A Sergeant Named Batista

Chapter 14

The struggle to put Cuba's political house in order continued throughout the early nineteen-thirties. Almost every conceivable kind of formula for the restoration of peace was offered and rejected. The government of President Grau evidently was not strong enough to cope with conditions in Cuba. Furthermore, it showed no interest in protecting private property. Strikers and leftist agitators had been causing trouble at a number of sugar mills and in some cases had actually seized the property and established miniature soviets to run the mills. Grau did nothing to discourage such socialistic tendencies. But Batista tolerated Grau because be knew that any quick change in presidents might, at this point, disturb the nation's equilibrium and cause even greater unrest. He wasn't satisfied with the morale in the Army and he needed more time to consolidate his control over the troops.

The break between Batista and Grau, which those close to the situation were expecting, almost came on November 3, 1933. A meeting between Batista and the original civilian junta was held on that day at the home of Sergio Carbó. Batista didn't like the looks of the place when he went into the meeting. The presidential aides were on hand in full regalia, but there were also a number of other men with submachine guns in their hands, and they were not Batista's friends. Oscar de la Torre, chief of one of the pro-Batista organizations, who had been warned that an attempt might be made against the life of Batista at the meeting, had stationed himself and his comrades at points outside the home of Carbó, ready to protect Batista should trouble start. When the meeting opened, Grau, visibly angry, stood up, looked directly at Batista, and made a charge. "You have been trying to overthrow me," said Grau, "holding clandestine meetings, forgetting that I, as President, can remove you from your post at any moment. I have my own resignation here in my pocket. I cannot continue to govern under these conditions,"

Batista controlled his impulses. Calmly, he interrupted the President to say that in due time, and with due respect, he would answer Grau's charges. It was a critical moment and José Irizarri, one of the members of the pentarchy, spoke: "Dr. Grau, you cannot resign in that manner without creating chaos. And I think you should know that Batista is not only the legitimate Chief of the Army but a great deal more than that because of his identification with the revolution which created this government. His deposition would also bring chaos." Irizarri was seconded by Guillermo Portela, another junta member. The President acknowledged the accuracy of Irizarri's appraisal and said that he had not taken any action against Batista because he knew that Batista was the "soul of the revolution." Batista then asked the President to withdraw his resignation "because a resignation without a plan of succession would be very serious for the country at this time." The crisis was averted when Grau agreed to remain in the Presidency. Thus, the group, in effect, gave Grau a vote of confidence, although they knew that his days in the Presidency were numbered. They also knew that Grau, with only a small number of young students supporting him, would certainly lose any argument he might have with Batista.

The student body at Havana University, meanwhile, was growing weary of the conduct of the Student Directorate, the group which had attached itself to Grau San Martin, and a meeting of the entire student body was called at the university on November 5. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the status of the Student Directorate, and the meeting adopted a resolution directing all students to get out of politics and back to their classes.

The political ills of Cuba in the latter part of 1933 were serious ones and the patient was not responding to the remedies administered by local politicians or to the treatment of the consulting specialist, Sumner Welles. Not only that, the bickering and quarreling among the various factions which had formed the solid revolutionary front against Machado had given the country a bad case of nerves. The people were tired and they wanted peace-any solution which would end the public disorders and political instability. But as time passed the situation became worse. Solution after solution was presented in an effort to establish a representative government, but all of these projects failed. Meanwhile, the more militant groups of malcontents were causing trouble. They set off bombs throughout Havana and added greatly to the confusion of the moment. The students who had supported Grau San Martin bad never commanded the respect of the old-line politicians or of the important anti-Machado groups, and they were able to contribute nothing to the efforts to find a solution. Anti-Machado political leaders, returned from exile, tried, without success, to reorganize their old parties and rebuild their organizations. For years the only party in Cuba was the Liberal Party, the implement with which Machado had forged his regime.

The central figure in the national controversy was Grau. The old-line politicians wanted him removed from office, and be no longer had the support of the Student Directorate. He was certainly not favored by the United States government, and Ambassador Welles' lack of faith in him was pretty well known in all quarters. Grau had not cared much for Welles since mid-September, when Welles apparently decided that it was time to reprimand the Provisional President. During the latter part of September, Welles met with Grau and what Welles had to say was not very complimentary to the President or anyone else in his administration. Here is Welles' account of the Grau-Welles meeting, as Welles reported it to Washington. "I said that in my judgment confidence in his government was daily diminishing and the attitude now assumed by financial, commercial, and agricultural elements in refusing to pay taxes, in closing down or in canceling orders wherever possible to do so, and in protesting publicly their opposition to a continuation of the present regime, must certainly convince him, as it had me, that the government was not supported by exceedingly important elements in the country."

To Grau and the Batista group supporting Grau, this didn't sound like the "hands-off" policy the United States had enunciated so many times. It sounded like meddling, in spite of the fact that Welles told his Washington superiors the very next day that he was "more than ever confident that the wisest policy for us to pursue is to keep our hands off except insofar as the protection of American lives is involved."

The political merry-go-round continued. Statements and counterstatements were being issued almost hourly; "solutions" were coming from all sectors. All-night meetings kept the politicians, the newspaper reporters, and the people in general in a state of bewilderment. The various solutions offered were not practical because every one of them called for the ousting of the government then in power. It is not easy to negotiate a solution with the government in power if that solution provides for the removal of the "ins" and their replacement by the "outs."

Grau continued to hold on. He was in an excellent position to reject solutions as long as he had the support of Batista and the Army. It made little difference to Grau whether he had the majority of the people with him or not. It would have been a great asset to have the public on his side, but it was much more important in those days of political turbulence to have the rifles on his side. The only reason Batista continued to support Grau was that he felt that a quick upheaval in the top echelon of the government would throw the country into even deeper confusion. But there was trouble ahead. As the weeks of squabbling went on, the nervousness among the people and among some of the revolutionary groups increased, and it was evident that something would have to happen. If a solution couldn't be found through negotiation then it would be achieved through a revolution against the Grau regime.

Before long the coming revolution was discussed openly around the cafes, in the streets, and in business offices. Night after night newspapermen stayed on duty long hours, waiting for the "break." This national nervousness increased toward the end of October, and the uneasiness was hurting the island's commercial interests. Business was bad, people weren't buying, and everybody seemed upset. Early in October, Batista had heard the first rumors of the plan for revolt. Intelligence agents reported that the disgruntled officers, the ABC Society, and certain military elements would lead the movement, which had the overthrow of Grau and Batista as its objective. The information reaching Batista indicated that the outbreak would come around November 8, and that the deposed officers would be headed by a Captain León Calás. Colonels Sanguily and Ferrer apparently were not involved in the conspiracy. It became known too that the Aviation Corps was at least sympathetic to the insurrection plans.

On the morning of November 7, reports reaching Batista showed that discipline had collapsed in some of the key units of the Armed Forces. There were difficulties with the troops of the Dragones, Atarés, and San Ambrosio Garrisons, all important posts in the city of Havana. Batista, convinced that the revolt could not be blocked, prepared to combat it.

His information that the revolt would come on November 8 had been confirmed, so he doubled the guard at all police stations and got ready for the showdown. He also had information that the first blow would come from the Air Force and that his home in Camp Columbia would be the first target for the rebel air bombers.

Batista and Grau had survived one violent crisis--the Battle of the Hotel Nacional--but they were still confronted with difficulties at the beginning of November, 1933, and Batista knew it.