
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Schemers & Dreamers: Filibustering in Mexico, 1848-1921. By Joseph A. Stout, Jr. (Fort Worth: Texas Christian University Press, 2002. Pp. x, 148. Illustrations, bibliography, index. \$27.95.)

Across the street from the Shively Public Library in Louisville, there is a bust of Cuban independence leader José Martí (1853-95), a gift of the Cuban government in 1955 to "the Youth Ambassadors of Jefferson County, Kentucky." Its plaque is dedicated "as a tribute to the valiant Kentuckians who fought for the liberation of Cuba in 1850." Some 240 Kentuckians, led by Theodore O'Hara, comprised a skeleton regiment of a filibuster expedition that invaded Cuba on May 19, 1850, under General Narciso López, in a failed attempt to overthrow the Spanish colonial regime. Today their battle flag is Cuba's national emblem.

The history of the filibuster era, beginning in the early nineteenth century and ending with the dawn of the U.S. Civil War in 1860, is presented by Robert E. May, the dean of filibuster historians, who has written about the topic for thirty years. May, in this encompassing work, has nearly exhausted filibuster references in U.S. archives and manuscript repositories to describe filibuster attacks against Canada, Mexico, Ecuador, Honduras, and Cuba. There are 107 pages of notes in this book, but it lacks a bibliography, probably due to publishing constraints. Spanish-language filibuster historiography and sources are omitted.

Joseph A. Stout Jr. uses Mexican archival documentation to portray the Mexican government's century-long distrust of American intentions toward their country as a result of war and filibuster incursions. Both of these scholarly works overlap and, at times, contradict each other when describing the failed antebellum raids into Mexico. Stout cites official Mexican documents that questionably double the size of José Carvajal's invading force. They purport that there were 800 filibusters at the battle of Matamoros in October 1851, while May's sources mention only 400. Four months later, in another skirmish, the defenders estimate there are 438 attackers, while May gives a figure of 244 opponents. Mexican accounts reveal a number of filibuster activists not mentioned by May, such as Francisco Sentmanat, G. H. Tobin, Charles Stillman, and Charles de Pindray. Another important point of contention between these books is Stout's claim, without a citation, that in January 1858, Mexico suspected that "President James Buchanan sanctioned filibustering when he publicly praised William Walker for his successful filibuster into Nicaragua" (p. 49). In The Presidency of James Buchanan (1975), Elbert B. Smith wrote that Buchanan "publicly denounced Walker's activities as 'robbery and murder" (p. 73). May concurs, adding that during Buchanari's first annual message, on December 8, 1857, he excoriated the outrages committed by filibusters, who "tarnished the American 'character" (p. 124).

Stout's English-language documentation is sometimes weak. He writes that former Georgia governor George Mathews, who filibustered into northeast Florida, "mysteriously died" en route to Washington, D.C. Stout neglected Rembert W. Patrick's *Florida Fiasco* (1954), which described how the seventy-three-year-old Revolutionary War colonel passed away after being afflicted with fever for a week. Stout occasionally omits citing important details, such as filibuster Carvajal's appointment as governor of Tamaulipas by President Benito Juárez (pp. 23-24), or the Yucatan expedition led by George William White (pp. 14-15), who is erroneously identified as "Joseph A. White." Stout also leaves out Mexican sources for William Walker's incursion into Baja California.

Neither author pinpoints when the term filibuster first appeared in the American press. May assumes that "it started either in 1850 or 1851." The Cuba expeditionaries were first denounced as "filibusters and pirates" by the *New York Commercial Advertiser in* August 1849. Stout favors the Mexican scholarly perspective on filibusters, which depicts them as "cutthroats" and invaders. May refers to the filibusters as "criminal adventurers" (p. 89), who were "unwary American youths" seduced "into likely self-destruction." An exception needs to be made for the López expeditionaries, portrayed by pre-Castro Cuban historians as independence redeemers.

May mentions in passing that spies working in the U.S. for the federal government and the Spanish minister had infiltrated the López filibuster camp (pp. 156, 216, 361). Further study is needed on the activities and consequences of these secret agents, including Mobile grocer Sebastian Barrios and the New Orleans spy network, headed by the Spanish consul, consisting of José Ramón Ayala, Fulgencio Llorente, Henry Marie, William Eagle, James MacConnell, Antonio González, Hungarian Maximilien M. Galody, Thomas Spearman, Henry L. Andrews, and a Mr. Jordan. Depositions given by Daniel Henry Burtnett and William E. Oliveira, who infiltrated the López movement in New York and Georgia, respectively, led to the indictment of more than a dozen filibuster leaders in April 1851. Spain's master spies operating in America were Ramón de Acha, Mariano Torrente, and Clemente Gallo. De Acha, the former captain of the Spanish warship Congreso, frequently visited U.S. ports and met in

the White House with President Zachary Taylor and Secretary of State John M. Clayton. Torrente was the author of a voluminous political and economic history of Cuba. In 1852, he bribed the editor of the *Mobile Tribune* with a monthly sum of \$100 to reprint his own articles that appeared in the *Philadelphia Public Ledger* under the guise of a staff member. Torrente offered one of the *New Orleans Delta* editors \$300 monthly "to omit from his columns all seditious and rabble rousing articles" against Spain. The Quitman filibuster fiasco of 1855 was not just compelled by "financial deficiencies," as May indicates, but was undermined largely by Spanish infiltrator Claudio Maestro, alias Antonio Rodríguez, who claimed to have met with Quitman many times at his plantation, where he helped pack rifles and ammunition. Maestro betrayed the entire Quitman conspiracy network in Cuba led by Ramón Pintó.

May analyzes the ramifications of international filibustering, concluding that Americans did not monopolize the phenomenon, and that "the vast majority of Americans neither filibustered themselves nor even supported filibustering" (p. 78). He believes that filibustering "did more to impede the nation's territorial growth than speed it along." In contrast, Stout frequently denotes that Mexicans assumed the contrary, that after the Mexican War, they believed that every rumor or fantasy of invasion, even pronouncements by a "crackpot" (p. 78), had the blessing of the U.S. government. Stout affirms that after 1874, whenever there was a serious threat against Mexico by either filibuster schemers or rebel expatriates, the U.S. Army was mobilized to the border region to impede it (pp. 70, 75, 88, 101).

Stout could have provided a good contrast to filibuster aggressions against Mexico by mentioning the Plan de San Diego of February 20, 1915. It called for an armed uprising by Mexican Americans and other minorities in the southwestern United States. They would create an independent republic in the territory lost in 1848, which afterward would be reincorporated into Mexico. The plan, with the apparent backing of the Carranza administration, advocated the execution of every American male over the age of sixteen. During the next two years, Mexican raiders carried out a guerrilla war in southern Texas in which hundreds were killed, thousands displaced, and property worth millions of dollars was destroyed. The plan left a legacy similar to that of filibustering: racial antagonisms between Americans and Mexicans that endured for generations.

Future filibuster historians will need to analyze and refer to the trove of new sources and details provided by both of these critical works.

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