

# THE LETELIER INVESTIGATION



Chilean secret police agent Michael Townley in 1973. Prosecutor Eugene Propper: from petty criminals to spies.

The assassination of a former Chilean Ambassador to the United States in Washington, D.C., has resulted in a grand jury investigation that reveals the chilling presence of a network of trained terrorists at work not only in Latin America, but in this country as well.



Rescue workers remove the bodies of Orlando Letelier and his aide, Ronni Moffitt, from the wreckage of Letelier's automobile. Ronni's husband, Michael, walked away with only minor injuries.

By Taylor Branch

**S**EPTEMBER 21, 1976 — Eugene M. Propper sat eating lunch in the cafeteria at the Federal courthouse in Washington, D.C., the courthouse where Judge John Sirica presided over the Watergate trials. Only 29, tall, slender and neatly bearded, Propper had worked upstairs for almost five years as an Assistant United States Attorney, but planned to leave soon for private practice, having tired of casework in burglaries and petty corruption.

When a superior dropped by his table and asked him to look into the double murder of a former Chilean Ambassador named Orlando Letelier and his American aide that had occurred that morning, Propper agreed on a hunch that the case might become an interesting finale to his prosecutorial career. He had no idea that the case would totally preoccupy him.

With only a newspaper reader's knowledge of undercover operations among Cubans and Chileans, gleaned from the most publicized C.I.A. stories of recent decades, Propper was far re-

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September 11, 1973 — Letelier is arrested in Santiago, Chile,



after a coup toppled the Government of Salvador Allende. Three years later, the outspoken critic of the junta that replaced Allende would be killed in Washington, D.C.

moved from the world of Latin American terrorism, a world of coups d'etat, murder and drug trafficking. It was a world populated by a small army of agents, some trained in the 1960's by the United States. For a hard-working prosecutor like Propper, it would be a long leap from street crime to the spy underworld and the heights of diplomacy.

The Letelier case would be interesting on two levels, Propper would soon learn. It was, of course, a dramatic international murder case of great significance. But beyond that, Propper would find that the more he probed the murder, the more he would learn about this country's controversial and often shadowy involvement in Latin American affairs.

The murder itself is still being investigated by a Federal grand jury in Washington, D.C., with indictments expected later this month. What the grand jury has found so far is secret, but sources predict that the indictments will involve not only important Cuban exile leaders but also officials high in the Chilean Government's secret police.

Propper would learn that men like Orlando Bosch, leader of the Cuban terrorist organization, CORU; Orlando Garcia, a top-level official in the Venezuelan secret police; Ricardo Morales, a master spy who had worked for a number of intelligence agencies, including the F.B.I. and the C.I.A.; Ignacio Novo, the leader of the U.S.-based Bay of Pigs veterans' organization; along with others, like Michael Townley, the American-born Chilean secret police operative, would play major parts in the Letelier investigation.

To many experts, the training of these men, and others like them by the C.I.A., was an experiment that was bound to someday backfire. For, as American policy toward Castro softened, a trained cadre of Cuban exile terrorists, embittered and frustrated, spread throughout Latin America, ultimately occupying important posts in various national police and intelligence agencies.

Propper's case would involve double agents, double crosses and double meaning, as well as a double murder. It began the morning of September 21, 1976, as Orlando Letelier drove down Massachusetts Avenue on his way to work at Washington's Institute for Policy Studies, accompanied by two young colleagues, Ronni and Michael Moffitt, 25-year-old newlyweds and newcomers to capital politics. As institute researchers and aides to a prominent Chilean exile like Letelier, they had plunged quickly into the thick of things. In 1976, Chile was much in the news, with revelations coming out about the C.I.A.'s persistent interventions in that country leading up to a 1973 military coup against the left-wing government of Salvador Allende. At the same time, there was a growing number of reports documenting a campaign of torture and murder by the Chilean junta's secret police, known as DINA.



Augusto Pinochet, leader of the Chilean military junta that ousted Allende, surrounded by his generals. Who gave the orders?

Letelier knew a lot about the coup and about the DINA. As Allende's Defense Minister, he was arrested during the coup and then imprisoned and tortured for nearly a year in a makeshift DINA work camp. In exile, Letelier, who had a wide circle of influential and highly placed friends — including United States Senators and European government ministers — became friend and mentor to the Moffitts. Traveling the globe, he employed all his contacts and all his talents in opposition to General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte's junta in Chile. The junta, in return, stripped Letelier of his Chilean citizenship.

But Letelier felt safe in the United States. Entering Sheridan Circle, his car moved past the embassies of South Korea, Turkey and Rumania. Suddenly, Michael Moffitt, sitting in the back seat, heard a loud hissing sound that seemed to run up the driver's door to the roof of the car, and he saw a flash of light on the dashboard. The floor erupted directly under Letelier, blowing off the car door and crumpling the roof. Careening into a Volkswagen parked in front of the Irish Embassy, the car settled among the scattered glass and debris. Letelier's legs lay in the street nearby, his torso pinned in the wreckage. He died shortly after reaching the hospital. Ronni Moffitt, while not mutilated like Letelier, died a few minutes later, drowned in her own blood. Michael Moffitt walked away from the carnage with only minor physical injuries.

In the heart of the American capital, in daylight, within sight of at least a dozen foreign embassies, terrorists had dared to carry out a major gangland-style political execution.

From that frozen moment of terror, there grew a mystery that investigators refused to abandon through long months of frustration and disillusionment. They would hold fiercely to the moment, shaking it, until, finally, questions were answered and governments began to feel the repercussions of the investigations.

As in Watergate, the original crime led back into a maze of official crimes and collateral scandals whose magnitude would come slowly into view. But, unlike Watergate, no Cubans were caught red-handed and there were no suspects.

From the beginning, Propper was surrounded by chaos. He helped settle chronic jurisdictional disputes among various agencies, especially the police and the F.B.I., and at the same time tried to arrange some sort of truce between F.B.I. agents and the victims' relatives and their friends at the Institute for Policy Studies. This last was no easy task, for the F.B.I. and I.P.S. had been classic political enemies for years. No F.B.I. agent needed to be reminded that I.P.S. had filed a \$1 million damage suit against the bureau for political harassments during the Vietnam war. The institute, called the intellectual home of the American left in Washington, housed assorted radicals who customarily assailed the conduct of the U.S. Government. By almost any

standard, they were personally incompatible with F.B.I. agents such as L. Carter Cornick, a conservative Virginian who joked that his family had boycotted the Washington newspapers ever since they started running pictures of "pinkos" like Eleanor Roosevelt back in the 1930's.

Propper and Cornick somehow managed to win the personal confidence of the scholars at I.P.S., but the I.P.S. people made no secret of their mistrust of the F.B.I. and the Government as a whole. No sooner did Propper and Cornick have the I.P.S. people convinced that they would follow the case anywhere than I.P.S. came back again, incensed over press reports that contradicted these assurances; Newsweek published an item stating that "The C.I.A. has concluded that the Chilean secret police were not involved in the death of Orlando Letelier. . . ." Propper, somewhat exasperated, could only repeat that the investigation was just beginning.

### THE VENEZUELAN CONNECTION

OCTOBER 1976 — The investigation quickly received a heavy dose of intrigue when its focus shifted to Venezuela, of all places. On Oct. 6, less than three weeks after the Letelier-Moffitt murders, a bomb exploded inside a Cubana Airlines jet en route from Barbados to Cuba, killing all 73 people on board. Fidel Castro, blaming the C.I.A., promptly canceled the 1973 anti-hijacking treaty with the United States. Shortly afterward, Venezuelan authorities arrested more than 20 people, almost all Cubans, who they said were involved in a terrorist network responsible for bombings in several countries. The Venezuelans charged a number of them, including a Cuban terrorist named Orlando Bosch, with conspiring to blow up the Cuban plane.

This became more than a gruesome news item to Propper when F.B.I. agents reported that Bosch had told the Venezuelan secret police that two New Jersey-based Cuban-American brothers named Guillermo and Ignacio Novo Sampol had been involved in killing Letelier. But who were the Novo brothers? The F.B.I. received information from

Bosch through two Cuban exiles high up in DISIP, the Venezuelan secret police, who also said the Chilean junta had been putting out murder contracts on Chilean exiles like Letelier.

While Propper's investigation moved hesitantly forward in Venezuela, it abruptly ran into a strange roadblock. Surprisingly, the Venezuelans refused to supply further information. Finally, Propper resorted to an official means of international inquiry known as Letters Rogatory, in which a court of one nation asks a court of another nation to seek out information useful to a pending case. Propper sent the Letters, which he had obtained from the First District Court in Washington, D.C., to Caracas secretly, to avoid diplomatic repercussions, but the Venezuelan courts declined to cooperate with the Letters, and the Venezuelan Government innocently maintained that it has no authority over the courts.

Struggling to learn why he was getting so little cooperation, Propper and his colleagues discovered that the Venezuelan Government appeared to work both with and against the terrorists. They also learned why Bosch and two DISIP Cubans — Orlando Garcia and Ricardo Morales — came together in that country, and how they were linked in one way or another to many people who might know about terrorist acts like the Letelier murder. According to sources, the three Cubans all had different kinds of C.I.A. careers; when Propper found them riding the razor's edge of terrorism in Venezuela, they were still "in the business" of espionage and intelligence. [See box, Page 29.]

OCTOBER 1976 — After Propper's Cuban sources implicated Guillermo and Ignacio Novo in the murders, Propper subpoenaed the Novo brothers before a Federal grand jury in Washington, D.C., at the end of October. The testimony produced no important evidence, sources say, but it did contain statements that became the basis for a charge of perjury relating to the murders.

At the same time, Propper stepped up his efforts to secure some cooperation from the C.I.A., since the crime appeared to be of international origin and since the witnesses and suspects appeared to have C.I.A. backgrounds. A Justice

Department delegation met with the agency's Director, George Bush, and its general counsel, Anthony Lapham, to seek a working arrangement. Sources said the participants "got around" legal restrictions on the C.I.A.'s involvement in criminal investigations through a high-level exchange of letters, initiated by the Attorney General, which stipulated that the agency would only provide information, not direct evidence. The parties recognized explicitly that if the Attorney General and the C.I.A. Director should disagree on whether a witness or a piece of evidence could be presented in open court, they would refer the dispute directly to the President.

Under these agreements, the C.I.A. began turning over to Justice Department officials background information on Cuban exile political groups and on foreign organizations such as the Venezuelan DISIP and the Chilean DINA. No source would say, however, that the agency ever provided a major new clue.

## PROPPER'S FIRST BREAKTHROUGH

NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1976 — Propper felt confident enough in the Venezuelan leads and in other evidence to intensify his investigation of the Chilean DINA. At a time when Propper and the F.B.I. refused publicly even to list DINA as a possible suspect in the case (to the dismay of Letelier's colleagues at I.P.S.), they committed enough F.B.I. manpower to sift through the visa applications of every single Chilean who entered the United States between May and September of 1976. It was laborious, unglamorous work, stretching out through the early months of 1977. One member of the search team put the number of visas in the initial batch at more than a thousand.

Operating on the theory that any Chilean conspirators "would not be dumb enough to travel on an official passport," as one F.B.I. source puts it, the agents started out looking for the people who had applied for non-official visas. By hunches and guesswork, they threw out the most unlikely ones first — the large families on vacation in California, and so on. "We went through them all," said a source involved in the search later. "We went all

through the forest to get a tree."

At the end, a small number of visa applicants attracted suspicion for one reason or another. Among them were two Chilean army officers named Juan Williams Rose and Alejandro Romeral Jara. When the suspect names were circulated among other governmental, police and intelligence agencies for signs of recognition, a report from an alert Ambassador in Paraguay about Williams and Romeral popped up from the records of the State Department. These records brought the first excitement to the investigation, the first moment when suspicions and clues came together in a promising way, and they documented the first of many episodes that would make United States Ambassador to Paraguay George Landau a hero to the investigators.

## FLASHBACK: THE ALERT AMBASSADOR

JULY 1976 (two months before the Letelier-Moffitt murders) — Ambassador George Landau received a phone call at his embassy office in Asuncion, Paraguay, from a high official of the Paraguayan Government, who inexplicably wanted to assure the Ambassador that the two Chileans who had just been granted official U.S. visas in Paraguay were O.K. The caller said the Paraguayans would vouch for them even though the Chileans were not — as diplomatic custom requires — attached to the Chilean Embassy in Paraguay. After puzzling over the call, Landau made calls of his own to check on the story.

Whatever he learned, it did not remove his suspicions. On the contrary, he called the Paraguayan official back that same day and notified him formally that the two Chileans' visas had been revoked. He then forwarded the visa photographs of Williams and Romeral to the State Department in Washington, along with a cable setting forth the details of the story. Such reports (especially from a known smuggling center like Paraguay) are fed into the Government's "Watch List" to alert security agencies. But for some reason Landau's cable and the photographs sat unnoticed in the bureaucracy until six months after the as-

sassinations. They arrived late, but sources believed it would have been almost impossible to break the case without them.

## THE CHILEAN CONNECTION

MARCH 1977 — Propper and his investigators possessed not only Williams' and Romeral's visas, but also visa applications — two sets of suspicious records. If, as investigators believed, these men arranged the Letelier assassination for the DINA, investigators believed, they committed many blunders. By seeking official visas in Paraguay, they not only drew attention to themselves but they had also submitted photographs. Then, incredibly, they apparently returned to Chile after their covers had been blown and applied for U.S. visas in Chile — official ones, requiring no photographs but supported by a letter from the Chilean Foreign Ministry. Thus, they left a paper trail that included not only revoked visas and photographs, but also a letter tying them to the top levels of the

Chilean Government.

Still, the paper trail very nearly went undiscovered, and investigators believed that the mistakes might well have been consistent with other errors in the murder — including the death of an innocent American, for example. Agents of the Chilean secret police might well have made such mistakes. "The DINA," noted a C.I.A. official who served in Chile, "is not a sophisticated service. It was only created in 1973, to defend the coup, so it's new. It took us about 15 years to get our own State Department to issue false official passports for our agency, so you can imagine how much trouble the Chileans might have."

## FAILURE IN THE GRAND JURY

Through the spring and summer of 1977, Propper called more than 20 Cuban witnesses before the Letelier grand jury, some of them several times. He used all the legal leverage he had to secure testimony to support the Venezuelan leads and informants' reports. He

had one Cuban suspect (later sought as a fugitive in the Letelier murder) jailed for refusing to testify under a grant of immunity. He told the president of Miami's Bay of Pigs Veterans Association (Brigade 2506) that he was a direct suspect in the case, and he threatened to have Hector Duran, a Chilean consul in Miami, declared persona non grata if he were not more forthcoming. Despite all this, and much more, the Cuban witnesses wouldn't talk. One F.B.I. source said that not a single witness recognized the photographs of Williams and Romeral. "This case was not made in the grand jury," sighed a prosecution source.

As in Venezuela earlier, Propper had accumulated a batch of tantalizing intelligence reports and then ran into a stone wall. The lack of hard evidence was especially frustrating, because the informants and the testimony showed how the same harsh currents that brought Orlando Bosch together with the DISIP agents in Venezuela had also brought Cuban exiles together with DINA agents in Miami in an atmosphere of violence. The same condition that per-

petuated Miami's violence — too many informants, too few witnesses — kept hard evidence in the Letelier case out of reach.

## GAMBLE IN CHILE

SEPTEMBER 1977 — One long year after the murders on Sheridan Circle, President Pinochet arrived in Washington to attend the signing ceremonies for the Panama Canal treaties. At the same time, Propper and Cornick, stymied after months of work on the American side of the murder conspiracy, had been forced to look outside the United States for new leads. They managed to have discreet interviews with Orlando Garcia and Ricardo Morales of the Venezuelan DISIP, and they also interviewed a young Cuban named Rolando Otero who had spent several months of 1976 in Chile, conferring with DINA officials who wanted him to kill the junta's enemies abroad. The United States Government had twice stopped Otero's efforts to testify about his DINA contacts,

but Propper was determined to hear what Otero knew. He wanted information about Williams and Romeral, and about the names of DINA officers who planned foreign murders. If the conspiracy could not be traced from America to Chile, Propper would have to reverse direction and, using diplomatic leverage, go straight after the DINA in its own land. It was an extraordinary move, based on the ironic notion that it would be more fruitful to pursue an American murder case in a foreign country.

Through the fall and winter of 1977, Cornick and his F.B.I. colleagues used routine Interpol channels in Chile to seek Williams and Romeral, as though they were suspects in a normal criminal case. The Chilean military dragged on cooperating with Interpol's efforts to locate the two men. Finally, one Chilean general broke the investigator's patience by leaving on a five-and-a-half week vacation.

After long deliberations with Justice Department superiors, Propper decided to send Letelier Rogatory to the Chilean Supreme Court. Unlike the Letters to Venezuela a year

(Continued on Page 39)

earlier, these would be publicly announced and transmitted to the Chilean junta along with a high-level message from the State Department to underscore their importance. Attorney General Griffin Bell and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance approved the substance of the plan.

FEBRUARY 1978 — Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher summoned Chilean Ambassador Jorge Cauas to his office. Christopher handed him a draft letter covering the Letters Rogatory, explained their purpose briefly, and then delivered the message that had been prepared in advance: "It is of the utmost importance that the Chilean Government recognize the gravity of the situation and the possible implications for the future of our relations." The meeting was over within 20 minutes.

In Chile, the branches of the armed forces declared one by one that they had never heard of any "Williams" or "Romeral." For 10 days, American officials in Santiago stressed the importance of the two suspects, while the Chileans shrugged their shoulders.

MARCH 1978 — Once again, Propper and his colleagues found themselves in danger of being shrugged off indefinitely. Sources later said they did not have any idea of the real identities of Williams or Romeral. Nor could they reveal what intelligence information they had received from the Venezuelan sources without showing how little they had connecting the two suspects to activities in the United States. So, it appears, they decided that one gamble required another.

All sources in the Justice and State Departments and the F.B.I. denied giving the "Williams" and "Romeral" photographs to Washington Star reporter Jeremiah O'Leary, but his story on March 3, across that newspaper's entire front page, appeared to be the result of a leak at the highest levels. The story said that "the United States is prepared to sever diplomatic relations with Chile" if the two men in the photographs were not produced to comply with the Letters Rogatory. Newspapers all over the world, including those in Chile, reprinted the photographs that had been squeezed up through the United States security system as a result of Ambassador George Landau's suspicions back in Paraguay.

Since that time, Ambassador Landau had been trans-

ferred to Chile, a development that Propper's colleagues took as a good omen in view of the Ambassador's previous actions in Paraguay.

Publication of the photographs lit the Letelier case like a fuse. Two days after the O'Leary story, the largest newspaper in Santiago, *El Mercurio*, identified "Williams" as Michael V. Townley, a 35-year-old American who had lived most of the last 20 years in Chile. *El Mercurio* had consistently advanced the thesis that Letelier had been murdered by his own socialist friends in a double-jointed plot to create a leftist martyr. Its identification of Townley was a stunning event in a Chile that had lived under strict censorship for more than four years.

The news breaks in the Letelier case had become too delicious to be suppressed. Teams of Chilean reporters besieged junta spokesmen for details of Townley's life and wrote profile after profile on his politics and upbringing. On March 9, *El Mercurio* identified "Romeral" as Capt. Armando Fernandez Larrios of the Chilean Army, and profiles were written about him, too. On March 10, President Pinochet broke his silence on the case by declaring his Government's innocence and attacking the U.S. investigation. "I have the impression," he stated, "that this is a very well-mounted campaign like all the campaigns that the Communists mount to discredit the Government."

By this time, the Chilean press was discussing the untimely death of Protocol Chief Carlos Guillermo Osorio, the man who had signed the supporting letters for the visa applications of "Williams" and "Romeral." The death certificate stated that he had died of a "heart attack" the previous October. However, the papers learned that Osorio's relatives had secured an autopsy in November, during which doctors found that Osorio had died of a gunshot wound in his forehead.

Having appointed three separate panels to investigate the circumstances of the "Williams" passports, the junta's machinery insisted long after the press identifications that the identities of the two men were still in question. Meanwhile, the name "Michael Townley" circulated quickly among law-enforcement agencies in the United States. Investigative sources said they were startled to learn that their suspect was an American — and were even more surprised at the news that he had lived in the Miami area in 1967-

1971 and 1973-1974. Agents rushed out to interview friends, relatives, co-workers, family doctors, landlords and anyone else they could find. International travel records were combed for Townley's name, and helpful signs popped up here and there. "Townley's name got hot very fast," said an investigator.

## THE FIRST SHOWDOWN

On March 19, Propper himself flew to Chile to help move things along. Two days later, Chile's newspapers reported more stunning news: General Manuel Contreras Sepúlveda, who had ruled the DINA with an iron hand as President Pinochet's chosen man, had suddenly and mysteriously resigned from the Army. Contreras had wielded such immense power that his departure stimulated gossip in Chile that he must have been involved in the Letelier affair. Diplomatic sources, picking up on the Watergate analogy that had become popular in Chile, remarked that Pinochet seemed to be "sacrificing his Haldeman."

Over the next two weeks, news about Michael Townley sent shock waves all through Pinochet's Government. Since he had worked for the DINA, some Chilean Army officers were said to be blaming General Contreras for fouling the honor of the Chilean Army with ugly Mafia tactics, while other officers were said to be equally disgusted with President Pinochet for allowing foreigners to push around the sovereign nation of Chile. There were many signs that factions within the junta were jockeying for position in case of a coup. Two diplomatic sources said that the American Embassy in Chile had received warnings that Contreras and his former DINA colleagues might try to have Townley killed. Factions within the Chilean Government maneuvered to protect him.

The American position toward the Chilean Government boiled down to one sentence: "We want Townley." In one especially stormy session with the Chilean Foreign Minister, sources say, Ambassador Landau declared that if Townley were not produced, Propper would have to go back to Washington and report a lack of cooperation. In that case, the Ambassador added, he expected the Carter Administra-

tion to break off relations with Chile. And if for any reason the United States decided not to sever relations under those circumstances, the Ambassador continued, he himself would resign.

The drama in this meeting was matched by a continuing excitement in the press and in the streets of Chile. F.B.I. agents L. Carter Cornick and Robert Scherrer scurried around Santiago looking for information about Townley, and Chilean citizens, recognizing them from photographs in the newspapers, approached them just to shake hands. Eugene Propper was even more of a public figure in the streets of Santiago. His red beard stood out like a matador's cape. On several occasions, throngs of Chileans surrounded Propper's embassy car, wanting to say hello to the "Fiscal" (prosecutor).

APRIL 1978 — L. Carter Cornick and Robert Scherrer were eating breakfast the morning of April 8 when an urgent call from the American Embassy reached them with orders to go directly to the Santiago airport. They were not to pack, not to check out — just go. Now. Within minutes of their arrival at the airport, an unmarked car pulled up, and officers of the Chilean secret police emerged with Michael Townley — in DINA handcuffs.

## RUSH TO COURT

The prosecutors worried that all the people Townley might implicate in the crime would be taking precautions. Propper threw himself into the effort to "turn" Townley into a Government witness, conducting intensive negotiations with him and his lawyer, former Watergate prosecutor Seymour Glanzer. When Townley agreed to plead guilty to a charge of conspiring to murder Letelier, investigators took his testimony in a rush — checking his leads, following his clues to other suspects. The case was breaking.

MAY-JUNE 1978 — Propper simultaneously prepared witnesses for the first trial, and traveled back to Chile in search of more suspects on the basis of Townley's evidence, this time higher up the DINA line toward General Contreras. Negotiations over such important Chilean officials grew so tense in June that Ambassador Landau was recalled to the United States for consultations.

In the State Department, of-

officials prepared for possible negotiations with the Pinochet junta. The question was whether the United States would be satisfied if the Chileans were to try certain suspects (including DINA officials) in Chile instead of turning them over to United States authorities. In Miami, Justice Department sources grumbled that terrorism in Florida continued without anything like the Federal commitment to stop it that had pushed the Letelier case forward. Those sources also said that only the "least connected" Cubans would be indicted in the Letelier murder, excluding any Miami operatives.

In Washington, the victims' relatives and their colleagues at the Institute for Policy Studies continued to press for the case to be followed to the top of the Pinochet regime, where, they always insisted, the conspiracy began. From the outset, however, the I.P.S. people had expressed their trust in the efforts and integrity of Propper and Cornick, and this odd bond between the cops and the institute took on more meaning in the wake of Townley's confession, and his subsequent testimony before the grand jury.

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Like the cracks and reforms in the Pinochet regime, these developments have all come about before a single indictment has been issued in the Letelier case, in a period when judges have sealed all charges filed thus far. When the first indictment is handed down sometime this summer, it will open the doors to the case the prosecution intends to prove in court — spelling out, in the manner of conspiracy indictments, the meetings and movements and transactions and other "overt acts" that took the murder conspiracy from beginning to end. It will, according to sources, trace the assassination plot from its roots in Chile into the United States, detailing how the conspirators recruited the assistance and assembled the explosives, the detonator, and other necessary equipment. Only fragments of such details have reached the public. The sinister drama will begin to unfold as the case moves toward the courtroom, when the witnesses and defendants emerge publicly to tell their tales. Journalists and prosecutors will pick apart the histories of the participants in an effort to explain how a crime like this one could have happened and how, against all odds, some justice could be done. ■