New York Times
April 18, 1961.  p. 18.

Text of Secretary Rusk's News Conference, Including Observations on Cuba

Special to The New York Times

        WASHINGTON, April 17--Following is the transcript, as made public by the Department of State, of Secretary of State Dean Rusk's news conference today:
        SECRETARY RUSK -- I shall be leaving here shortly to meet Prime Minister Karamanlis of Greece and his official party. Although we have had a number of prime ministers and other distinguished foreign statesmen in this country on informal or so-called working visits, this is the first official visit in the technical sense which we are having. Mr. Karamanlis will be eight days in the United States, and we are looking forward very much to his visit.
        The Soviet reply to the British proposals [on Laos] were received here in the middle of the night. There are several documents involved and we are giving them careful study, but it should be recognized that this is a reply to the British and not to the United States. We have not yet heard from our own embassy about any comments which might have been made there.
        Our first impression, however, is that while it retains most of the constructive elements of the Soviet reply of April 1, the present answer does not fully clarify the key point of the timing of the cease-fire and the mechanisms for this verification. This of course is a very critical matter in terms of the possibility of bringing the situation to a peaceful and satisfactory conclusion.
        We are of course concerned with the situation on the ground because what happens in Laos has a great deal to do with the possibilities of a peaceful settlement in that country, and we shall follow the events in that country very closely where we of course have means for determining what might be in the minds of those on the other side.
Observations on Cuba
        The question of Cuba is being debated today in the General Assembly of the United Nations. There have been many reports of further disorders in Cuba and additional landings on the Cuban coast. These are being made the subject of inflammatory charges against the United States by the Castro regime. Since this debate cannot easily go on in two places simultaneously, I do not wish to pursue it in detail here, but I do wish to make a few observations.
        The issue in Cuba is not between Cuban and the United States but between the Castro dictatorship and the Cuban people. This is not the first time that dictators have attempted to blame their troubles with their own people on foreigners. Nor is it the first time that refugees from tyranny have attempted to join their own countrymen to challenge a dictatorial regime. Dr. Castro himself was such a refugee who attracted much sympathy and practical support, both inside and outside Cuba, when it appeared that he was fighting tyranny instead of practicing it.
        There is no secret about the sympathy of the American people for those who wish to be free, whether in distant parts of the world or in our own neighborhood. We are not indifferent to intrusion into this hemisphere by the Communist conspiracy, which, as recently as December, 1960, declared its intentions to destroy free institutions in all parts of the world. We shall work together with other government of this hemisphere to meet efforts by this conspiracy to extend its penetration. The present struggle in Cuba, however, is a struggle by Cubans for their own freedom. There is not and will not be any intervention there by United States forces. The President has made this clear as well as our determination to do all we possibly can to insure that Americans do not participate in these actions in Cuba.
        We do not have full information on what is happening on that island. Much of what we have comes from the Castro regime itself and indicates that serious unrest and disorders are to be found in all parts of the country. I am not able, therefore, to answer detailed questions about what is a confused scene. The American people are entitled to know whether we are intervening in Cuba or intend to do so in the future. The answer to that question is no. What happens in Cuba is for the Cuban people themselves to decide.
        Now, gentlemen, I shall try to take a few of your questions.
1 Q. -- Mr. Secretary, does your categorical statement that we are not going to intervene in Cuba, period, mean that this Administration is abandoning the traditional reservation that we reserve the right to intervene to protect American lives.
    A. -- That particular question is one for the future, and I would not wish to relate it particularly to Cuba because of the debate now going on in the United Nations at this very moment.
2 Q. -- Mr. Secretary, in the past the Soviet Union, indeed Premier Khrushchev has said that the Soviets would go to the aid of Cuba. I believe at one point Premier Khrushchev said "rockets will fly." What would our attitude be in the event of intervention by the Soviets to help the Castro regime?
    A. -- I would not wish to answer a hypothetical question of that sort this morning.
3 Q. -- Mr. Secretary, could you tell us what contact our Government is maintaining, if any, with the so-called Revolutionary Council in New York, whose representatives came down and called on you a few days ago, and would you tell us when the last contact with the group was?
    A. -- I am very sorry not to answer questions on Cuba, but I must stand by the statement I have just made.
4 Q. -- Mr. Secretary, can you answer questions about the United States Immigration Service?
    A. -- Why don't you ask it, and I will see. (Laughter)
5 Q. -- Well, there is a very puzzling case of this pilot who landed in Miami, after saying he had defected from the Cuban Air Force. The Immigration Service, although his picture was printed--Castro has challenged us to produce him to verify the story that he told. Why do we not allow the press to see this man? Is the Immigration Service making policy for the State Department?
    A. -- I think this is a question which started as one on the Immigration Service and became on on Cuba, and I would not wish to answer that this morning.
6 Q. -- Mr. Secretary, there is another question that arises. If the rebels succeeded in establishing a solid foothold in Cuba, would we be prepared to consider or to grant diplomatic recognition?
    A. -- That is a question for the future, into which I can't go this morning.
7 Q. -- Mr. Secretary, I will get off Cuba.
    A. -- Thank you. (Laughter)
    Q. -- With respect to the situation in Laos, and you have already explained what the diplomatic note situation is--more practically than that, do you believe that there is an element of stalling in the Russians' handling of this matter in order to enable the pro-Communist elements to consolidate their position there?
    A. -- Well, there is of course a close connection between the place of diplomatic discussion and what happens on the ground in Laos. We feel that the situation in Laos is dangerous and that the diplomatic discussion ought to move promptly in order to bring that dangerous situation under control. The question of stalling is one which turns upon how discussions relate to what is happening, and we are of course watching that very closely. I would not want to characterize that particular point at the time, but it is obviously a very critical point.
8 Q. -- Mr. Secretary, would you say what role you would expect Prince Souvanna Phouma to play in any broadened government in Laos? I believe he is arriving here tomorrow.
    A. -- We ourselves have no special role for Souvanna Phouma in mind. The constitution of a government in Laos is for the Laotian leaders themselves. This is not a matter which can be easily negotiated because the constitution of a government is essentially a domestic matter and, since government personalities change, it does not lend itself to international agreement very easily. Incidentally, we understand that Prince Souvanna Phouma, because of the necessity of going down to the Black Sea to see Mr. Khrushchev, may delay his arrival here for a day.
9 Q. -- Mr. Secretary, Mr. Khrushchev said in an interview this morning that, while there are neutral nations, there are no neutral men. He was talking about the tripartitism, I think, that they are trying to practice now. In the light of that, how would you characterize Souvanna Phouma?
    A. -- Well, I wouldn't wish to characterize Souvanna Phouma in terms of that declaration of Soviet policy. As you know, that policy is under study itself in a great variety of ways these days--in the attack on the Secretary General in the United Nations, in the so-called tripartite proposals for the control machinery in the nuclear test talks and in other respects. we believe that on the issues raised by the manifesto put out by the Communist summit last December that there are very far-reaching issues in which those who wish to be free must be concerned. I think this idea that no one, that no individual can be neutral strikes at the heart of the possibilities of international organization, mediation and would set the world back a very long way indeed in settling disputed by peaceful means.
10 Q. -- Mr. Secretary, at the risk of receiving a "no," sir, could you tell me whether this Government is sympathetic toward those who are fighting tyranny?
    A. -- I have indicated so in my statement earlier.
11 Q. -- Mr. Secretary, what's your latest information on the situation on the ground in Laos? Are the pro-Communist rebels advancing?
    A. -- There seemed to be in most recent day or two some troop movement of minor sorts which may be indicative and the Soviet supply, of course, is continuing. And we are watching both of those very closely.
12 Q. -- Mr. Secretary, with out going into the specifics of the Cuban physical action, could you amplify for us the United States position on material aid to the Cuban forces opposing Castro in relation to our commitments under the O.A.S. [Organization of American States] agreements?
    A. -- I would not wish to get into that question in the middle of debate in New York this morning.
13 Q. -- Mr. Secretary, on Cuba, did we have any advance word that any such attack or invasion was coming this morning?
    A. -- Again I would prefer not to get into that question.
14 Q. -- Mr. Secretary, in regard to Laos, can you tell us how you feel the situation may develop in the next few days? Is there very much time to continue to wait before you decide what to do?
    A. -- I think the most immediate step is to clarify immediately this question of a cease-fire and the means to be taken to insure that a genuine cease-fire is in effect. We have problems about the meeting, about the calling of an International Control Commission. As far as we are concerned, we have no problems about a conference to try to find a peaceful settlement of this question. But we do have problems about a prolonged delay in establishing a cease-fire which would open the way for the negotiations which might bring this situation to a settlement.
15 Q. -- Can you say whether the latest Soviet reply on this subject has advanced the prospect for a cease-fire or simply left it up in the air?
    A. -- I think, pending clarification, it would be difficult to be precise on this point, quite frankly. This is a matter which we are studying now and on which we will be in touch with other governments again and presumably again with the Soviet Union.
16 Q. -- Mr. Secretary, there has been some criticism in Congress that the policy you are pursuing in Laos, that is the international conference and the establishment of neutralism there, would lead to the introduction of Communists into the government who could then subvert that government and it would quickly go behind the Iron Curtain. What assurance can you give on that point?
    A. -- Well, a government which is capable of subverting the country to communism is, of course, not a government which can sustain a country in a neutral, independent position. I have had a chance to discuss these matters with a number of the Congressional leaders and Congressional committees and this is something, of course, which is much involved in discussions that lie ahead of us.
17 Q. -- Mr. Secretary, would you tell us whether we invited Prince Phouma to visit Washington?
    A. -- Yes, we indicated to him that if he could arrange a schedule to come here that we should be very happy to see him. He comes here, of course, as a private citizen, not as an alleged official of the Laotian Government.
18 Q. -- Mr. Secretary, you spoke of keeping a close watch on the situation on the ground in Laos. How does that relate to the way in which things were left after the SEATO conference? If the situation on the ground in Laos reaches a certain point, do these appropriate steps that were referred to in the communiqué automatically go into effect?
    A. -- The SEATO governments are among those who are keeping a close watch on the situation in Laos and this obviously is something which they all had in mind when they issued their statement at the SEATO conference. I would not suppose that in matters of this sort that there is anything contingent ahead of us, that is that could possible be called automatic when governments are dealing with as complicated and difficult situations as this one.
19 Q. -- Mr. Secretary, now that the visits of Prime Minister Macmillan and Chancellor Adenauer are over, could you give us some indication of your thinking, the Administration's thinking, on methods, prospects, for improving the cohesion of the North Atlantic alliance?
    A. -- There are a number of ways in which we hope to move, and these will be, of course, discussed among other governments, members of NATO and of the Atlantic community, particularly at the forthcoming Oslo conference. For example, we believe that a good deal can be accomplished by a greater amount of consultation among the members on important issues that are before the member governments and before the Atlantic community.
    We feel there is a great deal of informal and, indeed, active cooperation among the members of the Atlantic community in which the economic field which will be dealt with under the O.E.C.D. [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.] We think that there are a variety of ways in which this great alliance can be strengthened, and we shall be discussing those fully with other members between now and the Oslo meeting and continuing from that point on for a considerable period.
20 Q. -- Mr. Secretary, in that connection, how would you assess then the actions and statements of President de Gaulie regarding NATO and the position of the French Government regarding the payment for the Congo action?
    A. -- These are questions which we shall, of course, be discussing with the French Government. As you know, the President is going over to visit with General de Gaulie a little later. France is a very important member of the Atlantic community, and of the Western alliance, and these are matters which will, of course, be fully discussed with them.
21 Q. -- Mr. Secretary, according to our best information, is there a full-scale invasion of Cuba under way, or is this merely a landing of guerrilla forces?
    A. -- I would not have supposed from the press reports that I have heard that anything is happening that could be called a full-scale invasion. There have been a lot of incidents, and a lot of groups active in that situation over the months since the large-scale defections from the Castro regime occurred. But I have seen nothing that would lead me to characterize it as a large-scale invasion.
22 Q. -- Mr. Secretary, is there an American policy on the use of American soil, or on forbidding the use of American soil, to train, equip, or otherwise get together for Cuban forces against Castro? Do we have a policy one way or another that you can state?
    A. -- What is going on in Cuba is not taking place from American soil.
23 Q. -- Mr. Secretary, at your last press conference, you indicated that something might be done regarding Cuban imports into the United States; that it was imminent. Can you throw any more light on that?
    A. -- Yes, that has been reserved for somewhat further study because of some technical questions that were encountered. This has not been brought to a final answer as yet.
24 Q. -- When you say "technical," do you mean treaties here or abroad, or just what?
    A. -- There were some technical and legal questions about the kinds of control that we had in mind that we had to study further.
25 Q. -- Mr. Secretary, has the department been in touch with the Amalgamated Clothing Workers Union in an effort to delay the boycott that they are threatening to impose on the first of May on Japanese imported woolen suits?
    A. -- Officials have been in touch with them. I am not personally immediately sure whether from the Department of State or from other departments.
26 Q. -- Returning to Laos, Mr. Secretary in view of the Communist advances and strengthening of position in Laos, do you believe that Russia is truly interested in a genuine cease-fire?
    A. -- This is what we are now in the process of finding out. in the discussions that have gone on, the Soviets have indicated that they believe that Laos should be an Austrian-type neutral, independent Laos. We think that that is a satisfactory answer in Laos. Now the problem is whether both sides mean the same thing by that kind of language.
27 Q. -- Mr. Secretary, in order to clarify further a point which has been asked before: You said in your statement that we sympathize with the groups which seek to overthrow tyranny, and I think Mr. Shutt asked specifically trying to overthrow the Castro regime at this moment. Would you answer to that point.
    A. -- Well, I think I indicated in my statement that there is no doubt we are sympathetic to those who are fighting for freedom.
28 Q. -- Mr. Secretary, is the United States now, or is it prepared to stop armaments moving to Castro?
    A. -- The President has indicated that there will be no intervention by United States forces in Cuba.
29 Q. -- What about the Russian arms and things of that nature?
    A. -- I will leave those answers unless and until the question arises in another way.
30 Q. -- Mr. Secretary, could you tell us how you see the progress in the nuclear test-ban talks in Geneva?
    A. -- There has been little to add in the most recent days about the negotiations there. The discussions now will try to fill out the subjects that will be necessary to discuss in concluding a treaty. Some very serious questions have already arisen. I mentioned the one, for example, on the tripartite control of the inspection mechanism. But we do want to find out exactly which are the central and key issues by further discussion and I have nothing in detail to report on that this morning.
31 Q. -- Mr. Secretary, in that connection, in view of the Walter Lippmann interview with Mr. Khrushchev this morning, wouldn't you suppose--do you still have any hope that any kind of an agreement could be reached? He seemed to slam the door pretty hard, didn't he?
    A. -- They have indicated that they feel very strongly about this matter of the tripartite thesis and international organizations. But we would like to find out what their attitude on the entire range of important issues in the nuclear test ban to see whether we can't resolve these questions. But there is obvious difficulty in that this tripartite problem remains.
    Thank you, gentlemen.