Batista was extremely upset by the killings at the Battle of the Hotel Nacional. He felt the whole thing had been unnecessary. I talked to him after the battle and he told me that he had done all he could to avoid the fight, in the first place, and to stop it once it got under way. Two days after the Hotel Nacional trouble Batista called on Ambassador Welles. He went to the United States Embassy to express his personal regret over the death of the American, Robert Lotspicht. The conversation between Welles and Batista was lengthy and penetrating. The two men reviewed the whole problem of Cuba. Welles, for the first time, conceded that Batista was the only authority in Cuba and that only he could save the country. In reporting this conversation to Washington, Welles said: "We had a protracted and frank discussion of the present situation in Cuba. He asked me for my advice as well as my opinion and I gave it to him. I told him that in my judgment he himself was the only individual in Cuba today who represented authority. I added that this was due in part to the fact that he appeared to have the loyal support of a large part of his troops and in part to the very determined and effective action taken by the troops in Havana, as well as in a lesser degree in other cities, against Communists and extreme radical elements." This must have been a gratifying interview for Batista, because these flattering words came from the lips of the man who a month before had seemed unwilling to recognize Batista's authority and had described Batista and his associates as extremely radical or Communistic elements.
 

This frank talk between Welles, the Groton-Harvard diplomat, representative of one of the world's great powers, and Fulgencio Batista, ex-cutter of sugar cane from the little village of Banes, was an important event in the life of Batista. it confirmed him, once and for all, as a man of international importance, the man who, in the opinion of the United States at least, controlled the destiny of Cuba. Welles told Batista that his action against Communists had won him the support of the great majority of commercial and financial interests in Cuba, who were looking for protection and could find that protection in Batista. He told Batista that his refusal to allow Grau San Martin to turn the newspapers of Cuba over to a group of students and workmen in the plants had won him the support of the Cuban press. Leaders of a number of the most powerful political parties, Welles told Batista, were in agreement that Batista's control of the Army as Chief of Staff should be continued, as the only possible solution, and that they were willing to support him.
 

Welles, in this vitally important conversation with Batista, spoke earnestly. He told Batista that the Grau government had not met any of the conditions required to achieve recognition by the United States and that the only thing that prevented a solution was the "unpatriotic and futile obstinacy of a small group of young men who should be studying in the university instead of playing politics and of a few individuals who had joined them for selfish motives." He referred, of course, to the student group, which had supported Grau from the very beginning, and which refused to accept any solution which would remove Grau from the Palace. Welles asked and got from Batista a promise that Batista himself would try to reconcile the differences of the various factions including the strong ABC revolutionary group, which, as Batista pointed out, was at that moment conspiring against Batista's Army. The American diplomat explained that he was completely indifferent about who was to hold the Presidency and who were to serve as cabinet members. His only desire, he said, was a solution which "represented effectively the desire of the Cuban people."
 

In reporting to Washington on this conversation, Welles mentioned the fact that such a conversation between himself and Batista was a little anomalous and he explained to Secretary Hull that he felt it necessary "to make plain, however, that there does not exist at the present time in Cuba any authority whatever except himself (Batista) and that in the event of further disturbances which may endanger the lives and properties of Americans or foreigners in the Republic, it seems to be essential that this relationship be maintained," Summed up, what Welles seemed to be saying was: "If you can't lick 'em, join 'em."
 

On the basis of the Army's victory at the Hotel Nacional, Secretary of State Hull, after a conversation with President Roosevelt, indicated the belief that perhaps something ought to be done about recognizing the Grau government. But Welles was adamant. He felt that the Grau government bad not qualified for such recognition and he pointed out to Hull, quite correctly, that the victory at the Nacional had been a Batista victory. Grau, Welles suggested, was one thing and Batista and his Army quite another. The observation was a sound one. The Army went along with Grau only because Batista so ordained. To the soldiers, and almost everyone else in Cuba, the real authority in government was Batista.
 

There can be no question but that the victory at the Hotel Nacional had strengthened Batista's position. Nor can there be any doubt about Batista's desire to see a stable government in Cuba, one capable of keeping public order and winning the respect and recognition of the other governments of the world. There may be some room for argument about the methods he used in trying to achieve that goal, but to those who saw him at work, there can be no question as to his sincerity of purpose. He went without sleep night after night, meeting and discussing possible solutions with various political leaders, examining every formula presented, trying to bring the discordant elements together.
 

It required a great deal of patience at this point to go on trying to create a capable civilian government in Cuba and had Batista ever really wanted to set himself up as a military dictator he could have done so very easily in the winter of 1933-34. He had tried time and again to find able men in civilian life to take over the administration of the nation's affairs; he had tried to persuade political leaders to put aside partisanship and work in unison for the good of the country, and his efforts had not been successful.
 

There can be no doubt but that Batista could have forgotten all about civilian governments and assigned the nation to the military had he chosen to do so. There was nothing to stop him. He bad the full support of the Armed Forces and there was no nonmilitary force capable of opposing him. Certainly then, it must have been something other than self-interest which inspired Batista to spend his days and nights negotiating, conferring, and seeking solutions by which a civilian government acceptable to the majority of the Cuban people could be established.
 

Prior to the Hotel Nacional incident, Batista bad tolerated the militant students who had attached themselves to President Grau. They were a noisy, immature group of youngsters who seemed to be intoxicated by a sense of power, a power which they had never really possessed. They were, undoubtedly, a great hindrance to efforts to resolve Cuba's political problems, and, as Sumner Welles said, they should have been attending classes at the university. They were continually issuing statements and manifestos which contributed nothing save confusion. But after the Hotel Nacional battle the students finally overstepped themselves. Apparently they made the mistake of thinking that they, rather than Batista', Army, were the victors in the battle, and they decided that things would go better if Batista were deposed. Not only was the idea that Batista could be removed impractical, it was down-right silly. So Batista turned the students out of the government and sent them back to their classes.