During the latter part of 1952, some months after Batista had taken over the country in the previous March, there was, undoubtedly, a certain amount of criticism directed at the President. But it was the exact opposite of the criticism one would expect to hear of a man who many considered a dictator. The criticism against Batista, was that be was not ruling with a strong enough hand. He was too soft, a great many people said, at a time when he should have been tough. This criticism came from intelligent, democratic-minded Cubans, and it sprang from the honest realization that there are times when a strong band is needed in governing
young, growing republics.

Maybe Batista has a number of faults that I haven't recognized. I don't know. But after twenty years of friendship, he still seems to me to be an exceptionally nice fellow with an exceptional amount of intelligence and ability.

But the most important question of all is: How do the people feel about Fugencio Batista, now that he has again taken the country into his own hands?

Batista has arranged for the people of Cuba to provide that answer themselves. When he took over the power in March, 1952, he immediately announced that national elections would be held in November, 1953. He appointed an electoral body to prepare for the elections, to adopt a code, and to carry out all the details involved in reorganizing the leading political parties.

Opposition party leaders opposed the plan to hold national elections and threatened to boycott the Batista project. For months the opposition issued public statements, spoke over the radio, and appeared on television networks, insisting always that they would not participate in elections until "constitutionality" was restored in Cuba. This attitude created an impasse and brought forth a series of suggested solutions which were completely impractical and unrealistic. They were impractical because the only way to attain the constitutionality the opposition demanded was through the holding of elections. Yet the opposition solutions all included the refusal to participate in elections. They were unrealistic because none of them took into consideration the very important fact that any solution offered would have to be acceptable to Batista, who was in complete control of the nation and its Armed Forces.

There are only two ways in which governments can be changed in Cuba. One is by electing a new government and the other is by revolution. Since the opposition insisted that constitutionality be restored, no solution could possibly have been found through revolution, which is, of course, the direct opposite of constitutionality. And since the same opposition refused to participate in an election, which was the only alternative to revolution, there appeared to be no way out of the political dilemma.

Nevertheless, Batista continued for some months to plan for elections in November, 1953. He implored the opposition to inscribe their parties, in accordance with the law, so that they could give the people of Cuba an opportunity to elect a new government and attain the constitutionality the opposition was demanding. Under Cuban governmental procedure, a political party must be inscribed in the electoral body's books at a fixed date prior to the opening of the political campaign. When the opposition groups refused to inscribe their parties, Batista postponed the closing date so that they could reconsider their decisions and indicate their participation
in the elections. The two major opposition parties, the Ortodoxos and the Auténticos, were split into factions within their own ranks. One faction in each party wanted to participate in the elections and the other wanted to boycott them.

This confusion among the opposition, as well as its refusal to participate in the elections, enhanced the Batista's party's chance of winning not only the Presidency, but the control of the Congress in the elections scheduled for November. The New York Times, early in 1953, published an article pointing out that the obstinacy of the opposition parties virtually assured Batista of victory in the national elections.

But in the late spring of 1953, Batista announced the postponement of the November, 1953, elections because he felt that without the participation of the major opposition parties, the result would not represent a fair expression of the will of the Cuban people. The new plan provided for congressional elections on June 1, 1954, and the reestablishment of the 1940 Constitution, to be followed by presidential elections at a later date. The date for the presidential elections was to be fixed by the first session of the new Congress. The postponement of the elections was seized upon by the opposition as another indication of the dictatorial nature of Batista, but the fact is the postponement was a popular one with the people of Cuba, and it was a completely unselfish act on the part of Batista. Had he chosen to go through with the November, 1953, presidential elections, and had he chosen to be a candidate for the Presidency, he would have been elected. His election, under boycott circumstances, would, no doubt, have been a kind of victory-by-default, but he would have been secure in the Presidency for another four years.