castro's Road to Power

The ascent of Fidel Castro to power can be directly traced to the coup d'etat of March 10, 1952 by Fulgencio Batista. Then, suddenly, almost on the eve of the scheduled election, and most likely out of sheer ambition for power, Batista destroyed the constitutional order that he had helped to create, realizing that his chances for winning the presidency were negligible. The public in general, and especially the business leaders, reacted with apathy to a practically bloodless coup, opposed only by the university students.

The University of Havana became the main center of political opposition to the usurpers of power, and young blood began to be spilled in small spurts until a large group of young men led by Fidel Castro--a former minor leader at the university--attempted a bold assault on July 26, 1953, on Cuba's second largest military garrison. Many were killed in action and others assassinated, starting an increasing spiral of violence and bloodshed that eventually led to the collapse of the regime.¹¹ This event had further significance in that it brought the personality of Fidel Castro to national attention, constituting his first landmark on the road to power.

Castro's determined and shrewd leadership, along with the ineffectiveness of other anti-Batista leaders, made him the leading contender for power by 1958. In effect, after a twenty-year sentence and an ample amnesty by Batista roughly two years after his imprisonment, Castro left for Mexico determined to continue the armed struggle. From Mexico he sailed in an ill-prepared yacht with eighty-two men to launch a guerrilla movement, but suffered almost total defeat after an abortive landing in Oriente, Cuba's easternmost province. Meanwhile, the other

traditional political groups that followed the non-violent line against Batista were unable to bring about a compromise solution with the government. Other groups such as the Directorio Revolucionario also attempted the violent line as the political solution became unfeasible due to Batista's stubbornness, but with less success, although their efforts were perhaps not less daring than those of Castro. For example, they attacked the Presidential palace and opened another guerrilla front in the Escambray mountains in Central Cuba. After a successful initial recovery, Castro's guerrilla movement was again at the brink of collapsing due to a strong Army drive, but through the corrupt government officials and top military leaders who took bribes, the insurrection not only survived but grew to the point of actually constituting a real military threat. From a quixotic guerrilla leader, Castro assumed such national prominence by 1958 that he was able to dictate orders to the other anti-Batista leaders. His program was full of democratic ideals, promises of social justice with significant but not radical reforms. It also included many calls for brotherhood among the soldiers he was fighting, who were actually invited to join the revolutionary forces. On the other hand, most opposition leaders were so over-anxious to eliminate Batista, that they neglected to see a danger in Castro's gangster-like youth which indicated the presence of an over-ambitious man.¹²

By 1958 the revolutionary struggle could have continued for many months, but two events related with the participation of the American government in Cuban affairs sealed Batista's fate and opened Castro's door to power. First was the arms embargo in April 1958, by the American government which inevitably depressed even more the already-low military

morale. But more critical was the December petition for Batista's resignation from the American Ambassador.¹³ This, together with sound, but not fatal, military defeats in the field, prompted Batista to flee in the same surreptitious way in which he took power in 1952. Thus, in the early morning of New Year's Day, Cuba was free of a dictator-ship, but also had a tremendous power vacuum. Pretty soon Castro became aware of his charismatic power at mass meetings that he held as he moved across the island to the capital. He began to use this charisma to gain absolute supremacy of the combined revolutionary forces, thus filling the power vacuum left by Batista.

From Humanism to Totalitarianism

Few persons in Cuba in 1959 would have predicted that the humanistic revolution promised by the heroic leader, Fidel Castro, could have transformed that nation into a communistic one. Again, the current Cuban leadership together with long-established American influence and armed intervention on the island were going to play leading roles in determining the above-mentioned transformations and, consequently, promoting the exodus that ensued. It is difficult, for a non-participant in this experience of collective behavior to understand the how and why of that transformation. The charismatic quality possessed by Castro in high degree, was very difficult to comprehend unless one witnessed it, and it probably obscured other factors, including the above-mentioned American role.

It is our conviction, along with other writers, that Castro's real goal was essentially to establish dictatorial personal rule. The facts since then seem to corroborate this assertion. To accomplish his goal he had to maneuver in a superb way, which he did. Deceit was used in

a masterly way (Castro has not denied it), and he arranged new alliances which would help guarantee his survival in power, while leaders that were not absolutely loyal to him were eliminated especially when they could no longer be utilized. Furthermore, the masses of the population were manipulated in such a way that they could be controlled, even when they realized that deceit was taking place. Ultimately, an entire society had to be transformed to the point that the state was to become practically the sole property owner and the sole entrepreneur and no dissent was tolerated. The fact that Castro was able to accomplish all this in less than three years is a most remarkable feat that deserves an in-depth study in itself, one that is yet to be done.¹⁴

Indeed Fidel's--as he is called by the Cubans--charismatic appeal enabled him to gradually implement revolutionary reforms that had not been promised, and also to step-by-step replace those democratic leaders who served him (or "the revolution" or "the fatherland") in 1959. When doubts were raised about the highly questionable turn of events, many consoled themselves by thinking that "if Fidel really knew what was happening, he would change things" and others at higher socio-economic levels reasoned that "if this is communism, the Americans would not tolerate it ninety miles from their shores." Thus the faith in the <u>caudillo</u> and the "Plattist" mentality, mentioned earlier, operated jointly to enhance Castro's apparent goals.¹⁵

He conveniently claimed many times that he was not a communist, that elections would be held, and that the rights of everyone would be respected. Yet, by the end of 1959, the increasing crucial role of the communists in the government was becoming evident, elections were almost forgotten, and human rights were being violated, which ranged

from that of dissent to that of possession of legally acquired property. Furthermore, for one to protest that communist participation was unwarranted was tantamount to being considered "counter-revolutionary," the worst thing one could be in those days in Cuba in view of the sacredness of "the revolution."¹⁶ Military control had been the first element of power to be firmly secured. Control of mass organizations, such as the powerful labor and student unions, followed as did confiscation of legally acquired property and seizure of all communication media. Not only did Castro use charisma and deceit to consolidate his power, but he played upon the opportunism displayed by some, as well as the envy and past frustrations of individuals. Thus, by the end of 1960, most urban property of all types, as well as more than half of the rural land, was in the hands of the state in spite of Castro's claim that "it belonged to the people." Many of these, in turn, were then "opening their eyes"--as it used to be called--and tried to organize and fight back, but it appears that both inadequate American intervention and inept Cuban leadership made that attempt a late and futile one.1/

Cuban Opposition and American Intervention

Opposition to Castro was strong early in 1960. A number of organizations were created under the leadership mainly of disillusioned revolutionaries, drawing their membership from all social classes. None of these organizations dared to publicly challenge Castro inside Cuba, perhaps because its leaders felt that this was useless, since by mid-1960, when they were fully organized, all communication media were under government control. Some speculate about this period that if a solid front could then have been formed under competent leaders whose

reputation was unquestioned, Castro would not have been able to carry out his totalitarian plans.¹⁸ Perhaps also, the "Plattist" attitude discouraged the formation of a truly nationalistic front. But on the other hand, this attitude, under the rationale that "if it is supported by the United States it can not fail," promoted an exile front, the FRD (Frente Revolucionario Democratico), which became totally dependent upon U.S. help.¹⁹

Pro-democratic and anti-Castro groups became very active by mid-1960. However, they were polarized between those acting independently of the United States and those who were quite dependent on it. Meanwhile, uncoordinated uprisings against Castro were taking place throughout the island, mainly in the central region, in the former anti-Batista bulwark, the Escambray mountains. Even though the guerrillas there never posed a crucial threat to Castro, they were a cause of great concern to the government. Their strength lay in their coordinated activities with the urban underground which became increasingly effective through sabotage and other activities.²⁰

By late 1960 it was evident that Cuba was again ruled by another dictator whose ties with the Soviet Union and communism were evident. American property had been confiscated, almost in its entirety, along with the large holdings of nationals. This was intolerable to the United States, and action was taken to promote Castro's overthrow. The measures taken ranged from an economic embargo to the utilization of the growing exile population as well as the support of those clandestine movements that seemed fully trustworthy. Plans were initially set up to promote guerrilla warfare within the island, using the exiles, but later were changed for the launching of a full-fledged invasion

force also composed of exiles. This was to establish a strong beachhead and a provisional government which would promote an internal uprising and further outside help. The role of the CIA in these operations seems to have been well established; and it appears clear that this agency tried to control the entire anti-Castro movement which proved to be fatal to them in the long run.²¹

The failure of the American-sponsored invasion at the Bay of Pigs was probably the most important factor determining Castro's consolidation in power. The hoped-for success of the invasion, started on April 17, 1961 by the 2506 Brigade, was contingent upon the destruction of Castro's Air Force. This was to have been accomplished by Cuban pilots in exile who were to fake an uprising of the Castro regime's air force by using planes almost identical to theirs. This plan was exposed in its early stage and failed.

American military officers who trained the invasionary force knew that it was doomed before its landing, yet it was allowed to proceed in a senseless manner without vital air support. The exile-soldiers fought bravely, as did their enemies who suffered very heavy casualties. Many Cuban militia men, as well as peasants, living in the area wanted to join the 2506 Brigade but there were no weapons àvailable for them. Unbelievably, the underground was not alerted to the invasion and, consequently, was not only unable to help the invading force, but also its members became "sitting ducks" for Castro's repressive forces. Eventually, out of ammunition, the invaders retreated to the landing positions, then quickly dispersed through the swamps in vain attempts to escape encirclement by Castro's immensely superior forces.²²

Castro's sound victory quickly enhanced his position of leadership both nationally and abroad. It consolidated his regime, which at the time was being rocked by increasing sabotage and other forms of organized resistance, including isolated uprisings mainly in the Central provinces. It took Castro several more years to liquidate these bands of resisters, but the backbone of organized opposition within the island was then definitely broken.²³ Some observers speculate that Castro could have been overthrown from within had not the United States intervened, because he was unable to destroy the increasing opposition that was mounting before the invasion. Thus, by mid-1961, greater despair and frustration seized large numbers of Cubans who were disenchanted by the regime, and whose only hope lay in escape from the island as quickly as possible.

Socio-Political Patterns in Revolutionary Cuba

What follows is the description of the socio-political patterns in revolutionary Cuba that appear to be causally related to the development of the exodus. These patterns will describe factual conditions subject to verification by anyone making a living on the island. They are based on the accounts of those researchers who have had first-hand experiences in Cuba, as well as upon the descriptions of numerous refugees interviewed. The reliability of their responses was positively ascertained by this researcher by means of objectivity tests. (See APPENDIX B.) The socio-political patterns that were thus revealed throw light upon conditions prevailing in Cuba in the early 1970's. In turn, an understanding of these patterns helps to clarify the motivational aspects of the exodus.

As a result of the revolutionary measures introduced by Fidel Castro, Cuba was transformed into a typical totalitarian society. He went far

beyond the restrictions characterizing the usual Latin American dictatorship comprising not only political control by an oligarchy, but also the absolute control of the entire national economic system. Consequently, this imposed rigid controls over all individuals. These reached extremes that are difficult for anyone to comprehend who has not lived in a social environment under totalitarian control. Attention is herein focused upon the political structure, the economic conditions, the educational system, and the consequences of the transformations experienced by these institutions, mainly upon the social class structure of the island.

Political Structure

As a totalitarian state, Cuba is under the control of a one-party system under the firm command of Fidel Castro. No elections have been held for national, regional or local offices, nor even for officials of that party, the Cuban Communist Party (PCC).* Dissent through any means is not tolerated, while professional and workers' organizations are in practice only instruments of the state to promote productivity. At the individual and local level, the controls established late in 1960, not only continue in force, but have actually been tightened. Recent refugee arrivals reported the imposition of an internal travel restriction which requires a permit, the RD-3 card. What the individual sees and hears in the media is only the official voice, constantly demanding greater sacrifices for "the fatherland." The block vigilance committees (C.D.R.) created in 1960 still keep an eye on any suspicious movement and claim a huge membership in their ranks.

*Except in 1974 in an experimental basis in Matanzas province for local officials, and under the strict control of the Party.

Another characteristic of Cuba's political structure is the practical impossibility of remaining neutral. In fact, not being identified with the government through membership or participation in some of the mass organizations such as the C.D.R.'s, the militia, the Women's Federation, or doing "voluntary work," actually entails jeopardy of the individual's welfare. It seems as if the goal of the regime would be to extend the direct control of the individual to the point that even his free time could be managed. Furthermore, the feeling of being constantly watched is apparently so pervasive, not only for those suspected as dissenters, that a sense of fear and distrust is practically universal. But this in turn has enhanced the value of true friendship, which can procure what money can not. It seems, on the other hand, that the most efficient entity in Cuba's socio-political life is the repressive system exercised under the direction of the secret police (G-2 or Seguridad del Estado) which has managed to destroy all organized opposition through very sophisticated means copied from elsewhere. Concomitant with this, the price of deviation from the official line could be costly, ranging from short confinement to do forced labor in a camp-prison system (granjas), to long prison sentences, also entailing forced labor, and possible execution. The Economic Conditions

The goal of the Castro regime appears to be complete control of the entire economic structure of the nation. This has been practically accomplished in urban areas, and is quite advanced in the countryside where the small farms are gradually being eliminated through various forms of coercion. All of the remaining small private businesses and shops were confiscated after 1968. These included the excellent cooper-

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ative or mutualist medical system (privately run) that had long flourished throughout the island, giving service primarily to low and middle income populations. No legal market is permitted, which even the Russians and the Chinese have not completely eliminated. Thus private initiative has been officially suppressed.

Workers had to forego significant rights, such as overtime payments, the Christmas (<u>aguinaldo</u>) bonus--not to mention the elimination of Christmas as a national holiday after 1970--and the right to strike as well as other benefits of the pre-Castro era. Moreover, workers received greater deductions from their paychecks, were coerced into "voluntary work" in the countryside, and were constantly indoctrinated by the Party representative through tedious meetings, much of which continues to this day. Professionals and skilled workers were equally harassed and even invited to leave the island when they were told that the revolution preferred an "incompetent revolutionary" to a competent non-revolutionary. Many followed that advice. Of record is that half the nation's 6,000 physicians refused to work under the totalitarian Castro regime and emigrated.²⁴

The resulting system comprises inefficient management, paired with lack of incentives and chronic absenteeism by the workers. This brought a sharp decline in the availability of food, which in turn forced the government to impose, in 1962, a severe rationing system never before witnessed on the island which even included sugar.* Rationing appears to some foreign observers to be equitably administered but this is not the case. Actually, the amount of hardship entailed by rationing is not immediately visible, as measured by the small quantity of food allowed per person. It is the hassle involved in actually getting what

*See APPENDIX C.

one is allocated that makes the system a harsh one through long, unending queueing.²⁵ It is the opinion of some refugees that this situation could also be a policy deliberately created by the government. This observation is based on the assumption that if people are kept constantly worried about obtaining the essentials for family survival they will not have time for subversive activities.

To bypass some of the rationing problems, a black market has developed. Initially it functioned on a barter basis at a time when the value of money plummeted due to extreme scarcities of consumer goods. Food was bartered for clothing or other goods. More recently, the government made more consumer products available but at exorbitant prices, apparently to drain away any excess currency that may be in circulation. Even badly needed appliances cannot be freely purchased. One has to "earn the right" to buy them through a "merit system" that, in fact, generated a new form of privilege to be described later.

The Educational System

In spite of the government's claim to great improvements in education, it seems that quantitatively this may be true, but qualitatively it is not. The educational system can be considered one of the most powerful means for the control of the young. It came into governmental hands after the confiscation of private schools. Besides being a pervasive element of indoctrination, the school system is being gradually transformed into another device to enhance material production. Students above the sixth grade toil in the agricultural fields for various periods of time. Recently the entire secondary school system was transferred to the countryside so that pupils could work in the fields for at least half a day, thereby being totally separated from their parents. This

situation could help explain the high rate of drop-outs from schools, as government statistics show.²⁶ But this system also weakens parental authority over children which, along with the often prolonged separation of the spouses due to "volunteer" agricultural work, has resulted in the increasing deterioration of the family structure, as evidenced by mounting divorce rates.²⁷

Although everyone is encouraged to secure secondary education, the same encouragement does not apply to the university level. Today, higher education is <u>de facto</u>, limited to those whose loyalty to the regime is beyond doubt. Various screening mechanisms operate in such a way that the opportunities for securing a college education for one who is not "integrated" into the revolution are practically nil. For him, or her, in this category, it will most likely result in a menial job, regardless of talent. In most cases, a male will be drafted into the military service (SMO), another effective and harsh means of control, where essentially the draftees will be exploited in extensive agricultural work during three long years.²⁸

Change in the Social Class Structure

One of the most dramatic results of the Cuban revolutionary process was the actual creation of a "new class," in spite of the equalitarian claim made by the regime which proclaims that "now all resources belong to the people." In the opinion of some who have lived on the island, Cuba has actually "regressed" socially by the practical elimination of the growing pre-Castro middle class who contributed decisively to Batista's overthrow. They distinguish between the new rulers called <u>mayimbes</u> or <u>pinchos</u>, and those who must obey, the people. The two essential qualifications for high privilege are allegiance to the

top political elite and being at the right place in the governmental hierarchy. For those at the top, privilege includes de facto exclusion from the rationing system, an Alpha Romeo 1750 or some other type of car, the ability to buy from well-stocked diplomatic corps stores or even from abroad. They also have the easy enjoyment (no queueing) of recreational and health facilities, and the best education available for their children. No housing problems bother them as with the rest of the population, to whom all kinds of shortages are commonplace. For the common people, ten to twelve persons are often crowded into one housing unit. Concurrently, they are faced with progressive deterioration and decay of buildings because of lack of materials, all of which are controlled by the government. Yet, the "elite" live in some of the best custom built housing or in dwellings formerly occupied by the wealthy. They also enjoy the best "villas" at the former fashionable resort in Varadero Beach. Privileges of this type decline sharply as one moves down to intermediate governmental or party levels, and even more for those within the lower echelons of "integration" to the regime.²⁹

The people have not reacted passively to these conditions, and those who have not submitted completely may use passive resistance in various ways. Among these are chronic absenteeism from work, so common that the government had to pass an "Anti-Vagrancy Law" in 1971 to force the people to work. Apathy runs parallel to absenteeism, together with deliberate or unconscious negligence at work. These, with mismanagement produced by the huge careless bureaucracy, appears to have resulted in huge economic waste. Examples are the rusting of almost new equipment, a visible fact throughout the island. A little bit of init-

iative, incentive and imagination could have made this equipment very productive. Last, but not least, a sense of frustration appears to have developed after 1960. This resulted from the above-mentioned conditions which were substantially magnified after the failure of the "ten-million-ton-sugar-harvest" in 1970.³⁰

The preceding description presented an outline of the factual conditions that were considered to have been causally related to the development of the exodus. We may now conclude that, macro-socially, the main motivational factor promoting the exodus was primarily of a political nature. It was the totalitarian political transformation that brought about the radical change from freedom of enterprise in the economic structure of the nation to "state capitalism." This resulted in a material deterioration and a degree of individual control never before seen on the island. Thus, the combination of these two factors, the political and the economic, impinged upon individual decisions to leave Cuba.

From the facts in hand, we may surmise that the above-mentioned sense of frustration became unbearable, due to the lack of hope for change in those conditions which appeared irrational and unnecessary. Hence, thousands individually made the decision to leave the country in spite of the extremely difficult obstacles raised by the regime to forestall migration. Of course, the "open door" policy followed by the United States was a factor that cannot be ignored in analyzing $v^{[1]}$ the causes for exodus, and this receives attention later on.

In the pages that follow, research data will be presented giving the numbers of Cuban people exiled, the years and their means of flight, how they were processed and resettled mainly in the United States, and

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- For a detailed account on the issues of political and economic 1. centralization see Ramiro Guerra y Sanchez et al., Historia de la Nacion Cubana III (La Habana: Editorial Historia de la Nacion Cubana, S.A., 1952), pp. 3-152. A brief description appears in Jaime Suchlicki, Cuba: From Columbus to Castro (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1974), pp. 76-78, and Howard I. Blutstein et al., Area Handbook for Cuba (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971), pp. 23 and 26. The negative impact of the colonial regime on the republic is analyzed by Emilio Roig de Leuchsenring in Males y Vicios de Cuba Republicana Sus Causas y Remedios (La Habana: Oficina del Historiador de la Ciudad de la Habana, 1959), and by Emeterio S. Santovenia and Raul Shelton Ovich, Cuba y su Historia III (Miami: Rema Press, 1965), pp. 214, 330, and 414. See also Boris Goldenberg, The Cuban Revolution and Latin America (New York: F.A. Praeger, 1965), p. 101.
- The United States attempted to buy Cuba five times. See Ramiro Guerra y Sanchez, La Expansion Territorial de los Estados Unidos (La Habana: Cultural S.A., 1935), pp. 131-364 and Hugh Thomas, <u>Cuba: The Pursuit of Freedom</u> (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1971), pp. 206-233.
- 3. See Guerra et al., <u>Historia</u> V on the Ten Year's War; for the leadership role of Marti see Vol. VI, pp. 119-181, and for the War of Independence, pp. 185-231. See also Thomas, <u>Cuba</u>, pp. 245-270, 293-309, and 316-338 for the same topics. A brief and recent account of the Wars of Independence appears in Suchlicki, <u>From Columbus to</u> <u>Castro</u>, pp. 63-99.
- 4. Guerra et al., discuss how the Platt Amendment was imposed in <u>Historia</u> VII, pp. 105-113. The implications of that amendment, especially in connection with the attitude developed, the "Plattist mentality," is concisely discussed by Suchlicki, <u>From Columbus to Castro</u>, pp. 103-114, and Blutstein et al., <u>Area Handbook</u>, pp. 36-45 emphasizing the economic impact of the amendment.
- 5. For the government of Estrada Palma and the second American intervention, see Thomas, <u>Cuba</u>, pp. 471-493. Other Cuban rulers are also discussed by this author devoting four chapters to the Machado regime, legally elected for 1925-1929, pp. 564-625 describing in detail the role of American diplomacy in this process.
- 6. The emergence of "the 1930 generation" and its role is discussed in detail by Luis E. Aguilar Leon, <u>Cuba 1933 - Prologue to Revolution</u> (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972). Thomas, <u>Cuba</u>, pp. 634-688, covers in detail the entrance of Batista to Cuba's political life as well as the revolutionary government that ensued and its elimination. See also Suchlicki, <u>From Columbus to Castro</u>, pp. 115-130 for a shorter version of this period.

- 7. The Cuban governments from 1934 through 1940 are described by Thomas, <u>Cuba</u>, pp. 691-705. He also covers in detail the 1940 Constitutional Assembly, pp. 716-723, and Batista's presidency is covered in pp. 724-736. Blutstein et al., <u>Area Handbook</u>, pp. 46-48, covers briefly the 1934-1944 period controlled by Batista.
- 8. Cuba's accomplishments by the 1950's compared with the situation in Latin America are discussed in detail in Grupo Cubano de Investigaciones Economicas, <u>Un Estudio Sobre Cuba</u> (Coral Gables: University of Miami Press, 1963), pp. 829-848, 898-906, and 1144-1150. Lowry Nelson briefly summarized the island's accomplishments of those years, underlining the growing control of the sugar industry by the Cubans, in <u>Cuba</u>, <u>The Measure of a Revolution</u> (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1972), pp. 44-49. He dismisses the widely held idea that Cuba was a backward country using reliable sources on this matter. See also Mario Lazo, <u>Dagger in the Heart:</u> <u>American Policy Failures in Cuba</u> (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1968), pp. 94-108; Goldenberg, <u>The Cuban Revolution</u>, pp. 120-126; and Suchlicki, From Columbus to Castro, pp. 149-152.
- 9. See Hugh Thomas, <u>Cuba</u>, pp. 737-786, for a description of the Grau San Martin and Prio governments. Eduardo Suarez-Rivas, a former minister in Prio's government summarized their legislative accomplishments in <u>Un Pueblo Crucificado</u> (Coral Gables: Service Offset Printers of Miami, 1964), pp. 236-242, as well as other aspects of that government. See also Blutstein et al., <u>Area Handbook</u>, pp. 48-50, for a brief summary of the 1944-1952 period.
- 10. See Thomas, Cuba, p. 772 and Suchlicki, From Columbus to Castro, p. 149.

- 11. For a detailed description of the Moncada attack, see Thomas, <u>Cuba</u>, pp. 824-844.
- 12. Castro's successful guerrilla warfare was due mostly to the inept use of the armed forces and brutal repression by Batista, which combined with the corruption of its officials and Castro's able use of propaganda and bribery constituted the key elements of his success. See Thomas, Cuba, pp. 1037-1047. Jose Suarez-Nuñez presents multiple aspects of this corruption in El Gran Culpable (Caracas: Publisher not listed, 1963). Fortunately for Castro, the military attempts of other anti-Batista forces were unsuccessful. American newsmen made a significant impact in the presentation of Castro as a formidable guerrilla force. An initial interview by Herbert Matthews of The New York Times gave him world prominence. The influential Cuban Bohemia contributed likewise within Cuba when the press was not censored. Thomas, Cuba, pp. 1038-1039, quotes "Che" Guevara on this matter: "The presence of a foreign journalist, American for preference was more important for us than a military victory."
- About the arms embargo, see Thomas, <u>Cuba</u>, pp. 974-987, and about the petition of Batista's resignation by the American ambassador, see <u>Ibid</u>., p. 1019. About the collapse of the Batista regime, see <u>Ibid</u>., pp. 1005-1036.

- 14. Castro's skillful use of charisma is very well depicted by Thomas: "Castro's hold over the Cubans was established within a few days of Batista's flight to such an extent that, while before 1 January he had only a handful of followers, within weeks many thousands believe that he could do no wrong. He was their liberator, not merely from Batista, but from all old evils. Mothers of men who had died in the struggle trooped to see him. Occasionally after years of struggle and disappointment, and for many reasons, people decided to place their collective will-power in the hands of a single man. Ever since the death of Marti, the Cubans had been searching for such an individual. Now they believed they had found one." Thomas, Cuba, p. 1038. See also on Castro's charisma, Juan Arcocha, Fidel Castro en Rompecabezas (Madrid: Ediciones Erre, S.L., 1973), pp. 18-24. For Castro's relations with the Cuban Communists and the Soviet Union, see Suarez, Castroism and Communism.
- 15. These two attitudes were very prevalent in Cuba, and were witnessed by the author on multiple occasions.
- 16. See Goldenberg, The Cuban Revolution, p. 201.
- 17. For a good description of this totalitarian process, see Goldenberg, The Cuban Revolution, pp. 201-213, and Thomas, Cuba, pp. 1255-1311. According to Julio E. Nuñez, in a very interesting article about the role of the elite in Latin America, the Cuban tragedy, far from being a revolution of the masses was a treason of the elite who had generated material abundance, but decayed morally and spiritually. He blames the Cuban elite for not being able to form a cohesive front against Batista, Life (Spanish edition), March 18, 1963, pp. 20-22. Gustavo Pitaluga, a Spanish physician living in Cuba summarily depicted in the 1950's the need for an active role of the elite in the promotion of the common good. He stated: "What Cuba lacks a capable leading class. Capable in the most complex sense is of this term: capable of thinking, feeling and acting; a select minority, honest, cultivated and decided." Gustavo Pitaluga, Dialogos Sobre el Destino (Miami: Mnemosyne Publishing, Inc., 1969), pp. 301-2.
- 18. This was stated to this writer by several underground leaders who witnessed that situation, and who later were imprisoned after the Bay of Pigs fiasco.
- 19. Very little has been written on this subject. Again the author witnessed this mentality among exiles.
- 20. For a look at the magnitude of the anti-Castro guerrilla activity, see Thomas, <u>Cuba</u>, p. 1471. He quotes official figures stating that between 2,000 to 4,000 of them had been killed by the army who lost between 295 to 500 soldiers. Very little is also known about this guerrilla activity that apparently lasted several years.
- 21. See Thomas, Cuba, pp. 1355-1371.

- <u>Ibid.</u> and Haynes Johnson, <u>The Bay of Pigs</u> (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1964).
- 23. See Suchlicki, From Columbus to Castro, p. 187.
- 24. Our information on the emigration of physicians is based on the memo to this author by Dr. Enrique Huertas, president of the Association of Cuban Doctors in Exile, 1973. Dumont, <u>Is Cuba Socialist</u>?, p. 53, quoted Castro in 1965 saying that "It was better to have a revolutionary with no technical competence than someone with technical competence who was not revolutionary."
- 25. See Dumont, <u>Is Cuba Socialist?</u>, pp. 58-9, and Karol, <u>Guerrillas in</u> Power, p. 428-9.
- 26. See Lowry Nelson, Cuba, pp. 140-4, about the drop-out rate.
- 27. Ibid., p. 154. The divorce rate appears to have tripled since 1958.
- 28. This is based on multiple testimonies of young men who had fled on rafts to evade that kind of service which started in 1963. See Blutstein et al., Area Handbook, p. 439.
- 29. On the issue of privileges, see Thomas, <u>Cuba</u>, p. 1424; Dumont, <u>Is Cuba Socialist?</u>, pp. 60, 70-1, 98, 106, 127-8, 203-4; Arcocha, <u>Fidel Castro</u>, pp. 72, 74, 108-116; and Edwards, <u>Persona Non Grata</u>, pp. 81, 113, 118, 234.
- 30. As an example of this pattern of frustration, psychiatrists who arrived in exile after the failure of that harvest in 1970 stated that a large number of their patients were then among the <u>integrados</u> or those identified with the revolution.

CHAPTER V

THE EXODUS IN PROCESS

The 1959 Cuban revolution generated the largest politically motivated migration ever witnessed by the Western hemisphere. Since then, around 700,000 Cubans have fled their homeland, according to reliable estimates. Most of this exodus was oriented toward the United States as its terminal point, but other countries received significant numbers of refugees. Students of this socio-political event have depicted it as a multi-stage phenomenon. These stages seem to be closely related to continuing events that took place on the island. Each of the stages identified are also distinctive due to the variation in the numbers of individuals leaving the island over the years, and in the hindering circumstances surrounding their departure, among other things. This chapter is an accounting of the number of exiles leaving Cuba, followed by a brief description of each migration stage, with attention also focused upon the means of exit and procedures for departure.

The Number of Exiles

It was a difficult task to determine with precision the number of persons that emigrated or fled from Cuba between 1959 and 1974. This was due to the apparent degree of unreliability of Cuban statistics dealing not only with emigration, but also with other matters of national interest.¹ Thus, we relied primarily upon U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service records concerning entries of Cubans into this country to estimate within reasonable limits the numerical size of the exodus. In addition, estimates made by the U.S. Census Bureau in 1970 on this

matter were also utilized. From that year on, the same estimation procedure utilized by the Census Bureau was employed for developing the figures up to 1974 with some variations. Nine per cent was selectively added to the number of entries to the United States to account for those who emigrated to other countries.² Thus a total estimate of 717,000 net emigrants from Cuba was reached (Table 3).

Table 3 also shows the official breakdown of Cuban entries into the United States by immigration status and calendar year. For the fifteenyear period under analysis, the total number of Cubans who entered this country reached 640,237. The following entry statuses were used:

-<u>Non-immigrants</u>, who entered as tourists, mainly between 1959 and 1961.

-<u>Parolees</u>, those who entered mainly after 1965 using a "visa waiver," a special entry permit that allowed them to work under a provision specified in the Immigration and Nationality Act.

-Immigrants or permanent residents, who besides being able to work,

were also entitled to eventually apply for American citizenship. A total of 64.2 per cent of the arrivals came under the parole system, while those entering as immigrants or residents comprised the smallest proportion (13.9 per cent). The non-immigrant status was the predominant form of entry through 1960, but sharply declined thereafter. Since then, the number of non-immigrants remained at a par with the immigrants, probably due to entries as tourists (non-immigrants) who later requested the "parolee" status, as was done during the early years of the exodus.

Comparatively, the relevance of the Cuban exodus can be further clarified when its magnitude is contrasted with the total Cuban population and other immigrations to the United States. Since the estimated net

<u></u>	Estimated Entries to the United States				
Year	Cuba's Net Migration	Parolees ^a	Non Immigrants	Immigrants ^b	Total
1959	64,000	4	56,100	6,700	62,800
1960	62,000	1,690	46,537	12,554	60,781
1961	67,000	25,170	18,891	6,796	50,857
1962	75,000 as	7. 64,761	3,093	5,778	73,632
1963	31,000	8,027	884	6,624	15,535
1964	17,000 49	3,227	769	11,049	15,045
1965	33,000	9,628	890	14,848	25,366
1966	65,000	46,451	865	8,106	55,422
1967	55,080	45,853	958	2,945	49,756
1968	54,000	44,040	1,049	5,093	50,182
1969	53,000	45,659	1,168	2,588	49,415
1970	53,000	45,297	1,648	2,275	49,220
1971	47,000	39,878	2,231	1,214	43,323
1972	12,000	7,972	1,826	1,691	11,489
1973	12,000 ₃₈₁	8,567	1,691	1,050	11,308
1974	17,000	_14,811	1,295	nggi min	16,106
Total	717,000	411,031	139,895	89,311	640,237

Table 3. Number of Cubans Entering the United States According to U.S. Immigration Categories, and Estimation of Cuba's Emigration, 1959-1974

Figures on entries to the United States were supplied to this author by James F. Greene, Deputy Commissioner, U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service.

^anot reported prior to October 1, 1960 ^bInitial admissions only. Adjustments under Act of November 2, 1966 are not included. emigration from Cuba can be placed at 717,000 it represents 12 per cent of the Cuban population in 1953, and 8.1 per cent of that of 1970.* During the 1960 decade the number of exiles who entered the United States was second only to the registered immigrants from Mexico, but was the first in terms of growth rates experienced by the foreign born during that same period.

Stages of the Exodus

Four stages in the Cuban exodus are identifiable by examining the proportion of Cubans leaving the island in each of the above-mentioned periods, as Table 4 shows. The 1962 Missile Crisis terminated the first

Table 4. Number and Proportion of Cubans Entering the United States in Each Stage of the Exodus

Stages	<u>Number</u> a	Per Cent of Total
First Stage (I)		
Early Departures		
January 1, 1959 - October 22, 1962	248,070	38.8
		•
Second Stage (II)		
Post Missíle Crisis Lull		
October 22, 1962 - September 28, 1965	55,916	8.7
Third Stage (III)		
Family Reunion Period		
September 28, 1965 - December 31, 1971	297,318	46.4
Example Change (TV)		
Fourth Stage (IV)		
Wane of the Exodus		
January 1972 - December 1974	38,903	6.1
	640,207	100.0

^aThe numbers in each stage do not correspond exactly to the dates limiting each period. The figures correspond to the calendar years as they appear in Table 3. For the First Stage the numbers run through December 1962; for the Second from January 1963 through December 1965; and the Third from January 1966 through December 1971. The Fourth runs as in the table.

*The Cuban population according to the 1953 Census was placed at 5,829,029; the 1970 Census yielded a total of 8,553,395 persons.

stage of the exodus. The Post Missile Crisis Lull followed, and ended in September 1965. At that time, Castro offered unrestricted emigration, starting the third stage. This stage, The Family Reunion Period, included both the boat exodus from Camarioca (Matanzas Province) and the Varadero-Miami airlift, which officially ended in 1973. Starting in 1972, a rapid decline in the number of exiles arriving marked the beginning of a fourth stage.

The various stages of the exodus were characterized by differences in demographic and social class characteristics of the exiles, by the obstacles of departure, and by the means of transportation utilized. The stages of the exodus were composed of two main periods of departure. These are the first and third stages in which about 85 per cent of the exodus actually left the island. The periods in between were in turn comparatively smaller. Restrictions against departure became increasingly difficult and, concurrently, the social composition of the exiles seems to have changed radically, i.e. from a heavier proportion of the upper socio-economic classes in the beginning of the exodus to a larger proportion of the lower at the end.

Although four distinct stages of the exodus were delineated, for analytical purposes they were collapsed into three, identified as The First Seven Years, The Family Reunion Period, and The Wane of the Exodus.

The First Seven Years

Stages I and II of the Cuban exodus, which covered the first seven years, were clearly distinguishable both in the numbers of refugees leaving the island, their means of exit, and their direct access to the United States. The analysis of the first seven years takes into account the prevailing sociological conditions, and the circumstances restricting emigration.

The Early Departures

The first stage of the exodus began with the overthrow of Batista on January 1, 1959 and continued throughout the Missile Crisis of October 1962. During this period almost 39 per cent of the total exile movement took place. A fast succession of events occurred during this stage which convinced more than a quarter of a million Cubans that their departure was their best alternative. Some perhaps counted on an early return, while others considered their exit to be an indefinite and possibly a permanent one.

There is no doubt that most of those leaving at the very beginning of this period were the ones most directly affected by the revolutionary takeover. Around 3,000 persons, mostly the cream of the previous government (from the political and military-repressive elites), left the island early in 1959, either through Latin American embassies by political asylum or escaping revolutionary wrath by plane, yachts, or boats.³ They were fleeing immediate reprisals, which in effect were carried out on those left behind by the deposed dictator. These reprisals were mainly in the form of executions, numbering in the hundreds, many carried out without real legal process.⁴ These victims were mainly the second level or low ranking armed force officials with a real or alleged political murder record. Other outstanding Batista supporters were sentenced to long jail terms.

The revolutionary policies very soon began to affect progressively the entire Cuban occupational ladder, starting from the top and moving steadily down to the workers. The alienation produced by those measures impinged first upon the propertied classes, both in the rural and urban settings, as well as in the entrepreneurial, managerial and professional sectors.

These upper social strata constituted the bulk of the initial exodus. The sample taken from the files of the Cuban Refugee Program in Miami for 1961 shows that this category comprised 45 per cent of the registrants with that agency. However, as Castro's totalitarian pattern of government became increasingly evident, especially after the Bay of Pig's fiasco, the clerical and sales workers also felt the compulsion to flee. They comprised more than a quarter of the exile labor force registered with the Cuban Refugee Center by the end of this period.

The feeling of absolute powerlessness in the face of an unbeatable and merciless grinding political apparatus, organized to progressively take over the entire nation regardless of the dissenting opinions of many of its leaders, apparently was permeating all social classes.⁵

By 1962 a substantial proportion of skilled workers had realized that vital portions of their social conquests were either jeopardized or totally demolished. No wonder that by this time they already comprised one quarter of the exiled labor force in the United States registered with the Refugee Program.

It was also during this stage that more than 13,000 unaccompanied children were sent by their parents to this country. Their purpose was to evade what they considered an imminent law eliminating parental jurisdiction over their offspring. In it the government would have assumed total control of the children through a scholarship (becados) system, implying that many accordingly would be sent to Russia. Many children were actually sent there under a scholarship program, but no law was ever passed eliminating parental authority, although it partially occurred <u>de facto</u> when the government assumed total control of the educational system.⁶

Departure means. Commercial transportation directly to Miami was the main outlet during the early exodus.⁷ During this period, several airlines had multiple daily flights between Havana and Miami, which provided transportation for more than a quarter of a million Cubans. Exit by sea was also available through 1961 by an American-based ferry connecting Havana with Key West and West Palm Beach. One Spanish sealine likewise provided a considerable amount of transportation mainly to Spain and to some extent to South America.⁸

Dozens of persons who had taken political asylum in various embassies during this period, especially during early 1959, used commercial flights for departure after permission to leave Cuba was granted.⁹ By April 1961 the Latin American embassies were getting desperate calls for asylum from underground leaders and anti-Castro militants who feared the probability of execution if captured.¹⁰ Most embassies honored this traditional policy to the point that in some cases, not only were the official embassies filled with refugees, but also the personal residences of the ambassadors. But there were some cases in which diplomats tried to profit from the situation.¹¹ Illegal departures by air, sea, and other avenues of escape began immediately after the overthrow of Batista, but this subject is covered in great detail in Chapter VII.

Departure restrictions. Before 1959 Cubans leaving the island were only required to have a passport. With the arrival of Castro in power, in addition to a passport, an extra permit for departure issued by the National Police D.T.I. (Departamento Tecnico de Investigaciones) became mandatory. This extra permit was easily granted without an expiration date at the beginning, but by 1961 it had validity for just one year. It was obtained without much difficulty by anyone not connected with the deposed government. The reason given for this unprecedented

measure was to prevent the departure of wanted members of Batista's repressive forces and important officials of his regime. For them, political asylum or escape was the only road open.

The next travel restriction imposed by Castro was a ceiling on the number of dollars that a person could take out of the country. By the end of 1959 this figure was first placed at \$150, but was reduced to \$60 by mid-1960, and to \$5 by the end of 1961. By 1962 no one was allowed to take dollars abroad. The exchange of dollars for pesos was conducted initially at any bank, provided the applicant held a valid exit permit.

Beginning early in 1959 all departing passengers had their luggage searched with various degrees of thoroughness. Occasional personal searches, especially of persons with some social, economic or political responsibility or distinction, were conducted at the airport at the moment of departure during 1959, but grew in intensity by 1960.¹² They often included the total stripping and search by the G-2 (Internal Security Police of the Interior Ministry) personnel of the would-be traveler at special offices provided for this purpose. The reasons for these searches were to prevent the loss of both national and American currency plus other valuables such as jewelry. The latter objective was emphasized by 1960 in view of the fact that only a wedding ring and a watch were legally allowed to be carried from the country only if the total value did not exceed \$200. In spite of these searches, seldom 100 per cent complete, it seems that considerable amounts of the prohibited items were taken from the country, according to accounts given by people who left Cuba.13

After the government seizure of rented urban property and utilities in late 1960, travel restrictions were tightened. It included, besides the above-mentioned restrictions, clearance certificates from all utilities. The would-be traveler had to present to the D.T.I. all receipts for payment up to the month of departure. Even though the Committees for Defense of the Revolution (C.D.R.) had by then been established, no inventories of household items were made and it was possible for a traveler to leave someone in his home after his departure. This was no longer possible after Castro's declaration that all property of those leaving the country would be confiscated by the government.¹⁴

After the above-mentioned declaration of property confiscation, the government imposed further control on the would-be emigres. Now, when the person requested his passport and exit permit, the C.D.R. proceeded to make an inventory of his household items. At the actual time of departure a final check-up was made by the same neighborhood organization. It appears that the thoroughness of this final inspection varied significantly from case to case.¹⁵ In time, the government placed this responsibility in the hands of the more reliable Interior Ministry in order to stop frequent "leaks."

Those making preparation to leave were made to suffer a considerable degree of harassment. This occurred when those waiting in line to apply for passports or even in front of the American Embassy (before the break of relations), were insulted and annoyed by government-controlled youth gangs.

Another important prerequisite for out-of-country travel was to secure a foreign visa. This required an application with the American

Embassy either for an immigrant or a tourist visa. Subsequent to the break in diplomatic relations between Cuba and the United States (January 3, 1961), the would-be refugees had to go to a third country (normally Mexico, Spain, Jamaica, Colombia and Venezuela). Then, once again, he had to request an immigrant visa in the country where he resided if he wished to come to this country. It was a slow and costly process which prompted the U.S. government to start a new entry procedure by means of a "visa waiver."¹⁶

These visas were obtainable from the U.S. State Department by Cubans already domiciled here in favor of relatives or friends in Cuba. The waivers were generally granted if no derogatory information resulted from a State Department investigation.¹⁷ More than 700,000 visa waiver applications were processed by both the State Department and the Immigration Office in Miami up to shortly after the Missile Crisis in October 1962 when the visa waiver procedure was discontinued.¹⁸

The Post Missile Crisis Lull

The second stage of the exodus was marked by a substantial decrease in the number of exiles leaving the island, mainly because direct entry to the United States was barred. The Missile Crisis (October 1962) prompted the total interruption by the U.S. of direct transportation to the island. The only exceptions were the exit of 1,117 POW's from the Bay of Pigs expedition released from prison, and flown on the 23rd of December 1962, from Havana to Miami, and 4,903 persons, mainly relatives of those prisoners. This included American citizens and their relatives who arrived in planes and unloaded freighters which carried the above-mentioned ransom payment to Cuba.¹⁹

The results of the tightening of social controls as well as the disastrous effects on production were quite evident by late 1962. To

mention just a few, the entire nation was under the absolute rule of one man who controlled not only the government and most economic means, but also demanded absolute loyalty and increasing regimentation of the population. It was even dangerous to try to remain neutral. The swift change from a private enterprise system to that of state capitalism brought not the panacea envisioned by the leaders, but instead a system of total rationing never before seen in Cuban history. Not unrelated to the rationing imposed in 1962 was the further confiscation of the intermediate size farms taken over in 1962 and 1963. Psychological and economic control of the population resulted in mounting dissatisfaction, especially among the lower socio-economic levels.

After the failure of the Bay of Pig's expedition many Cubans felt great frustration when they saw the apparent impossibility of change due to the totalitarian invincibility of the regime. This reinforced in many the desire to leave their homeland as they considered it impossible to adapt to the new conditions. It is no wonder that 1961 and 1962 were the peak years for the legal exodus when just minor exit controls were exercised. Illegal escape also became an important outlet reaching a peak between 1962 and 1963. But perhaps more significant than their sheer numbers, was the socio-demographic analysis of those leaving, especialy the escapees. By 1963 the peasants and laborers constituted the majority of those choosing this perilous way out of Cuba.

Departure through Mexico and Spain became the most important form of legal exit up to the beginning of the Varadero-Miami Airlift in 1965. Many of those planning these routes had already obtained American visa waivers but it then became imperative to have a Mexican or Spanish transit

visa plus money in dollars for air fare.²⁰ The latter had to be obtained through the efforts of relatives or friends in the U.S., but the Mexican visa was a different problem.

A transit visa, a simple consular permit practically free everywhere, did not operate this way for the Cubans who wished to leave their country through Mexico.²¹ The traditional Mexican <u>mordida</u> (bite-extortion) operated unmercifully in most cases, both in Mexico and in Havana, through some "under the table payment." The size of the bribe would vary but apparently only those with relatives in the U.S. who were willing to advance (with great sacrifice at that time) substantial numbers of dollars for use in Mexico, and pesos in Havana, managed to get their visas.²²

Spain also provided another route to exiles during this period. Each weekly flight by Iberia carried a few dozen refugees who, in order to come to the United States, as was the desire of the majority, had to start their processing anew. Spanish officials apparently always showed honesty and efficiency in handling the refugee situation. Only Spain and the United States provided official help to the totally deprived emigres arriving from Cuba.

Departure restrictions in Cuba continued with greater intensity after the Missile Crisis. Household check-ups then became more thorough. It was clearly understood that the would-be refugee had to leave his property to the government. This not only constituted an obstacle, but it was a crime to sell any personal belongings to anyone before leaving. Bank savings that had been withdrawn had to be returned. Money obtained from the sale of an automobile or any other conspicuous item had to be surrendered to the government. As the departing Cuban received notice

of his exit date, a final inventory was made, checking for missing items, and the house was "sealed." The late owner or renter then had to manage on his own or with some relatives or friends for the remaining days on the island.

The Family Reunion Period

Unexpectedly, Fidel Castro inaugurated the Family Reunion Stage of the Cuban exodus on September 28, 1965. It was on this occasion that at the end of one of his usual extremely lengthy speeches an offer was formulated to allow dissatisfied Cubans to leave the country effective October 10, 1965. The offer included the possibility for U.S. based Cuban refugees to return to pick up relatives approved to leave at the small port of Camarioca (in Matanzas province). This was the actual beginning of the third stage of the Cuban exodus that lasted for six years through the U.S. sponsored airlift. It resulted from President Johnson's October 3, 1965 acceptance of Castro's offer, and the subsequent negotiations carried out through the Swiss Embassy.²³

Several reasons could be formulated as an explanation to this departure from the traditional communist position on migration. Among others, undoubtedly the great number of boat escapees was creating a considerable degree of international embarrassment, especially when empty boats were discovered adrift in the Florida Channel.²⁴ Concomitant to this was Castro's desire to improve Cuba's international image in view of the scheduled meeting of the Organization of American States programmed to start on November 17, 1965. Internal dissatisfaction, on the other hand, appeared to be mounting in such magnitude that it was considered wise to open a safety valve on the rationale that if there was hope to leave, this would discourage radical opposition. Last, but not least, by making

this offer, Castro was really challenging the U.S. to open its doors to the Cubans, thus creating a complicated problem of handling the thousands that would have to be taken care of. At the same time he probably envisioned the possibility of making some sort of economic profit from this venture. Events showed that both the Cuban and U.S. governments probably underestimated the desire of the people to leave the island. The Camarioca Exodus

While negotiations were in progress, Castro opened the small northern Matanzas province for departure by boat.²⁵ An port of Camarioca in immediate favorable reaction was sparked in the exile colony, mainly in Miami. A rush for boats developed after an initial waiting period to see what happened with those who defiantly, but successfully made the initial trip. In consequence, boat prices soared fantastically. Meanwhile, in Miami, large numbers of boats of all sizes proceeded to Cuba where provisions had been made to handle the incipient exodus.²⁶ The attitude of the Cuban government was initially quite cooperative but turned increasingly wary as the rush to leave mounted, along with the unfavorable reaction created by the people leaving with relatives who claimed them.²⁷ An opposite role was played by the U.S. Coast Guard which moved from initial opposition and open discouragement against the boat exodus, to open cooperation during the two months of unprecedented flight that brought 4,993 Cubans to the U.S.

With the arrival to Florida of the first group of refugees from Camarioca on October 7, 1965, it became extremely difficult, without harsh measures, for the U.S. to prevent these illegal trips to Cuba. The arrival from Camarioca convinced the Cuban exiles that Castro's offer was real. And, as Captain Cass described:

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The lid was completely off. Hundreds of crafts of all descriptions were bought or chartered. They varied from 16 foot outboards to a 120 foot ferry built in 1888. Opportunists, quick buck artists and outright swindlers were active. Actually the majority of sellers were treating the Cuban exodus as a legitimate opportunity normal to the ups and down of the boat business. There is no estimate available of the money involved, but hundreds of transactions must have totaled a large sum and attest to the sincerity and family feelings of the refugee colony.²⁸

More than 200,000 Cubans requested to leave the country via Camarioca.²⁹ Communications between refugees in Miami and relatives in Cuba established a link by which the latter were alerted of the incoming trip by the former. Upon their arrival in Cuba, that government was notified of the names of the relatives willing to leave. After this procedure, the Cuban relatives were informed of their departure dates and interned at the Kawana compound at Varadero until departure. This was the procedure followed by 2,979 would-be refugees. The U.S.-based Cuban exiles were also housed at Kawana while waiting the departure of the relatives. While there, the Cuban government provided food and shelter plus gasoline for the return trip to Florida.³⁰ It was obvious that Castro was trying to positively impress the arriving exiles about internal conditions at the same time that he propagandized against the U.S. by placing the blame on this country for the initial difficulties in the travel to Florida.

It was true that the U.S. tried initially to discourage the boat exodus but when it turned out to be inevitable, this policy was modified for frank cooperation with the exiles, especially for the return trip.³¹ The Coast Guard played a crucial role during this process. An operation plan was designed to help the safe return of those who had defied or bypassed the Coast Guard in going to Cuba. A considerable number of Coast Guard ships were assigned to this task, establishing a sort of inverted

funnel whose mouth was pointing toward Camarioca and the spout at Key West. It took several days before the northbound exiles realized that the Coast Guard boats stationed right off the Cuban coast were really trying to help in their return voyages.³²

A sort of shuttle system was then established with the Coast Guard vessels in order to guide the U.S. bound exodus. In spite of the night departures encouraged by the Cuban government, the Coast Guard patrols managed with the increasing cooperation from the exiles, to inspect, identify and place under escort the departing boats.³³ Sometimes needed lifejackets were furnished; in others, refugees were transferred to patrol vessels when boats were too overloaded or unseaworthy.³⁴ It was a gigantic task accomplished the best way they could with a highly humanitarian motivation on the part of the crews of these patrol boats. The U.S. Coast Guard has a record of the loss of eight refugee lives during this period (interviewed refugees consider the actual loss at least twice that amount). Certainly the Coast Guard prevented greater tragedy with its assistance.

As the burden for the Cuban government became too heavy with no apparent reward, it agreed with the U.S. government to cancel the Camarioca exodus.³⁵ In principle, the agreement for an orderly departure in the form of an airlift had already been reached on November 6, 1965. At that time there were 425 boats in Camarioca with the capacity for transporting 10,000 refugees.³⁶ In spite of a November 7th deadline for departure with refugees for those arriving before midnight of that date, actually few were allowed to do so. Thus, the empty boats began to depart, leaving the port cleared by the 9th of November when 117 vessels withdrew.³⁷ The remaining 2,000 refugees at the Kawana compound

were later transported to Key West on charter runs carrying 190 persons each, beginning November 15. The Coast Guard continued rendering its services even with these safer vessels, escorting them both ways. By November 30 the boat exodus was over. All together 2,979 people reached Florida (mainly Key West) prior to November 15, and 2,014 after that date.³⁸ A more orderly and lasting air exodus or airlift was to start the next day, December 1, 1965.

The Varadero-Miami Airlift

The Memorandum of Understanding between the Cuban and U.S. governments regulated in great detail the orderly exit of people from the island. The top priority was assigned to the reunion of immediate relatives and other persons living in the same household.³⁹ This was labeled "Priority List A." The Cuban government compiled what was called "Cuban Master List A," a listing of immediate relatives of exiles in the United States who had applied to leave.⁴⁰ In turn the U.S. government compiled another list of relatives claimed by exiles in the United States called the "U.S. Master List A." The names appearing in both lists were then incorporated in what was called the "Joint Consolidated List A" that was transmitted through the Swiss Embassy in Havana to the Cuban government.⁴¹ The priority order of embarkation was to guarantee the departure of the most urgent cases as follows:

First, parents and unmarried brothers and sisters under age 21 living in Cuba of children living in the United States under age of 21; second, unmarried children under age of 21 living in Cuba of parents living in the United States; and third, spouses living in Cuba of persons living in the United States.⁴²

In a similar fashion, Cuban and American Master List B was compiled to cover those not falling within the definition of immediate relatives mentioned above, which included other degrees of kinships of exiles in

the U.S. Those in Priority B were supposed to depart after Priority A had been exhausted. In both cases the Swiss Embassy played the role of mediator. It verified the names and kinship of persons claimed as relatives; it also represented the U.S. government in any problem that arose concerning the implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding.

The Cuban government apparently had the last word on who would be able to leave and when. Periodically the Cuban government sent partial listings from the Consolidated List to the U.S. State Department which later sent them to the CREC. These partial listings, transmitted to the CREC at least one week in advance of an anticipated embarkation date, contained the names of persons approved for departure from Cuba.⁴³ In the above-mentioned Memorandum of Understanding the Cubans imposed a restriction to Castro's initial liberal offer for freedom of exit. It specified that neither any male between 15 and 26 years of age would be permitted to leave due to their possible induction into the Military Service nor technicians and skilled persons "whose departure from the country may cause a serious disturbance in a specific social service or in production" until those persons could be replaced in their duties.⁴⁴

The other goal of President Johnson in promoting the airlift was to obtain the liberation of political prisoners which was officially rejected by Cuba in the Memorandum. Apropos to this, notes of regret by the U.S. government were inserted in that document. It was also specified that Varadero was to be the point of departure, what the final inspection procedures by Cuban and U.S. officials were to be, and the number of monthly departures set to be at 3,000 to 4,000 persons per month. The U.S. government was also to provide the means of transportation to the refugees.

The inflow of refugees to Miami proceeded without interruption at a rate of two flights per day, five days per week until August 1971. By that month a total of 249,000 Cubans had arrived to the U.S. After August the flights were sporadic, and many among the passengers were aged refugees.

It is difficult to make an accurate estimate of the total number of Cubans who were willing to use this airlift. According to estimates made in the U.S., 900,000 Cubans may have wished to have been claimed by their relatives in the U.S., but an estimate of the acutal registrations made in Cuba (after the above-mentioned restrictions of persons not allowed to leave) was around 300,000.⁴⁵

Along with the airlift to the United States, the travel to Mexico and Spain remained open during this period. The great majority of all these refugees had as their ultimate goal admission to the U.S. where they would be reunited with their relatives and friends, and those leaving through Mexico and Spain were no exception. They were subject to the same exit restrictions as those leaving via the Varadero-Miami airlift.

Through the airlift the Cuban government not only disburdened itself of the dissatisfied and unproductive people (the aged and women as well as children) but it was also a means to enhance privileges and to increase the inflow of dollars from abroad. The former occurred when some important official coveted either the house or car of a would-be refugee. Some refugees stated that priority for departure was advanced for this very reason. Also many of our 1971 respondents (77 per cent) declared that they knew someone whose relatives abroad had sent them the money (in dollars for round trip tickets) for passage to Mexico or Spain, but that were later diverted to the United States via the Varadero-Miami

airlift without financial reimbursement. This specific circumstance occurred to 11.4 per cent of the 114 respondents questioned on the subject.⁴⁶

<u>Restriction to leave during the airlift</u>. When a person applied to leave the country by filling out the forms provided by the Interior Ministry (Immigration Department) he began to face a number of negative measures varying in degree according to the person involved.⁴⁷ In most cases he would be discharged from his job unless he was employed in some crucial occupation. Physicians, for instance, were normally allowed to continue their professional practice but only at the <u>Policlinicos</u>, but all of their equipment at their private offices had been confiscated.⁴⁸ Retired persons continued to draw their pensions until departure, as did the former urban landlords (whose property had been confiscated by the 1960 Urban Reform Law) who continued receiving their monthly compensation payments.⁴⁹

A new set of departure restrictions was added during the Varadero-Miami "airlift" period. This was the compulsory work in agriculture (with practically no pay) and in many cases lasting until the time of departure. These new restrictions were imposed on top of the penalties already in existence. Between 1966 and 1967 a policy was inaugurated to send all able bodied men and women to labor in the agricultural fields. The apparent objective of this measure was twofold: first, to dissuade the person from his decision to leave, and second, to make him productive under very harsh conditions if he persisted in that decision.⁵⁰

Most heads of household awaiting departure were assigned to forced agricultural labor. Disabled persons and those sixty-five years and older were exempt from agricultural labor, as were retired persons.⁵¹

Our sample of 1971 interviewees showed that in 93.8 per cent of the cases some family member had to go through this prerequisite. Table 5 shows the actual breakdown of who in the family served time in agricultural labor.

Table 5. Family Member Going to Agricultural Forced Labor

$71.8 \\ 5.7 \\ 8.4 \\ 7.9 \\ \underline{6.2} \\ 100.0$

In the majority of the cases it was only the male head of the household who went to the <u>agricultura</u>. But there were instances where both the male head of the household, the spouse and other relative labored in the fields (16.3 per cent). When both spouses were serving it was because both were below the above-mentioned age limit, but it does not mean that either or both had to be confined to the agricultural camps away from their urban centers. When the "other relative" was involved it was normally either another person living under the same household within the age limitation or a son or a daughter usually above fifteen years of age and not attending school.⁵² Apparently few householders ever managed to dodge this imposition.

The main hardship involved in this service was to be sent away from home (initially to the province of Camagüey) for periods of about six months or more. Close to 64 per cent of the 233 respondents in our sample remained continuously in this status (<u>albergados</u>) after they were called to agricultural work and until the time of their departure.⁵³ They

were normally kept in <u>albergues</u> (barracks of bare thatched roofing, with no walls, dirt floor and practically no sanitary services) under the direction of a supervisor.⁵⁴ The "working centers" usually covered several square miles. Often the trip to the working sites from the <u>albergues</u> (sometimes several miles away) had to be made walking. Communication with the peasants of the zone was strictly forbidden, since they often tried to help these would-be refugees with food to supplement their meager ration.⁵⁵ Working hours varied. According to our sample, close to 55 per cent usually worked more than eight hours per day and 22 per cent told of being forced to work eleven hours or more. For these, sunrise to sunset was the working period with a noon-time break.

The total number of months or years spent in agricultural labor would also vary. Almost 45 per cent of our sample had been engaged in it for more than three years before leaving Cuba, while barely 15 per cent served eight months or less in the fields. About a fifth served between nine months and two years while 21.1 per cent worked two and three years. In total, more than two-thirds had served the government practically free for more than two years.⁵⁶ Periodic summons were apparently made by the Immigration Office to recruit agricultural laborers, but the criteria used to make this selection was not learned.

Physical and moral mistreatment of workers was common in these agricultural camps. In general they did not look like the concentration camps used for confinement of political prisoners. Those camps are surrounded by barbed wire and machine gun posts. Such was not needed in agricultural camps since the people who were laboring there (they were officially called "Immigration personnel" and nicknamed the <u>Johnsons</u> and gusanos) knew that if they deserted from the camps it would have

been self-defeating since their departure permit would not be granted. The possibility of departure hence became their greatest motivation for enduring all sorts of harassment. These were in the form of continuous vexation and insults about their moral behavior. Threats of withholding a worker's pass to visit his family and punishment for minor faults were very common.⁵⁷ Huge, impossible goals, as reported by most, were set by the supervisors and usually under the threat of suspension of their two-day passes mentioned above.

Theoretically, these people were not prisoners, just laborers entitled to pay like any other citizen working in agriculture (at a rate of \$3.20 per day) in other than cane harvest activity (paid by piece). This arrangement never worked that way for the majority of the "Immigration personnel," especially the <u>albergados</u>. In one way or another the government always managed to cheat them out of their wages to the degree that the <u>albergado</u> was happy if he could send home ten pesos per month.

This juggling of the money earned through hard labor was really blatant during the sugar harvest. At that time the receipts (<u>Vales</u>) of the amounts cut were systematically "lost." On top of this the would-be refugee had to pay for the meager starchy food collectively consumed at the camps. We probed about this matter and found instances where these people had to go without solid food for several days at a time. On one occasion a respondent said, "We just had mangoes for three consecutive days."

These practices imposed great hardships on the relatives of the <u>albergados</u>. This was the case of the majority, even though most managed to survive through the help of friends and relatives who, with great sac-

rifice shared with them portions of their already meager rations (see APPENDIX C about the size of the ration). Moreover, the <u>albergados</u> had their names removed from the household "supply card" which was another form of discriminative punishment.⁵⁸

Apparently, not all of those doing agricultural work as a prerequisite to leave the country were mistreated, since roughly 15 per cent of the respondents declared that they were treated "good" while doing agricultural work. These were most likely to be the ones who were not permanently interned (albergados). In fact, they commuted every day to the agricultural labor centers located close to their urban homes. In general these people apparently lived under better conditions. From this we must conclude that there were exceptions to the harsh treatment received by others.

An apparent change of attitude was observed after 1970 in some supervisors in the labor camps where would-be refugees were retained. This fact emerged from the taped in-depth interviews probing about treatment.⁵⁹ It was obvious that something reshaped the attitudes of many supervisors after the failure of the "ten-million-tons-of-sugar-harvest" of 1970. From harsh treatments conciliatory overtones became noticeable. It seemed as if these supervisors were then envying and admiring those who were lucky enough to leave after having endured long years of dissuasive treatment, and who now wished them well upon release for emigration.

The Wane of the Exodus

The fourth stage of the exodus started with the sharp decline of refugee arrivals to the United States by the end of 1971. The continuous airlift flights from Cuba were interrupted for the first time in August 1971. These were later sporadically resumed through April 6, 1973, when

the airlift was officially ended. This refugee program, unique in American history, brought 260,561 Cubans into this country in 3,048 flights since December 1, 1965 with the goal of reuniting families. Yet the termination of the airlift did not end the exodus from Cuba, nor the influx of refugees into the United States. Exiles were still leaving Cuba via Spain and Mexico, and in turn were coming into this country, following very closely the pattern established during the second stage or Post Missile Crisis Lull (1962-1965) where no direct transportation existed between the island and the U.S.⁶⁰

Cubans had always used Spain and Mexico as avenues of departure, even during the airlift or Family Reunion Stage. But they much preferred Spain, and this eventually was to cause a refugee bottleneck there in 1972 when their numbers began to increase.⁶¹ This apparently resulted from a larger number of departures from Cuba as a result of the sharp decline in the airlift, and as a consequence of the new U.S. 1968 Immigration Law (Act 212-A-14) which placed Cubans entering this country on a quota basis, similar to that applied to other Latin American nations. Consequently, a backlog of some 30,000 refugees developed in Spain, causing great anguish within the exile community. Those refugees who were fortunate to have close relatives in the United States managed to come here after a relatively short time in Spain.⁶² For the rest, at least eighteen to twenty-four months of painful waiting followed their arrival in Spain.

In addition to the limitations of the 1968 U.S. legislation, Cuban exiles faced a new obstacle beginning in 1970 in coming to the United States from third countries. A "job affidavit" subscribed to by a citizen or a resident alien was needed in order to emigrate to this

country; prior to the issuing of the affidavit, the State Employment Service had to insure that all employment opportunities were first offered to American citizens.⁶³ This requirement created a real impediment for emigration to the U.S., but then two factors interceded to lessen its impact. In May 1970, the Cuban government stopped accepting exit applications, and in October 1973 the U.S. Department of State relaxed the entrance requirements making the family reunion process easier. The only obstacles that remained were security and health clearances plus an affidavit of support.⁶⁴ No resident visas were issued to this group, just the parole type, similar to the one given to their Varadero-Miami airlift counterparts. This ended what was considered discriminating and unfair situation when contrasted with the facilities given to the airlifted refugee.⁶⁵

By the end of 1974 a considerable number of refugees stranded in Spain were able to enter the United States, producing a slight upward turn in the curve depicting the exile influx into this country (see Table 3). But in spite of this, the prospects of the Cuban exodus for 1975 and thereafter do not point towards any significant increase, but rather to a further decline. The obvious reasons behind this were that applications to leave Cuba were cancelled while illegal departures were so rigidly curtailed that even this exile route practically disappeared.

NOTES

- 1. Mesa-Lago, "Availability and Reliability of Statistics in Socialist Cuba," Latin American Research Review IV (1969): 53-81.
- U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, "Projections of the Population of Cuba by Age and Sex: 1968 to 1990," <u>International</u> <u>Population Reports</u>, series P-91, No. 20 (March): 5.
- 3. Edwin M. Martin, Deputy Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Testimony before the U.S. Senate, May 22, 1963, in Laureano Batista, Political Sociology, p. 15.
- 4. Comision Internacional de Juristas, El Imperio.

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- 5. Leaders were being eliminated in one way or another by Castro, the <u>maximo lider</u>, who was also the sole interpreter of what "revolution" ought to mean and what was best for it.
- 6. Walsh, "Cuban Refugee Children," p. 378-415.
- 7. South Florida has always been a preferred place for Cuban political refugees or exiles since the Wars of Independence. Key West and Tampa used to be important exile centers in those days. With the emergence of Miami, this city, together with New York, became the new Cuban exile centers during the republican era. If a choice were given, Miami would be favored because of the climate and proximity to the homeland.
- 8. The main airlines were Compañia Cubana de Aviacion, Pan American, Eastern, Delta and National; also the European based Iberia and K.L.M. The ferry was operated by the West Indies Fruit and Steamship Co., owned by Daniel E. Taylor, and the Spanish ships by Compañia Transatlantica Española.
- 9. According to Ruiz, <u>Diario 1959</u>, p. 248, 339 persons were reported to have left this way in 1959.
- 10. Executions in 1961 were probably more numerous than in early 1959. They usually took place at <u>La Cabaña</u> fortress where, according to witnesses, many of the condemned were gagged because of their defiant anti-Castro shouting prior to being executed. Often executions were observed by dozens of pro-Castro youth of both sexes, brought to the scene for this purpose. Many others who sought asylum had to force their way at gunpoint into embassies. Ruiz, in <u>Diario 1961</u>, pp. 209-210, describes one of these attempts in front of the Ecuadorian Embassy where several were killed by Cuban militia men-guarding the building.
- 11. Venezuelan, Ecuadorian, Costa Rican, and Brazilian embassies were top examples of the former instance, while diplomats in the Mexican embassy are cited as exemplifying the latter.

12. Persons about to board an airplane were placed at the <u>pecera</u> (fish bowl), an enclosed glass area which prevented communication with outsiders. All searches were conducted within this area.

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- 13. Concealing articles on the body, in dresses or belts, was perhaps the less significant way. Definitely foreign embassy officials, through a normal generous "commission," provided the most substantial way out for currency, jewelry, and other easily transportable valuables, such as paintings, gold, and silver in different forms.
- 14. Law 989 of December 5, 1961.
- 15. Inventories were made even if only one person was scheduled to leave the household. If the departing person had by any chance sold an item such as a TV set, a car, or a refrigerator he either had to replace it or surrender the money received in the transaction. This was the common situation, but there were also instances where the inspector would overlook missing items either as a sign of friendship or due to a small "present" from the departing neighbor. It was common knowledge that those doing these types of inspections almost always profited in one way or another.
- 16. This unique procedure was based on an 1878 Appendix to the Immigration Law made for special cases. The provision was discovered by Mr. Anthony Fariñas, a pre-Castro Cuban immigrant and active in civic affairs in Miami. The possibility to use this provision with the Cubans was presented to the late Sen. Spessard Holland who managed to make it operational.
- 17. Woytych, "The Cuban Refugee," p. 16-17.
- 18. According to Anthony Fariñas who, together with Wendel Rollason, directed the Inter-American Affairs Commission which handled this processing along with other voluntary agencies of the Cuban Refugee Program.
- 19. The ransom consisted of an effective payment of \$53 million in medicine, medical and surgical equipment, baby food, and \$2.9 million in cash raised under the auspices of the late Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy. Johnson, <u>The Bay of Pigs</u>, pp. 309 and 327. Negotiations with the Castro government were directed in a very skillful manner by the late attorney James Donovan. Returning planes that had carried the ransom cargo brought 890 persons to the United States. Woytych, "The Cuban Refugee," p. 17.
- 20. It became mandatory prior to 1965 to pay for outgoing plane fares in dollars to the Cuban National Bank, as a means for Cuba to obtain reserves (<u>divisas</u>).
- 21. The cost of the Mexican visa has varied from a few dollars, if good connections were available, to a few hundred if the person lacked those connections.

- 22. Two major victims of this system were apparently Wendel Rollason and Anthony Fariñas, officers of the Inter-American Affairs Commission, who had helped thousands of Cubans to obtain the visa waiver in a totally non profit basis and they became involved in helping Cubans out via Mexico with the same motivation. They went to Mexico City in 1963 to investigate the bribe situation, but were immediately apprehended and prevented from a personal confrontation with the Minister of <u>Gobernacion</u> (Interior) and the American Ambassador. They were subsequently detained without legal processing for fifteen months on charges of fraud and embezzlement. Their innocence was acknowledged by their personal conduct after their release through the offices of the U.S. government, who indirectly recognized their moral integrity but who decided not to stir up the matter any further.
- 23. At a speech delivered at the Statue of Liberty during the signature of the new Immigration Bill, Johnson declared that any Cuban seeking refuge in the U.S. will find it. Negotiations were started with the Cuban government the next day through the Swiss Embassy. President Johnson's objectives were to seek both the reunion of those with families in the U.S., and the freedom of political prisoners.
- 24. Almost 75 per cent of all boat escapes to the U.S. occurred before 1966.
- 25. Camarioca became a reference point for arriving and departing boats. Exiles were taken by land to Kawama, a former exclusive area (President Grau San Martin's expropriated house was the headquarters) at the famous Varadero Beach, 7 miles east of Camarioca. A sort of compound was arranged there for the exiles and departing Cubans, totally enclosed to guarantee isolation and restraint of movement.
- 26. Most information on this episode comes from descriptions of many exiles involved in it as well as from the excellent first hand account on the whole matter by Capt. William F. Cass (Chief of Operations, 7th Coast Guard District, Miami, Florida) in "Cuban Exodus," pp. 46-57 and the articles by Mary L. Wilkinson of <u>The Miami News</u>, Don Bohning of <u>The Miami Herald</u>, Harvey Aronson of <u>Newsday</u>, and H.R. Kaplan, "The Cuban Freedom Shuttle."
- 27. A free tour of Havana was organized for the first arrivals along with the provision of accommodations for the arriving boats and their crews. Exiles were allowed to have prison-fashion visits from relatives and friends at Kawama. Many came to witness the event which sometimes reached a molo-like situation. The simple fact that this took place was apparently disturbing in the long run to the government since it served as a stimulus to encourage the desire to leave the country.
- 28. Cass, "Cuban Exodus," p. 51.

29. Ibid., p. 52.

- 30. Capt. Cass mentioned that many engine failures occurred in the return trip due to the poor quality of the fuel provided by the Cuban government. Ibid., p. 55.
- 31. Apparently no communication existed between the U.S. Coast Guard Patrol boats, which always were out of Cuban territorial waters (three miles), and the Cuban authorities handling the boat-lift. About 10 per cent of those contacted in the southbound trip during the week of October 4-16 turned back. As more successful return trips increased, the deterrent effect of the patrols tended to diminish. From the estimated 550 to 600 boats that made the trips the Coast Guard patrols identified and warned operators of 435. No prosecution ensued for these illegal trips. Ibid.
- 32. Besides the illegality of some trips, they were highly risky operations in view of the quality of the vessels and the lack of adequate navigational knowledge of many skippers for this sort of endeavor.
- 33. Unclassified material at the 7th U.S. Coast Guard District was inspected.
- 34. These were mostly elderly men and women, females and children. Cass, "Cuban Exodus," p. 53.
- 35. In effect, the whole affair appears to have "boomeranged" since probably the government never expected the huge demand for departure that actually occurred. A snowballing effect to leave the country seemed to be in progress throughout the island at this time.
- 36. Cass, "Cuban Exodus," p. 54.
- 37. Passengers on the very last boats witnessed the machinegunning from Cuban patrol boats of many young desperate Cubans who jumped into the water trying to reach the departing boats. A few succeeded in reaching the departing boats, others either drowned or were captured, as based on statements of refugees in Miami.

- 38. Cass, "Cuban Exodus," p. 55.
- 39. "Parents of unmarried children under age 21, spouses, unmarried children under age 21 and brothers and sisters under age 21." U.S. House of Representatives, Cuba and the Caribbean, pp. 6-8.
- 40. Applications were closed in Cuba on May of 1966, except for the "Supplementary List" composed of claims of U.S. naturalized Cubans who were able to apply in the U.S. on behalf of their relatives after that date. Ibid., p. 161.
- 41. The registration process in the U.S. was conducted by the Cuban Refugee Emergency Center (CREC) in Miami. The Immigration and Naturalization Service was the agency responsible for coordinating the security check performed by other federal agencies on the claimed relatives.

42. U.S. House of Representatives, Cuba and the Caribbean, p. 6.

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- 43. There were complaints from the U.S. authorities on the quality of the print-outs sent by the Cuban government. American officials thereafter decided to supply the Cubans with IBM cards and the necessary paper for the data processing (Palmatier testimony). <u>Ibid</u>., p. 147.
- 44. Ibid., p. 8.

- 45. It is mentioned that Cubans have estimated initially that between 100,000 and 150,000 might have taken advantage of this exit offer, while Washington calculated that at the very most 75,000 might join. Both entities underestimated the attitudes of the Cubans. "Cuba; The Freedom Flood," <u>Time</u>, April 1, 1966 and testimony by Robert A. Hurvitch, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, <u>Cuba and the</u> Caribbean, p. 47.
- 46. The money in dollars had to be deposited with the Cuban National Bank.
- 47. Loss of all property extended to the extreme by just allowing the would-be refugee to carry with him only a few changes of clothing and practically no valuables. In many cases rings, chains, watches, and even medicine were confiscated at departure. He had to report to the Immigration Offices located in a secluded area of difficult access in Havana, in the former exclusive residential suburb of El Laguito, now called Cubanacan.
- 48. The <u>policlinicos</u> are the first place to seek medical attention, distributed by zones comprising more than one neighborhood in the new medical system.
- 49. The revolutionary government apparently kept its promise here, contrary to what happened to those dispossessed of their land through the 1959 Agrarian Reform Law.
- 50. Stories of celebrations and congratulations at the above-mentioned "Immigration Office," to the person withdrawing his application to leave were told by several refugees who knew of these incidents.
- 51. Initially the age limit for forced agricultural labor was set at forty-five years, then raised to fifty-five, and later to sixty-five.
- 52. Young students were not required to drop out of school but parents were obligated to prove their children had good attendance records as attested by a certificate before being released for departure.
- 53. We discovered that some managed to avoid being sent far away from home using a medical certificate based on a faked illness.
- 54. The treatment received by the <u>albergados</u> and all in agricultural labor varied according to the type of supervisor responsible for the camps. Usually the worst in treatment were the classic opportunists trying

to make merits. Many of these had been connected with the Batista regime in some capacity.

- 55. The peasants were told that the <u>albergados</u> were a sort of criminal and <u>apatridas</u> (without love to the fatherland). They soon realized that this was not the case, resulting in communication and help. Often they left food, such as cooked viands, at the side of the road to be picked up by the would-be refugees. These usually reciprocated when possible by leaving clothes of some type, shoes, soap, all very scarce items within the rural population.
- 56. More than 100,000 men and women probably served in the fields for various periods according to estimates developed from this study, and high productivity was normally extracted from them under the threat of losing their departure rights.
- 57. This was especially harsh when the person had been isolated for several months (albergado) in a remote part of the country. Passes were usually given according to the work performed, every 15 days or every month, depending on the place.
- 58. This is the official name used by the government for the ration card. This is contrary to what happened to those with children on scholarships (becados) who were allowed to keep them in their card in spite of being fed by the government. This is the same case for those having their meals at the labor centers and those in the military.
- 59. We were unable to ascertain how prevalent this change in attitude might have been since the in-depth interviews were limited to a fraction of our sample.
- 60. A total of 98 per cent of the arrivals had a U.S. oriented goal, according to a survey completed in Spain. Fernandez, "Aproximacion al Problema."
- 61. The number entering Spain by that time increased to approximately 1,100 individuals per month. Roberto Fabricio, "Stranded in Spain, Cubans Wait and Hope," <u>The Miami Herald</u>, November 26, 1972. Up to November 1972, a total of 80,700 Cuban exiles had used Spain at least as their initial place of exile. Roberto Fabricio, "For a Few Exiles, U.S. Cuts Red Tape," <u>The Miami Herald</u>, November 28, 1972. Among these late arrivals to Spain there was a preponderance of persons over sixty years old according to a memo to this researcher by Mrs. Maria Comella, Director of the Office for Reception of Cubans in Madrid.
- 62. These comprised approximately 25 per cent of those awaiting visas, i.e., mainly persons claimed by the spouse, by children of any age, or by parents, provided that the claimed persons were not legal adults. They traveled with a parole status. Fabricio, "Stranded in Spain."

- 63. Exempt from this regulation were women over fifty and men over fifty-five; also those with university degrees, graduates in technical fields and students registered for school attendance to study in this country. Fernandez, "Aproximacion al Problema," p. 49.
- 64. Roberto Fabricio, "25,000 Cubans May Get Visas to Enter the U.S." and "Refugees from Cuba, Stranded in Madrid, Arrive in Miami," in <u>The Miami Herald</u>, September 28, 1973 and December 6, 1973, respectively and Evaristo Savon, "Explica Palmatier Como y Cuando Vendran los Cubanos de España," Diario Las Americas, November 6, 1973.
- 65. Fabricio discovered in interviews with 1973 arrivals to Madrid how coats had been confiscated in Cuba before departure on the rationale that "they would not be needed since (in November) it was still warm in Spain." Roberto Fabricio, "When the Plane from Cuba Lands the Waiting Begins," The Miami Herald, November 26, 1972.

CHAPTER VI

RECEPTION AND RESETTLEMENT OF THE CUBAN EXILES

How the Cuban refugees were treated once they left the island is the main concern of this chapter. The handling of these refugees, mainly in the United States, profited from a vast experience gained coping with this type of problem during the present century. A brief look at this background of assistance seems warranted. Our attention will then be focused on the United States where most of the exiles have Consideration will be given to the first assistance received by gone. the exiles, that of private institutions. But the bulk of our concern will be given afterwards to the massive help rendered by the U.S. government which generated a unique program in American history to help this population. The treatment of the Cuban refugees elsewhere will also be covered. Major emphasis will be given to Spain where a good amount of private and public help has been rendered, while the case of Mexico will be examined briefly in view of the small amount of assistance given there to the refugees.

Precedents of Help to Other Refugees

The nature and kind of assistance received by refugees has varied considerably since the beginning of the century. At that time, for example, immigrants and refugees coming to this country received only check-ups for disease upon arrival, and had to meet a number of governmental restrictions in order to prevent the entrance of undesirables.¹ Little orientation was given to help the individual in the new society;

he was mainly on his own, or could count only on friends or relatives, churches and ethnic organizations for some private assistance, although some legislation was enacted in order to protect the newcomers from mistreatment. But the post Second World War era marked a substantial change in the handling of refugees. Their number in Europe was so large and they were so destitute that international organizations were created to cope with this problem.² These were essentially hundreds of thousands of displaced and expelled Germans pushed into the newlyreduced Germany, and the subsequent flow that took place from East to West Germany.³ There were also others seeking to escape communist control which included Russians who were out of the Soviet Union by the end of the war and who refused to return, as well as individuals from other nationalities who had fallen under communist control.⁴ The fleeing Hungarians constituted a major final group in Europe after their illfated 1956 revolution. The vast number of Chinese fleeing the mainland constituted the major example in Asia, while the Middle East witnessed another exodus of refugees from Palestine after the creation of Israel.

Focusing in Europe, a number of programs were created and financed mainly by the U.S. and its allies to handle the post-war refugee problem.⁵ Refugee camps had to be erected in West Germany and Austria in order to process this large human wave who were later resettled mainly through Europe, North and South America, and Australia.⁶ This process of screening and relocation normally entailed many months of waiting, usually under very uncomfortable conditions. Transportation for those going out of Europe was normally by ship, except for the Hungarians who were airlifted to the United States.⁷

United States as the Main Area of Reception and Resettlement

The official reception and resettlement process provided for the Cuban exiles by the United States has had certain similarities with those developed for the European refugees, especially the Hungarians. In both of these instances, the United States government played a vital role, mainly in financing resettlement operations, usually through voluntary agencies experienced in dealing with refugees. In the Cuban case, the history of American influence on the political affairs of her smaller neighbor posed a significant difference between these cases. This made almost unavoidable the heavy involvement by the United States in the Cuban exodus. In fact, the exile phenomenon was most certainly enhanced by the "open-door" policy held by this country towards the Cubans seeking political asylum--a pattern maintained since colonial times--and obviously, also by the presence of a communist regime on the island. All of these factors led the United States to an unprecedented financial and regulatory commitment involving displaced refugees from Cuba.⁸ Official reception afforded Cuban refugees varied substantially since 1959, and the pattern observed is one of increasing formality in the reception process.

Even though assistance to the Cuban refugees by the United States government outranks by far that received from the private sector, the latter is noteworthy. Private assistance was the only aid available during the first years of the exodus and it continues as an important source of aid to Cubans in this country. The initiatory role of the private sector will first be discussed, followed by the description of the official reception procedures and by a brief analysis of the federally-sponsored Cuban Refugee Program, where its goals, major welfare efforts, and cost will be emphasized.

Assistance from the Private Agencies

Most exiles who arrived in Miami in 1959 required no initial material assistance. However, as the exodus grew toward the end of Castro's first year in power, restrictive measures were imposed by the Cuban government to prevent the flight of valuable material possessions. Subsequently, the Cuban situation in Miami became increasingly difficult, and by late 1960 it was serious. Very few of the incoming refugees had money in American banks. The five dollars (\$5.00) per capita allowed by the Castro government to be taken out of Cuba did not last long.

Most of the exiles upon arriving in the United States were desperately in need of food, housing, medical aid, clothing, and employment. Those refugees fortunate enough to have relatives or friends, even someone previously exiled, in the pre-Castro Cuban colony of the area, were generally able to receive at least some initial support.⁹ This primary type of social solidarity, however, was economically limited.¹⁰ Obviously, extra help was needed in order to successfully accommodate the 1,500 to 2,000 persons arriving each week. At this time, early in 1962, private organizations, particularly the Catholic church, began to show concern for the exiles, and various programs to aid them were developed.

Since most of the refugees were Catholic, almost instinctively, they looked to that church for help. The "Centro Hispano Catolico" founded by Bishop Coleman F. Carroll (now Archbishop), furnished needed social services for the Spanish-speaking people in the area in the form of food, clothing, medical services, and help getting jobs for the destitute refugees.¹¹ Approximately \$200,000 in goods and services were

supplied to them by the Diocese of Miami during the first two years of the exodus. 12

Private initiative is credited with accepting the initial financial burden of providing aid to unaccompanied children, and later with supplying the manpower needed for a child-care program that ensued. These children, 14,048 in number, were assisted by "Operation Pedro Pan," a private program designed to help Cuban parents send their children to the United States.¹³ The Cuban Children Program that followed, initially sponsored by the Catholic Welfare Bureau, assumed full responsibility for over half of the children admitted.

The first funds were allocated late in 1960 by the federal government for the care of refugee children. Private institutions continued to play an important role in the reception and aid provided to the refugees, even after the beginning of federal assistance. An indication of the significance of private support to Cuban refugees is found in a partial accounting undertaken by the University of Miami Research Institute for Cuba and the Caribbean (RICC). This agency calculated that between 1959 and 1966 private agencies provided a total of \$14,089,600 in assistance to Cuban refugees.¹⁴

State and county institutions in Florida were structurally and financially unprepared to meet the emergency created by the arrival of thousands of refugees. Initially local officials declined responsibility for the new population, thus the charity of the churches and other private institutions was taxed to the extreme. It was through the initiative of Bishop Carroll that a citizens' committee to petition for federal aid was formed; in October 1960 it formulated an appeal for aid to President Eisenhower. This was indeed a unique situation for the

United States. Never before had this country served as place of "first asylum" for a large number of exiles since prior to the Cuban crisis, refugees admitted to the United States were first processed in European camps. This, of course, did not seem practicable dealing with the Cubans, and an entirely new procedure had to be worked out.

Governmental Role with the Refugees

The first contact with the arriving exile was with the immigration process which changed considerably over the years. Since most Cubans initially came with a simple tourist visa, no major formality was undertaken at the point of arrival. He was simply another tourist in this country. But this eventually changed, especially when those with "visa waivers" (mentioned in Chapter V) began to arrive. Then some extra "clearing" process took place, besides the help provided by the Cuban Refugee Program after December 1960. The reception process and the aid provided by the government will be the order in which these two important aspects of the handling of the refugees in the United States will be covered.

The reception process

Early in the exodus, Cubans entering this country were required to have only a tourist visa. That immigration status precluded legal employment. To overcome this restriction, the person, if he had already decided to stay in this country as an exile, requested from immigration authorities a change in status to that of "parolee." This permitted him or her to accept gainful employment, but precluded certain types. For example, excluded was the practice of medicine by individuals qualified as doctors in Cuba. Neither were persons, while under "parolee" status, able to apply for United States citizenship. Those arriving with a

"visa waiver" by 1961 would normally undergo a more formal process and were often detained for further investigation at the Opa Locka Processing Center. They were given the "parolee" status upon their release by immigration authorities. Those arriving after the Missile Crisis, including the Bay of Pigs prisoners and some of their relatives, went through the assignment of the "parolee" status at the point of entry. Individuals arriving via third countries were admitted in most cases with a permanent resident status.¹⁵

The Varadero-Miami airlift, initiated on December 1, 1965, marked the period of greatest formality in the reception process. Officers of the United States Immigration Services boarded the empty aircraft sent to Varadero to confirm that only "cleared" individuals were accepted. A doctor from the United States Public Health Department also went to Cuba to check against carrying infectious diseases to the United States.¹⁶ After arrival in Miami, refugees were directed into a reception compound.¹⁷ At this place the credentials of each refugee were checked by the Immigration Service and a baggage inspection was made by the United States Customs Bureau. Upon being given "parolee" status, the individual registered with the Cuban Refugee Program, through the representatives of one of the "voluntary agencies" (described later) located in the same airport compound. He usually registered with the specific agency through which he had been "claimed" by his initial sponsor-relative in the United States.

After the formalities of registration were completed, the refugees with their family, if any, were medically examined and then vaccinated.¹⁸ Every refugee was required to remain at the Reception Center while he completed registration for his family and arranged for their resettlement.

After this, the refugee family was allowed either to join relatives in Miami, or in the absence of any kin nearby, was lodged at "Freedom House" where they could remain until further travel was arranged.¹⁹ During their stay at Freedom House, food, plus a one-time \$5.00 allowance per family, and occasional entertainment were provided. Those scheduled for resettlement were allowed to leave the airport area during the day but were obligated to return to Freedom House to spend the night.

The escapees arriving in the United States were given processing similar to Cubans entering through conventional channels. The main difference between them was that escapees had initial contact with the U.S. Coast Guard.²⁰ Often when the crossing from Cuba to the United States was a prolonged one, many escapees, upon reaching Florida, were found to be in deplorable physical condition. Such persons, after arriving in Miami were temporarily interned in the Jackson Memorial hospital, with all expenses paid by the Cuban Refugee Program. If extended screening was necessary after 1965, they were required to remain at the Reception Center Compound at the Miami International Airport.²¹

Those arriving from Spain, especially after the 1973 relaxation of controls, came mostly as "parolees," although some also came as permanent residents. Since they had already been "cleared" for immigration purposes in Spain, no further delay at the airport had to take place upon their arrival here, contrary to what happened to the airlift arrivals who had to undergo a two to three-hour processing.

Organization of the federal Cuban Refugee Program

The Citizens' Committee created by community leaders in Miami to appeal for federal assistance to aid Cubans succeeded in obtaining funding of one million dollars. Shortly thereafter, President Eisenhower sent Mr. Tracy Voorhees, who had previously worked with Hungarian refugees, to investigate the Cuban situation in Miami. Upon the recommendation of Mr. Voorhees, the Cuban Refugee Emergency Center (CREC), was opened in Miami on December 2, 1960. Initially, the staff of the center numbered fourteen but was expanded to 328 in less than one year.²² The primary concern facing the staff was for the resettlement of refugees away from the Miami area and for the care of unaccompanied children.²³ Concurrently, an additional \$4 million from the President's Contingency Fund, authorized under the United States Mutual Security Act, was allocated to finance the Cuban Refugee Program through June 30, 1961. Subsequently, funds were disbursed on an annual basis by action of Congress chrough the Migration and Refugee Act of 1962.²⁴

On February 3, 1961, Abraham A. Ribicoff, the newly appointed Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare in the Kennedy Administration, proposed the following program, having as goals:

- 1. Providing all possible assistance to voluntary relief agencies in providing daily necessities for needy refugees, for resettling as many refugees as possible, and for securing jobs for them.
- 2. Obtaining the assistance of both private and governmental agencies to provide useful employment opportunities for displaced Cubans, consistent with the over-all employment situation in Florida.
- 3. Providing funds for the resettlement of refugees to other areas.
- 4. Furnishing financial assistance to meet basic maintenance requirements of needy Cuban refugees in the Miami area and as required in the communities of resettlement.

- 5. Providing for essential health services for the refugees.
- 6. Furnishing federal assistance for local public school operating costs in the Miami area.
- 7. Initiating measures to augment training and educational opportunities for Cuban refugees.
- 8. Providing financial aid for the care and protection of unaccompanied children-the most defenseless and troubled group among the refugee population.

9. Undertaking surplus food distribution to needy refugees.²⁵ Secretary Ribicoff's nine point policy statement aptly summarized the goals of the Cuban Refugee Program. In view of the increasing concentration of Cubans in the Miami area, resettlement was paramount. A concomitant concern was the care for unaccompanied children. Providing Cubans with subsistence in the nature of retraining or vocational rehabilitation was also essential. Thus, the CREC immediately began to register families of refugees in need and to dispense assistance.

Two critical strategies utilized to realize the clearly defined objectives of the Program were: (1) the involvement of capable voluntary relief agencies experienced in refugee rehabilitation, and (2) the employment of Spanish-speaking personnel, most of whom were Cuban, to assist in registering and processing the exiles. Three of the agencies participating were the United States Catholic Conference (USCC), the Church World Service (CWS), and the United Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS). All three were religiously affiliated. Another important agency involved, the International Rescue Committee (IRC), possessed a secular background. Upon arrival in the United States, refugees were required to identify themselves with one of the four agencies in order to receive financial or relief assistance and personal guidance to attain selfsufficiency. These agencies were staffed with persons possessing similar

linguistic and cultural backgrounds which softened the culture shock with which the refugees were confronted. Furthermore, it should be pointed out that the personal adjustment required was made especially difficult by destitution.

Not all of the expatriated Cubans in the United States were processed through CREC. We have estimated that 178,864 individuals, or 27.9 per cent of the total admitted, did not register, and they did not receive any organized assistance.²⁶ The majority of refugees who received assistance, registered with the USCC (Table 6). Next in rank was the IRC, followed by the CWS, and the HIAS.

Table 6. Variation in Registration by Voluntary Agency of the Cuban Refugee Program in Two Selected Years: 1963 and 1974

		963 ^a	Year	1974 ^b
Agency	Number	Per cent	Number	Per cent
USCC IRC CWS HIAS	113,926 36,800 14,064 <u>3,359</u>	67.7 21.9 8.4 2.0	308,337 96,004 52,547 <u>4,485</u>	66.8 20.8 11.4 <u>1.0</u>
Total	168,149	100.0	461,373	100.0
Sources:			Refugee Prog Fact Sheet (

<u>Welfare assistance</u>. The nine-point Refugee Program emphasized the over-all desire of the United States government to make the exile a self-supporting individual. In the interim, especially during the early 1960's, monthly welfare payments were made to each registered individual, who, if qualified, accepted a vocational retraining arrangement.²⁷ The financial aid provided to a recipient or his family was also contingent on willingness to accept resettlement elsewhere. This regulation was

partially instrumental in reducing the number of Cubans receiving welfare from a peak of 67,000 in 1962, to a low of 17,000 by 1965, in the Miami-Dade area. Another kind of assistance was provision for surplus foods.²⁸ In 1971, a food stamp system was introduced to replace the inefficient food distribution.

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The Cuban Refugee Emergency Center, located at the Freedom Tower in downtown Miami, was also the location of an outpatient medical clinic and drug dispensary.²⁹ It offered the refugee a wide variety of medical and dental services, laboratory analysis, radiology, and psychiatric treatment. This clinic served a felt need within the refugee colony, especially during the early 1960's when few refugees could afford to pay for private medical care.

Welfare assistance for a refugee who had resettled away from Miami was easily available. In case of loss of employment, a serious illness, or other financial difficulty, the resettled exile could turn to the local welfare agency for assistance at the location of his residence. When assistance was granted, the Refugee Program would assume responsibility for all such expenses. In fact the Program's responsibility to the resettled exile ceased only when he became a citizen.³⁰

Education aid. The goal of self-sufficiency promoted by the Cuban Refugee Program also called for educational assistance and rehabilitation for many exiles. Certainly the most pressing need was the acquisition of basic English, vital to all age levels.³¹ There were also immediate educational needs to be served both at the primary and secondary school levels. Needs involved both the refugee and the school systems. Refugees at college level who required financial assistance were comparatively few in number. The educational needs of the adult population ranged from those with professional degrees to those of near illiteracy. In coping with this problem, the private institutions and the Refugee Program were certainly positive factors.

The public and parochial schools of Dade County were initially unprepared for the incoming tide of refugee children. The granting of federal assistance to school authorities relieved the county of the economic burden resulting therefrom, but not from the problems of coping with thousands of children with little or no knowledge of English.³² As a result, special emergency programs were instituted both in the public and parochial schools, although the latter received no federal assistance. These programs consisted mainly of the addition of bilingual teachers and administrative personnel to existing staffs. In most instances, Cubans with teaching experience were employed. This approach proved to be a very workable one. However, largely because of the overcrowding of schools in their immediate neighborhoods, Cuban children often were transported to schools located far from their homes.

The educational needs of the adult exiles were complex and urgent. In response, churches first organized English classes with their own resources. Later, Dade County, through the English Center, the Lindsey Hopkins Educational Center, and the public schools lent support to such training. Registration and materials were provided without charge to the refugees, and thousands took advantage of this opportunity. This eventually aided many of them to secure better employment, either within the Miami area or elsewhere. These English classes, financially supported by the Refugee Program through the county public school system, have continued until the present.³³

College and university retraining was needed for those with university degrees obtained in Cuba. Academic or professional accreditation in the United States was difficult to secure, even when they were competently trained for employment in this country. The case of Cuban physicians is the most evident example.³⁴ Beginning in 1961, the University of Miami, initially with funds supplied by the Ford Foundation and later by HEW,³⁵ provided refresher courses to prepare Cuban-trained physicians to pass the Foreign Medical Examination of the American Medical Association. Later, under HEW direction, the program provided the means by which other Latin American physicians also were able to qualify to practice medicine in the United States.³⁶

Dentists who received their degrees in Cuba were not as fortunate as the physicians in their application for professional employment. Only by almost total retraining were they able to practice their profession lawfully in the United States.³⁷ By 1973, Cuban dentists (along with other foreign-trained professionals) were allowed to take qualifying examinations, similar to that given to the physicians. Their successes in passing the examinations were significantly lower than the physicians, although all of them had received training at the same Cuban university. Consequently, many Cubans considered the examinations to have been unfair, mainly due to the language barrier.

Lawyers, teachers, and many other professionals also faced serious problems in finding gainful employment in their chosen fields. All too frequently their training was not immediately acceptable to governing agencies. It was soon discovered, however, that with some retraining the skills possessed by these refugees could be made economically productive to American commerce, industry, and education.

Educational officials in Iowa were the first to realize the possibility of using Cuban lawyers and teachers to teach Spanish in high school. This alleviated a shortage of qualified language teachers in that state. State and local officials, after consultation with representatives of the Cuban Refugee Program, actually pioneered what became known as the "Teacher Training Project." As a result of this program, almost a thousand Cubans were enabled to resume their professional careers and to help meet an urgent national demand.³⁸ The usual retraining procedure consisted of a careful screening of applicants followed by an intensive one-year training period at a selected university. The tuition charged the participants was paid from program funds, and each was permitted to borrow \$1,000 per year for expenses.³⁹ In addition, some refugees earned extra income from part-time jobs they held during their year of study. Upon the successful completion of their training, a provisional teaching certificate was issued. The holder of this certificate was then permitted to teach while he progressively met the other credit requirements for permanent certification. This pattern varied somewhat from state to state, but the core was the same. 40 Some optometrists and librarians were included in these retraining programs and with equal success in their professions.

Refugees enrolled in college were also entitled to secure assistance from the above-mentioned Cuban student loan fund which was activated through a program started in 1961, similar to the one available to United States citizens under the National Defense Education Act.⁴¹ By 1970, more than 11,000 loans had been granted to Cubans. Delinquency in repayment of loans has been rather negligible, and without this financial assistance the college education of many would have been severely compromised or impossible.⁴²

Concomitant with the need for a functional command of English was the necessity for occupational retraining for those with few skills, if any, so that they might become self-supporting. In Miami, both the English Center and the Lindsey Hopkins Educational Center provided a wide range of vocational training under the sponsorship of the Federal Refugee Program.⁴³ Many unskilled Cubans took advantage of these opportunities.

By 1963, the number of refugees arriving annually in the United States was considerably reduced. Cuban refugees then being resettled exceeded the number registering at CREC. Hence the authorities in charge deemed it more appropriate to review the situation of Cubans still on welfare rolls, and thereafter more than 22,000 cases were The survey showed that 3,812 recipients were female heads of examined. household eighteen to fifty-five years of age, and 3,313 consisted of both male and female heads of fifty-four to sixty-four years old. 0f the former, many either had husbands in Cuba or were widowed. Through a selective process, many of these persons were given the opportunity to study English and/or to receive vocational training to become selfsufficient through a program called "Training for Independence."44 Those enrolled in this program received waivers of tuition charges, allowances for transportation to and from places of training, and adequate child-care services, if needed. Admission to the program was made contingent upon the willingness of the enrollee to accept resettlement if employment could not be found within a reasonable time in the Miami area. Upon a refusal to accept resettlement, welfare payments were discontinued. The success of this program is evidenced by the fact that 80 per cent of the participants were able to find employment after the completion of their training.45

As was mentioned earlier, the primary goal of the refugee program was the promotion of self-sufficiency. In order to accomplish this, it was necessary to resettle refugees in areas where occupational opportunities were more abundant. In this process, 299,326 exiles were relocated in various communities throughout the entire nation.⁴⁶

<u>The resettlement process</u>. One basic policy of the Cuban Refugee Program was to relocate as many exiles as possible away from the Miami area. In fact, 64.8 per cent of all of those who registered with CREC left Miami.⁴⁷

Two stages are distinguishable in the resettlement process. The first lasted until the start of the Varadero-Miami airlift in 1965. During this stage, many refugees received vocational training in Miami before being resettled elsewhere. The second stage extended through the airlift or program of "Family Reunion Period." It was characterized by a brief stay in Miami, and no training at all in that area, being immediately reunited with relatives who had claimed them. Adjustment of resettled refugees coming during this period seems to have been smoother than that of earlier arrivals since in most instances the former had relatives anxious to help them; and they also could depend upon finding a Cuban community already experienced in facilitating the adjustment process.

The private religious and non-denominational voluntary agencies mentioned earlier were the main instruments in implementing the resettlement operation. Table 7 exhibits the actual resettlement breakdown of exiles by voluntary agencies and considers the earlier years of the program and after the end of the airlift.

Table 7. Comparison of Resettlements of Exiles Registered in 1963 and 1974 by the Voluntary Agencies of the Cuban Refugee Program

	Number of Exiles <u>Resettled</u>		Rese of T	Per cent Resettled of Total Resettled		cent ttled ency's ations ^C
Agency	<u>1963</u> ^a	<u>1974^b</u>	1963	1974	1963	1974
USCC IRC CWS HIAS	38,754 14,304 11,813 <u>1,973</u>	190,430 62,460 43,586 2,842	58.0 21.4 17.7 <u>2.9</u>	63.6 20.9 14.6 0.9	34.0 38.8 79.7 <u>58.7</u>	62.8 66.6 83.8 63.6
Tota1	66,844	299,326	100.0	100.0	39.7	66.1
Sources:	^a John Thomas, "Cuban Refugee Program," p. 9. ^b Cuban Refugee Program, <u>Fact Sheet</u> (March 1975). ^C See Table 6 for the number of registrations per agency.					

An increase in resettlement rates of exiles rose from 39.7 per cent in 1963 to 66.1 per cent in 1974 which represented a four-fold increase in numbers or from 66,844 to 299,326. A change in the proportion of relocations handled by each of the agencies is also noted. The Catholic facility (USCC) increased its share of relocated cases in relation to the total resettlement picture, while the Jewish agency (HIAS), handling most of its cases early in the exodus, declined from 2.9 to 0.9 per cent. The resettlement rate of the Protestant agency (CWS) was the highest from the beginning. A decade later this voluntary agency had even increased its resettlement rate.

Relocation has always been encouraged through various means by the Cuban Refugee Program. Transportation fare, extra clothing, and some cash for travel expenses were provided to assist the refugee in resettlement.⁴⁸ There was also an informal attempt to provide for initial housing needs. It was conducted between the voluntary agency, the target community and the refugee's relatives. In this way, often some home furnishings were provided. Also, there was even some effort to defray the pressing initial expenses, such as food, meat, and utilities through financial assistance which varied of course by individual case. Provisions for employment and schooling for children in need could also be arranged. Ultimately the refugee was never entirely alone since, in case of financial distress, he could always rely on the voluntary agency originally sponsoring him or on the local welfare facility.⁴⁹

Not all geographic regions of the United States appeared to equally attract the Cuban refugees. Table 8 shows the geographic distribution, by region and by state, of the resettled population over an eleven-year period. Outside of Florida, by 1973, resettlement in numbers has been greatest in the Northeast, whereas New Jersey and New York received the heaviest concentrations accounting for more than half of the entire resettled population.⁵⁰ California attracted most of the resettled refugees in the far West; Florida (excluding Dade County), Louisiana, and Texas in the South; Illinois in the North Central States; and in the "Other" locations listed, Puerto Rico received 99.8 per cent of a total 23,906 for that category in 1973.

Between 1962 and 1973 the distribution of resettled refugees changed according to region and state. For example, the Northeastern region, although it still remains the most important resettlement area, has lost some of its attraction in favor of the South and West. On the other hand, the inflow into the North Central area remained relatively constant. This was true also of Puerto Rico.

Of equal interest is to observe the changes that have occurred in some states within the various regions. In the Northeast, for example,

Table 8. Cumulative Number and Percentage Distributions of Cuban Exiles Resettled in the United States at the End of Four Selected Years, by Regions and States and Territories

	196	52	196	5	197	<u>'0</u>	197	'2
	<u>170</u>	Per	<u></u>	Per	<u></u>	Per		_ Per
State	Number	cent	Number	cent	Number	cent	Number	cent
Northeast	27,898	59.3	46,590	49.8	139,793	52.0	156,570	52.5
Connecticut	370	0.8	1,193	1.3	3,424	1.3	3,880	1.3
Maine	12	0	18	0	29	0	32	0
Massachusetts	1,482	3.1	3,353	3.6	7,369	2.7	8,201	2.7
New Hampshire	42	0.1	93	0.1	141	0	142	0
New Jersey New York	7,462 17,410	15.9 37.0	12,830	13.7	50,816	19.0	59,084	19.8
Pennsylvania	986	2.1	26,794 2,052	28.6 2.2	73,849 3,598	27.3 1.3	80,794 3,838	27.1 1.3
Rhode Island	132	0.3	2,052	0.2	473	0.2	505	0.2
Vermont	152	0.5	38	0.2	473 94	0.2	94	0.2
V OL MOLL	<u> </u>	0	50	U	54	U	54	Ŭ
North Central	5,016	11.0	10,972	11.7	30,526	11.4	33,848	11.3
Indiana	276	0.6	798	0.8	1,524	0.6	1,681	0.6
Illinois	2,536	5.4	5,061	5.4	19,754	7.4	22,296	7.5
Iowa	98	0.2	363	0.4	545	0.2	570	0.2
Kansas	182	0.4	563	0.6	976	0.4	1,028	0.3
Michigan	324	0.7	1,048	1.1	2,452	0.9	2,806	0.9
Minnesota	156	0.3	311	0.3	526	0.2	539	0.2
Missouri	216	0.4	773	0.8	1,227	0.4	1,281	0.4
Nebraska	188	0.4	288	0.3	469	0.2	481	0.2
North Dakota	28	0	41	0	46	0	46	0
Ohio Couth Dalasta	776	1.5	1,257	1.3	2,275	0.8	2,363	0.8
South Dakota	22	0.5	48	0	55	0	55	0
Wisconsin	214	0.4	421	0.4	677	0.2	702	0.2
West	4,312	. 9.1	12,690	13.5	39,900	14.9	44,893	15.0
Arizona	. 84	0.2	136	0.1	226	0.1	234	0.1
California	3,206	6.8	9,915	10.6	34,816	13.0	39,456	13.2
Colorado	326	0.7	937	1.0	1,348	0.5	1,381	0.5
Idaho	2	0	4	0	12	0	12	0
Montana	24	0	140	0.1	152	0	152	0
Nevada	286	0.6	540	0.6	1,464	0.5	1,625	0.5
New Mexico	150	0.3	289	0.3	440	0.2	452	0.1
Oregon	130	0.3	481	0.5	1,001	0.4	1,115	0.4
Utah	2	0	13	0	15	0	15	0
Washington	94	0.2	221	0.2	408	0.1	432	0.1
Wyoming	8,	0	14	0	18	0	19	0
South	5,564	11.8	12,253	13.0	34,602	12.9	38,878	13.0
Alabama	170	0.4	255	0.3	399	0.7	415	ан на 9 М
Arkansas	20	0	55	0	81	0	82	0
Delaware	46	0.1	175	0.2	359	0.1	365	0.1
District of	802	1.7	1,115	1.2	2,223	0.8	2,323	0.8
Columbia					-			-
Florida	704	1.5	1,736	1.8	10,663	4.0	12,762	4.3
Georgia	362	0.7	881	0.9	2,174	0.7	2,376	0.7
Kentucky	122	0.2	196	0.2	. 342	0.1	363	0.1

Table 8-continued

	196	2	196	5	197	0	197	3
		Per		Per		Per		Per
State	Number	<u>cent</u>	Number	<u>cent</u>	Number	cent	Number	cent
Louisiana	902	1.9	1,852	2.0	7,286	2.7	8,299	2.8
Maryland	402	0.8	626	0.7	1,623	0.6	1,811	0.6
Mississippi	72	0.1	91	0.1	110	0	110	0
North Carolina		0.5	441	0.5	828	0.3	857	0.3
Oklahoma	68	0.1	386	0.4	530	0.2	562	0.2
South Carolina		0.2	173	0.2	274	0.1	306	0.1
Tennessee	170	0.4	334	0.3	569	0.2	599	0.2
Texas	1,132	2.4	2,720	2.9	4,969	1.9	5,380	1.8
Virginia	250	0.5	1,109	1.2	2,008	0.7	2,104	0.7
West Virginia	20	0	108	0.1	164	0.1	164	0
Alaska	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0
Hawaii	18	Ō	26	0	30	0	30	0
Puerto Rico	4,184	8.9	10,113	10.8	22,399	8.4	23,875	8.0
Other	22	0	850	1.0	-		·	
0 . 1 m . 1	17 011		00 /05				000 00r	
Grand Total	47,014		93,495		267,251		298,095	
			Program Problem		ttlement	Re-Cap	(October	1962).
					raphic Di	stribu	tion of R	eset-
			ember 19					
1973 [.]	-Cuban R	efugee	Program	, <u>Fact</u>	Sheet (M	arch 19	973).	

New Jersey increased its share of resettled exiles from 15.8 to 19.8 per cent in eleven years; within the same period New York suffered a comparable decline. Illinois, in the North Central region, experienced a great increase, outranking all states in that area. In the South and the West, Florida, California, and Louisiana showed an increase, although to a lesser degree.

The eleven-year growth ratio of the resettled population has also shown an uneven distribution for each region. In the Northeast, because of the initial large number of refugees resettled there, the refugee population experienced its smallest increase (4.5 times). Meanwhile, refugees in the West recorded the largest increase or by 9.7 times. The North Central and South trailed showing total growth rates of 5.7 and 6.9, respectively.

The resettlement process did not end for many refugees with their exit from Miami. A substantial portion of them returned to what was the original point of entry, i.e. the Miami-Dade County area. Here is found the largest concentration of Cubans outside their native land.

In spite of the resettlement effort, the number and impact of the Cuban exiles in Miami appears to have been steadily increasing.⁵¹ Besides the obvious natural increase, the increment of this population seems to stem mainly from both the stay in the area by those who were never resettled after arriving on the 1965-1973 airlift, as well as by the return of many who were relocated elsewhere. This latter fact clearly emerged in a 1972 survey of the Miami Cubans based on a 1,400 case random sample which revealed that 27.4 per cent of this population had lived in other parts of the country.⁵² The flow of returnees from the various resettlement areas as reported in 1972 did not seem to have been an even one. Some areas appear to have contributed more heavily than others to this return migration (Table 9). Of the six major resettlement areas, New York, having received the greatest number of resettled refugees in the sample (27.1 per cent) contributed a proportionally larger share also of returnee population (30.8 per cent) to the Miami-Dade area. On the other hand, New Jersey, California and Puerto Rico contributed to the returnee movement in smaller proportions than their respective contributions to the resettled population. This could be interpreted to indicate that the resettled refugees became better adapted to these states and territory than to New York.

Table 9.	Distribution of the Resettled Cuban Exiles and of	
	the Returnees to Miami-Dade Area from Five States	
	and Puerto Rico, 1972	

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Location	Per cent of Total <u>Resettled</u> ^a	Per cent of Total <u>Returnees</u> b				
New York	27.1	30.8				
New Jersey	19.8	13.2				
California	13.2	11.1				
Puerto Ric	o 8.5	4.1				
Illinois	7.5	4.4				
Louisiana	2.8	1.8				
Sources: ^a Fact Sheet (March 1973). ^b Juan M. Clark, "Los Cubanos de Miami," p. 18.						

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It is noteworthy to point out some of the factors determining the returnee phenomenon. Both "push" and "pull" reasons have worked in the decision to return to Miami. Among them are the social and cultural variables within the already well-developed Miami-Cuban subculture, encompassed by friends and relatives, food and music, Spanish language spoken in the streets, on radio as well as on television. And last but not least, by the South Florida weather, almost a carbon copy of the one left behind in the island. In most cases, the survey of the returnees found that they came either with a new skill to work, with a job offer, or with capital for a new business. Seldom do they seem to constitute another burden to the local welfare rolls.⁵³

On the issue of the magnitude of the Cuban population within this area, we had pointed out in 1973 that the corresponding 1970 Census had actually subestimated this minority group in metropolitan Miami.⁵⁴ In 1974 the Census Bureau recognized that a significant undercount of minority groups within the United States had occurred.⁵⁵ Our estimate of the Cuban population in this area for 1972 was conservatively 350,000, of which 41.1 per cent arrived after 1965.⁵⁶ Their largest concentration is within the municipalities of Miami and Hialeah, constituting 45.3 and 44.4 per cent, respectively, of their total populations according to the 1970 Census.⁵⁷ Probably by now, the area within Miami known as Little Havana is close to 100 per cent Cuban.⁵⁸

Increasing cost of the refugee program. At first the relief funds for Cuban refugees came from the Presidential Contingency Fund, amounting to one million dollars. This fund grew into a program with continuous congressional allocations, totalling \$865 million by fiscal year 1973. Table 10 shows how those funds were disbursed since the beginning of the refugee program.

	Number	Number	Drogram	Cumulative	Per cent		
			Program				
<u>Year</u>	Registered	<u>Resettled</u>	Cost ^a	\underline{Cost}^{a}	Change		
10/1	00 (00	1 ((0	A	Å/ 000			
1961	29,628	4,668	\$4,089	\$4,089			
1962	95,098	27,587	38,502	42,591	841.0		
1963	40,870	30,233	56,027	98,618	45.5		
1964	6,976	16,742	46,012	144,630	-17.8		
1965	5,027	10,172	32,532	177,162	-29.2		
1966	29,548	26,606	35,825	212,987	10.1		
1967	43,372	37,382	45,594	258,581	27.2		
1968	39,834	35,768	55,226	313,807	21.1		
1969	42,339	31,616	70,649	384,456	27.9		
1970	46,537	30,173	87,376	471,382	23.6		
1971	46,938	31,773	157,968	629,800	80.7		
1972	25,931	12,513	106,200	736,000	-32.7		
1973	6,948	2,702	129,000	865,000	21.4		
1974	2,327	1,391	90,000	935,000	-69.7		
	461,373	299,326					
^a In thousands							

Cumulative Cost per Fiscal Year of the Cuban Refugee Table 10. Program in Relation to the Number of Registrations and Resettlements

Sources: U.S. House of Representatives, Cuba and the Caribbean, p. 159 for 1961-1970, and figures released to this author by officials of the Cuban Refugee Program for years 1971 through 1974.

Expenditures for the Cuban Refugee Program followed very closely the rate of immigration into this country. Program expenditures for 1962 were over eight times greater than those in the 1961 budget. By 1963, the funds allocated for refugees reached an all-time high. Since then, congressional funds allocated to the program declined as the flow of refugees dwindled. After December 1965, with the start of the Family Reunion Period, the overall budget again increased, passing the \$100 million mark for a record high in 1971. In spite of lowered refugee registrations for 1973, due to the sputtering arrival of refugees, total expenditures were only second to 1971, a fact that displeased some important congressional leaders. But by 1974 a sharp decrease in the expenditures signaled the initial stage of what appears to be the phase-out of this program.

The escalation in cost for the Refugee Program prompted sharp criticisms from congressional circles early in 1972.⁵⁹ Senator Edward Kennedy, Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Refugees and Escapees, pointed to the great increase in the refugee welfare budget as the major cause of the overall cost escalation. Figure 1 shows the proportional variation in cost of the major items within the program budget for three selected years.




Figure 1. Proportional Variation of Cost Items in the Cuban Refugee Program in Three Selected Years: 1962, 1966 and 1973

Sources: Research Institute, <u>The Cuban Immigration</u>, Appendix B, Table 5, and <u>The Miami Herald</u>, January 11, 1972.

The significant change experienced in welfare costs sharply contrasted with the relatively constant proportion of expenditures for other major items. The late director of the Refugee Program, Mr. Howard T. Palmatier, explained that this increase in the welfare budget was related to significant increases in medical costs throughout the nation.

The year 1971 marked a very large increase in payments by the Refugee Program--through a sliding scale system--to refugees receiving benefits in the State of Florida.⁶⁰ This resulted in a minimum boost representing a 26 per cent increase from the previous welfare rate.⁶¹ Mr. Palmatier justified the increase pointing out that welfare costs in the United States had risen similarly. He emphasized that it would be misleading to simply compare the 23 per cent increase in national welfare expenditures with the 26 per cent boost of welfare payments to Cuban refugees during the same period. It was vital not to overlook the fact that during this period, the United States population rose by just one per cent, while the number of Cuban refugees increased by 11 per cent.⁶²

Spain and Mexico as Secondary Points of Arrival

Spain and Mexico were, next to the United States, the most important places of arrival for Cuban refugees after leaving their native land. More than 80,000 Cuban exiles had used Spain as their initial place of exile.⁶³ There are no figures available on the number of exiles entering Mexico. However, from non-official sources it may be concluded that their number has been substantially lower than that indicated for Spain. Neither is there published information available on Mexico's participation in the Cuban exodus, and only the barest is recorded for Spain.

Variation of Cuban Migration Patterns in Spain

The number of Cuban exiles entering Spain averaged 7,300 annually from 1961 through 1970. The majority of them looked upon Spain merely as a stepping stone, since their hope lay in admission to the United States. During the first years of the exodus, some 400 refugees arrived monthly in Spain and remained only until an immigrant visa to the United States was procured, usually after three or four months in waiting. By 1972, the number of Cubans entering Spain averaged approximately 1,100 per month.

Due to the lack of permanent records, such as those at CREC in Miami, it was difficult to determine accurately the social and demographic characteristics of Cuban exiles in Spain. Research inquiry by this author brought to light that the heads of most households immigrating via Spain to the United States in 1970-1971 were mostly blue and white collar workers. Professionals with university degrees accounted for only 2 per cent of the total. Among the 1973 arrivals it was evident there was a preponderance of individuals above sixty years of age.

The obstacles against the departure of Cubans leaving through Spain and Mexico were at least as difficult as for those leaving by the airlift. For instance, besides the restrictions of property loss and forced labor in agriculture that applied to everyone leaving the island, those passing through Spain had the uncertainty about initial living conditions there plus the lack of adequate clothing for cold weather. In fact the refugee passing through Spain faced a colder climate contrasting with the milder one of Florida, and in many cases this condition was aggravated by the confiscation of winter clothing by the Cuban authorities at the time of departure.

Aid from the Spanish Public and Private Sectors

The handling of Cuban refugees in Spain has been a cooperative The United venture between national and international organizations. Nations through its Higher Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Commission for European Migration (ICEM), and others joined with Spanish organizations to promote a smooth handling of the incoming Cuban refugees.⁶⁴ The main Spanish organizations were the Joint Office for Information to Cubans (OCIC), founded especially to help the refugees in various ways. A semi-official Spanish organization that has also rendered considerable services to the Cubans has been Servicio The Catholic church and other already known international Social. voluntary agencies such as the International Rescue Committee (IRC) and the Church World Services (CWS) have also been very involved in assisting the refugees in Spain. A considerable source of financial assistance to many of the programs in operation came from both the UNHCR and ICEM.

The assistance process to the arriving Cuban refugees was never as complex in Spain as it has been in the United States. Upon arrival at the Barajas International Airport (either by Cubana de Aviacion or Iberia) the refugees were transported by bus to the Office of Reception of Cubans, working in connection with Auxilio Social. After registration and issuance of their ID (the "yellow card"), indispensable to receive institutional services, they were to a great extent on their own. Those without relatives or friends had to rely often on representatives of boarding houses trying to gain new residents for an initial place to stay. He was entitled to a small grant (\$6.00, turned into a loan after 1972 to be returned in three months) to be picked up at the IRC offices. Any further institutional assistance had to be procured on an individual basis for such needs as food, health, clothing, work, and transportation.

The above-mentioned organizations contributed in various ways to the satisfaction of the urgent needs of the destitute refugee. Auxilio Social for instance provided food through three dining halls where one good meal was served, an assistance that was in great demand by the exile population.⁶⁵ They also offered health services for a year in a clinic especially prepared for the Cubans who could also receive shots and other minor treatment at the dining halls.

The Spanish Catholic Commission for Migration (CCEM), together with the IRC and the CWS were the main voluntary non-governmental agencies providing services to the Cuban refugees.⁶⁶ Among the services offered were the processing of legal papers and documents, the distribution of used clothing, the furnishing of no-interest loans for transportation abroad and personal loans at low interest rates.⁶⁷ In two instances, the IRC organized the collection of funds in the United States through telethons to help support their assistance programs.⁶⁸

The role of the Catholic church was indeed significant in helping the Cuban exiles. Through Caritas, its Diocesan agency, it channeled assistance (clothing, food, personal loans) through the different parishes where the refugees could always seek assistance. The St. Vincent of Paul organization handled a special wardrobe of used clothing together with the CWS.⁶⁹ A sort of Cuban parish in Madrid (Nuestra Señora de la Caridad), headed by a Cuban priest, also provided material assistance as well as spiritual comfort. Early in the exodus, the church was entrusted also with the care of unaccompanied children through the foundation for Hispanic Exchange; it still takes care of the few cases not yet reunited with their relatives.⁷⁰ Individually, some priests like Father Gerardo Fernandez, a Spanish priest of long residence in Cuba, helped in a very

exemplary way in housing children and in their education, besides other forms of help.

The role of the private sector helping the Cuban refugees has also been significant in other ways. Besides the already-mentioned instances of religious and non-denominational organizations, it is important to mention the role of private citizens. Most of the help from the permanent Cuban colony in Spain came in this way, not through a specific organization. Spanish citizens individually have also been quite often more than just understanding. There have also been exceptions by those who have tried to take advantage of the refugee situation (both by Spaniards and Cubans) especially in the area of housing--knowing of the assistance coming from relatives in the United States--but these instances seem to have been a minority.

For the arriving Cuban, obtaining employment in Spain was indeed a difficult thing. First a refugee had to obtain a working permit originally costing 1,000 pesetas (about \$18), but was reduced after 1969 to less than 25 pesetas (\$.50) for all Latin Americans. But not many jobs were available and the fact that the stay of Cubans in the country was a transient one, their situation was most difficult. In spite of these circumstances, many were able to find jobs earning at least enough to partially support themselves in jobs below their qualifications.⁷¹

In spite of the aid provided to Cubans in Spain from public and private sources, the key to their survival lay with their relatives and friends in the United States. Without their aid--except for the minority who were able to support themselves--the situation for most exiles in Spain would have become unbearable. Often with great sacrifices, families in this country sent funds to others in Spain averaging \$150-200 monthly.

The majority of the Cubans in Madrid awaiting entrance to the United States experienced a certain degree of clustering, resembling somewhat the pattern common in Miami. <u>La Concepcion</u> and <u>Quintana</u> are good examples of neighborhoods within which Cubans were voluntarily segregated.⁷² Several restaurants catering to the refugees have flourished, and many stores sold Cuban food. This environment has been helpful in promoting self-help by the refugees, where advice, and multiple forms of assistance can be obtained, ranging from where to go to buy food to the procurement of housing, a job, or some other pressing need.

Authorities in Spain have facilitated in various ways the meeting of the educational needs of the Cuban exiles. Children arriving from Cuba were permitted to attend public schools at the primary and secondary levels along with the Spanish people. Religious schools were opened to refugee children upon the acquisition of a scholarship. At the university level, the Spanish government granted some scholarships early in the 1960's but this aid was soon discontinued. Nevertheless, the Cuban student was subject to the same registration fee as the native. For the older population, English classes were offered by ICEM on a regular basis at the Centro Cubano, a club of permanent residents in Madrid. On the other hand, studying in Spain for Cubans already residing in the United States became especially attractive. It became a sort of shortcut route to a college or university degree particularly for those studying medicine.

The Cuban Exodus through Mexico

The reception of Cuban refugees in Mexico differed substantially from that in Spain. Here, perhaps more than anywhere, the ability of

Cubans to help themselves apparently was the general rule.⁷³ Actually the Mexican government restricted the entrance of refugees to that country in 1966 by demanding ample guarantees that they would not require any local welfare assistance.⁷⁴ Subsequently the government only admitted separated spouses, or parents separated from their children.

During the initial years of the exodus, Cuban residents in Mexico City organized a small refugee center called the "Cuban House." This service lasted through 1965, and since then the minor efforts of the Cuban Club of Mexico have been the main sources of collective aid for the arriving refugee. Also some of the voluntary agencies, such as the IRC and the CWS, extended some assistance to Cubans. The Catholic church has also helped mainly through a "Catholic Refugee Center" which primarily distributed clothing. Thus, the Cuban exile in Mexico had to rely almost exclusively, during his wait for an American visa, upon his relatives and friends in the United States, a situation that was certainly much more dramatic in Mexico than in Spain.

The Mexican government never offered any kind of assistance to the destitute Cubans, even though on the average, they had to remain in that country from six to eighteen months. A backlog of refugees never developed in Mexico. The comparative ease with which the frontier could be crossed appears to be the logical answer. So far, U.S. Immigration authorities have not rejected this new type of "wetbacks."

The Mexican government placed certain regulations upon the refugees during their stay there. For example, they were to check every week with the immigration authorities. Gainful employment was forbidden, but out of sheer need, some violated this provision. A final regulation was an exit permit that had to be surrendered to the authorities before boarding a plane for the United States.

As in Spain, Cuban refugees in Mexico tended to live in clusters. Due to their smaller number, they were much less visible than in Madrid, but certain boarding houses and hotels catered very heavily to the Cuban refugees.

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NOTES

- 1. T. Lynn Smith, <u>Population Analysis</u> (New York: McGraw Hill Book Co., 1948), p. 436. The five periods marked by increasing control into which Smith divides immigration the United States are: the Colonial Period (up to 1783); the Era of Free Immigration (up to 1830); the Period of Agitation and State Control (up to 1882); Federal Control and Individual Selection (up to 1917); and the Period of Federal Control and Restriction (up to the present). He identified the undesirables as "the mentally ill, beggars, anarchists, prostitutes, and procurers." "George M. Stephenson, <u>A History of American Immigration 1820-1924</u> (New York: Russell and Russell, Inc., 1964), pp. 248-254.
- 2. In Germany alone there were fourteen million refugees. Leo Walder Schwarz, <u>Refugees in Germany Today</u> (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1957), p. 15. It was estimated that world wide about sixty million persons were displaced from their homes by the end of the war. The refugee phenomenon continues unabated, according to Senator Edward M. Kennedy. By 1968, a total of 15,594,090 persons were classifiable as refugees in <u>The World Refugee Report 1968</u> by the United States Committee for Refugees inMichael G. Wenk, "Adjustment and Assimilation, The Cuban Refugee Experience," <u>International Migration Review</u> II (Fall 1968): 38.
- 3. Federal Ministry for Expellees, and War Victims, Care and Help for Expellees, Refugees, Victims of Material War Damage, Evacuees, Prisoners of War and Civilian Prisoners, Repatriated Persons and Non-German Refugees (Bonn, Germany: Government Document, 1964). This report contains an excellent account of the West German view of the problem. It was estimated that by 1956 in West Germany there were 2,200,000 persons from East Germany, and 90,000 from other communist-controlled nations (Czechs, Hungarians, Poles, and Balts). Schwarz, Refugees, pp. 20 and 28. The report of the --West German Federal Ministry for Expellees, p. 16, cited an average annual flow of ten to twelve thousand persons escaping from East Germany before the erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961. By December of that year, 2,738,566 persons from the East had registered for help from the West German government. According to the 1968 report of the U.S. Committee for Refugees, a total of 34,000 persons escape annually from Eastern European countries. Henry P. David, "Involuntary Migration: Adaptation of Refugees," International Migration III-IV (1969): 73.
- 4. Inkeles and Bauer, <u>The Soviet Citizen</u>, p. 5. These authors cover this matter. They estimate that between 250,000 and 500,000 former Soviet citizens succeeded in escaping repatriation and remained in Western Europe after the war.
- 5. The above-mentioned Federal Ministry for Expellees, Refugees and War Victims is just another example at the national level. At the international level, the following organizations have done or are doing relief work with refugees: the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA, 1943-1947); the International

Refugee Organization (IRO, 1947-1952); the United Nations Higher Commission for Refugees (UNHCR, since 1952); the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM, since 1951): and the U.S. Escapee Program for Hungarian Refugees (1956-1957). All of these have U.S. financing. A.T. Bouscaren, "The U.S. Record on Immigration," International Migration I (1963): 71.

- 6. T. Lynn Smith, <u>Fundamentals of Population Study</u> (Chicago: Lippincott, 1960). The ten most important nations receiving immigrants up to the mid-1950's were: United States, 1.7 million; Canada, 1.1 million; Australia, 900,000; Israel, 780,000; Argentina, 760,000; United Kingdom, 440,000; Brazil, 411,000; France, 390,000; Venezuela, 300,000; Belgium, 290,000. Mr. Hugh McLoone, head of the United States Catholic Conference Program for Cuban Refugees in Miami, who had considerable experience with post-World War II refugees coming to the United States, gave us valuable first hand information about that process.
- 7. Martin A. Bursten, <u>Escape from Fear</u> (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1958), p. 194.
- 8. Thomas, "First Asylum," pp. 5-14. For the first time in this country, the Cuban refugee phenomenon marked a southern port as a significant point of entry for refugees.
- 9. Miami long has had a substantial Cuban colony. The estimated Cuban population of the city in December 1958, for example, was approximately 30,000. Msgr. Bryan O. Walsh, "Cubans in Miami," <u>America</u> (February 26, 1966): 23-26, and the Research Institute for Cuba and the Caribbean, <u>The Cuban Immigration (1959-1966) and Its Impact on Miami-Dade County, Florida</u> (Coral Gables: University of Miami Press, 1967).
- 10. That type of social relationship encompasses the typical extended family and its variation, with uncles and cousins of different degrees either living together or very close. Traditionally these ties have been very strong among Cubans.
- 11. This center is still operating, in perhaps a more limited capacity, providing child care, medical and dental services, job referrals, immigration status information, and other types of assistance to Cuban refugees as well as to other Spanish-speaking people in the area. There are some emigres from South American countries in Miami who are also making use of this facility. Charges to users are prorated according to their income.
- U.S. Senate, <u>The Cuban Refugee Problem</u>, p. 226, quoted in Research Institute, <u>The Cuban Immigration</u>, p. 24 and Walsh, "Cuban Refugee Children," p. 386.
- 13. This was the name given to a private operation which counted on the good will of the American families in providing for Cubans. Walsh, "Cuban Refugee Children," pp. 378-415. Msgr. Walsh was the person responsible for taking care of unaccompanied children under the sponsorship of the Diocese of Miami.

- 14. Estimates by the Research Institute for Cuba and the Caribbean are based on figures released by the private organizations and appear to be considerably underestimated.Appendix B, Table 4 of that publication breaks down the contributions as follows: private hospitals, 4.7 per cent; religious entities, 85 per cent (Catholic, 63 per cent; Protestant, 20.3 per cent; Jewish, 1.7 per cent; and non-religious entities, 10.3 per cent).
- 15. Woytych, "The Cuban Refugee," p. 18.
- 16. <u>Ibid</u>.
- 17. It was located at "T-90," an old World War II army barracks converted to that use.
- 18. Doctors detected, in many instances, acute cases of avitaminosis and so reported in oral testimony to this author.
- 19. This was another two-story World War II army barrack close to Building "T-90" and converted to hostelry where individuals or families would temporarily reside; it has no resemblance whatsoever to a camp.
- 20. If he was an escapee through Guantanamo Base, he remained there for a few days and thence was sent to Miami with a group of similar refugees. Upon arrival, he underwent the same admission procedures as apply to other escapees.
- 21. Careful security checks were always conducted on these escapees. There has always been a suspicion that the Castro regime may have used this means to infiltrate agents into the United States, especially through the more accessible Guantanamo Base. Orlando Castro Hidalgo, Spy for Fidel (Miami: E.A. Seeman Publishing Inc., 1971).
- 22. Research Institute, "The Cuban Immigration," p. 24.
- 23. Tracy S. Voorhees, <u>Interim Report to the President on the Cuban</u> <u>Refugee Problem</u> (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, December 19, 1960), p. 10.
- 24. Public Law 87-510, quoted in the Research Institute, "The Cuban Immigration," p. 28.
- 25. John F. Thomas, "Cuban Refugee Program," p. 5.
- 26. It is based on Immigration and Naturalization Service as well as on CREC figures. The discrepancy between the two indicates that the quoted amount did not register with that center. See Tables 3 and 6.
- 27. Initially there was a maximum allowance of \$100 per family, or \$60 per individual.
- 28. U.S. House of Representatives, Cuba and the Caribbean, pp. 11-12.

- 29. This was under the direction of the U.S. Public Health Service, with the supervision of the Dade County Public Health Department.
- 30. U.S. House of Representatives, <u>Cuba and the Caribbean</u> (Palmatier testimony).
- 31. Those with skilled occupations suffered less from the impact of occupational change than others. In the opinion of many, this category of workers substantially improved their level of living by going into exile.
- 32. A fact-finding commission sent by the President informed in November 1960, that 93 per cent of the new refugees admitted that fall were exempted from the non-resident fee; 18 per cent were exempted from the instructional material fee; and 6 per cent were receiving free lunches. Research Institute, "The Cuban Immigration," p. 99.
- 33. This is true with the exception that he does not have to show proof of need, and the minimum registration fee (\$5.00) is not automatically waived as was true before 1973.
- 34. The Research Institute for Cuba and the Caribbean has estimated that by 1966 the number of physicians that had left Cuba was about 2,000, with the majority of them residing in the United States. In 1972, the Colegio Medico Cubano en el Exilio (through memo to this author by its president, Dr. Enrique Huertas) estimated their number at 3,100 by August of that year. Bearing in mind that the cost of medical school, exclusive of previous education ranges between \$64,000 and \$104,000 for a four-year course, the contribution to this country by this group of Cubans could be estimated conservatively between \$198.4 to \$322.4 million. U.S. Senate, <u>The Cuban Refugee Problem</u>, p. 39, and "Educating Doctors Cost up to \$26,000 a Year, Medical Group Survey Shows," <u>The Miami Herald</u> (October 11, 1973), p. 8A.
- 35. It also provided a \$350 loan per student. Research Institute, "The Cuban Immigration," p. 157.
- 36. Since 1964 other Latins constituted more than 20 per cent of the enrollment.
- 37. Regulations relating to dentists varied by state. Actually, due to this reason, an underground dental practice developed in the Miami area, taking care of the dental needs of apparently a substantial proportion of the refugee population in the lower income levels.
- 38. This program was carried out between 1963 and 1970.
- 39. It was named the U.S. Cuban Student Loan Program, which will be described in Note 41.
- 40. Participating with the University of Miami were nine colleges and universities from the following states: Iowa, Indiana, Pennsylvania, Oregon, New Jersey, Kansas, California and Florida. U.S. Cuban Refugee Program, Professional Manpower.

- 41. The funds provided by the Refugee Program were to be repaid at a nominal interest rate (3 per cent) over a ten-year period. Under-graduates were limited to a maximum of \$5,000; but if graduate work was undertaken it could reach a ceiling of \$10,000. The loan covered in a mandatory way tuition in the current academic period, leaving the remainder of the funds released for that term to be used at the discretion of the student.
- 42. U.S. House of Representatives, <u>Cuba and the Caribbean</u> (Palmatier testimony).
- 43. Dade County Public Schools, Programa de Estudios para Adultos <u>Refugiados Cubanos y Americanos Repatriados de Cuba</u> (pamphlet) (Miami: Dade County Public Schools, n.d.).
- 44. U.S. Cuban Refugee Program, <u>A Narrative History of Training for</u> <u>Independence</u> (pamphlet), n.d. This program was patterned after the American Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC).
- 45. It is considered that the local garment industry (which grew significantly afterward) was one of the main beneficiaries of this program. Many feel that the boost received by this industry was attributable to the large number of females trained by this program, and employed as sewing machine operators. Other courses offered were commercial housekeeping, receptionist clerk, hotel front office procedures, PBX receptionist, hotel houseman, and upholstery. These courses lasted between 4 to 6 weeks, with daily classes ranging between three to six hours throughout the week. Refugee Program official Mr. Mariano Vallejo, to whom we are highly indebted for his cooperation in our research, informed us that the experience gained from this program was later utilized by the national planners of the anti-poverty program.
- 46. U.S. Cuban Refugee Program, Fact Sheet, March 1975.
- 47. These constituted 299,326 out of the 461,373 registrations by December 1974. Ibid.
- 48. A transitional grant of \$100 was given per family, and \$60 to a single individual in all resettlement cases.
- 49. This was reimbursed entirely by the Refugee Program to the state or local welfare agency. As was mentioned earlier, the responsibility of the program stopped only when the refugee became a United States citizen.
- 50. This does not include voluntary non-officially sponsored resettlement which was unaccounted for in the records of the Cuban Refugee Program. New York had a Cuban colony since pre-independence days, and job opportunities were more abundant in that area.
- 51. "Flight from Cuba, Castro's Loss is U.S. Gain," <u>U.S. News & World</u> <u>Report</u> (May 31, 1971), pp. 74-77.

- 52. This study was directed by Professors Juan Clark and Julio Avello of Miami-Dade Community College. The survey undertaken consisted in an availability cluster sample of 1,400 Miami-Cubans. A very short questionnaire eliciting just basic socio-demographic data was used; the interviewers were Cuban students from the above-mentioned college and the Cuban-American Belen Jesuit High School. Two articles with conclusions concerning the essential facts about this population have been published in Ideal.
- 53. Juan M. Clark, "Los Cubanos de Miami: Cuantos Son y de Donde Provienen," Ideal (January): 19.
- 54. The article "Los Cubanos de Miami" shows how the 1970 Census estimates for the size of this population were below reality, taking into consideration the Cuban Refugee Program figures, as well as those of the Immigration Service.
- 55. Austin Scott, "Census Undercount Estimated at 4.8 to 5.8 Million Persons," <u>The Miami Herald</u> (April 26, 1973), p. 16A, and Don Bedwell, "'70 Census of Latins Too Low, Many Uncounted Commission Says," <u>The Miami Herald</u> (February 14, 1974), p. 17A.
- 56. Clark, "Los Cubanos de Miami," p. 18.
- 57. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, <u>1970 Census of</u> <u>Population and Housing, Census Tracts, Miami, Fla. Standard Metro-</u> <u>politan Statistical Area</u>. Publication No. PHC(1)-129 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, March 1972).
- 58. The Little Havana area comprises several census tracts, and its limits could be placed at 7th Street North West down to the Miami River, by 27th Avenue at the North West end, to Coral Way in the South, to 2nd Avenue, South East, and up to downtown Miami.
- 59. These conclusions are based on an audit by the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), which pointed out also that the rush in resettling new airlift arrivals out of the Miami area, without any language or job retraining, pushed many of these refugees into permanent welfare. "Welfare Cost up 300 per cent for Cuban Refugees," <u>The Miami Herald</u> (January 11, 1972).
- 60. The State of Florida holds 47 per cent of all welfare cases of Cuban refugees; other major states receiving refugees, such as New York, New Jersey, and California, were already among the top in welfare payments, which also increased their rates. In the case of Florida, welfare payments to Cubans were raised to the same levels as those of the native American welfare cases.
- 61. This implied an increase per family of two persons from \$100 to \$126, up to a maximum of \$246 for a ten-person family and for individuals it rose \$60 to \$86. Overall, it represented a 43 per cent boost. Gustavo Pena Montes, "Aumentaran la Ayuda a Refugiados Cubanos," Diario Las Americas (May 29, 1971).

- 62. Gustavo Pena Montes, "Explica Palmatier Aumento del Costo del Programa de Ayuda para los Exiliados," <u>Diario Las Americas</u> (January 16, 1972).
- 63. Roberto Fabricio, "Stranded in Spain."
- 64. ICEM was founded in 1951 with the participation of thirty-one countries. Since 1961 through April 1972 it has helped 31,400 Cubans in their transportation to the United States. Intergovernmental Commission for European Migration, <u>Guia Cronologica de Organismos y Servicios</u>, printed leaflet distributed to refugees in Madrid, 1972.
- 65. More than half of the Cuban exiles in Madrid have to use this facility. Roberto Fabricio, "Cubans in Spain, a Long Wait for Visas to the States," The Miami Herald (November 27, 1972).
- 66. Intergovernmental Commission, Guia Cronologica.
- 67. Ibid.
- 68. The IRC handled 29.9 per cent of the refugees arriving to Spain in 1970. International Rescue Committee, <u>Annual Report of the Year</u> <u>Ended December 31, 1970</u> (Madrid: International Rescue Committee, 1971), p. 1. Roberto Fabricio, "Cubans Receive Little Aid in Long Madrid Stopover," The Miami Herald (November 28, 1972).
- 69. Manuel Fernandez, Memo to Juan M. Clark, June 1973.
- 70. Maria Elena Saavedra, "Fundacion de Intercambio Hispanoamericano Ayuda a Niños Refugiados en España," <u>Diario Las Americas</u> (June 28, 1971). This institution is directed by Fr. Antonio Camiñas of the Franciscan Order.
- 71. Jose Gash, "El Sector Olvidado del Exilio Cubano en España," <u>Diario</u> Las Americas (February 17, 1971).
- 72. Roberto Fabricio, "Cubans in Spain, A Long Wait for Visas to the States," and Maria Lopez Salas, "Concepcion: el Barrio Cubiche de Madrid," <u>Replica</u> (January 10, 1973).
- 73. The information for this section came primarily from visitors to Mexico as well as from refugees that utilized that exit way. Our efforts to collect official figures from the American Embassy in Mexico and the Mexican Interior Ministry concerning the granting of visas to Cubans have so far been unsuccessful.
- 74. This seems to be more of a pretext than a valid reason in view of the prevailing non-cooperative official attitude towards the refugees by that government.

CHAPTER VII

THE CUBAN ESCAPEES

Cuban nationals who fled their homeland during the early years of the Castro regime by unconventional means constitute only a small but highly significant number of all anti-Castro exiles. They are the ones among thousands who furtively succeeded in escaping from Cuba either by sea, air, or by land.

Individuals who clandestinely slipped away from their island homeland by sea used crafts which ranged from seaworthy vessels to flimsy homemade rafts made buoyant by the use of either truck or tractor innertubes, or both. Not all who attempted to escape by this means realized their hopes. Many were overtaken and slain by gunfire from Castro's patrol ships. Others were attacked by voracious sharks, and still others died from dehydration and hunger. Those who neither escaped nor died in seeking their freedom were often captured. When apprehended they faced a high risk of execution, but at times only several years of imprisonment followed.

Attempts to escape from Cuba by air, by way of contrast, were less frequently tried than by boat, but as with boats or small ships, unauthorized plane flights were undertaken at great personal risk. The airplanes used sometimes secretly entered Cuba from Florida to make clandestine pick-ups of individuals hopeful of rescue. In some instances, Cubans hijacked Cuban airliners and fumigation planes in order to flee from their homeland. In one case an escapee hid in the wheel-well of a DC-8 jet in a bid for freedom.

It seems paradoxical to escape from an island by land, but because the American Navy is based on Cuban soil at Guantanamo, it became a place of refuge. After 1959 thousands of Cubans succeeded in entering the base as refugees. However, for many Cubans who sought to enter the base, either death or capture by Cuban security forces wrecked their hopes for personal freedom.

The escapees appear to be a highly significant group within the Cuban exodus in spite of their small number. Yet their apparent lower socio-economic composition poses highly relevant questions about the nature of the entire process of the exodus and its implications within the Cuban population. Furthermore, the escapees are also significant because the main constraint to leave the island in their case was sheer courage and ability, rather than status or family ties as was the case of most legal departures from Cuba after the 1962 Missile Crisis. These factors, which seem to indicate a considerable degree of closeness of the escapees with the Cuban population, make an in-depth study of this group a highly pertinent one. Consequently, a better understanding of the escapees will in turn shed considerable amount of light upon the whole revolutionary phenomenon.

In spite of the preceding reasons, the escapees, as the leading Miami newspaper has pointed out, have not received an adequate amount of coverage by the news media, nor have they been studied systematically.¹ This chapter hopes to close this gap by analyzing first the magnitude of the fifteen-year escapee flow from 1959 to 1974. It also includes the descriptions of instances illustrating the three basic escape modes in each of the stages into which the escape process was subdivided, followed by an account of the deterrents to, and the handling of, the

escapee situation by the Cuban government. It will conclude with a view of rescue assistance rendered to the escapees by the different agencies or nations involved in this matter, especially by the United States. An analysis of the socio-demographic characteristics of this group will be presented in the next chapter, comparing them with all the exiles and the Cuban population.

Variation in the Number of Escapees through the Years

The analysis of changes resulting from the movement of escapees was seriously constrained by the lack of consistent data for each of the three basic methods described above. Only those who arrived by boat were recorded systematically by the Cuban Refugee Center (CREC) in Miami and the U.S. Coast Guard. But even here, their data on record do not always coincide as Table 11 indicates. A search of literature aimed at identifying published material about escapee instances yielded a total of 707 cases,* mostly based on press accounts.² In total they involve 5,330 persons, of which 4,706 are of the boat type; obviously the total number is much larger as we shall see. Unfortunately, the recorded data for some years was more fruitful than others, partly due to the greater comprehensiveness of one source reviewed.³ In view of this inevitable inconsistency, we have limited the yearly trend analysis presented herein primarily to boat-related cases, utilizing the roster of 707 escapee cases mainly to ascertain variations within each method of escape.

The total number of persons identified as successful escapees from Cuba since 1959 up to December 1974 can be conservatively estimated at 16,523. Table 11 shows primarily the yearly record of boat escapees

^{*}A case comprises one or more individuals.

	Escapees Reported				Boat Escapees		
	<u>ir</u>	<u>in the Daily Press</u> Boat		<u>Recor</u> Coast	Recorded by		
Year	Cases	Persons	Escapees	Guard	CREC	GRAND TOTAL ^a	
					4		
			-1-	-2-	-3-		
1959	25	99	60	9	_	60	
1960	56	219	165	157	_	165	
1961	82	850	776	1,399	1,801	1,801	
1962	22	303	303	1,920	2,274	2,274	
1963	-	-	-	1,756	1,953	1,953	
1964	30	251	206	1,249	1,521	1,521	
1965	31	707	707	5,730 ^b	950	950	
1966	21	356	353	1,007	1,036	1,037	
1967	111	660	523	514	456	523	
1968	111	625	611	590	547	611	
1969	75	496	375	319	300	375	
1970	59	346	328	239	247	328	
1971	46	204	199	185	179	199	
1972	24	149	146	27	65	1,46	
1973	9	49	49	34	29	49	
1974	5	16	16	4	20	20	
	707	5,330	4,706	10,359	11,378	12,012 ^c	

Table 11. Number of Escapees Recorded by the News Media, the U.S. Coast Guard and the Cuban Refugee Program, by Year of Arrival, 1959-1974

^aIncludes the largest figure from columns 1, 2, and 3.

^bIncludes 4,993 coming through Camarioca in a legal way, thus not considered escapees, according to the U.S. Coast Guard records.
 ^cTo be added 4,000 Guantanamo escapees plus 511 "other" escapees = 16,523

assisted by the U.S. Coast Guard plus those registered with the Refugee Center and those identified as such by our inquiry. To these figures we have added a conservative estimate of those identified as Guantanamo escapees (4,000), plus examples of stowaways of various types (511). Thus, our total number of boat escapees was based on the selective combination of the three above-mentioned sources, finally using the highest.4 The extreme right column shows the final composite number of boat escapees. Our contention is that the total number of escapees listed is very conservative because we do not have complete records of all escapees, especially those who fled from Cuba to other countries. Furthermore, many escapees arriving in the United States were never recorded as such, especially if it involved a rescue operation, also known as "exfiltration." Furthermore, we have not been able to estimate accurately the number of arrivals at Guantanamo before 1966. They should have comprised a sizable number, according to estimates available for later years. It should be pointed out also that the 4,993 persons legally leaving through the Camarioca exodus (see Chapter V), although they had exceedingly high risk due to the inadequacy of their boats, they were not included as escapees in our count, nor in that of the Refugee Center.

As with the total refugee population, it is possible to delineate several stages in the escape process, with overall distinctive characteristics differentiating them. Here, however, the borderlines are not as distinct as with the total exile population, thus one stage may actually overlap with the other. Four periods are rather apparent, and coincide to a great extent with those of the total exile exodus as Figure 2 indicates. The first stage extended from 1959 to 1960 inclusive.




Figure 2. Annual Variation in Per cent of Boat Escapees Compared with the Exile Population Entering the United States, 1959-1974

This was followed by another which clearly began in 1961 and ended in 1966. The third ran from 1966 through 1971, and the fourth develops from 1972 through 1974 when this study was terminated.

The curves (at different scales) depicting the annual variations of the boat escapees and total exile populations show certain degrees of coincidence. Both reach a peak at the same year, 1962, and both taper off also in a similar way by 1974. The main differences are right at the beginning of the exodus (1959) and by the late 1960's. At both periods the exiles proportionally surpass the escapees. At the initial period, the boat escapee flow is just starting while by the latter stage that flow is rather dwindling. The opposite is true for the total exile population since at those two periods the flow of the exiles is close to its maximum volume. It is noteworthy that the picture of the total exile would tend to resemble that of the escapees by the late 1960's if we graphically add to them the estimates of the Guantanamo escapees (around 4,000) to that of the boats (see the dotted line on top of "Boat Escapees").

The Early Escapees (1959-1960)

As with the early 1959 exiles, the majority of the few early escapees were members of the regime overthrown on January 1st. Most of them fled by luxury yachts and airplanes on that New Year's Day. Those left behind, who feared for their lives if captured, sought political asylum or escape by yacht or arranged for pick-up flights from Florida. No record is available of these successful air rescues, but apparently there were many. They took advantage of the abundant roads and small air fields, and even important highways like the Via Blanca, but not all were successful.⁵

Hijackings of "Cubana Airlines" and other national planes were very frequent in 1959, and even more so in 1960 of planes on national flights. In the latter part of 1960, entire plane crews defected to the United States in spite of the military guards placed on them. By that time smaller airplanes such as those used for crop fumigation began to be employed for escape purposes, often by their regular crew, who sometimes took relatives or friends with them.⁶

By late 1959 some of the disillusioned officials of the Castro government began to leave by boats, some of which appear to have been of small size. Noticeable by the use of this means were such prominent figures of the revolutionary regime as the head of the Revolutionary Air Force (FAR, July 1959); in 1960, the Minister of the Treasury (October), the President of the Tribunal de Cuentas (October), and the Minister of Public Works (November). Other political and military people also escaped from Cuba by sea.⁷ An example of the latter was the escape from El Morro fortress of some of the imprisoned military comrades of Major Huber Matos. The major is still in prison to this date, but nineteen of his comrades reached Florida in October 1960. Following the same route, the former president of the Labor Unions Confederation (CTC), David Salvador, was captured on November 1960.8 We cannot recount here other instances of the apparent frequent smuggling out of Cuba of political figures, some taking place in merchant ships. Also by late 1960, Cuban merchant ships began to experience defections that ranged from sailors to captains. This trend continued into the next stage, to the point that most of the pre-Castro captains were practically gone by 1962. The Cuban Navy also experienced defections during this period as some news releases indicate.9

Most of those who escaped by boat or ship during this period reached the Florida Keys as their first point of arrival. Only limited numbers reached Jamaica, Puerto Rico, the Yucatan Peninsula in Mexico, or Cay Sal, just fifteen miles off the north central Cuban coast (See Figure 3). The banks of Cay Sal eventually became one of the most frequently used stepping stones for Cubans fleeing from the central provinces. In this regard, the U.S. Coast Guard began to play, by the end of this period, a very important role around that area, rescuing refugees from that bank as well as from other points on the Straits of Florida. The few who escaped during this period tended to be from the western provinces; the even fewer who reached Jamaica, Cay Lobos or Puerto Rico departed from the easternmost part of the island. At least 225 persons fled the island by boat during this early period, plus an estimated one hundred used other illegal means. In total they comprised less than 2 per cent of the entire boat-escapee population.

The Great Leap Outward (1961-1965)

The second period of the escape process started in 1961 and continued through 1965. These two years were selected as borderline points for their significance on the whole process. First of all, 1961 signaled an abrupt increase in boat escapees as we can visually perceive in Figure 2. On the other hand, 1965 was selected because the Camarioca exodus (October-November 1965) was a significant turning point both for the escapees and the total exile population (See Chapter V). On September 28, 1965, Castro publicly offered the Cubans the freedom to leave. This action apparently was motivated by the systematic black eye that his government was receiving after the publicity of horrible cases of escapees perishing in the seas surrounding the island.¹⁰ With the departures of

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


Figure 3. Cuba and Its Vicinity

nationals legally permitted from Camarioca, plus the more orderly one that followed by plane after December 1, 1965, Castro was apparently trying, in a way, to halt the huge illegal exodus that was continuing, although at diminishing rates (See Table 11).

The Great Leap Outward is also marked by an initial eleven-fold increase in boat escapees by 1961 in contrast with 1960. This trend continued and peaked by 1962. In that year, transportation between the United States and Cuba was still open (until October 22), but control of departure through exit permits was very rigid and the procurement of a U.S. visa was contingent on a claim from a relative in this country.¹¹ This explains partially the peak in boat cases, since most of those from lower socio-economic levels had only this means of exit. Another important factor contributing to the large number of boat escapees lies in the greater availability of boats and in the laxity of coastal vigilance by Castro's armed forces which was gradually tightened.

Indeed, after 1965 there was a significant change in the boatescapee pattern, both quantitatively and qualitatively. Furthermore, in this second stage, comprising a five-year span, close to threequarters of all who escaped by sea (8,499 individuals), left the island (Table 11). In Table 12, it is indicated that in this period large boats were being used to escape because the number of persons per boat was greater than the average. Looking at internal conditions in Cuba connected with this type of exodus, the beginning of this stage coincided with the feeling of the full impact of the totalitarian revolutionary transformations by the Cuban lower socio-economic sectors. This was felt both in the political and economic life of the nation generating unparalleled repression and total rationing which reached all

Year	Cases ^a	Men	Women	Children	Total Persons	Persons Per Case	
1961	194	1,384	219	198	1,801	9.2	
1962	250	1,641	309	324	2,274	9.1	
1963	193	1,147	421	385	1,953	10.1	
1964	170	996	274	251	1,521	8.9	
1965	85	489	230	231	950	11.1	
1966	130	663	117	256	1,036	7.9	
1967	84	327	41	88	456	5.4	
1968	109	404	41	102	547	5.0	
1969	68	253	13	34	300	4.4	
1970	45	178	24	45	247	5.4	
1971	30	102	34	43	179	5.9	
1972	17	49	10	6	65	3.8	
1973	10	27	-	2	29	2.9	
1974	20	20			20	1.0	
	1,405	7,680	1,733	1,965	11,378	8.1	
^a Includes instances of boats or rafts normally comprising more than one							

Table 12. Annual Record of Boat Escapees by Case, Type of Person, and Average Number per Case, Registered with the Cuban Refugee Program by Year of Arrival

^aIncludes instances of boats or rafts normally comprising more than one person.

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levels of the population. This was immediately reflected in the massive appearance of blue collar workers, farmers, and fishermen in the escapee flow.

As the Cuban government was apparently angered by the large number of boat escapees during the early years of this stage, it began to apply very harsh treatment to those discovered fleeing. Such is the evidence of those who escaped and as witnessed by empty boats floating helplessly in the sea, often with bullet-ridden bodies of men, women, and children.¹² At other times the boats may have been full of bullet perforations and no passengers. Due to these sightings, Cuban northern waters were labeled "The Death Corridor" or "Machine Gun Alley."¹³ It seems that the patrol boats given by the Russians in 1962 were put to very effective use rather soon.

This five-year escape period is occupationally dominated by the presence of the common man, both from the city and rural areas. Thus, by 1962, the first all-farmer boat load was noticeable after the successful hijacking of a National Institute of Agrarian Reform (INRA) Sigma III fishing vessel.¹⁴ Hijackings of boats by fishermen were abundant, developing a trend that continued throughout all escape periods. Combinations of boat loads with farmers, fishermen plus blue collar occupations and scattered professionals were commonly recorded during this time. Several important political and military figures, representing a very small fraction of the total escape population, were also noticeable during this stage. They were fleeing actual persecution by Castro's security forces. Such instances were exemplified by the cases of Capt. Jorge Sotus, a hero of the Sierra Maestra struggle against Batista, plus the dramatic case occurred with a group of twenty-two survivors of the 2506

Brigade who managed to flee the Bay of Pigs area in a fishing boat. For fifteen days they were adrift and ten died of hunger and dehydration.¹⁵

This stage shows a considerable variety of boats and the scarcity of air hijackings. In effect, the range of boats used went from large fishing and intracoastal ships to thirty-foot boats, sailboats, and small row boats which in some instances were homemade. As years progressed, more smaller boats were used, eventually dropping to the raft level. With large boats, a hijacking of some sort was usually involved, carrying normally thirty or more persons. In this sense the single largest arrival ever took place in 1965 with ninety-one persons, all fishermen with their families, in a joint escape with two boats, marking a record not yet surpassed.¹⁶

By the end of this period the scarcity of boats is dramatized by the presence of more homemade boats and the appearance, for the first time in our records--in 1964--of an inner tube raft utilized by five men including two teenagers; this inner tube trend continues up to the present time.¹⁷ On the other hand, tighter security controls on airplanes are revealed by the sharp drop in this type of escape. Thus, during the initial two-year stage (1959-1960), a total of nineteen air hijackings were uncovered by our inquiry, whereas only nine were noticeable during this longer five-year period. In most cases the aircrafts involved here were of the fumigation type; only one commercial airliner was successfully hijacked in this period.¹⁸

The incidence of stowaways in non-communist ships and the defections, mainly of sailors from Cuban vessels, appear to have continued over this period. Four cases were recorded in 1961, plus the defections of fourteen sailors including the captain of the important Cuban merchant vessel

"Bahia de Nipe," along with ten crew members.¹⁹ Defections via "Cubana Airlines" on their Gander, Canada stopover _en route to Czechoslovakia were apparently very frequent, in view of which the Cuban government decided to cancel this route after a mass defection of forty-four passengers on November 1964.²⁰

Concerning the distribution of points of departure and arrival of escapees, the boat cases showed greater variety during this period than over the preceding one. There were reports of more cases of arrivals to Jamaica, Grand Cayman, Mexico and Cay Sal Bank. This in turn was indicative of departures from a wider range of Cuban coastal points such as along the less-populated southern coast, and from the central eastern provinces. The confrontation of more difficult obstacles for departure are also noticeable. These ranged from greater use of patrol boats to the aid of Soviet spy ships and better land-coastal vigilance (See The Deterrent Role of the Cuban Government, p. 174).

The Post-Camarioca Exodus (1966-1971)

The six years following the Camarioca exodus can be considered the third period in the escape process due to some relevant features that characterize it. Among them, a sharp decline in boat escapees was noticeable for this stage, which represented as a whole close to a quarter of all these cases. Only 1966 was a slight exception to the downward trend by surpassing 1965 in boat escapees, but beyond that year the trend continued without interruption. Furthermore, a decline in the number of persons per boat was also evident, as Table 12 indicates, mainly due to the increasing use of rafts. These were used frequently during these years, and continued in "service" during the following period. But perhaps the most significant characteristic of this stage was the increase of escapees into Guantanamo, especially during the late 1960's.

This escapee stage also showed the predominance of the blue collar and extractive occupational groups as well as that of the young. Whenever news releases offered a description of those arriving by boats or rafts, almost invariably we found workers, fishermen, and young men, mostly in their teens escaping military draft; men in their upper thirties were also common. This pattern was also true for the Guantanamo escapees during this stage. Furthermore, our personal experience with both the boat and Guantanamo cases indicates that blacks, mulattoes, and <u>mestizos</u> constituted approximately a third of all the cases with whom we were in contact.

The boats used on the post-Camarioca stage were predominantly of the small (less than twenty foot) type, except for a few occasions. Rowboats, sailboats and skiffs--often homemade--were very visible examples of this trend. The case of a tiny homemade kayak powered by a lawn mower engine which made its way close to Miami in 1966 illustrates this pattern.²¹ Small "vessels" were more evident in 1967 and in subsequent years. Among these were rafts which comprised 32 per cent of all the boat-related cases identified for the 1970-1971 span.

Rafts were of various models and sizes. The most popular, the inner tube raft, usually consisted of either two or three truck or tractor inner tubes lashed together with ropes and some wooden frame and planks on top or inner tubes inside a canvas container. A more rudimentary type would consist of inner tubes just lashed with ropes with some burlap as a bottom or even without this. Usually around three persons combined their efforts collecting with great difficulty and secrecy the materials and food supplies needed for the trip. Sometimes they carried these items one by one and assembled them in a hurry at the moment of departure,

often in the water. The raft had the advantage of not being easily detected by radar, and being unsinkable if it was of good rubber quality. The black market was the most important source of inner tubes, where the western capitalist type were sold at prices several times higher than those from communist countries. Exceptionally, some rafts were with oil drums as pontoons and lumber, one of which reached Honduras with eighteen persons.²² An exceptionally large boat escape was the 1971 hijacking of a medium sized boat from the fishing port of Batabano, south of Havana province. The fifty persons on board ended up in Honduras, after missing Grand Cayman as their initial stopping point to the United States. They managed later to come to this country in an odd and daring way.²³ This hijacking marked a pattern of similar events in the future where fishermen in the crew commandeered the boat, going later to pick up relatives and friends at a predetermined coastal point. Hijacking was the only way to get a hold of large boats for escape since they were all nationalized in 1968.

As boats and other floating devices became scarcer by the late 1960's, more Cubans selected Guantanamo Base as their escape route. Most of the estimated 4,000 Guantanamo escapees seem to have come during this period. Entering this base could be done by land or through the bay (Figure 4). Both imply a high amount of risk and both ways have apparently been tried by the would-be escapees. The water route entailed swimming without detection or floating in inner tubes (at night) usually taking advantage of the current produced by the tide effect on a wide bay with a rather narrow entrance. It took considerable amount of endurance to reach the base waters avoiding Castro's land and sea patrols. But sharks were also abundant in the bay, so "swimmers" often used a combination of

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


Figure 4. Guantanamo Base and Its Surrounding Area

non-animal grease with pepper to repel the sharks and the patrol dogs. On the other hand, those going by land faced a long, difficult hike from some access point. They normally hid during the day and walked at night through mountainous terrain filled with cactus and other thorny bushes until they reached the fence system at the perimeter of the base (See Figure 5). To cross it, not only endurance was needed, but also knowhow due to the mined fields and other "booby-trap" types of obstacles. Due to these difficulties it is estimated that few could make it without the assistance of the knowledgeable people of the area, which may not exclude the Frontier Guard men for the right price. Obviously many did not make it, and we have evidence of cases that were blown up by the mines or were captured in the attempt.²⁴ By late 1970 and mid-1971 the Guantanamo escapees were on the decline after new fences were erected around the base by the Cuban government (See <u>The Deterrent Role of the</u> <u>Cuban Government</u>, p. 174).

The Guantanamo escapees have seldom received news coverage. An exception was the case of eighty out of a group of 150 who entered the base in January 1969 using a van-truck , most of them coming from Havana (See Figure 3). They managed to avoid detection by officials throughout the island in a shrewd manner.²⁵ The news black-out about this route was aimed at preventing a legal confrontation with the Cuban government, which could call for the extradition of the escapees. This right is based on a 1903 treaty between Cuba and the United States which specified that fugitives from Cuban justice entering the base must be returned. The escapees constitute such cases by their illegal departures, but Cuba has never pressed the issue.

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Other modes of escape took place during this stage, but to a lesser degree. Stowaways on merchant ships continued to some extent but were not frequently publicized. Defections of sailors from Cuban merchant and fishing ships were also recorded in several instances in 1967 as well as for successive years. A famous incident involving this type of escape occurred in 1968 off Portsmouth, Va. where four Cuban sailors tried to defect from the "26 de Julio" merchant ship after commandeering the vessel. After failing to bring the ship to port, they seem to have negotiated their escape in one of the lifeboats under the surveillance-at a distance--of the U.S. Coast Guard. This attempt failed, and it appears that the three ultimately involved in the boat escape were shot and rammed by the Cuban ship in spite of the Coast Guard's presence.²⁶ Probably the single largest successful defection of a fishing ship crew occurred in 1971 when twelve out of fourteen of the crew members defected in Mexico.²⁷

Air escapes from Cuba were infrequent during this stage. Our research effort was able to uncover only three instances of this type: two involving hijackings of small planes and a stowaway in a jet airliner in a transatlantic flight. On the first hijacking in this period, a small plane was stolen in 1966 by three men, one of whom died when they crash-landed in Florida.²⁸ The second occurred in 1968 involving a pilot and thirteen relatives and friends in a crop dusting biplane flying to Homestead, Florida at fifty feet above water to avoid detection.²⁹

Probably the most significant air stowaway of the entire Cuban exodus took place in 1969. The relevancy of the case is hinged on the type of person involved as well as on the unique way in which he managed to accomplish it. This was the case of Armando Socarras Ramirez, seven-

teen, who with a companion, Jorge Perez Blanco, sixteen, tried to stow away on the Iberia DC-8 Havana-Madrid flight. Only Armando was able to safely lodge himself into the jet wheel-well and Jorge was apparently killed when he fell from the airliner. Eight hours after leaving Cuba, the plane landed at Barajas, Madrid's international airport. Right after it had completely stopped, leaving behind a 5,563 miles of night flight at 29,000 feet and 41° F. below zero, a semifrozen unconscious body dropped from the plane. Doctors could not explain how Armando had survived the altitude with insufficient oxygen and sub-freezing temperature. By the same token an official from Douglas Aircraft Co. said that there was only "one chance in a million that a man would not be crushed when the plane's huge double wheel retracts." Armando survived, recuperated, and later came to the United States. He is the son of a plumber who declared he was totally fed up with Cuban life.³⁰

There were no noticeable variations in departure and arrival points, compared with the previous stage, especially for boat cases. Cay Sal Banks and Cay Lobos remained as favorite stepping stones in flights by sea from the northern central and eastern provinces. Jamaica, Grand Cayman, Yucatan Peninsula and Honduras continued to be usual arrival points for those leaving from southern Cuba. As usual, the Florida Keys and the Straits of Florida continued as common rescue spots for those leaving from the northwestern points of the island.

There is considerable evidence during this stage of the extremely high risks involved in escaping Cuba. Probably the most dramatic and terrifying cases were the ones involving boats and rafts. Some of the latter were found empty and at other times with the dead aboard or nearby.³¹ One of them, an escapee, dead for two days, was found by the

U.S. Coast Guard on a raft floating peacefully off the Florida coast on the Atlantic. There is indication that his companions met the same fate.

In 1968 a surviving escapee was able to tell the story of another horrible case where seven persons died of hunger and dehydration in a flimsy raft. Juan William Espinosa Carrazana was the only survivor of a group of eight who left from Matanzas province. He and Santiago Padron Martinez had fled a concentration camp and were desperate to leave the island. The latter did not want to leave behind his teenage sons, fearing the military draft, and brought them along. Unfortunately, soon after departure with four others, a storm washed away the food and water supplies, and by the fifth day the first death occurred. By the sixth, Padron's sons were also dead as well as another escapee, but he refused to throw them overboard. By the ninth day only Espinosa and Padron remained alive, the latter still clinging to the corpses in advanced stages of decomposition. He begged Espinosa, if he were the one to survive, to tell the world what communism does to those who oppose their system; shortly afterwards, he also died. Espinosa, a former Raul Castro soldier, was finally rescued by a British freighter, after twelve days of ordeal.³²

By far the greatest boat tragedy ever recorded about the Cuban exodus took place early in this stage, involving a secret ferryboat operating from Miami. A veteran of more than seven rescue missions to Cuba, Enrique Gonzalez had slipped this time to Pinar del Rio province on October 1966, and was sailing back to Florida with forty-four persons under the influence of Hurricame Inez. The twenty-foot boat capsized, some managed to get into a raft, but only Gonzalez survived.³³ Gonzalez

denied that his missions were made for profit, although he admitted that contributions were accepted for fuel and maintenance.³⁴ He indeed lived in a modest one-story frame house, and eventually paid with his life for his daring enterprise when he was captured and executed by Castro after another mission by the end of the year.³⁵ This case appears to be just an example of a system developed by Cubans with various degrees of organization to pull relatives and friends out of the island by the mid-1960's.³⁶ But rescue operations did not always have a sad ending, as Frank Soler reported in 1971, when three Cuban refugees returned to Cuba and successfully picked up their families.³⁷

The Strangulation of the Escapee Flow (1972-1974)

This last stage, elapsing thus far between 1972 and December 1974 is characterized by a radical reduction of all escape arrivals. Boat escapees added up to 215 persons or 1.7 per cent of that entire population. Table 11 shows how this new trend reached an all-time low by 1974 with only twenty persons escaping from Cuba, just using inner tube rafts. Table 12 indicates also that there is a sharp drop in the number of escapees per case, obviously reflecting the use of rafts. For the first time in the escape record, there were no women involved since 1972, and no children after 1973. Also for the first time the U.S. began to take action against those escapees who hijacked boats to this country.

Discarding the possible explanation that conditions may have improved in Cuba to prompt the lessening of the desire to leave (See Chapter IV), a number of other factors seem to be responsible for this escapee decline. The presence of rafts in a predominant way indicates the lack of boats due to the tightening of security measures along escape routes, and the imposition of greater controls upon the population (See <u>The Deterrent</u> <u>Role of the Cuban Government</u>, p. 174). Even inner tubes became increas-

ingly scarce, all of which certainly prevented many would-be escapees from carrying out their plans.³⁸

But perhaps as important as the above-mentioned measures, accounting for the 1973-1974 sharp decline, could be the in-Cuba widely publicized Anti-Hijack Treaty between the United States and Cuba. This agreement, signed on February 15, 1973, calls for both parties to either extradite or punish with "the most severe penalty" any person who "seizes, removes, appropriates or diverts from its normal route or activities any aircraft or vessel."³⁹ The Cuban government divulged this fact in such a way that many persons desiring to escape feared they would be returned after a successful escape. This was the impression gathered from raft arrivals as well as from Guantanamo cases.⁴⁰ Some of the latter had chosen that way precisely out of this fear. Because of the circumstances prevailing at the time of the signing of the treaty, it seems that the Cuban government was destined to receive most of its benefit. This appears to be the case since it had not been able to completely prevent the hijacking of boats, as did the United States, through its massive and expensive antihijacking program with airplanes.⁴¹ In any event, it was apparent that Castro was using the pact as an important escape deterrent with a high success rate, especially after 1973 (See Tables 11 and 12).

Right before the signature of the Anti-Hijack agreement and for the first time since Castro came to power, the United States actually prosecuted fleeing Cubans entering the country without legal papers, perhaps as an "overture" to the Cuban government.⁴² By the end of 1972, as negotiations were well underway, the first attempt to prosecute actually took place when a young fisherman and two friends hijacked a fishing

vessel. The charges brought against these refugees were based on an unheard technicality with Cuban escapees: entering the country without legal documents. They were freed on bail, pending deportation, and finally allowed to remain without penalty.⁴³ But the first actual test of the Anti-Hijack Pact occurred on March 1973 when two young fishermen apparently hijacked and tried to divert to Mexico a sixty-one foot fishing vessel.⁴⁴ After developing trouble with their gas line, which set them adrift, the Coast Guard towed the distressed ship to Key West. By that time the would-be escapees seemed to have given up their attempt. A bizarre escape by the two fishermen ensued when, after a few days of repair, their boat began to leave U.S. shores. The fishermen jumped into the sea, were rescued and later prosecuted, receiving light penalties.⁴⁵ To the pleasure of the Castro government, no other boats have been hijacked up to December 1974.

Since 1973, with some exceptions, most boat-related cases were made on rafts. The majority of these were of the inner tube type, as explained earlier. There were departures from this norm as the case of five persons in 1972, including an elderly woman, who made it to Key West with an ingenious prefabricated, pontoon-like, raft with wooden planks, to be assembled in short time close to the shore and powered by an outboard motor.⁴⁶ But in contrast with this highly successful escape there were also tragedies in the use of rafts. When William Domingo Albelo was rescued, he was the sole survivor of a group of eight, including a woman with a dog, who had left Cuba fifteen days earlier on an eight-inner tube raft with some boards on top. The rafts, which made successful crossings, carried between two to four persons on the average. The trips usually lasted from five to seven days before rescue at some place in the Florida Straits.

In spite of the greater surveillance, hijacking of fishing boats in 1972 and 1973 was noticeable. Three large groups escaped through hijackings from the fishing town of Batabano. These three incidents probably spurred the Cuban government to press for the 1973 Anti-Hijacking Pact. The takeovers followed the already-mentioned pattern of the 1971 fishing boat hijacked to Honduras with fishermen on the crew commandeering the vessel and later picking up relatives and friends at another coastal point. In the two 1972 instances they conspicuously ended up in Mexico, while the third arrived at Grand Cayman in April 1973.⁴⁸ The latter presents two additional features, one of having been bombed by a Cuban plane--according to a news account--in spite of which they kept going until reaching that British possession. The other was their interesting interview about Cuban social conditions made by Roberto Fabricio.49 On May 1973, another hijacked boat, also from Batabano, carried the purchasing and personnel directors of Cuba's single largest fishing company, Batabano Fishing Cooperative.⁵⁰

Only one successful air hijacking was carried out during this entire stage--so far--on September 1972. It was again, a small single engine plane that managed to leave Cuban territory. It was running extremely low on fuel when its two occupants spotted a fishing vessel to which they signaled their intent to ditch into the sea. They did, and were picked up and transported to safe port.⁵¹

The degree of desperation seems to be immense among these escapees, especially the raft-borne ones. An explanation for their desperate attempts is that they often were double escapees, since they were also fleeing Castro's political prison, taking advantage of a short pass permit, or that had simply escaped from their concentration camps.⁵²

This was the case of those who fled San Ramon Concentration Camp in Oriente and managed, after many days of ordeal, to reach the Guantanamo Base.⁵³ Other cases on record also exemplify this desperation.⁵⁴ Probably few were so dramatic in the expression of their frustration with life in Cuba as were four blue collar workers who left in the middle of their working shifts and who expressed that they were glad to go "where the sea wanted to take us," because "anything was better than staying in Cuba."⁵⁵

All defections from Cuban ships during this stage have occurred so far between 1972 and 1973. These involved a total of four cases, comprising nine fishermen who either jumped into the sea to a nearby vessel or defected at ports--either on the Florida coast or the Canary Islands.

Some flights to the United States were long and daring during this period. One is the record of eight Cubans, all from Oriente province, including four women and one child, who left Cuba via Madrid. Desperate because of the long wait in Madrid for a visa, they flew to Santo Domingo to reach the U.S. by boat. Not finding adequate conditions there, they went to Haiti where the party secured an old twenty-foot boat on which they embarked for the United States but were in serious trouble when on the way a fishing ship from the Bahamas spotted them. Their journey to the United States took them 10,050 miles.⁵⁷ Another daring rescue case in 1972 illustrates in a dramatic way the strength of Cuban family ties. Two blue collar workers, who themselves fled Cuba by boat in 1969, organized the longest and largest rescue operation in our records.⁵⁸ The two men saved enough to buy and equip an eighteen-foot two-engine boat in Miami. With it they penetrated to their native sugar-mill town of Cunagua through the extremely difficult northern coast of Camagüey province,

covered with swamps and mangroves. The four-hundred-mile round trip that had been planned nine months earlier, almost ended in tragedy when the heavily loaded boat hit rocks and was taking water fast. But it had a happy end when the rescued party of four men, six women, and three children reached Cay Lobos, thirty miles north of that Cuban eastern province.⁵⁹ On the other hand, a similar rescue effort undertaken in 1974 by former Guantanamo escapees ended in failure and thirty-year prison sentences.⁶⁰

The Deterrent Role of the Cuban Government

The knowledge about the deterrents and aid facing the Cuban escapees is crucial to understand fully what this important exit means within the Cuban exodus. Unfortunately, it is not possible at this time to have a complete picture of the preventive measures implemented by the Cuban government. There is no official report by the government on this matter, nor did we obviously have access to their records. Hence, our information has to be based mainly on the accounts of those who have fled. In addition to this, other first-hand accounts of knowledgeable persons who had been in Cuba or had traveled around Cuban territory, will also be used.

The pattern that emerges is that of a complex effort to prevent illegal departures that has varied in quantity and quality through time, and which has also been contingent on the specific area of the island. A combination of measures at the possible departure areas, related also to the prevention of infiltrations into the country, plus increasing restrictions of movement throughout the island, as well as an effective internal spy network, can sum up the deterrent effort on the part of the Cubans.

Cuban Sea-Related Surveillance

The prevention of illegal departures from Cuba appears to be closely tied to the military control of armed incursions by the exiles. A wide variety of measures, ranging from coastal search lights to fast patrol boats, air patrols over sea and powerful radar ships, have been used. During the early 1960's the Castro regime made use of the vessels left by the deposed government which ranged from small patrol cutters to frigates. One of the latter was recorded in action in May 1959, when the "Antonio Maceo" intercepted a boat escape attempt made by a group of former military men.⁶¹ Cuban patrol boats were reported on anti-escapee activities beyond territorial waters in 1961.

An international incident was triggered by an international incursion on August 13, 1963. At this time a boat with twenty-nine escapees had landed at Cay Anguila on the Cay Sal Bank. They had apparently been detected by a Russian radar ship disguised as a trawler, which in turn radioed a Cuban helicopter which landed escorted by patrol boats. Nineteen unarmed refugees were seized but the rest managed to hide. The . whole incident was extensively photographed by a U.S. Coast Guard aircraft unable to intervene. The survivors were later picked up by an American vessel while the British protested to no avail about the intrusion to the Cuban government. Three of the captured men were executed in Havana in spite of a British plea for their release.⁶²

Castro's coastal patrol vessels have increased substantially since 1962. Up to that time he counted on the inheritance left by Batista. But since 1962 the Soviet Union began supplying more modern equipment.⁶³ Fishing boats have also been pressed into coastal patrol service, armed with machine guns and manned by militia men.⁶⁴ Some of these vessels

like the submarine chasers have been sighted by the U.S. Coast Guard as far north as Bimini Island in the Bahamas.⁶⁵ Some of these boats are also equipped with powerful search lights, used predominantly in anti-escapee activities.

Since about 1963 there is evidence that non-military vessels have been patrolling Cuban northern waters. Our record indicates the presence of Russian radar ships late in 1964 posing as fishing trawlers as described by a newsman flying in a U.S. Coast Guard Albatross plane, thirty miles off the Cuban coast. This ship was patrolling up and down the Old Bahamas Channel, and its apparent objective obviously was not catching fish, but Cuban refugees going in both directions: leaving and infiltrating. According to the reporter, the "catching job" was left to fast torpedo boats, also Russian made, that can develop up to fifty-five knots. The Russian "Snooper" trawler was also carrying a highly sophisticated radio equipment capable of working on every possible frequency, including the U.S. Coast Guard communications.⁶⁶ As late as 1971 Cuban escapees mentioned a Russian ship on similar types of mission.⁶⁷

Russian ships have been on record for picking up escapees from boats and rafts and returning them to Cuba according even to photographic evidence presented by the U.S. Coast Guard. This was case of six Cubans on a raft who were photographed desperately waving for help to an American aircraft when they were about to be picked up by a Russian merchant vessel.⁶⁸ Other instances involved two teenagers and a technician.⁶⁹

There is evidence also of Cuban merchant ships being used as patrols during the mid-1960's and later years. U.S. Coast Guard ships patrolling along the Old Bahamas Channel at that time were often trailed by such type of Cuban ships, ostensibly on no commercial mission. Escapee

arrivals interviewed in the early 1970's have mentioned how a Cuban merchant vessel performed regular patrol, usually starting at dusk and covering good portions of Cuba's northern coast. Cuban commercial and military planes have also been spotted on sea patrols. On an irregular basis, portions of the northern coast were patrolled by a small airplane with Cuban insignia.⁷⁰ There is evidence of a similar type of patrol using a commercial plane from "Cubana Airlines" on the southern coast. These patrols used to go south as far as Swan Island.⁷¹

There is also testimony coming from escapees of Cuban planes attacking fleeing refugees. The first was in July 1964 where five escapees arriving at Marathon told about such actions by helicopters.⁷² In 1967 six escapees arriving on inner tubes mentioned how a plane had been "machine-gunning little boats fleeing the island.⁷³ Finally, the last reported incident occurred in March 1973 with the hijacked fishing boat from Batabano (already mentioned) which was bombed, but not sunk, by a Cuban plane.

The Frontier-Guard Patrol

Land-coastal patrols were initiated early in the Castro regime. By late 1960 extensive coastal patrolling was conducted by militia men who covered critical coastal areas susceptible to infiltrations, but also aimed at preventing illegal departures. There were crucial periods, as at the time of the Bay of Pig's invasion (April 1961) or the Missile Crisis (October 1962), when strategic coastal areas were subject to great military surveillance with the emplacement of all kinds of weapons. Bunkers were constructed later on as well as observation posts. These usually had several guards, being the observation towers equipped with search lights.⁷⁴ These lights were sometimes extremely powerful as the

one on Cabo San Antonio, and worked in conjunction with those of other posts, preventing many attempts to flee the island.⁷⁵ Mobile units are also equipped with powerful searchlights, being randomly emplaced during the night.⁷⁶ There is evidence that dogs were introduced in the 1960's to aid the guardsmen.⁷⁷ Dogs have been trained to patrol alone between sentry posts carrying a message package to be checked by the guards. Soldiers usually patrol in pairs, combing up and down two or three miles of coast line, starting the rounds also at dusk time. They strictly enforced the regulation of the 1960's which prohibited anyone in certain areas from being on the beaches after 6:00 PM.⁷⁸

The Frontier-Guard was created by 1962 and received the responsibility of the job originally assigned to the militia to patrol Cuba's coastline and around the Guantanamo Base. This military unit was formed apparently from selected members of the armed forces whose loyalty appeared beyond doubt. According to persons acquainted with this unprecedented military unit in Cuba, they worked in close combination with the G-2 (Internal Security). As compensation for their important responsibility, they received privileged treatment in several ways, food being an important one. Besides patrolling the coastline they also are responsible for authorizing pleasure boat trips and controlling the accesses to rivers and other strategic coastal points. They also have under their supervision the various forms of electronic devices at those places.


Probably one of the most crucial roles played by the Frontier-Guard has been the surveillance of the Guantanamo Base. Obviously due to the increasing popularity of this place as a departure point, the Cuban government has been making it increasingly difficult through various ways. The main one has been the erection of fences, starting with a set of three


rather close with barbed wire along and between (six-foot high) in the early 1960's. These were considered insufficient by the end of that decade, and a new set was constructed as indicated in Figure 5.⁷⁹ Following apparently the East German experience, three additional, but further apart vertical fences were constructed (twenty-foot high) with some additional deadly features.⁸⁰ Among these were mined fields in the form of booby traps between fences four and five, and in various portions at least, it was electrified.⁸¹ These new fences have a wider separation that allows the passing of vehicles, strictly for surveillance purposes. At periodic distances watch towers with search lights are located with sentry and dog quarters, surround the six-foot chain-link American fence.

Fences are not the only deterrents facing the Guantanamo would-be escapees. Those who try the bay route (See Figure 4) have to also duck the patrol boats with search lights constantly patrolling the waters after the "swimmers." In addition, coastal patrols are strategically located, some with dogs, to prevent the escaping individuals from entering into the water on the Cuban side of the Bay, or to detect them if they managed to enter. We have evidence of unsuccessful attempts using this route where the would-be escapees have been captured totally exhausted after many hours of swimming for freedom.

Other Security-Related Measures

Probably the most effective deterrent measure to would-be escapees lies within the island's security apparatus. The Internal Security Police (G-2) have proven very effective infiltrating groups and taking advantage of the huge spy system interlinked with the Committees of Defense of the Revolution (CDR). Often those planning this kind of exit





make the indiscretion of talking too much, and this eventually reaches someone in the security network. In addition to this, the method of luring people to leave has been extensively used by the G-2 according to multiple evidence, especially with boat escapees.⁸² An agent in disguise will promote an illegal escape, even facilitating certain means. At the critical moment of departure, all will be rounded up and processed according to "revolutionary justice." Due to this circumstance, most successful escapees mention absolute secrecy as an essential factor in their departure effort, requesting a minimum amount of help.

In addition to the work by Internal Security, the entire social life system can be considered also as an escape deterrent. This is due to the increasing regimentation to which the population is subjected. Such is the Anti-Vagrancy Law, the use of "voluntary work," the constant vigilance of the CDR or block committees plus the pervasive G-2 (Secret Police) and more recently the new travel restriction through the RD-3 card, all of which were described in Chapter V. This obviously makes it much more difficult for a person to move around in order to procure the bare essentials for an escape attempt, such as some pieces of lumber, nails and a few truck or tractor inner tubes.

The handling of captured escapees seems to have varied throughout time. According to the available evidence, the actual capture of an escapee party on the sea could imply execution on the spot, as evidence presented above indicates for the early 1960's. No wonder Cuba's northern waters were labeled "machine-gun alley" since that time. This was definitely the case if some resistance was offered.⁸³ Special physical abuse with the unfortunate captives has also occurred according to a former political prisoner. He described how two men were forced to strip, tied

back to back after their capture, and dragged through the water for the fourteen-hour return journey to Cuba.⁸⁴

The actual jail punishment for the crime of illegal departure from the island varies according to the circumstances surrounding each case. These individuals are known in prison as <u>boteros</u> (boat passengers). If they had no pending matter with "revolutionary justice," usually their sentence would range between two to nine years of imprisonment.⁸⁵ This will vary according to the background of the person, his education, government responsibility, degree of leadership exercised on the attempt as well as the degree of force employed. There is a positive relationship between the degree of responsibility of the individual and the sentence. Most <u>boteros</u> will immediately join the prison "rehabilitation plan," which will expedite their access to the streets, and as we have seen very often, to try again another illegal departure.

Security measures have been extremely successful preventing hijackings of commercial airliners. Since 1962 there is no record of an effective attempt of this kind. The main reason for this lies in the security system provided in such flights. Apparently the main effort has been to isolate the pilots from the rest of the plane with two armed guards inside the cockpit. This is in turn locked and bullet proof material guarantees that no one will force his way through on a hijack attempt, preventing the pilots from doing so either. No matter what happens then in the passenger section, the plane will not be diverted, guaranteeing a national landing if an attempt is made.⁸⁶

Assistance to the Fleeing Escapees

The assistance to escapees in distress has fallen primarily in the hands of the U.S. Coast Guard, 7th District. A very consistent picture of their work can be drawn from a few articles and congressional hearings on this matter, plus the availability of the Coast Guard unclassified assistance files, as well as personal interviews with some of its commanders. This agency of the U.S. Treasury Department has also varied in their assistance according to the escapee flow and to the policies of this government. They share a role similar to the Cuban Coast Guard, that is, the prevention of raids on Cuba by exiles from Florida. Nevertheless, it seems that quantitatively, the humanitarian role of rescuing escapees in distress has by far outranked the purely military one in relation to the total Cuban situation. In addition to the U.S. Coast Guard, other governments and entities have also played a role in relation to the Cuban escapees.

Rescue Efforts by the U.S. Coast Guard

By 1960 the U.S. Coast Guard, 7th District, began to assume a greater role in relation to sea events taking place around Cuba. This agency had the responsibility of patrolling 14,100 miles of coastal areas, covering South Carolina, Georgia, the Caribbean and part of the Panama Canal.⁸⁷ Thus it was just logical that when the need arose for extra responsibilities with the increasing urge to assist Cuban escapees, it would fall into the hands of this unit. Throughout this entire process though, their primary objective has been preventing the use of U.S. territory as a base for attacks or raids on Cuba. The assistance and rescue of Cuban escapees fleeing the island has been a natural humanitarian corollary of those preventive patrols,⁸⁸ even though the

former was more emphasized before 1962. The patrol of Cuban waters, or what came to be known as the "Cuban Patrol" was initially developed by expanding the Coast Guard's traditional reef patrol along the Florida Keys into the ocean. The eighty-two and ninety-five foot vessels were assigned to this task. But after 1962, the need to strictly enforce the prevention of raids was highly emphasized, thus requiring the expansion of the outer reef patrol, and reaching to farther eastern points on Cuba's northern coast.⁸⁹ In this way Cuban refugees received additional benefit in their plight to leave the island as a result of a purely military measure.

Besides the pre- and post-1962 periods, it is possible to distinguish two other stages in the role played by the U.S. Coast Guard in relation to the Cuban refugees. By the end of 1965, and as a result of Castro's offer to let those go who wanted to, a new Dunkirk-like exodus developed on the Straits of Florida from the Cuban port of Camarioca--already described in Chapter V--which certainly prevented the incidence of hundreds of fatalities. By December 1965, the Coast Guard again resumed its normal Cuban patrol until 1969 when its air surveillance was reduced even more. Further curtailments occurred afterward, also affecting surface units.⁹⁰

Normally, the Cuban Patrol had surveillance levels ranging from the Florida Keys to as far east as Cay Lobos in the Bahamas, forty miles north of the Cuban province of Camagüey (See Figure 3). By the mid-1960's the entire patrol involved twenty vessels including some of the larger 210-foot type plus nine aircraft.⁹¹ The closest one to Florida, the Inner Patrol, started with the forty-foot utility boats covering the inside reef at random from bases in Miami, Key West, Isla-

morada and Marathon. The Intermediate Patrol covered from the reef line to about ten miles off shore, being conducted by ninety-five foot vessels. Another additional ship covered the Middle Straits from Key West to and around Cay Sal Bank. The far reaching surveillance, the Outer Patrol, has been conducted by the larger (165-210) foot vessels. Aerial patrols have been conducted on a daily basis with the twin engine <u>Albatros</u> aircraft covering the Straits and the Cay Sal Bank. On a random, mostly weekly, basis these aircraft had flights over the Old Bahamas Channel, as well as over the Outer Banks of the Bahamas. These aerial patrols were known as Red, Yellow and Green according to their length, ranging between 5.5 to eight or more hours. Amphibious helicopters supplemented the airplanes. The former could be carried on ships which significantly increased their efficiency.⁹²

The rescue procedures developed by the U.S. Coast Guard have followed to a great extent the exit flow of the escapees. The aerial and surface missions were all within the possible path of the boats and rafts fleeing the island. More often than not, it was the Albatross plane the first unit to have visual contact with the group of escapees which, in more than 50 per cent of the time, were in desperate need for help. After the aerial sighting, they radioed the Rescue Coordination Center (RCC) at the Miami Coast Guard Headquarters, which in turn contacted the closest surface vessel that eventually performed the actual rescue. The aircraft, in the meanwhile, may have dropped a parachute with food and water as initial assistance. If the case was considered urgent, and within range, a helicopter could have been dispatched to the scene for a faster rescue. Another frequent occurrence was that of a commercial vessel sighting the escapees. In this case--if it was a non-communist one--they might pick

them up and rendezvous with the Coast Guard for a transfer, or radio their location for them to perform the entire rescue operation. 93

In relation to radio messages, the U.S. Coast Guard learned to use special care with their radio messages about sighted refugees the hard way. Early in the 1960's, they discovered that these messages were being overheard, either directly by Cuban surface patrols or through the Russian "trawlers" already mentioned. Often Cuban patrols reached the escapees earlier for another type of "rescue." This appears to have been the case with the twenty-nine escapees that landed at Cay Anguila the 13th of August, 1963, where nineteen of the twenty-nine refugees were captured under the helpless eyes of a flying unarmed <u>Albatros</u>. In order to prevent the recurrence of this type of incident, a code was then utilized to describe the location of the refugee crafts.⁹⁴

After the fleeing group was contacted, a rather complex process ensued. First, immigration authorities were alerted of the upcoming arrival as well as the Cuban Refugee Program and the Office of the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs.⁹⁵ When names were known, some sort of security check was made on them; if emergency facilities were needed they were activated and often helicopters transported escapees to the Jackson Memorial Hospital where they were usually taken. Normally the escapees were put aboard the Coast Guard surface vessel, and the boat or raft was picked up or towed to the port of destiny. If the boat was not considered seaworthy it was sunk, while rafts were usually picked up due to their greater floatability. Initial urgent medical treatment was normally available in all Coast Guard units.

The humanitarian role performed by the U.S. Coast Guard in assisting boat escapees cannot be underestimated. The success ratio of the boat departures from Cuba has been estimated at one out of four. This could never be ascertained in a firm way. But, if the proportion of cases described in the media and the Coast Guard record as helpless or as tragedies can be interpreted as an indicator for the entire escapee population, that estimate might not be too far off. In this sense, the helping role played by the Coast Guard with the Cuban escapees has to be highly praised because without their assistance the death toll would probably have been much higher.

Only a few words can be said about assistance rendered to escapees at Guantanamo Base. Once the escapee managed to enter the base, totally on their own, they usually remained for several days in an isolated facility with little or no contact with persons not related to that unit. This was not only for security checks on the individual, but also to receive the urgent medical attention that most need. Many were wounded by shots or the antipersonal booby traps. Land arrivals were usually quite exhausted after their multiple day journey through the extremely rugged terrain. They were usually full of sores and multiple bruises after crossing several barbed-wire fences. Their numerous encounters with cactus and other thorny bushes produced wounds of this type all over the body, often with hundreds of thorns not easily removed. But normally after a few days of recovery, these escapees were flown to Miami on military planes.⁹⁶

Assistance by Other Entities

In addition to the U.S. Coast Guard, other governments and entities have been the most frequent first aid to sea-escaping Cubans. As mentioned earlier, they share a high proportion of initial sightings of these cases. Very frequently they picked up the usually desperate refugee and arranged for a further transfer to a Coast Guard unit. On the other hand, especially if the rescue was on the Gulf, they may have carried the escapee to their immediate port and arrangements were made to transport them to Miami.

The British Navy has also performed some assistance to escapees. This has been primarily through the frigate that is used to patrol the Bahamas plus the small one-engine plane also used for the same purpose. They have always worked in coordination with the U.S. Coast Guard, to whom the refugees were normally transferred if the British had performed the initial rescue. The personnel kept at Cay Lobos to man the lighthouse have also performed a considerable degree of assistance to the refugees who frequently arrived to that point from the eastern provinces. Besides some initial material help, the lighthouse keepers always notified the U.S. Coast Guard, who in turn picked up the escapees with the closest surface vessel in the area.⁹⁷

In addition to the above entities, the role played by other nations or areas concerning the overall escapee situation should be mentioned. These include primarily Haiti, Jamaica, Grand Cayman, Honduras and Mexico. All have in common that they provided political asylum to the Cuban escapees, but very little else. We have record only of Grand Cayman facilitating housing arrangements by the authorities.⁹⁸ In the other countries it has been a matter of private aid by the churches,

the communities or the possible Cuban colony in the area.⁹⁹ Subsistence aid had to come in most cases from relatives or friends in the United States if they were lucky enough to have any. On the other hand, there is evidence of rather unfriendly receptions, as was reported with some arrivals to Haiti who were kept incomunicado for three months under very uncomfortable circumstances.¹⁰⁰

NOTES

- The following are editorials of <u>The Miami Herald</u>: "A Death Ring around Cuba," November 14, 1964; "Boat Loads of Cuban Freedom," September 23, 1965; "And Still They Flee Castro," July 11, 1967; "Sea Slaughter Par for Fidel," February 29, 1968; "Epic Escape from Cuba Shows Freedom's Lure," January 10, 1969. For an introductory study of the escapees, see Juan M. Clark, "Selected Types of Cuban Exiles," and "The Cuban Escapees" in 1970.
- 2. The review of news releases was made on <u>The Miami Herald library</u> which also included accounts from <u>The Miami News</u>, the two most important Miami newspapers. The entire file on "Cuban arrivals to the U.S." was reviewed. The newspaper files of the Cuban Refugee Emergency Center were also reviewed.

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- 3. Ruiz, Diario 1959, Diario 1960, Diario 1961, and Anuario 1967.
- 4. The difference between the two U.S. government agencies may be explained by the fact that in some instances there were cases that were assisted by the Coast Guard but did not register with the Refugee Center since they did not need welfare aid. These cases tended to occur mainly after 1967 where escape means were more hazardous but the exile community was economically on more solid ground. On the other hand, during the earlier years, the opposite tended to occur: more cases were registered by the Refugee Center than were assisted by the Coast Guard, reflecting the better quality of escape means-managing to reach land without help-- and a shakier position by the exile community, requiring immediate registration in order to receive welfare assistance.
- 5. Rafael del Pino, a former comrade of Fidel Castro, was captured in a rescue airplane from Miami on that highway on July 26, 1959. Ruiz, Diario 1959, p. 147.
- 6. Ruiz, Diario 1959, p. 67 and Diario 1960, p. 279, 329, 314.
- Ruiz, <u>Diario 1959</u>, p. 124 for Diaz Lanz, and Ruiz, <u>Diario 1960</u>, pp. 327, 328, 350 for the subsequent cases.
- 8. Ibid., pp. 302 and 334.
- 9. The case of Capt. Luis Morse Delgado is the first in our records. Ibid., pp. 319 and 311.
- 10. Probably the most dramatic case was that of a boat load leaving from nearby Santiago de Cuba. Out of eighteen persons, only one survived after seventeen days of terrible ordeal that ended in Grand Cayman with Vicente Mayans reaching that island with his dead wife in his arms. He later narrated how one by one the sixteen persons died of hunger and dehydration after missing Jamaica, their destination point. Martinez, "Cuban Pays Highly." Also in <u>The Miami Herald</u> for other cases: "A Death Ring," Shot Riddled Boat Reported Off Cuba," June

27, 1964; Don Bohning, "11 Flee Cuba in Boat for Miami Beach," December 21, 1965, who actually quoted Castro on the reasons for the legal departures after 1965; Anderson, "Escape from Cuba," and Glass, "1 of 4 Cubans."

- 11. Transportation was available until October 22 when it was closed by the United States. Until that date Panam had been running the Havana-Miami route with considerable financial loss. The process of claiming relatives appears to have developed an upward social bias among those leaving by conventional or legal means in view of the chain connection between earlier departures and later claims.
- 12. Glass, "1 of 4 Cubans." The testimony of a British cargo skipper was cited here as evidence.
- 13. "Shot Riddled Boat." This was reported by a U.S. freighter after seeing a boat, with three inch in diameter holes, which apparently belonged to a fishing coop from Caibarien, Las Villas. "A Death Ring" and "The Awful Arithmetic."
- 14. Erwin Potts, "Farmers Report Fidel 'Sold Out' Food," <u>The Miami</u> <u>Herald</u>, March 1, 1962.
- 15. Ruiz, <u>Diario 1961</u>, pp. 19, 57, 106, 128 for the survivors of the 2506 Brigade's ordeal. The cases of Captain Jorge Sotus and other political leaders are mentioned.
- 16. Carlos Martinez and Don Bohning, "Happiness or Death, Say 2 Who Fled Cuba," <u>The Miami Herald</u>, July 8, 1965. This group included thirty-nine men, thirty-five women and sixteen children. The largest single boat load of this stage took place with a thirtysix foot one carrying fifty-one persons. "51 Cuban Exiles Arrive in Miami," The Miami Herald, July 22, 1964.
- 17. Carlos Martinez, "Five Flee Cuba on Inner Tube Raft," August 7, 1964; other reported cases of this nature were in succession: "4 Men Flee Cuba on Raft," September 11, 1964 and Bill Amlong, "Ex Castro Governor Flees Cuba in Inner Tube Raft," July 30, 1965, all in <u>The Miami Herald</u>. Luis Casas Martinez spent twelve days on a raft after two other unsuccessful attempts and an escape from prison.
- A "Cubana" DC-3 on July 8, 1961 hijacked in a national flight. See Ruiz, <u>Diario 1961</u>, p. 125, where a total of fourteen persons requested asylum.

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19. This took place September 2, 1961, according to Ruiz, <u>Diario 1961</u>, p. 157. Unfortunately, this most thorough source on stowaways and defections covers only 1959 through 1961, and 1967. Thus we are deprived of that source for the remaining years.

- 20. "Escape from Cuba Via Canada," November 6, 1964 and "Airline Drops 'Defection' Run," November 13, 1964, both in <u>The Miami Herald</u>. It appears that most of these defectors were actual would-be refugees, allowed to leave Cuba, but via Prague. In order to save that unnecessarily long trip many left the plane at Gander, and were receiving considerable publicity by the American press, which the Cuban government apparently resented.
- 21. "Cubans Flee in Kayack," <u>The Miami Herald</u>, September 15, 1966. A man and his girl friend in an eight-foot kayack were picked up seventy-one miles south of Miami.
- 22. Evaristo Savon, "Fugaronse Primero de Cuba y despues de Honduras 18 Cubanos Desesperados," <u>Diario Las Americas</u>, July 4, 1970.
- 23. We interviewed most of this group in Honduras during a research project in that country. Except for two professionals in the group, the rest were fishermen, farmers, agricultural workers and a truck driver in several family groups. "Dramatico Relato de la Odisea de 50 Cubanos que Huyeron de la Isla Esclava Hacia Honduras," La Prensa (San Pedro de Sula), August 4, 1971, and "Honduras Eyes" Asylum for 50," The Miami Herald, August 6, 1971. After several months of waiting for a U.S. visa, most persons in the group, including a baby born in Honduras, managed to "stowaway" in a Honduran sixty-foot fishing vessel which brought them to Tampa ensuing a legal battle about their status, which was decided in their favor. Frank Soler, "Refugees Take Over One Boat, Hide on Another to Reach U.S.," September 24, 1971. (These were two who arrived earlier using that method.) For the rest see, "Refugees Stormy Voyage Ends in Tampa Reunion," November 20, 1971; "Cubans Use Two Boats in Escape," November 20, 1971; Dudley Clendinen, "Is Refugee Ship Captain Fool or Hero?" November 27, 1971; and "Refugee Boat Crew Released," December 1, 1971, all in The Miami Herald.
- 24. This description is based on interviews with Guantanamo escapees who used both forms of entering the base. A 1969 Associated Press cable mentioned that "thousands have been flown here [to the U.S.] without publicity in recent years after making it to the base by swimming or crossing barbed wire areas." "18 Refugees Flee Cuba as Escapee Traffic Grows," The Gainesville Sun, September 19, 1969.
- 25. Montalbano, "80 Escape from Cuba," "Epic Escape from Cuba Shows Freedom's Lure," January 1, 1969, and "Exiles Desperate Flight to a New Life," January 9, 1969, all in <u>The Miami Herald</u>. Most individuals in this attempt traveled by regular means to Santiago where the driver of a large van-truck picked them up posing as a trip to do voluntary work in agriculture. The goal was to crash the truck against the Cuban fence bordering the base; they got close enough to produce the largest massive escape using this way. Besides the ingenuity of the case, it is relevant to the fact that a considerable number were students, workers, and non-whites, and because the number of original escapees snowballed beyond the control of the planners, managing to reach the base fence without detection.

The shrewdness of the truck driver, who shot it out with the Cuban guards, was a crucial factor in this partially successful attempt.

- 26. The Cubans claimed that they picked up the three mutineers, but this was contradicted by the Coast Guard account. The Cuban ship, at all times in international waters, resumed its trip to Cuba. The Coast Guard was heavily criticized for their lack of prompt action to save the lives of these men. "Cubans Put 3 in Lifeboat, Gun Them Down," The Miami Herald, February 28, 1968.
- 27. "Se Asila la Tripulacion de un Buque Cubano en Mexico," (UPI) Diario Las Americas, May 11, 1971.
- Don Bohning, "Cuban Escapees Double Since Airlift Start," <u>The Miami</u> <u>Herald</u>, February 25, 1966.
- 29. Frank Soler and Bruce Giles, "14 Cubans Flee to U.S. in Crop-Dusting Plane," <u>The Miami Herald</u>, August 8, 1968. The total plane "cargo" consisted of five men, five women, and four children. At their arrival they surrendered three pistols and a rifle, and passed around a box of Cuban cigars.
- 30. Armando Socarras Ramirez as told to Dennis Fodor and John Reddy, "Stowaway," <u>Reader's Digest</u>, pp. 62-66, May 1970, and "Flees Cuba in Wheel Well of Airliner; Companion Dies," (AP) <u>The Gainesville</u> <u>Sun</u>, June 4, 1969.
- 31. "Death Due to Dehydration." In another case, an empty raft presumably carrying five persons was found ten miles southeast of Keywest. They appeared to have been washed away by a recent storm. "Cuban Refugees Lost at Sea; Raft is Left," September 18, 1969 and "An Empty Raft Sad Story" (Editorial), October 10, 1969, both in <u>The Miami Herald</u>. Wright Langley and Lucretia McDine, "Daring Exiles Don't Make It," <u>The Miami Herald</u>, January 1, 1970. They described the case of the discovery of the bones of a young man protruding from the water on a secluded mangrove island in John Pennekampt State Park, Florida. Close by, still floating, was the nine-foot long raft made of inner tubes (stamped "made in Roumania") and boards. Still another sad case was reported by Charles Anderson, "2 Empty Rafts Discovered; What Happened to Exiles?" <u>The Miami Herald</u>, September 2, 1970. The raft was equipped with a bicycle crank attached to an automobile fan, and this acted as a propeller.
- 32. "En medio de Horribles Torturas Mueren Siete Cubanos que Huian," <u>Bohemia</u> (Puerto Rico), June 18, 1968.
- 33. Sneiger, "Only One Survives Inez' Fury," Miller and Bohning, "He Clung Four Days," and Werne, "Sea Tragedy Skipper."
- 34. Milt Sosin, "Coast Guard Probing Cuban Refugee Sea Tragedy, <u>The</u> <u>Miami News</u>, October 11, 1966.

- 35. Martinez, "Cuba Executes Lone Survivor."
- 36. Burt, "They Come Silently."
- 37. Soler, "Gentle Rapping," and Evaristo Savon, "Entran 2 Refugiados en Cuba Comunista y Rescatan a Familiares en Baracoa," <u>Diario Las</u> <u>Americas</u>, October 3, 1971. The mission was planned by three Cuban fishermen from the small fishing town of Baracoa, west of Havana, who had fled Cuba several years earlier. Their goal was now to retrieve their families when the hopes of taking them out through the Varadero airlift had vanished. Thus, using two boats, they infiltrated into their native town and rounded up their relatives including six children. Shortly after midnight they sailed from a beach on rough seas, taking in a considerable amount of water on their small nineteen-foot boat. Fortunately, they were able to rendezvous with the other, a twenty-four foot boat around noon time, and after being spotted by a passing German freighter, were towed by the Coast Guard to Key West.
- 38. According to interviews with some of these arrivals. Miguel Perez, "Seven Flee Cuba, Make it Here," <u>The Miami Herald</u>, July 23, 1974. One case described here stated their great difficulty finding tractor inner tubes. They were searching for two years; "Those are very hard to find in Cuba now days," said one of the escapees.
- 39. "Cuba, U.S. to Sign Anti-Hijack Pact Today," <u>The Miami Herald</u>, February 15, 1973, and "Pact on Skyjackings... Closer Ties Now for U.S. and Cuba?" U.S. News & World Report, February 26, 1973.
- 40. This was clearly expressed by a 1974 raft escapee: "The word was that anybody coming to Miami would be sent back...Everybody was afraid." Humberto Cruz, "Refugees See More Fleeing Cuba," <u>The Miami</u> News, August 21, 1974.
- 41. According to "Pact on Skyjackings," <u>U.S. News & World Report</u>, there were eighty-five planes hijacked to Cuba from the United States involving 150 hijackers; the number of Cuban boats and airplanes is innumerable and the number of persons can be counted by the thousands. Furthermore, the motivations of both types of hijackings seem to be quite different.
- 42. H.D.S. Greenway, "Hijack Treaty Foundation Laid, Rogers Says," <u>The</u> <u>Miami Herald</u>, December 6, 1972.
- 43. Hilda Inclan, "Won't Return to Cuba Trio, U.S. Affirms," <u>The Miami</u> <u>News</u>, December 12, 1972. The hijackers were a fisherman, twentyfive, a math teacher, nineteen, and an electrician, twenty. Roberto Fabricio, "Cuban Refugees Freed on Bail as They're Ordered Deported," The Miami Herald, December 22, 1974.
- 44. Wright Langley, "Cuban Boat Towed in after Reported Hijack," <u>The Miami Herald</u>, March 14, 1973, and Frank Soler, "U.S. Checking Cuban Fishing Boat Hijacking," The Miami Herald, March 15, 1973.

- The fishermen apparently requested political asylum as soon as 45. they reached port where all were kept under "protective custody" until the boat was repaired. After certain delays, the repaired ship was finally being towed to international waters with its entire crew aboard when the two would-be defectors jumped into the sea, a few hundred yards from the shore. At that point they either swam to shore or were picked up by waiting Cuban exiles; the following day they were surrendered to immigration authorities, and a legal battle about their status ensued. The twenty-one and twenty-two year-old fishermen were initially released on \$5,000 bond and charged with "entering the country without proper Customs inspection." It appeared that the authorities had been trying to preserve the content of the pact without being harsh with the freedom seekers since they did not technically hijack the ship to the United States. The pair was ultimately sentenced to three months of confinement and \$250 fines after pleading "no contest" to the misdemeanor charge. Frank Soler and Wright Langley, "Two Cuban Fishermen Ask to Stay in U.S., but Their Fate is in Doubt," The Miami Herald, March 17, 1973. "2 Crewmen of Cuban Boat Reportedly Jump Overboard," (UPI), March 19, 1973, and Frank Soler and Roberto Fabricio, "2 Cuban Exiles Set to Surrender Today," March 20, 1973, both in The Miami Herald. Roberto Fabricio, "Cuban Fishermen Released on Bond; Charge Reduced," March 21, 1973 and "Cuban Ship-Jumpers Face Minor Charge," March 22, 1973, both in The Miami Herald. Jim Buchanan, "Refugees Given Light Penalties," April 7, 1973, and Joe Oglesby, "Cuban Fishermen get Three Months for Illegal Entry," May 3, 1973, both in The Miami Herald.
- 46. "6 Refugees Plucked Off Tiny Raft," <u>The Miami Herald</u>, April 13, 1972. In this raft came Bruno Danenberg who engineered the attempt, and who had been a navigator for "Cubana Airlines" for ten years. Danenberg was interviewed extensively by this researcher. He had valuable information about conditions in Cuba and the deterrent efforts of that government against escapees.
- 47. It is noteworthy the frequency with which dogs are mentioned as members of escape attempts, even in rafts. There is too much attachment, apparently, to leave them behind. After encountering difficulties in the construction of the raft planned to be finished at sea, three broke from the party in an attempt to swim back to Cuba. The rest gradually died, but Albelo was finally rescued off Key Largo in very serious condition, suffering from dehydration and quite delirious. Herb Greenberg, "Delirious Refugee Says Eight Others are Lost at Sea," <u>The Miami Herald</u>, November 11, 1972; Phillip Hammersmith, "They Drifted Out One by One, I Called for Help, Cried," <u>The Miami News</u>, November 11, 1972; oscar Iborra, "Yo los Vi Morir a Todos," <u>Replica</u>, November 22, 1972; and Guillermo Zalamea-Arenas, "Narra Cubano Su Odisea de 2 Semanas en el Mar," <u>Diario Las Americas</u>, November 11, 1972.
- 48. On September 6, 1972, according to a radio news release, a party of twenty-seven arrived at Islas Mujeres, Mexico. It included eleven men, five women and eleven children. "44 Flee from Cuba in Boat to

Mexico," <u>The Miami Herald</u>, October 19, 1972. This included nine women and three children. In order to elude Cuban Coast Guard patrols they twice changed the name of the fishing boat used to flee. Hilda Inclan, "28 Flee Cuba in Hijacked Boat," <u>The Miami</u> News, March 3, 1973.

- 49. Most were disillusioned supporters of the revolution. They were fed up with the government totalitarian control of their lives as a twenty-six year old architect said, "I tried to conform in every possible way to the revolution, but when they told me I had to trim my hair and I have to give up my clothes because they were not in good taste I knew I had to leave the country... I worked in agriculture, I served on Committees of Defense of the Revolution, not because I cared one way or the other, but because I had to do it to get through school. But my own life style is nobody's business..." Another young housewife and medical student, twenty-three, expressed that "there was no hope for me in my career for life in general. There are very few incentives for a doctor in Cuba." She complained about the excessive demands by the government who "asks too much of youth and doesn't give much in return." For her, "the lack of choice and the lack of opportunity are the worst things for a young ambitious person in Cuba." Another female student, twenty-six, expressed how she had been a "victim of verbal abuse at the University of Havana when she said that the Cuban revolution should be open to new, liberal ideas." The group also included a barber, a cook, fishermen, two teachers and a charcoal maker. This one expressed in simpler but emphatic terms: "even with all the problems we have, with the lack of privacy and the hordes of mosquitoes, even with all of these primitive and degrading problems we face we are happier here than we were in our houses in Cuba. The fact that we risked our childrens' lives should tell you how badly we wanted to leave." Roberto Fabricio, "Cubans Flee to Cayman's, Look to U.S.," The Miami Herald, May 14, 1973. They faced a long wait on that island. "28 Cubans on Grand Cayman Face Long Wait," The Miami Herald, March 2, 1973. The group included twelve men, seven women, and nine children. They had to ask for a U.S. visa in Jamaica, the nearest U.S. Consulate.
- 50. Fabricio, "Cubans Flee."
- 51. "Two Cubans Fly, Swim to Freedom," <u>The Miami Herald</u>, September 20, 1972. Fortunately they spotted a small boat to which they signaled about their distress, ditching then into the ocean; the twenty-one and twenty-four year old half-brothers who stole the plane were from Santiago de las Vegas, Havana.
- 52. Bob Cain, "4 Refugees on Sinking Boat Rescued; 3 Say They were Political Prisoners," <u>The Miami Herald</u>, May 24, 1973. These were of ages thirty-eight, the fisherman, plus the prisoners of ages thirty, thirty-three, and forty-six.
- 53. Hilda Inclan, "Seven Fleeing Cubans Meet Here," <u>The Miami News</u>, July 23, 1974. They described the inhuman conditions in prison. This group was racially composed of non-whites.

- 54. Some had already been sentenced from two to five years for previous unsuccessful escape attempts and were willing to try again in spite of the higher risks. Perez, "Seven Flee Cuba." Roberto Fabricio, "Sharks Attack Us, Cuban Refugees Say," The Miami Herald, August 10, 1974. Two of the four in this group had been in prison for illegal departure with four year sentences. Their desperation and determination to leave was reflected by the statement: "if the Cuban Coast Guard had caught us, I would have just drowned." More often than not they had very little knowledge either of navigation or of the minimum skills to survive at sea. Sharks and storms were two additional perils witnessed by a 1974 group who had to fight two storms plus "sharks banging their heads against the inner tubes." The feeling of desperation was exemplified by the case of William Nelson, a black American who hijacked a fishing boat to Cuba in 1963, but became so desperate about conditions there that he decided to escape with two companions, floating on inner tubes. Wright Langley, "Fed Up in Cuba Defector Floats Back to U.S.," The Miami Herald, June 13, 1968.
- 55. Humberto Cruz, "Life Begins Anew for 4 Cuban Refugees," <u>The Miami</u> <u>News</u>, June 12, 1974, and Dan Newharth, "Raft Borne Exiles Try on New Life," <u>The Miami Herald</u>, June 12, 1974. These were of ages twenty, twenty-one, and thirty-seven.
- 56. In another instance they took advantage of a hurricane that forced the ships close to the shore on the Florida Gulf coast. "4 Cuban Fishermen Seek Asylum in U.S.," <u>The Miami Herald</u>, May 18, 1972 and Lucy Ware Morgan and Robert Fraser, "3rd Cuban Fiserhman Flees Same Ship," <u>St. Petersburg Times</u>, June 22, 1972. In one of the defections off the coast of Naples, Florida, two young fishermen, twenty-one and twenty-two, on a small boat asked for asylum with sign language to a party on a pleasure boat. Andy Rosenblatt, "Naples Fishermen Hide Fleeing Cubans," <u>The Miami Herald</u>, August 14, 1973. At Las Palmas, Canary Islands, two more fishermen jumped ship in 1973, raising the total number of similar defections on those islands to eighty-eight since 1959, according to accounts of the U.S. Coast Guard.
- 57. Roberto Fabricio, "Flight of Eight Cubans Lasted for 10,050 Miles," <u>The Miami Herald</u>, August 6, 1972 and "8 Refugiados 11egan a E.E.U.U. Despues de una larga Odisea," (UPI) <u>Diario Las Americas</u>, August 8, 1972.
- 58. Their earlier escape had consisted of seven men and one child who reached Cay Lobos on October 9, 1969, according to the U.S. Coast Guard Record.
- 59. Roberto Fabricio, "Miamian, Detroit Mechanic Rescue 13 Kin from Cuba," <u>The Miami Herald</u>, July 27, 1972, and an interview with the leaders of this venture, all of extractive or skilled occupations who described their odyssey as well as aspects of living conditions in Cuba. Mantilla as told to Roberto Fabricio, "All We Wanted."

- 60. Ana Maria Alvarez, "3 Exiles Get 30 Years in Jail," <u>The Miami</u> <u>Herald</u>, November 14, 1974. These were Miguel Sales, twenty-three, Rodolfo Camps Verdecia, twenty-five, and Luis Manuel Zuniga, twentythree. They were students and all had been political prisoners before their escape from Cuba early in 1974.
- 61. Six were fleeing on the boat "Triston" and were captured on May 15, 1959. Ruiz, Diario 1959, p. 98.
- 62. Anderson, "Escape from Cuba."
- 63. The inheritance from Batista's regime included thirteen coast guard cutters, a dozen auxiliary patrol boats, plus three frigates and yachts converted for that purpose. The Soviet equipment consisted of twenty Komar and OSA guided missile boats, eighteen submarine chasers and twenty-four torpedo boats. "Cuba," <u>Jane's Fighting</u> Ships (1972-1973): 73.
- 64. Mervin K. Sigale, "Castro Chokes Off Cuba Escapees," <u>The Miami</u> News, February 28, 1968.
- 65. U.S. Senate, Communist Threat, p. 1463.
- 66. The reported OSEGSK was a two hundred-foot vessel of the K9063 type with two huge radar masts close to sixty-foot tall which enabled them to see beyond the horizon. A Soviet admiral commanded this "fishing fleet" which in reality was performing an outer coast patrol. George Weller, "'Super Snooper' Russian Trawler Looks for Exiles," The Miami Herald, October 6, 1964.
- 67. "Persigue a los Fugitivos de las Costas de Cuba Sovetica un Barco Ruso," Diario Las Americas, May 9, 1971.
- 68. U.S. Senate, Communist Threat, p. 1507-8.
- 69. In the former the boys were brought aboard the Russian ship but then jumped into the sea. One was shot and killed, but the surviving nineteen-year-old told the story. He swam under water evading capture and a fishing boat picked him up and brought him to Miami. "Escapee Shot by Russians, He Fled Twice Refugee Says," <u>The Miami Herald</u>, May 29, 1968. In 1963 a technician escaping with his family on a boat was sighted by a Russian fishing vessel. Being lost and adrift he naively requested help from them to reach the Florida coast. Instead, he, his family and boat were seized and taken back to Cuba where he was imprisoned. In 1968 he tried again through the same way, but now with success. Sigale, "Castro Chokes Off."
- 70. According to an interview with Commander Duane P. Gatto, of the 7th U.S. Coast Guard District, this was based on his experience during his 1965-1966 patrol duty in the area.
- 71. According to interview with Bruno Danenberg, former navigator for ten years of that airline who fled in a raft in 1972.

- 72. "Five Exiles Arrive in Marathon," The Miami Herald, July 23, 1964.
- 73. Carlos Martinez, "Inner Tube Raft Carries 6 Cubans to Freedom," The Miami Herald, September 2, 1967.
- 74. "Llamame Guardafrontera," <u>Bohemia</u> (La Habana), April 19, 1968, p.
 35, shows an example of one of these posts. "42 Refugees Flee in Small Boats," <u>The Miami Herald</u>, July 10, 1964, describes the great amount of coastal fortifications with concrete bunkers, barbed wire, trenches, cannons and tanks at that time. By 1971 it seems that this trend continued. "Construyen numerosas Casamatas en Litorales de Cuba Comunista," Diario Las Americas, July 11, 1971.
- 75. Carlos Martinez, "Daring Cubans Sail to Freedom," June 11, 1964 and "39 More Refugees Escape," August 26, 1965, both in <u>The Miami</u> <u>Herald</u>. These were on Havana's northern coast, and each reflector had a one-mile range.
- 76. According to interview with Manuel Carballo, a young raft-escapee who arrived to the U.S. in 1974, reported that along the coastline between Yaguajay and Caibarien (40 kms) there were eighty-two guard posts; some were located on the Keys. Carballo, who observed several possible areas for his escape pointed out the abundant use of dogs, mainly during the night, as well as helicopters in coastal patrols during the day. The placement of posts along the coast varied according to the area. Many of these were established only during the night.
- 77. "Dogs Patrol, Cuban Says," (AP) The Miami Herald, January 2, 1966.
- 78. <u>Ibid</u>. This regulation evidently has varied throughout time. In 1966 it was applied after 7:00 PM between Havana and Varadero. We do not have evidence that this was a nation-wide policy all the time.
- 79. One of the objectives behind the additional fences was probably to avoid the defections of Frontier Guard personnel. According to Ruiz, <u>Anuario 1967</u>, pp. 129 and 163, a total of twenty-five defected in July and forty-five in August of 1967. The fence layout presented in Figure 5 is according to the version of Guantanamo escapees, and other persons acquainted with the area, mainly Rolando Perez Cerezal who arrived in 1974.
- 80. "East Germany Border Barriers," Time, January 22, 1973, p. 33.
- Evaristo Savon, "Fueron Electrocutados y Destrozados por Minas Explosivas de Castro Varios fugitivos Cubanos," <u>Diario Las Americas</u>, July 12, 1970.
- 82. Martinez, "Daring Cubans" and "39 More Refugees." Also we gathered evidence on this matter from our interviews with escapees in the 1970's. This method has been extensively used according to evidence presented to us. Besides catching possible escapees, the method of posing as a counter-revolutionary has also been used among the peasants and even within the military.

- 83. Benjamin de la Vega, "Asesina la Patrulla Costera a 11 Cubanos que intentaban Huir por la Playa de Guanabo," <u>Diario Las Americas</u>, August 25, 1968, and Evaristo Savon, "Fusilaron a Cinco Militares que trataron de Escapar por Varadero," <u>Diario Las Americas</u>, March 1, 1970 and "Ametrallan las Patrullas de Castro a 3 grupos de Fugitivos," November 8, 1970 and "Huyeron de Cuba Roja Bajo Rafagas de Ametralladora 10 Fugitivos Cubanos," October 4, 1970.
- 84. "Espinosa, Reunited with Family, Tells of Horror of G-2 Prison in Red Cuba," Acadiana Profile II (October-November 1970): 10.
- 85. According to the multiple cases interviewed and scattered information on news release accounts.
- 86. According to interview with Bruno Danenberg, already identified.
- 87. de la Vega, "6 Mil Cubanos Salvados."
- 88. Cass, "Cuban Exodus."
- 89. Kaplan, "Cuban Patrol." This was apparently also a corollary of the Kennedy-Kruschev agreement as a result of the settlement of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Navy (March 1965).
- 90. U.S. Senate, <u>Communist Threat</u>, p. 1493. Air patrols were reduced from seven to five per week.
- 91. "Cubans Still Fleeing at Rate of Revolution," <u>Tampa Tribune</u>, July 10, 1967, according to an interview with Rear Adm. M.A. Whalen, commander of the 7th Coast Guard District at the time.
- 92. Kaplan, "Cuban Patrol." The larger vessels used were the Diligence, Ariadne and the Androscoggin ("Big Andy") which could carry the amphibious helicopters of the HH-52A and HH-3 of greater range.
- 93. According to Kaplan, "Cuban Patrol" and interviews with Commander Gatto and Lt. John Zeigler, Coast Guard personnel.
- 94. Ibid.
- 95. While it existed in Miami.
- 96. We witnessed a case with a serious head wound as a result of an incident of this type. Another pointed out to us that months after his successful escape, thorns that had been implanted during their trek for freedom were still coming out.
- 97. According to interviews with the above-mentioned Coast Guard officers.
- 98. Fabricio, "Cubans Flee to Caymans."
- 99. "La Colonia Cubana se Mobiliza en Ayuda de los Refugiados," <u>La Prensa</u> (San Pedro de Sula), August 5, 1971, and "Estudiantes Ayudan a Refugiados," <u>La Prensa</u>, August 6, 1971.

100. Frank Soler, "From Cuba to Haiti to U.S. - a 9 Month Ordeal for Six," <u>The Miami Herald</u>, May 14, 1971. They were kept incomunicado for three months.

CHAPTER VIII

A SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS OF THE EXILES

A sociological analysis of the exodus from revolutionary Cuba would not be complete without an examination of the basic demographic characteristics of its components. Such variables as occupation and education are usually important in determining the socio-economic status of individuals, while age, sex, and race are crucial in describing their physical aspects. When information is available concerning residential patterns, marital conditions and income levels, it also provides insights into the dynamics affecting the target population.

A Methodological Note

Most studies of this type have traditionally relied upon census data covering a total enumeration to assure a high degree of accuracy in the description of the above-mentioned variables. But in recent years, the U.S. Census Bureau has pioneered in sampling techniques to reliably estimate the size and characteristics of a population.

Unfortunately these ideal analytical techniques could not be applied to this study of the Cuban exiles. Census data for Cubans in the United States only provide information on population numbers.¹ A survey of the exodus was on the other hand economically impossible, not to mention that of the escapees. The next best source of demographic data would have been the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service, but their available data applies only to persons admitted to this country as legal immigrants and not as refugees.² A third alter-

native was the use of the computerized records of the Cuban Refugee Center which contain data for all the registered family nuclei, primarily its head of household or principal applicant. This alternative was not the ideal one in view of the non-registrants with the program but it was considered the next best one. A systematic survey of these records for the total exile population and boat escapee sub-group was then made by year of arrival as described in Chapter II. (See the description of the determination of the size of the sample in Appendix A.) The selected sample yielded a rather acceptable picture of the basic demographic characteristics and the annual changes experienced by the exile populations.*

A detailed examination of our data indicated the possibility of two types of analytical treatment, according to the nature of each variable, and limited to the years for which information was available. Whenever an annual trend analysis was feasible, we chose the chronological examination of that variable between 1959 and 1974. Each sociodemographic characteristic was examined, focusing in its variation within each of the various migration stages outlined in Chapter V.

^{*&}quot;Exiles," "exodus," "total exodus," "exile population," "total exile population," and "all exiles" are synonymous terms; in the same sense we will use "escapees," or "boat escapees." "Exile groups," "exile subgroups," or "exile populations," will be the terms used to refer to both populations. Considering Occupations, "professionals, semi professionals, managerials and officials," will be referred to as "professionals." By the same token, "skilled, semi skilled and umskilled" occupations will be labeled as "skilled," and "agricultural, fishery and mining" occupations will be referred to as "extractive." Our sample used heads of household or principal applicants registered with the CREC. In most cases, these were males, but many females were classified as such. We will refer to them as the "registrations" or "the exile labor force," even though the actual exile labor force is certainly broader.

But since the sample provided by CREC did not cover the exiles up to 1974, as it did for the boat escapees, we also relied on our 1971 survey of the Varadero-Miami airlift arrivals to be considered as estimates for that year. The same approach was followed for 1974, using the survey conducted on the arrivals from Spain as described in Chapter II. Because CREC began collecting data in 1961, the range of our analysis spans mostly between that year and 1974. Time graphs were used to present these analyses.

Upon completion of the trend analysis, whenever this was possible, a second analytical procedure was used. This consisted of the contrast between the exiles, the boat escapee subgroup and the parent Cuban population for each of their socio-demographic characteristics in their possible breakdowns. For this purpose the Cuban censuses were used, relying heavily on the 1953 one since it is the most complete. Some use was made though of the 1943 Cuban Census as well as the most recent one in 1970. Unfortunately, the Cuban government, so far, has released only data for the total population and breakdowns by political units.

Both the trend analysis and the contrasts with the Cuban population will only be feasible for occupation, education, and age characteristics. These will be presented first, followed by a more condensed comparative analysis of the remaining variables: place of residence, marital status, income levels, race, ethnicity, and sex. For these variables, sometimes no information would be available for the escapees, thus only a very tentative estimation can be made of the exiles as a unit.

Occupational Characteristics

The occupational variable should generally be considered one of the strongest indicators of socio-economic status with a given population.

An in-depth examination of this attribute was considered an essential research procedure. The annual trend analyses will be shown in Figures 6 and 7. It reveals that the occupational patterns for the exile population and the boat subgroup show some significant variations through the years. These variations were especially relevant for the professional and the skilled, semi and unskilled categories. Other occupations showed less noticeable variations through time. The trend analysis will initially consider each of the four outlined stages in the entire exodus and examine in a comparative fashion the annual variations experienced by the total exile and the escapee subgroup for the years in which data are available. Finally, the total occupational breakdowns for the two groups will be contrasted with the known characteristics of the Cuban population for each occupational category. In all of these contrasts, Figures 6, 7, and 8 will be used instead of the original tables.

Early Departures

The <u>exile population</u> appears to have been strongly marked by professionals, semi-professionals, managerial and officials at the very early stage of the exodus (Figure 6). Unfortunately, no reliable data are available on occupations for 1959 and 1960.³ Data available for 1961, on the other hand, established very clearly the above-noted predominance of white collar workers. But the fact that a substantial number of refugees never registered with the Refugee Center (27.9 per cent) in the initial years, as indicated in Chapter VI, we may speculate that most likely these belonged to that predominant sector who were more prone to have adequate financial reserves, were too proud to accept aid, or simply had found a job and therefore did not need refugee welfare






Figure 6. Annual Variation in Per cent of Occupational Composition of Exiles Registered with CREC, 1961-1974





assistance. Thus, their proportion may have been even higher for 1961 and we may rightfully speculate that their estimation for 1959 and 1960 may have been even higher. The predominance of this occupational group continued well into the pext stage of the exodus. On the other hand, individuals in clerical and sales occupations up to 1962 were proportionally more numerous. This seems a natural consequence of the process of confiscation of major businesses by the Cuban government. In descending proportional order appeared the skilled levels, the services, and well below, the extractive sector.

However, the <u>boat escapee</u> sector depicted in Figure 7 showed a slightly different picture by 1962. As among all the exiles, the professional occupations were initially more abundant, but sharply declining. They were followed by the skilled occupations who in turn were increasing at a fast rate. Clerical and sales trailed in importance, along with the extractive sector and services, respectively. In the years that followed both exile subgroups experienced significant changes concerning the professional and skilled sectors.

Post-Missile Crisis Lull

Subsequent to 1961 <u>the exiles</u> have experienced a consistent downward trend for the professionals and kindred workers (Figure 6).⁴ By 1964 professionals reached its lowest point until then, representing roughly one-fifth of that. The increased influx of refugees who were among the skilled, clerical and sales workers was primarily responsible for the proportional decline noted in the professional categories. Concomitantly, the proportion of workers in extractive employments increased significantly during this period reaching 12.1 per cent of the exodus by 1964. The service workers, on the other hand, remained rather stable

during this period in which the negative revolutionary impact was felt very distinctively by the lower socio-economic levels of the population.

Within <u>the escapees</u>, the professionals continued the downward trend in a dramatic way during this period in which no direct legal travel existed between Cuba and the U.S. By 1963 they ceased being a majority, leaving this role to the skilled occupations which constituted almost 52 per cent of the escapees in 1964. On the other hand, extractive occupations experienced also a substantial increase, reaching a peak (17 per cent) in 1963. These two occupations constituted on the average almost 56 per cent of the escapee population registered during this period. A correlation could obviously be established between these facts and the negative impact of the totalitarian transformations on the island. The other occupations – clerical-sales and services – were clustered very closely, following a pattern that will continue through 1974.

Family Reunion Period

For <u>both exile groups</u>, year 1965 marked an exception in the downward trend for the professional category.⁵ Professionals in the total exodus constituted 37.4 per cent of the registrants with the Refugee Program for that year; the explanation may be rather simple. Those who came at the beginning of the airlift were the closest relatives of exiles already in the United States, claimed through the Family Reunion Program. Thus, if there had been an earlier predominance of professionals and kindred occupations, it would be expected to see this category at the top when the Family Reunion Stage started in the fall of 1965.

Among the escapees, the explanation for the milder increase of professionals may not be that simple. We can speculate that this might be

a case of sampling error or we may hypothesize that those professionals leaving through this means were mainly those anxious to leave who were not allowed to do so using the legal way due to lack of kinship ties or due to the restrictive government regulations. In spite of the increase in professionals, they only constituted a small fraction (15.5 per cent) within the escapee population in 1965.

The decline for the total exile population of the skilled and extractive occupations in 1965 is also paralleled within the escapee subgroup. But within the latter, the skilled workers still remained a majority (35.6 per cent) while the extractive became the smallest (8.2 per cent). Clerical and sales plus service occupations remained rather stable within the total exile population in 1965, while they experienced a slight increase for the escapee subgroup.

After 1965 the <u>total exile population</u> experienced a continuous decline within the professional category.⁶ This trend leveled off by 1970 and 1971 where this sector constituted roughly 13 per cent of the exodus. In turn, skilled plus clerical and sales occupations became predominant during the Family Reunion period. Combined, these two occupations constituted 64 per cent of the registrations up to 1971. On the other hand, extractive occupations experienced a definite upward trend during this stage, reaching a peak also in 1971, when they comprised almost a fourth of the labor force. Significantly, service occupations remained almost unaltered, representing on the average 8.5 per cent of the exile, population during this Family Reunion stage.

The <u>escapees</u> showed during this period a definite predominance of the skilled and extractive occupations. These two categories combined represented, on the average, a total of 75 per cent since 1966. The

skilled alone reached 65 per cent in 1969, climbing to more than 80 per cent by 1973, while the extractive peaked in 1970 (29.7 per cent) and declined afterward. The other three labor sectors were more or less clustered on the minority side, but there was a total absence of professionals and service occupations by 1973.

Wane of the Exodus

The only statistics available for this period are for the 1974 arrivals from Spain. These show little change from the 1971 refugees, the last year of major influx from the Varadero-Miami airlift. The occupational characteristics of the 1974 arrivals differed mainly concerning the clerical-sales group and the extractive occupations. The former experienced a substantial increase after a rather sharp decline in 1971, representing by then almost 28 per cent of the employable refugees. The extractive on the other hand, experienced an opposite trend, dropping from an all time high in 1971 of almost 20 per cent, to just 6 per cent. This was expected since the trip through Spain is certainly more costly, thus being prohibitive for an agriculturalrelated person with no relatives or friends outside the island, which was often the case. In 1974 the other occupational groups--professionals, services and skilled--remained without much change from the 1971 levels. Cuba and the Refugees

The comparisons of the different occupational categories between both exile groups and the parent Cuban population are depicted in Figure 8.⁷* This figure also includes a "parity index" which indicates the

^{*}The terms "Cuban population," "parent Cuban population," and "parent population" are synonymous, referring to the characteristics reported for Cuba. The exile groups will normally be compared with the Cuban population, unless otherwise noted.




Figure 8. Comparison of the Occupational Composition in Per cent between the Cubans 1953, the Boat Escapees and the Exiles, 1961-1974

degree to which the exile groups have a parity or are representative of the parent population for a given category.* An overall look at Figure 8 shows how in all but two occupational categories the escapees were closer to the parent population than the exiles. The latter were usually either largely over or underrepresentative of the 1953 Cubans.⁸ A closer look at each occupational category will help in clarifying these comparisons.

The proportion of professionals within the exile group was overrepresentative of the 1953 Cubans. For the exiles, overrepresentation reached a ratio of more than two to one (parity index = $2\frac{A}{A}$), while that of the escapees was slightly over the parity level (1.1). The professional pattern was very much replicated within the clerical and sales occupations, but the escapees were then slightly below the level of parity (0.9). Service occupations represented an exception to the preceding trends since the three populations were almost proportionally identical (1.3 and 1.1).

The comparisons for the extractive and skilled sectors deserve a separate description. The exile groups were undoubtedly underrepresentative of the largest Cuban economic sector, the extractive (mainly agriculture), but again the escapee subgroup was proportionally much

^{*}The degree of parity between the exile groups and the parent Cuban population was included in parenthesis () in each graph where the comparisons were made (Figures 8 and 9), and Tables 13 and 14. In those graphs, the index appears on top of the bar representing the proportional magnitude for a given variable of the exile and escapee populations. This index was calculated having as a base the per cent corresponding to the Cuban population; that is, dividing the corresponding exile or escapee percentage by that of the Cuban population. The resulting figure should be interpreted as follows: a <u>one</u> (1) indicates that a <u>parity</u> level exists, or that either the escapees or the exiles were proportionally equal to the Cuban population for that variable level. A figure <u>above one</u>, i.e. 1.5, indicates that there is <u>overrepresentation</u> on the part of the refugee group, or that the percentage for that given group was one and a half times higher than the corresponding percentage

closer to the parent population than the exiles as a whole. It could be speculated that if the urbanization trend had continued in Cuba, as it appears that it had, then the above observed gap must have been smaller.

With the skilled sector (including semiskilled and unskilled), the comparisons showed a totally different picture. Contrary to common belief, the exile groups were actually overrepresentative of the blue collar workers of the parent population. That is, Cubans in exile have proportionally more persons within the skilled occupations than the Cuban population did in 1953. The escapees departed here from their previous pattern of greater parity with the parent population and were actually more overrepresentative of that occupational sector than the exiles as a whole. This fact alone has a considerable amount of sociological implications. As the trend analysis showed (See Figures 6 and 7), this pattern of overrepresentation was well established for the escapees and the exiles by 1963 and 1964, respectively.

A final comment is mandatory concerning the first hypothesis, namely that in the earlier years of the 1959-1974 exodus professionals and related workers were heavily represented among the exiles, while persons with working class occupational skills dominated its latter stages. The operational definition of the term working class includes both the skilled and extractive related sectors. Figure 6 clearly supports this hypothesis. Professionals comprised 44.5 per cent of the

^{*}for the Cuban population. Finally, a figure <u>below one</u>, i.e. 0.5, indicates that the given refugee group is underrepresentative of the parent Cuban population; or that the proportion for that variable within the group was half the percentage shown for the Cubans.

United States-based refugee population early in the exodus, but the percentage of professionals among the exiles steadily declined thereafter. In 1974, professionals represented merely 13.9 per cent of the newly arrived exiles. Conversely, in 1961 the working class exiles represented only 19.7 per cent of those then entering the United States, but steadily increased and reached 45.9 per cent for those arriving in 1974. Conceived of as a unit, the working class members of the exodus remained in the forefront after 1966. These findings prove the correctness of the hypothesis originally stated.

Educational Status

The analysis of the educational characteristics--probably the second most important variable determining socio-economic status--should clarify the picture that emerged from the description based on the occupational levels. The same procedure used for that variable was repeated here for the analysis of the educational characteristics. Figures 9 and 10 were utilized first for the trend analysis, while Figure 11 was the basis for the educational comparisons between the three populations (See page 221).

Early Departures

For both the exiles and the escapees, the educational characteristics of the refugees arriving at the end of the first stage of the exodus seemed to be remarkably similar (Figures 9 and 10).* In both groups those with

^{*}The selected educational breakdowns were 0 to 3 years, practically illiterates; the 4 to 6, comprising those who completed grade school or part of it; the 7 to 11 which includes those who have completed high school or part of it; the 12 to 15 years with some college, and the highest level, 16 years and over, comprising those with a university degree. These five levels sometimes may be referred to as the first, second, etc., educational levels. This breakdown was selected following the pattern of previous studies on the Cuban exodus.




Figure 9. Annual Variation in Per cent of Educational Composition of Exiles Registered with CREC, 1961-1974




Figure 10. Annual Variation in Per cent of Educational Composition of Boat Escapees Registered with CREC, 1961-1974

completed high school education or part of it (7 to 11 years) comprised the predominant educational level. In this stage, the proportion of university graduates was very low. This pattern had some bearing upon the occupational picture presented earlier, since initially in the exodus the professionals were the predominant category (Figures 9 and 10). An obvious interpretation of the apparent lack of agreement between occupation and education would be that those classified as professionals corresponded mostly to semiprofessionals, managers and officials who did not need university degrees. In this sense, it was logical to assume that those with some college education (12 to 15 years) should rank rather high in both exile groups, as they did at this stage.

The early escapees had a high average number of years of education during this stage. After 1961, proportionally fewer people from the highest educational level left Cuba. There was a long-run downward trend for this educational level among the exiles, but the decline was sharper for the escapees. Both refugee groups also presented as a distinctive feature an increasingly upward trend for the 4 to 6 years of education which extended throughout the entire period of analysis. Post-Missile Crisis Lull

Both exile populations presented considerable more variation in educational attainment during this stage (Figures 9 and 10). The 4 to 6 year educational level was the preponderant one during this stage for both populations. However, the second most important was the 0 to 3 year level for the escapees and the 7 to 11 one for the exiles. Perhaps the most noticeable contrast occurred for the two highest levels. Thus, while the exiles with university degrees or some college education remained rather stable, for the escapees the university graduates were

very few, to the point of being practically negligible by 1964. The apparent lack of agreement between occupation and education was observed here also.

Family Reunion Period

In this third stage, the educational patterns were similar to those of the second with slight exceptions. For the exiles, 90.7 per cent of the people were in the three lowest educational levels (0 to 11) up to 1971. The second educational level (4 to 6) was definitely the single largest throughout this period with an all-time peak of 60.7 per cent in 1967. In the year 1961 the proportion of illiterates was only.8 per cent but by 1971 the proportion of people in that level reached an all-time peak of 35.2 per cent. The incidence of this low educational level corresponded also with the increase in the extractive occupations for that particular year (Figure 6). It is our impression, though, that many of those with low educational levels had at least some semi-skilled occupation in Cuba.

The <u>escapee</u> subgroup practically repeated the same educational trend observed for the exiles. But for the escapees, the three lowest educational levels constituted on the average 94.6 per cent of that population for this period. The 4 to 6 year category was also the predominant one reaching 64.5 per cent in 1967. For the <u>exiles</u>, in this stage an increase was observed at the intermediate level (7 to 11) as well as the pronounced increase at the lowest levels (0 to 3) by the end of this period, in 1971.

Wane of the Exodus

The 1974 <u>arrivals from Spain</u> exhibited some radical changes from 1971 (Figure 9). The majority still had an intermediate educational

level (4 to 11), but there was also a sharp drop in the lowest educational category from an all-time high of 35.2 per cent in 1971 to 2.3 per cent in 1974. That is, very few of the 1974 arrivals were illiterate or nearly so. On the other hand the proportion of those with more than twelve years of education had a small increase. A good number of physicians were evident, though, in the arrivals from Spain. Within the <u>escapees</u>, those with educational attainments of 4 to 11 years of schooling remained in the preponderance, while there was a sharp decline to zero for those with either high school or university education. A similar decline was also noticed for the illiterates.

Cuba and the Refugees

The educational comparisons of the two exile populations with the 1953 Cubans presented some methodological complexities. First of all, we had to insure that equivalent populations were compared in terms of age. A cut-off line of twenty years of age was selected for the Cuban population and the exiles. Figure 11 illustrates these comparisons.

An immediate trait that can be seen by these comparisons is that the exile groups were much better educated than their parent population. Yet, there were some relevant differences when the exiles and the escapees were independently compared with the Cuban population. In general, the escapees more closely resembled the 1953 Cubans in most educational categories. However, there was a proportional overrepresentation by the exile groups for the three highest educational levels, shifting to underrepresentation for the lowest.

The proportion of the refugee population with university degrees was much higher than that of the escapees and the Cuban population as the parity indexes show. The same conclusion could generally be derived con-




Figure 11. Comparison of Educational Composition in Per cent between the Cubans, 1953, the Boat Escapees and the Exiles, 1961-1974

cerning the next educational level, 12 to 15 years. Again, the escapees were proportionally closer to the parent population than the exiles. These two comparisons pointed toward the huge brain drain suffered by Cuba as a result of the revolutionary process.

The intermediate educational level (7 to 11 years) showed great overrepresentation by the refugee groups, but these in turn were much closer to each other than in the preceding educational levels. As we move to the second level (4 to 6 years), a degree of parity was almost reached between the three populations, but underrepresentation was the main characteristic when the lowest educational level was analyzed. Here, the escapees were closer to the parent population, but a claim by the Cuban government about illiteracy warranted some further analysis.

They have claimed that illiteracy had dropped in Cuba from the 1953 level of 23.8 per cent, to 4 per cent in 1960, due to the educational campaign conducted at that time, especially among the adult population.⁹ Even though we feel that this is a highly optimistic claim, a considerable amount of improvement may have taken place. If this was so, the exiles in general would have probably been more representative of their parent population on this lowest educational level than what appeared in the comparison.

Age Distribution

The analysis of the refugees' age composition followed the similar procedures utilized for occupational and educational variables.* Figures 12 and 13 depict the trend analysis, while the comparisons with the parent

^{*}The age brackets selected were: 1-those below 20 years; 2-between 20 and 29; 3-between 30 and 39; 4-between 40 and 49; and 5-those 50 years and above. These will also be referred to as the first, second, etc. age levels.

population were presented in Tables 13 and 14. The analysis for the annual variations of the age distributions was limited to heads of household or principal applicants, while the comparisons with the 1953 Cubans also included the entire exile population coming through the airlift.

Early Departures

The differences between the exiles and the boat escapees were quite relevant within the first stage of the exodus. For the <u>exile</u> population (Figure 12) the age cohorts were rather clustered, each constituting on the average about 20 per cent of the total with the exception of those below twenty years. These comprised less than 10 per cent of the exiles, and remained rather low throughout the years under analysis. For the entire exile migration this was the stage which contained the youngest population, averaging thirty-nine years of age.

The age distribution for the <u>escapees</u> had a wider range and a different rank order than the exiles (Figure 13). Conversely among the exiles, people in the older age brackets were cleary predominant. Thus the persons fifty years of age and above reached an all-time peak of 36.1 per cent. The fact that military service (SMO) was not yet enacted may constitute an important factor here. By 1963 the SMO started and contributed to the alteration of the entire age distribution for the escapees. Thus the escapees' average age reached here its highest level (43.3 years) in 1962, but declined steadily afterward.

Post-Missile Crisis Lull

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This period of the <u>exodus</u> witnessed some substantial departures from their initial age distribution. The older age brackets took a definite lead to the point that the average age for this period jumped 12 per cent, to 42.5 years of age. Considering the escapees, it appeared that the




Figure 12. Annual Variation in Per cent of Age Composition of Exiles Registered with CREC, 1961-1974




Figure 13. Annual Variation in Per Cent of Age Composition of Boat Escapees Registered with CREC, 1961-1974

young people began to feel the negative impact of the revolution, and especially the harshness of the military service since they began to use these illegal means of departure when the legal ones were closed to them. Those among the 20 to 29 year cohorts then constituted the predominant category, while those in the older bracket (40 years and above) experienced a sharp decline.

Family Reunion Period

This stage presented relevant differences between the exodus and the escapees. The <u>exiles</u> tended to have little variation in the age distribution until the end of the Family Reunion Period (Figure 12). People in the older age bracket continued to predominate, followed by the lower age levels. It is no wonder then that the average age for this stage was 47.5 years.

But the <u>escapees</u> showed considerable amount of variation. There is a puzzling increase in 1965 for the highest age level. The downward age trend was altered here, and no explanation can be given at this time, but by 1966 that earlier trend was resumed. An identical variation was also observed for the 20 to 29 year bracket. The proportion of those in this age level increased over the rest of this stage to the point of constituting more than half of the escapees by 1969. The 20 to 24 year subgroup alone comprised, on the average, 27.3 per cent of the escapees during this period.

The escapees showed a low percentage for those within the lowest age bracket, but this may be due to the age bias built into our sample. Many of these younger ones had relatives in the U.S. and upon their arrival they were normally absorbed by a CREC "family nucleus," thus not appearing as "head of household" or "principal applicant." This explanation is corroborated by the examined newspaper records.

Wane of the Exodus

Departing from the earlier trend, the <u>exiles</u> between ages 30 to 49 showed a substantial increase within this period. This was accompanied by a minor increase by the oldest age level after their sharp drop in 1971. Conversely, there was a decrease for all those below twenty-nine years of age. For the <u>escapees</u>, the age distribution showed considerable variation. Those within the 20 to 29 year level constituted the majority, followed erratically by ages 30 to 39, and more steadily by the 40 to 49 year level. By 1974 no one in the lowest nor in the highest age cohorts were present.

Cuba and the Refugees

Probably the most difficult comparison between the Cuban population and the exile groups is with the age variable. First, we have the limitation imposed upon our sample due to the type of registrants included in it.¹⁰ Secondly, it is quite likely that the age structure of the Cuban population had actually changed to some extent due to variations in the birthrate since 1953.¹¹ Therefore, any comparison attempted between the exiles and the parent population concerning age will always be a tentative one.

The best alternative for a meaningful comparison with the Cuban population was to use the reliable figures for the entire airlift portion of the exodus including all age and sex groups, which comprised approximately 50 per cent of the exiles entering the United States. The next alternative utilized was our CREC sample, limiting it to the 20 to 64 age bracket.

The comparison of the airlift arrivals with the Cuban population is shown in Table 13. A slight overlapping of age brackets was unavoidable due to the way in which the airlift data was released. As a whole these arrivals were rather close to the 1953 Cubans, but there is a trend from

1953 Cuban	-			Airlift Arrivals	Parity	
<u>Per cent</u> ^a	*******	egor		Per cent ^D	Index	
	Cubans		Airlift			
12.6	0-4	(1)	0- 5	10.0	0.8	
33.2	5-19	(2)	6-18	24.0	0.7	
16.8	20-29	(3)	19-29	8.5	0.5	
13.5	30-39	(4)	30 - 39	19.2	1.4	
11.0	40-49	(5)	40-49	15.2	1.4	
6.0	50-59	(6)	50-60	10.5	1.7	
6.9	60+	(7)	61+	. 12.3	1.8	
100.0				100.0		
Sources:	: ^a Oficina Nacional de los Censos Demografico y Electoral, <u>Censos de Poblacion, Viviendas y Electoral</u> , 1955, p. 32.					

Table 13. Contrast between the Age Distribution of the Airlift Arrivals (1965-1973) and the 1953 Cubans

bFact Sheet, February 1975.

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Table 14. Contrasts of the 20 to 64 Age Groups between the 1953 Cubans, the Boat Escapees and the Exiles

1953	Roat	1	Parii	- V				
	<u>h</u>	Exiles ^C	Index					
Pe	r cen	t	Escapees	Exiles				
18.0	. 22.4	6.8	1.2	0.4				
15.6	18.8	8.2	1.2	0.5				
13.9	15.6	15.0	1.1	1.1				
13.2	11.4	16.3	0.9	1.2				
12.0	8.0 -	14.6	0.7	1.2				
10.1	7.6	12.9	0.8	1.3				
7.2	6.0	10.7	0.9	1.5				
4.8	4.5	8.6	0.9	1.8				
5.2	5.9	6.0	1.1	1.3				
100.0	100.0	100.0						
2,903,202.	1927	<u>,</u> 5892						
^a Oficina Nacional de los Censos Demografico y Electoral.								
b <u>1961-1974</u>								
c1961-1974								
	18.0 15.6 13.9 13.2 12.0 10.1 7.2 4.8 <u>5.2</u> 100.0 2,903,202. ^a Oficina Nacio <u>Censos de Pob</u> b1961-1974	S Cubans Escapees Escapees P P r c e n 18.0 22.4 15.6 18.8 13.9 15.6 13.2 11.4 12.0 8.0 10.1 7.6 7.2 6.0 4.8 4.5 5.9 100.0 100.0 2,903,202 1927 40 1927 40 196 196 196 196 197 40	$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$				

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underrepresentation for the three youngest age cohorts, to overrepresentation for the older groups (See the Parity Index in Table 13). As this index shows, the differences between the two populations are rather small within each age cohort, with the exception of the two older ones. This indicates that the airlift arrivals tended to be older than the parent population; in fact the average age of the former was 44.6 years, while the latter had a median of 34.1.

The comparisons of those that could be considered in the labor force (20 to 64 years) offered another perspective on age (Table 14). Again the escapees were closer to the parent population than the exiles (See the Parity Indexes). However, there were other important differences between the escapees and the exiles in comparison with the 1953 Cubans. There was a definite overrepresentation of the younger age brackets (20 to 29 years) among the escapees while the opposite was true for the exiles. These, on the other hand, were clearly overrepresentative of the parent population for the higher age levels while the same was not the case for the escapees.

Other Variables

Residential Characteristics

The place of residence of an individual may affect in a significant way his perception of social reality. The analysis of this variable within the context of the Cuban exodus is important in order to determine the degree to which the exiles are geographically representative of the parent Cuban population. Unfortunately, no annual data was available, making impossible a trend analysis, but there were data for certain points in time that allowed us to make some estimates for the refugee population. Tables 15 and 16 will be used for the residential comparisons.

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Juan M. Clark was born in Havana, Cuba on May 16, 1938, son of the former Maria R. Sanchez and Juan M. Clark. He attended La Salle High School in Havana graduating in June 1955. Afterward he entered the University of Havana, but was forced to interrupt his studies due to political turmoil in Cuba. Mr. Clark had occupied the position of National President of the Young Catholic Students organization. His involvement in the political affairs led him into exile in June 1960, and to his participation as a paratrooper of the 2506 Brigade to fight in the Bay of Pigs invasion, April 17, 1961. He was captured and imprisoned until December 1962 when the prisoners of war were returned to the United States after a ransom payment was negotiated with the Castro government.

Mr. Clark married in 1963 the former Clara de Leon and has two sons, Juan Marcos and Jose Alberto. As an exile in Venezuela, 1964-1965, he was Head of Programs in La Guaira area for the Instituto Venezolano de Accion Comunitaria (IVAC), a community development organization.

In June 1965, Mr. Clark entered the University of Florida and received the B.S.A., 1967, and M.S.A., 1969, in Agricultural Economics with a minor in Sociology. He entered the Doctoral program in Sociology in 1969, passing the qualifying examinations in June 1970. When a graduate student he held an NDFL Title VI Fellowship and was active in student organizations, being president of the Latin American Club and chairman of the Council of International Organizations.

In 1971 Mr. Clark was field director for an A.I.D. project conducted in Honduras, Central America. That year he joined the faculty of Miami-Dade Community College, South Campus. He has conducted research about conditions in Cuba and about the Cubans and other Spanish speaking people in Dade County, Florida. He directed there an HEW sponsored needs assessment research project on the elderly and is currently the field director of the Cuban portion of a NIMH sponsored study on immigration and assimilation patterns in this country. Mr. Clark is serving as research consultant to a University of Puerto Ricobased study on the impact of the Cuban migration on that island, and has written, lectured, and testified before the U.S. Congress on some of these matters.

-	EARLY	EXODUS	LATE EXODUS		
	Residence	Birth Place	Residence	Residence	
	of 1943	of 1959-60	of 1970	of 1971	
Province	Cubans ^a	Exilesb	Cubans ^C	Exiles	
	P	e <u>r</u> c	e n	t	
Pinar del Rio	8.3	7.6	7.6	19.9	
La Habana	25.9	51.7	26.0	24.8	
Matanzas	7.6	6.9	5.8	11.3	
Las Villas	19.6	13.4	15.6	26.7	
Camaguey	10.2	7.8	9.9	4.1	
Oriente 🔎	$\frac{28.4}{100.0}$	$\frac{12.6}{100.0}$	$\frac{35.0}{100.0}$	$\frac{13.2}{100.0}$	
N	4,778,583	1151	8,553,395	266	

Table 15. Geographical Distribution by Province of Exiles 1959-1960, 1971, and Cubans in 1943 and 1970

 Sources: ^aOficina Nacional de los Censos Demografico y Electoral, <u>Censos de Poblacion, Viviendas y Electoral</u>, 1955, p. 9.
 ^bNinisterio de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias, Estado Mayor General, Republica de Cuba. <u>Sentencia de la Causa</u> <u>No. 111 de 1962 seguida por infraccion del artículo 128</u> <u>del Codigo de Defensa Social en Relacion con el 5 de la</u> <u>Ley No. 425 de 7 de Julio de 1959</u>. Habana, April 11, 1962.
 ^cLisandro Perez, The Growth of the Population of Cuba, 1953-1970. Master's thesis, University of Florida, 1973. p. 181.

Table 16. Representation by Municipio within Province of Residence of 1971 Exiles before Leaving the Island

Province	Municipi Represen	• •	Representativeness Index
Pinar del	Rio 12	14	85
La Habana	13	26	50
Matanzas	· <u>1</u> 3	22 .	59
Las Villas	19	32	59
Camaguey	4	10	40
Oriente	7	22	31_
Total	68	126	54
		de los Censos Demogra ion, Viviendas y Elect	

As was pointed out earlier, the Cuban government "provided" us with what could be considered a fairly large sample of the early 1959-1960 exiles.¹² This was based on the prison sentences imposed on more than 1,000 Cuban exiles captured after the Bay of Pigs (April 1961) invasion which contained data on place of birth for all of the 2506 Brigade members. There is no reason to believe that, geographically, the Brigade members were drawn in a biased or skewed manner from the early refugee population. Thus, they could be used as estimates of the exiles' place of origin by 1960.

As for the late refugee arrivals, our 1971 survey provided a 266 case sample group that could also be used as an indicator of the place of residence of the refugees before they left Cuba (Table 15). It is important to emphasize though, that no absolute representativeness of the entire exodus is claimed for either one of these groups.

Concerning comparative indicators for the Cuban population, the only data released, so far, by the Cuban government for the 1970 Census can be used for comparisons with the 1971 refugee arrivals. As a counterpoint for the early exodus, the data from the 1953 Census was considered inadequate to match with the place of birth of our 1960 exile group since the strong element of internal migration would have blurred the real residential picture. The use of the place of residence obtained from the 1943 Cuban census was considered the best alternative for the analysis of the degree of representativeness of our early exiles, since that year was the closest to the time of birth for around 50 per cent of the Brigade members.¹³

The comparison between the early exodus (1959-60) and its parent population showed two significant differences (Table 15). The most

striking one is the great lack of parity present for the Havana and Oriente provinces. Among the early exiles, Havana showed almost a two to one ratio of overrepresentation in relation to the Cuban population. In the case of Oriente, the opposite was the case. For the rest of the provinces, the exiles were underrepresentative of the Cuban population, but especially so for Las Villas, Camagüey, and more strongly for Oriente. But the rest of the nation presented a more balanced ratio.

As we moved to the late exodus (1971) relevant changes took place. Instead of a strong set of bipolar differences for Havana and Oriente, we observed only a strong difference for the latter. Thus Oriente, the most populated province, was now underrepresentative among the late exiles by a 2.6 ratio. On the other hand, and surprisingly, Havana province was then slightly underrepresented within the late arrivals, an important departure from the pattern of the early arrivals. Also interestingly, the other provinces that were underrepresented during the early exodus were now overrepresented or closely so with the exception of Camagüey.

Another angle from which the geographical distribution of the exiles can be considered is by the analysis of their distribution by <u>municipio</u>.* In this approach a better picture of the intra-province spread of the exiles was obtained, or how representative they are within each province. Unfortunately, we can only count on our 1971 sample to be compared with the Cuban population. This sample contained the <u>municipio</u> of residence, at the time of departure, of the individual; through this information we determine the geographical spread of the arriving exiles. In other words, we could ascertain what proportion of the municipios per province were

*The municipio is the equivalent to a county in the United States.

represented in our 1971 arrivals. An index of representativeness was again compiled dividing the number of <u>municipios</u> present in our sample by the total number of municipal units in that province, and multiplying the result by one hundred, as presented in Table 16.^{*}

Exiles from western and central provinces represented a wider area per province than those from eastern provinces (Table 16). Thus, Pinar del Rio, the western most, showed the highest geographical spread, followed by the two central ones--Matanzas and Las Villas--with Camaguey and Oriente as the least representative in the east. Those from metropolitan Havana constituted only 19.9 per cent of the 1971 exiles while in 1962 they represented 62 per cent.¹⁴ As a whole, the 1971 sample came from 54 per cent of the Cuban municipalities.

Finally, it is interesting to point out that 18.8 per cent of these late arrivals came from rural areas. In 1953 rural Cuban people comprised 43 per cent, but that proportion was probably lower by 1970 if the early migration toward urban areas had continued.

Marital Status

The contrasting analysis of the marital status of the exile groups was also useful in determining the degree of representativeness of the populations under study. We relied here on our sample of the total exodus as well as on that of the escapees, each taken as a unit. The only Cuban frame of reference available was the figures for the 1953 census, comprising people age twelve and above. The lower age boundary for the exiles was higher due to the nature of our sample as pointed out earlier. Representativeness indexes were also compiled following the procedure already established.^{*} The three populations were compared in Table 17.

[&]quot;The representativeness index is synonymous of the parity index

Marital	Cuba	Boat		Parity 1	Index
Categorie	<u>s 1953</u> ^a	<u>Escapees</u> ^b	<u>Exiles</u> ^C	Escapees	Exiles
Single	40.6	32.6	15.0	0.8	0.4
Married	35.1	43.3	64.8	1.2	1.8
Divorced	1.1	4.6	6.0	4.2	5.4
Widowed	4.7	7.6	9.4	1.6	2.0
Common La Marriag		12.0	4.8	0.6	0.3
N	3,963,114	2169	6592		
Sources:				nográfico y El Electoral, 195	-

Table 17. Comparison of Marital Statuses between the Cubans 1953, the Boat Escapees and the Exile Population

Sources: ^AOficina Nacional de los Censos Demográfico y Electoral, <u>Censos de Población, Viviendas y Electoral</u>, 1955, p. 83. Figures are for persons twelve years and older. ^b1961-1970 ^c1961-1971

As was the case in previous comparisons the escapee population was in general definitely closer to the parent Cuban population than were the exiles. It seems clear that the exile population consisted predominantly of <u>married persons</u>, almost doubling the percentage of the 1953 Cubans (See the Representativeness Index), but the escapees in turn were again much closer to the 1953 Cuban population.

Single persons in Cuba were underrepresented by the refugees but more so by the exiles (0.4) than the escapee sub-group (0.8). One explanation for the underrepresentation of singles among the refugee population is that the Castro regime precluded the exit of men ages fifteen to twentysix to serve in the military service. Furthermore, there was also the built-in bias in the sample provided by the Refugee Center. This sample was more likely to contain married people who would normally be the "heads of household" or "principal applicant." The comparisons between the other marital statuses yielded some interesting differences and, again, the escapees are closer to the parent population. The differences observed for the divorce category were probably smaller than the ones shown in Table 17, since Lowry Nelson uncovered that the divorce rate had increased substantially in the past two decades.¹⁵

For the <u>widowed</u>, the differences between the three populations are not great, but the escapees were closer again to the 1953 Cubans. In the <u>common law marriage</u> we feel that the resemblance of the escapees with the parent population is rather relevant. This is another indicator of the lower socio-economic level of the escapees since this status was rather typical of that level.

Income Levels

An important corollary of the occupational distribution of a population is its income level. In the case of the Cuban refugees, this information is important because it would help clarify their change in socio-economic status throughout the years. But since no income data was available for the refugees from the available sources, we had to rely on surveys done with the arriving refugees, or those already here to ascertain their income characteristics. Fortunately, in an early study of the exodus, data was collected on income earned by exiles in 1958 for those in this ccuntry in 1962. In our 1971 survey of arrivals here that item was elicited plus income at the time the exiles applied to leave Cuba, which, for the most part, was after 1965. Table 18 presents these three income levels broken into various subcategories. Since the 1953 Cuban census did not publish data on income, we relied on surveys conducted in Cuba for comparisons with that population.

	<u> </u>	Exile	es Arriv	ving In
Approxímate	Annual	<u> 1959–1962</u>		1971
Socio-Economic	Income	Cuba	Cuba	Before Exit
Levels, Cuba 1958 ^a	Levels	<u>1958^b</u>	<u>1958</u>	<u>Application</u>
	Per	c e	n	t
Lower-Lower ^c	1-Less than \$1,000 ^c	7	17.0	7.4
Upper Lower	2-\$1,000 - \$1,999	16	32.5	41.0
Lower Middle	3-\$2,000 - \$3,999	27	36.4	38.2
Middle Middle	4-\$4,000 - \$5,999	18	5.8	7.4
Upper Middle	5-\$6,000 - \$7,999	11	3.9	4.1
Upper	6-\$8,000 - \$9,999	8	1.5	1.4
	7-\$10,000 - \$14,999	7	2.9	0.5
	8-\$15,000 or more	6.	0	0
		100.0	100.0	100.0
N		199	206	217
-				

Table 18. Levels of Income in Cuba of the Exiles Coming to the United States in 1959-1962 and 1971, Compared with Estimates of the Cuban Population, 1958, by Socio-Economic Status

 Sources: ^aDeducted from <u>Investment in Cuba</u>, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign Commerce, Washington, D.C., 1956, pp. 185-6.
 ^bFagen, <u>Cubans in Exile</u>, p. 21.
 ^cA total of 62.2 per cent of the labor force earned less than \$75 (pesos) per month (\$900 per year). Consejo Nacional de Economia, <u>El Empleo, el Sub-empleo y el Desempleo en Cuba</u>, 1958, quoted in Grupo Cubano de Investigaciones Economicas, <u>Un Estudio Sobre Cuba</u> (Coral Gables: University of Miami Press, 1963), p. 812.

A number of conclusions could be derived from Table 18 and the fact that 62.2 per cent of the Cuban population earned less than \$75 per month, or \$900 per year (See note c in Table 18). Comparing the two exile stages, those who arrived in 1971 were more largely of low income levels than the 1959-1962 group. Thus the proportion earning less than \$1,000 per year is more than doubled by the late arrivals as opposed to early arrivals for their 1958 income, although they are quite below the parent population with 62.2 per cent on this low income level. In 1958 Cuban middle class income, as presented, probably coincided with levels three and five, according to various expert personal opinions and an international study.¹⁶* Thus, most of the 1971 group classified within the lower middle 1958 income level (three), whereas the early arrivals would fit more in the upper middle sectors (four, five). A Cuban earning above \$8,000 annually in 1958 should be classified as in the upper income bracket, and usually within the same social class status. Of the early arrivals (21 per cent) fell within this level, as did only 4.5 per cent of the later ones. We may then conclude that the bulk of the early arrivals were within the middle and upper income levels of the pre-Castro Cuba, while the 1971 refugees were drawn primarily from within the upper-lower and lower-middle income levels of the Cuban population.

The comparison of the 1958 incomes for the 1971 arrivals with their corresponding incomes prior to their application to leave the country showed some interesting differences. The late arrivals experienced substantial economic upward mobility after 1959. Thus, persons in the lowest income level experienced a 56 per cent decrease; on the other hand, the subsequent higher income levels experienced some increase with the exception of level seven, indicating that the majority of the late arrivals had actually improved their incomes during the revolution.¹⁷ Furthermore, additional questioning of the 1971 group revealed that 45.6 per cent had suffered no loss of property from the revolution, while only 4.2 per cent declared having a substantial one.

^{*}Unfortunately there are no estimates available for the size of this group, but its magnitude must be comprised within the remaining 37.8 per cent earning \$900 per year or more. An income of \$2,000 or more² was considered the lower boundary for the middle class sector.

Race and Ethnicity

The <u>racial composition</u> of the exodus was probably the most difficult demographic characteristic to ascertain. No datawere collected on this matter by any of the agencies involved, so again we relied upon estimates based on surveys of the exile population. A 1968 University of Miami study of the impact of the Cubans in Miami became our reference for the mid-1960's. These data were compared with the 1971 arrivals and the Cuban population (Table 19).

Table 19. Racial Composition of the Exiles, 1966, 1971 and the Cuban Population, 1953

Refugees			Parity Index		
1953	Mid	1971	Mid 1960's	1971	
<u>Census^a</u>	<u>1960's</u> b	Arrivals	<u>Arrivals</u>	<u>Arrivals</u>	
Ре	r c	ent ⁻			
72.8	94.0	89.8	1.3	1.2	
			•		
27.2	6.0	10.2	0.2	0.4	
(12.4)	(2.0)		0.2		
(14.5)	(3.5)		0.3		
(.3)	(.5)		1.7		
100.0	100.0	100.0			
	1953 <u>Census</u> ^a P e 72.8 27.2 (12.4) (14.5) (.3)	$\begin{array}{c} \underline{\text{Census}^{a}} & \underline{1960's^{b}} \\ \hline P & e & r & c \\ \hline 72.8 & 94.0 \\ \hline 27.2 & 6.0 \\ (12.4) & (2.0) \\ (14.5) & (3.5) \\ (.3) & (.5) \\ \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	1953Mid1971Mid1960'sCensus ^a 1960's ^b ArrivalsArrivalsPrcen72.894.089.81.327.26.010.20.2(12.4)(2.0)0.2(14.5)(3.5)0.3(.3)(.5)1.7	

Sources: ^aOficina Nacional de los Censos Demografico y Electoral, <u>Censos de Poblacion, Viviendas y Electoral</u>, 1953, p. 48. ^bResearch Institute, <u>The Cuban Immigration</u>, p. 15. They had relied on several sources, especially one comprising 19,600 refugees on a survey conducted in 1964.

As shown in the table, the exodus was in general, very underrepresentative of the non-white Cuban population. But apparently this finding has been a changing one, moving toward a greater identification with the parent population.

This racial change is reflected in our 1971 sample. The random selection of interviewees yielded 10.2 per cent of non-whites, most of whom were Negro or part Negro. This represented a 70 per cent increase over the earlier period, but still this category was underrepresented (0.4 ratio).

Some of these non-whites, when interviewed, mentioned the great degree of difficulty they had to face in order to leave the country due to their race. It seemed as if the government resented the decision of non-whites to leave.¹⁸ Furthermore, they also had to overcome peer opposition, which apparently had shifted in a significant way during the late 1960's. Such was the case of a black mechanic interviewed in 1971 who had applied to leave in 1965, by the start of the airlift. At that time he drew a lot of criticism from fellow blacks, but the situation was totally the opposite when he actually left in 1971. Then, a feeling of envy and joy prevailed among the same earlier critics because he was able to leave.

Other ethnic minorities were also present in the Cuban exodus. The Spaniards were the largest foreign-born group on the island, and quite identified with Cuban culture.¹⁹ An undetermined number left the island, some being repatriated to Spain, but a good portion went into exile in the United States. Jamaicans were also present in the exodus. Some of them interviewed by us in 1971 were actually second generation Cubans. There is evidence that during the early exodus, many native Jamaicans were repatriated. The Chinese minority was more conspicuous during our 1971 survey. They constituted the fourth largest foreign-born group in Cuba, and their number coming to the United States seems to have been proportionally rather large. The majority of the American citizens living in Cuba departed in the early 1960's. Repatriation flights for them were also organized later, and they appear to have been used by the Castro government as bargaining points with the United States. A good

portion of the Jewish ethnic colony in Cuba appears to have left early in the exodus, mostly to this country.²⁰ Their decision to leave was based on the feeling of the similar negative perception of the consequences of the revolution, as the rest of the refugees did, since they were not persecuted or harassed because of religion.

Sex Balance

In spite of being one of the simplest demographic variables to ascertain, the sex composition of the exiles is not available in an accurate form. Immigration figures were useless due to the reasons mentioned earlier. The sample released to us by the Refugee Center contained information on sex but was not acceptable due to the nature of the registrants, which generated a strong male bias if sex is the variable to be analyzed. On the other hand the <u>Fact Sheet</u> released by CREC contains some usable information concerning sex, but unfortunately it is segmented and presented on a percentile cumulative basis. In other words, it is broken down by "men," "women," and "children" and based on the accumulations over the years for the airlift arrivals.

Nevertheless, these data were the best available. They are used only as an indicator, and not as representative of the refugees' sex composition. Table 20 shows the breakdowns that actually covered the entire airlift process. Assuming that the sex composition of children will be fairly evenly distributed between males and females, a sex ratio could then be safely devised for the adult population as shown in the table. These ratios indicate a strong predominance of females during this portion of the exodus, which tended to decline slightly by the end of the airlift period.

Category	1967	1973
Men	20,221	72,935
Women	29,730	100,321
Children	24,009	87,405
Total	73,960	260,561
Sex Ratio Excluding Children	68.01	72.70

Table 20. Sex Breakdown of Airlift Arrivals and Their Cumulative Variation of the Sex Ratio of Those 18 Years and Over, 1967, 1973

Source: Figures released to us by Mr. Clifford H. Harpe, Records Control Officer of the Cuban Refugee Program.

The second hypothesis tested in this study was that the socio-demographic characteristics of the escapees were more akin to the 1953 Cuban population than were the exiles as a whole. In general, this hypothesis was proven to be consistently correct, as an examination of Figures 8 and 11, and Tables 14 and 17 show. The main characteristics compared were occupation, education and age. One exception was that the exiles in the service sector were proportionally somewhat closer to the Cuban population than the escapees. Two other similar exceptions applied to the 40 to 44 and 45 to 49 age categories. But these exceptions did not adversely affect the hypothetical assumption tested.

NOTES

- 1. See U.S. Department of Commerce, 1970 Census, p. 23 as an example.
- 2. See U.S. Department of Justice, <u>Annual Reports</u>. Many of these who appear as immigrants are actually refugees already in the United States who were able to apply since 1966 for a change to the resident status, then rendering this source useless for our analytical purposes.
- 3. As possible indicators of the early exiles, the occupational breakdown of the Brigade members, excluding 241 students, is offered. Professionals and kindred, 23.9 per cent; clerical-sales, 33 per cent; services, 13.9 per cent; extractive and kindred, 1.8 per cent; and skilled-kindred, 26.7 per cent. 44.3%
- 4. For analytical purposes this stage will comprise 1963 and 1964, since the registrations up to October 22, 1962 constituted the majority for that year, and those arriving after that date were few.
- 5. We are including the occupational characteristics for 1965 as part of the Family Reunion Period since there was evidence that most of the data for that year corresponded to the exiles coming through the Camarioca exodus and the subsequent airlift started on December 1, 1965.
- 6. The figures utilized from 1966 to 1970 for the total exile population were derived from an actual total count produced by the Refugee Center. In this sense it was noticeable that our sample differed very slightly from the official count. This in turn served as an indicator of the excellent reliability of our sample.
- 7. These comparisons were based, for the exile groups, on the marginal figures derived from the sample provided by the Refugee Center. The Cuban parent population occupational picture was that of 1953, since no occupational figures have been released from the 1970 census.
- 8. Oficina Nacional, Censos de Poblacion, derived from Table 37, p. 125.
- 9. See Nelson P. Valdes, "The Radical Transformation of Cuban Education," in Rolando E. Bonachea and Nelson P. Valdes, <u>Cuba in Revolution</u> (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1972), p. 429.
- 10. As pointed out earlier, these included "heads of household" or "principal applicant" who will normally tend to be over twenty years of age. These comprised 35.7 per cent of the airlift arrivals, while housewives, children, and students comprised the rest. See <u>Fact</u> Sheet, May 1973.
- 11. See Perez, The Growth of the Population, p. 53.
- 12. The study of the exodus up to 1962 by Fagen et al., did not contain data broken down by neither province of residence nor that of birth.

- 13. Only broad demographic data broken down by province and the new smaller <u>municipios</u> has been released by the Cuban government for 1970. In this way we eliminated the possibility of distortion due to internal migration. Thus, we are preventing the Cuban parameter from being biased in favor of the Oriente and Havana provinces--gainers of population--as the most recent analysis of Cuban population trends indicate. See Perez, <u>The Growth of the Population</u>, p. 176. From 1172 Brigade members listed in the prison sentence, it was reduced to 1151 in order to eliminate the foreign born for which comparisons were not possible.
- 14. See Fagen, Cubans in Exile, p. 23.
- 15. See Lowry Nelson, Cuba, p. 154.
- 16. See U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign Commerce, <u>Investment in Cuba</u> (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce, 1956), pp. 185-6.
- 17. We must bear in mind that the 1971 income was the one they had before they applied to leave the country. After the application to leave, the person was deprived of his regular job and sent to work in the agricultural fields for a subsistence income. Consequently this final income would not be a valid one for comparative purposes.
- 18. The case of a partially crippled young black was a good example. He mentioned how government officials tried to persuade him in very polite terms not to leave. When this procedure failed, they harassed him with insults and warnings about how bad he was going to be mistreated when he arrived in the United States.
- 19. For the foreign citizens with residence in Cuba in 1953, see Oficina Nacional, Censos de Poblacion, p. 81.
- 20. See Frank Soler, "Life of Cuban Jews in S. Florida Studied," <u>The</u> <u>Miami</u> Herald, December 7, 1969.

CHAPTER IX

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This is a study of the process of migration from Cuba as a result of the revolutionary phenomenon, and of the social characteristics of the migrants who left the island between 1959 and 1974. The main purposes of the study were to ascertain:

- the social and historic background that prompted this emigration,
- how the migration actually developed and changed over the years, and what happened to the refugees once they left their native land, and
- 3. the annual variations found in their socio-demographic characteristics, and to what extent they were representative of the parent Cuban population for those characteristics, mainly occupation, education and age.

The analysis of the migration centered upon two main groups: the entire "exile population" who left mainly by conventional means, and those who left Cuba by illegal and perilous ways, the "escapees."

The methodology employed to accomplish those objectives involved the use of several procedures, but relied primarily on the survey method. An anonymous random sample of the refugee cases on the files of the Cuban Refugee Center was obtained, as well as a sample of the 1971 and 1974 arrivals to the United States. These arrivals were interviewed formally with a questionnaire which was administered to 266 and 354 cases, respec-

tively. The purpose of the samples was to collect not only demographic data, but also to ascertain aspects of the Cuban social conditions which were related to the migration process. The data collected through those surveys were subjected to univariate and bivariate computerized analysis; the latter mainly to determine annual trends for the variables of interest. The available socio-demographic characteristics for the Cuban population, the escapees, and the exiles as a unit were then compared to ascertain the degree of representativeness of the refugees along those characteristics, utilizing mathematical (a parity index) as well as graphic methods.

Surveys of the literature pertinent to the exodus were also performed and subjected to content analysis. The assessment of background conditions prompting the exodus relied, to a great extent, on this approach. In the same way the determination of the characteristics of the evolution of the exodus and the reception of the refugees abroad were ascertained. The process of escape through illegal means from Cuba relied heavily on the survey of newspapers and chronologies depicting instances of this nature. The data concerning these areas of interest were classified by topics, and placed on cards for further analysis. A fifteen-year daily record of escapee instances was compiled which included in a systematic manner the characteristics depicting those occurrences, such as the number of persons involved, means used and other relevant information.

The main findings of this study could be summarily presented along the three main lines of objectives mentioned earlier: the background of the exodus, the evolution and results of the exodus, and the socio-demographic characteristics of the refugees.

Background of the exodus. The migration from revolutionary Cuba was predominantly motivated by political reasons as a result of the transformation of the political structure of the nation into a totalitarian-communistic one. Because of this reason the Cuban emigrants could rightfully be called exiles. The roles played by Cuban leadership and the various degrees of American influence or intervention on the island appear to have been closely related to the factors that allowed such a totalitarian transformation. The alliance of Castro with communism, Soviet style, was crucial in making possible his survival in power. As a result of that transformation, the Cuban population has been subjected to high degrees of multiple forms of repression of their individual human rights and to levels of material hardship unprecedented in that nation. A final consequence of that totalitarian change appears to be the radical alteration of the pre-Castro class structure. This brought about the practical elimination of the growing middle class and the inauguration of a "new class" whose level of privilege surpasses those of the previous elite. This situation has created enormous frustration, which in turn appears to have generated various behavioral patterns ranging from passive resistance to insurrection and efforts to leave the country.

Evolution and Results of the Exodus. The totalitarian-communistic transformation of the island generated an unprecedented exodus of over 700,000 persons throughout the fifteen-year period under analysis. This exodus was divided into four stages clearly identifiable due to the numbers of persons who left the island as well as by the characteristics surrounding their exodus. The fourth stage can be considered open, since the regime still permits restricted departures. The would-be refugees were subjected to various forms of curtailment in their efforts to

leave, ranging from the total loss of their property to forced agricultural labor, often under dehumanizing conditions. Yet the fact that departures were allowed from an officially communist country was a significant deviation from the policies prevailing under similar regimes.

Most of this exodus was oriented to the United States which has shown an open door policy to the refugees. This country has been a traditional sanctuary for Cuban political exiles since colonial times and the advent of communism to the island did not constitute an exception. Cultural ties were also close between the two countries, which together with the active role played by the U.S. government on the island, made almost unavoidable that open door policy. This policy in turn seems to have been a factor contributing to the promotion of the exodus. Political-propagandistic reasons may have also influenced the U.S. policy, which ultimately led to the creation in this country of a unique refugee program which has spent close to one billion dollars to promote the settlement of the refugees.

The Cuban Refugee Program, started in 1961, handled in some way the majority of the exiles coming to this country. They also experienced an increasing degree of formality in the reception process upon their arrival in the United States. At first there was practically no control of the Cubans entering because most of them had tourist visas. Later, the U.S. government applied more formal procedures of reception especially after 1965. That year was the beginning of a process of "family reunion," initially offered by Castro and later sponsored by President Johnson's administration. The airlift that ensued between Varadero and Miami brought 260,561 refugees to this country, most of whom were resettled outside of the Miami area. This operation was coordinated by the Cuban

Refugee program, which also sponsored a number of other programs, such as welfare subsidy, medical and educational assistance. The apparent satisfactory level of adjustment reached by the Cuban refugees in the United States could be attributed to an undetermined degree to the efforts of that program.

Private assistance to the exiles in the United States was an important element promoting their adjustment. To this extent, both religious and civic organizations made relevant contributions which have to be credited directly to the American people at the grass roots level. Their open minds and hearts made that adjustment a smoother one.

Spain and Mexico were the two next important points of arrival for the exiles. These were also the only avenues open to the Cubans while direct transportation with the United States was closed. Only Spain provided organized official assistance to the destitute refugees. That effort was helped by church and other private institutions, with the aid of international organizations. Spain has to be credited also with a very cooperative attitude toward the would-be refugee by its diplomatic representation in Cuba, which was in contrast with its Mexican counterpart.

The Cuban escapees were a small but relevant group. They used all possible means of departure ranging from airplanes, boats and rafts to crossing by land or sea into the Guantanamo naval base. Several stages were distinguishable in the influx of this type of refugee whose socioeconomic picture is composed mainly by persons in the working class occupations and the younger age levels. The majority of the escapees left Cuba during the first half of the 1960 decade, and their number dwindled through the following years. This appears to be due to the increasing sophistication of deterrents used by the Cuban government as well as to

the scarcity of means which made the crude inner tube raft one of the most popular means of escape. Consequently, the rates of failure in clandestine attempts to escape seem to have been rather substantial, including numerous deaths and capture. Those who succeeded owe a debt of gratitude to the U.S. Coast Guard for its assistance which, in many instances, saved the lives of hundreds of men, women, and children. As with the legal departures, the ultimate residential goal for the escapees was the United States, although some initially arrived in other nations surrounding the island.

Socio-demographic characteristics of the refugees. The analysis of the occupational, educational and age attributes, as well as others, showed a number of relevant results. The trend analysis revealed that people who left early in the exodus were predominantly the highly educated and in professional occupations, but age-wise, the early exiles were mainly below fifty years of age. By the mid-1960's this pattern changed, and the majority were working class people, comprising the skilled and the extractive sectors, predominantly from the intermediate educational levels (4 to 11 years), as well as persons aged fifty and above. By the 1970's the same trends continued for occupation and education, but the latest arrivals, those coming from Spain, showed a proportional decrease in the average age, with a strong preponderance of those in the 30 to 39 age bracket.

The escapee population showed in general the same patterns described for the exiles but with stronger overtones. Thus, many were working class people who escaped by various means throughout most of the exodus, especially after 1963. Their level of education was predominantly 4 to 11 years, with many in the 4 to 6 year sub category. Age-wise, they were

older than the exiles in the first period, but by 1963, they were mainly in the 20 to 29 year age level, and this pattern continued to the present time with few exceptions.

The comparisons of the refugees' basic socio-demographic characteristics with those of the parent Cuban population showed various degrees of representativeness. Occupationally, the exiles are overrepresentative of their parent population for the professional and the clerical-sales sectors. On the other hand, they are overrepresentative of the Cuban working class if the skilled type of occupation is considered as a unit. Significantly, the boat escapees were more representative of the Cuban population than the exiles as a whole, at all levels of comparison. Age-wise, the exiles were rather underrepresentative of the younger Cuban population, but the opposite was the characteristic for the escapees. At the higher age levels the escapees were in turn underrepresentative but the exiles, collectively, were overrepresentative.

The analysis of the other demographic variables showed that the early refugees tended to be highly overrepresentative of metropolitan Havana, while the rest of the country was underrepresented. But late exile arrivals showed a wider geographical distribution, with Havana being slightly underrepresented while the other western and central provinces were overrepresented. Clear underrepresentation was the case among the late arrivals for the easternmost provinces, Camagüey and Oriente. For marital status, the escapees repeated their pattern of greater closeness with the Cuban population than did the exiles. Income and race-wise the exiles were underrepresentative of the Cuban population, and tended to close the parity gap as time went by.

<u>Suggestions for further research</u>. This study has comprehensively analyzed the 1959-1974 exodus from Cuba up to the point of resettlement of the refugees in the United States. Cubans in exile in this country now number close to a million. The problems of accommodation and assimilation they experienced have yet to be researched in-depth. Such study would be a logical endeavor in view of the claims about the Cubans in this country. Much has been said about their success, but documentation of research on this subject is limited. Obviously, geographical areas with high densities of Cubans, such as Florida, New York, New Jersey, California, Puerto Rico and Illinois would be logical places for such an undertaking. The impact of Cubans upon the social and economic life in Dade County, Florida, the single largest concentration, should receive top priority in view of the conflictive situations that appear to be developing in that area.


The degree to which Cubans have developed permanent roots in the United States is a subject of prime importance, especially since the normalization of relations between this country and Cuba seems to be in the offing. In some quarters, it is feared that such an event could introduce a great deal of distress or even violence in areas where Cubans are heavily concentrated. The determination of levels of assimilation of Cubans into the American culture is of considerable importance. This importance will be magnified in the event that communism were replaced by a new democratic government. Such a momentous event could promote a massive return to Cuba of both the new intelligentsia and skilled abilities developed in exile. Research should help to pave the way to meet the challenges presented by such a possibility.

The trend toward greater representativeness of the Cuban population by the exiles poses considerable implications vis a vis the revolutionary phenomenon. At this point we can not ascertain to what extent exiles in the United States are in fact a random sample of the entire Cuban population, or simply an alienated minority. But the fact that those in this study were actually overrepresentative of the Cuban skilled occupations, not to mention the high degree of representativeness of the working class among the escapees, questions the validity of the proclaimed support that the majority of the Cuban people grant to the Castro regime. An in-depth analysis of Cuban social conditions through the recollections of those who have actually experienced them seems highly warranted, especially after demonstrating their reliability on factual matters and conditions on the island, as shown in APPENDIX B. Such a study could in turn provide new insight into the Cuban revolutionary process as perceived by the grass roots level, a subject that has remained in general unresearched by social scientists.

Last, but not least, the ascertainment of the effectiveness of the unprecedented U.S. sponsored Cuban Refugee Program could be extremely useful in the handling of similar future flows into this country, as the one present by the end of this writing with the arrival of the Vietnamese refugees.

APPENDIX A

The formula utilized to calculate the sample size for each year of arrival was:*



N = Size of the Population

*See William G. Cochran, <u>Sampling Techniques</u> (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1963), pp. 74-75.

APPENDIX B

Objectivity Test

This test was composed of seven items pertaining to aspects of Cuban social life about which we felt rather certain that the government has had a positive role. Three of these items dealt with a macrosocial perspective, or a perception that went normally beyond the one at the neighborhood level, while the rest, the microsocial, were clearly within the latter level. (Three possible responses were predetermined for each item: a "Yes" a "No" and a "Don't Know.") Since the objective was actually to have an indicator of the tendency to distort reality, a score of one (1) point was assigned to all affirmative answers which in fact recognized a governmental accomplishment. The same score was also to be given to the doubtful answers on the rationale that the respondent simply was not certain, which in turn did not imply any distortion of reality, but rather an honest attitude. On the other hand, a zero (0) score was given to those who answered in a negative way, implying a tendency to distort reality either due to the rejection of something that should have been rather visible to him, or due to the negation of something of which he did not know about. The testing statements used and the percentage distribution of "Yes," "No," and "Don't Know" responses are presented in Table 1 and the resulting "Objectivity Index" is presented in Table 2.

The results show that in general the microsocial items yielded higher affirmative response than the macrosocial ones. This in a way

P	Items	Number	Yes	No	Don't Know	(1+3)
		-	$\frac{1}{(1)}$	(2)	(3)	<u> </u>
	(Microsocial)		P	e r	c e	n t
1.	There is no home eviction	260	76.5	8.1	15.4	91.9
	for lack of rent payment					
2.	Public telephones are free	260	82.7	3.5	13.8	96.5
3.	Vaccination has been	260	92.7	4.6	2.7	95.4
	greatly emphasized					
4.	Organized prostitution like	260	87.7	7.7	4.6	92.3
	in 1958 has been eliminated					
	(Macrosocial)					
5.	Cuba has a bigger merchant	260	41.2	8.5	50.4	91.6
	fleet than in 1958					
6.	Cuba has a bigger fishing	260	45.4	5.8	48.6	94.0
	fleet than in 1958					
7.	There are more rural roads	260	68.8	17.3	13.8	82.6
	and schools than in 1958					

Table 1. Objectivity Test Applied to Cuban Refugees, and Percentage Distribution of Responses Obtained by Item, Miami, Florida, 1971

Table 2. Distribution of Scores within the Objectivity Index Obtained by Cuban Refugees, Miami, Florida, 1971

	Scores	Percentual	Cumulative
	Transformed	Distribution	Percentual
Raw Scale	<u>100-Point Scale</u>	for Each Score	Distribution
0	0	0	0
1	14.2	0	• 0
2	28.5	0.8	0.8
3	42.8	1.5	2.3
4	. 57.1	3.1	5.4
5	71.4	6.5	11.9
6	85.7	23.5	35.5
7	100.0	$\frac{64.6}{100.0}$	100.0
N=260			

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was expected since one of the macrosocial items dealt with the rural environment to which the majority of the refugees was not exposed. For the same reason, those items dealing with the merchant and fishing fleets yielded low positive scores. In order to emphasize the degree of objectivity, as well as the possible incidence of the tendency to distort, the "Yes" and "Don't Know" responses were combined (1+3). The combination of these raw responses can be considered indicative of a high level of objectivity, or of a low tendency to distort reality.

In order to appraise the cumulative effect of the responses obtained, an index intended to measure the degree of objectivity was manually computed from the marginal responses to each of the seven items. Table 2 shows the range of scores for all items which varied between a maximum possible value of "7," indicating the absence of "No" responses, and "0" indicating negative responses for all. To present these these scores in a more meaningful way they were transformed to a 100-point scale using the proportional method. Thus a person with a perfect objectivity score, "7," was assigned 100 points in the transformed scale. Likewise, a person obtaining a score of "3" received 42.8 points, and one with all "No"

The lowest score registered was "2," made by two persons. Scores of "3," "4," and "5," were obtained by only 11.1 per cent of the respondents in the sample. A highly acceptable score of "6" was reached by close to one quarter of the respondents while a perfect score, "7," was obtained by the majority (64.6 per cent). These two top scores combined, represented 88.1 per cent of the interviewees, having at least an 85.7 point score in the transformed objectivity index. These results were sufficiently high to trust our informants about factual conditions throughout the island,

but a couple of other tests were still performed to further examine this conclusion and the verification of our hypothesis.

The occupational composition as well as the place of residence in Cuba of our respondents was considered important in order to evaluate the degree of representativeness of our respondents. Cur 1971 sample was composed of 13.9 per cent professionals, 21.9 per cent of clericalsales, 7.1 per cent of services, 19.8 per cent extractive and 37.1 per cent skilled as shown in Figure 6. When compared with those of the Cuban population in Figure 8, we can conclude that they closely resembled the distribution of the parent Cuban population, with the main exception of the people in the agricultural sector, of whom the 1971 sample was underrepresentative.

Likewise, the residential distribution by province of our 1971 sample showed great similarities with that of its parent population, as Tables 15 and 16 indicate. However, western provinces were more proportionally represented in the sample than the eastern, especially Oriente. Looking at the smaller geographical areas, the "municipio" (equivalent to the U.S. county) our sample came from 54 per cent of the Cuban municipalities as these were outlined by the 1953 census.

Thus the occupational and geographical indicators give assurance that our 1971 sample can be considered fairly representative of the parent Cuban population. Nevertheless, extra caution should be exercised when inferences or generalizations are derived concerning the agricultural sector in general, and the eastern provinces separately.

APPENDIX'C

Variation in the Quantities Allowed in the Supply Card, per Individual, in Revolutionary Cuba, 1969, 1971 and 1974

Items	<u>1969</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1974</u>
Rice	4.0 lbs. ^a	. 6.0	6.0
Lard-Oil	1.5	1.5	1.5
Beans	1.5	0.5	6.0 oz.
Meat	3.0	3.0	8.0 oz. ^c
Eggs	15 units	8.0 units	12.0 units
Bread	15	7.5	7.5
Milk (condensed)	3.0 cans	3.0 cans	3.0 cans
Coffee	6.0 oz.	6.0 oz.	6.0 oz.
Cigarettes	6.0 ^b	6.0 ^b	4.0 ⁹
Sugar	6.0	5.0	4.0

^aQuantities are in pounds per person per month unless otherwise noted. ^bpackages ^cevery 9 days or 1.66 lbs. per month

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Ruth E. Albrecht, Chairman Professor of Sociology

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Leslie

Professor of Sociology

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This thesis was submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Department of Sociology in the College of Arts and Sciences and to the Graduate Council, and was accepted as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

August, 1975

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