Information. USIA continued its strong play that Castro-Communism, despite all its promises, has failed to achieve progress. Special stories were prepared on Castro's sending 7,000 more army troops into the sugar cane fields. There also were stories of the Cuban people's refusal to turn in old silver coins for the new low-value alloy issue. Commentary material along the lines of "hungry Cuban people get excuses instead of food" was produced, with some cross-play from Latin American newspapers.

HILLASSFED ---- SITIVE

Political. State reports it has prepared a position paper, to follow up the Rostow presentation at NATO, for Secretary Rusk's use at the MATO Ministerial Meeting, 3 May.

<u>Studies Scheduled.</u> The preparation of a number of papers desired by the Special Group is in progress, including:

- 1. Blockade how to impose physically (Defense)
- 2. Blockade effects of total blockade (CIA)
- 3. Cubans in the U.S. Armed Forces (Defense)
- 4. List of Cuban anti-Castro organisations (CIA)
- 5. Security Committee, OAS, activity (State)
- Joint analysis of evidence on supporting military facilities (Defense-CIA)
- 7. Census of Hemisphere travellers to Cuba (CIA)
- "Patrol posts" in Caribbean, with particular reference to Haiti and Dominicar Republic (Defense)

9. Feasibility of electronic intrusion (Defense)

10. Feasibility of uses of Guantanamo (Defense).

**FIRSTER** 

"Eyes Only" of

~ SIIX

Copy 1 - Gen. Taylor

- 2 Mr. Johnson +
- 3 Mr. Gilpatric
- 4 Mr. McCone

7 - Chief of Operations

5 - Mr. Kennedy

6 - Gen. Lemnitser

Previously Declassified/Related on 12-25-8.8 (F85-421) under provisions of E.O. 12-3 by N. March, March 1997

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#### 20 January 1962

REF. -NS

#### MEMORANDUM FOR MEMBERS, CARIBBEAN SURVEY GROUP

From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale St.

At yesterday's meeting, the Attorney General underscored with emphasis that it is your responsibility to develop and apply the maximum effort of your Department (Agency) to win the goal of the Cuba Project.

As he so adequately tasked us, there will be no acceptable alibi... If the capability must be developed, then we must acquire it on a priority basis. It seems clear that the matter of funds and authority offers absolutely no defense for losing time or for doing less than the very best possible effort in your tasks.

In reviewing our program, I appreciate the difficult problems inherent in getting bureaucratic procedures and personnel aroused to do the dynamic thinking and actions demanded by this project. However, I also am very clear about the unreserved requirement laid upon us. You should be equally clear about this. As the Attorney General said, it is untenable to say that the United States is unable to achieve its vital national security and foreign policy goal re Cuba. Castro and his Communist henchmen have many difficult problems to meet in maintaining even a status quo, and we have all the men, money, material, and spiritual assets of this most powerful nation on earth.

"It is our job to put the American genius to work on this project, quickly and effectively. This demands a change from business-asusual and a hard facing of the fact that we are in a combat situation -where we have been given full command."

It is my firm intention to avoid impeding your thinking and actions, except where coordination and constructive direction in the overall interest are involved. In turn, it is your responsibility to keep me informed adequately of your plans and progress. As the Attorney General made plain, you are to call on me, as the Chief of Operations for the Project, at any time for advice and help. He offered the same for himself.

'In the meantime, we must believe that you are getting fully into action on your assigned tasks, and are working towards additional tasks you can come up with to win the Project goal. You were given dead-line dates in the tasks listed in my 18 January paper to the President. I trust that you are not merely attempting to just meet those dates, but are making your own time-table and making it with shorter dead-lines. The urgency and importance of our Project must be reflected in the thinking and actions of the U.S. government people who are to help us win -- and that is up to you.

4136F

Heriously Declassified/Released on 12-30-15 bader provisions of EO. 12356 (FP4-12 89) by C. Rever, National Scripty Connett

# THICERSFED

Distribution to Members, CSG:

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Copy No.	py No.	
1 - State:	Assistant Secretary Woodward (Mr. Goodwin, Mr. Hurwitch)	
2 - Defense:	Brig. Gen. Craig	
3 - CIA:	Mr. Helms	
4 - USIA:	Mr. Wilson	
5 to 10:	Brig. Gen. Lansdale	

# THELLESKEDT

Review by Brig. Gen. Lansdale 25 January 1962

#### POPULAR SUPPORT OAS MEETING, JANUARY 1962

One task of the special Project was to generate popular support in the Hemisphere for the U.S. position (sanctions against the Communist regime in Cuba) at the OAS Meeting of Foreign Ministers, Punta del Este, which started 22 January 1962. Since the Communists also were generating popular support for the Cuban-Communist position, I kept a score-sheet of results. The following is the tabulation, to date, from all reports available to me.

#### PRO-COMMUNIST

#### PRO-FREEDOM

#### Venezuela

None reported.

22 Jan, Scattered demonstrations in Caracas, US Embassy and Foreign Ministry bombed. 3 persons killed in various incidents.

23 Jan. Anniversary of Jimenez overthrow linked up with OAS meeting. Students and rioters burned 6 to 8 busses, Transport strike, Government office bombed. Pan American and Burroughs offices, Caracas, hit by "Molotov cocktails."

23 Jan. Armed mobs damaged city of Barquisimeto. Oil line belonging to US subsidiary bombed between Puerto La Cruz and Anaco.

#### Colombia

None reported.

22 Jan. CP planning propaganda agitation, but no actions reported. CP planned guerrilla action in Dept. of Valle, 49 persons killed.

CP has alerted party units and front for strikes, demonstrations and sabotage for 26 Jan.

#### Ecuador

Minor skirmishes of leftish youth with anti-Castro demonstrations.

Viousy Decisioningd/ Related on 12-28-88

18 Jan. Mass (10-20,000) demonstration, Quito, held despite government prohibition. Called for break with Cuba. Good radio coverage.

this declars contains 4 pages.

(F85-101) under provisions of E.O. 12053\* by N. Marth, Marthal Standy Council

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#### PRO-COMMUNIST

#### PRO-FREEDOM

Quito demonstration followed successful demonstrations in Tulcan, Cuenca, Riobamba, Mass demonstration (10-35,000) in Guayaquil popular success, despite government prohitition.

#### Chile

Bolivia

None reported.

18 Jan. Demonstration of 3,000 persons. Described as not up to usual Communist standard.

Communists, fronts, and Labor met 22 Jan. to plan a "solidarity march."

Mass meeting, Recife

Demonstrations planned.

(25 Jan. reports state numerous

marchers were afflicted with diarrhea and several were

hospitalized.)

22 Jan. Mass rally (20,000) organized by Catholic Church. Marched to Presidential Palace. Demanded break with Cuba. Leaflets distributed outside Church at each Mass urging "March of Silence."

#### Brazil

None reported.

#### Argentina

21 Jan. Special Masses dedicated to liberation of Cuban people held in all Catholic churches, Buenos Aires.

Number of small demonstrations and anti-Castro resolutions in civic groups, student and labor organizations. Few details.

Military reported in touch with neighboring military to encourage anti-Castro position at OAS.

#### Uruguay

5-day protest youth march from Montevideo to Punta del Este. Organized by Communist youth, supported by leftish youth and labor groups. 2,000 attended rally at start, 17 Jan. 450 marchers. Media campaign (radio, TV, cinema, press) 15-28 January supporting OAS objectives. Anti-Communist students brought in from interior for propaganda effort.

Propaganda package delivered to all OAS delegates.

19 Jan. Demonstration (1,000) in Montevideo Ateneo. Good press coverage. Urged strong sanctions against Cuba.



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## THORASEFEET

#### PRO-COMMUNIST

Demonstrations and acts of

violence against US Embassy and Canal being planned.

None reported.

23 Jan. Montivedeo demonstration (12,000). Anti-U.S., pro-Cuban.

#### PRO-FREEDOM

22 Jan. Open-air rally (2,000) held in rain. Speakers included former OAS President Eduardo Garcia of Argentina and Cuban exile leaders.

Peru

Demonstrations being organized.

#### Panama

None reported.

None reported.

#### Guatemala

Sketchy reports. Plans for weeklong program of "solidarity with Cuba," with 28 Jan. rally at Jose Marti memorial. 18 Jan. Airport rally sending off delegation to OAS. Banners at airport and in city called for anti-Castro stand. Good press and radio coverage.

#### Honduras

Demonstrations planned,

### Costa Rica

Demonstration planned to welcome 58 Costa Ricans who spent 3 weeks in Cuba. 10 Jan. 5-minute work stoppage virtually all workers, San Jose. All Catholic Church bells in city tolled at end of stoppage.

#### Mexico

15 Jan. Attempted demonstration (20-40) in front of US Embassy. Dispersed by police.

17 Jan. Propaganda campaign (wall painting, posters). 20 persons arrested.

21 Jan. Pro-Cuban rally (800) in Teatro Follies Bergere. Communist-Marxist leaders present. Attacked US, defended Cuba, demanded Leftist support to pressure Mexican government to support Cuba.

21 Jan. Pro-Cuba, anti-US meetings in Torreon, Guadalajara, and Tepic. 20 Jan. Pilgrimage (10,000) to Basilica of Guadalupe to pray for divine guidance of Foreign Ministers at OAS. Front page coverage all major Mexican papers.



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#### PRO-COMMUNIST

PRO-FREEDOM

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Hait

Anti-US propaganda. Reported bribery None reported. of Haitian delegates to OAS.

Canada

22 Jan. Small student demonstrations at US Consulate, Montreal.

None reported.

No reports on activities connected with OAS meeting have been received from the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Nicaragua or Paraguay.

USLA reported giving continuous priority coverage, with all its resources, on OAS meeting. Played up President's statement 24 January of concern felt by the people of Latin America and the U.S. at the intrusion of Communism into the OAS family. Also, VOA broadcasts feature an early Castro speech proclaiming himself a pure Cuban nationalist, immediately followed by his recent speech boasting of always having been a Marxist.





Review by Brig. Gen. Lansdale

1 February 1962

#### POPULAR SUPPORT OAS MEETING, JANUARY 1962 (2nd Report)

This is a second report of the score-sheet I have been keeping on popular demonstrations in the Western Hemisphere for and against the U.S. position on Cuba at the OAS Meeting of Foreign Ministers (MFM), Punta del Este. The information given below is a compilation of all new reports received since my review of 25 January (under this same heading) and does not repeat previous reports.

The Hemisphere press has been most active in reporting the OAS meeting, and has been largely favorable to the U.S. position. However, a press analysis has not been included in this score-sheet of actions. The score-sheet is an indication of the clash of people on the street, between Communist forces and the forces of Freedom in the Western Hemisphere. The issue, for and against the Communist regime in Cuba, was plainly enough at stake in the OAS meeting to make this show of strength on the streets of the Hemisphere significant.

#### **PRO-COMMUNIST**

#### PRO-FREEDOM

#### Argentina (population 20,956,000)

18 Jan. The Communist Party of Argentina instructed its members to prepare leaflets, put up posters, and prepare effigies of Uncle Sam to be burned on 18 January at a mass meeting to be followed by a demonstration in front of the U.S. Embassy. These activities were broken up by the Argentine police. 19 Jan. Demonstrations by approximately 100 students in Buenos Aires.

26 Jan. Argentine Navy Chief urged U.S. to stand firm on its position at MFM.

31 Jan. Argentine military reported dissatisfied with MFM outcome and would seek break of relations and ousting of Foreign Minister.

#### Bolivia (population 3, 462,000)

23 Jan. La Paz demonstration attended by 4,000 including youth armed with Czech machine pistols. One killed, 30 wounded. Demonstration reported in Cochabamba. Two U.S. flags burned. 23 Jan. In La Paz, Catholics attempted to storm Communist Headquarters; police intervened. Newspaper and radio station attacked. Demonstration reported in Cochabamba.



Partially Declassified/Released on <u>1-5-89</u> (F88-758) under provisions of E.O. 12356 by N. Menan, National Security Council



#### PRO-COMMUNIST

24 Jan, La Paz demonstration attended by 4,000. Reports of larger and more violent demonstration being planned.

19 Jan. Small meeting in Recife Theater. Rally in Santos (500).

#### PRO-FREEDOM

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24 Jan, "Spectacular" interference with Communist demonstrators.

Brazil (population 68,000,000)

> 19 Jan. Meeting in Recife disrupted when unidentified individual threw bottle of acid. Rally in Santos disrupted by two smoke bombs emplaced by anti-Communists.

25 Jan. Anti-Communist labor groups called for free elections in Cuba under OAS supervision.

#### Chile (population 7, 627, 000)

15 Jan. About 35 pro-Castroites, carrying a banner, made a sudden, brief attack on the USLA office in Santiago, breaking a window and spattering red ink on outside walls. The group dispersed before any arrests could be made.

25 Jan. Pro-Castro elements in Santiago continued a program of defacing or pasting over anti-Castro posters.

22 Jan. An attempt to stage an anti-Castro parade on 22 Jan. was unsuccessful due to reluctance or indifference of local groups and the fact that many group members are on vacation.

25 Jan. 21,000 posters on the Cuban question were posted throughout Santiago.

#### Colombia (population 14, 132,000)

21. Jan. 40 Persons murdered North Valle, 24 murdered near Caicedonia, and 11 murdered near La Victoria. Survivors report perpetrators all armed and wearing fatigue and police uniforms. Wounds indicate use of Madsen sub-machine guns, carbines and .38 calibre pistols. Government communique implies action of lefiisi caireraisis ..... . cleased texts of two letters allegedly written by Colombians to Castro and Che Guevara, linking terror to Punta del Este and Communists

18 Jan. Cuban exiles bid farewell to Colombian representative to MFM at airport.

22 Jan. Three minor demonstrations and one street fight during week.

26 Jan. Two-hundred Anti-Communist hecklers harrassed Communist demonstration in Bogota.



#### PRO-COMMUNIST



PRO-FREEDOM

23 Jan. Minsy demonstrations in Bogota, Cali, and Medellin.

26 Jan. Demonstration Bogota attended by 600. U.S. flag burned.

## (population 1, 171, 000 )

22 Jan. Demonstration - police used tear gas to break up march on President's home. 200 involved. Communist paper called for demonstration and work stoppage in banana zone. Civil guard headquarters attacked by Communists (300) in an unsuccessful attempt to free 2 Communists from prison.

Government has prohibited public demonstrations until after the 4 Feb. election.

Dominican Republic (population 3,014,000)

None reported. '

None reported.

Ecuador (population 4, 298, 000)

25 Jan. U.S. Country Team reports probably overthrow of President Arosemena by extreme right or extreme left in near future.

#### El Salvador (population 2, 612, 000)

None reported.

22 Jan. Rally attended by an extimated 2,000 people was closely monitored by plain-clothes police who were detailed to control the demonstrators.

27 Jan. Pro-Castro meeting (1,000) -(reported 50% were government agents)was terminated by people being drawn off to observe Thunderbird Air Show or to attend Cathedral Ceremony.

## SALESSIFIED

#### PRO-COMMUNIST

#### PRO-FREEDOM

## (population 3, 759,000)

29 Jan. A few bombs exploded with no casualties.

24 Jan. Government sent letters to

schools indicating support of Mexico rather than U.S. position at MFM -

same read over radio and demonstrations being organized by government for 24 or 25 Jan for same objective. Other reports indicate Haittan opposition to US by police concentration on surveillance of US personnel and activities, and not on Communist

methods or activities.

25 Jan. Most stringent state of seige in Guatemalan history declared.

29 Jan. Government expelled some oppositionists.

Haiti (population 3, 505, 000)

None reported.

NOTE: Haiti ultimately voted with U.S.

26 Jan. Inflammatory anti-US speeches probably engendered by President Duvalier's speech on 2 Jan.

> Honduras (population 1, 950,000)

24 Jan. Students and construction None reported. workers failed in an attempt to organize demonstration.

(population 34,626,000)

22 Jan. Communist demonstration. Because of government counteraction, only about 400 participated.

28 Jan. Meeting of 35 leader-members of pro-Cuban group to criticize Mexican representative's remarks at MFM. 24 Jan. A Church-sponsored demonstration and pilgrimage in homage to the Virgin of Guadalupe culminated in Mexico, D. F., when approximately 40,000 rural residents, mostly from Toluca, who had participated in a three-day pilgrimage, united at the Basilica of Guadalupe in order to pray for world peace and divine guidance for the Meeting of Foreign Ministers. The participants carried anti-Communist placards. Mexican newspapers gave front-page coverage to the pilgrimage.



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## UNCLASSIFIED

#### PRO-COMMUNIST

#### PRO-FREEDOM

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## (population 1,053,000)

22 Jan. Small crowd of 50-200 persons attended meeting at Santa Ana Plaza to hear speeches by pro-Castro agitators.

25 Jan. Several hundred persons demonstrated demanding firm action against Cuba. Reportedly not impressive in terms of numbers but well publicized locally.

## (population 10, 857, 000)

23 Jan. The GOP denied a scheduled pro-Castro student meeting a permit to meet. When the students attempted to meet anyway, they were dispersed by riot police and 20-100 were arrested.

24 Jan. Small groups of students provoked series of incidents. Dispersed by police using tear gas and firehoses.

30 Jan. Action by Communists thwarted by police. Reported terroristic bombing of bus. U.S. Ambassador requested in view of forthcoming election, adding his desire that such agitators be identified as clearly in opposition to government.

22 Jan. About 100 persons, mostly Guban exiles, participated in a "march of silence" in downtown Lima. The "march" was organized to protest Guban executions and to support OAS action against Castro. According to the American Embassy, Lima, the pro-Gastro elements on hand outnumbered the marchers, and attempted to disrupt the parade. However, police dispersed the hecklers with tear gas and firehoses.

24 Jan. Between 22 and 24 Jan, 100,000 leaflets were distributed throughout the country attacking Castro and urging the OAS to take strong action.

## (population 2, 700,000)

21 Jan. A pro-Castro rally held in Maldonado drew approximately 350 persons, at least half of whom were merely curious passers-by.


23 Jan. Communists organized one of the largest rallies held in Montevideo in the past two years. (Police estimated 12,000 persons attended this pro-Castro rally).

25 Jan. The Communist Party of Uruguay (PCU) is exerting all possible effort to support Cuba. All other Party activities have been suspended. PCU members of leftist-oriented labor unions and pro-Cuba

23 Jan. Anti-Castro individuals harrassed the 23 Jan pro-Castro rally with tear gas and stink bombs.

25 Jan. Prominent Peruvian ex-Communist addressed full house at National Culture Center calling for mobilization under leadership of democratic reform groups.

28 Jan. Demonstrations in San Carlos, Piriapolis, and Maldonado (3,000).



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## USCUSSIFIED

#### PRO-COMMUNIST

#### PRO-FREEDOM

Uruguay (continued)

committees have been instructed to go out on the streets as soon as they hear that the MFM has taken measures against Cuba. Reports state the first targets for destruction will be the U.S. Embassy and the plants of <u>El Dia</u>, <u>El Pais</u> and Radio Rural.

## (population 6, 709, 000)

19 Jan. Communist action group raided sporting goods stores to obtain 11 shotguns, 43 boxes of ammunition and 11 containers of gunpowder.

24 Jan. Scattered incidents occurred throughout the day in Caracas and in the interior. Rioting took place in Caracas during the evening and night of 24-25 Jan. In Caracas total dead was estimated at 30 and probably more than 100 wounded.

25 Jan. Riots and terror subsided to a degree. (Reported Communists unhappy with lack of support of military elements.)

26 Jan. Disturbances reported Puerto Cabello.

28 Jan. Some attempted actions taken in Marine Barracks and in 23d Section of Army in Caracas.


29 Jan. Resignation of Rector at Venezuela University as a result of leftist student pressure to close University until several Communists (students and professors) released from jail. They had been arrested in connection with earlier Communist activity in connection with MFM. Unsuccessful rebellion in military in several places. Attempt made at prison in Caracas to organize force to release prisoners.

22 Jan. Cuban exiles in Caracas peacefully demonstrated on 22 Jan. 500 marchers, mostly women, paraded through the streets carrying flags, banners, posters condemning Castro and Communism.

23 Jan. Caravan of 175 automobiles carrying AD, COPEI, and independent students paraded through Caracas blowing horms, waving flags and distributing anti-Castro and anti-Communist leaflets.

25 Jan. A second large caravan of AD, COPEI, and independent students numbering more than 500 cars paraded throughout Caracas

30 Jan. Arrested Major reported existence of Communist guerrilla training camp in Eastern Venezuela. Training camp attacked, 9 captured, including 3 Cuban agents of Venezuelan nationality, but recently returned from Cuba. Large quantity of arms, military uniforms, radio station, extensive supplies of food captured; helicopter landing field discovered.





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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

20 February 1963

EYES ONLY.

FROM: Brig. Con. Lanadale Siland

SUBJECT: The Cube Project

Transmitted herewith is the projection of actions to help Cubans recepture their freedom. This total plan is EYES ONLY. The lives of many brave people depend on the security of this paper entrusted to you. Any inference that this plan exists could place the President of the United States in a most damaging pecifies.

This is a specific plan, with time phases. It responds to the request of the Special Group (5412) for such a paper. I usgo that this paper not be made known, in this complete form, boyond yourself and these named as addressees.

The Attorney General

Special Group: General Tayler State: Secretary Rusk, Alexis Johnson, Richard Goodwin Defense: Secretary McNamara, Deputy Secretary Gilpatric, Brig. Gen. Craig Gen. Lemnitzer CIA: John McCone, Richard Heims, William Harvey USIA: Ed Murrow, Don Wilson

> PREVIOUSLY Declassified/Released on 12-28-88 (FRS-421) under provisions of E.O. 12003 by N. Monan, National Scrutty Council

UNGLASSIEFED STATIVE

20 February 1962

Program Review by Brig. Gen. Lansdale

#### THE CUBA PROJECT

The Goal. In keeping with the spirit of the Presidential memorandum of 30 November 1961, the United States will help the people of Cuba overthrow the Communist regime from within Cuba and institute a new government with which the United States can live in peace.

The Situation. We still know too little about the real situation inside Cuba, although we are taking energetic steps to learn more. However, some salient facts are known. It is known that the Communist regime is an active Sino-Soviet spearhead in our Hemisphere and that Communist controls inside Cuba are severe. Also, there is evidence that the repressive measures of the Communists, together with disappointments in Castro's economic dependency on the Communist formula, have resulted in an anti-regime atmosphere among the Cuban people which makes a resistance program a distinct and present possibility.

Time is running against us. The Cuban people feel helpless and are losing hope fast. They need symbols of inside resistance and of outside interest soon. They need something they can join with the hope of starting to work surely towards overthrowing the regime. Since late November, we have been working hard to re-orient the operational concepts within the U.S. government and to develop the hard intelligence and operational assets required for success in our task.

The next National Intelligence Estimate on Cuba (NIE 85-62) promises to be a useful document dealing with our practical needs and with due recognition of the sparsity of hard facts. The needs of the Cuba project, as it goes into operation, plus the increasing U.S. capability for intelligence collection, should permit more frequent estimates for our guidance. These will be prepared on a periodic basis.

Premise of Action. Americans once ran a successful revolution. It was run from within, and succeeded because there was timely and strong political, economic, and military help by nations outside who supported our cause. Using this same concept of revolution from within, we must now help the Cuban people to stamp out tyranny and gain their liberty.

On 18 January, the Chief of Operations assigned thirty-two tasks to Departments and Agencies of the U.S. government, in order to provide a realistic assessment and preparation of U.S. capabilities. The Attorney General and the Special Group were apprised of this action. The answers received on 15 February provided the basis for planning a realistic course of action. The answers also revealed that the course of action must contain continuing coordination and firm overall guidance.

The course of action set forth herein is realistic within present operational estimates and intelligence. Actually, it represents the maximum target timing which the operational people jointly considered feasible. It aims for a revolt which can take place in Cuba by October 1962. It is a

Excluded from automatic regrading: DoD Dir 5200,10 does not apply. (F81-758) under provisions of E.O. 12356 '/ II. Manan, National Security Council This document contains

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series of target actions and dates, not a rigid time-table. The target dates are timed as follows:

Phase I, Action, March 1962. Start moving in.

Phase II, <u>Build-up</u>, April-July 1962. Activating the necessary operations inside Cuba for revolution and concurrently applying the vital political, economic, and military-type support from outside Cuba.

Phase III, Readiness, 1 August 1962, check for final policy decision.

Phase IV, Resistance, August-September 1962, move into guerrilla operations.


Phase V. Revolt, first two weeks of October 1962. Open revolt and overthrow of the Communist regime.

Phase VI, Final, during month of October 1962. Establishment of new government.

Plan of Action. Attached is an operational plan for the overthrow of the Communist regime in Cuba, by Cubans from within Cuba, with outside help from the U.S. and elsewhere. Since this is an operation to prompt and support a revolt by the people in a Communist police state, flexibility is a must for success. Decisions on operational flexibility rest with the Chief of Operations, with "carultation in the Special Group when policy matters are involved. Target actions and dates are detailed in the attached operational plans, which cover:

- A. Basic Action Plan Inside Cuba
- B. Political Support Plan
- C. Economic Support Plan
- D. Psychological Support Plan
  - E. Military Support Plan
  - F. Sabotage Support Plan
  - G. Intelligence Support Plan

Early Policy Decisions. The operational plan for clandestine U.S. support of a Cuban movement inside Cuba to overthrow the Communist regime is within policy limits already set by the President. A vital decision, still to be made, is on the use of open U.S. force to aid the Cuban people in winning their liberty. If conditions and assets permitting a revolt are achieved in Cuba, and if U.S. help is required to sustain this condition, will the U.S. respond promptly with military force to aid the Cuban revolt? The contingencies under which such military deployment would be needed, and recommended U.S. responses, are detailed in a memorandum being prepared by the Secretaries of State and of Defense. An early decision is required, prior to deep involvement of the Cubans in this program.



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Distribution:

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1.	The President
2.	The Attorney General
3.	General Taylor
4.	The Secretary of State (through Deputy Under Secretary Johnson)
5.	The Secretary of Defense (through Deputy Secretary Gilpatric)
6. '	The Director, Central Intelligence Agency
7	The Director, U. S. Information Agency (through Deputy Director Wilson)
8,	State (Mr. Goodwin)
9.	Defense (Brig. Gen. Craig)
10.	CIA (Mr. Harvey)
1112.	Chief of Operations (Brig. Gen. Lansdale)

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# A. BASIC ACTION

#### PHASE I

#### (March, 1962)

#### **OPERATION IN CUBA**

#### PURPOSE

#### CONSIDERATIONS.

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MARCH

 Establish three "pathfinder" agent operations in key areas selected by CIA. Explore operational conditions and requirements. Report on potential and active resistance elements and situation for exploitation by resistance teams. Lay groundwork for bringing in additional agents and teams as conditions warrant. Agent operations must stay alive, make useful contacts and communicate securely with CIA. Risk to the personnel is substantial due to lack of intelligence, but mission is essential to planning and operations.

#### PHASE II (April-July 1962)

#### **OPERATION IN CUBA**

#### PURPOSE

Report on resistance potential and lay

groundwork for additional agent opera-

tions.

#### CONSIDERATIONS

These additional teams should provide current reporting on major Cuban areas, so broad political action program can be planned. Risk to teams will continue high, but mission is essential.

APRIL

 Establish up to five more agent operations in key areas selected by CIA.



#### OPERATION IN CUBA

#### APRIL (cont.)

 b. "Voice" of Cuban movement goes on the air. Establishes vital psychological assurance to people that a movement exists to overthrow the regime,

PURPOSE

#### CONSIDERATIONS

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Preferably, the "voice" should be from mobile transmitter inside Cuba, Broadcasts can be brief ones at first: identifying music, slogan, and short news. News to include reports on "resistance" acts, taking credit for all sabotage. As daily broadcasts are established, "criminals against people" should be named and promised swift justice, two names per broadcast. If operational judgment dictates,

by having it inside Cuba; a second transmitter and crew should be moved in if the first is lost.

The agents will have to prove to local partisans that outside support is a reality. Thus, as arms, ammunition, and equipment, etc., are needed to equip resistance groups, we must be able to respond effectively to these needs. Maritime and, as feasible, air re-supply will be used. This capability will have to expand as resistance is developed.

 Re-supply agent operations as necessary. Deliver supplies to satisfy needs developed by agent operations, if valid.

### A. BASIC MOTION HUAN PHASE II (cont.)

#### OPERATION IN CUBA

#### PURPOSE

Mission is the same as for previous "pathfinder" operations.

#### JUNE

by CIA.

d.

e. By June, introduce three resistance teams in areas under initial "pathfinder" surveillance, if situation is favorable.

By June establish 12 more agent

operations in key areas selected

 Establish bases for guerrilla operations. This will test acceptance and use of the more highly trained teams that must guide development of the popular revolution within Cuba. This also will check emphasis and timing of program from viewpoint of Cuban situation.

To have focal points, with some viability to stockpile for defensive needs and for future attack operations.

#### CONSIDERATIONS

These will be the last agent operations infiltrated into key areas from the outside. Further expansion by "pathfinders," after these teams are in, can be done from groups inside. It is likely that some of these last "pathfinders" will be replacing casualties.

Very minor resistance actions by important population elements such as labor must be tried and groundwork laid for broader anti-regime program leading toward firm uprising program. Realism of political platform can be tested.

These b ases are to be selected after onthe-ground surveys by the teams inside Cuba. Some may exist already. These will also be logistical bases, for caches and stockpiling of arms and equipment to be used by the resistance. The p. a. teams will need not only supplies for active resistance, but also should be able to provide some welfare aid (such as to families of resistance members, families affected by plants shut-down by sabotage, etc.).



JUNE (cont)

#### **OPERATION IN CUBA**


g. Establish clandestine leadership headquarters with means to com-. municate with all resistance elements.

#### PURPOSE

Organize internal direction and control of the popular movement.

#### CONSIDERATIONS

Leadership will have been emerging and this is about the earliest date possible to establish a clandestine headquarters. It should be of a bare, field type, in the securest area possible. This can become the meaningful source of politicalpsychological actions, to develop Cuban will to resist and fight.



- By July establish up to 5 more resistance teams in areas prepared by "pathfinder" operations, as operationally feasible.
- Basic organization of underground in vicinity of airfields and communication centers.

Mission is the same as for the first resistance teams (A II e above).

To prepare the means for sabolage against military aircraft and key communication links of the regime's security forces. Experience of first resistance teams must be considered in preparing these additional teams for operations. Security of personnel is very important at this point, as the operation expands.

This requires ground surveys, selection of sites for caching of sabotage supplies, and recruitment of local underground, including members of military and communications employees. Popular support must be prepared by resistance teams.

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### A. BASIC ACTION PLAN PHASE II (cont.)

PURPOSE

#### OPERATION IN CUBA


#### JULY (cont.)

k. Expand infiltration points along coasts.

To obtain maximum security for stepped-up infiltration.

#### CONSIDERATIONS

Original "rat-lines" need to be expanded into a functioning "underground rallway" to pass more infiltrees into interior. Means of quick alerts to danger, delaying defenses, multiple routes, coastal watchers and receivers need to be organized and activated.



PURPOSE

#### (L August 1962)

#### OPERATION IN CUBA

#### AUGUST

1.--

m. 'Final check on resistance elements in Cuba. To have a final look at the situation and at the means in place before giving the signal to initiate actions leading to full-acale revolt.

#### CONSIDERATIONS

This is a last-minute pause, to be certain that the resistance has a possible organization in key places which will act when needed, that the significant portion of the Cuban people are in sympathy with the aims of the movement and will join in when given the chance, and that the movement will be able to gain an area of Cuba as its own against the regime's military forces, as a minimum

#### PHASE IV

(August - September 1962)

#### AUGUST

n. Symbolic work slow-down.

To give workers a feeling of participating in the popular movement, without immediate reprisal. 12 August is the anniversary of the overthrow of dictator Machado. The resistance should link the Castro-Communists with Machado and call on workers to lose one hour by slow-down methods on 12 Aug. to commemorate the overth ow of one dictator. Workers should be asked to give either one-hour by slow-down or one act of sabotage. The "Voice" of the movement should thank them the next day for their splendid response (to shame those who didn't participate by making them feel alone).

## TOP STOP STEP .

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## A. BASIC ACTION PLAN PHASE IV (cont.)

#### PURPOSE

#### AUGUST (cont.)

p.

 Symbolic signs painted on walls: "Machado One".

**OPERATION IN CUBA** 

To commemorate the downfall of one remembered dictator and give a symbolic pace to the resistance.

By August, have actions to penetrate and subvert the regime.

To weaken and frustrate organized actions against the popular movement.

q. Cuban paramil tary teams infiltrated to bases in the hills.

Guerrilla bands activated in key areas.

To provide a trained guerrilla cadre upon which to form guerrilla units.

To build a military striking force for the popular movement inside Cuba.

#### CONSIDERATIONS

Timed with the symbolic work slowdown (A IV n above). Spaced a few days apart, the signs should have lines added to them to read:

> "Machado One Batista Two Castro Three."

These are actions on officials of the regime, including the military and the police. Some should be defected in place. Others should be defected and helped to escape to the outside worldto tell the inside story of the regime's tyranny, to evoke world sympathy with the freedom fighters.

The paramilitary teams must be capable of initiating minor harassment and reprisal actions, as well as organizing and training guerrilla units. Popular support is essential.

Recruits will be coming in after the symbolic harassment and reprisal actions. They will be screened, organized, and trained for guerrilla action. The regime's security forces can be expected to be very active. Anti-tank and anti-aircraft tactics are necessary. Increased popular support is a must in this phase.

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### A. BASEENETION PLAN PHASE IV (cont.)

#### OPERATION IN CUBA

to every locality in Cuba.

Commence expanding underground

SEPTEMBER


B ...

#### PURPOSE

To have a truly revolutionary organization throughout Cuba.


#### **CONSIDERATIONS**


The guerrillas are the open arm, but the popular movement must have mass support, which requires intelligence collection and clandestine activists in cities and towns throughout. They will surface when the revolt needs open support.



Start entry of volunteer "freedom fighters" from Latin America and elsewhere. To let the Cuban people know that they are not alone in their struggle against tyranny, by the physical presence of foreign "freedom fighters." A "Marti Battalion" might be formed for foreign volunteers. Recruits from Latin America, from refugee groups (such as Hungarians, Poles, etc.), and Americans, need a controlled means of entering the good fight. Some veterans of the Huk campaign could be a gesture and a practical one.

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#### PHASE V

#### (FIRST TWO WEEKS, OCTOBER 1962)

#### OCTOBER

 General strike by the Cuban workers. To make public the popular support of the militant revolt, signifying the passing from underground to open rebellion. Strike must tie-up transportation and communications. The resistance teams must have set the readiness of the workers for this defiance of the regime. Arms must be available, Military cells will be activated. Funds will be needed to help the workers hold on and to bait defections of groups.

b. Anti-regime demonstrations,

Same purpose as noted above (A V a) for the general strike.

To initiate the hour of decision by calling on all Cubans for open support.

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The resistance teams must have set the readiness of all population elements (youth, farmers, Church, etc.) to openly defy the regime. Arms must be available, including anti-tank weapons. Military cells will be activated.

Since the aims of the liberation will have been publicized previously, this is the "go" signal. All Cubans and the world need to hear it.

Declaration of the revolt. c.



PURPOSE

#### **OPERATION IN CUBA**

**OCTOBER** (cont.)

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d. Open revolt by the Cuban people.

 Return of Cuban refugees who are qualified and want to help liberate their homeland.

### To overthrow the Communist regime.

To start a more open movement back to Cuba of those Cuban refugees who are able and willing to risk their lives in overthrowing the Communist regime.

#### CONSIDERATIONS

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This is the combat phase, fighting to take and hold ground.

Cuban refugee organizations will be tested with a "put up or shut up" proposition. Those who have ability to contribute to the popular movement inside Cuba should be given a chance to go home and act. Their screening and infiltration will have to be controlled. It must be a joining-in, not a taking-over of the inside movement.

### PHASE VI

#### (DURING OCTOBER 1962)

 Establish a new Cuban government, which can be recognized by the U.S. To give legality to the moral right of the Cuban revolt.

When the popular movement is holding meaningful territory in Cuba, it should form a provisional government. This should permit open Latin American and U.S. help, if requested and necessary. A military government situation will exist for the initial period and we must insist upon realism in this interim period preceding reasonable civilian control.

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#### ACTIVITY

1. Use OAS and its organs.

 Use United Nations members and U. N. organs.

 Use US officials and news releases at Washington level. Indicate policy and commit prestige of U.S. government to appropriate support of the Cuban people vs. Communist dictatorship.

#### CONSIDERATIONS

OAS members must be firm and open about this being a regional concern. OAS must build support for the cause of the Cuban people against the Communist regime, by statements and reports about the police state methods and foreign domination in Cuba. This will require official and personal diplomacy with a real sense of mission, and must be an effort by Latin American as well as U.S. officials. (State responsibility, with CIA and USIA support.)

Statements of world leaders for humanity and justice can come from speeches and comments about misery of Cubans under Communist political-economic program. Plight of trade unionism, religion, health, education all fall within UN interest. Phoney Communist maneuvers abou persecution of Castro regime can open way for a challenge to a UN inquiry team from OAS states re the true status of popular support within Cuba. A challenge to hold free elections under UN monitor could be timely and place Cuban Communists on the defensive. . A UN "aid for Cuban poverty and health" would be sound move to highlight situation. (State responsibility.)

Top officials of Executive and Legislative branches can keep pressure upon Castro regime directly by timely statements. This also supports similar attitude by leaders of other nations and helps spirit of Cubans. Development of sympathy leading to favorable opinion about outside support for Cuban people is a goal. (State has responsibility to lead in

PURPOSE

POLITICAL SUPPORT PLAN

13.

To realfirm sfrong official condemna tion of Communist rule in Cuba. To influence Latin American and world opinion against Communist grab of Cuba and favorably toward Cubans recapturing their freedom.

To enlist world o inion for plight of Cuban people under domination of a foreign sponsored government. Build hostility to Communist regime and a favorable attitude to people's revolt. Develop basis for outside support of Cuban people.

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#### ACTIVITY

 Use U.S. diplomats and staffs in official and other contacts.

#### PURPOSE

B. POLITICAL SUPPORT PLAN (cont.)

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To influence attitude of political leaders favorably for the Cuban people and hostile to Communist dictatorship. To influence key staffers of foreign leaders along same line and, as appropriate, influence leaders in intellectual and major population groups.

#### Commit national prestige and power of Latin political, intellec. tual, labor, youth, religious, military leaders to cause of Cuban people against Communist regime. For own public impact, international support, and morale of resistance within Cuba.


#### **CONSIDERATIONS**

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Personal influence upon foreign officials is vital to build sympathy and support for Cuban revolution against Castro regime. Can lead to independent actions by other nations to build the case for the Cuban people. Latin American nations are most important, but NATO also important. Official attitude of Spanish government can be key to operational values in homeland ties to Spanish colony in Cuba. (State responsibility, with support by others as required.)


 Timely and strong public statements will be encouraged. Maximum publicity at country of origin, other key countries and into Cuba by CIA assets.
 (State responsibility, with support by CIA and USIA.)



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5. Activate Latin American leaders,

#### activate Latin American lease government and public,



 Radio programs for Cuban political activatior.

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## B. POLITICAL SUPPORT PLAN

#### PURPOSE

To inform and keep basic interests within the Cuban population.

#### CONSIDERA'TIONS

Religious programs, interviews with exile workers, students, fishermen, families to help keep Cubans in touch with the way of life they must recapture from the Communists. CIA capability for daily and ... special broadcasts exists, noting Swan Island station, and arrangements with private stations in Miami, New Orleans, and some 75 small outlets in the Caribbean



The policy line for recognition of a revolutionary government is involved directly at this point.

 By October, official U.S. and Latin American policy support.

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To provide a positive basis for more open support of the people's revolution, possibly a foundation for military assistance upon request of recognized new government.

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#### ACTIVITY

- Persuade QAS, NA' 'O and countries friendly to freedor to desist from trading with the Communist dictatorship in Havana.
- Stop trans-shipment of U.S. items to Cuba, especially va Mexico and Canada.
- A "positive list" for Latin America subject to licensing procedures for other parts of the Free World.

#### PURPOSE

To build anti-regime feelings among Cuban people, by economic squeeze.

To reduce supply of items and parts critical to the Cuban regime's economic program.

To reduce supply of special interest items,

#### CONSIDERATIONS

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The regime may be weakened as the Cuban dollar market is depleted through loss of credit line. Requires full cooperation of allies and friends. (State responsibility with CIA and Commerce.)

Target is Cuban sugar economy, power petroleum, communications, transport. (State responsibility with CIA, Commerce, Justice.)

(Responsibility of State with Commerce and CIA participating.)

 Obtain cooperation of National Foreign Trade Council in delaying or refusing charters to vessels calling at Cuban ports, by mid-March.

6.

To reduce supplies the Cuban regime 'must have to keep economy going.


. (Responsibility of State, with Commerce and CLA participating.)

 Obtain by mid-March the cooperation of U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers to influence U.S. firms having subsidiaries abroad to adhere to the spirit

of U.S. economic boycott of Cuban regime.

To harass Cuban economy.

(Responsibility of State, with Commerce and CLA participating.)



## D. PSYCHOLOGICAL SUPPORT PLAN

#### ACTIVITY


I. Create atmosphere of a "crusade" for human liberty"

#### PURPOSE

To set the deeply moving tone and motivating force for the liberation of Cuba.

#### CONSIDERATIONS

All media. This means maximum use of spiritual appeal (such as the prayer for Cuba hy Bishop Boja Masvidal who has a genuine Cuban revolutionary background), recapturing the ideal of Marti by taking use of his memory away from the Communists (even to issue of commemorative U.S. stamp), and popularizing songs by commercial recordings. (USIA and CIA responsibility.) 0,0,0,0,3



 In March, communice visits of prominent U.S. and Latin American personalities to Suban refugee camps in Florida. To demonstrate concern for plight of refugees, particularly parentless children.

Publicity for selected defectors from Castro team. To demonstrate Cuban regime's failure to live up to promises of original 26th of July movement. Mrs. Kennedy would be especially effective in visiting children refugees. (One camp near Miami has about 1,000 children who came out without their parents.) Her impact upon Latin Americans on the recent Presidential visit to Venezuela and Colombia suggests this. (USLA responsibility.)

Feature stories, documentaries, etc. (USIA responsibility, with help of CIA, Justice, and State.)

## D. PSYCHOLOGICAL SUPPORT PLAN (cont.)

#### ACTIVITY

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6.

 Publication of weekly reports with human-interest stories about Cuban refugees, starting in March.

#### PURPOSE

To illuminate intolerable conditions in Cuba and the plight of the Cubans who remain inside.

#### CONSIDERATIONS

This should include supporting reports giving statistics on the numbers of refugees who have fled, and keep Heeing, to the U.S., Jamaica, Venezuela, Mexico, and Spain. (USIA responsibility, with support of others as required.) 000036

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 Dramatize individual stories of Cuban refugees representative of major population groups: workers, youth, farmers, fishermen, women, church. To publicize that ordinary citizens, not just the rich, have fled tyranny. Documentaries, etc., of these refugees now at work in the U.S. (not just in refugee centers), awaiting the day they can return to strike a blow for liberty. (USIA responsibility.)

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#### ACTIVITY

#### Provide logistic, personnel and training support.

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#### PURPOSE


To insure optimum implementation of the basic plan.


#### **CONSIDERATIONS**

The basic plan requires complete and efficient support of the military, to include the use of facilities and military cover. (Defense responsibility.) 0 0

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#### ACTIVITY

- Special Operational Room fully activated, by 1 March 1962
- Caribbean Admission Center, Opa-Locka, Florida, fully activated by 15 March 1962.

 Develop additional Interrogation centers in other areas, during March 1962.

 Expand special intelligence and other sensitive intelligence coverage, as required.,

#### PURPOSE

To provide the Chief of Operations and the project team with current intelligence. and daily developments. To provide top U.S. officials with status briefings, as useful.

To collect intelligence required for the operations, to identify and earmark assets as refugees arrive, and to provide security against Communist agent operations.

To collect intelligence in a Latin atmosphere, at different levels than now seem possible in the continental U.S., to spot additional assets for the operation, and to provide security against Communist agent operations.

To develop increased "hard" intelligence.

#### **CONSIDERATIONS**

A maximum security room for this project will be maintained in the inner JCS security area of the Pentagon. (Defense responsibility, with support by CIA and others as required.)

This operation, in response to early recommendation as essential by the Chief of Operations, is moving at ulmost speed to become fully active by 15 March, with a new building completed and occupied, and with a staff of 42 at work. The staff is now being increased in phases, as quickly as personnel are trained, to supplement the initial staff of 9. (CIA responsibility, with support by Defense, Justice, State, USIA.)

As Opa-Locka becomes fully activated, as first priority, CIA must survey means and methods for activating other interrogation centers where useful. Example the second second should be included in this survey. The new centers should be activated as quickly as feasible. (CIA responsibility, with support by Defense and others as necessary.)

(Defense responsibility, in collaboration with CIA.)

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G. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT PLAN (cont.)

#### ACTIVITY

3

 Develop intelligence potential of Cuban "colonies" in U.S.

#### PURPOSE

To exploit the intelligence possibilities of former residents of Cuba (including U.S. citizens) now in the United States.

#### CONSIDERATIONS

There are "colonies" in Washington, D. C., and other U, S. cities which are "little Cubas." Family, Church, and business interests provoke unusual personal ties inside Cuba for some of these residents; a real potential exists for collection of intelligence not otherwise available. (Justice/FBI responsibility, with support from CIA and others as required.) 4

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(Responsibility of Defense, with support by others as required.)

As the operations develop, there will be both increased intelligence collection and a need for as current an Intelligence Estimate as the U.S. can produce meaningfully. It is likely that a more informal method of producing an Intelligence Estimate for use at the national level (than now governing the issuance of NIE's) may have to be followed. (CIA responsibility, with support of others as required.)



 Periodic intelligence estimates, as required by progress of operations. To add to the increased U.S. intelligence coverage on Cuba and to strengthen the concern of Latin American states for security.

To up-date NIE 85-62, so that current estimates can be considered at national policy levels.

March 1962

#### THE CUBA PROJECT

The Goal: The United States will help the people of Cuba overthrow the Communist regime from within Cuba and institute a new government with which the United States can live in peace.

#### Developments

30 November 1961: The above goal was set for the United States, with Brig. Gen. Lansdale as Chief of Operations and with operational lieutenants appointed as direct representatives of the Secretary of . State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director, Contral Lieu States. The Special Group (NSC 5412) was to be kept informed and be scale of the for advice and recommendation.

<u>December-January</u>. Decisive effort was made to re-orient the operational concepts within the U.S. government and to develop the hard intelligence and operational assets required for success. A joint effort was mounted to obtain intelligence in depth from refugees at Opa-Locks. Florids, and to provide more thorough access to operational assets. At the same time, reports from significant population groups, including religious and laber groups, indicated that the spirit of the Cuban people was dying under the Communist police-state controls and that some evidence on which to base hope for a better future was needed promptly to prevent this death of spirit. A review of operational assets dictated that the U.S. was powerless to hamper the sugar harvest, without U.S. attribution.

the Tricing 1962. The Chief of Operations assigned thirty-two task the Departments and Agencies, for a realistic assessment and set the tricing capabilities.

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Partially Declassified/Released on <u>1-5-59</u> (F88-758) under provisions of E.O. 12356 by N. Menan, National Security Council

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15 February 1962. Detailed staff papers were received from Departments and Agencies, responding to assigned tasks. A basic action plan was then made, for the step-by-step development of an internal revolution, by the Chief of Operations with joint consideration and approval by the operational representatives (CIA, State, Defense, and USIA).

20 February 1962. Completed basic plan for paced operations inside Cuba, and support plans for political, economic, psychological, military sabotage, and intelligence actions. The outlined concept would develop assets inside Cuba for a popular revolution in October (judged to be the earliest possible date by those responsible for operations), with U.S. and Latin American help from the outside. Each step would be taken as operationally feasible, collecting intelligence, building revolutionary assets, and taking adventage of targets of opportunity.

21 February 1962. Plan was discussed by Special Group (NSC 5412) and decision was made to meet again on it the following Monday, with Secretary McNamara.

26 February 1962. Special Group (NSC 5412) met with Secretary McNamara. Chief of Operations was asked to submit a plan for an initial intelligence collection program only.

<u>1 March 1962.</u> Special Group (NSC 5412) acr-ed that the immediate objective of the U.S. during March, April, and May will be the acquisition of intelligence, and that other U.S. actions must be inconspicuous and consistent with an overt policy of isolating Castre and of neutralizing his influence in the Western Hemisphere. At the end of May, the situation will be reviewed and a decision made as to the next phase. The Chief of Operations is to report to the President through the Special Group (NSC 5412 augmented by the Attorney General and the Chairman, JCS); the Special Group will be responsible for providing policy guidance for approving important operations, and for monitoring progress.

#### INTELLICENCE PLAN'

"As requested by the Special Group (NSC 5412), a plan for basic intelligence collection, upon which to base the decision to undertake actions to cause the overthrow of Castro, is submitted herewith. In view

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of the new requirement for a comprehensive and definitive intelligence finding concerning the Cuban population vis-a-vis the regime, CIA requested that the initial period be extended through July 1962. This practical realism is reflected in the plan. Also, responsible CIA operational officers noted that at least 6 months should be added to the timing of phases set forth in the original basic action plan, if a decision to seek an internal revolution is deferred until the end of the collection and reporting period.

The attached plan reflects the Special Group's desire to collect definitive intelligence inside Cuba prior to a decision, while being consistent with giving the impression that the U.S. effort is to isolate Castro and to neutralize his influence in the Western Hemisphere. The plan gives maximal commitments of U.S. assets for intelligence collection in the periods shown.

#### DISTRIBUTION

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Copy No.	10 .
1	The Attorney General
Z	General Taylor
3	The S. c. ctary of State (through Deputy Undersecretary Johnson)
4	The Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense
5	The Chairman, JCS (through General Craig)
6	The Director, CIA (through Richard Helms, William Harvey)
7-8	The Chief of Operations

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#### PURPOSE

#### CONSIDERATIONS

There will be no assumption of risking visibility of this U.S. intelligence activity within Cuba. Selected personnel are being intensively trained. First team has 2 agents, second has 3, and third has 3 or possibly 4, for total of 3 or 9. Three areas in which resistance has been reported have been selected. Agent operations must stay alive, make useful contacts, and report securely to CIA. Physical risk to personnel is substantial, due to lack of intelligence. First reports from first team are expected by the end of March, while reports from the second and third teams are expected to start in April. -

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 Caribbean Admission Center, Opa-Locka, Florida, fully activated by 15 March 1962.

To collect intelligence required for the operations, to identify and earmark intelligence assets as refugees arrive, and to provide security against Communist agent operations. This operation, in response to early recommendation as essential by the Chief of Operations, is moving at utmost speed to become fully active by 15 March, with a new building completed and occupied, and with a staff of 42 at work. The staff is now being incr ased in phases, as quickly as personnel are trained, to supplement the initial staff of 9. (CIA responsibility, with support by Defense, Justice, state, USIA.)

#### ACTIVITY

#### INSIDE CUBA

 Establish three intelligance agent operations in key areas selected by CIA.



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#### MARCH (cont)

#### PURPOSE

To collect intelligence in a Latin atmos-

phore, at different levels than now seem

possible in the continental U.S., to spot

vice security against Communist agent

operations.

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additional intelligence assets and to pro-

ACTIVITY

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5.

Develop additional Interrogation centers in other areas, during Afarch 1962.

Expand special intelligence and other sensitive intelligence

Cuban "colonies" in U.S.

Coverage, as required. Osvelop intelligence potential of To exploi

To exploit the intelligence possibilities of former residents of Cuts (including U.S. citizens) now in the United States.

To develop increased "hard" intelli-

#### CONSIDERATIONS

As Ops-Locka becomes fully activated. CIA will activate other interrogation centers as promptly as feasible. Negotiations with local authorities are being undertaken to activate centers, if possible, in San Juan, Puerto Rico, and surveyed for possible centers. (CIA responsibility with support by others as necessary.)

Use of cays near Cuba entail unacceptable security risks when vulnerable to Cuban landing parties. (Defense responsibility, in collaboration with CIA.)

There are "colonies" in Vashington, D. C., and other U.S. cities which are "little Cubas." "Family, Church, and business interests provoke unusual personal ties inside Cuba for some of these residents; a real potential exists for collection of intelligence not otherwise available. (Justice/FBI responsibility, with support from CIA and others as required.)

(Responsibility of Dollanse, with support by others as required.)







#### MARCH (cont)

#### ACTIVITY

required by progress of operations.

#### FURFOSE

Periodic Intelligence estimates, as To up-date NIE 85-62, so that current estimates can be considered at national policy levels.

#### Continue political, economic, and 8. psychological operationatio isolate Castro and neutralize hid influence In the Western Hemisphere.

To continue activities in consonance with U.S. policy established shortly after the April 1961 failure in Cuba.

Provide logistic and personnel support.

To ensure optimum implementation of the intelligence plan.

#### CONSIDERATIONS

As the operations develop, there will be both increased intelligence collection and a need for as current an Intelligence Estimate as the U.S. can produce meaningfully. It is likely that a more informal method of producing an Intelligence Estimate for use at the national level . (than now governing the issuance of NIE's) may have to be followed. (CIA responsibility. with support of others as required. )

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These activities will have some negative impact on the Cuban people, who are part of the target, but are consistent with an overt policy of isolating Castro and neutralising his influence in the Western Hemisphere. They are noted here. for the sake of completeness, but are separate actions, independent of this special operation, and are now being carried out by U.S. Departments and Agencies under other programs and projects.

The intelligence plan requires effective support by U.S. military, as necessary. (Defense responsibility.)



(I April - 31 May 1962)

#### PURPOSE


#### CONSIDERATIONS


ACTIVITY

#### INSIDE CUBA

 Up to 31 hiay, establish 5 to 12 more intelligence agent operations in areas selected by CIA. To have intelligence missions similar to the first agent operations, but to cover additional areas. Each agent operations team will vary in size from 2 to 5 agents, depending upon area selected and suitability of personnel to operate there successfully. The totals would be 10 to 25 agents. The March teams should be reporting in this phase. 7-0000

#### OUTSIDE CUBA





#### INSIDE CUBA

- Western

 Establish 10 to 15 more Intelligence agent operations Inside Cubs, in selected areas.


To have every area inside Cuba covered for intelligence purposes by 31 July, except the Isle of Pines (with no place to hide and with 70,000 troops).

IINPL LOCIEIED

#### Each intelligence "team" will vary from 1 to 5 agents, depending upon feasibility of terrain and capability of personnel. Some of these agents will undoubtedly replace, casualties in earlier teams or reinforce teams where desirable.

This means a total of intelligence sgents placed inside Cuba by 31 July of a minimum of 33 agents to a maximum of about 70 agents.

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REF - NSC (12

3/5/62

5 March 1942

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1. Operation Mangaose will be developed on the following accomptions:

g. In undertaking to asses the compthere of the Gastro government, the U.S. will ask maximum use of Galan resources, internal and anternal, but recognizes that final seconds will require desisive U.S. military intervention.

b. Such Colon resources as any developed will be used to propose for and justify this intervention, and thereafter to facilitation and support it.

1. The immediate objective of V.S. efforts during the coming months will be the acquisition of hard intelligence on the conditions inside Cobs. Concernatly, other actions gamerally political and . economic in observator may be taken provided that they are relatively? incompletenes and consistent with an overt policy of icolating Castro and of newtrolizing his influence is the Western Hamisphere. The JSS will camp depend the measurery planning. At the onl of this first parts, dat effection will be reviewed and a desision taken as to the self of the program.

J. Buring this period, General Lonsdale will continue as chief of operations, calling directly on the participating departments and againing for support and implementations of agreed tasks. Who hands

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herioury Declassified / Released on <u>4-30-97</u> under provisions of E.O. 12356 (TABC #225) hy B<del>- Telen Mational - Thy Sermel</del>i C/A adding where the adding of the provident. Annual involution is responsible for eventianting embland planning and momentian, reporting to the Provident through the Special Group (3412), separated by the Attorney General and the Chaizman, JCL. The Special Group (3412 expended) is responsible for providing policy guidence to the project, for approving important operations and for motioning progress.

UNULASSIFIEU



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

6 March 1962

SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD GOODWIN, STATE

From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale

At the 5 March meeting chaired by Secretary Rusk, on our favorite subject, the Secretary spoke of "other tracks" which might be opened for the U.S. to achieve its objective. He mentioned proof of "their" plots in Latin America, as an example. Also, there was joking reference to a "Bay of Pigs" in, perhaps, as a notional clandestine action for which "they" could be blamed.

General Taylor has asked me to report on these alternate "tracks," among other things, to the Special Group he chairs. I intend to complete this report on Friday, 9 March. Thus, request that you provide me the section on alternate "tracks" Secretary Rusk sees as possibly open to the U.S., by Thursday, 8 March. I plan to include this, as the State response, in my report. Alexis Johnson was present when Secretary Rusk mentioned this, and perhaps could be of assistance.

Along these same lines, and in response to direction, I am asking the Defense representative (Gen. Craig) to give me a brief but precise

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REF -NS



12 March 1962

KIRKDRANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUCHINTED)

FRCM: Director of Cantral Intelligence

SUBJECT: Operation Mongoose

EXTERNCE: Memo prepared by General Taylor, dated 5 March 1962, antitled "Guidelines for Operation Mongoose"

It is strongly recommended that paragraph 2 of the references memorandum be changed to read as follows:

"The immediate priority objective of U.S. efforts during the coming months will be the acquisition of hard intelligence on Cubs. Concurrently, all other political, economic and covert actions will be undertaken short of those reasonably calculated to inspire a revolt within Cubs, or other development which would require U.S. armed intervention. These actions, insofar as possible, will be consistent with overt policies of isolating Castro and of neutralising his influence in the Western Hemisphere. The JCS will carry forward the necessary planning. At the end of this first period, the situation will be reviewed and a decision taken as to the next phase of the program."

Cr 1. General Saylor Cr 2. General Comeral Cr 2. General Comeral Cr 2. General Comera Cr 2. General Comerce (Chru Gen. Craig) Cr 2. General Lanadale Cr 7 & 8. BCI

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

12 March 1962 '

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)

From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale

Subject: Policy Questions, Operation Mongoose

As Operation Mongoose goes into the approved activities of Phase I, a number of policy questions have started to arise. Current problems, needing resolution, are listed below. It is requested that the Special Group (Augmented) provide guidance, as a matter of some urgency.

1. Use of U.S. military installations. CIA desires to train small groups of Cuban nationals on the U.S. Air Force Bombing Range, Avon Park, Florida, immediately. Defense reports that the proposed area is adequate for this training, but that such training of covert agents who will be introduced ultimately into Cuba represents a security problem and a departure from past security procedures, due to the fact that U.S. Government sponsorship will be apparent to trainees. Capture and interrogation of any of these covert agents could result in exposure (in international news media) of U.S. official involvement in efforts to unseat the present Communist Cuban regime. A policy determination is needed as to whether or not agents to be infiltrated into Cuba should be trained on U.S. Government installations.

There are other U.S. military installations and properties, in the Southeastern U.S. and Caribbean areas, which CIA would like to use for similar training and operational purposes in the future. The same policy determination could cover all uses of identifiable U.S. Government properties for training and deployment of Cuban nationals for covert infiltration into Caba.

2. <u>Arming of Cuban guerrillas</u>. CIA needs a policy determination on the supplying of arms and equipment to deserving Cuban guerrillas, as they are located, assessed, and request help. Such requests are starting to surface, as the intelligence-collection effort is increased, and it is

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# SENSITIVE

logical that the number of requests will increase as the operation proceeds. There is a need for clearly defining the limits of arming guerrillas (for self-defense, for training, for purposes short of open actions in revolt), to permit operational judgment to be used by designated operations officers, in Phase I.

3. Use of U.S. military personnel and equipment. CIA has requested Defense assistance in air and sea capabilities, including supplying equipment and supplying U.S. military crews to operate the equipment. Included in these requests are

where U.S. military personnel and equipment are involved in Phase I, there is need for a policy determination which will permit operational judgment to be used by designated operations officers, as well as a need for rules of engagement.

Distribution:

Co	py:	To:
1	-	General Taylor
2	-	The Attorney General
3	-	Secretary Rusk/Deputy Under Secretary Johnson
4		Secretary McNamara/Deputy Secretary Gilpatric
5	-	General Lemnitzer (through General Craig)
6	-	Mr. McCone (through Mr. Helms/Mr. Harvey)
7		Chief of Operations

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Again,

14 Marek 1962

C.C.

1. Operation Mongoose will be developed on the following assumptions:

<u>s</u>. In undertaking to cause the overthrow of the target government, the U.S. will make maximum use of indigenous resources, internal and external, but recognizes that final success will require decisive U.S. military intervention.

lines for Operation Nongcose

b. Such indigenous resources as are developed will be used to prepare for and justify this intervention, and there after to facilitate and support it.

2. The immediate priority objective of U.S. efforts during the coming months will be the acquisition of hard intelligence on the target area. Concurrently, all other political, economic and covert actions will be undertaken short of those reasonably calculated to inspire a revolt within the target area, or other developmentwhich would require U.S. ermed intervention. These actions, insofar as possible, will be consistent with overt policies of isolating the lated to inspire and of neutralising his influence in the Western

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The JCS will

14 Mareh 1963

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continue the planning

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The JCS will

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At the end

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of this first period, or earlier if conditions permit, the situation will be reviewed and a decision taken as to the next phase of the program.

4. During this period, General Lansdale will continue as chief of operations, calling directly on the participating departments and agencies for support and implementation of agreed tasks. The beads of these departments and agencies are responsible for performance through normal command channels to higher authority. General Lansdale is responsible for coordinating combined planning and execution, reporting to higher authority through the Special Group (5412), augmented by the Attorney General and the Chairman, JCS. The Special Group (5412 sugmented) is responsible for providing policy guidance to the project, for approving important operations and for monitoring progress.

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At the and of this first period, or earlier if conditions permit, the situation will be reviewed and a decision taken as to the next phase of the program.

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4. During this period, Ceneral Lanadale will continue as chief of operations, calling directly on the participating departments and agencies for support and implementation of agreed tasks. The beads of these departments and agencies are responsible for performance through normal command channels to higher authority. General Lanadale is responsible for coordinating combined planning and execution, reporting to higher authority through the Special Group (5412), augmented by the Attorney General and the Chairman, JCS. The Special Group (5412 sugmented) is responsible for providing policy guidance to the project, for approving important operations and for monitoring progress.

# **UMPLASSIFIED**

#### **OPERATION MONGOOSE** PEASE [ (State)

#### UPULINUUM ILL

March - July 1962

#### ACTIVITY

Political and economic operations to isolate Castro regime and neutralize its influence in the Western Hemisphere.

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3.5.5

#### PURPOSE

Activities in consonance with U.S. policy established after the April 1961 failure in Cuba.

#### CONSIDERATIONS .

These activities will have some negative impact on the Cuban people, who are part of the target, but are consistent with an overt policy of isolating Castro O and neutralizing his influence in the Western Hemisphere. They are noted here, for the sake of completeness, as actions now being carried out by the Department of State under other existing programs and projects.

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## UNULAUUII ILU

March - July 1962

PURPOSE

#### **CONSIDERATIONS**

To develop increased "hard" intelligence.

Use of cays near Cuba entail unacceptable security risks when vulnerable to Cuban landing parties. (Defense, in collaboration with CIA.)

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3. Provide logistic and personnel support for CIA intelligence operations into Cuba.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff will continue the planning and essential preliminary actions to assure a . decisive U.S. military capability for intervention.

To ensure optimum implementation of the intelligence plan.

To overthrow the Communist government of Cuba.

The intelligence plan requires support by U.S. military manpower and equipment.

The U.S. military intervention must be conducted as quickly as possible and with sufficient force

**OPERATION MONGOOSE** PHASE I (Defense)

ACTIVITY

I. Expand special intelligence and other sensitive intelligence coverage of Cuba as required.

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OPERATION MONGOOSE PHASE I (USIA)

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#### ACTIVITY

Propaganda programs to isolate Castro regime and neutralize its influence in the Western Hemisphere. TOPHECIENSE

March - July 1962

#### PURPOSE

1.0

Activities in consonance with U.S. policy established after the April 1961 failure in Cuba.

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#### CONSIDERATIONS

These activities will have some general impact upon Castro support and influence in the Western Hemisphere. There will be some new material for use as the Phase I intelligence operations produce but essentially the program is a continuation of that already in effect.

#### OPERATION MONGOOBE PHASE II (State)

#### ACTIVITY

- Make political decision to Intervene with U.S. military forces in Cuba.
- U.S. officials and nows releases on policy decision.

 Latin American leaders, government and public, in support. Commit national prestige and power of Latin political, intellectual, labor, youth, religious, military leaders to cause of Cuban people against Communist regime. For local public impact, international support, and morale of resistance within Cuba.

#### PURPOSE

To overtly engage the U.S. prestige in support of a Cuban revolt to an extent that would require the U.S. to become involved in assuring the ultimate victory of a Cuban revolution; this involvement must include the commitment of U.S. military forces as necessary to achieve such victory.

Indicate policy and commit prestige of U.S. government to appropriate support of the Cuban people vs. Communist dictatorship.


#### CONSIDERATIONS -

This political decision will require consideration of the legal and moral factors, assessed in the perspective of world opinion and U. S. security interests.

Top officials of Executive and Legislative branches to make timely statements. This should encourage similar attitude by leaders of other nations and help spirit of Cubans. Development of sympathy leading to favorable opinion about outside support for Cuban people is a goal.

Timely and strong public statements will be encouraged. Maximum publicity at country of origin, other key countries and into Cuba by CIA assets. Support of State action by CIA and USIA is involved.

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#### ACTIVITY

 After political decision, provide maximum U.S. support to resistance fighters in Cuba who have been spotted in Phase I.

After political decision,

commit U.S. militar · forces

in accordance with centingency

PUL POSE

To assure that Cuban "freedom-fighters" are fully equipped to attack the Communist regime's military and police forces; as part of the assurance, the U.S. support must include the immediate commitment of U.S. leadership personnel in combat operations.

To intervene as required to achieve victory for the revolutionary forces.

#### CONSIDERATIONS

DOD support planning, stock piling, readying of equipment and personnel for commitment must be developed with maximum lead time. Close coordination with CIA is required to insure maximum readiness to meet the immediate needs of the revolutionary forces. The hazard of visibility in preparing for these support activities makes security a paramount consideration. 0

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Consistent with security aspect, U.S. military forces are placed in a state of readiness to accomplish the assigned mission. The military forces must be prepared to assist in the maintenance of order until the revolutionary government is in control.



#### OPERATION MONGOOSE PHASE II (CLA)

#### ACTIVITY

#### Support U.S. militar/ actions in Cuba.

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3.63

To provide intelligence, guerrilla action, and Cuban political-psychological support of U.S. military operations.

TO

PURPOSE

#### CONSIDERATIONS

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Υ.

CIA capabilities must be continuously assessed and considered in the development of military planning. Executive responsibility for directing the use of covert assets must be clearly understood as resting in the U.S. military - commander of the U.S. intervention, as in agreed-upon wartime operations.

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OPERATION MONGOOSE PHASE II (USIA)

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#### ACTIVITY

 Increase news emphasis on Cuban revolt and intervention from the outside to help the Cuban movement.

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#### PURPOSE

To neutralize opposition to U.S. policy and, if possible, gain support for U.S. policy in the Western Hemisphere.

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#### CONSIDERATIONS

Optimum exploitation of news material available to CIA and Defense is essential.

## TOP SECRET

SENSITIVE

13 March 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)

From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale

Subject: Institutional Planning, Operation Mongoose

As desired by General Taylor on 12 March, the planning for Operation Mongoose is now prepared on a format of separate planning for each Department and Agency involved. Revised planning along this line is submitted herewith.

Activities already approved are marked with an asterisk. Further planning must await determination of policy questions raised in my 12 March 1962 memorandum to the members of the Special Group (Augmented).

Planning transmitted to you by my memorandum of 10 March 1962 should be returned to me for destruction as a matter of security.

#### Attachments

#### Distributiont

Copy:	To:
1 -	General Taylor
2 -	The Attorney General
3 -	Secretary Rusk/Deputy Under Secretary Johnson
4 -	Secretary McNamara/Deputy Secretary Gilpatric
5 -	General Lemnitzer (through General Craig)
6/7 -	Mr. McCone (through Mr. Helms/Mr. Harvey)
8 -	Mr. Murrow/Mr. Wilson
9/10 -	Chief of Operations


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SENSITIVE

#### TOP SECRET



\* Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962.

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#### ACTIVITY

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1.5

 Caribbean Admission Center, Opa-Locka, Florida, fully activated by 15 March 1962.

#### PURPOSE

To collect intelligence required for the operations, to identify and earmark intelligence assets as refugees arrive, and to provide security against Communist agent operations.

 Periodic intelligence estimates, as required by progress of operations.

#### To up-date NIE 85 62, so that current estimates can be considered at national policy levels.

#### CONSIDERATIONS

This operation, in response to early recommendation as essential by the Chief of Operations, is moving at utmost speed to become fully active by 15 March, with a new building completed and occupied, and with a staff of 43 at work. Operations commenced 15 February and, as of 9 March, 33 people were active at the Center. (CIA responsibility, with support by Defense, Justice, State, USIA.)

As the operations develop, there will be both increased intelligence collection and a need for as current an Intelligence Estimate as the U.S. can produce meaningfully. It is likely that a more informal method of producing an Intelligence Estimate for use at the national level (than now governing the issuance of NIE's) may have to be followed. CIA is now publishing daily intelligence summaries on Cuba and is planning a bi-monthly or weekly report summing up intelligence for this purpose. (CIA responsibility, with support of others as required.)

#### OTHER OPERATIONS



#### INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

 Two teams of agents dispatched to Cuba. To collect intelligence.

One team of 4 and one team of 3 agents. Both teams include personnel who have had resistance training and some past experience,

Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962

#### ACTIVITY

9. By 31 March, have 105 agents selected and 50 agents trained.

1764

To ready agent operations.

PURPOSE

10.\* Develop intelligence potential of Cuban "colonies" in U.S. To exploit the intelligence possibilities of former residents of Cuba (including U.S. citizens) now in the United States.

II. \* Develop additional interrogation centers in other areas by 31 March 1962. To collect intelligence in a Latin atmosphere, at different levels that. now seem possible in the continental U.S., to spot additional intelligence assets and to provide security against Communist agent operations.

#### CONSIDERATIONS

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Effectiveness and numbers are dependent upon purpose of recruitment, nature of training, and policy decisions controlling these factors. If the recruit nent and training are for resistance activities, the task of recruit<sup>2</sup> ment and training will be much less difficult than if they are limited to intelligence-collection purposes only.


There are "colonies" in Washington, D. C., and other U.S. cities which are "little Cubas." Family, Church, and business interests provoke unusual personal ties inside Cuba for some of these residents; a real potential exists for collection of intelligence not otherwise available. (FBI support and coordination is basic in this effort.)


As Opa-Locka becomes fully activated, CIA will activate other interrogation centers as promptly as feasible. Negotiations with local authorities are being undertaken to activate centers, if possible, in the second secon

#### OTHER OPERATIONS

None.

Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962.





ACTIVITY

## 16 UNULAU

#### **OTHER OPERATIONS**



To debase the economy of Cuba.

PURPOSE

### 1 June - 31 July 1962

#### INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

26. \* 10 to 15 teams of agents dis patched to Cuba.

To collect intelligence.

27. Reinforce and resupply agents and leams previously placed or activated inside Cuba.

29.


- To reinforce and resupply, as possible.
- 28. By 31 July, select 100 additional To ready agent operations. agents and train 70 additional agents.

#### CONSIDERATIONS

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Number of agents in each team and selection of areas will be determined by developments of the previous actions and by conditions.

Numbers, areas, and supplies are completely dependent upon conditions at the time, and upon policy approval of methods to be used (that is, if air delivery can be used, or if this activity must depend upon maritime delivery).

30. \* Survey airfields, military To provide current intelligence on installations, and communica key security resources of the

This is conceived of as ground surveys, and the possible recruitment of military and other official personnel as intelligence agents.

tion centers.

\* Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group ch 1962 TOPS

regime.

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### ACTIVITY

### OTHER OPERATIONS


### None.

### End of July 1962

32. \* Comprehensive and definitive intelligence report on attitudes and 0.11 abilities of the popula .. tion ins. ... Cuba.

To provide the Special Group () ICC 5412 augmented) with a hard estimate of the Cuban situation.

PURPOSE



### CONSIDERATIONS

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Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962.

### uppulywaya Ilu



5 April 1962

STREET STREET

### MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL TAYLOR SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)

From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale

Subject: Operation Mongoose

For the information of the members of the Special Group (Augmented), the following are highlights of current matters in Operation Mongoose reported to met

Trial. The trial of the Playa Giron prisoners has ended, according to Havana Radio, with the sentences to be announced at a later date. CIA has accepted the figure of 1, 182 prisoners. The trial prosecutor reportedly asked for sentences of death or 20-years at hard labor.

The US-resident families of the prisoners decided not to go to Cuba, according to the State Department.

"Tood for Prisoners." At the 29 March Special Group (Augmented) meeting, State was tasked with ascertaining if a deal could be made with Castro on the prisoners, in return for lood from private charitable organisations. Dick Goedwin has reported that State is still trying to find an emissary. The Australian government turned it down. The Italian delegate to the UN has received approval from Rome to act as an emissary, at 1145 this morning, according to the State Department.

Clements: Dick Goodwin reported that Goulart received a reply from Provident Dorticos of Cuba and informed the White House yesterday; in action. Destine politely noted Goulart's appeal for Cuban clemency. State and promised appeals from other governments, notably Mexico and Canada, as well as an OAS resolution.

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Information. Don Wilson reports that USIA has handled the trial as the top news story, except for yesterday when Goulart's visit took over with background stories, governmental and editorial reactions in the Western Hemisphere. Icn USIA posts attempted to get local journalists to attend the trial; only Guatemala and Trimidad sent requests to Guua, which were turned down. Gubans in Miami generally were unwilling to be interviewed by VCA; only two interviews were played. Gurrent play is now being given to Gastro's speech containing slurring remarks about Latin American leaders.

Program Reports. CIA is issuing a special progress report of its activities in connection with Operation Mongoose. Since Mr. McCone directed this means of keeping the Special Group (Augmented) informed of CIA efforts, we are confronted with the problem of security and arranging for proper reporting of all Departments and Agencies on the Operations Mongoose team. If CIA activities are to be reported separately, then I propose to ask the others (State, Defonse, USIA) to prepare similar reports directly to the members of the Special Group, with an agreement of the reporting date being the same for all. I further plan then to make a composite report to the Special Group (Augmented) at least every two weaks, with due recognition to the separate reports which have been submitted by the several Departments and Agencies. If separate reporting is to be continued, then I would underscore heavily that security means for handling these reports must be tightened.

There are some developments, in areas such as Defense support of CIA, which should be brought to the attention of the Special Group (Augmented). If you wish, I will be prepared to report on this at your next meeting.

Distribution:

Mr. McCone, CIA Mr. Johnson, State

The Attorney General Mr. McGeorge Bundy General Lemnitser

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

19 April 1962

# SENSITIVE.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)

From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale 2d.

Subject: Operation Mongoose, 13-19 April

The following are the significant highlights of Operation Mongoose for the past week:

<u>Tasks</u>. All tasks agreed to at the 11 April meeting in Secretary Rusk's office and the 12 April Special Group meeting have been assigned by the Chief of Operations to Departments and Agencies concerned. The State Department, through Assistant Secretary Ed Martin, requested revision of the "total blockade" tasking to be limited to a CIA estimate of the effects on Cuba of a blockade; the tasking was so changed. Status of these tasks will be included in my report to the Special Group next week, when I plan to attend the meeting.

<u>Prisoner Ransom</u>. The Chief of Operations met with State and CIA representatives to work on problems arising from Castro's proposed \$62 million ransom deal for prisoners. State agreed to contact James Fusca, the New York public relations advisor to the Cuban Families Committee, so that consideration is afforded the propaganda impact of public appearances for Brigade fund raising, suggesting that the theme be in terms of the fight for recapturing human freedom and national independence rather than in terms of disabled Cubans to whom the U.S. owes a debt of guilt.

(USIA reports that local reaction

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in 11 Latin American countries is strongly negative to a deal with Castro, with the consensus that the U.S. government should ignore Castro's efforts to "sell human beings.")

The threat of splintering refugee groups over the purpose of their organization, in turn, raises the problem of what the U.S. desires the CRC to be: a central refugee organization with mainly non-political goals, or a central organization of Cuban politicalmilitary actionists for liberating their homeland.

<u>Reports of New "Invaders.</u>" The New York Times this morning reported a group of Cubans training in the U.S. for guerrilla operations. This is one of several news stories published recently and is an expected outcome of the restlessness of Cuban refugee groups. CIA cited a Chattanooga news item along the same line in its weekly summary. (CIA can report on the facts and meaning of this verbally to the Group.)

Agent Actions. Upon the return of Mr. Harvey from his current field visit, more specific information on the status of agent training and operations should be available. The CIA Progress Report this week notes that maritime actions to infiltrate two agent teams into Cuba and exfiltrate one team were unsuccessful.

7 - Chief of Operations

SENSITIVE



21 April 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)

From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale

Subject: Possible Security Violation, Operation Mongoose

The attached copy of an item in the Wall Street Journal, 20 April 1962, was brought to General Taylor's attention by the Chief of Operations as a possible security violation. General Taylor, in turn, has notified the Director, Central Intelligence, and has asked me to furnish each member of the Special Group (Augmented) with a copy of the news item, as a probable item for discussion at the next meeting.

Attachiant

Copy

- General Taylor
- 2 Mr. Johnson
- 3 Mr. Gilpatric
- 4 Mr. McCone

- 5 Mr. Kennedy
- 6 General Lemnitzer
- 7 Chief of Operations

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

26 April 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)

From: Brig. Gea. Lansdale 2d

Subject: Operation Mongoose, 20-26 April

The following are the significant highlights of Operation Mongoose for the week:

<u>May Day.</u> World-wide attention focused upon May Day by the Communists, as "their day," is expected to be exploited by Castro promoters throughout Latin America. CIA and USIA hope to counter this propaganda play and possibly to encourage public opinion favorably for Cuban freedom. The plight of Cuban workers especially will be a theme injected into state ments, speeches, meetings, and parades on 1 May. It is hoped to have prominent Cuban exiles make statements and, if possible, appearances in key Latin American cities to attract news pick-up and impress their case most favorably.

Agents. The past 3 weeks have been marked with bad luck in CIA's infiltration and exfiltration of agent teams. Most of the operations aborted. Bill Harvey is now in Florida initiating a new series of agent infiltrations and is hopeful of closing up with the schedule in May. He will be back in Washington 30 April.

Special Press Interest. The increased play given by the U.S. press to possible liberation projects and the Guban refugees makes the security of operations more difficult and important. An item **pertaining to intelligence** in the Wall Street Journal, which appeared 28 April, was called to the attention of General Taylor by the Chief of Operations as warranting special attention. At General Taylor's request, cepies of the item were sent to members of the Special Group (Augmented) to note possible security implications. Such news projects as Dave Brinkley's scheduled coverage of Guantanamo for a TV documentary underline the need for being alert to publicity affecting Operation Mongoose.



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Mr. Johnson





OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

3 May 1962

SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)

From: Brig. Gen. Lanedale Sd

Subject: Operation Mongoose, 27 April - 3 May

The following are the significant highlights of Operation Mongoose for the week:

CIA. Mr. William Harvey has returned from his field trip and is to give his report directly to the Special Group.

In taking measure of where we stand on our tasks, I believe it pertinent to note that CIA now has largely solved its difficult erganisational and personnel staffing problems which impeded sound planning and actions as the project was launched. CIA is now moving absact with the intelligence collection needed to construct appropriate political, psychological and resistance operations to win our goal. In my opinion, CIA deserves to be commended for this difficult regrouping and "re-tooling"; the somewhat disappointing score in attempted operations during this period should consider this.

Now that CIA is ready to move into the fuller operational phase we require, we must recognize that there is inevitably the risk of visibility and audibility. CIA must undertake practical projects, such as paramilitary training, on a more intensive scale, as basic to fulfilling assignments inside Cuba. Such projects must be backed with firmness from the policy level, in the face of possible adverse events of times, if we are to succeed. Also, such projects are going to require further help from Defense; the Defense staff is awaiting definite requests from CIA.

Brigade Frisoners. State reports that the Families Committee has decided to work for the release of the prisoners as a body instead of in small groups or individuals and has signed a three-months contract with John Price Jones to try to raise the \$62-million ransom. James Fusca remains as a personal advisor to the Committee chairman.

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Previous Ly. Declassified/Released on 12-28-88 (F85-421) under provisions of E.O. 12008 by N. Menan National Security Council <u>Studies</u>. The series of planning papers noted in my report last week are nearing completion by the several Departments and Agencies; for example, Defense has just completed its part of the Blockade study. I plan to collate these papers and forward to the Special Group (Augmented) as each series is completed.

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6

7

cc: "Eyes Only"

- 1 General Taylor
- 2 Mr. Johnson -
- 3 Mr. Gilpatric
- 4 Mr. McCone

- Mr. Kennedy
- General Lemnitzer
- Chief of Operations





OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

10 May 1962

26

# EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)

From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale Sa

Subject: Operation Mongoose, 4-10 May


The following are the significant highlights of Operation Mongoose for the week, in addition to those reported separately by CIA:

TV. USIA helped in the effective drama "Anatomy of Betrayal: . Dateline Cuba," which was televised on the Armstrong Circle Theater last night. USIA advised the writer of the drama, put him in touch with refugees in Miami, and reviewed the script. It is noted that the appearance of Jose MIRO Cardona at the end was particularly effective.

May Day. USLA's follow-up coverage of Havana's May Day celebration included commentary on methods of coercing workers to attend such mass celebrations. Interviews with a Cuban ex-Secretary of Labor and a former transportation worker in Havana were used. The commentary hit on a real Communist vulnerability: coercion.

VOA. The Voice of America continued to devote major emphasis to the sugar harvest flasco and "salary adjustments" of the sugar cane workers. One interview with Morell Romero, a former Supreme Court Justice, drew heated commentary from Radio Havana for three days fellowing the broadcast.

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"Whip Lash." Exercise "Whip Lash" is scheduled for 8-18 May, with participation by the JCS. Unified and Specified Commands, the military forces, and some US agencies, to exercise emergency alerting procedures. All messages pertaining to the exercise scenario will be prefaced by the words, "Exercise Whip Lash." The play possibly will include a simulated recommendation for the first phase of the CINCLANT contingency plan for Cuba.

"Eyes Caly" copies to:

- Ceneral Taylor
  Mr. Johnson -.
  Mr. Gilpatric
- A Mr. Mipatri
- 4. Mr. McCone

- 5. Mr. Kennedy
- 6. General Lemnitzer
- 7. Chief of Operations



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

14 May 1962

## EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)

From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale

Subject: Cuban Patrol Incident, Operation Mongoose

For your information.

Habana radio has announced that a Cuban Navy patrol best was attacked by "pirates" late Saturday night, with Cuban casualties resulting. The attack took place between Habana and Matausas, off the north coast of Cuba.

CIA has informed me that this was an accidental intercept by a Cuban patrol, during the scheduled delivery of an agent team. Our craft took defensive action, crippled the Cuban patrol, and retired. Our craft was not hit. The team returned to Florida, and is in isolation from press and public.

Intelligence findings are that this encounter was completely accidental. This is assessed as a routine incident in operations, which was handled very competently. The Castro propaganda reaction has produced a temporary rise in the noise level but serious increase in operational risk is not indicated.

### "Eyes Only" copies to

EYES ONLY

1. General Taylor 2. Mr. Johnson 3. Mr. Gilpatric 4. Mr. McCone 5. Mr. Kennedy

6. General Lemnitzer


7. Chief of Operations

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17 May 1962


# SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)

From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale Ed.

Subject: Operation Mongoose, 11-17 May

The following are the significant highlights of Operation ' Mongoose for the week, in addition to those reported separately by CIA:



Teams. CIA has reported separately on its successful infiltration of a 3-man team into Oriente. This makes a total of four teams now inside Cuba.

Intelligence. It is noted that reports on the construction of underground military facilities in Cubs are now being screened further, within the U.S. intelligence community, before publication in the CIA summary on Cubs. Most reports fail to be confirmed.

<u>May Day</u>. There were meager results from the special effort we made to get incidents and other material, from Latin American May Day celebrations, for use in propaganda aimed at Guba. While

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
Castro had a poor show, himself, the U.S. effort did not appear to rise above the level of its long-term program aimed at labor groups in Latin America.

CRC. State reports that Dr. Miro Gardona apparently has weathered the storm of dissension within the CRC. As a result of his talk with John McCone, apparently Miro's personal storm also was calmed.

Patrols. Defense has submitted a thoughtful study on methods of destroying Cuba's capability to patrol coastal waters. This is being passed to CIA and will be developed between Defense and CIA.

Sanctions. State reports that NATO countries are favorable to denying arms to Cube, but other sanctions are difficult to arrange. Treasury has extended its embargo which restricts U.S. citizens and alien residents from importing Cuban products.

Information. USIA reports further publication and dissemination of cartoon books in Latin America, about Cuba. They effectively publicize the Castro betrayal of religion, students, labor, and farmers. The program of radio interviews with refugees was curtailed by Immigration authorities in Miami, due to a misunderstanding. The Attorney General corrected the situation.



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'Eyes Only' copies to:-

- 1. General Taylor
- 2. Mr. Johnson
- . Mr. Gilpatric
- 1. Mr. McCone

- 5. Mr. Kennedy
- ó. General Lonnitzer
- 7. Chief of Operations

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### OPERATION MONGOOSE PRIORITY OPERATIONS SCHEDULE 21 MAY - 30 JUNE 1962

### TASK

### POLITICAL

 Obtain some special and significant action within the OAS organization against the Castro-Communist regime. (STATE)

 Activate key public leaders in Latin America to make timely and strong statements about the Castro-Communist threat to the Hemisphere, the failures of the regime towards Cuban workers, students, farmers, and freedom. (STATE)

logical impact on Cuba.

To produce material for psycho-

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To produce material for psychological impact on Cuba.

PURPOSE

# Institute, as well as the Special Consultative Committee on Security.

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CONSIDERATIONS

Members of OAS need to be inspired

to push some special action through.

opportunities for exploitation through

such OAS bodies as the Commission L on Human Rights, the Peace Committee, the Council of Jurists, and the Children's

Current events offer a number of

17 May 1962

each Country Team by now has the. means to generate more open and active commitment of Latin American political, in ellectual, labor, youth, religious, and military leaders. One significant action in each Latin Americancountry, for hard impact on Cuba, is a minimum need.


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### PURPOSE

### CONSIDERATIONS

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POLITICAL - continued.

TASK

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 Develop a suggested platform of Cuban political-economic objectives for possible adoption by Cubans in freeing their country. (STATE) For the guidance of Operation Mongoose personnel, particularly in the selection and readying of agents to ensure that they are committed to acceptable political beliefs before introduction into Cuba. There are a number of statements of Cuban political objectives, including drafts by State and CIA. What is needed now, and promptly, is a single working document for the guidance of U.S. operational staffs.

 Assure that optimum values are obtained from the CRC and Cuban refugee groups in the U.S. (CIA)

These Cuban external groups have a vital role for propaganda impact inside Cuba. We must have purposeful, singleness of guidance and monitoring of their activities to support the project. CIA and State both have had roles with the CRC and others. Cuban leaders also make contact at a number of high offices of the U.S. government. For the good of the U.S., the Cuban refugees, and our project, there must be coordinated management. The Director, Central Intelligence, should have this responsibility, particularly with leaders of the stature of Dr. Jose Miro Cardona.





### PURPOSE:

### CONSIDERATIONS

### PSYCHOLOGICAL

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
 Steer psychological-propaganda Working Group for day-to-day Cuba operations. (STATE)

TASK

To assure full consideration of material, as collected, in terms of special psychological-propaganda use against the Cuban regime, and to inform the public. This has been a normal State-chaired working group. It needs to be sharply or geared to the project's operations, including consideration of declassifying or material for operational use. Defense or should be added to the membership. It is possible that USIA should assume leadership.

 Make strong, repetitive theme on radio broadcasts to Guba of the overwhelming disapproval throughout the Western Hemisphere of the Gastro-Communist regime, along with sympathy for the captive Gubans. (USIA) To undermine Castro's psychological basis of control over the Cuban people and the lower echelons of the regime's bureaucracy. This is to make full use of material produced by actions in the Western Hemisphere.

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### TASK

in

### **PSYCHOLOGICAL** - continued

- Give fullest play into Cuba (and the Western Hemisphere) of Cuban refugees and defectors, as dramatic witness against the Castro-Communist regime. (USIA)
- Fo undermine Castro's psycho-'ogical basis of control and to build the tone for anti-Castro actions in the Western Hemisphere.

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PURPOSE

9. Ready the "Voice of Cuba" for radio broadcast. (CIA)

To provide a ready capability for giving a "voice" to encourage resistance elements inside Cuba and to undermine the morale of the Castro regime. CONSIDERATIONS

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Note the inclusion of defectors in this task; it is still a CIA task to produce the defectors. Also, this task includes exploitation of Dr. Miro Cardona's intensely moving statement at the end of the Armstrong Circle Theater drama, "Anatomy o Betrayal."

Initially, this would be for brief news broadcasts of local events inside Cuba, simulating a location in Cuba, but actually A plan of how best to do this, with the proposed program format, is needed to obtain policy decision.



 Create musical and visual symbols to express anti-regime sentiments. (USIA)

To provide catchy expressions of popular resistance against the Communist regime.

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New words to a favorite song, a new tune, a visual symbol for wall-painting, a hand symbol as easy to do as "V for Victory," are the types of expressions sought. USIA should call on GLA for assistance, since some thought has been given to this already

### TASKS

### **PSYCHOLOGICAL** - continued

 Select a sabotage operation. (CIA)

# PURPOSE

#### CONSIDERATIONS

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
To make a psychological impact upon the regime and public, which symbolizes popular resistance to the regime and which causes talk encouraging to resistance. CIA should select a feasible sabotage operation. a ) showy" one against the regime, but rot against the people, and present a specific proposal for approval.

### INTELLIGENCE

 Make a special effort to step-up the infiltration of teams. (CLA)

To exploit recent experience in order to ensure that there is adequate coverage inside Cuba to permit the firm end-of-July intelligence estimate required for further decisions. Feasibility depends on CLA's judgment, both operationally and for depth of intelligence required. The schedule was for 14 teams, 2 singleton agents.

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PURPOSE

### TASKS

### INTELLIGENCE - continued

18. Get ready for air re-supply missions. (CIA)

To have a ready capability for re-supply of agent teams inside Cuba when needed.

### CONSIDERATIONS

PAGE . 10

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Since the Air Force has readled a capability for this task and since it is still desired that CLA mount such operations with Cuban personnel, in acceptable means must be found promotly. CLA, with Defense assistance, as a priority will review feasible means of mounting these operations, and recommend the most practical method for a policy decision."

### MILITARY

54 4 1

19. Develop a real dual-purpose capability of intelligence teams in building up the agent pool for infiltration. (CIA)

To assure that skills needed for guerrilla operations are present inside Cuba, so that paramilitary actions can be initiated when the decision is made. While CIA is currently carrying out this task, it is worth CIA taking a further. hard look it its training program to anticipate needs. If larger groups of action types are to be trained for possible introduction in September, it is known that at least 3 months "lead time" is required for minimum selection and training. That means now. It is possible that Defense can be of fir more help than called upon at present. Also, it is possible that furthe policy guicance might be required.



### TASKS

- MILITARY continued
- Induct Cubans into the U.S. Armed Forces for training. (DEFENSE)

To fulfill Guban exile leadership desires and to build up a potential reserve for possible future milltary action inside Cuba.


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PURPOSE

### ECONOMIC

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 Tighten effect of sanctions by increased effort to enlist further participation by NATO nations, Mexico, Japan, and others. (STATE) To further restrict Cuba's economy.




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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON 25. D.C.

4 June 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR ALEXIS JOHNSON

From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale

Subject: Operation Mongoose

Responsive to the direction from the Special Group (Augmented) last Thursday, there is still an obligation to have a definitive statement on the special tasks which the Department of State might undertake in furtherance of our project goals. I have been unable to arrange the desired meeting with Mr. Martin, by telephone last Thursday evening and through Dick Goodwin on Friday.

I am scheduled to make a report to the Special Group (Augmented) this week. I can offer only the generalizations resulting from my conversation last Friday with Mr. Goodwin and Mr. Hurwitch. I believe that you, General Taylor, and the other members had anticipated something more definitive, presenting issues of emphasis, priority, and policy warranting consideration by the Special Group. It would be particularly helpful to know if there are special-emphasis actions which the Department prefers.

Alex I agree that before Ed reporte back to the speciel grap, thes share be a session with meeting and to this the start? fordirin. Would you tay & bring The attar? SENSITIVE 27.7.5 RECTA PREVIOUSLY Declassified/Released on 12-28-88 (FRS-421) under provisions of E.O. 12000 'by N. Menan, Matianal Shim "y Crunal



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON 25. D.C.

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20 June 1962

SENSITIVE

MEMORANDEM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)

From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale S.

Subject: Progress, Operation Mongoose

Internal Situation. Your attention is invited to increased reports, in CIA's daily and weekly summaries, of popular unrest, political strife, and economic disruptions inside Cuba. It is suggested that the Special Group (Augmented) consider the value of having an SNIE on Cuba made in the immediate future, as a preliminary to the more conclusive estimate due at the end of Phase I, Operation Mongoese. Since Phase I is scheduled to end 31 July, it should prove helpful to have as firm a fix on the Cuban situation as possible, in determining any desirableincrease or special effort emphasis in our activities for the last menth of Phase I.

<u>Presidential Visit.</u> State reports that the President's forthcoming visit to Mexico may offer an opportunity for discussion of the Communist regime in Havana and hopefully some change in the official Mexican government's attitude towards Castro.

Defector. CIA has agreed, as a matter of priority, to reach a stage in the interrogation of Pedro Roig (the Cuban economic official who defected in Mexico) where he can be surfaced to make public charges of Cuban Communist operations against Latin American nations. It is desired to gain maximum impact from this story on the people of Cuba, the people and governments of Latin America, and world opinion. State and USIA will help. Meanwhile, USIA reports that substantial press coverage was given to Reig's initial statement about Cuba's arms traffic and espleage ring in Mexico.

**EATO:** State reports it is making a special effort with the British to break the impasse on the NATO report on Cuba. Secretary Rusk will discuss the problem in London. Assistant Secretary Kohler has told the UK Ambassador in Washington that we find the British attitude unhelpful.

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<u>VOA.</u> The Voice of America continues its effective interviews with individual Cubans. On 12 June, VOA carried a half-hour program of interviews with relatives of prisoners in Castro's notorious Isle of Pines jail, describing the miserable conditions in which political prisoners are forced to exist. For its regular series last week, USIA taped interviews with a famous Cuban radio and TV star, a poor fisherman who escaped with seven little children, a construction worker, an owner of a food store, and a time-keeper. The stories of these people ring true and indite the regime in a manner no other medium can do.

<u>Press</u>. USIA's press output emphasized Castro's admission of mis-management of Cuba's agriculture, a refugee interview telling how Cuba's consumer industries are being ruined, and a commentary on the drop in Cuban sugar production.

"Voice of Cuba." For operational effectiveness, CIA has selected a new area in Cuba for its initial radio broadcasts State has concurred in the theme and content of the broadcasts. They will take place around the end of the month.

Special Political Activities. The Chief of Operations has had two meetings with Robert Hurwitch since he was appointed as State's representative for operations. State was asked for proposed State actions giving special emphasis to Operation Mongoose. No proposals have been submitted yet; Mr. Hurwitch has promised them for submission on 22 June. They will be included in a revision of the 17 May "Priorities Schedule," which will then be distributed.

"Eyes Only" copies to:

- 1. General Taylor
- 2. Mr. Johnson -
- 3. Mr. Gilpatric
- 4. Mr. McCone

- 5. Mr. Kennedy
- 6. General Lernnitzer
- 7. Chief of Operations

0001-02

June 22, 1962

TOI G - Mr. Johnson FROM: - Mr. Martin ARA

2. 2.

Subject: Cuban Subversion through Population Groups

I am forwarding the attached memorandum and enclosure addressed to you and given to Mr. Hurwitch by General Lansdale, in the event mention of it is made at the next meeting.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The types of Cuban subversive activities described in the enclosure have already been mentioned (though not in this detail) in the Department's publication <u>Cuba</u> of April 1961, which received world-wide dissemination, and in the Department's publication <u>The Castro Regime in Cuba</u> of August 1961, which received hemispherewide dissemination. In addition, sanitized versions of reports of Cuban subversive activities have been informally made available to the governments concerned.

While we do not think General Lansdale should be discouraged in this effort, we doubt that information such as that contained in the enclosed would "awaken world opinion to this conspiracy" nor do we think the attendant publicity would make an impact in the hemisphere equal to that of proof of arms shipments to Latin imerican countries.

Attachments

Memorandum from General Lansdale.

## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON 25. D.C.

15 June 1962

MEMORANOUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)

From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale

Subject: Cuban Subversion through Population Groups

Transmitted herewith is an excellent summary analysis by CIA of the travel and activities of Cuban organisations (student, labor, cultural) towards subversion in Latin America. It is noted that a special school in Havana, with mostly Soviet instructors and with a capacity of 1,000 students every 3 months, is teaching Latin Americans the techniques of agitation, sabotage, self-defense, and erganising demonstrations. Other schools and activities also are noted in the summary.

I am asking CIA to undertake the declassification of as much of this information as possible, for maximum publicity use to awaken world opinion to this conspiracy. The psychological impact of such publicity should be just as great as legal proof of Communists' sending in boat-loads of arms and ammunition to rebel groups in Latin American countries.

We needs't react only defensively. There are staunch democratic forces among the free Latin Americans. We still require dynamic actions in the Hemisphere which can be used against the Communist regime in Cuba.

SHILL SKIFIFT

SENSITIVE

5. Mr. Kennedy 6. General Lemnitser

7. Chief of Operations

Partially Declassified/Released on <u>1-5-88</u> (FSR-75F) under provisions of E.O. 12356 by N. Menan, National Security Council

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### SUMMARY

There has been an extensive exchange and movement of students between Cuba and other Latin-American countries. Hundreds of scholarships have been issued by the Cuban government to students throughout 1 atin America. Invitations have been extended to Cuban celebrations and to meetings of international left-wing student organizations held in Havana. Also, Cuban students have been sent abroad to other Latin-American countries to agitate, to lend support to revolutionary student groups, and to engage in local subversive activities.

\_abor unions in Cuba, formerly some 1,500 in number, have been weided into one national union serving the government. The CTC has aggressively entered the international labor movement in Latin America supporting the Communist cause. It has taken the initiative in Latin America in establishing a rival Communist dominated international union of plantation workers.

Cuba, through its Institute for Friendship with Peoples, has become very active in inviting cultural leaders to visit Cuba. Cuban Friendship Societies are proliferating in Latin America as claewhere, and increasing interest and attention is being devoted.

to international front organizations involving artists, journalists, women, educators, and "peace" lovers throughout Latin America.

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## DISCUSSION

Student Activities:

reported that hundreds of Latin-Americans were being brought to Cuba for training and indoctrination. A special school was opened in mid-1961 in Havana to train young Latin-Americans in methods to achieve Communist objectives in Latin America. Some 1,000 students can be trained in each three-month course. Such a school could graduate 4,000 students per calendar year. The course includes one month of Communist theory, plus two months of practical training in agitation, sabotage, self-defense, and the organization of public demonstrations. Most of the instructors are Spanish-speaking Soviet nationals.

Special six-month courses were reported to have been given in Cuba in 1961-62 to Latin-American women, trade unionists and professional people, with special tasks assigned to graduates after their return to their own country. Some foreign students resident at Cuban univers' ies, as well as Latin-American youth and students visiting Cuba, have been given special paramilitary training.

Cuban students have been involved in subversive activities among Latin-American student organizations, and Cuban Embassies have frequently supported leftist and other revolutionary student groups in Latin-American countries. For example, five Cuban students arrived in Mexico City from Brazil on 27 October 1961. When their baggage was examined at the airport, a large quantity of propaganda material was discovered and confiscated by Mexican officials. Last August, Buenos Aires police raided a Communist school and broke into a class being conducted by Alejandro RAMOS Diaz, a Cuban student. Large quantities of Communist propaganda were seized; including instructions for the recruitment of volunteers for the Cuban forces.

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On 19 October 1961, the Superior Council of the Universities of Cuba announced that 1,000 scholarships were to be made available to Latin-American university students, confirming Castro's sarlier promise to the International Students Union. It was also announced that applications for the scholarships had to be filed with Cuban diplomatic missions or sent directly to Havana. The scholarship program involves study at three Suban universities: Las Villas, Santiago de Cuba, and Havana. The Latin-America students undoubtedly will i receive political indoctrination along lines already given routinely

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to Cuban students. Since political indoctrination is an integral part of a university's curriculum in Cuba today, it follows that foreign students in attendance are exposed to the same instruction. Further, it has already been established that foreign students who attended Cuban universities during the academic year 1960-1961 received Marxist ideological training in their courses.

The International Student Union Congress (Communist) was held in Havana from 23 May through 8 June 1961, with world wide representation including Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Puerto Rico, Venezuela, and a delegate-at-large representing the West Indies.

Activities ranged from organization of seminars on imperialist and clerical penetration in Latin American education and culture to resolutions to give moral and "material" help to Panamanian students, suffering under U. S. imperialist occupation, to re-establish their territorial integrity.

One of the principal speeches of the meeting was given by Jose Venegas, who traced in detail the history of the penetration and domination of Latin America by the United States, pointing out that U. S. imperialist policy towards Latin America was laid out as far back as 1787.



The entire meeting, including its unanimous resolutions involving Communist Party activities on a world-wide basis, followed the Soviet pattern of agitation among students generally.

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Some Latin-Americans have actually received training in sabotage and guerrilla warfare in Cuba. Although members of these groups have not necessarily been students, many of those trained were young enough to move freely in student circles. For example, three Salvadoreans who went to Havana for the 26th of July celebration in 1961 remained in Cubs for eight months of training which included espionage and sabotage. Another example is that of three members of the Communist Youth of Ecuador who travelled on a chartered Cuban flight with the Ecuadorean delegation to the anniversary celebrations on 1 January 1962 but who remained in Cuba to attend a six-month course in political affairs sponsored by the Cuban Government. Still another case is that of an Ecuadorean, working independently of the Cuban Embassy, who was responsible for selecting Ecuadoreans for training in guerrilla warfare and general revolutionary action. Upon selection, their names were submitted directly to a Cuban organization and the necessary money for travel expenses to Cuba was provided to the candidates.

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### Labor Organizations

By early 1961, after the Castro regime had consolidated its control over organized labor, a significant change in labor reorganization became evident. Overlapping organizations were established to encompass virtually all workers. Local unions were "voluntarily" abolished in favor of one "national" union, with authority centered at headquarters in Havana.

The Confederation of Cuban Workers (CTC) which before 1959 had been active in the international field and affiliated with non-Communist organizations withdrew from these organizations after 1959 and turned its attention to building up rival Communistdominated international labor bodies.

Early evidence of this trend was the sending of a Cuban delegation to the Metallurgical Workers Conference in Brazil in August 1960. This conference was sponsored by the Communist-dominated W. F. T. U.

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delegates from Communist China and the leaders of the international W. F. T. U.

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Resolutions stressing the political and economic exploitation of workers by U. S. monopolists and the like were a dominant theme of the meeting. Travel expenses of all foreign delegates were defrayed by the Cuban union (CTC) and delegams were treated as guests of the Cuban Government during their stay.

Later in November 1961, the CTC invited foreign labor leaders to attend its congress in Havana. Labor leaders from Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, British Guiana, Jamaica, Dominican Republic, Panama, Brazil, Nicaragua, Argentina, Colombia and Venezuela were present.

The international W. F. T. U. underwrote travel costs for some of the delegates and the Mexican labor leader Vincente LOMBARDO Toledano took part in these arrangements. (He is a vice-president of W. F. T. U.) Following the meeting in Havana, a special flight took selected delegates on to the W. F. T. U. congress in Moscow.

Again in December 1961. Cuba took part in an international meeting in Montevideo sponsored by construction workers. Basically the meeting was developed into a strong anti-imperialist demonstra-: tion.

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### Other Organizations

It is now common practice to invite cultural leaders to Cuba to participate in national celebrations such as May Day activities, anniversary of the 26th of July and the like. The executive organization responsible for planning and executing these visits is the Guban Institute for Friendship with Peoples (ICAP). ICAP's function is to insure that such visitors are impressed with the social order in Cuba and the political progress of the people. Costs of travel and expenses incurred by invited guests are defrayed by ICAP in many cases. In this way ICAP resembles the parallel Soviet organization which acts in a liaison capacity between the Soviet Government and foreign guests.

In April 1961 sixteen Cuban women travelled to Mexico to attend the Meeting of Women of Mexico. Central America and the Caribbean, at which plans for a July 1962 hemispheric congress of women were discussed. About the same time, a similar meeting w as held in Rio de Janeiro, attended by delegates from Brasil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay. Celia de la Serna de GUEVARA, mother of Ernesto "Che" GUEVARA, was among the representatives of Argentina attending the meeting and was considered to have been i a "Cuban" delegate.

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On 4 January 1962 a special preparatory meeting for the July women's congress was held in Havana and was attended by delegations from the women's organizations of Brazil, Chile, Colombia. Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Paraguay, Uruguay, Panama, and Dominican Republic. The meeting was held to amplify and elaborate on the agenda and themes of the July congress and to designate preparatory committees. Women from Chile, Mexico, and Uruguay participated in the Fifth National Plenary of the Federacion de-Mujeres Cubanas (FMC) in Havana on 30 and 31 January 1962.

The FMC is the organization charged with agitating within the churches to spread dissension and is closely associated with the Association of Rebel Youth (AJR) whose members agitate outside the churches.

A meeting was called of the executive committee of the International Organization of Journalists, a Communist front, in Havana in mid-January 1962. It was attended by representatives from thirty-five countries, including delegates from Mexico, Bolivia, Peru, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, British Guiana, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

# INSULER FILM

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There is evidence of similar aggressive activities on the part of Cuban organizations in the development of international friendship societies (Communist) with other Latin-American countries, in the formation of international artistic and cultural groups and the formation of "peace" committees. All of these bear the historical markings of Communist-inspired and executed front organization.

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON 15. D.C.

27 June 1962

LEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)

From: Office, Chief of Operations

Subject: Progress, Operation Mongoose

Internal Situation. The team introduced into Oriente Province on 4-5 June reported that Cuban security measures made operations in that area difficult. An allegation of Raul Castro on June 25 concerning the destruction of a team in Oriente is being checked, but to date this report is not accepted as fact.

On 21-22 June a maritime operation to emplace & caches, of arms and demolitions was accomplished without incident.

<u>Defector</u>. Roig, the commercial officer who defected from the Cuban Embassy in Mexico, has provided the names of other General G-2 personnel abroad. This information was used to alert U.S. agencies in Canada, Uruguay, Brasil, Mexico and Chile. On 23 June, Roig appeared at a CRC sponsored press conference in Miami, which was attended by more than 40 press, radio, and TV representatives. VOA is giving full coverage to press conferences of Reig.

<u>Propaganda Effort</u>. The VOA and USIA press service continued coverage on the Cardenas incident involving government police suppression of food shortage demonstrators. The deteriorating economic situation, mismanagement, and the disadvantageous trade pattern with the Soviets have been publicised. Additional stories have been played on food, housing and transport shortages, and the Myth of the land **distribution program**.

**Sette of Selly** Propaganda Theme. CIA stations in 14 countries were provided with propaganda guidance designed to exploit the theme of **Castre's betrayal** of the revolution, particularly in connection with the 26th of July Anniversary. The station chiefs were to coordinate actions with local State

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rr − b	y N. Menan,	National Security Council

Post-Castro Political Program. State has developed guidelines for Cuba after the Castro-Communist regime falls. Copies of this document will be made available for information and use in Mongoose

Evidence of Cuban Subversion. State reports that during his visit, President-elect Vallencia of Colombia was urged to present evidence of Cuban subversive activity to the OAS Consultative Committee on Security in order to facilitate collective action.

<u>Contingency Planning</u>. The Department of Defense Representative reports that the preparation of an Inter-Agency Contingency Plan is well underway.

Labor Pamphlet. The USIA's Press Reproduction Center in Mexico has published a pamphlet on Cuban labor, "Cuban Unions Come Full Circle," for distribution and reproduction throughout Latin America.

DOD Operations Representative. Effective 1 July, Brig. Gen. B. T. Harris, USA will replace Brig. Gen. William H. Craig as DOD Operations Representative.

<u>Chief of Operations</u>. General Lansdale is now in the Miami area on a brief survey trip in connection with future priorities schedules. He will report to members of the Special Group (Augmented) upon his return.

"Eyes Only" copies to:

- 1. General Taylor
- 2. Mr. Johnson -----
- 3. Mr. Gilpatric

planning.

4. Mr. McCone

- 5. Mr. Kennedy
- 6. General Lemnitzer
- 7. Chief of Operations

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

5 July 1962

### MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)

From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale

Subject: Progress, Operation Mongoose

President in Mexico. State reported that President Kennedy's visit to Mexico greatly enhanced U.S. good-will in Mexico, was marked by the absence of pro-Castro propaganda, and fulfilled U.S. plans to impress upon Castro that Mexico, upon whem the Castroregime counts as an ally, is solidly with the United States and the West. In discussions about Cuba, President Lopes Mateos expressed the Mexican view that Castro was in trouble and that his regime would fall of its own weight. President Kennedy expounded the U.S. view of the Cuban problem; State believes this should ease the way for future discussions about Cuba with the Mexicans.

Joint Communique. The joint communique issued by President Kennedy and President Lopes Mateos, included a topic of interest to Operation Mongeose: "Both presidents reaffirmed the dedication of their countries to the ideals of individual liberty and personal dignity which constitute the foundation of a civilization which they share in common. In consenance with their dedication to these ideals and acting always as sovereign and independent countries, which decids their own policies and their own courses of action, they propose to respect and maintain the principles of non-intervention -- whether this intervention may come from a continental or extra-continental state -- and ef self-determination of peoples."

The U.S. repetited that the Mexican press and political observers hallow this joint message as evidence of President Kennedy having "europeiered" to Mexico's policy of "hands off Cube." In response to my energy the Department of State said: "There were no developments resulting from the President's trip to Mexico, including the text of the joint United States-Mexico Communique, which alter the basic guidelin... governing the Cube project."

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Partially Declassified/Released on 1-5-89(F88-758 under provisions of E.O. 12356 Operations. My visit to the Miami area included discussions with the operations staff of the CIA station, which carries the brunt of current work on Operation Mongoose. I was pleased to note that CIA has built a team which has a number of people experienced in operations into Communist-controlled areas (Europe and Asia), whose know-how strengthens the operations of people with Latin American experience. They have some problems, most of which are being resolved on the operating level. Some problems involve policy matters, which are being staffed for presentation to you.

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Overall, this is a splendid effort by CIA within present guidelines. On intelligence-collection, the magnitude of the special emphasis given the operation is indicated by the presence of 45 agents now in the Habana area alone (a rather remarkable accomplishment in a Communist capital where there is no official U.S. presence). In addition, there are agents and teams in the provinces; efforts are being made to complete the provincial coverage at an early date, since there are some areas insufficiently covered now.

"Voice of Cuba." The separate CIA weekly report noted the successful initial broadcasts "the U.S. publication of the fact that such broadcasts were heard in the U.S., and the replay of this news back into Cuba for the general public. It is noted that UPI carried this news item, but spiced it up with added stories of Castro's use of militia against guerrillas in Matanzas. The two stories put together by UPI have no relationship in reality, and the "Voice of Cuba" broadcasts are being closely directed to fit in with other operations and to keep within Mongoose guidelines.

<u>Diplomatic.</u> State reports that diplomatic efforts are being made to block Cuba's application for accreditation to the European Economic Community. Similarly, efforts are being made to exclude Cuba from the proposed Latin American Free Trade area.

<u>Contingency Planning</u>. Rumors in mid-June of a Cuban uprising led to my tasking Defense for further contingency planning, including an inter-departmental plan. Defense reports this planning is progressing well. As an interim report,

You will be informed, when this planning is

completed.

Defense Intelligence. Defense is reviewing actively its responsibilities for intelligence collection in Cuba, with a view of strengthening the effort considerably.

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<u>Voice of America</u>. USIA reported that VOA concentrated mostly on the President's trip to Mexico. Other telling news items were a Costa Rican labor union condemnation of the Castro tyranny, interviews with Cubans who had escaped from a concentration camp and who gave minute details of the terrible conditions, a quote from Castro's own press about chaotic administration (367 days to answer a letter from a Cuban asking permission to acquire industrial equipment), the story of Cuban students disappointed with Russian agricultural schools (VOA pointed out that Russia, with its own agricultural failures, was not in a position to teach others), and an interview with a person from Cardenas where the recent hunger demonstration led to a big Castro military show of force.

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"Eyes Only" copies to:

- 1. General Taylor
- 2. Mr. Johnson -
- 3. Mr. Gilpatric
- 4. Mr. McCune

- 5. Mr. Kennedy
- 6. General Lemnitzer
- 7. Chief of Operations

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### UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY

#### WASHINGTON

July 20, 1962

#### MEMORANDUM FOR:

Brig. General Edward G. Lansdale Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) The Pentagon

The following information is supplied for inclusion in your report on Phase I, Operation Mongoo'se.

1. Our objectives during this period were: (1) to utilize all media

by demonstrating its failure to satisfy the aspirations of the people, by its totalitarian nature and by its subservience to Sino/Soviet policy dictates, and (2) to utilize short wave radio directed at Cuba in order to maintain overt communications with the Cuban people and to assist in undermining their support for and confidence in their Castro/Communist rulers.

Specific tasks assigned to USIA within the general framework of the two principal objectives included those of exploiting Castro defectors and children refugees, examining and reporting on medium wave broadcast

2. Accomplishments during Phase I.

During this phase reporting from our field posts and limited public opinion surveys indicate a continuing decline of Castro's public prestige among the general public in Latin America. However, this does not mean that we feel there is any general repudiation of Castro and, much less, that there is any strong upsurge in public support for the need for action against Castro. The present general attitude might best be described as "negatively apathetic." (A subsequent memorandum from USIA indicates that these surveys are based on broad samplings in seven Latin American countries. The usual scientific sampling technique was applied, as in the Dominican Republic where 814 persons were contacted.)

## TOPISECRET

Partially Declassified/Released on (FPR-758) under provisions of E.O. 12356 by N. Menan, National Security Council We assigned a full-time representative to Opa Locka. His duties have been to identify and develop the most exploitable material from the refugees who go through that center. He has also made a continuing appraisal of VOA programing and reception.

The principal themes upon which we concentrated during this phase were:

A. Economic. Our heaviest continuing output has concentrated on the deteriorating economic situation and the consequent failure of the Castro regime to satisfy the needs of the Cuban people. Media content has relied heavily on our Miami office which has supplied a constant flow of interviews with arriving refugees. Particular emphasis has been placed on the bungling management by the Cuban Communists. Parallels with agricultural failures in the Soviet Union and famine conditions in Red China have also been utilized in order to pin Cuban failures on the Communist system. The power struggle between Castro and the old line Communists has also been treated, not as an ideological struggle, but rather as another cause of economic chaos and inefficiency in running the government.

B. <u>Refugees</u>. The refugee situation received heavy play by our Press Service and the Voice of America. Several interviews per week were used, stressing chaotic economic conditions, rising unemployment and food shortages. Special attention was given to the fact that the refugee groups now include growing numbers of negroes and persons from the lower income groups -people on whom Castro had depended for his initial support.

C. <u>Labor</u>. We have stressed in our general media output the repression of the labor movement under the Castro regime with specific emphasis on lower pay, longer hours and growing unemployment in Cuba. On this theme we have been particularly successful in Venezuela where the Confederation of Venezuelan Workers (COV) is distributing our materials on the Cuban situation.

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D. Students & Intellectuals. This has been the most difficult target group to work on. Paradoxically, this group appears to be the least susceptible to logical and reasoned appeal. The Castro problem is so highly charged emotionally that no broad avenue of approach has yet been found. The themes which have been helpful in building a negative attitude in the general public -revulsion at mass executions, immediate, concrete economic hardships, attacks on the Church and the social structure, regimentation of labor and other infringements of individual liberties -- have not proved particularly effective with this group. Castro's Messianic appeal to this group elicits an emotional response which so far has proven most difficult to overcome. Nevertheless, we are working very hard on developing materials capitalizing on his takeover of the university and attacks on individual liberties.

E. <u>Media</u>- products developed in support of the Operation (in addition to the usual daily and weekly output in our normal operations) have included:

- (1) Books. (Spanish)
  - (a) Lequerica Velez 600 dias con Fidel (1,000 copies)

An account of the Castro regime as seen by the author during his two years as Colombian Ambassador in Havana.

(b) Baeza Flores - Las Cadinas vienen de lejos (20,000 copies)

An account of the inner workings of the Castro regime and its takeover by the Communists by a . Chilean journalist who worked closely with Castro in the early days of the Revolution and who later escaped to Mexico.

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<sup>(</sup>c) Gilbert - El Infidel Castro (Castro l'Infidele) (6,000 copies)

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A French newsman's very unfavorable commentary on Castro's Cuba as he saw it in a 1961 visit.

(d) James - <u>Cuba</u>, <u>lst Soviet Satellite in America</u> (6,000 copies) - (A Portuguese edition is now under way)

(2) In English we also distributed widely in Latin America both the James book (d above) and Theodore Draper's <u>Castro's Revolution</u>.

<u>Cartoon Books</u>. During the period we have had in production and/or distribution throughout Latin America a total of 5 million copies of the following six cartoon books:

La Estafa -	(Castro's takeover of the universities)
La Punalada -	(Castro's attack on the Church)
Los Secuestrado	res - (Brainwashing of children)
La Mordaza -	(Takeover of the press and radio)
El Despertar -	(Betrayal of the land reform)
La Traicion -	(Takeover of the labor movement)

Films. The Agency produced one film on Cuba during this period:

La Tierra Prometida (10 minute animated on economic failure in Cuba) - Shown in commercial theatres throughout Latin America, also by mobile film units.


Two more similar films are now in production. Exact titles are not yet available but they will cover Castro mistreatment of organized labor and children.

We also supplied newsreel clips on Cuban refugees. Ecuador's break with Cuba, the COSAC Meeting, and the Punta del Este MFM.

#### Radio.

(a) Broadcasts to Cuba:

Opa Locka reports indicate listenership to be high at least among this group. Short wave is, of course, always somewhat limited as we indicated in our detailed memoranda on this subject. Nevertheless, it does give us a direct channel to certain sectors of Cuban society.



Of 1370 refugees interviewed at Opa Locka in the past two months, 625 said they listened to the Voice of America and were able to identify at least one program on the Voice.

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Three of the daily nine hours of Spanish broadcast by the VOA are aimed directly at Cuba. Fourteen different programs make up this package. These include news, commentary, dramatic, sports, Cuban news, agricultural, and historical features, all carrying some freight for our objectives.

(b) Broadcasts to Latin America. For radio coverage of the rest of Latin America, we depend to some extent on local retransmission of VOA shortwave feeds and, principally, on local transmission of VOA taped shows, and shows produced by our field posts. Our placement record is good and we have access to the large majority of radio listeners in the area by these means. News and commentary shows together with serialized anti-Castro and anti-Communist dramatizations are our best outlet in this medium.

Listenership surveys show our scap opera, La Garra Escondida (The Hidden Claw) to have a very high rating throughout the area. Pitched to the urban working class audience, the program is built around family life in a surburban area and the villain of all episodes is the Communist Party or Fidelista front groups.


TV. We have acquired the rights for the Armstrong Circle Theatre show - Anatomy of a Broken Promise - which is now in Spanish and Portuguese production and should be on the air throughout the area in from 30 to 60 days.

We have also acquired the rights to a half-hour West German newsreel on Cuba which is now being put into Spanish and will be circulating in a very short turne.

Cuban material has also been included regularly on our fifteen minute show - Panorama Panamericano - shown weekly to 15 million people throughout the area.

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#### 3. Potential for psychological operations.

In all psychological planning special attention should be given to avoiding, insofar as is practical, any indications which might be construed as plans to return to the status quo ante. All information output should be pointed toward reassuring the populace that the anti-Castro movement is designed to carry forward programs supporting the social and economic aspirations of the Cuban people.

Particular attention should be given to the tactical utilization of medium wave radio prior to and during any operations. Short wave radio broadcasting would also be stepped up in support of operations. Propaganda leaflets should also receive a high priority.

Immediate food distribution and medical attention programs should also be given priority because of their psychological value in enlisting local populous support for the liberating forces.

5. We do not consider items a and d feasible at this time and therefore limit our presentation to b and c.

Factors worth consideration in deciding on a future course: -

b. Exert all possible diplomatic, economic, psychological, and other pressures to overthrow the Castro-Communist regime without overt U.S. military commitment.



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I. Positive factors supporting this course of action ...

i. This would be a Cuban operation directed for and by Cubans, thus making for possibly wider acceptance from the bulk of the Cuban people.

ii. There would be minimum static at the UN and OAS on "intervention" charges.

iii. There would be a minimum propaganda base for exploitation of ever-present anti-Yankee sentiment in the rest of Latin America.

iv. This operation would have a psychological advantage in forcing the various Cuban anti-Castro factions to come to a working agreement with each other rather than separate arrangements with CIA. This should provide a better psychological base for long-range political development in a free Cuba.

v. This option would provide the new GDC with a better psychological base for developing policies more responsive to the demands and aspirations of the Cuban people. (i.e., operations with overt GUS support would probably result in strong pressures from U.S. business firms and Bastistianos for significant action pointing towards a return to the status quo ante.

Negative factors include:

i. Failure of this operation due to U.S. nonintervention would have disastrous effects on the morale of all opposition groups in and out of Cuba.

ii. Failure would also have very negative effects on U.S. prestige and stature in the hemisphere and probably damage our position of power ... regional and other international organizations.

iii. Less chance of strong moral and material support from U.S. business interests, vital to rebuilding process.



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iv. Less chance of effective U. S. guidance of information media during and immediately after landings.

v. Much more difficult to control information media support in time and space after landings.

c. Commit U. S. to help Cubans overthrow the Castro-Communist regime, with a step-by-step phasing to ensure success, including the use of U. S. military force if required at the end.

1. Positive factors.

i. With a better chance of a short struggle and a cleancut victory, psychological operations would be more easily handled and controlled.

ii. The U. S. power position and prestige in Latin America and probably the rest of the world would be greatly enhanced.

iii. U. S. guidance and direction of media content during and immediately after the operations would be facilitated.

iv. These operations would serve as a strong warning to leftist, non-communist parties in Latin America that the U.S. will not tolerate alliances with Communists. This could be effective in Bolivia, Chile and Colombia.

2. Negative factors.

i. Much more difficult to justify to world opinion in terms of traditional U.S. policy of nonintervention and respect for the rule of law.

ii. There would be a much higher noise level on intervention at the UN and OAS.

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iii. It would provide the Sino-Soviets a good propaganda base for possible operations in Berlin, Laos, Quemoy, etc.

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iv. It would provide a strong propaganda base for indigenous Communist group actions against pro-U.S., anti-Castro governments in neighboring countries (Colombia, Venezuela, Guatemala, Ecuador).

v. Greater difficulty in evolving a post-overthrow political ideology suitable to all elements involved. (i. e. U. S. leadership during the operation will be strongest factor holding diverse groups together and will thus probably have to combine after overthrow.

vi. Possibility of remaining guerrilla-type operations acting on the propaganda base of anti-foreign invaders.

(signed)

Donald M. Wilson Deputy Director

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

20 July 1962

SENSITIVE MEMORANDUM FOR U. ALEXIS JOHNSON

From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale

A Department of State presentation to the Special Group yesterday included a misstatement of my views in the preparation of a State telegram to U.S. Embassies in Latin America, based on reports of plans by Cuban patriots to attack Castro by bombing key installations in Havana from a third country.

Since this was given to the Special Group members without any opportunity for me to know about or correct the statement, I am noting the truth in this memorandum and am sending copies to other members of the Group in the interest of accuracy. I trust this will straighten the record, so we can proceed in working together for the President's goal without misunderstanding.

The first time that I saw either the draft State telegram or the internal State memorandum of my remarks was yesterday evening, after these two papers had been given to the Special Group. I did not make the statements attributed to me.

At noon last Saturday, 14 July, your representative Robert Hurwitch telephoned Lt-Col James Patchell of my staff. Mr. Hurwitch said that State had drafted a message and that Ed Martin wished it "passed by" me, although the action was being handled by others than Hurwitch. Mr. Hurwitch then "double talked" a version over the telephone.

Lt-Col Patchell informed me of this, obtained my comment, and then reported my comment promptly to Mr. Hurwitch. I did not agree with the proposed message, as related in "double talk" for the following reasons:

Previously Declassified/Raissond on 12-28-88 (F85-434) under provisions of L.O. 1\_0\_3 (F85-434) by N. Menan, Mational Scruthy Council

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a. The intelligence estimate seemed premature at that time.

b. It was "digging pretty deep" to use "increased Soviet aid to Raul Castro" as an argument by U.S. officials with foreign governments.

c. It seemed heavy-handed for the United States to "direct" Latin American countries to take the actions proposed in the message as given to me.

d. We want to guide and direct the actions of exile groups, but not "cut them off at the ankles" as proposed in the message. We can't have our cake and eat it, and our premise for winning the project goal rests heavily upon genuine and effective Cuban refugee activity.

Additionally, Lt-Col Patchell informed Mr. Hurwitch that I would like to have an exact copy of the message, if State was sending it out and wanted my reaction. Later, on 16, 17, 18, and 19 July, Mr. Hurwitch was asked for a copy of the proposed message, but each time he replied that he did not have a copy and did not know its status, except that it had not been sent.

The first firm, detailed information I had on this wildcat Cuban operation was given to me by CIA around noon yesterday. I made certain that the State and Defense representatives were promptly alerted, including calling their attention particularly to one detailed CIA report which had just been issued. Also, I was told that Mr. McCone intended to bring this to the attention of the Special Group that same afternoon.

I regret that time has had to be taken on this matter, which could have been straightened out in a few moments if your staff had cut me in properly.

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#### Copies to:

- 1. General Taylor
- Z. Mr. Gilpatric
- 3. Mr. McCone
- 4. Mr. Kennedy SENSITIVE
- 5. General Lemnitzer

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## OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

23 July 1962

### MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF OPERATIONS, OPERATION MONGOOSE

Subject: End of Phase I

In response to the questions posed in your memorandum of II July 1962, subject: End of Phase I. I have prepared 5 paragraphs each of which is directly responsive to your questions:

#### 1. Statement of What DOD Hoped to Accomplish During Phase I.

a. DOD hoped to provide all required support to CIA, State and USIA necessary to the accomplishment of the objectives of Operation Mongoose during Phase I.

b. DOD hoped to accomplish all the planning and essential preliminary actions necessary to establishing a decisive capability for US Military intervention in Cuba.

#### Accomplishments in Phase I.

a. Establishment of a DOD Working Group. A Brigadier General was appointed to full time duty as the DOD/JCS Representative to handle Mongoose affairs. Each of the Services, JCS Directorates and DIA appointed full time representation to serve on the Working Group. Each of these representatives has direct access to his Chief or, in the case of the Services, the Operation Deputies as well. Office space cleared for Top Secret information was established in the Joint Staff area, and secretarial help was assigned.

b. Establishment and Operation of an Interrogation Center at Opa Locka, Florida, on 15 February 1962. DOD assisted CIA in the initial planning for and the establishment of the Interrogation Center. Since the inception of the Center, the DOD has provided personnel support to the Center by furnishing 26 personnel (15 officers and 11 enlisted men) out of a total of 37 personnel manning the Center.

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c. PT Boats. DOD reconditioned a PT boat for possible use by CIA. In addition, DOD obtained certain data on characteristics and costs of PT boats manufactured by other countries.

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d. Voice Radio Broadcasts available to CIA for the conduct of voice radio broadcasts near Cuba by the CIA.

e. Overflights of Cuba. DOD has conducted several reconnaissance and photographic missions over Cuba for the CIA.

f. Utilization of AVON-PARK, Florida, by CIA as a Base for the Training of Cuban Refugees. DOD investigated the feasibility of using certain facilities at AVON-PARK for the training of Cuban refugees in guerrilla warfare.

h. Detail of an Officer to CIA. DOD detailed an officer to duty with CIA

i. Contingency Plan for Overt US Military Intervention in Cuba. In order to insure a decisive US military capability for overt military intervention in Cuba, CINCLANT's regular contingency plan for Cuba has been updated. Attempts are being made to reduce the reaction time required for implementation of this plan, without piecemeal commitment of US forces.

j. Alternate Contingency Plan for Overt US Military Intervention in Cuba. CINCLANT developed an alternate plan which accomplished a reduction in reaction time but requires piecemeal commitment of forces. In order to reduce the risk inherent in such an operation CINCLANT is seeking means for reduction of the reaction time without piecemeal commitment.

k. Cover and Deception Plan. This plan has been developed for the purpose of



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1. Air Strikes Against Cuba. A plan has been developed for the use of airpower only following a national policy decision, to suppress and/or neutralize Cuban forces pending the execution of an assault or to be executed in support of an internal revolt.

m. Air and Sea Blockade of Cuba. A plan has been developed for the complete air and sea blockade of Cuba within hours after decision.

n. Civil Affairs and Military Government. An outline plan providing guidance for the conduct of civil affairs and for a provisional military government for Cuba has been prepared.

o. DOD's Position as to its Stake and Proposed Role in the Removal of the Communist Regime from Cuba. This paper included a statement of conditions under which Deferse believes that overt military intervention in Cuba could be accomplished without leading to general war and without serious offense to public opinion.


q. Air Re-supply. Four aircraft and crews have been readied for air re-supply missions over Cuba.

r. Risk Estimate. An estimate was prepared concerning the risk involved in air re-supply missions over Cuba.

t. Military Intelligence. A detailed list of Essential Elements of Information was prepared in February 1962 covering the requirements of the Caribbean Survey Group and CINCLANT and was levied on the Intelligence Community for fulfillment. Reconnaissance activities consisting of overhead reconnaissance, air patrols, and special operations were implemented. Specific intelligence requirements to be used in the interrogation of knowledgeable refugees covering items of military, political



and economic interest were provided to the Caribbean Admission Center, Opa Locka, Florida. All information obtained from these sources was processed through the Intelligence Community's channels. The flow of information concerning Cuba has been greatly improved as a result of these efforts. However, gaps still exist, particularly in details of military order of battle. Increased efforts are being made to fill these gaps.



3. Operational Estimate of the Potential for Intelligence Collection.


a. Reconnaissance - a summary of the Cuban reconnaissance operation is given below:

Vehicle	Code Word	Frequency
WV-2Q	Melrose	13
A3D-2P/2Q	Fitbolt	4
USS Moale	Operation	19 Mar - 12 Apr 62
RB 47		1 May 62
Submarine/UDU		5 - 6 May 62
Continuing		
F3D-2Q	Call Money	6 - 11 per month
AD-5Q	Sleepwalker	2 per month
C -130	Quick Fox	10 per month
A3D-2P		6 - 8 per month
Navy DD		daily
Navy P-2V		twice daily .
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In addition to these, there are two special operations per month. The results of all this reconnaissance are satisfactory as far as producing air and navy order of battle information. However, against ground order of battle, they are not able to contribute too much.

b. Refugee Interrogation - Although the quantity of refugees processed at Opa Locka has not diminished, the quality of the information that they have available is not as good as in the past. Particularly in the area of military intelligence, very few refugees can make major contributions. Occasionally, they do fill some gaps in military intelligence and they make considerable contribution in other areas. Therefore, this effort should be continued.



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d. Clandestine - The Intelligence Community has put considerable effort into improving their clandestine collection capabilities against the target island. However, these operations suffer from the lack of a definite target date and objective. With an open-end operation, such as Project Mongoose, specific military order of battle information is largely perishable especially when the Armed Forces are in a constant state of reorganization, regroupment and redeployment. About 25 per cent of all reports on Cuba received from clandestine sources prove to be of definite value.


Collection of information through third-country sources varies widely as to quality. The number and competence of observers and the specific collection requirement levied on the third-country source determine the value of the information obtained. Some very valuable information on specific items have resulted from this effort and this source should continue to be exploited.



•. Summary - Our knowledge of Cuban military order of battle, especially ground order of battle, has dropped off considerably in recent weeks. Changes in unit organization and in the numbering system as well as the militia nature of the organization itself make OB material perishable. Until such time as a definite target date and objective is set making it possible to inject a sufficient quantity of trained observers into the area with specific targets, this situation will probably continue.

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4. Estimate of the Potential for Military Operations within Cuba -Should a policy decision be made to militarily intervene in Cuba, the U.S. could:



5. Factors Worth Considering in Deciding on One of the Following Four Courses of Action for the United States to Follow in Relation to Cuba:

a. Cancel operational plans; treat Cuba as a Bloc nation; protect Hemisphere from it. 7



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#### Advantages

 (1) This would be temporarily economical in terms of funds, equipment and allocation of forces.

(2) It would demonstrate the US devotion to the principle of non-intervention.

#### Disadvantages

(1) This would be an acceptance of a Communist bridgehead in the Western Hemisphere and an admission that there was nothing that the United States could or would do about it.

(2) This would be damaging to the prestige of the United States and would weaken the will to resist or fight against communism in Cuba, Latin America and elsewhere.

(3) It would increase the probability of the establishment of Soviet military base(s) in Cuba which could ultimately prove to be an unacceptable threat to the security of the United States.

(4) It would become increasingly difficult to protect the United States or the Western Hemisphere as Cuban military force capabilities increase.

(5) It would prevent the United States from assuming a posture which would permit exploitation of any "breaks" that may develop within Cuba.

(6) It would permit the Castro Communist regime to consolidate its gains and become even more firmly entrenched.

(7) It might encourage the Communist regime to become even more bold in exporting communism to Latin America.

(8) It would permit the Castro regime to prepare at its own pace the exportation of their revolution to other Latin American countries.

(9) It could eventually cost billions of dollars as US defense forces would have to be developed or shifted to meet the increasing threat from the South.

(10) It would virtually assure the permanent existence of a Communist base for subversion and espionage throughout the Western Hemisphere.

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b. Exert all possible diplomatic, economic, psychological and other pressures to overthrow the Castro Communist regime without overt US military commitment.

#### Advantages

(1) Would demonstrate US devotion to the principle of non-intervention.

(2) Would be in accord with the UN charter and stated US policy regarding the non-use of military force in settling disputes.

(3) Depending upon the success of the pressures, in the short term, it would conserve US military forces and resources.

#### Disadvantages

(1) Except in matter of degree, this has essentially been the US policy since the severance of relations on 3 January 1962, and it has not been successful.

(2) This would give the Soviets time to develop Cuba as a base for operations throughout the Western Hemisphere.

(3) It would give the Communists further time to develop military bases which could cost the United States billions of dollars in developing appropriate defenses.

(4) This would require that US military resources and forces be tied up indefinitely to protect the Hemisphere against the continuing Communist threat.

(5) This would permit the continued indoctrination of Cuban Youth and the peogressive strengthening of the internal police state and military forces. These would combine to make the threat to internal revolt more remote and the price of US intervention more costly.



c. Commit the United States to help the Cubans to overthrow the Castro Communist regime, with a step-by-step phasing to ensure success, including the use of US military force if required.

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#### Advantages

(1) Would permit the United States to control the timing of operations against Cuba and permit a progressive build-up which could be modified or terminated as circumstances require.

(2) It would eventually show that we are willing to back anticommunist efforts and it would reaffirm the Monroe Doctrine.

(3) US action against Cuba would be more acceptable to world opinion as it would cast the United States in the role of aiding Cuban freedom fighters.

(4) Widespread revolution would simplify some of the problems of military intervention.

(5) Revolution could produce leaders from within Cuba who could constitute the new Cuban government.

(6) It would furnish new hope and incentive to anti-communist elements inside and outside of Cuba.

(7) It would be economical in terms of military resources and forces by obtaining maximum support from the Gubans.

(8) It would assure the eventual ousting of the Castro Communist regime.

#### Disadvantages

(I) The time involved in this course permits additional Cubans to be indoctrinated thereby creating more problems during the invasion and after.

(2) Contains the danger of "telegraphing the punch" and thereby putting Castro and the Soviets on notice, which could result in counter-action and possible escalation if the Sino Soviet Bloc provides open assistance. Furthermore, the longer US intervention is delayed, the higher the cost will be in American lives. (3) This course would further antagonize die-hard non-intervention elements within Latin America.

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(4) This would require the United States to establish, control, support and manipulate front organizations, develop Cuban leadership and run covert training and operations which carry the risk of extreme national embarrassment.

d. Use a provocation and overthrow the Castro Communist regime by US military forces.

#### Advantages

 Would permit the United States to take action against Gubs at a time and place of our own choosing.

(2) Chances of premature disclosure and compromise, . compared with other courses of action, would be reduced.

(3) It would demonstrate to anti-communists throughout the world the US determination to oppose communism.

(4) It would reaffirm our adherence to the principles of the Monroe Doctrine.

(5) It would stop further communist indoctrination of Cubans.

(6) It would eliminate the possibility of Soviet bases being established in Guba.

(7) It would eliminate the utilization of Cuba as a base of subversion throughout the Western Hemisphere.

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(8) It would eliminate the possible requirement for a major outlay of funds in preparing to meet an increasing threat from Guba.

#### Disadvantages

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(2) It could inspire Soviet counter-action in other areas.

(3) This course of action is contrary to the UN charter and the non-intervention doctrine enunciated at the Bogota Conference.

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### (signed)

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BENJAMIN T. HARRIS Brig General, USA DOD/JCS Representative Caribbean Survey Group

# TUICLASSIFIED MONGOOSE

## OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

### WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

#### SENSITIVE

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25 July 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)

From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale

Subject: Review of Operation Mongoose

This is the Operations report at the end of Phase I. It has been compiled to assist you in reviewing Operation Mongoose thus far and in determining the best course of U.S. action for the future.

This Operations report contains the contribution of each major participant, on objectives, on the planning and operational activity to win these objectives, and on future possibilities to be coverned by the policy framework. A National Intelligence Estimate (NIE 85-2-62) is being submitted separately for consideration in connection with this report.

As Chief of Operations, I am indicating in this covering memorandum what I consider to be the most significant aspects of our policy and program picture. The full report of each major participant is appended, to ensure that you have access to the exact reporting as submitted.

#### OBJECTIVES

As desired by higher authority on 30 November 1961, the U.S. undertook a special effort "in order to help Cuba overthrow the Communist regime." After a review of operational planning and programming concepts, the Special Group (Augmented) provided guidelines on 14 March 1962 for Phase I, Operation Mongoose (roughly until the end of July 1962). The main objectives were seen as:

a. The acquisition of hard intelligence on the target area.

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b. Undertaking all other political, economic, and covert actions, short of inspiring a revolt in Cuba or developing the need for U.S. armed intervention.

c. Be consistent with U.S. overt policy, and remain in position to disengage with minimum loss in assets and U.S. prestige.

d. Continue JCS planning and essential preliminary actions for a decisive U.S. capability for intervention.

#### ACCOMPLISHMENT

Elements of the U.S. government were organized to reach the goals set for Phase I. My assessment of where we are on each objective is noted under appropriate sub-headings below. In general, this has been a remarkably quiet operation, well within the "noise" and "visibility" limits imposed.

Higher authority has been kept informed of progress through the Special Group (Augmented), by frequent reports. The Special Group has provided policy guidance, as required, in Phase I.

The Chief of Operations has coordinated the efforts of participating departments and agencies, through meetings of the Operational Representatives and by constant review of progress. The Operational Representative of each major U.S. participant in Operation Mongoose are William Harvey (CLA), Robert Hurwitch (State), Brig. Gen. Benjamin Harris (Defense), and Don Wilson (USLA).

My assessment of the organization, planning, and actions to reach the goals in Phase I:

Intelligence. CIA had the main assignment to acquire the "hard-intelligence" desired. The headquarters and field staff of CIA are now well organized for a major effort for this aspect of Operation Mongoose, being strengthened by a number of CIA officers experienced in "denied area" operations elsewhere in the world. Planning and actions rate superior, in a professional sense of intelligence collection.

CIA established the Caribbean Admission Center at Opa-Locka, Florida,

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where guerrilla resistance was expected to be spotted, recruited, and organized, was short of the hoped-for goal; this was due to the regime's security precautions and, to some degree, to policy lumitations on the risks to be assumed.

Defense contributed the majority of personnel to staff the Caribbean Admission Center, despite changes and improved sophistication of Cuban communication procedures, and brought into play the available assets of Service intelligence organizations, in coordination with CIA. State stepped up its information collection from diplomatic and refugee organization sources. Justice (FBI and INS) and USIA provided significant support to the Caribbean Admission Center.

Political. State appointed a representative to devote full-time to Operation Mongoose and to develop the required political actions. During Phase I, the Punta del Este conference was a major U.S. political action to isolate Castro and neutralize his influence in the Hemisphere, but was not developed within the context of Operation Mongoose. The successful visit of President Kennedy to Mexico was another major U.S. political action, with a potential impact upon our special goals, but was not developed within the context of Operation Mongoose. Two Operation Mongoose efforts in political action were attempted in Phase I: to counter Castro-Communist propaganda exploitation of May Day and to arouse strong Hemisphere reaction to Cuban military suppression of the hunger demonstration at Cardenas, in June. Ambassadors in Latin America were asked to undertake a special effort, as possible, with the help of their Country Teams; political action results in both instances were mostly negative, due to lack of capability and the local attitude in Latin American countries.

State is responsible for refugee political policy matters, assisted by CLA in daily liaison. This is an area of major interest to Operation Mongoose, since the Cuban refugees have an open objective of overthrowing the Communist regime in Havana and recapturing their homeland.

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They are given open U.S. assistance to remain in this country, yet are participating in covert actions in a limited way. Only a fractional opening has been made to release the frustrated energy of these refugees in freeing their homeland and in creating a favorable political climate in Latin America for the liberation of Cuba. Policy limitations of "audibility" and "visibility" apply directly in considering the handling and use of this dynamic refugee potential.

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As a working document for U.S. operational guidance, State developed a definition of a political program for a free Cuba, with the understanding that any real political program must be developed by the Cubans themselves.

<u>Psychological.</u> Psychological activities for Operation Mongoose make use of existing assignments of responsibilities within the U. S. government: State, having the policy role, chairs an inter-agency Cuba Psychological Operations Group which meets weekly: USIA disseminates any U.S. government information (VOA and Press Service)



Conditions and events in Cuba have provided many effective themes, which have been promptly and sharply exploited by available means in the Western Hemisphere. However, the U.S. still lacks the capability of effectively getting information to the majority of the Cuban people. Our short-wave broadcasts are highly regarded by the Cuban people, but shortwave receiver sets are limited inside Cuba. Our medium-wave broadcasts compete against stronger Cuban signals; it was felt that greater U.S. competition in medium-wave broadcasts could lead to Cuban interference of U.S. commercial broadcasts over a fairly wide area of the U.S. Clandestine broadcasts of appearing as broadcasts by Cuban guerrillas inside Cuba) have been initiated; they are in their infancy, and have a long way to develop before their messages are believed and get passed among Cubans by word-of-mouth. Dissemination of leaflets and propaganda inside Cuba has not received policy approval.


Economic. State has the main responsibility for developing economic actions. State has chaired an inter-agency working group, which generated



the U.S. trade embargo, denial of bunkering facilities, increased port security, and control procedures on transhipment, technical data, and customs inspection. Diplomatic means were used to frustrate Cuban trade negotiations in Israel, Jordan, Iran, Greece, and possibly Japan. Under Resolution VIII adopted at Punta del Este, the OAS has established a special committee to study "the feasibility and desirability of extending the suspension of trade with Cuba to other items (than arms)," State has prepared a program to be submitted to this OAS committee in the future.

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The evidence in that Cuba's economy is suffering. Trade with the Communist Bloc and others has kept it limping along, despite scarcity of U.S. goods, the bad drought limiting agrarian crops, increased worker non-cooperation and the regime's bungling of economic control measures. Critical spare parts still arrive in Cuba, including shipments from British and Canadian firms. Chartered shipping from Free World sources still plays a major role in Cuba's trade, and the U.S. has little hope of cutting this life-line to Castro.



CIA reports that 11 teams will have been infiltrated by the end of July and that 19 maritime operations have aborted. Of the teams in, the most successful is the one in Pinar del Rio in western Cuba; its success was helped greatly by a maritime re-supply of arms and equipment; the fact that it is a "going concern" and receives help from outside has attracted recruits. Its potential has been estimated at about 250, which is a sizeable guerrilla force. With equally large guerrilla forces in other Cuban provinces, guerrilla warfare could be activated with a good chance of success, if assisted properly. However, the teams in other provinces have not been so successful; our best hope is that we will have viable teams in all the potential resistance areas by early October. Bad weather, high seas, and increased security patrols will make the infiltration of teams and their re-supply from small boats a hard task.



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Sabotage has not taken place, on a U.S. -sponsored basis. Planning for such action by CIA has been thorough, including detailed study of the structures and vulnerabilities of key targets.

type raids would take maritime means which now have priority use in support of CIA teams being infiltrated inside to survey and create a guerrilla potential. CIA has reported that there is now some capability inside Cuba for sabotage action, that target selection has been under further careful review, and that a proposal is forthcoming to be submitted for policy approval.

Intervention Planning. The JCS were given the responsibility for planning and undertaking essential preliminary actions for a decisive U.S. capability for intervention in Cuba. This "Guidelines" objective has been met, fully. Also, U.S. military readiness for intervention in Cuba has been under continuing review within Defense, being improved wherever feasible. In addition, rumors during June of a possible uprising inside Cuba led to further planning for a contingency where a non-U.S. inspired revolt might start inside Cuba; inter-agency staffing of U.S. planning for such a Cuban contingency is being completed, under Defense leadership.

Assets. Whatever we decide to do in the future depends, to a large degree, on the assets available to us. Our own U.S. assets in organization, personnel, and equipment are sufficient to liberate Cuba, given the decision to do so. Assets among the Cubans, to liberate themselves, are capable of a greater effectiveness once a firm decision is made by the U.S. to provide maximum support of Cubans to liberate Cuba, and the Cubans start being helped towards that goal by the U.S. There are enough ablebodied and properly motivated Cubans inside Cuba and in exile to do the job. There is wide-spread disaffection in Cuba, with strong indications that economic distress and demoralization of population is causing real concern and strain for the regime's control officials. Firm U.S. intention to help free Cuba is the key factor in assessing the Cubans themselves as an operational asset for Operation Mongoose.

At the close of Phase I, my concern is strong that time is running out for the U.S. to make a free choice on Cuba, based largely on what is happening to the will of the Cuban people. Rightly or wrongly, the Cubans have looked and are looking to the U.S. for guidance on what to aspire to and do next. They wonder if we are not merely watching Cuba closely, as

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a matter of our own security, undertaking some economic proscription, and isolating the Castro/Communist gang from contaminating the Hemisphere. Along with recognition of our humanitarian sympathies, this seems to be the fear among Cuban refugees, although they are still hopeful.

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If Cubans become convinced that the U.S. is not going to do more than watch and talk. I believe they will make other plans for the future. The bulk of Cuban refugees in the U.S. are most likely to start getting serious about settling down for life in the U.S., dulling their desire to return home with personal risk involved. The bulk of disaffected people inside Cuba will lose hope and incentive for futile protests against the regime and start accepting their status as captives of the Communists. Some Cuban activists will not accept the loss of their homeland so easily and may seek release from frustration by liberation operations outside U.S. territory and control. The recent wildcat Cuban scheme to bomb Habana from Central America is an example.

Our probes of the guerrilla potential inside Cuba have been hampered by similar morale factors. Cubans sent to risk their lives on missions inside Cuba feel very much alone, except for their communications link back to the U.S. They are unable to recruit freedom fighters aggressively by the time-proven method of starting an active resistance and thus attracting recruits; U.S. guidelines to keep this short of a revolt have made the intention behind the operation suspect to local Cubans. The evidence of some intent is seen in the recent maritime re-supply of the team in Pinar del Rio. We brought in extra weapons, for which there were immediate recruits; if we were to exploit the evident guerrilla potential in this province, it appears likely that we would have to furnish supplie: by air and probably open the U.S. to strong charges of furnishing such support to Guban resistance elements.

Therefore, we have been unable to surface the Cuban resistance potential to a point where we can measure it realistically. The only way this can be done. accurately, is when resistance actually has a rallying point of freedom fighters who appear to the Cuban people to have some chance of winning, and that means at least an implication that the U.S. is in support. Word-of-mouth information that such a freedom movement is afoot could cause the majority of the Cuban people to choose sides. It would be the first real opportunity for them to do so since Castro a-1 the Communists came to power. There was little opportunity for the Cuban people to join an active resistance in April 1961; there is less opportunity today. If the Cuban people are to feel they have a real opportunity, they must have something which they can join with some belief in its 'success.



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#### PROJECTION (PHASE II).

As a help towards the making of a U.S. decision on a future course of action, the Operational Representatives developed working statements of four possibilities; at my request they have commented on the positive and negative factors worth considering for each possible course, and it is suggested that these thoughtful statements are worth reading in full. The working statements of the choices open to the U.S. are as follows:

a. Cancel operational plans; treat Cuba as a Bloc nation; protect Hemisphere from it, or

b. Exert all possible diplomatic, economic, psychological, and other pressures to overthrow the Castro-Communist regime without overt employment of U.S. military, or

c. Commit U.S. to help Cubans overthrow the Castro-Communist regime. with a step-by-step phasing to ensure success, including the use of U.S. military force if required at the end, or

d. Use a provocation and overthrow the Castro-Communist regime by U.S. military force.

#### RECOMMENDATION.

It is recommended that this review of Phase I be considered by the Special Group as providing the operational basis for guidelines and objectives for Phase II. It is a matter of urgency that these be arrived at by the Special Group, to permit developing specific plans and schedules for Phase II.

#### 4 Attachments

#### "Eyes Only" copies to:

Special Group (Augmented)

- 1. General Taylor
- 2. Mr. Alexis Johnson
- 3. Mr. Roswell Gilpatric

### Operational Representatives

7. Mr. William Harvey (CIA)

8. Mr. Robert Hurwitch (State)

- 4. Mr. John McCone
- 5. Mr. Robert Kennedy
- 6. General Lemnitzer
- 9. General Harris (Defense)
- 10. Mr. Don Wilson (USIA)
- 11. Chief of Operations



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SENSITIVE

Program Review by Brig. Gen. E. G. Lansdale, Chief of Operations

18 January 1962

#### THE CUBA PROJECT

#### I. OBJECTIVE

The U.S. objective is to help the Cubans overthrow the Communist regime from within Cuba and institute a new government with which the United States can live in peace.

#### II. CONCEPT OF OPERATION

Basically, the operation is to bring about the revolt of the Cuban people. The revolt will overthrow the Communist regime and institute a new government with which the United States can live in peace.

The revolt requires a strongly motivated political action movement established within Cuba, to generate the revolt, to give it direction towards the objective, and to capitalize on the climactic moment. The political actions will be assisted by economic warfare to induce failure of the Communist regime to supply Cuba's economic ngeds, psychological operations to turn the peoples' resentment increasingly against the regime, and military-type groups to give the popular movement an action arm for sabotage and armed resistance in support of political objectives.

The failure of the U.S. -sponsored operation in April 1961 so shook the faith of Cuban patriots in U.S. competence and intentions in supporting a revolt against Castro that a new effort to generate a revolt against the regime in Cuba must have active support from key Latin American countries. Further, the foreigness (Soviet Union and Bloc) of the tyranny imposed on the Cuban people must be made clear to the people of the Western Hemisphere to the point of their deep anger and open actions to defend the Western Hemisphere against such foreign invasion. Such an anger will be generated, in part, by appeals from the popular movement within Cuba to other Latin Americans especially.

The preparation phase must result in a political action organization in being in key localities inside Cuba, with its own means for internal communications, its own voice for psychological operations, and its own action arm (small guerrilla bands, sabotage squads, etc.). It must have the sympathetic support of the majority of the Cuban people, and make this fact known to the outside world. (It is reported that the majority of Cubans are not for the present regime, but are growing apathetic towards what appears to be a hopeless future or the futility of their status.)

The climactic moment of revolt will come from an angry reac \_n of the people to a government action (sparked by an incident), or from a fracturing of the leadership cadre within the regime, or both, (A major goal of the Project must be to bring this about.) The popular movement

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will capitalize on this climactic moment by initiating an open revolt. Areas will be taken and held. If necessary, the popular movement will appeal for help to the free nations of the Western Hemisphere. The United States, if possible in concert with other Western Hemisphere nations, will then give open support to the Cuban peoples' revolt. Such support will include military force, as necessary.

#### III. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

Our planning requires sound intelligence estimates of the situation re Cuba. The latest National Estimate (SNIE 85-61) of 28 November 1961 contains operational conclusions not based on hard fact, in addition to its intelligence conclusions; this is a repetition of an error in the planning for the unsuccessful operation of last April.

The planning indicated herein will be revised, as necessary, based on the hard intelligence estimate of the situation by the U.S. Intelligence community. A new National Intelligence Estimate (NIE 85-62 on Cuba), due on 23 January, apparently has been postponed until 7 February.

It is recognized that one result of the Project, so far, has been to start the collection of Intelligence on Cuba in depth, to provide facts on which to base firm estimates and operations.

> IV. INITIAL PHASE (30 Nov 61 - 18 Jan 62)


#### A. Establish a U.S. mechanism for the project.

Status: The President's directive of 30 November 1961 was implemented by creating a U.S. operations team, with Brig. Gen. Lansdale as Chief of Operations, and with tacks promptly assigned. His immediate staff are Mr. Hand and Major Patchell. Representatives of Secretaries and Agency Directors are:

State - Woodward (Goodwin, Hurwitch) CIA - Helms Defense - Brig. Gen. Craig USIA - Wilson

B. Intelligence Support

Status: CIA made a special survey of U.S. capabilities to interrogate Cuban refugees in the USA (1, 700 - 2,000 arriving per month) and on 16 January approved a program increasing the staff at the Opa Locka Interrogation Center in Florida from the present? member to 34. CIA will build up agent assets (positive intelligence assets inside Cuba are very limited and it has no counter-intelligence assets inside). Special intelligence assets will be exploited more fully. The Cuba project needs far more hard intelligence in depth than is presently available. CIA will require further assistance from Defense and other U.S. organizations in this intelligence effort, and is submitting specific qualifications for personnel on 19 January.





#### C. Political platform for peoples' movement inside Cuba.

Status: State has sketched in a broad outline. CLA is to produce the firm platform statement of aims for which the Cubans who will operate inside Cuba are willing to risk their lives, and upon which popular support can be generated.

#### D. . Nucleus for popular movement

Status: To date, CIA has been unable to produce the necessary political action agents for this purpose. Upon re-evaluation of its capabilities, CIA now hopes to complete spotting and assessing eight to ten Cuban political action agents by 15 February, from among Cubans available in the United States. The minimum need for the Project to be effective is 30 such political action Cubans and CIA is tasked to make a priority search for them among Cubans in the U.S. and Caribbean area.

#### E. Deployment of nucleus

Status: CIA is tasked to select 20 localities within Cuba where political action groups can be established. Initial selection and plans for establishing these action groups are now due 1 February. Havana, and localities in the provinces of Carnaguey and Las Villas will receive priority consideration, according to present intelligence. Planning on this must be adjusted as firmer intelligence is acquired.

#### F. Diplomatic actions

Status: State is concentrating on the OAS Meeting of Foreign Ministers, which opens 22 January, hoping to get wide Western Hemisphere support for OAS resolutions condemning Guba and isolating it from the rest of the Hemisphere. A companion resolution, to offer OAS relief directly to the suffering Guban people (similar to U.S. relief to Russia, 1919-20) is being considered, as a means to reach the Guban people sympathetically without going through their Communist government. The OAS meeting is to be supported by public demonstrations in Latin America,

The major task for our diplomatic capability is to encourage Latin American leaders to develop independent operations similar to this Project, seeking an internal revolt of the Cuban people against the Communist regime. This is yet to be initiated by State and must be vigorously pressed.

#### G. Economic warfare

Status: This critical key to our political action Project is still in the planning stage under Str\* leadership. State is basing future economic actions, including plans for an embargo on Cuban trade, on in outcome of the forthcoming OAS meeting. Meanwhile, State has chaired an Economic action group, which agreed on developing 13 actions. 15 February is set for a report on implementing plans, so that actions can be initiated.



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H. 'TV intrusion


#### I. Special sabotage support

Status: State has explored, with negative results, the feasibility of pre-emptive action with respect to

#### J. Military actions

Status: Defense has been tasked with preparing a contingency plan for U.S. military action, in case the Cuban people request U.S. help when their revolt starts making headway. This contingency plan will permit obtaining a policy decision on the major point of U.S. intentions, and is looked upon as a positive political-psychological factor in a people's revolt, even more than as a possible military action. Defense also has been tasked with fully assisting State and CIA, as commitments of Defense men, money, and materiel are required.

K\_ Major elements of the population



#### L. Outlook

Status: As reported to the Special Group last week, there has been a period of a realistic second look at CLA capabilities to mount the required clandestine operations against Cuba, and a subsequent start in "tooling up." After this second look, CIA has concluded that its realistic role should be to create at least the illusion of a popular movement, to will exterious support for it, to improve CIA operational capability, and to help create a climate which will permit provocative actions in support of a shift to overt action. This outlook, although arrived at thoughtfully within CIA, is far short of the Cuba project's goals. CLA must take yet another hard look at its potential capabilities, in the light of the following tasking, to determine if it cannot make the greater effort required.

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#### V. TARGET SCHEDULE

A. Intelligence

Task 1: NIE 85-62 on Cuba due 7 February (CIA).

Task 2: By 15 February, Opa Locka Interrogation Center to be made an effective operation for collection and processing of intelligence (CIA with support of Defense, State, I&NS, FBI).

Task 3: Intelligence collection from Cuban refugees elsewhere than Miami area. CIA to survey other refugee points and on a priority basis to ensure maximum coverage of all such source points. 15 February target date.

Task 4: CIA to continue its re-examination of intelligence assets, with priority on agents inside Cuba, and report on capability by 15 Feb-

FURTY. SLAPPER S Political в.

Task 6: CLA to complete plans by 1 February for Cover and Deception actions, to help fracture the Communist regime in Cuba. Defense, State and FBI are to collaborate on this.

Task 7: By 1 February, CIA to submit operations schedule for initiating popular movement within Cuba. This must include localities selected inside Cuba, assessment of selected Cubans, their infiltration, activity assignments, and political platform. One section must deal with the "underground," assess its true status and plans to use it.

Task 8: State to follow up the OAS meeting by having U.S. Embassies in Latin America exploit all opportunities to enlist local sympathy for the Cuban people and to increase hostility towards the Communist regime in Cuba. State to submit report on results of this assignment by 13 February, so further planning can be programmed.

Task 9: By 15 February, State to submit an inventory of operational assets in the Caribbean area, including capabilities of local governments or groups to mount operations on their own, to help achieve the Project's goals. Plans for early use of such capabilities are due by 19 February.

Task 10: CIA to submit operational schedule for using assets in the Caribbean area to achieve the Project's political action goals. The objective of working on dynamic elements of the Cuban population (such as workers, farmers) is underscored. Due 19 February.



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#### C., Economic

Task 11: State to prepare recommendations to the President on U.S. trade with Cuba, as follow-up to OAS meeting. (If the minimum result of the meeting is an agreement to condemn Cuba as an accomplice of the Sino-Soviet Bloc and adoption of a general statement that Cuba presents a threat to the peace and security of the Hemisphere, State is prepared to recommend to the President that remaining trade between the U.S. and Cuba be barred.)

Task 12: State to plan, with Commerce and other U.S. agencies, on how to halt the <u>diversion</u> of <u>vital</u> items in the Cuban trade. Due date 15 February. Cooperation of other OAS nations, particularly Canada and Mexico, is to be explored by State.

Task 13: State, with Commerce and others involved, to plan on how to make "positive list" items to Latin America be subject to the same licensing procedures as applied to such shipments to other parts of the free world. Due 15 February.

Task 14: State to obtain from Commerce proposal to amend present export controls of technical data (petrochemical, communications equipment) so that Cuba is treated the same as the Sino-Soviet Bloc. Due 15 February.

Task 15: State by 15 February to submit recommendations on issuance of transportation order (T-3) under authority of the Defense Production Act of 1950 forbidding U.S.-owned vessels to engage in trade with Cuba.

Task 16: State plan due by 15 February on feasible extension of U.S. port treatment now given to Bloc and Cuban vessels to charter vessels of Bloc and Cuba (Treasury to advise on this).

Task 17: State to report by 15 February on feasibility of harassing Bloc shipping by refusing entry into U.S. ports (statedly for security reasons), if vessels have called or will call at Cuban ports.

Task 18:

Task 19: State to report by 15 February on possibilities for obtaining the discreet cooperation of the National Foreign Trade Council to urge U.S. shippers to refuse to ship on vessels which call at Cuban ports. (Commerce to assist on this.)


Task 20: State to report by 15 February on possibilities to obtain the discrect cooperation of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers to influence U.S. firms having subsidaries abroad to adhere to the spirit of U.S. economic sanctions, (Commerce to assist on this.) TUGLASSIFIEDT

Tack 22: State to report by 15 February on status of plans to gain cooperation of NATO allies (bilaterally and in the NATO forum, as appropriate). Objective is to persuade these nations to take steps to isolate Cuba from the West.

Task 23: State to report by 15 February on status of actions undertaken with Japan, which has comparatively significant trade with Cuba, along lines similar to those with NATO nations.

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#### D. Psychological



Task 28: By 15 February CIA will report on plans and actions for propaganda support of the popular movement inside Cuba. Included will be exactly what is planned for use by the movement inside Cuba.

#### E. Military Action

Task 29: Defense to submit contingency plan for use of U.S. military force to support the Cuban popular movement, including a statement of conditions under which Defense believes such action would be required to win the Project's goal and believes such action would not necessarily lead to general war. Due 28 February.

Task 30: CLA to submit by 15 February its operational schedule for sabotage actions inside Cuba, including timing proposed for the actions and how they effect the generation and support of a popular movement, to achieve the Project goals.



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Task 31: CIA to submit specific requests to Defense for required support by Defense as early as possible after its plans firm up. Requests for all major needs are expected by 23 February.

Task 32: Defense will submit plan for "special operations" use of Cubans enlisted in the U.S. armed forces. Due 23 February.

#### VI. FUTURE PLANS

By 20 February, it is expected that sufficient realistic plans for individual tasks will have been received, and initial actions started, to permit a firm time-table to be constructed. Since the President directed that the Chief of Operations conduct the Project through the appropriate organizations and Departments of the Government, and since these U.S. organizations are mainly in the initial inventory and development of capabilities phase concerning assigned tasks, a precise operations time = ' table as of today would be too speculative to be useful.



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-		Copy No.		
		1.		The President
		2.	•	The Attorney General
	•	3.		The Military Assistant to the President, General Taylor
		4.	-	The Secretary of State (and Deputy Under Secretary Johnson
		5.	•	The Secretary of Defense (and Deputy Secretary Gilpatric)
*		6.		The Director, Central Intelligence
Ċ		7.	÷	The Director, USLA
÷		8.	•	The Department of State Project Officer, Assistant Secreta Woodward and Mr. Hurwitch
		9.	÷	The Department of Defense Project Officer, Brig. Gen. Cr (who will inform the Chairman, JCS)
		10.	÷	The CIA Project Officer, 1'r. Helms
		11.	÷	The USLA Project Officer, Deputy Director Wilson
		12-1.4	-	Brig. Gen. Lansdale

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

27 July 1962

SUBJECT: NIE 85-2-62: THE SITUATION AND PROSPECTS IN CUBA

THE PROBLEM

To analyze the situation in Cubs and to estimate the prospects over the next year or so,

#### CONCLUSIONS

A. Fidel Castro has asserted his primacy in Cuban communism; the "old" Communists have had to accommodate themselves to this fact,

as has the USSR.

 'artial 'eclassified/Released on <u>'1-5-89</u>
 '7SP) under provisions of E.O. 12356 by N. Menan, National Security Council Der CIA letter dated 25 per 58

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B. By force of circumstances, the USSR is becoming ever more Castro deeply committed to preserve and strengthen the Outer-regime. C. The Cuban Armed Forces are loyal to the personal leadership of the Castro brothers. Their capabilities have been and are being

greatly enhanced by the Soviet Bloc's provision of military equipment


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ground intimidate \_D. The Cuban must forces are well able to/overawe the general population and to suppress any popular insurrection likely to develop in pre\_\_A\_ circumstances. They are probably capable of containing and controlling any threat to the regime through guerrilla action

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H. The Castro regime still seeks to lead the "inevitable" revolution throughout Latin America, but its preoccupation with domestic problems tends to limit its activity in this respect. In Latin America there is widespread disillusionment regarding the Cuban revolution. Nevertheless, militant pro-Castro groups exist in several countries, and Cuban subversive activity could prove effective in certain unstable situations

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DISCUSSION

L. Developments in 1962 have tended to define more clearly the relationships between Castro and the leaders of the prerevolutionary Cuban Communist Party (PSP) and between Castro and the USSR. For the time being, at least, Castro has established his primacy in Cuban communism, and the PSP and USSE have been = constrained to accommodate themselves to that situation.

2. Differences between Castro and the "old" Communists of the . FSP developed in 1961 and reached a alimax in easily likes Castro had accepted "old" Communists in every branch of his government and had relied heavily on them for their expertise. However, he was and/ous to preserve his own authority as leader of the Cuban revolution and wanted the "new" Communists -- his followers of the 26th of July Movement -- to play a role at least equal to that of the veteran PSP members. Castro was also and/ous to have Cuba accepted as a member of the "Socialist camp" and resented the appellation of "national democracy" (as opposed to "socialist democracy") which was invented for Cuba in 1960 at a world congress of Communist Party leaders in Moscow. The Soviets were reluctant to make these concessions to a





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regime that they did not consider to be Communist and that was not under their firm control.

3. Castro kept up the pressure for full recognition, proclaiming Cube a socialist state and himself a Marxist-Leminist. Meantime elements of the PSP pushed ahead as rapidly as possible to establish "old" Communist control of Cube through the machinery of the Integrated Revolutionary Organizations (CRI), an interim party set up to bring together the various political forces behind the regime and create a single dominant political party. Veteran Communist Anibal Escalante, the organizing secretary of CRI, was the key figure in this effort.

4. The result was a head-on clash between the "old" Communists and Castro, who realized that they were threatening his position and that of his loyal followers of the 26th of July Movement. After careful maneuvering a new National Directorate for the ORI was agreed upon, in which power was shifted from "old" to "new" Communists. Then on 26 March Castro demounced Anital Escalante and by implication all "old" Communists for seeking to dominate the Cuban revolution.

5. Further reorganization of the CRI and of other elements of the regime's political machinery followed, with the general

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effect of strengthening the position of the "new" Communists. These changes, however, can by no means be described as a vholesale purgs of the veteran Communists. Many, including Blas Roca, the FSP chairman, have remained in important positions and Castro has made it clear that the differences between "old" and "new" Communists are not over the goal of communizing Cuba. The overall effect of the "Escalante affair," and of the changes in the regime which followed was the assertion of Castro's personal leadership of Cuban communism.

6. Neither the PSP nor the Soviets proved willing to contest the issue with Castro. Both moved quickly to acknowledge his authority and to reaffirm their close ties with him. Blas Roca gave his approval to Castro's move against Escalante.

then proceeded to elevate Cuba in the socialist hierarchy by placing it next after the Bloc states and ahead of Yugoslavia on the list of May Day greetings and by such minor but significant moves as referring to the Cuban Premier as "Comrade Fidel."



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


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
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7. In yielding to Castro's desire to have Cha brought into a closer relationship with the Bloc, the Soviet leaders have made a significant concession. That they should have done so, fully aware of Castro's undisciplined nature, is a measure not only of the importance they attach to Cubs, but also of the narrow field of choice open to them.

8. The Soviet Union has also made a considerable concession in its agreement to supply a line of credit for the purchase of consumer goods. It has, in effect, reaffirmed its villingness to pay the increasing costs of keeping Cubs aflost, despite the Cubans' failures in the field of economic reorganization and development.








10. On balance, Castro is in stronger position now than appeared likely a few months ago. He has asserted his leadership and it has been accepted by the USSR and by the "old" Communists in Cuba. He has demonstrated remarkable political skills and an ability to engage in carefully calculated maneuvers which had been obscured by his generally erratic and bombastic behavior. He seems to be well in control of the apparatus of government and security. His attack on Escalante and the efforts of the "old" Communists and the reshuffling of the top leadership of the CRI

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and the Armed Forces have apparently satisfied the majority of the "ness" Communists, who were becoming restive. At the same time he has retained the cooperation of the "old" Communists and the USSR. He probably believes that he can handle them and that both the "old" Cuben Communists and Maccow must continue to accept him as the indispensable man in Cube.



12. The capabilities of the Cuban Armed Forces to suppress insurrection or repel invasion have been greatly enhanced by the Bloc's provision of military equipment and instruction and by a thoroughgoing reorganization initiated in the fall of 1960. This reorganization and concomitant training programs are now well advanced, although not completed.

13. Up to as Bloc military advisers and instructors are believed to be now in Cuba. Bloc advisers are probably assigned to the principal staffs throughout the military establishment. Most of the instructors are stationed at established military schools and training areas. In addition, several hundred Cuban military personnel have received or are receiving military instruction in Bloc countries.

14. Almost certainly the present military establishment as a whole is politically reliable. Successive defections and purges have eliminated the seriously disaffected elements. The principal



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commanders have been selected for their personal loyalty to the Castro brothers. Great attention has been paid to the political infoctrination of the troops. Morale probably has been adversely affected, in some instances, particularly among reserve components, by the discontent of the general population. However, the military establishment as a whole will almost certainly support and defend the Castro regime, unless its overthrow seems imminent.,

15. The Cuben ground forces are believed to consist of a standing army of about the men and a ready reserve of about the standing army personnel serve as full-time cadres in ready reserve units. In addition, there are home guard type militia units numbering about the standing about the serve as full-time cadres

16. The standing army has received intensive training in the use of Bloc-supplied arms and equipment and tactical training through the battalion combat team level. It has acquired capabilities for the combat employment of armor and artillery (including antiaircraft and antitank weapons) hitherto unknown in any Caribbean country.


17. The ready reserve battalions are less heavily armed and les. thoroughly trained. Each has a full-time cadre varying from

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
wen. The remaining personnel are available for only one or two drills a week and a month of active duty training each year. The arms are kept in the custody of the full-time cadre. These battalions are based on places of employment and are generally capable of rapid mobilization.

18. The home guard militia units have no significant combat capability. Their function is to sugment the police as necessary to control the population.





22. The Cuban/Arross forces are well able to develop to develop population and to suppress any popular insurrection thetocatchtcocour in present circumstances. They have not been able to eliminate the low level of sporadic guerrilla activity which now exists in Cuba, but they are probably capable of containing and controlling any threat-to the regime through guerrilla action.




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


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26. The expabilities of the Cuban Armed Forces will continue to improve through further training and experience. The Bloc will almost certainly continue to support this development through the provision of equipment, instruction, and edvice.



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30. Mid-year 1962 finds the Cuban economy in deepening trouble. A highly vaunted economic plan and the record budget officially announced for 1962 have by now, for all practical purposes, been abandoned. The pervasive disruption which was evident in industry and transportation last year manifested itself this year in the agricultural sector as well, most conspicuously in the sugar industry, the very heart of the economy and the principal earner of foreign exchange.

31.

The 1962 sugar crop was hard hit by a prolonged drought, growing apathy and passive resistance among the cane-cutters, and bad managerial judgment -- such as the decisions to reduce the rate of replanting and to divert cane land to other crops.



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
32. With respect to other agricultural products Cuba has clearly not achieved the much meeded expansion called for under the regime's plans. Cuba's own production of food has remained insufficient to support the population, and food rationing has become necessary. Meanwhile, in the industrial sector the deterioration of plants, equipment shortages, poor quality of raw materials, and gross mismanagement continue. Because of the US embargo and the shortage of foreign exchange, the Cubans have not been able to find adequate sources for the machinery and parts formerly imported from the US and other Western countries. Only the first beginnings have been made in the reconstruction of Cuban industry with Bloc equipment;

qualified personnel, often selected for their political reliability,

33. The regime has responded to the agricultural crisis with a series of changes in policy and organization.



controls over private farmers and tightening controls over the collectivized sector of agriculture.



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35. Cuban economic prospects for the remainder of 1962 and for 1963 are bleak. Cuba will not be able to build up significantly its dangerously low holdings of convertible foreign exchange. The expected increase in capital imports from the Bloc is unlikely to bring about not growth of Cuba's economy in the next 18 souths

The effect of the new agricultural policy remains uncertain; in any case it could not result in a significant increase in production within the next year or so. Supply and management problems will continue to plague industry; transportation difficulties will probably get worse. No substantial overall improvement in the Cuban economy is likely to occur for several years.

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36. Active support for the Castro regime has declined The hard core of this support consists of those who have a vested interest in the revolution, especially the new managerial class and the Communists. Others support the revolution because they have been influenced by indoctrination and participation in the mass organizations.

37. Disaffection is increasing primarily because of the growing inability of the regime to provide the goods and services to which most of the Cuban people have been accustomed. The shortages of food, ordinary household items, medicines, public transhave portation, etc.,/www.underscored, in terms understandable to the individual Cuban, the regime's failure to live up to its original promise. "Others have become bored with years of repetitious propaganda. One factor which is likely to have an increasingly adverse effect on public attitudes is the deterioration of public health conditions and services.

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38. The majority of the Cuban population has for some time been indifferent toward the regime.

39. In the past four months Fidel Castro and other regime spokesmen have themselves acknowledged two causes of popular discontent and have begun corrective measures. One of these is the dissatisfaction and insecurity aroused by the increasingly obvious "old" Communist takeover which threatened to destroy the loyalty of a large segment of the "new class" until Castro took action in March. The other is the fear of collectivization on the part of farmers, which the regime has also taken steps to allay. Fublic hostility to Communist regimentation is likely to continue to be a factor in the ability of the regime to control the population, but it is the effect of such regimentation on them personally, rather than communism itself, that seems to arouse the Cuban. Increasing communization is likely to continue to provoke discontent

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


42. There has been some increase in active resistance to the Castro regime despite its massive and expanding security apparatus and its constant efforts to intimidate, harass, and immobilize those who take action against the government. The Armed Forces are used extensively to guard against sebotage, to control public demonstrations against the regime, and to sweep areas of rebel activity. The Ministry of Interior, run by a loyal Castro follower, exercises checks and controls over the Cuban public through its extensive police apparatus, its network of informants in the Committees of Defense, and the antisabotage Peoples' Defense organization. Between 400 and 500 thousand Cubans -- one in every 14 -- are involved in this elaborate security machinery.

43. This widespread security effort by the Castro government does effectively limit and harass the active opponents of the regime. Nevertheless, there are at least six nationwide resistance groups in Guba with a claimed membership ranging from a few








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45. There is some coordination of the activities of the mational organizations and there have been reports of a recent agreement among them for unified action. In practice, however, activities tend to be

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


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42 27 47. At present the primary effect of resistance operations is psychological: they are an embarrassment to the regime and force it to commit large resources to meet security requirements. 

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52. Castro seems to have no doubts about the desirability of facing the rest of the world as a member of the "Socialist camp." He will continue to associate Cube with the Bloc and to seek to make the most of Soviet commitments. For their part, the Soviets must regard the situation in Cube as a net gain for their international position, despite the misgivings they must feel about the Latin American reaction to the proclamation of an avovedly Communist regime in Cuba

53. Castro's vitriolic anti-US position continues unchanged. Anti-Americanian is deeply ingrained in the regime and in much of the Cuban populace. The authority of the regime depends in significant part on its so-far successful defiance of the US, and the regime is unlikely to see any advantage to be gained by changing its attitude toward the US.

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54. The Cuban regime continues to try to appeal to the Afro-Asian neutralist bloc, even while proclaiming its adherence to Marxism-Leminism. It seeks to play a role at such neutralistsponsored conferences as the "World without the Bomb" meeting in Ghama and the underdeveloped nations economic conferences in Cairo. However, the conduct of the Cuban emissaries at these meetings has generally been such as to antagonize the Afro-Asian neutrals.

55. The appeal of Castroism has dimmed considerably in other Latin American states as a consequence of the Cuban Leeder's avoval of Marxism-Leminism, his obvious toadying to the Eloc, and the selfscknowledged failings of the regime. After a period in which Castro and Cuba were the focus of attention through the area, Latin Americans have turned back to their own problems. However, there are militant pro-Castro minorities in several Latin American states and many neutralists and protagonists of reform who look with favor

56. Mexico, Brazil, Chile, Bolivia, and Uruguay are now the only Latin American countries maintaining diplomatic relations with Cuba. Relations between Cuba and Uruguay have been strained

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or account of the nearly 400 asyless in the Uruguayan Embassy in Hevens. Cuban leaders, although preoccupied with domestic prob-57. lems, still seek to assert Cuben leadership of the "inevitable" revolution in Latin America. They have been very active in attempts to organize a new and ostensibly neutral Latin American labor organization. Cube operates schools for indoctrinating and training in guerrilla verfare Latin American students who eventually return home to apply what they have learned.

58. Communist parties in other Latin American states have been disturbed by events in Cuba, and particularly by the Soviet Union's acceptance of Castro as a Communist, because they feel that the role and the prerogatives of veteran Communists have been cast

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in doubt. Uruguayan Communists were disturbed by statements made by Blas Roca at a Communist Party meeting in Montevileo to the effect that it had been demonstrated that a non-Communist could lead a successful revolution against the capitalists and imperial-

ists.

59. The present image of the Castro regime in Latin America is that of a client of the Bloc and a failure in the conduct of its own affairs, particularly in the important area of economic develop-

ment.



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
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### ANNEX

INVENTORIES OF THE CUBAN ARMED FORCES

TABLE 1.	GROUND FORCES
TABLE 2:	NAVI
TABLE 3:	AIR FORCE (CRAAF)



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Page(s)  $A_{nnex}$  1-8 are denied in its/their entirety. Exemption(s): (b)(1) and (b)(3)

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27 July 1962

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD SUBJECT: NIE 85-2-62: THE SITUATION AND PROSPECTS IN CUBA

INTELLIGENCE

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1. The attached draft estimate has been approved by the Board of National Estimates pursuant to a consideration of it by the USIB representatives.


2. The attached Annex is classified at the request of the military services re-resentatives.

3. This estimate has been claced on the agenda of the . USIB meeting scheduled for 1030 Wednesday, 1 August. There will be no cleanup unless requested by a USIB member.

> CHESTER L. CCCPER Deputy Assistant Director National Estimates

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON-25, D.C.

31 July 1962

copy - 21 ---

#### MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)

From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale Sat

Subject: Contingency Plan

Transmitted herewith is a copy of "United States Contingency Plan No. 2, Cuba (S)," which is submitted for your consideration. The plan has been approved by the Secretary of Defense and by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

This plan was developed as a result of reports in mid-June 1962 that the Cuban people were about to revolt against the Castro-Communist regime, without U.S. sponsorship, and the desire expressed by the Special Group that the U.S. be ready for such a contingency. The DOD/JCS representative was tasked by me to develop a plan with the assistance of Operation Mongoose representatives from participating departments and agencies. The DOD/JCS representative did so, and the attached plan is the result.

"Eyes Only" copies tet

- 1. General Taylor
- 3. Mr. Gilpatric
- 4. Mr. McCone
- 7. Mr. Harvey, CIA
- 8. Mr. Hurwitch, State
- 9. General Harris, DOD/JCS

5. Mr. Kennedy

6. General Lemnitzer

10. Mr. Murrow/Mr. Wilson USLA

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11. Chief of Operations

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## UNCLASSIFIED

1 August 1962

Proposed Agenda for MONGOOSE Meeting, 10 August 1962

÷		Responsible Agency
Α.	Consideration of special NIE on Cuba,	CIA .
*B.	Discussion of the effects of the existence of the Castro Government during the past year on the United States, Latin America, and the USSR.	State
	Particular states to a state of the	4.5.
c.	Explanation of the distinction between the	General
	four proposed courses of action.	Lansdale
*D.	Discussion of a possible stepped up Course B	General
	as to content, implication and difference	Lansdale
	from present course of action.	20000020
E.	Pros and Cons of the precommitment proposed in Course C.	State, Defense, USTA
	III COULSE C.	COLA
*F.	Consequences of military intervention to include cost (personnel, units and equipment), effect on world-wide ability to react, possibility of a requirement for sustained occupation, the level of national mobilization	DOD, JCS
	required, and Cuban counteraction.	
G.	Future courses of action to be recommended to higher authority.	All

\* It is requested the responsible agencies for the topics marked with asterisks above circulate papers to the members of the Special Group (Augmented) by 8 August.

MDT

6. Mr. McCone

9.

7. General Lemnitzer

Chief of Operations

8. General Taylor

Copies to:

- 1. Secretary Rusk
  - 2. Secretary McNamara
  - Attorney General
- 4. Mr. Johnson .
- 5. Mr. Gilpatric

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WE Mr. Loomis

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August 3, 1964

189/2 - Edgar T. Martin

141.

Medium Wave Broadcasting to Cube

In accordance with your request of August 2, we have made a comparative study of various locations in the Caribbean area for breadcasting to Cube. The study is based on the following assumptions:

Transmitter power is 1,000 KW medium wave, using a directional autenna with a gain of at least 5 db in the direction of the target.

The North American Regional Broadcasting Agreement (NARBA), so which the United States is a signatory nation, will be abrogated.

The transmitter will be located outside the territorial limits of the continental United States.


The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) will take necessary domestic action, and the Department of Stats necessary international action, to acquire a clear channel for the station. (The coverage maps shown in this report are based on clear channel operation.)

The Cuban Covernment will not jam, or otherwise interfere will the intensions.

notestial locations for the transmitter are as follows:

Program feed from the U.S. (relative case or difficulty in providing line program material to the transmitter from U.S. sources.)

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- (3) Groundwave signal coverage of Cuba. (Signal coverage based on FGC curves.)
- (4) Fading zone effects in Cubs (potantial distortion and severe fading as a result of interaction of skywave and groundwave signals during the nighttime hours.)

Interference to or from radio stations in the U.S., or other adjacent countries, has not been considered since the assumption is made that the proposed station will operate on a clear channel.

The locations chosen for comparison are as follows, (where several locations are lumped together, the technical suitability, propagation-wise, is considered to be essentially the same for each location):

- (1) Gr. Abeco Island, Grand Bahama Island, and other nearby islands in Bahamas.
- (Z) Nassau
- (3) Navasa Island.
- (4) Pterto Lica.
- (5) Dominicas Republic.
- (6) Swan Island.
- (7) British Honduras.

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IV: Micaragus/Hondures (on the sea coast near border of the two countries.)

(9) Cayman Island,

The attached chart shows the relative comparison between the various locations, considering the various technical factors as aforementioned.

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			Groundwave, Saytime signal in Gabé	Tading soas offects in Cuba	Skylwave. alghttime sig- sal in Cuba	Program Saud from U. S.	
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\*S. Discussion of the offects of the existence of the Castro Soverment during the past year on the United States, Latin America, and the USSE.

Consideration of special BIE on Cohe.

- C. Replanation of the distinction between the four proposed courses of action.
- 40. Discussion of a possible stopped up Course B as to content, implication and differences from pressent course of action.
  - Pres and Cons of the procountrast proposed in Course C.
- W. Consequences of military intervention to include cost (personnel, units and equipment), affect on world-wide ability to react, prezibility of a requirement for sustained occupation, the level of mational webilization required, and Cuban constornation.
- Future courses of action to be recommunied to higher sutherity.

It is requested the responsible symmion for the tapics marked with asteriaks above circulate papers to the numbers of the Special Group (Anguested) by 8 Angust.

Copies tes

1. Secretary hisk

- 2. Secretary McKemars
- 3. Atterney General
- 4. Mr. Johnson
- 5. Me. Gilpstris

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6. Mr. McCous

- 7. Gameral Lemaitsor
- 8. General Taylor
- 9. Chief of Operations

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#### SPECIAL HANDLING

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5412 SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED) WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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MELIORANDUM FOR: The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense The Director, Central Intelligence The Director, US Information Agency

Subject: United States Contingency Plan No. 2, Cuba (S)

1. The attached plan delineates the course of action to be pursued by the United States in the event that US military intervention is undertaken in support of open, wide-spread revolt in Cuba.

2. Subject plan is effective for planning on receipt and for the conduct of operations when directed.

3. This document requires special handling and is not releasable to foreign nationals.

FOR THE 5412 SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED):

EDWARD G. LANSDALE Brigadier General, USAF Chief of Operations, Operation MONGOOSE

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#### TITLE PAGE

1. The title of this document is:

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UNITED STATES CONTINGENCY PLAN NO. 2, CUBA (S) 2. The title of this document is classified SECRET. The plan may be referred to as the Caribbean Survey Group (or, CSG) Plan No. 2, which name is unclassified unless related to Cuba.

3. This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws (Section 793 and 795, title 18, U.S.C.). Its transmission or revelation of the contents thereof in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

4. Reproduction of this document in whole or in part without permission of the Director of Operations, Operation MONGCOSE is prohibited except as necessary for the preparation of supporting plans. Distribution will be restricted to those US government agencies specifically requiring knowledge of the plan on a "Special Handling - Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals" basis

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US CONTINGENCY PLAN NO. 2, CUBA (S)

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### US CONTINGENCY PLAN NO. 2. CUBA. (S)

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Department of State Department of Defense \*Department of the Treasury \*Department of Justice \*Department of Health, Education and Welfare \*Department of Agriculture Central Intelligence Agency US Information Agency \*Federal Aviation Agency

\*Bureau of the Budget

\*Distribution to asterisked agencies will not be made until such time as their participation is required in planning or implementation of the plan. When distribution is made to these agencies, only those portions of the plan which pertain to their continuation will be disseminated.

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UNITED STATES CONTINGENCY PLAN NO. 2, CUBA (S)

Reference: Memorandum for Representatives of State, Defense, CIA and USIA, from Chief of Operations, Operation MONGOOSE, subject: "Spontaneous Revolts in Cuba, Contingency Planning", dated 14 June 1962. Task Agencies: Department of State

Department of Defense

a

Central Intelligence Agency US Information Agency

1. Situation.

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a. The purpose of this plan is to define the courses of action to be pursued by affected agencies of the US Government in the event that a decision is made that the United States undertake military intervention in Cuba.

b. The assumed situation in Cuba is open, widespread revolt. This contingency may be a non-US initiated situation, similar to that rumored as being activated for mid-June 1962. US actions to exploit the situation include the use of US military force.

c. It is assumed that this plan would be implemented under the following conditions, and would be considered for implementation under situations less severe. An internal revolt has created a chaotic situation in Cuba where:

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 The revolution is open and threatens the Communist regime;

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: (2) Areas are taken and held by the revolutionaries, and:

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(3) Leadership of the revolt, unable to overthrow the government or sustain the revolution indefinitely, requests assistance from the United States and/or the Organization of American States (OAS).

d. The United States may, or may not, be able to determine that a rebellion is imminent before actual outbreak. However, it is unlikely that the assumed situation will occur all at once and without notice. More probably it will evolve from a localized revolt which will provide some advance notice and the opportunity to initiate necessary diplomatic, propaganda, covert and military preparations.

e. The strength, morale, disposition and equipage of unfriendly fires will be assured to be as described in current estimates of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB).

2. Mission.

The United States will support and sustain the rebellion in Cuba through all its resources including the use of US military force to assure replacement of the Communist regime with a new Cuban government acceptable to the United States.

3. Execution.

a. Concept of Operations.

(1) When the likelihood or emergence of a Cuban revolt becomes apparent to the US intelligence community it will be immediately brought to the attention of the 5412 Special Group (Augmented) through the Office of the Chief of Operations, Operation MONGOOSE, Evaluation of the situation by the Special Group will determine whether

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
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or not the President's decision should be sought to implement this plan.


(2) The initial stages of a spontaneous revolt will be supported by the United States through propaganda, covert operations and other actions as necessary,


In the event that the revolt spreads as a popular movement against the Communist regime, the United States should be capable of rapid military action to forestall a concerted and drastic reprisal program in the interest of humanity and the mission of this plan. (3) US Military Reaction.




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place the United States in as broad a multilateral context as possible.

(a) Innediately sound out Latin American Governments to determine whether the United States can count upon a 2/3 majority decision authorizing the use of military forces under Article 6 of the Rio Treaty.

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(b) If 2/3 majority is available, request the Council of the Organization of American States to · convoke immediately a meeting of foreign ministers under Article 6 of the Rio Treaty and obtain Organization of American States (CAS) decision authorizing use of force.

(c) Seek agreement from at least two Latin American mations (preferably not Nicaragua or Guatemala) to provide token forces to join United States forces.

(d) If 2/3 majority cannot be mustered, recognize the anti-Castro forces as the Government of Cuba and, in response to its appeal for help, come to its assistance with United States military forces and whatever foreign token forces have been made available.

(e) Keep key members of Congress informed of significant developments.

(f) Inform all friendly governments of our actions and the reasons therefor; obtain public expressions of their support and of their sympathy for the anti-Castro forces. Marn them to expect communist directed violence and offer them assistance.

(g) Notify the OAS and the United Nations (as appropriate) of our actions and be prepared to defend them in these international bodies.

(h) Engage in all-out psychological warfare and propaganda stressing the morality of United States action designed to assist the Cuban people throw off the bonds of communist enslavement. (2) Thase II - (Fost Invasion)

(a) Provide immediate emergency economic and other assistance to the civil populace.

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(b) Turn over as rapilly as possible to the Cuban
 Government for administration of the territory taken
 by United States troops and assist that government
 to the extent feasible as it requests.

(c) Make preparations to provide the Cuban Governcent with long range economic assistance.

(d) Take measures to assist the Cuban Government to control entry into and exit from Cuba.

(e) Re-establish the United States country team in Havana.

d. Central Intelligence Agency Operations.

(1) CIA operations against Cuba are controlled by a component of CIA Headquarters, Washington. Operational elements are located in the vicinity of Miami, Florida, with sub elements at other Florida locations.

(2) In the event of localized revolt, CIA will give covert support to the revolt through introduction of communications, arms, equipment and trained personnel as appropriate and feasible.

(3) when US Military intervention is directed and contingency plans are implemented, CIA will fully support the military actions in accordance with the JCS/CIA Command Relationship Agreement, whether it is implemented or not.

(4) Liaison and communications will be established prior to implementation of CINCLANT and subordinate plans.

(5) CIA will support military operations by clandestime intelligence, counter intelligence, propaganda, political and paramilitary operations.

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(6) After the initial assault and during the subsequent consolidation and occupation phase, CIA will designate selected versonnel from CIA Headquarters and/ or CIA operations base, Florida, to proceed to Cuba and conduct clandestine operations in support of US forces

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D. United States Information Agency Operations.

(1) The Agency will provide complete, but strictly factual and impartial informational coverage to a spontaneous revolt in its initial phase. The purpose of such coverage will be to keep the people of Cuba, and of the hemisphere, fully informed of developments, and to set the stage for possible subsequent courses of action. Extreme caution will be taken to avoid the appearance of US involvement during this phase so as to nullify possible later charges of US intervention (by Cuba or other Latin American governments) should the revolt fail. In this context, the Agency during this phase must carefully refrain from a type or tone of coverage that might be construed as incitement to riot.

(2) In the event of direct 'JS involvement, the Agency will:

(a) Assign informational specialists to work with
 Defense Psywar units during combat operations.

(b) Staff up a regular USIS unit to nove into Havana with the Department of State contingent at the time and place to be decided on by the Department.

(c) Prepare for immediate shipment all physical equipment and resources necessary to support a USIS operation in Cuba.

(3) Easic considerations in Agency informational support of direct US military action:

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(a) Medium wave radio should receive priority attention for any overt combat operation in Cuba. Immediately upon securing any beachhead or other enclave on the island, and perhaps immediately prior to or concurrent with such action, massive medium wave broadcasting should begin. A beefed-up Guantanamo

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### TANA SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN 47414

transmitter, leased U.S. Florida facilities, floating transmitters and, as soon as possible, captured Cuban station(s) should be assigned to this task. Short wave facilities will also be increased to provide necessary backup.

(b) The messages of this initial phase should be simple and direct, reassuring the people of their personal safety and the protection of their individual rights, instructions on the maintenance of public order, the distribution of food and medical attention, all done hopefully in a Cuban context and with only the minimum of reference 'to US military forces and power necessary to maintain order and to assure credibility of the inevitability of Castro's rapid and complete defeat.

(c) Care must be exercised, particularly with the anti-Castro Cubans, to woid alienating possible support by immediate talk of vengeance, or of indications of possible loss of any gains (housing, land, social benefits) which might have accrued to the peasant and worker groups during the Castro regime.

(d) Given the relatively high rate of literacy in Cuba, wall posters and leaflets reiterating the thenes of the broadcasts should also be available and utilized as soon as practical, the leaflets by air drop ahead of military action where deezed advisable.

(e) any provisional military government must also have a news bulletin for factual news summaries and instructions to the civilian population.

(f) In all psychological planning, special attention should be given to avoiding in so far as possible

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### SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN 4745

any indications of plans to return to the <u>status</u> <u>quo</u> <u>ante</u>, all information output should be designed to reassure the populace that the US supported movement is designed to carry forward the realization of the social and economic aspirations of the Cuban people.

f. Decartment of the Treasury

Department of Justice

Department of Health. Education and Welfare

Department of Agriculture

Federal Aviation Agency

Sureau of the Budget

Supporting functions will be undertaken to assist, expedite and promote the efforts of Task Agencies:

 a. As requested by Task Agencies, prior to plan implementation, and

b. As requested by Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose, when plan is implemented.

4. Coordinating Instructions.


a. Implementation of this plan will be as directed by the President.

b. Military operations, including clandestine and paramilitary activities, will be conducted by CINCLANT as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The administration of military government activities in Cuba will be conducted by CINCLANT as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in accordance with policy established by the Secretary of State.

c. Political, psychological and economic operations will be accomplished in accordance with policy established by the Secretary of State.

i. Supporting plans are required from all Task Agencies. Direct coordination between agencies should be effected for planning purposes. One copy of supporting plans is to be provided Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose, and maintained in current status.

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### SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN 47010

•. During implementation of the plan the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose, will act as the coordinator for the 5412 Special Group (Augmented) on inter-Agency activities. The coordinating office will be established in the Pentagon, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Room 2 B 913, telephone extension 59710.

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#### Considerations


In our Operational Representatives discussions, it was generally acknowledged that a widespread revolt of the Cuban people against the regime might well lead to an open appeal by Cubans for help by U.S. military forces, as the regime's security forces attempt to crush the revolt.

At the close of the attached CIA section on "covert activities," there is a list of policy approvals deemed required. It is suggested that this be read in context with the CIA operational suggestions as outlined in the section. It is noted that authority would be required for overflights (resupply, leaflet drops, infiltration, exfiltration), use of U.S. submarines for infiltration and exfiltration, major sabotage operations, stepped up psychological actions

In the "covert activities" section, it is noted that CIA would support State in any feasible action to develop individual Latin American country support and would provide covert support to the CRC and appropriate Cuban groups, to assist in the achievement of the goal of Operation Mongoose.

My own comment is to urge that you give the fullest possible consideration to the concept of actions by Cuban groups, and actions from and by Latin American countries, to achieve the goal of Operation Mongoose. Consideration of this concept is urged, since it alone could offer making the responsibility for initiative and actions reside in groups and countries other than the U.S. If a support concept is possible which would permit U.S. assets to assist such non-U.S. operations, with reasonable assurance of mutual objectives and methods, then this would be the most desirable concept for winning our goal.

Attachments



THELASSINE

"Special Handling" numbered copies to:

#### Special Group (Series A)

- 1. General Taylor
  - 2. Mr. Johnson
  - 3. Mr. Gilpatric

- 4. Mr. McCone
- 5. Mr. Kennedy
- 6. General Lamnitzer

- Added (Series B)
- 1. Mr. Bundy
- 2. Mr. Rusk

- 3. Mr. McNamara
  - . Mr. Murrow

#### Operational Representatives (Series B)

Mr. Hurwitch (State)
 General Harris (Defense
 Mr. Harvey (CIA)
 Mr. Wilson (USIA)
 9/10 Chief of Operations



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
7 August 1962

#### MILITARY

General Benjamin T. Harris, DOD/JCS Representative for Operation Mongoose, states:


1. <u>Support</u>: Within its capabilities DOD is prepared to provide all required support to CIA, State and USIA necessary to the accomplishment of the objectives of Operation Mongoose.

2. <u>Military Readiness</u>: If there is a decision to use U.S. military force, execution of our military contingency plans for Cuba will be undertaken as rapidly as the posture of our forces will allow at the time the decision is made.



c. In concept, initial military operations commence with an air and naval blockade, concentrated air strikes, and coordinated naval gunfire to effect destruction of enemy airpower and to neutralize and destroy as much as possible of the enemy armor, artillery and anti-air capability.

Partially Declassified/Released on <u>1-5-89</u> under provisions of E.O. 12356 by N. Menan, National Security CTOPSECRET



# **FSTCHULUUIUML**

### THELESINGT

7 August 1962

#### PSYCHOLOGICAL

Donald M. Wilson, USIA Representative for Operation Mongoose, states:

Under stepped-up Course B there would be two psychological tasks:

1. Increase the flow of information to Cuba, exposing the weaknesses and perfidies of the Castro/Communist regime.

2. Improve the informational capability throughout Latin America to "isolate" Castro/Communism and build up support for pro-democratic Cuban elements.


#### 1. Increase the flow of information to Cuba.

a. Where other access is denied us, radio is the best means to reach the Cuban people. It is USIA's view that our short wave capability (VOA) is operating at the most efficient technical level, with nine hours of broadcasting a day in Spanish. Three of the nine hours are devoted specifically to Cuba, while the other six concern themselves with the rest of Latin America. All are heard clearly in Cuba and will be heard much more clearly in December, 1962, when our new transmitter in Greenville, North Carolina, goes on the air.

The establishment of a medium wave capability would be desirable. It is indeed possible to broadcast a strong signal into Cuba, and USIA has made a study of ten possible sites to locate transmitters (reported separately). Our study also shows, however, that Castro has the ready capability to jam our effort with an extraordinarily high percentage of success. Faced with Castro's capability, should the U.S. undertake construction of a powerful broadcasting facility at an estimated cost of eight million dollars and an estimated building time of fifteen months? It is always possible that Castro would not utilize his jamming capability and the U.S. would therefore have a successful medium-wave operation into Cuba. Should an uprising occur, th. opportunities presented by such a U.S. medium-wave capability would be great. Should there be an ultimate military action by the United States, the opportunities of such a capability would also be great. However, if none of these contingencies occur, we will have an expensive operation on our hands with small listenership to show for it.

> Partially Declassified/Released on <u>1-5-29</u> (PSS-1S) under provisions of E.O. 12.33 by N. Manan, National Security Council

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#### 2. Improve the information capability throughout Latin America

Our capability will depend on the availability of funds. The Latin American program was stepped-up 32 percent in Fiscal Year '62 and it will be stepped-up 26 percent more in Fiscal Year '63, so the availability of even more funds is a real problem.

Here are examples of current programming which could be augmented:

1) <u>Radio</u>. We could step up our production of packaged radio programs for placement on radio stations throughout Latin America.

2) <u>Cartoon Books</u>. The Agency has done six anti-Castro cartoon books (5 million copies) having a widespread impact over the area. This program could be stepped-up.

3) <u>Motion Pictures</u>. The Agency has produced an animated film on Cuban land reform theme and has two more films in the pipeline. An increased production of films, although expensive, could be instituted.



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4) <u>Television</u>. Television reaches a growing audience in Latin America. The Agency has done one TV "Special" on Castro, and has acquired others from commercial producers. Currently the Agency is doing an anti-Communist TV series which will document the methods and results of Castroism. Vast new opportunities are available in this medium. For example, we could do a puppet series to poke fun at Castro, a device with vast appeal to Latinos.

5) <u>Books</u>. Our book program has several good anti-Castro titles although the circulation is small. We have already asked Congress for a supplemental appropriation to distribute five million books next year in Latin America. Some of these will have an anti-Castro theme.

6) <u>Refugees</u>. We could make an even greater use of the Cuban refugee story through all media. For example, we could do more TV shorts on Cuban refugees at work (in garages, driving taxis, clerking, and so on.) We could more fully exploit the Negro defectors.

Following are some possibilities for new programming:

2. Subsidize a troupe of Cuban dancers, musicals, singers in one big show to tour Latin America. Ample talent is available among the refugees.

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3. Organize a show by Cuban painters, cartoonists, sculptors on one theme -- perhaps the executions -- to be sent around Latin America.

4. Develop a speakers' bureau throughout Latin America to send lecturers before all types of groups.

5. Develop a series of hard-hitting exhibits on various anti-Castro themes, and get them displayed in key locations all over Latin America.

It is USIA's view that the most effective information program in Latin America must have a positive theme. That is why the majority of our output is still devoted to support of the Alliance for Progress. Our anti-Castro output, being essentially negative in nature, still is relegated to a less important position. We believe this accent on the positive to be most desirable and should there be an increase in anti-Castro material we would believe it necessary to similarly increase our positive support material for the Alliance for Progress.



# TOPCESSFEP

### Advantages of Stepped-up Course B:

a. It would raise the hopes of the anti-Castro Cubans and check their tendency to grow complacent and settle into U.S. ways.


b. It would tend to bring together the various Cuban anti-Castro factions.

c. It would call forth the heightened attention of the rest of Latin America to the Castro/Communist regime.

#### Disadvantages:

a. World opinion, particularly in Europe, would become suspicious of "intervention."

b. A higher noise level will be accompanied by a higher risk of exposure of the program.





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## THELASSINE

#### SENSITIVE

8 August 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)

From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale

Subject: Medium-Wave Broadcasting to Cuba

At a meeting with the operational representatives of Operation Mongoose, 1 August, General Taylor and the Attorney General asked about the possibility of strong medium-wave broadcasts into Cuba. In response, Don Wilson of USIA has sent me some thoughtful studies on this subject, after collaboration with State and CIA at the operating level, and noting an earlier memorandum from Ed Murrow about broadcasts from the U.S. (which Mr. Murrow discussed with the Special Group). These studies are attached, for your information.

The conclusions reached are:

a. Medium-wave broadcasts from stations in the U.S. are a possibility for short term tactical purposes. They would be illegal in terms of international agreement and could bring serious reprisals (Cuban interference with medium-wave broadcasts over wide areas of the United States).

b. Although it was believed that Swan Island broadcasts could be strengthened and possibly undergo a character change (becoming similar to Radio Free Europe) to gain Cuban listeners, further study concludes that no new medium-wave capability should be developed from Radio Swan (difficult and expensive logistic problems, coupled with April 1961 reputation).

c. A thousand kilowatt transmitter is in storage in the U.S. It is estimated that it would take about 15 months, at a cost of about \$8 million, to install a transmitter of this power as rapidly as possible.

d. Ten locations around the Caribbean were studied as possible sites for a powerful transmitter, considering technical and political feasibility. Venezuela ranked first politically, tenth for technical reasons. The Dominican Republic would appear to present the best prospects from a political standpoint and ranks second technically. The political feasibility of establishing a transmitter on foreign soil in the proother locations studied appears remote. Declassified/Released on <u>12-29-99</u> other locations of ED. 1200 point of S-44 under providens of ED. 1200 by N. March Miller 1. Sam M. (1997)

Excluded from automatic regrading: DoD Directive 5200.10 does not apply.



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# TOP SECRET

Cuba could negate our medium-wave effort, if Castro so desired, by using surplus transmitters in Cuba to broadcast locally on the same frequency. (It is more difficult to jam short-wave broadcasts, due to the capability for simultaneous broadcasts on multiple frequencies.)

Attachments

"Special Handling" copies to:

#### Special Group (Augmented)

- 1 General Taylor
- 2 Mr. Johnson
- 3 Mr. Gilpatric
- 4 Mr. McCone

#### **Operational Representatives**

- 7 Mr. Hurwitch (State)
- 8 Gen. Harris (Defense)

9- Mr. Harvey (CLA) 10- Mr. Wilson (USLA)

11 - 14 - Chief of Operations



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- 5- Mr. Kennedy
- 6- Gen. Lemnitzer

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Even more serious, however, is the ease with which the Cuban government could negate the whole effort by placing some of their transmitters on whatever frequency we select. The shaded area on the map shows what the Cuban government could do merely by utilizing existing transmitters which are now surplus to their needs. These transmitters are surplus because they were built when there was private competitive broadcasting and most cities and towns had more than one transmitter. Now that there is only one program, many transmitters are no longer required. If Castro was sufficiently concerned to put most of his transmitters on our frequency, we would have virtually no listenership. It probably would not interfere too greatly with his own coverage, particularly in the cities.

While a thousand kilowatt medium wave transmitter is now in storage, the power plant would have to be procured or diverted from Liberia. It is estimated that it would take about fifteen months and cost about eight million dollars to install a transmitter of this power as rapidly as possible. This does not take into account whatever time would be required to obtain the political permission and to locate a physical site.

In contrast to medium wave coverage, short wave coverage is much more difficult to jam because you can operate on so many more frequencies simultaneously, and Castro's existing capabilities in the short wave field are limited. It is easy to provide a strong short wave signal from the U.S. or anywhere in the Caribbean. The new VOA station in North Carolina, which will commence broadcasting in December 1962, will provide an even stronger signal than our current excellent one. The number of short wave receivers in Cuba is unknown, although we do know that more than half of the defectors questioned at Opa Locka state that they have listened to short wave radio. It is interesting to note that a Latvian Electrical Company has announced that it has filled the first part of a large order of tropicalized receivers for Cuba capable of reception on both medium wave and short wave.

Attached is a paper outlining the technical factors considered in comparing ten different potential locations. The technical factors considered are:

 Program feed from the U.S. (relative ease or difficulty in providing live program material to the transmitter from U.S. sources.)

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### TOPRES

- (2) Skywave (nighttime) signal coverage of Cuba. (Signal coverage calculations are based on FCC skywave curves, increased by a factor of 4 db to take into account geomagnetic conditions in the Caribbean area.)
- (3) Groundwave signal coverage of Cuba. (Signal coverage based on FCC curves.)
- (4) Fading zone effects in Cuba (potential distortion and severe fading as a result of interaction of skywave and groundwave signals during the nighttime hours.)

Interference to or from radio stations in the U.S. or other adjacent countries. <u>has not</u> been considered since the assumption is made that the proposed station will operate on a clear channel.

The locations chosen for comparison are as follows (where several locations are lumped together, the technical suitability, propagation-wise, is considered to be essentially the same for each location):

- Grand Abaco Island, Grand Bahama Island, and other nearby islands in Bahamas.
- (2) Nassau.
- (3) Navassa Island.
- (4) Puerto Rico.

(5) Dominican Republic.

- (6) Swan Island.
- (7) British Honduras.
- (8) Nicaragua/Honduras (on the sea coast near border of the two countries.)
- (9) Cayman Island.

(10) Venezuela.



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### TOP SECRET

The attached chart shows the relative comparison between the various locations, considering the various technical factors as aforementioned.

(signed)

Donald M. Wilson Deputy Director

Attachments

### TOP SECRET

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Weighing Factor	Nassau	Dominican Republic	Cayman Island - Jamaica	Navassa. Island	Nicaragua/ Honduras	Swan Island	British Honduras	Gr. Abaco/ Brand Bahama Island	Puerto Rico	Venezuela	0.0.0.2
5	5	4	4	4	4	4	4	• 3	5	4	fat.
10	4	4	5	5	3	4	3	4	z	2	
-8	3	2	5	5	2	4	2	4	1	1	SEC
5	4	3	5	4	3	4	Z	4	1	1	TOP SECRE
	61	59	55	50	49	48	44	43	42	37	,

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4. Groundwave, daytime signal in Cuba

Program feed from U.S.

signal in Cuba

Skywave, nighttime

Fading zone effects

Total

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in Cuba

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Attachment #1

### TOPSECRET

#### UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY

WASHINGTON

#### August 3, 1962

#### MEMORANDUM FOR: Brig. General Edward G. Lansdale

SUBJECT: The Technical Feasibility of Medium Wave Broadcasting to Cuba.

The problem presented is how best to provide a medium wave radio signal throughout the island of Cuba. For purposes of this study it is assumed that the transmitter will be located outside the continental United States, and it is assumed that the transmitter will have a power of a thousand kilowatts and will use a directional antenna. And it is further assumed that the North American Regional Broadcasting agreement (NARBA), to which the United States is a signatory nation, will be abrogated.

If it is assumed that a clear channel can be provided by the FCC and if it is assumed that the Cuban government would not attempt to interfere with the transmissions, satisfactory service could be provided from a number of Caribbean sites. If you were primarily interested in daytime coverage, Jamaica, Grand Cayman or Andros Island in the Bahamas would be best. However, if both day and night were considered, and varying factors were weighted, the sites would be ranked as follows: Nassau 61, Dominican Republic 59, Jamaica-Cayman Island 55, Navassa Island 50, Nicaragua-Honduras 49, Swan Island 48, British Honduras 44, Grand Abaco-Grand Bahama Island 43, Puerto Rico 42, Venezuela 37.

If the FCC did not provide a clear channel, nighttime coverage would be drastically reduced. In order to provide such a channel, the government would undoubtedly have to purchase an existing clear channel station since its value would be ruined by our extended use of its frequency. It should also be borne in mind that our transmitting power of a thousand kilowatts would undoubtedly severely interfere with U.S. and Caribbean stations on adjacent channels and would undoubtedly result in many complaints from Caribbean countries.

Previously Declassified/Released on 12-28-88 (FIS-421) under providions of E.O. 1\_\_\_\_ by N. Marra, Millard Com " " C uncil

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Attachment #2

8 August 1962

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#### MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL LANSDALE

From: Robert A. Hurwitch (State) and Don Wilson (USIA)

Subject: Joint State-USIA Memorandum

State and USIA have considered the political pros and cons of the 10 best locations for medium-wave transmitters. We rate them in the following order:

#### 1. Dominican Republic

The Dominican Republic would probably welcome such an opportunity. They are currently unhappy about Cuban broadcasts and would most likely be pleased to retaliate. A station in the Dominican Republic would have a Latin American cover, although it would have more of a taint of U.S. -Yankee influence than in Venezuela. It should be pointed out that the Council of State is scheduled to go out of office in December. Any successor to it might not be as enthusiastic about such a station.

#### 2. Venezuela

This would be a very desirable choice because the Betancourt Government would provide highly acceptable cover for the station. The precarious position of the Government, however, makes it quite unlikely that Betancourt would agree to establishing the station in Venezuela, for it would gratuitously provide ammunition for his political opposition.

#### 3. Jamaica/Cayman Islands

Despite its anti-Castro policies, the attitude of the newly independent Jamaican Government to such a project would probably be negative. The presence of many thousands of Jamaicans in Cuba would be a major factor affecting a Jamaican commitment of this kind.

#### 4. Honduras

A station here would have a Latin American cover in a country that has a reasonably democratic tradition. However, the likelihood of the Honduran Government agreeing to the establishment of the station in Honduras before the elections in October 1963 is very remote.

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#### 5. Nassau/British Honduras/Gr. Abaco/Gr. Bahama Islands

A commitment by the British to such a broadcast facility would be very desirable politically. The involvement of a major NATO power would have beneficial effects throughout the Hemisphere. However, the possibility of British commitment to such a broadcast facility is practically nil.

#### 6. Nicaragua

The image of Nicaragua as a long-time dictatorship would make this a most undesirable site. The credibility of a broadcasting station located in Nicaragua would be almost totally under-cut from its inception. The Nicaraguan Government would probably welcome such an opportunity, however.

#### 7. Navassa/Puerto Rico

As U.S. territory, both these alternatives would bear the same general liabilities as a location in Florida.

#### 8. Swan Island

We reject the consideration of Swan Island outright, because its credibility has been totally under-cut by its association in the minds of the Cubans with the April 1961 invasion failure.

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#### Attachment #3

#### UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY

#### WASHINGTON

August 4, 1962

#### JOINT USLA -CLA MEMORANDUM FOR:

#### Brigadier General Edward G. Lansdale

In a memorandum dated May 23, 1962, from Edward R. Murrow to Brigadier General Edward G. Lansdale, USIA recommended a Radio Free Europe type approach utilizing either: the present facilities of Radio Swan, facilities located in Florida, one of the Caribbean Islands, or a floating transmitter. Since that time CIA has developed a Radio Free Europe type project to be operated from facilities located in Florida. USIA has not as yet seen this plan.

USIA and CIA have been asked to comment on the future capabilities of medium-wave broadcasting from Radio Swan -- Radio Americas. It is our present feeling that no new medium-wave capability should be developed from Radio Swan. Our reasons are as follows:

1. Radio Swan, a 50 kilowatt medium-wave station is operating at maximum technical capability now. In order to improve its technical capability, an entirely new facility would have to be constructed.

2. There are better locations than Swan Island for such new facilities. USIA's memorandum of August 3, 1962, addressed to you points out, for example, that Nassau, Dominican Republic, Cayman Island-Jamaica, Navassa Island, Nicaragua, Honduras are all better locations. Florida, of course, is too.

3. The logistics involved in supplying Swan Island are extremely expensive and difficult. The construction of a new facility would involve building a pier, developing off-shore fueling points and constructing an entirely new power supply. The Island is so small that the radiated power from new transmitters would create a problem of mutual interference with necessary receiving facilities.

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4. Radio Swan is, in our opinion, inextricably linked with the failure of the April 17, 1961 invasion attempt. Its credibility is low. A new Radio Free Europe type sponsorship would always be tarred by past associations.

5. We do not believe that a change in the frequency would hide its identity. A change of frequency would be reported as a matter of course in the Free World. It certainly would draw continuing attention from Castro propagandists.

6. We do not believe that a change in name would materially improve the credibility of the station. Although currently called Radio Americas, the evidence from refugees indicates that Cuban listenership still regards the facility as Radio Swan.

(signed)

Donald M. Wilson Deputy Director USIA

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Cleared by: CIA - Mr. Seymour Bolten (signed)

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Attachment #4

### **TOP SECRET**

UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY WASHINGTON

May 23, 1962

TOP SECRET - Group 2

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Brigadier General Edward G. Lansdale

#### SUBJECT: Medium-Wave Broadcasting to Cuba

Attached is the requested memorandum on broadcasting.

(signed)

Edward R. Murrow Director

Attachments:

As stated (TOP SECRET)

ALUIOUSLY Declassified/Relasced on 12-28-88 by N. Manan, National Scruthy Council

### TOP SECRET

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#### ABSTRACT

Medium-wave broadcasting to Cuba is possible. After a careful study of the various possibilities, we feel that the most feasible approach would be to strengthen the Radio Americas (Radio Swan) operation and give it a new approach somewhat comparable to Radio Free Europe. We believe that a privately operated station of this type, with covert support, could attract and hold substantial listenership in Cuba. As alternatives or supplements we would suggest installation of a new medium-wave facility pointed to Cuba in Florida or one of the Caribbean islands or use of a "Courier" type floating transmitter operating from our territorial water. Contracting with one of the 17 U.S. "clear channel" stations entails certain economic and internal political roadblocks but remains a possibility for short term tactical purposes.

There are strong obstacles to any of these, the main legal one being our adherence to an international agreement which, in effect, prevents us from beaming medium-wave signals into another country. To ignore this might bring on serious reprisals, such as Cuban interference with domestic U.S. medium-wave broadcasts over wide areas of the United States. Technical obstacles include the high noise level and bad atmospheric conditions over Cuba, the relative ease of jamming medium-wave, and the low strength of transmitters currently available to us.

It is our strong opinion that the U.S. Government should not engage in overt electronic warfare with the Cubans.

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### TOPISECRET

#### MEMORANDUM

#### SUBJECT: Medium-Wave Broadcasting to Cuba

#### I. Situation:

Studies over the past several years indicate that medium-wave broadcasting from mainland or island points to Cuba, using either existing or new equipment, is feasible but has serious limiting factors.

A VOA survey prior to our rupture of diplomatic relations with Cuba disclosed that day time hours reception of U.S. medium-wave, in Cuba, was not very good. Along the northern shore of the island, fair reception of WGBS Miami and WKWK Key West was possible but these stations could not be heard very far inland or in the large cities. During the night hours, when medium wave reception generally improves, the Miami and Key West stations and WSB Atlanta on 710 kw could be received quite well throughout the western half of Cuba.

Subsequent experience with Radio Swan (now Radio Americas) and Cuban exile hours on the Miami station, demonstrates that a reasonable but not consistent medium wave signal can be laid down to the island, and can be heard reasonably well in some areas. But on balance we would have to rate the utility of these existing channels, from a technical standpoint, as being marginal at best because of sporadic reception, high noise levels, and the relative case of jamming. The prospects for medium-wave transmission over different channels or new and more powerful facilities are better but must also be weighed in the light of the limiting factors discussed below.

#### Limiting Factors

1. The United States and Cuba both subscribe to two international telecommunications agreements applicable to medium-wave broadcasting. They are the Geneva Telecommunications Convention of 1959 and the North American Regional Broadcasting Agreement, both of which have been ratified by the U.S. Senste and have full treaty status.

These agreements regulate broadcasting so that participating countries may make the most effective use of medium-wave for national radio coverage. Both agreements protect participants from "harmful" or "objectionable"

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interference. In addition, the Geneva agreement contains an implied policy against infernational broadcasting in the standard or medium-wave bands.

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The Department of State's legal advisor, in an opinion dated June, 1960, stated that if United States' high-power medium-wave broadcasts to Cuba resulted in harmful or objectional interference to stations in Cuba or signatory nations of the Geneva or NARBA agreements, the United States would be in violation of these agreements. The opinion also stated that if the United States violated either of these agreements, Cuba could lawfully denounce them insofar as its obligations to protect Cuban stations from interference and lawfully could take measures against U.S. stations.

Note should be taken here of the reprisal measures of which Cuba is capable should it choose. Cuba could: (a) seriously interfere with domestic U.S. medium-wave broadcasts over wide areas of the U.S. (as far north as New York and as far west as the Mississippi) with resulting economic repercussions to the U.S. stations concerned; and (b) jam U.S. medium-wave programs to Cuba.

2. Clear Channel - Another significant domestic consideration results from the fact that any high-power medium-wave station sited in the U.S. and beaming programs to Cuba would, by necessity, have to use one of the seventeen so-called clear channel frequencies allocated exclusively to the U.S. by the NARBA agreement. These channels are not restricted as to the power of the transmitter. Each of the seventeen clear channels used in the U.S. has been assigned for many years to the largest and most powerful broadcast stations in this country, and they form the economic backbone of the major radio net works in the U.S. Unless one of these channels can be made available, there is no suitable frequency on which the U.S. could broadcast to Cuba with a high-power medium-wave transmitter. It is very unlikely that a private station would give up a clear channel voluntarily for use by the government or tolerate limitations on its coverage by sharing, and on the other hand any attempt by the government to obtain a frequency involuntarily is certain to get a strong negative response by the broadcast industry. Nevertheless, the use of these facilities for any short term tactical purposes remains a possibility.

3. Jamming - It appears that Cuba is in the process of developing a formidable jamming system. It has been confirmed by monitoring observations (by members of our engineering staff and by the FBIS) that Cuba is using noise jammers on Radio Americas' (ex-Radio Swan) shortwave transmissions on 6000 kcs. Radio Americas' medium-wave transmissions on 1160 kcs is now being interfered with intentionally by several Cuban broadcasting stations which

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have been placed on the same frequency. Already identified among these stations are COJK-Camaguey, Radio Imra in Havana (believed to be a new high-power transmitter possibly purchased from Czechoslovakia), and a station in Matanzas.

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A very strong Cuban noise jamming station is now also interfering with the Spanish language broadcasts from WGBS in Miami on 710 kcs. The jamming signal is so strong that during the night time hours it is also causing interference to reception of other domestic radio stations in the U.S. operating on 710 kcs in New York City (WOR) and Shreveport, Louisiana (KEEL).

It should also be noted here that the Cuban airways are already cluttered by some 135 medium-wave radio stations, of which an estimated 30 are in the Havana area. This, by itself, complicates the problem of broadcasting via medium-wave to the island.

Atmospheric conditions also enter the broadcasting picture. According to the VOA, Cuba has one of the highest atmospheric noise levels in the world. Noise is much greater in the summer than in the winter. The higher the noise, the stronger the radio signal required [0, intelligibility.

#### 4. Economic considerations

Owners of several U.S. commercial radio stations queried by the Voice indicated willingness to cooperate with the government in broadcasting medium-wave to Cuba but pointed out some serious financial matters involved. Advertising contracts extend far into the future and would have to be broken if the station undertook Cuban programming. Even though the government paid a radio station for broadcasting its programs during prime evening time, this would severely damage the station's domestic audience and therefore its future commercial standing.

Time could be acquired more easily after normal broadcasting ceases and reception would be better in Cuba, but obviously the audience is smaller after midnight.

These considerations point up the fact that the problem of contracting time on a strong commercial station is great on both sides, government and the station, the cost is high, and the risks high. Another agency has, as noted above, made use of commercial radio time in the Miami area for Spanish language broadcasting which spills over to Cuba. But experience has shown that the signal is not too good, and the operation is highly susceptible to jamming.

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#### II. Reconstituting present covert facilities.

Reports going back for some period of time show that Radio Americas (formerly Radio Swan) is heard in Cuba. But this station became thoroughly discredited some time back, to the extent that a change in name, personnel and programming was needed. Listenership has never been recouped, and CIA representatives at the various inter-agency meetings tell us that they are taking another long look at the operation with an eye toward revitalizing it.

We believe that a complete shift in broadcast tone and attitude, as well as more powerful facilities, are needed. We suggest that the organization and programming be patterned more closely along the concept of Radio Free Europe. Hard, aggressive promotion by a privately financed organization, one which seeks contributions in the U.S., as does RFE, but with undercover financial support from CIA and programming assistance from USIA, could go far to set this vehicle back on its feet and attract listenership in Cuba. This type of "Radio Free Cuba" approach, bringing the operation out into the open rather than in the murky, mysterious shadows as heretofore, could make the station a good channel for tough, hard programming into Cuba.

It might be well here to discuss the different concepts of VOA and covert programming. VOA broadcasts direct to Latin America on short wave only. It will have a greatly increased technical effectiveness starting in December when the 500 kw short-wave transmitters in Greenville go on the air. VOA's tone is, and we believe should continue to be, more like the BBC than like RFE or Radio Liberty. VOA is directly attributed to the U.S. Government, It's usefulness is strategic, not tactical. The experiences of the British station in Cyprus (whose effectiveness was destroyed in two days during Suez) and of <u>Radio Swan</u> (whose effectiveness diminished drastically after the Bay of Pigs) are adequate to show the unwisdom of trying to use radio for short-range tactical purposes when not supported by hard facts.

When covert or semi-covert radio operations are established, particular care must be given to the purpose and the timing of the operation. Assuming that it is possible to establish a Radio Free Cuba with attribution to some private American organization, the stance and the tone and the purpose will have to be clearly defined. It seems inevitable to us that such an operation would in time take on the tone of the Cuban refugees in Miami and the station would begin to sound like the voice of those who propose to liberate Cuba from Castroism in the near future. Fiery denunciations and exhortations can be effective only for

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a relatively short time before they become incredible, boring, and exasperating, unless supported by action. The broadcasts, to achieve peak effectiveness, must be coordinated with military operations. If one is behind the other then the tactical use of the radio station will be ineffective.

The hard fact should be faced, therefore, that the new operation would have to have a stance and posture quite different from that of VOA's, or there would be no use starting it. Simply to give the Cuban refugee organizations their own radio mouthpiece is not an end in itself, because of the self-limiting factors in this kind of broadcasting, as we have seen them elsewhere.

Basically, then, the key to starting such an operation would have to be the decision in such an operation to military action. This would be an expendable tactical radio operation with the mission of raising the Cuban expectations of U.S. assistance, and also of reminding Cubans that when Castro falls retribution will be meeted out to those who do not abandon him promptly. In our judgment, VOA's role would still be to continue its longer range strategic approach.

The present covert WGBS Miami operation should also be improved. We understand that this station has become somewhat discredited within Cuba because of the strong refugee flavor of its programming. Greater acceptance might be obtained by devoting this valuable broadcast time (to which persons in Cuba listen at considerable personal risk) to hard news, commentary, and documented programming, rather than flowery refugee oratory.

#### III. Possible New Medium-Wave Approaches

A. The "Courier" is a ship-based transmitter run by USIA and based at Rhodes, Greece. Use of this type of transmitter to Cuba has been debated at some length. While the idea sounds good, and would virtually insure a clear signal into the island, it would require some basic decisions. For one thing, the "Courier" is currently engaged in Arabic-language broadcasting in the Middle East and will not be available until new facilities are constructed and available toward the end of 1963. To pull it out before then would mean the termination of Arabic language broadcasts. No other "Courier" type ship is available. Apart from this major consideration, this operation could run afoul of one or another of the "limiting factors" mentioned above, plus a few more:

1) Communications channel problems: Someone (The FCC?) would have to assign the transmitter a frequency or frequencies which would not conflict with those allocated to U.S. stations. The "Courier" is a powerful transmitter and the possibilities of interference run high. The fact that

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its antennae are non-directional makes this risk even greater. The FCC would have to be asked for an opinion on this one very early in the game.

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2) Maritime law problems: Maritime law forbids medium-wave broadcasting from the high seas. The "Courier" would have to be anchored within U.S. territorial limits, or inside the limits of a third country which might cooperate with us in the operation. The possibility of anchoring it at Guantanamo could be explored.

B. Guantanamo Naval Base. We understand that broadcasts over the base radio station reach out into nearby areas, including the city of Santiago de Cuba. An increase in the power might extend the signal across the island to Havana. USIA could assist in programming if a decision were made to use this station for our political purposes. A more feasible arrangement would be for the Guantanamo station to relay regular VOA programs, use VOA tapes, etc.

C. The British are currently installing a TV station in the Bahama Islands. It may be possible to bounce a signal from there to Cuba. There are also medium-wave stations in the Islands, but they have very little power. If given the authority, we could enter negotiations with the British for limited use of the TV facility and land to install a new medium-wave transmitter beamed toward Cuba.

D. In October of this year we expect to take delivery of a 50 kw mediumwave transmitter which is one component of a mobile transmitter complex also including three 50 kw short-wave transmitters. This mobile unit might be diverted to the Cuban problem if an appropriate location were available. We understand that under average propagation conditions the transmitter will have a range of 100 miles, up to 300 miles if given a particularly good location.

Apart from use on the mainland, which has objectionable features from various points of view including those of existing commercial facilities here, we could explore the possibility of siting somewhere in the Bahamas, as discussed above, or in Jamaica. Negotiations would be required in either case. We originally considered the Dominican Republic as an appropriate location but discarded this because of atmospheric conditions which virtually preclude a clear signal from there to Cuba.

E. Installation of a permanent medium-wave facility in Southern Florida. Voice of America technicians have studied this possibility at some length.

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VOA currently has an unused 500 kw transmitter which could be installed in Florida for an estimated cost of \$1.5 million excluding cost of power lines to the site. Construction time would be one year. The 500 kw with directional antennas would provide a massive signal covering Cuba day and night, summer and winter. This signal would also cover the entire Caribbean including most of Central America and parts of Colombia and Ecuador. Studies indicate that the transmitter could be mounted in trucks and therefore be mobile at no extra cost over a fixed installation.

The annual operating cost of a 500 kw transmitter, programming five hours daily would be in the neighborhood of \$350,000.

#### IV. Current Overt Radio Programming to Cuba

The daily VOA three-hour short-wave Cuban show (plus six more hours in Spanish directed at Latin America in general) is the U.S. Government's only existing overt radio transmission to Cuba. Reliable sources indicate good listenership to this program, but the fact remains that Cuba has relatively few short-wave receivers (estimated in 1960 at 200,000, probably less now due to breakdowns) and our prospective audience on the island is therefore limited. VOA suggests that the short-wave audience in Cuba can be increased materially by undercover import of great numbers of short-wave receivers into the island. If such activity were authorized, the equipment smuggled into Cuba should be of the type most commonly used there now so as to reduce the danger of apprehension by the Cuban authorities.

Format of the Cuban hours is as follows:

15 minutes of news every hour on the hour, with the balance consisting of commentaries on Cuban developments; interviews with Cuban refugees in Miami, features such as <u>Voice</u> <u>Over the Seá</u>, which consists of excerpts of letters from Cuba received daily; adventure programs with a heavy anti-Castro emphasis; special events coverages such as the recent arrival of a group of Cuban exiles in Washington; programs designed to counteract Castro propaganda lies.

Other material bearing on Cuba is interspersed throughout the remaining six Spanish broadcast hours and averages about one hour in length per day. An example of this type of material is "The Three Villalobos," an adventure series about three brothers who lead the fight against a Castro-like mythical Communist dictatorship.

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One final thought. Being directly attributed to the U.S. Government, our daily VOA programming maintains a high level of credibility. We feel that this level must be maintained at all cost. We must look to covert or other types of operations for programming of a harder propaganda line. It is our opinion that the U.S. Government should not engage in electronic warfare in the Cuban situation.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)

From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale

Subject: Stepped Up Course B

You requested a paper on "a possible stepped up Course B as to content, implication and difference from present course of action."

<u>Course B</u> was described in our 25 July team review of Operation Mongoose, as a course of action possible under present U.S. policy. It read: "b. Exert all possible diplomatic, economic, psychological, and other pressures to overthrow the Castro-Communist regime, without overt employment of U.S. military." The major difference from Phase I of Operation Mongoose would be in removing the restriction, in the 14 March policy guidelines, which kept our actions "short of those reasonably calculated to inspire a revolt within the target area."

As a practical way of getting a meaningful paper to you, for consideration prior to the policy meeting, I held working sessions with the Operational Representatives: Mr. Hurwitch (State), Gen. Harris (Defense), Mr. Harvey (CIA), and Mr. Wilson (USIA). After benefit of discussion, each was tasked with writing a specific section of this paper. The thinking reflects those of responsible representatives, rather than completely staffed positions from participating departments and agencies.

The papers from each representative are attached. The major contribution is from CIA, since CIA would have the main burden in a stepped up Course B. The State, Defense, and USIA papers are essentially reflective of companion roles to CIA's covert activities. USIA has added a "think piece" on anticipated world-wide psychological reaction to a stepped up Course B.

Excluded from automatic regrading: DoD Dir. 5400.10 does not apply Partially Declassified/Released on <u>1-5-89</u> (F89-751) under provisions of E.O. 12356 by N. Manan, National Security Cauncil

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8 Augus t 1962


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
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED) Subject: Consequences of US Military Intervention in Cuba (TS) 58

1. On 2 August 1962 the Chief of Operations, Operation MONGOOSE, requested the DOD/JCS Representative, Operation MONGOOSE, to prepare a paper for distribution to the Special Group (Augmented) on 8 August 1962. The specific requirement is to set forth "Consequences of (US) Military Intervention (in Cuba) to include cost (personnel, units and equipment), effect on world-wide ability to react, possibility of a requirement for sustained occupation, the level of national mobilization required, and Cuban counteraction." Pursuant to this request, the requirement has been divided into its separate parts.

2. Requirements (personnel, units and equipment)



c. Major units involved in the initial assault include:




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
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States will be augmented by the additional Naval and Air Force forces brought into the area for this operation. Therefore, no redeployment of CONAD forces from other areas is anticipated.

5. Castro-Cuban Counteraction.

a. The military reaction will be determined in large measure by the will of the Cuban armed forces to resist, as well as by the weapons available to them and their proficiency in their use, at the time of US military intervention.

b. The military capabilities of Cuba are oriented primarily toward defensive activities. Cuban plans are believed to contemplate a strong initial resistance, followed by a determined defense of preselected keypoints, and finally by protracted guerrilla warfare.

c. Cuba has about 50 MIG fighters, some of which may be configured for carrying light bombs. Any of these that survive the US air strikes could be used offensively against targets in Florida. Also they have 11 B-26 aircraft some of which, if they survive the air strikes by US forces, could attempt to attack targets in the southeastern United States. All forces engaged in the operation, as well as the Continental Air Defense forces, however, would be alert to guard against any such attempts at retaliation.

d. In the future the Castro-Cuban capability for counteraction will improve if Soviet's continue to provide the Cubans with additional military equipment and training. Thus, the urgency of the requirement to remove the Communist government from Cuba is made apparent by Castro's constantly increasing capabilities.

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#### 6. Possibility of a Requirement for a Sustained Occupation.

a. The duration of a US military presence in Cuba is contingent upon such factors as the will of Castro-Cuban forces to resist invasion, the degree of popular support a defeated Castro might receive for the conduct of residual guerrilla operations, and time required to reconstitute an effective friendly Cuban government.

b. Following the establishment of essential military control of the island, a substantial US military commitment may be required in Cuba for a significant period of time. Post assault tasks will include restoration of law and order and the conduct of counterguerrilla operations.

c. To achieve the objectives of subparagraph b above, it is planned that the post assault military presence initially will consist of substantial Army follow-on forces with such other sea and air support as may be required. This will be reduced gradually in size as the effectiveness of the new Cuban government increases. Thercafter, a lengthy period of providing military assistance is anticipated.

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7 August 1962

#### POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC

Robert A. Hurwitch, Department of State Representative for Operation Mongoose, states:

It should be recognized at the outset that short of the employment of U.S. military force the programs and actions of the U.S. aimed at the downfall of the Castro Government will probably be only marginal as compared to the policies and actions of the Castro Government itself and those of the USSR. Despite the preponderance of power presently at the disposal of the Castro Government, however, the deteriorating and mis-managed Cuban economy coupled with a generally discontented and volatile people whose lives are becoming increasingly regimented provide some of the ingredients of an uprising against the regime. U.S. actions may in this unstable situation provide the necessary spark; they may not. Since there are no scientific means of determining which actions offer assurances of success, we can only probe and experiment. In so doing, however, we should avoid engaging U.S. prestige openly in operations, the success of which may be doubtful.

The present course of action with respect to Cuba involves the exercise of all feasible political, economic and psychological pressures, as well as limited covert activities within Cuba, designed to make the Castro Government's survival more difficult and to isolate Cuba from the Hemisphere, thereby detracting from its value to the Sino-Soviet Bloc, and reducing its capability to threaten the peace and security of the Hemisphere. This course of action has undoubtedly contributed to an advance toward these objectives over the past year.

Under a stepped up Course B, the actions that might feasibly be undertaken by the Department of State are limited in scope. The Department would continue to invest political capital in courses of action designed to weaken, isolate and eventually effect the downfall of the Castro Government whenever it repronably appeared that the benefits from each course of action would outweigh the losses for the free world.

A stepped up Course B would appear to involve primarily an increase in covert activities which might stimulate the creation of Declassified/Released on <u>12-21-51</u> FIS J) under provisions of E.O. 12356 by N. Menan, National Security Count OF SECRET

organized internal resistance to the Castro Government. Of the variety of such covert activities a program of systematic sabotage warrants serious consideration. (Added note on page 4.)

It may be reasonably argued that a program of sabotage should not be undertaken until an organized base of political opposition already exists in Cuba. It may be equally persuasively argued, however, that a program of sabotage may contribute significantly to the creation of such a base of political opposition. Since organized political opposition does not now exist in Cuba, a program of sabotage may prove to be the means of developing one. This program is visualized as three-fold: supply of sabotage materiel to Cubans in Cuba who are not under U S. control; supply of sabotage materiel and instructions as to targets to Cubans in Cuba under our control; and sabotage of targets by Cubans under our control who arrive in Cuba, destroy the target, and withdraw from Cuba. Priority should be given to targets of economic importance, the destruction of which would result in the minimum possible loss of life. Terroristic acts of sabotage should be ruled out.

A second area of covert activities which might contribute to the formation of organized opposition to the Castro Government is that of improved techniques of propaganda beamed to the Cuban people. Consideration should be given to seeking the establishment of a powerful, medium wave radio station in a friendly country on the Caribbean perimeter, operated by selected Cuban refugees.

There follow a list of overt political and economic actions which the Department of State might undertake under a stepped up Course B, with advantages and disadvantages briefly noted where pertinent:

#### POLITICAL

A. Be prepared to initiate action or support another American Republic's initiative against Cuba in the OAS or subordinate inter-American organization, as the appropriate occasion arises.

Advantage: Such action would continue to place the Cuban problem in a multilateral context, thereby advancing the "Hemisphere versus Cuba" impression.

Disadvantage: If poor judgment were exercised and an inappropriate occasion chosen for OAS action, such action could place on public display sharp division among the OAS member states and could serve to weaken the inter-American system.

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B. Continue and intensify, where possible and necessary, the diplomatic and political campaign to inform free world governments and peoples of the nature and activities of the Castro Government and urge them, as appropriate, to undertake all feasible actions which would undermine the Castro Government and demonstrate solidarity with the Cuban people.

Advantage: Continuance of this campaign, where successful, would serve to isolate and weaken further the Castro Government.

<u>Disadvantage</u>: If overdone, such a campaign could result in other nations and peoples regarding the U.S. as immature and neurotic with respect to the subject of Cuba, since, in many instances, they do not regard the existence of the Castro Government with the same degree of concern as does the U.S.

C. Encourage Latin American Governments to take steps to prevent their nationals from traveling to Cuba.

Advantage: This action would contribute to isolating Cuba and reducing its capability of subversive activities in the Hemisphere.

<u>Disadvantage</u>: Most Latin American nations do not have legislation which provides for control over travel of its nationals to specific countries. Attempts to obtain such legislation with respect to travel to Cuba could create serious local political problems.

D. Be prepared to exploit by diplomatic and other means, any indication of a split in the regime from which there may emerge significant anti-Castro/communist elements.

E. Continue and intensify where possible and necessary, U.S. efforts to strengthen the democratic sectors in Latin America under the Alliance for Progress program in order to improve their capabilities of countering Castro-communist threats to political stability and orderly economic and social development.

F. Continue the program of seeking hard evidence of Cuban subversive activities in the Hemisphere.

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G. Exploit all feasible opportunities for denying markets in the free world for Cuban exports.

<u>Advantage</u>: This action, where successful, would exacerbate Cuba's already precarious foreign exchange position and further reduce its ability to purchase vital equipment in the free world.

<u>Disadvantage</u>: In some instances, Cuban exports are less expensive than are similar products from alternate sources. Under these circumstances, the U.S. might be compelled to subsidize the alternate sources, an operation for which funds are not currently available.

H. Exploit all feasible opportunities for preventing the shipment of critical spare parts and equipment from free world sources to Cuba.

Added note on sabotage

Distinction should be made between major and dramatic sabotage acts and those that might be characterized as irritants or harassment: for example, complete destruction of oil refineries or power plants as compared to temporary impairment of sugar refineries or cutting of power lines. With respect to the first category, such acts should not be isolated events but rather should be accompanied by other actions in Cuba which might have resulted from the particular act of sabotage or of which the act of sabotage might have been the result. Acts of sabotage of the second category might be isolated events.

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#### 7 August 1962

#### PSYCHOLOGICAL

Donald M. Wilson, USIA Representative for Operation Mongoose, states:

Under stepped-up Course B there would be two psychological tasks:

1. Increase the flow of information to Cuba, exposing the weaknesses and perfidies of the Castro/Communist regime.

2. Improve the informational capability throughout Latin America to "isolate" Castro/Communism and build up support for pro-democratic Cuban elements.

#### 1. Increase the flow of information to Cuba.

a. Where other access is denied us, radio is the best means to reach the Cuban people. It is USIA's view that our short wave capability (VOA) is operating at the most efficient technical level, with nine hours of broadcasting a day in Spanish. Three of the nine hours are devoted specifically to Cuba, while the other six concern themselves with the rest of Latin America. All are heard clearly in Cuba and will be heard much more clearly in December, 1962, when our new transmitter in Greenville, North Carolina, goes on the air.

The establishment of a medium wave capability would be desirable. It is indeed possible to broadcast a strong signal into Cuba, and USIA has made a study of ten possible sites to locate transmitters (reported separately). Our study also shows, however, that Castro has the ready capability to jam our effort with an extraordinarily high percentage of success. Faced with Castro's capability, should the U.S. undertake construction of a powerful broadcasting facility at an estimated cost of eight million dollars and an estimated building time of fifteen months? It is always possible that Castro would not utilize his jamming capability and the U.S. would therefore have a successful medium-wave operation into Cuba. Should an uprising occur, the opportunities presented by such a U.S. medium-wave capability would be great. Should there be an ultimate military action by the United States, the opportunities of such a capability would also be great. However, if none of these contingencies occur, we will have an expensive operation on our hands with small listenership to show for it.

> Partially Declassified/Released on <u>1-5-89</u> (FRC-756) under provisions of E.O. 12356 by N. Menan, National Security Council

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
7 August 1962

#### MILITARY

General Benjamin T. Harris, DOD/JCS Representative for Operation Mongoose, states:

1. <u>Support:</u> Within its capabilities DOD is prepared to provide all required support to CIA, State and USIA necessary to the accomplishment of the objectives of Operation Mongoose.


2. <u>Military Readiness</u>: If there is a decision to use U.S. military force, execution of our military contingency plans for Cuba will be undertaken as rapidly as the posture of our forces will allow at the time the decision is made.



c. In concept, initial military operations commence with an air and naval blockade, concentrated air strikes, and coordinated naval gunfire to effect destruction of enemy airpower and to neutralize and destroy as much as possible of the enemy armor, artillery and anti-air capability.

> TOPSECRET (78-758) under provisions of E.O. 12356 by N. Menan, National Security Council

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#### 2. Improve the information capability throughout Latin America

Our capability will depend on the availability of funds. The Latin American program was stepped-up 32 percent in Fiscal Year '62 and it will be stepped-up 26 percent more in Fiscal Year '63, so the availability of even more funds is a real problem.

Here are examples of current programming which could be augmented:

1) <u>Radio</u>. We could step up our production of packaged radio programs for placement on radio stations throughout Latin America.

 Cartoon Books. The Agency has done six anti-Castro cartoon books (5 million copies) having a widespread impact over the area. This program could be stepped-up.

3) Motion Pictures. The Agency has produced an animated film on Cuban land reform theme and has two more films in the pipeline. An increased production of films, although expensive, could be instituted.



Notice Had Belowed on 76 60034

14 August 1962

MONGOOSE

By the National Security Council under provisions of EQ. SARES //652-YLK 76-338 MTM. NAKS 2-5-80

> MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)

From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale

Subject: Alternate Course B

In compliance with the desires expressed in the 10 August policy meeting on Operation Mongoose, the Operational Representatives have worked out the attached outline of an Alternate Course B, for your consideration. More detailed planning can be undertaken when guidelines are firmed for future activities.

Attachment

"Special Handling" numbered copies to:

Special Group (Series A)

1.	General Taylor
2.	Mr. Johnson
3.	Mr. Gilpatric

- 4. Mr. McCone
- 5. Mr. Kennedy
- 6. General Lemnitzer

Added (Series B)

1.	Mr.	Bundy	3.	Mr.	McNamara
2.	Mr.	Rusk	4.	Mr.	Murrow

Operational Representatives (Series B)

5. Mr. Hurwitch (State)

- 6. General Harris (Defense)
- 7. Mr. Harvey (CIA)
- 8. Mr. Wilson (USLA)
- 9/10 Chief of Operations

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IME - Mr. Scott

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
> Howard Furnas Deputy Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Meso for the Special Group dated August 14, copy 2.

> Declassified/Released on <u>1-5-89</u> (F86-758) under provisions of E.O. 12306 (F86-758) N. Manta, Pristand Samery Council

> > EVES CHLY



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By the National Security Council under provisions of E.O. 19985 //652 NLK 76-338, MTTH, NARS, 2-5-80

14 August 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)

From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale

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  Mr. Kennedy
- 6. General Lemnitzer

#### Added (Series B)

1.Mr. Bundy3.Mr. McNamara2.Mr. Rusk4.Mr. Murrow

#### Operational Representatives (Series B)

5. Mr	. Hurwitch (State)		And State of State of State of State
6. Ger	neral Harris (Defense)	- EVOLUTION	TROM AUTOMATIC
7. Mr	. Harvey (CIA)	RECENDENC	DIR 5200.10
8. Mr	. Wilson (USLA)	DOSS	NOT AFFLY
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CE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

12 September 1962

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From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale 24

Subject: Phase II, Operation Mongoose

The attached addendum reflects discussions by the Special Group on Phase II, Operation Mongoose. Request that this be held with the operational projection of 31 August, which was sent you under the same subject as above.



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
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### ADDENDUM, PHASE II OPERATION MONGOOSE


As noted by the Special Group, clarifications are given below on numbered activities listed in the 31 August projection of Phase II:

10. (Broadcasts). USIA was asked to take a further hard look at the capabilities for radio and TV broadcasts to Guba. USIA has done so, with the help of State and CIA. The study is attached. USIA concludes that improvement would result by raising Key West station WKWF to 50 kw, that medium wave and TV operations must be tied to short term tactical operations, and that it does not favor the U.S. engaging in all-out electronic warfare with Cuba at this time.

21. Note change, as underscored: "Direct propaganda at Soviet and other Bloc personnel in Cuba. (CIA and USIA)."







### UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY WASHINGTON

September 11, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Brig. Gen. Edward G. Lansdale

SUBJECT:

Broadcasting to Cuba

This memo will attempt to cover the present status of radio broadcasting to Cuba, possibilities of additional radio broadcasting, and the possible use of television to Cuba.

I. Present Operations

A. Short Wave - Overt

1. <u>VOA</u> - It is USIA's view that our short wave capability (VOA) is operating at an optimum technical level. We now broadcast nine hours daily in Spanish, three hours of which is devoted specifically to Cuban programming. In December 1962 the VOA's new Greenville, North Carolina, facility will become operational, giving a substantial increase in signal strength.

Programming is built around hard news and commentary, features and local Cuban happenings, particularly items not carried in the Castro/Communist media.

Listenership is limited by the availability of short wave receivers, estimated to be from 15 to 25% of the total number of receivers on the island (the number of short wave units is calculated to be between 195,000 and 325,000). However, Opa Locka interrogations indicate a very high percentage of VOA listenership at least in this particular group. (In June and July, of a total of 1370 refugees questioned on this point, 625 declared themselves regular listeners and were able to identify VOA programs by title or content.)

2. Short Wave Broadcasting - Covert

a. <u>Radio Americas</u>, in addition to its medium wave broadcasts provides for short wave simulcast of all medium wave programs. The transmitter, which has a power output of seven and one half kilowatts, is capable of delivering a good signal to the target area but is subjected to heavy jamming.

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b. Station WRUL, a commercial short wave station with transmitters in Boston and studios in New York, is owned by Metromedia. Its broadcasts are beamed to all of Latin America on five frequencies and are heard well in Cuba on at least two frequencies and to some extent on the remaining three. A thirty-minute program is produced and voiced by Dr. Luis CONTE Aguero, formerly one of Cuba's leading political commentators. The program itself is flexible with no established format although it deals generally in news and commentary on Cuba and other Communist countries. Its major purpose is to encourage resistance against Castro and to warn other Latin American countries of the dangers of Communism. In the processing of a group of recent Cuban arrivals, 12% claimed to have listened to WRUL and a majority of these had heard Dr. CONTE.

#### B. Medium Wave - Covert

1. <u>Radio Americas</u>, operated under a cover company, is a directly controlled radio station broadcasting on 1160 KC (also short wave) with a power of 50 kilowatts. The station broadcasts ten and one half hours daily, seven days per week, from Swan Island in the Caribbean. Programs are written and taped by Cuban excles working under Agency supervision and control.

The programs are directed to a general audience with special emphasis on farm and labor groups. Up-to-the-minute news programs are broadcast live on an hourly basis and taped editorials deal with current political problems. The station offers a broad range of music and entertainment, provides a daily religious program and broadcasts a five-minute report in Cantonese on current conditions in Communist China. Radio Americas is heavily jammed, but letters from inside Cuba and interviews with escapees indicate widely scattered listenership. For further details see Joint USLA-CLA Memorandum on Subject dated 4 August 1962.

A survey is now under way to determine if the technical effectiveness of SWAN can be improved.

2. Three commercial stations carry anti-Castro programs purchased by a front organization which is controlled directly by the Agency. The front organization is responsible for supplying programming under the general guidance of the Agency. Policy direction and thematic guidance are afforded on a continuing basis.

Stations used and a brief description of their program format follows:



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Station WGBS in Miami, operating with a power of 50 KW, delivers a strong medium wave signal to all of Cuba and is heard to some extent in Central America. Broadcasts targeted at Cuba are on the air from 11:30 to 12:30 p.m. and repeated at 6:00 to 7:00 a.m. The program consists of news, commentary, and music; and despite the unattractive hours, letters from inside Cuba and refugee interviews indicate that it has gained a reputation for credibility and reportedly enjoys a good audience.

Station WKWF in Key West is a low-powered medium wave station heard moderately well in the western half of Cuba. The program carries news, daily refutation of Castro's propaganda, interviews with Cuban refugees, and letters addressed to the station from persons inside Cuba. Directed at a varied audience, it devotes more time to workers, farmers, and students than to other groups. The two hour program runs from midnight to 2:00 a.m. and is repeated twice for a total of six hours of air tune ending at 6:00 a.m.

Station WWL is a Jesuit owned station in New Orleans operating at 50 KW on medium wave. It is heard well in Cuba and audience letters indicate that it has a growing listenership in Mexico. On from 10:30 to 11:00 p.m., EST, the program carries news and commentary, responses to Cuban broadcasts, and occasional interviews during weekdays. On Sundays, it features Bishop BOZA Masvidal who was Cuba's top church official prior to his exile by Castro. Dr. Hermio PORTELL Vila, probably Cuba's leading historian, also produces scripts for this program.

Beginning in October, program time on WWL will be expanded to two hours daily on week days and one hour on Sundays. Evening shows will run from 10:30 to 11:30 p.m., EST, and a morning program running from 5:00 to 6:00 a.m. will be added. The Sunday program will extend from 10:30 to 11:30 p.m. The expanded evening period will permit an increase in the time for refutation of Communist falsehoods and distortions, and permit additional feature programs. The morning program will be a repeat of the previous evening.

3. <u>Guantanamo</u>. A small AFN transmitter on the base. At last reports was broadcasting several short news summaries in Spanish which were reportedly received as far away as Santiago.

C. FM Broadcasting

There is no present use of FM broadcasting to Cuba.

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#### D. Television

There is no present use of TV to Cuba.

#### II. Possibilities of Additional Broadcasting

#### A. Medium Wave

#### 1. Policy Considerations

Both the U.S. and Cuba have ratified the Geneva Telecommunications Convention of 1959 and the North American Regional Broadcasting Agreement. These agreements regulate broadcasting so that participating countries may make the most effective use of medium wave for national radio coverage. Both agreements protect participants from "harmful" or "objectionable" interference. In addition, the Geneva agreement contains an implied policy against <u>international</u> broadcasting on the standard, or medium wave, bands.

The Department of State's legal advisor has given us an opinion stating that if the U.S.' high powered medium wave broadcasts to Cuba resulted in harmful or objectionable interference to stations in Cuba or other signatory nations of the Geneva or NARBA agreements, the U.S. would be in violation of said agreements. This opinion further states that if the U.S. violated either agreement, Cuba could lawfully denounce them under its obligations to protect Cuban stations from interference and could lawfully take measures against U.S. stations. The reprisal measures of which Cuba is capable include both jamming U.S. medium wave broadcasts to Cuba and seriously interfering with domestic U.S. medium wave broadcasts over wide areas of the U.S. (as far north as New York and as far west as the Mississippi) with resulting economic repercussions to U.S. broadcasting stations in this area.

The NARBA provides that the contracting governments may settle their differences through diplomatic channels or by any other method agreed upon. If no such method of settlement is adopted, by agreement of the parties the dispute may be submitted to the International Court of Justice or to a single arbitrator. In the absense of such agreement, the dispute is to be submitted to arbitration in accordance with the procedure set forth in Part II, § 2-7. The decision by the International Court of Justice or by the arbitrators is final and binding on the parties and not subject to review.



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In the case of the Geneva Conventions (Telecommunications), an alleged harmful interference would be reported by the offended nation to the International Frequency Registration Board. The Board, after investigation, would make recommendations to the alleged offending nation. In the event that this recommendation was not accepted, the offended nation would proceed under Article 27, Settlement of Differences. Under this section parties would use diplomatic channels or other methods agreed upon. If there were no agreed method for the settlement of the difference, under Annex 4 the parties would be required to follow the special arbitration provisions providing for the appointment of an independent arbitrator whose decision would be binding on the parties.

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Another significant domestic consideration results from the fact that any high power medium wave station sited in the U.S. and beaming programs to Cuba would, by necessity, have to use one of the seventeen so-called clear channel frequencies allocated exclusively to the U.S. by the NARBA agreement. These channels are not restricted as to the power of the transmitter. Each of the seventeen clear channels used in the U.S. has been assigned for many years to the largest and most powerful broadcast stations in this country, and they form the economic backbone of the major radio networks in the U.S. Unless one of these channels can be made available, there is no suitable frequency on which the U.S. could broadcast to Cuba with a high power medium wave transmitter. It is very unlikely that a private station would give up a clear channel voluntarily for use by the government or tolerate limitations on its coverage by sharing, and on the other hand any . attempt by the government to obtain a frequency involuntarily is certain to get a strong negative response by the broadcast industry. Nevertheless, the use of these facilities for any short term tactical purposes remains a possibility.

It appears that Cuba is in the process of developing a formidable jamming system. It has been confirmed by monitoring observations (by members of our engineering staff and by the FBIS) that Cuba is using noise jammers on Radio Americas' (ex-Radio Swan) shortwave transmissions on 6000 kcs. Radio Americas' medium wave transmissions on 1160 kcs is now being interfered with intentionally by several Cuban broadcasting stations which have been placed on the same 'requency. Already identified among these stations are COJK-Camaguey, Radio Imra in Havana (believed to be a new high power transmitter possibly purchased from Czechoslovakia), and a station in Matanzas.

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A very strong Cuban noise jamming station is now also interfering with the Spanish language broadcasts from WGBS in Miami on 710 kcs. The jamming signal is so strong that during the night time hours it is also causing interference to reception of other domestic radio stations in the U.S. operating on 710 kcs in New York City (WOR) and Shreveport, Louisiana (KEEL).

It should also be noted here that the Cuban airways are already cluttered by some 135 medium wave radio stations, of which an estimated 30 are in the Havana area. This, by itself, complicates the problem of broadcasting via medium wave to the island.

Atmospheric conditions also enter the broadcasting picture. According to the VOA. Cuba has one of the highest atmospheric noise levels in the world. Noise is much greater in the summer than in the winter. The higher the noise, the stronger the radio signal required for intelligibility.

Owners of several U.S. commercial radio stations queried by the Voice indicated willingness to cooperate with the government in broadcasting medium wave to Cuba but pointed out some serious financial matters involved. Advertising contracts extend far into the future and would have to be broken if the station undertook Cuban programming. Even though the government paid a radio station for broadcasting its programs during prime evening tune, this would severely damage the station's domestic audience and therefore its future commercial standing.

Time could be acquired more easily after normal broadcasting ceases and reception would be better in Cuba, but obviously the audience is smaller after midnight.

#### 2. Technical Feasibility of Medium Wave Broadcasting

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There has been no change in the technical aspects of the problem and our memorandum of August 3, 1962 on this aspect of the problem is still completely valid.

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#### **B.** FM Transmission

Only one station in Cuba, Havana's "La Voz del INRA" announces transmissions on FM. There are no hard statistics on the number of FM receivers, but the VOA estimates them to be very few.

The 25 to 30 FM transmitters listed in some previous reports are used principally by broadcasting stations as studio-to-transmitter site links.

FM transmissions are covered only in the Geneva agreement under the terms of which transmissions may not originate on or over international waters. This would mean that any FM transmission would have to be made from U.S. territory, territorial waters or air space. No present U.S. facilities can send a clear FM signal to Cuba.

Given the few receivers, short range of transmission, and the high cost of installations, no action in this field is presently contemplated or recommended.

C. TV Transmission

TV signals from Miami are occasionally visible in Havana, but no . regular transmission is possible due to the distances involved.

CIA has the capability for intruding on the dormant audio channels of Havana TV, utilizing small vessels but this is temporarily suspended due to technical difficulties.

Stratovision (beaming a TV signal from an airplane in flight) offers definite possibilities for short-term purely tactical utilization of TV. Preliminary studies indicate that air-borne TV transmitters operating over U.S. territory and territorial waters could beam a strong signal into the Havana area, using presently vacant channels. Our estimates indicate that it would probably take the Cubans from 15 to 21 days to engineer and put into operation an effective jamming system. This operation would cost approximately \$250,000, assuming that aircraft and crews would be made available by DOD and programming and technical staff would come from USIA.

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#### Final Considerations

1. One immediate step which could be taken to improve medium wave transmission to Cuba would be to intervene with the FCC to authorize WKWF in Key West (see I-B-2. above) to raise its power to 50 kw's and thus strengthen measurably its power in Cuba.

2. It is this Agency's view that Medium Wave or TV operations to Cuba must be tied to short term tactical operations. We do not favor the U.S. engaging in all-out electronic warfare with Cuba at this time.

(signed)

Donald M. Wilson Deputy Director

Mr. Johnson, State



OPERATION MONGOOSE Main Peints to Consider 26 October 1962

I. What is the Pelicy Objective? We need a sharp focus on exactly what we hope to get from Mongoose new. This will determine how best to employ these unique U.S. resources -- either to support U.S. military operations or directly to commit against the Communist regime immediately.

Is the end objective the removal of the Castre/Communist regime or to bring it to its knees? Should Mongaose help generate a popular revolt with the probable need for evert U.S. military help as the regime moves in to crush it? Or, is the aim that of maximum harassment, to make Cuba a maximum burden for the Bloc?

Undoubtedly, mest people in the world now expect us in intertowards removing the Castro/Communist regime. Certainly the the Cubans in exile and inside Cuba, who are the main covert as a set CIA, new expect this policy goal as the price of risking their living.

2. Mongoose Actions

Statust

a. Harrassment of and resistance to Cuban regime.

SENSITIVE EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC THE SECRET I REGRADING: DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY Partially Declassified/Released on 1-5-89 (F\$8-758) under provisions of E.O. 12356 000230 by N. Menan, National Security Council

### SENSITIVE




e. Miner acts of sabetage, by all Cuban people. Requires Ky delivery of instructions, of how to do it, to Cuban people.

Status: No current capability indicated by CIA. Teams going in for any purpose at this time should have this assignment.

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h. Help the Cubans to help themselves. This means greater V U.S. support of Cuban groups to take actions in Cuba.

Status: Under study.. No firm plan yet for doing.

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SENSITIVE



k. Give Cuban resistance popular symbols. Songs, Visual.

Status: No song yet. Visual symbol is "gusane libre."

1. Political planning for post-Castro period.

Status: No firm planning reported from State. The need for clear U.S. policy objectives is basic here.

m. "Crusade" for human liberty, to make maximum use of spiritual appeal. Prayers, such as by Bishop Besa Masvidal, widely publicized inside Cubs. Take use of memory of Marti away from Communities and give it to Cuban "freedom fighters."

Status: Sporadic activities, not a "crusade."

n. U.S. or Free Cuban radio and TV breadcasts into Cuba.

3

Status: USIA making maximum use of medium and short wave radio facilities, including CIA and commercial resources. No "Voice of Free Cuba" short-wave broadcast scheduled immediately. New 50-kw radio transmitter expected to be operational in Florida Keys next week. TV broadcasts from aircraft new under development. (Being developed outside Meageose.)



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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

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28 January 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS

SUBJECT:

Cuba, Operation Mongoose

In the interest of security and orderly procedure, it is suggested that the files in State pertaining to Operation Mongoose be transferred to the officer currently responsible for your operations covering Cuba.

The Chairman, Special Group (5412/2), concurs in this proposal. The sensitivity of material as it involves deliberations of the Special Group is especially noted. My own files are being turned over to the custodian of Special Group records, Mr. Parrott, for reference as may be appropriate.

As Mongoose is phased out, my own warm appreciation will always remain for your fine support and the cooperation of your staff in this difficult task. I particularly wish to pass along my commendation to Mr. Martin, Mr. Hurwitch, and their staff

(F87-154) under provisions of E.O. 1223 (F87-154) W. Menan, National Star Ty Council

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EDWARD G. LANSDALE Brigadier General, USAF

> EXC REST: