The activities of Welles in Cuba in the early nineteen-thirties will never be forgotten. Even today, almost twenty years after Welles left the island, his famous "mediation" efforts in 1933 are frequently the subject of conversation among statesmen and newspapermen. A great many Cubans believe that Welles allowed his emotions to influence his judgment, and there is adequate evidence in the record to show that Welles in his reports to Washington was wrong on many occasions-at times when important policy decisions were being made. It is possible that Welles' disappointment in the failure of the Céspedes government, which was, to some extent, the creature of his mediation, may have had something to do with his refusal to see anything meritorious in anything Batista did. This same pessimism was shown in his reports to Washington on Provisional President Grau San Martín, who, with the support of Batista, took over the Presidency after the downfall of the Céspedes government.

From the moment Batista took over the country in September, 1933, and established a five-man civilian junta to reorganize the government, Welles in his official reports to Washington described the whole maneuver as an extreme radical or Communistic effort. In his very first report on the Batista action Welles told Washington that the junta was composed of "extreme radical" elements, and he repeated the charge a number of times. For example, after reporting that one of Batista's declarations was signed by a "group of the most extreme radicals of the student organization and three university professors whose theories are frankly communistic," Welles referred to the members of the civilian junta by Dame and described four of the five as "extreme liberals." The four men he named were Carbó the publisher and Drs. Portel, Grau San Martín and Irizarri, all professors at Havana University. There was nothing in the record of these men to support the charge that they were "extreme radicals." Mr. Welles referred to Porfirio Franca, the fifth member of the junta, as "a supposedly conservative business man of good reputation, who is being used as window dressing." There was nothing "supposed" about Señor Franca's business ability or his reputation. Both were very solid. As a matter of fact, be was one of the most respected gentlemen in Cuba and far too smart to allow himself to be used as "window dressing" for any purpose.

It is interesting to note that the Mexican government, which was watching Cuban developments as closely as was the Washington government, did not agree with Mr. Welles' classification of the members of the Cuban junta as radicals. On September 7, after Welles had reported several times that the junta was composed of "extreme radicals," the Mexican Foreign Minister felt compelled to cable a contrary opinion to Secretary of State Cordell Hull. "I take the liberty of advising Your Excellency," the Mexican official said, "that we have accurate data concerning personality at least four persons now serving as members Executive Commission of the new government of Cuba, data indicating that they are not communists , but persons of undoubted preparation, intellectual capacity, and social responsibility."

The information reaching the Mexican Foreign Minister was provided by a brilliant young career diplomat named Octavio Reyes Spíndola. Reyes Spíndola, with the rank of Chargé d'Affaires, was the senior officer in the Mexican Embassy in Havana, and he was one of the first foreign diplomats to conclude that Batista was something more than a mutinous sergeant. He was able to form an opinion of Batista on the basis of personal acquaintanceship with the Sergeant from Banes. Wbile most other diplomats were holding themselves aloof, waiting to see what the United States was going to do about Batista, Reyes Spíndola arranged to meet Batista on an informal basis. He found that Batista liked to spend an hour in the early mornings horseback riding and Reyes Spíndola, a fine horseman himself, managed to get himself invited to ride with Batista.

There is no doubt but that the Mexican diplomat was able, in this informal manner, to get a lot of information on what Batista had in mind, and the two men became good friends. These early morning rides with Batista around the outskirts led newspapermen to refer to Reyes Spíndola as the "horseback diplomat."

Apparently the information reaching the United States Embassy in Havana on Batista caused considerable alarm and, perhaps, a bit of panic there, because on the day Batista came into power, and for some days after that, Welles asked the United States government to send battleships to Cuba. Indication of this confusion was apparent all through the Welles reports. On September 5, the day after Batista took over, Welles pessimistically reported to Secretary of State Hull as follows: "I think the situation is gradually getting worse. I have had a conference with the political leaders of the Republic and they are of the opinion that it would be wise to land a certain number of troops from the American ship. It would be my idea that what we would do in that case would be to have a certain number come to the Embassy as a guard and a certain number to the Hotel Nacional. It would not imply patrolling the streets or anything of that kind. The difficulty is that we have only fifty men on the McFarland, which is now in port, to be brought ashore. Is the Richmond arriving tomorrow?"

American troops were to be sent to the Hotel Nacional because Welles lived there at the time. In less than an hour Welles reiterated his belief that the landing of troops was necessary. "I think it absolutely indispensable that men be brought from the ship to the Embassy now, and there is no protection whatever except a few policemen that we have in the Embassy building. I am not certain what will happen before long if we do not have men here."

It was at about this time that Welles tried to convince Batista that be ought to agree to a plan to safeguard American lives and property in Cuba. Batista, of course, knew that such a step would inevitably bring bloodshed and that it might result in a serious rupture in relations between Cuba and the United States.

Summarizing this important conversation with Welles later, Batista told me that Welles had suggested that United States Marines be permitted to land and that neutral zones, which would be policed by the American Marines, should be established.

Batista asked Welles to explain his conception of a neutral zone and Welles replied that the homes of Americans and the hotels in which they resided would be neutral zones, tinder the protection of the American flag, and that zones would be established around the Cuban Telephone Company, the Cuban Electric Company, and other American'owned properties.

Courteously but firmly Batista rejected the proposition, explaining to Welles that the revolution in progress was a nationalist revolution and that the revolutionaries would not stand for the landing of foreign troops on Cuban soil for any purpose. Batista said that regardless of his own will or the authority of the Cuban government, the landing of foreign troops would precipitate serious trouble. He pointed out to the Ambassador that United States Marines on the streets of Havana might be attacked by Cubans and that, of course, would lead to real conflict. In such a case, Batista said, "the Armed Forces of Cuba would be obliged to put themselves on the side of the Cuban people in order to defend Cuban sovereignty."

Batista expressed his respect and consideration for the government and the people of the United States, but be pointed out that the Cuban revolution was opposed to the Platt Amendment (which gave the United States the right to intervene in Cuban affairs) and that he wanted the Ambassador to understand that the views he was expressing were realistic ones. Batista said that he was rejecting the proposal from Welles because of a very sincere personal desire that relations between Cuba and the United States continue on a friendly and firm basis. Welles seemed to understand the Batista viewpoint and told the Colonel that the Batista hopes for continued good relations between the two countries coincided with those of President Roosevelt.

Those days following the fourth of September, 1933, were strenuous ones for Cuba and for Welles. Apparently the intelligence furnished Welles from the day he arrived in Cuba was at times both inadequate and unreliable. On several occasions he made recommendations which indicated a lack of knowledge of the true situation. He had not foreseen the Revolt of the Sergeants, and when it came, the American Embassy staff apparently was thrown off balance. At the very moment Batista and his group of army sergeants seized the power, Welles was involved in hopeless negotiations with other factions, still convinced that he could, through mediation, stabilize the flimsy regime of Céspedes. When the Batista revolution overthrew Céspedes, Welles miscalculated Batista's strength, misjudged his intentions, and displayed a complete lack of faith in Batista's ability to hold the power or to restore public order.

Welles continued, even after Céspedes himself had given up hope of returning to power, to hold to the belief that the only way to help Cuba was to remove Batista and his followers and reinstate the Céspedes government. As late as September 7, after the old-line politicians and many of the Batista opponents bad advised him that they had no intention of trying to overthrow Batista, Welles became interested in a preposterous plan put forth by Horacio Ferrer, Secretary of War under Céspedes, which had for its objective the ousting of the Batista group by military action-in other words, by counterrevolution. The fantastic part of this plan was that the Armed Forces of the United States were to be landed in Cuba to police the country once the counterrevolution had succeeded. The inexplicable part of the whole thing was that Welles placed any faith at all in the plan. It is difficult even today to understand why Welles paid any attention to such an absurd scheme in view of the repeated declarations from Washington that the United States would never interfere in the internal affairs of Cuba. Welles must have known that political factions in Cuba had, on several occasions, tried to precipitate American intervention in Cuba because they thought it would help their own political interests and that the Ferrer plan would certainly have achieved that intervention for them. Fortunately, President Roosevelt himself stepped in to prevent any participation by American troops in such a project. But it was this sort of maneuvering which contributed to the deterioration of relations between Batista and Welles.

On the day Welles presented the idea to Washington, Secretary of State Hull forwarded a message from Roosevelt to Welles which was brief and to the point. It said: "We feel very strongly that any promise, implied or otherwise, relating to what the United States will do under any circumstances is impossible; that it (the landing of American troops for police duty) would be regarded as a breach of neutrality, as favoring one faction out of the many, as attempting to set up a government which would be regarded by the whole world, and especially throughout Latin America, as a creation and creature of the American Government." President Roosevelt was right, of course. Armed intervention in Cuba at that time would have jeopardized the Good Neighbor Policy, which was one of the most popular doctrines of the Roosevelt administration, and it could have led to bloodshed -American blood as well as Cuban blood.

Welles apparently felt very strongly that nothing good could result from Batista's activities. Even after Secretary of State Hull had suggested that Cuba might regain her political stability if the various political factions supported the provisional government, Welles still believed the Batista movement would collapse. Maybe this was wishful thinking. Or perhaps Welles put too much credence in the misinformation being passed to him by frustrated politicians. Obviously, Batista was not very happy about what looked like diplomatic sniping on the part of Welles, and the animosity between the two men increased as the weeks passed. At one time Welles told Washington that a member of the cabinet of the deposed Céspedes government had reported to him that Batista had requested an interview with Céspedes on September 7 "in order to inform him (Céspedes) that the Army wishes to place itself at his disposal." This certainly was not true. But Welles put a great deal of faith in the information. So much so that he reported to Secretary Hull that it was his impression "that the situation here is breaking fast" and that "the sergeants and ringleaders of the mutiny are in a state of panic." If Batista and his supporters were "in a state of panic" and ready to turn themselves over to Céspedes on September 7, the American newspaper correspondents in Cuba were not aware of it, and they were close to the Cuban story night and day. I, personally, had a long talk with Batista and a number of his supporters on September 7, and there was no indication of panic when I interviewed them. On the contrary, they seemed to be a pretty calm, though determined, group of young fellows.

This nonexistent "state of panic" Welles heard about might have resulted from the fact that Batista on several occasions offered to return to the ranks once a capable regime was established. These offers were never accepted for the simple reason that no outstanding man to head a strong government could be found among the old-line politicians or in the ranks of the younger civilian or army leaders. It was at this point in the history of the revolution that the so-called ruling class, the men trained for leadership, missed the great opportunity of their lives. Had these men stepped forward to take the authority from the outstretched hands of Sergeant Batista, the noncommissioned officers, including Batista, would have returned to the ranks of the Army to resume their military careers. But the politicians, as well as business and professional leaders, felt it below their dignity even to negotiate with a lowly Sergeant and they remained aloof. Their pride, their fear of criticism, and, perhaps, their sincere belief that Batista was just an unimportant mutineer kept them from taking the whole country-lock, stock, and barrel-into their own bands.