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staff.

Our Heritage — The Exile Cuban Terrorists

By George Crile III

IT IS ALL but certain that Cuban exile terrorists were responsible for the bombing of an Air Cubana plane last month and the resulting death of the 73 aboard. Another exile organization is suspected in the assassination two months ago of former Chilean Foreign Minister Orlando Letelier. These were simply two incidents in an epidemic of bombings, killings and kidnappings carried out by anti-Castro exiles based in Miami over the past three years. The frequency and ruthlessness of these attacks have reached the point where the possibility must be considered that we are witnessing the coming of age of the first serious American-based terrorist movement. An effort to understand who these people are and to gauge the danger they pose might well begin with a single stark case history.

Luis Crespo seemed a most unlikely candidate for terror. He was a shy, 32-year-old father of two, a drug store salesman, just another of the 450,000 or so Cubans in Miami. But there he was in March of 1974 assembling a book bomb. Just after midnight he was fitting the C4 ex-

plosive into a hollowed-out copy of "British at the Gate" when it blew up in his hands.

Crespo, believing himself dying, was rushed to the hospital shouting "Viva Cuba Libre." The police, unnerved, shackled Crespo to his bed. The Miami papers identified him and his partner in the venture, Humberto Lopez Jr., as members of the National Cuban Liberation Front, a newly formed anti-Castro terrorist group. But why this group had formed, exactly who its members were, and why such seemingly upright young men were attempting such acts went unexplained.

It might all have seemed less puzzling if the background had been examined. Far from being suddenly possessed of terrorist notions, both men were veterans of guerrilla campaigns against Castro backed in another era by the CIA.

Lopez had participated in an Agency-financed program based in Nicaragua. Crespo had been a member of one of the CIA's elite commando teams operating from Miami during the Kennedy years. He had been trained in the use of explosives and sabotage techniques and was then sent on raids to Cuba. Like all of the CIA's full-fledged agents, he had signed a secrecy oath, submitted to polygraph tests, served under the command of an American case officer.



Luis Crespo, manacled to a hospital bed after a bomb he was assembling exploded.

Crile is Washington editor of *Harpers* magazine and author of a book to be published by Doubleday on the CIA's Cuban operations.

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CUBANS, From Page C1

When he went to work for the CIA, he was just 21, one of almost 2,000 Cubans recruited in Miami for Operation Mongoose, the Kennedy administration's secret war on Cuba. He served under Rip Robertson, the legendary American case officer who had led the Brigade ashore at the Bay of Pigs. There had been no question in those years about the U.S. commitment to the exiles' cause.

Crespo was then a totally reliable instrument of U.S. policy. The policy changed in time but, like the broom of the sorcerer's apprentice, Crespo could not be induced to stop.

When President Johnson halted the CIA's paramilitary operations in 1965, Crespo left the Agency and began to mount independent raids with other Agency veterans. When Customs and the Coast Guard began to arrest the raiders, he turned to terrorism as the only tactic available.

Then came the bomb accident. From the hospital, he was taken to the Dade County jail. When I talked to him here, he had just started a hunger strike to dramatize his cause. He now looked the martyr, an emaciated, boyish figure with a hook where his right hand had been.

He had long ago, Crespo explained, committed his life to the cause of "liberating" Cuba. Any regrets for his losses were outweighed by pride in his sacrifice and the outpouring of sympathy and respect from his fellow exiles. "I have been paid richly in moral payments, far more than I deserve, for what little I have done."

His only smile came when he spoke of Rip Robertson. He liked the CIA men he had known. They were honest, dedicated anti-Communists. But he did not see how he could be criticized for resorting to terrorism. He was only doing what he had been trained to do. And what, after all, had Robertson been if not a terrorist, like him, against Castro?

Foreign Connections

IT IS PEOPLE like Crespo, driven by similar ambitions and molded by the same conditions, who are at the heart of the terrorist causes today.

There have been over 100 bombings in Miami since Crespo's bomb blew up two and a half years ago. Earlier this year Rolando Otero, who at the age of 16 had been the youngest soldier in the CIA's 2506 Brigade at the Bay of Pigs, was arrested for bombing the Miami FBI, the State's Attorney's office, the Dade County police department and Miami International Airport. These attacks were clearly targeted against officials investigating the terrorists; it is a miracle that no one was seriously injured.

Even more alarming are the political assassinations. Five exile leaders have been murdered since the Crespo incident, and several others seriously wounded. Some of the victims advocated moderation toward the Castro regime. Emilio Milián, the leading exile radio commentator, had both legs torn off by a bomb in his car after he had criticized the terrorists for committing such acts within the United States.

A similarly designed bomb killed Letelier. Significantly perhaps, that assassination came only a matter of months after the machine-gunning of Bernardo Leighton, a former Chilean Christian Democratic leader, and his wife in Rome.

Although at least one press report suggests that Italian fascists were responsible for the Leighton incident, some investigators tend to believe it was the work of ZERO, a particularly ruthless Cuban exile organization which claimed credit in a communique describing the weapons used, the number and caliber of shots.

It is known that a number of exiled activists have been working closely with the right-wing Chilean junta. And, according to U.S. government sources, they may have carried out or arranged the Leighton shootings as part of an ongoing mutual assistance agreement with DINA, the junta's secret service.

The extent of the foreign assistance available is particularly significant. Just as the Palestinians have been able to operate only with the help and financial backing provided by Libya and other Arab countries, so too do the Cuban terrorists require the support of friendly governments in this hemisphere.

They have built-in bases of support within a number of Caribbean and Latin American countries. Venezuela, for instance, has a prosperous and influential exile population of about 25,000, and exiles have held sensitive posts in the Venezuelan intelligence service since the early 1960s, when the country was under attack from Castro trained and armed guerillas. Some of those arrested in Venezuela in connection with the Air Cubana bombing were meeting with high government officials not long ago. They had even been given a \$1,000-a-plate fund raising dinner for their cause in Caracas.

One of the men indicted, Luis Posada Carriles, had been both a CIA veteran and a high Venezuelan security official. He is reported to have been a link between the government of Venezuelan President Perez and the Chilean junta.

A Violent Tradition

THE EASE with which upright members of the exile communities of the Caribbean murder their political enemies, or finance those who do, may startle people in the United States, but terrorism does not carry the stigma among Cubans that it does for Americans. Rather, it is the time-honored instrument of revolutionaries against any regime they considered unjust. Had it not been for the CIA's virtual monopoly on the anti-Castro activities in Miami in the early 1960s, there probably would have been major outbreaks of organized terror earlier. As it was, there were two short-lived campaigns inspired by men who figure prominently in recent events.

The first began in 1964 with the mortar attack on the U.N. when Che Guevara came to address the General Assembly. This was the work of the fanatically right wing Cuban Nationalist Association, made up of disgruntled Bay of Pigs veterans who warned the exiles not to trust the CIA, calling instead for an Algerian-styled terror.

Today the Nationalists are active once again; two veterans of the U.N. bombardment (the Novo brothers) are prime suspects in the Letelier assassination.

The second outbreak came in 1968 with bombings in Miami harbor of ships flying the flags of countries that had relations with Cuba. Readers of Miami's daily papers were introduced to "Ernesto," the mysterious leader of "Cuban Power," through "clandestine, exclusive" interviews in which the terrorist would appear in a black hood and whisper his intentions to bomb Cuban installations and kidnap and assassinate Cuban officials around the world.

Later, "Ernesto" dropped the *nom de guerre* and revealed himself as the well-known pediatrician, Dr. Orlando Bosch. Today Bosch is considered the terrorists' guiding force. In testimony before the Senate Internal Security subcommittee this year, he was accused of plotting the assassination of Secretary of State Kissinger. He is now in jail in Venezuela under indictment for an alleged role in the Air Cubana bombing. Rumors persist that Bosch had received CIA training before the Bay of

The New Cuban Terrorists

Figs. But there are no indications that he was ever a controlled agent. On the contrary, he was one of the first exile leaders to turn against the Agency.

In the mid 1960s, Bosch bitterly denounced the CIA for "dispersing, dividing and destroying the anti-Castro revolution." He, for one, would pursue an independent path. Thanks to his Cuban Power, Miami led the world's major cities in bombings — 44 — in 1968. The terror promptly stopped late in that year when Bosch and eight followers were arrested and jailed.

Some exiles responded favorably to Bosch's efforts in the 1960s, but few of the CIA's Cubans or the mainstream anti-Castro leaders took his work seriously. They saw the bombings as symbolic gestures without real impact, and they continued to look to the U.S. government as the last, best hope of liberating Cuba. Once the Vietnam struggle ended, they believed, the green light would be given by Washington to resume the secret war.

But events were under way which would radicalize many of the mainstream exiles and, in 1973, precipitate the first popularly supported terrorist campaign. The decisive development came when the United States signed a treaty against hijacking with Cuba and began vigilantly to arrest those exiles still trying to raid the island; in some cases they were the very veterans the CIA had trained and sponsored on such missions only a few years before. Sens. Claiborne Pell (D-R.I.) and Jacob Javits (R-N.Y.) went to Cuba and Dr. Kissinger began talking as if he planned to open negotiations with Castro.

"Fish" in the "Sea"

IT WAS AT this moment, when all seemed lost for the exiles, that Palestinian gunmen were demonstrating that terror could make a considerable political and public relations impact; soon Yasir Arafat would appear with a pistol at his belt, to address the U.N. General Assembly. With the example of the Palestinians very much in mind, the bickering factions among the exile activists moved to unite and to renew their war. Conveniently, Dr. Bosch had just been paroled after four years in prison; the activists swiftly embraced him as their prophet, theoretician and indisputable leader. In the autumn of 1973 70 different exile organizations gathered in San Juan for a congress; an umbrella organization was formed and shortly thereafter the terrorist campaign was initiated by the bombing of several Cuban diplomatic missions.

It is a part of the doctrine of "liberation" movements that terrorists must function as "fish" in the "sea" of a supportive environment. The "fish," men such as Luis Crespo, seem to be in abundant supply among the exiles. The critical factor is the hospitable sea. Without it, a terrorist cannot finance his activities, cannot escape his enemies and, perhaps most important, cannot sustain himself emotionally. It is here that the shift in sentiment among the mainstream exiles counts; it has created a substantial subculture within the Miami community which has so far provided the support needed to sustain the current terrorist war.

Take the instructive reaction of Carlos Prío Socarras, the last constitutional president of Cuba, to the new developments. From his exile in Miami, Prío warned that exiles would react violently to any move by the United States to recognize Castro, adding:

"My position is against indiscriminate terrorism. I don't like dynamite — it is too blind. It's not good to kill innocent people. But it is good to attack the Castro people wherever they are. That's okay. I'm not against this kind of political terrorism just because it is inside the United States. It's all right with me."

Perhaps even more significant was the position voiced by Dr. Miro Cardona, who had been Castro's first prime minister and then, as president of the Revolutionary Council, the man selected by the CIA and the Kennedy administration to become president of Cuba once Castro was overthrown.

He was a highly respected jurist, but over the years he had become increasingly embittered. As he neared the end of his life, he began to meet with Dr. Bosch and to advocate a policy of terrorism:

"We are alone, absolutely alone . . . there is only one route left to follow and we will follow it: violence, the internationalization of the struggle for the freedom of Cuba at all levels."

Miro's words, spoken at the end of 1973, served as a battle cry and moral justification for the new campaign. Overnight, the initials of the new exile front, FLNC, were painted on walls across Miami's Little Havana. Either out of respect or fear, no one painted them over. Later that year, when a young terrorist died while trying to bomb the Cuban embassy in Paris, he was given a martyr's funeral in Miami. Hundreds, including former President Prío, attended. An article in the Miami Herald went so far as to make analogies between the slain man and José Martí, the father of Cuban independence.

And then, early in 1974, a FLNC communique declared that henceforth "anyone, anywhere who negotiated with Castro would become a military objective".

Shortly after this warning, George Davis, the FBI's chief Cuban expert, served a subpoena on the man whose home had been Luis Crespo's bomb factory. The following morning a car without lights started up rapidly behind Davis and, accelerating, bore down on him. He was barely able to leap to safety.

A week later, on Good Friday, exile leader José de la Torriente was assassinated in his living room while



Dr. Orlando Bosch: jailed in Venezuela on bombing charge.

watching "Ben Hur" on television. His killer left a note identifying the assassination as the work of ZERO the same group which claimed responsibility for the Leighton machine-gunning in Rome. A subsequent letter threatened other old-style leaders who had "misled" the exiles in the past. Alarmed by these developments, the FBI advised Senators Pell and Javits, who had become identified in exile eyes with the effort to renew U.S. relations with Cuba, to vary their routes to and from work in the Capital, just in case.

Though the terrorism created bitter debate within the exile community, the new campaign did gain in popularity. At a rally held to raise a defense fund for Luis Crespo and Humberto Lopez, hundreds of simple folk in Little Havana walked in off the street and contributed more than \$12,000, mostly in \$1 and \$2 donations. And when the two men went on trial, Miami's Mayor Maurice Ferrer wrote the judge asking that mercy be shown to the patriots.

The Brigade's Decision

THERE HAVE been hundreds of anti-Castro organizations formed in Miami over the years; at one point the police files listed 105 revolutionary groups. Nevertheless, only one of these organizations, the (Bay of Pigs) Brigade 2506 Association, commands universal respect.

The Brigade Association, with its approximately 1,500 members, has always managed to remain aloof from Little Havana's internecine intrigues. Until a year ago it had been a fraternal organization. But at its 14th anniversary ceremonies in April, 1975, a marked shift was apparent, a shift which would soon bring about a fundamental change in the terrorists' campaign.

Twelve years earlier the Brigade had presented its flag to President Kennedy. The President hailed the Brigade as the standard-bearer of freedom in the hemisphere and, before tens of thousands of cheering exiles in the Orange Bowl, pledged to return its flag to the free soil of Cuba.

Now the Brigade veterans were making speeches accusing the United States of betraying their cause, and they demanded that the Kennedy Library return the flag, threatening to storm the library if refused. (Wisely, the flag was returned.) The Brigade concluded its ceremonies by awarding its first Freedom Award to Gen. Pinochet of the Chilean junta.

Dr. Bosch, too, was apparently establishing close links with the Chileans. He had jumped parole, fleeing the United States just after the Torriente killing. He was interviewed in Curacao by an exile newsman who reported that Bosch was being escorted by a band of armed Chileans and had access to all the money he needed. (The reporter also said Bosch was reading a biography of Yasser Arafat.)

State Department files indicate that the Chileans were offering safe haven, passports and even the use of diplomatic pouches to some Cuban terrorists. One government investigator says that a remote control detonating device, used in the assassination of the exile leader Roldando Masterer in 1975, had been brought into the United States in a Chilean diplomatic pouch.

The Chilean connection is beyond dispute; the question is just how far it goes. Max Leznik, the publisher of Little Havana's largest newspaper, Replica, says that some of the exile terrorists are performing strong-arm services for DINA. "The Chileans are using the Cubans; they use them because the Cubans are crusaders. You tell them there are 10 Chileans in Paris who were close to Allende and that Allende was close to Castro and they will go with you."

Like other prominent exiles, Leznik has resorted to bodyguards. At the end of our interview he pulled out a .45 and said, "It's incredible, but I need this to survive as an editor. You American newsmen feel you don't need to carry a gun but think what it was like in the Old West. It's like that here. Everywhere I go, I take a man with a pistol and other weapons. If the police take them away from me, then I die."

Leznik's problem is particularly thorny because he is a professed socialist and fought alongside Castro in the Sierra Maestra. Some of the exiles, he says, cannot distinguish between socialism and communism and doubt his loyalty to the anti-Castro cause. However misguided they may be about Leznik, it is understandable that some exiles are confused about the loyalties and even the identities of their comrades.

Such suspicions were reinforced by the nature of the violence in 1974-75. Although the terrorists did strike at some Castroite targets abroad, they concentrated their attacks in Miami and most of the targets were other exiles. The campaign was by no means universally supported, but none dared to be outspokenly critical.

Some of the exiles, however, came to see the terror campaign as suspiciously counterproductive. It not only spread fear and suspicion within the community but also alienated the U.S. government and public.

That the exiles have been deeply penetrated by agents from Havana is a view long held within the FBI and other interested agencies. No one seriously questions the fanatical sincerity of most of the terrorists, but some exile leaders and U.S. officials have begun to theorize that agents provocateurs were behind some of the inflammatory incidents most likely to create dissension within the exile community or to enrage U.S. opinion.

Such observers cite the history of Carlos Rivero-Collado, Brigade veteran, son of a pre-Castro prime minister and a leading member of the oldest and most fanatically right-wing exile terror group, the Nationalists. He was said to have been one of the Nationalists' most formidable members, with a personal following among the younger terrorists. Suddenly, in the fall of 1974, several months after Torriente's assassination, Rivero-Collado

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United Press International

Radio commentator Emilio Milian had his legs blown off when a bomb exploded in this car.

defected to Cuba, publicly denouncing the terrorists as fascists and — more significant — describing their membership in detail. Their plans, he claimed, included assassination of U.S. officials.

The Offensive Begins

THE CIVIL war aspects of this supposedly anti-Castro terror campaign grew in intensity after Rivero Collado's departure, culminating in December, 1975 with a sudden rash of bombings, including those against the FBI and state's attorney's offices. Then the violence in Miami all but stopped. And a true offensive was launched against Cuban targets in Europe and the Americas.

The apparent explanation for this reversal in targets is to be found in the sudden entry of the veterans of the Bay of Pigs Brigade into the struggle. The decision was reached at the 14th reunion of the Brigade on April 11, 1975. The Brigade leaders claim to have reached an agreement with the other terrorists to call for war at home; in return, the Brigade would take the anti-Castro war.

This new coalition was apparently responsible for the following incidents:

April 6 — two Cuban fishing vessels machine gunned, one Cuban killed. April 22 — a bomb kills two Cuban officials in Lisbon. July 5 — Cuban U.N. office bombed. July 9 — bomb explodes in luggage car on Air Cubana before being loaded aboard. July 10 — Cuban airlines office in Barbados bombed. Aug. 9 — two embassy officials in Buenos Aires kidnapped. Late August — one Cuban official killed in Mexico City, and an unsuccessful attempt made to kill another in Yucatan.

In the midst of the campaign last summer, Echeverria and other leaders met in the Dominican Republic with representatives of Dr. Bosch and of several terrorist groups, including the Nationalists. A new agreement was reached to form a united front to carry out a coordinated campaign of international terror against Castro targets wherever they could be reached. The new organization's name, the Commandos of United Revolutionary Operations (CORU), would not become known to the American public until the group was implicated two months later in the crash of the Air Cubana plane en route from Havana to Havana.

During the Labor Day weekend the Brigade took an unprecedented step, apparently designed to broaden the base of the terror movement. It held its first conference and there announced the opening of a war chest to establish an exile "government in arms." The only organization universally respected among the exiles has lent its prestige to terror.

Like Luis Crespo, the Brigade's leaders do not understand why the United States should disapprove their latest effort, now that the violence in Miami has abated. Seventy exiles have reportedly been subpoenaed to testify before a Grand Jury in Miami; others have been called before a Grand Jury in Washington in connection with the Letelier killing.

The leaders of the Brigade's terrorist arm say they have violated no American laws. Most are American citizens and they are careful to conspire abroad.

One of them, a long time veteran of America's wars against Cuba, spoke of his bitter resentment at being labeled a terrorist. "To us a terrorist is a man who sets a bomb off and doesn't care who he kills. A revolutionary is a man who uses the methods and equipment available to him at the moment to hit Fidel Castro. We are revolutionaries."

The explanation he offered for the Air Cubana crash was that the new terror campaign is aimed at the Cuban economy. The crash, it was assumed, would damage tourist trade.

"Also," he said, "98 per cent of the people on that plane were Communists and our war is against Communists." It was hoped, he added, that the terror attack would lead to increased tension between the United States and Cuba.

Facing Realities

AND INDEED Castro quickly abrogated the anti-sabotage treaty, charging that the CIA was behind the terrorism. This was just what the terrorists wanted — to put Cuba and the United States back at loggerheads.

There is no reason to believe Castro's charge that the CIA is sponsoring today's terrorists, but there is also a way of denying the past intimate CIA connections with many of these men.

The impression should not be left here that all or most of the CIA's Cuban veterans have become terrorists, that all or most of the exiles support the terrorists. That is not the case. But there are enough militants and supporters to cause terrible problems for some time to come.

The Air Cubana bombing, which caused the death of the entire Cuban national fencing team among others, was taken by the Cuban people as a national tragedy.

In a speech shortly after the crash, Castro warned that henceforth his government would retaliate for attacks. The terrorists, for their part, say there will be new attacks, and soon. The prospects are ominous.

The natural tendency is to dismiss the exile terrorists as fascists or part of some lunatic fringe. But not so long ago they were our closest military and ideological allies, acclaimed by President Kennedy as the champions of freedom in the hemisphere.

If we are now to find a way of containing these men, we must begin by remembering our own part in starting them down the desperate path they are following.

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By JACK ANDERSON:

Slain Chilean tied to Havana

Secret papers found in Chilean exile leader Orlando Letelier's attache case after his assassination show he had been collecting a mysterious \$1,000 a month through a "Havana connection." The papers also reveal that Letelier's office had been in close contact, perhaps innocently, with a top Cuban intelligence agent named Julian Torres Rizo.

The respected Letelier, a former Chilean foreign minister, was blown to oblivion on Sept. 21 as he was driving down Washington's tranquil, tree-shaded Embassy Row. Accompanying him in his blue Chevrolet were two passengers, Mike Moffit and his wife, Ronni. The bomb blast also killed Ronni, but Mike miraculously survived.

He telephoned us afterward in anguish and pleaded with us to investigate the assassination. Our preliminary findings indicated that Chile's dread secret police, known as DINA, probably had been behind the bombing. Now our investigation has turned up some unexpected developments.

The blast that killed Letelier, we have learned, revealed that he had been leading a strange double life. The evidence was locked in a Samsnite attache case, which investigators salvaged from the wreckage.

The briefcase was returned to the murdered man's family. But first, intelligence agents copied the contents for possi-



ble clues that might lead to the assassins.

They found some unexpected clues that were even more fascinating. The briefcase contained papers so sensitive that Letelier probably carried them to prevent their theft by CIA housebreakers. We have now seen some of these hush-hush papers.

They show that Letelier received \$1,000 a month through a "Havana connection." His contact was none other than Beatrice (Tati) Allende, daughter of Salvador Allende, the Chilean president who was slain in 1973 by a military junta. Tati now lives in Havana with her husband, who is a Cuban official.

In a May 8, 1975, letter to Letelier, she notified him that he will receive \$5,000 as an advance payment "para apoyar tu trabajo" — "to support your work." This was to be followed by the monthly \$1,000 payments. The money would come, she said, from the Chilean Socialist Party in exile. The disbursement had been approved, she explained, by the party's leader, Carlos Altamierano, who is reported to be living in exile in East Berlin.

The Chilean Socialist Party has offices in East Berlin, Havana and Rome. Intelligence sources contend that money couldn't have been transmitted to Letelier without the Cuban government's approval.

Another letter in Letelier's briefcase was written on Sept. 14, 1976, by one of his young colleagues. It tells of a meeting in Havana with Emilio Brito, a Communist Central Committee functionary. According to our intelligence sources, Brito is affiliated with the Cuban planning group that directs the subversion of Puerto Rico and the United States.

The letter thanks Brito for some scholarly material "received from the hands of Julian Rizo." The writer promises to send other academic information to Brito through "la Mision," meaning the Cuban mission at the United Nations.

Officially, Rizo was listed as the first secretary of the Cuban mission. But as early as March 1, 1976, we identified him as a spy in diplomatic disguise. "His mission at the United Nations," we wrote, "is to develop contacts with radicals in this country."

We have omitted the name of Letelier's young colleague, because he has received an assassination threat. But we questioned him for an hour. The young man contended persuasively that he was totally unaware of the intelligence roles of Brito and Rizo.



Dead Chilean exile had link to Cuba

By Jack Anderson and Les Whitten

WASHINGTON — Secret papers found in Chilean exile leader Orlando Letelier's attache' case after his assassination shows he had been collecting a mysterious \$1,000 a month through a "Havana connection."

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murdered man's family. But first, intelligence agents copied the contents for possible clues that might lead to the assassins.

They found some unexpected clues that were even more fascinating. The briefcase contained papers so sensitive that Letelier probably carried them to prevent their theft by CIA housebreakers. We have now seen some of these hush-hush papers.

They show that Letelier received \$1,000 a month through a "Havana connection." His contact was none other than Beatrice "Tati" Allende, daughter of Salvador Allende, the Chilean president who was slain in 1973 by a military junta. Tati now lives in Havana with her husband, who is a Cuban official.

In a May 8, 1975, letter to Letelier, she notified him that he will receive \$5,000 as an advance payment "para apoyer tu trabajo" — "to support your work." This was to be followed by the monthly \$1,000 payments. The money would come, she said, from the Chilean Socialist party in exile. The disbursement had been approved, she explained, by the party's leader, Carlos Altamierano, who is reported to be living in exile in East Berlin.

The Chilean Socialist Party has offices in East Berlin, Havana and Rome. Intelligence sources contend that money couldn't have been transmitted to Letelier without the Cuban government's approval.

Another letter in Letelier's briefcase was written on Sept. 14, 1976, by one of his young colleagues. It tells of a meeting in Havana with Emilio Brito, a Communist Central Committee functionary. According to our intelligence sources, Brito is affiliated with the Cuban planning group that directs the subversion of Puerto Rico and the United States.

The letter thanks Brito for some scholarly material "received from the hands of Julian Rizo." The writer promises to send other academic information to Brito through "la Mision," meaning the Cuban mission at the United Nations.

Officially, Rizo was listed as the first secretary of the Cuban mission. But as early as March 1, 1976, we identified him as a spy in diplomatic disguise. "His mission at the United Nations," we wrote, "is to develop contacts with radicals in this country."

We have omitted the name of Letelier's young colleague, because he has received an assassination threat. But we questioned him for an hour. The young man contended persuasively that he was totally unaware of the intelligence roles of Brito and Rizo.

Letelier, at the time of his death, was affiliated with the Institute for Policy Studies. The Institute's director, Marcu Raskin, said he had no knowledge of Letelier's secret payments. "What he did for his Chilean concerns was totally outside his Institute work," Raskin told us.

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The Washington Star

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WASHINGTON, D.C., WEDNESDAY, APRIL 20, 1977

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LETELIER'S ORDER FOR TWO GUNS

By Jeremiah O'Leary
Washington Star Staff Writer

On March 7, 1973, a short letter was sent to a Washington-area firearms dealer by Ambassador Orlando Letelier of Chile on embassy stationery.

It read:
"Please enter my order for two Ingram M11 Systems .380 ACP cal. for test and evaluation. Very truly yours, Orlando Letelier, Ambassador of Chile."

In less than two days, the State Department's Office of Munitions Control had signed the export license, and the transfer was also signed by Rex Davis, director of the Treasury Department's Bureau of Alcohol,

Tobacco and Firearms. Both documents are dated March 9, 1973.

Late that afternoon, a messenger from the firearms company arrived at the Chilean embassy residence, where he received a check from an administrative officer named Hernan Navarro in the amount of \$476.80. The check was signed by Letelier.


THE CHILEAN ambassador then left for a 10-day visit in Santiago via LAN Chile Airlines Flight 451 with his luggage and, apparently, the package from the Washington-area arms dealer. The package contained two Ingram 9mm submachine guns. These weapons are equipped to fire a 32-cartridge clip, effective at 100

meters single-shot and more if sprayed at the full-automatic setting.

With the sound suppressor, or silencer, the Ingram is described by U.S. authorities as a lethal counterinsurgency weapon that has no other purpose than killing by stealth. With the silencer and clip removed and the wire shoulder stock folded inside the gun, the weapon is no larger than a .45-caliber pistol of the standard American make.

The reason for the purchase of two of these submachine guns with silencers, plus 200 rounds of ammunition, by Letelier — six months before his Marxist Unidad Popular government was overthrown by the Chilean

See LETELIER, A-12.



—Washington Star Photographer Ray Lustig
The type of submachine-gun purchased by Letelier, equipped with silencer and with 32-round clip in place. With stock folded as shown and silencer removed it is about the same size as Colt .45 automatic in picture.

600

LETELIER

Continued From A-1

armed forces — is as much a mystery today as his murder here last Sept. 21 when a bomb exploded under his car.

FEDERAL OFFICIALS and Washington police investigating the murders of Letelier and his associate, Ronni Karpen Moffitt, discovered that he had bought the weapons. The Washington Star began checking the same ground last week after Letelier's widow, Isabel Letelier, told a Georgetown University audience that her husband had been falsely accused by the military junta of involvement in drug trafficking and weapons smuggling.

Dets. Stanley R. Wilson and John R. Chaillet of the Metropolitan Police homicide squad, assigned to the Moffitt-Letelier case, were asked about the junta accusations and Mrs. Letelier's response. Although they refused to discuss any aspects of their investigations, the detectives said there was no evidence of any kind that Letelier had been involved in drug trafficking.

They did confirm, however, that Letelier had bought two weapons before he was recalled from his ambassadorship here in May 1973, but declined to disclose any further details of the purchase. But The Star located the arms dealer, who also insisted on anonymity, and has obtained a copy of Letelier's order for the submachine guns.

The dealer insisted that the sale was legal and showed the U.S. government documents he obtained at the State and Treasury departments before making the delivery to the ambassador. The dealer said he hand-carried the documents to State and Treasury for the necessary signatures. A State Department source said the transaction apparently was expedited by officials because normally the necessary approvals could not be obtained in a two-day period.

THE SILENCERS, according to Deputy Director James D. Hataway, could not be exported now under State Department policies established since Letelier bought the silencers and submachine guns.

The Ingram submachine gun was designed for use with a silencer and is out of balance without it. Without the silencer and with the stock at full extension, the weapon is easily concealed inside a suit coat. It has little recoil and, with the silencer, is almost noiseless.

While it could not be ascertained whether Letelier took the weapons with him to Chile on March 9, 1973, the messenger who delivered the package to the chancery was told that the ambassador needed the package for his journey. Bringing the weapons out of the United States and into Chile would not have been smuggling because Letelier had all the necessary permission from U.S. authorities. There would have been no difficulty in getting the weapons past customs since Letelier could either have carried them in his luggage or in the Chilean diplomatic pouch.

THE ARMS DEALER said he had no idea whether Letelier wanted the weapons for his own use, was taking them to Chile for someone else or whether the "test and evaluation" motivation was genuine. Officials say the normal procedure for any government acquiring weapons for test and evaluation is through military attaché channels. In any case, it is not known what Letelier did with them.

The Chilean Embassy here, now representing the military junta, said it would have to ask Santiago if the Ingrams and the silencers were captured when the armed forces took power. The serial numbers of the weapons bought by Allende are 3-300819 and 3-3001047. The silencer numbers are S-3-2000379 and S-3-2000460, according to the records of the arms dealer here.

Letelier returned to Chile in May 1973 and became successively foreign minister, minister of interior and defense minister. He was taken prisoner by the armed forces on Sept. 11, 1973, when the coup d'état was carried out by the armed forces under Gen. Augusto Pinochet, and spent much of the next year on bleak Dawson Island near the Straits of Magellan.

About a week after the coup, a Star reporter visited Mrs. Letelier in her Santiago home and was asked if her husband had had any weapons. She said he had a pistol that was given to him by fellow employes when he was leaving the Inter-American Development Bank. Mrs. Letelier, who now lives in Bethesda, said she turned this souvenir pistol over to the Chilean national police as soon as the junta issued a decree requiring that all weapons be handed in.

The Ingram submachine gun and silencer were made by the Military Armament Corp. of Powder Springs, Ga. The local arms dealer said the company since has gone out of business.

Cubans Harassed in Letelier Case?

By Jeremiah O'Leary
and Toni House

Washington Star Staff Writers

Members of an anti-Castro exile group under scrutiny in the murder of Chilean diplomat Orlando Letelier have charged U.S. officials with harassment and said the jailing of one of their members for refusing to testify before a grand jury was a "fishing expedition."

Leaders of the Movimiento Nacionalista Cubano from the northern New Jersey area made the charge in a press conference after U.S. District Judge John Lewis Smith yesterday sentenced Jose Dionisio Suarez to jail.

Suarez had refused to testify under immunity before the grand jury investigating the Sept. 21 car-bomb murders of Letelier and his associate, Ronni Karpén Moffitt.

SUAREZ' ATTORNEY, Oscar

Gonzalez Suarez (who is not related to the witness) declared after the sentencing, "It would appear that (the prosecutor) wants to pit one anti-Castro group against another."

"They are trying to get any information they can about what every anti-Castro organization is doing and that's a fishing expedition," said the lawyer.

Suarez, an Elizabeth, N.J., car salesman, and another MNC member, Alvin Ross Diaz, were granted immunity from self-incrimination in the Letelier probe April 14. The two Cubans, along with eight other exiles now living in New Jersey and Miami, made their first grand jury appearance here April 6 but refused to answer questions.

Yesterday, accompanied by their attorney, they came to Washington for a second grand jury appearance.

Suarez, the only witness called by Asst. U.S. Atty. Eugene Propper, re-

fused to answer any questions before the grand jury. The prosecutor immediately haled Suarez before Smith, where Propper requested that the witness be held in contempt.

Smith ordered the Cuban exile to be jailed for the life of the grand jury, which does not expire until next March, or until he testifies.

ATTORNEY SUAREZ and another MNC leader, Guillermo Novo, told reporters they objected to testifying about other Cubans groups with which they said they have no connection. Novo said the MNC is not subordinate to the exile terrorist organization, CORU, or its leader, Orlando Bosch, who is in jail in Venezuela. Novo, of Union City, N.J., declared that the MNC is "100 percent opposed to indiscriminate violence."

Novo and the other Cubans also denied any connection with DINA, the Chilean secret police.

APRIL 21
1979

(X)

**JACK ANDERSON
and LES WHITTEN**

WASHINGTON—Congress has called for military equipment, including planes, radar, sensors and satellites, to bolster the faltering battle against drug abuse.

This unusual request has been forwarded to the Pentagon by the Senate Permanent Investigations subcommittee. In a private letter to Defense Secretary Harold Brown, the senators pleaded: "This country is fighting a self-proclaimed war on drugs. When fighting a war, you use the best resources available and make every effort to win. This is not being done."

The letter, signed by Sens. Sam Nunn, (D-Ga.) and Charles Percy (R-Ill.), contends that drug abuse costs the United States a staggering \$17 billion annually. More than 5,000 Americans die each year from the improper use of drugs; thousands more are killed and injured in drug-related crimes.

The sheer magnitude of the drug problem has led the subcommittee to seek drastic countermeasures. "Within the federal government," declare the senators, "the Department of Defense alone possesses the air and land vehicles needed to pursue and overtake the drug traffickers."

They point out that the Customs Service "lacks sufficient planes, radar, sensors and other equipment to adequately protect our borders; the equipment it does have largely consists of second generation or ill-equipped models." To curb the deadly drug traffic, the senators insist, will take "resources comparable in sophistication to those used by the smugglers themselves."

FOOTNOTE: A spokesman said the Pentagon has received the proposal and is preparing a response.

Cuban officials have tipped off visiting Americans that the Cuban terrorist, Orlando Bosch, is the man behind the dynamite death of Chilean exile leader Orlando Letelier in Washington last September.

This conclusion is based upon Fidel Castro's own investigation of the assassination. His agents, re-

that the Chilean military junta enlisted Bosch to bankroll the plot. He was chosen, according to the Cubans, because he was fanatical and honest enough not to steal the murder money. He allegedly parceled out the money to other anti-Communist Cubans who actually blew up Letelier and a companion as they were driving down Washington's tree-shaded embassy row.

Last August, we revealed that this same Orlando Bosch was involved in a plot to assassinate former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in Costa Rica. Bosch slipped into Costa Rica on a false passport, ready to gun down Kissinger, but was clapped into jail four days before the visiting secretary arrived in

the country. Bosch is now in a Venezuelan jail on suspicion of bombing a Cuban airliner. This caused the deaths of 73 Cubans, some reportedly Castro secret agents.

FOOTNOTE: Cuban foreign ministry sources passed on the information about Bosch to American visitors. There is always the possibility, of course, that the information may be fabricated to embarrass the Chilean dictatorship.

Saudi Arabian sources have made the startling suggestion, in the strictest of privacy, that the Arab oil states may be willing to provide financial aid to Israel if the Middle East conflict is settled. The Saudis pointed out that the Israelis and the Arab moderates have a common interest in keeping the Communists out of the Middle East.

Tuesday - May 3 - 77



Foreign spies get CIA cooperation

By Jack Anderson and Les Whitten

WASHINGTON — Some of the world's most sinister secret police are operating in the United States with the blessing of the Central Intelligence Agency. There is evidence that these foreign agents have arranged murders, committed burglaries, attempted kidnaping and terrorized political opponents in violation of U.S. laws.

In past columns, we have reported that the CIA has a secret understanding with such notorious foreign intelligence agencies as Chile's DINA, Iran's SAVAK and South Korea's KCIA. Not only does the CIA work closely with these police agencies; the agents operate within one another's countries by mutual consent.

Now the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has quietly started an investigation into the activities of foreign intelligence agencies in the United States. The committee is particularly curious about the CIA's role in these activities.

On the House side, Rep. Donald Fraser, D.-Minn., has also asked the CIA to divulge the details of its reciprocal arrangements with foreign intelligence agencies. The CIA has refused to cooperate.

As far back as July 17, 1975, we published charges that the KCIA had terrorized Korean exiles, had set up illegal front groups to manipulate U.S. public opinion and had tried to buy off U.S. congressmen. We also cited documents from SAVAK's files as evidence that the Iranian secret police were intimidating opponents of the shah in this country. The documents included detailed instructions on how to burglarize homes and offices.

In our reports on the Chilean police, we warned on Nov. 16, 1975: "There is reason to believe that DINA has hired thugs to track down and and assassinate prominent exiles." Ten months later, Chilean exile leader Orlando Letelier was blown up in his car on Washington's embassy row. Investigators are now convinced that DINA hired Cuban killers to murder Letelier.

As additional evidence, we have now obtained an explosive document from

DINA's own files. It is a memo, dated Sept. 16, 1975, from DINA chief Manuel Contreras Sepulveda to Chilean President Augusto Pinochet.

The memo requests "an additional allotment of \$600,000 for the (DINA) budget." Among four reasons for the extra money, this was the most fascinating: "Additional expenses for the neutralizing of the principal adversaries of the government junta in the exterior, especially in Mexico, Argentina, Costa Rica, the United States, France and Italy."

We can only speculate of course, what the phrase "neutralizing of the principal adversaries" means. But the memo was followed by an assassination attempt against Chilean dissident Bernardo Leighton on the streets of Rome. Then Letelier was dynamited to death on the streets of Washington.

The FBI also learned of murder plots against two other Chilean exiles. Gabriel Valdes and Rodomiro Tomic, who were given protection.

We hand-delivered a copy of the DINA memo to the Chilean embassy in Washington and waited a week while embassy officials examined it. A spokesman then denounced the document as "completely false." He said Contreras' signature was a "forgery." The fact that the memo was not written on a DINA letterhead, the spokesman asserted, was additional proof that the document was a fabrication.

The memo was delivered to us by sources who have been reliable in the past. For three weeks, we painstakingly checked it with a number of sources including U.S. officials. They all agreed it not only appeared genuine but was consistent with their own intelligence information.

A DINA defector now in asylum in the Italian embassy in Santiago, according to competent sources has confirmed the authenticity of the memo. We have also had access to other DINA documents, which the Chilean government has acknowledged are authentic. These resemble the disputed document in every detail. Many, incidentally, are not written on DINA letterhead.

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By

On the Trail Of a Murderer

WASHINGTON — The man behind the murder of Chilean exile leader Orlando Letelier, as federal investigators have pieced together the mystery, is probably Chile's shadowy secret police chief, Manuel Contreras Sepulveda.

In one of the most complicated investigations since Watergate, FBI sleuths have traced the man who ordered the killing to Contreras' office in Santiago, Chile. They are not yet certain, however, whether Contreras himself gave the order or whether it came from a top aide.

Most federal sources believe the murder could not have been carried out without Contreras' direct approval. In fact, some Justice Dept. sources speculate that Chilean President Augusto Pinochet himself personally suggested the assassination.



No one working on the case will comment directly. But we have learned that the FBI has stepped up its activity among terrorists in Miami and hopes to resolve the case in the near future, complete with the names of the actual assassins.

Letelier was killed by a bomb, which was attached beneath his Chevrolet. The bomb exploded last Sept. 21 as he was driving down Washington's tranquil Embassy Row with two American colleagues, Mike and Ronnie Moffitt.

The blast killed Letelier and Mrs. Moffitt but miraculously spared her husband. Afterward, an anguished Mike Moffitt begged us to investigate the bombing. We have kept in close touch, therefore, with the federal investigation.

Within a few weeks, we were able to identify Chile's notorious secret police, known by the dread initials DINA, as the probable culprits. Now we can describe the murder plot.

We are told that Pinochet expressed his displeasure with Letelier to the DINA chief. We have reason to believe that Contreras, in response to the Chilean president's wishes, dispatched a DINA officer to the United States to meet with two leaders of Brigade 2506, an organization of Bay of Pigs veterans.

Some members of the brigade, trained in

violence by the CIA, allegedly have become right-wing terrorists. The DINA agent was put in touch with them, according to our sources, by a Chilean diplomat in the United States, who secretly works for DINA.

We reached the diplomat who reportedly has been interrogated by U.S. authorities. At first, he told us through an interpreter that the affair was his "private problem." Then he refused to comment; then his aide told us the charge was "ridiculous."

Investigators tell us, however, the two brigade leaders contacted among others a Cuban demolition expert, Guillermo Novo, in New Jersey. At that time, he was on probation after conviction for illegal use of explosives. He violated his probation and is now a fugitive.

The assassination plot was worked out, our sources say, at a secret rendezvous near Bonao in the Dominican Republic. It was decided that a special shaped plastic charge was needed for the bombing.

The explosive was available on the streets of Miami, and the bomb materials were bought and fashioned in the United States, most sources believe.

However, one source told us the bomb was actually constructed in Chile.

It was later delivered to the Miami area by a Chilean military official carrying a diplomatic passport and flying in a military airplane, the source said. The device was transmitted to a member of Brigade 2506, we are told. He then carried it to New Jersey where the assassination team was waiting for it. They used the bomb, according to our sources, to kill Letelier.

The Justice Dept. had no formal comment on the case. We have learned that prosecutors, however, are trying to figure how to get testimony from Chileans with diplomatic immunity and how to extradite potential defendants from Chile.

Footnote: The Chilean government has repeatedly denied any involvement with the assassination. Spokesmen for Brigade 2506 also have sworn that their members had nothing to do with murdering Letelier. Incidentally, Chile has announced the dissolution of DINA. But our

The FBI has traced the man who ordered the killing of Chilean Orlando Letelier to the office of the chief of Chile's secret police.

sources say its duties simply have been taken over by other organizations.

Around the World

Chilean in Letelier Probe Linked to Secret Police

SANTIAGO, Chile—A military source here has identified the second of two men sought in connection with the death in Washington of former ambassador Orlando Letelier as Armando Fernandez Larios, an Army captain attached to the Chilean secret police, special correspondent John Dinges reported.

The source, who said he has known Fernandez since military school, said he recognized the officer from pictures printed Saturday in the Santiago press.

The Chilean government has refused to comment on the identity of the two men. The Washington Post reported Monday that Chile has said the two men sought by the United States—identified initially as Juan Williams Rose and Alejandro Romeral Jara—do not exist in military or civilian files.

Williams' picture has been recognized by several persons who said he was an American. Michael V. Townley, with a reputation for right-wing activity in Chile.

Another informed source revealed that the two published photos were obtained by the U.S. government from a consulate in Paraguay. The source said the two men applied for U.S. visas using unspecified false documents.

It has been reported that two men using the names of Williams and Romeral traveled to the United States on official Chilean passports with U.S. visas.

The Weather

Today—Sunny, high near 90, low near 60. The chance of rain is near zero through tonight. Wednesday—Sunny, high near 90. Yesterday—3 p.m. air quality index: 90. Temperature range: 85-45. Details are on Page C2.

The Washington Post

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Higher beyond
See

Ex-CIA Aide, 3 Cuban Exiles Focus of Letelier Inq

By Bob Woodward

Washington Post Staff Writer

A former CIA explosives expert and three Cuban exiles will soon be sought by federal authorities for questioning in the investigation of last year's Embassy Row bomb-murder of former Chilean Ambassador Orlando Letelier, according to informed sources.

Edwin P. Wilson, the former Central Intelligence Agency operative, and the three Miami-based Cuban exiles came to the attention of federal officials when they learned that Wil-

son was under FBI investigation in an unrelated assassination plot abroad.

Wilson allegedly sought to recruit the three Cubans to kill a political opponent of the Libyan leader, Col. Muammar Qaddafi, last year, according to the sources.

Wilson heads a small consulting firm here called Consultants International. It is involved in the arms export business. Wilson was out of the country yesterday and could not be reached for comment.

In reviewing information developed in the Libyan investigation of Wilson, investigators have established these

possible connections with the Letelier case:

- Wilson had a secret contract with the Libyan government to provide detonation devices called "timing pencils"—a tube filled with chemicals that can be remotely controlled to trigger explosions. Such a "timing pencil" is believed to have been used to detonate the bomb that exploded beneath Letelier's car.

- The three Cuban exiles arrived in the Washington area just three days before the Sept. 21, 1976, bombing of Letelier's car.

- One of the Cuban exiles, an ex-

plosives expert believed to have been trained by the CIA in the 1960s, met in Miami recently with a close associate of other Cuban exiles who have been chief suspects in the Letelier case.

Assistant U.S. Attorney Eugene M. Propper, who is in charge of the Letelier investigation, met with CIA officials last week and asked for all files and information on Wilson and the three Cubans, the sources said.

The three Cubans are not among the 10 anti-Castro Cubans who have reportedly been questioned already by the grand jury investigating the Letelier murder.

"These are new Cubans and a completely new direction for the case," said one source familiar with the investigation. The sources said, however, that the extent of Wilson's involvement, if any, could not be learned until Wilson is questioned.

In the Libyan investigation, the sources said that Justice Department attorneys are not sure if any U.S. law has been violated because the department has no jurisdiction to prosecute crimes committed abroad.

The Libyan case is now in the Justice Department Criminal Division for review.

That investigation began last year

when CIA officials learned that a former employee was allegedly recruiting Cubans for terrorist activity.

According to the sources, Wilson was acting under a contract with the Libyan government and wanted the Cubans to assassinate a Libyan who had exiled himself to Egypt much like Letelier had exiled himself to the United States after the September, 1973, coup in Chile and a year of imprisonment there.

The Cubans turned down the job offer, which was made by Wilson at a

See LETELIER, A12, Col. 1

Ex-CIA Aide, Cuba Exiles Focus of Letelier Probe

LETELIER, From A1

meeting in Geneva, Switzerland, according to the sources.

Upon learning of this, the CIA requested the FBI open an investigation of Wilson. This case was so sensitive that President Ford was personally informed of it.

Wilson's contract with Libya included a promise to supply thousands of timing pencils. "It is one of the most alarming things I've ever seen," one source said. "There were enough (timing pencils) contracted for to support terrorist activity for the rest of the century."

The Libyan government has in the past supported terrorist activity. At a news conference last July 19, President Ford said, "We do know that the Libyan government has in many ways done certain things that might have stimulated terrorist activity."

In addition, the sources said that there is some evidence that Wilson may have had contact with one or more current CIA employees who have access to supplies of timing pencils.

It is not clear from the investigation if any or how many timing pencils Wilson actually supplied to the Libyan government.

The sources said Wilson also tried to recruit other former CIA employees to be explosives instructors in Libya.

One former CIA employee was offered \$100,000 a year but turned it down. Wilson himself had contracts valued at hundreds of thousands of dollars with Libya, according to the sources.

Wilson has declined to answer ques-

tions from FBI agents in the Libyan investigation, the sources said.

Consultants International is located at 1425 K St. NW. An official there said yesterday that the firm was not involved in any questionable activity.

According to the firm's own promotional literature, Consultants International could supply an army with equipment including patrol boats, parachutes, airborne accessories and armor-protected vehicles.

"Armaments can be arranged to meet the requirements of the purchaser," the literature says.

Sources said that Wilson had a contract with Libya to clear land mines but the contract was the "cover" for the real purpose of supplying detention devices.


"Explosive detection devices" are one of the items on the firm's sales list.

Wilson's firm has received numerous licenses from the State Department Office of Munitions Control to export arms related material though no license has been granted to export any thing to Libya, according to government records.

Letelier, 44, former Chilean ambassador to the United States, was foreign minister and minister of defense in the government of the late Chilean social President Salvador Allende.

At the time of his death, Letelier headed a foreign affairs research program at the Institute for Policy Studies in Washington. A staff member of the Institute, Ronni K. Moffitt, also died in the explosion. Her husband, Michael, a research associate, survived the blast.

Ben Weiser assisted in the reporting of this article.



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The Letelier Case: M1

By Timothy S. Robinson
Washington Post Staff Writer

One of the first police officers to arrive at the scene of the explosion watched the debris still floating through the damp air to the ground like ash from a campfire. He looked at his watch and noted the time: 9:38 a.m. on Sept. 21, 1976.

Stately Sheridan Circle on Embassy Row was soon filled with investigators from the D.C. police, the FBI, the Executive Protective Service, which guards diplomats and embassies here, and the U.S. Treasury's Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms unit, which investigates crimes involving explosives. As smoke continued to rise from the mangled Chevelle on the roadway of the circle, the investigators scurried to collect every possible bit of evidence from the debris around it.

They shook tiny particles down from tree leaves, drained a rain puddle and strained its contents, vacuumed debris from the grass, and unceremoniously put ladders up against embassy walls to search rooftops. By the end of the gray, rainy day, thousands of tiny plastic bags had been filled with fragments that were taken to an FBI laboratory for analysis.

Painstaking work in the laboratory produced the first clues to the nature of the crime. The bomb had been strapped with precision above the I-beam of the Chevelle's frame so the driver would be hit with the full force of the blast. The high power of the expertly constructed explosive was clearly intended to kill. And the fact that it could have been detonated by remote control was further evidence of the sophistication of the crime.

The next clue was the identity of the target of the crime: Orlando Letelier, a former ambassador to the United States from the Chilean government of Marxist president Salvador Allende and an outspoken opponent in exile of the current Chilean president, Gen. Augusto Pinochet, who overthrew Allende in 1973.

Letelier had been working here at the Institute for Policy Studies, a liberal "think tank" that gave him a platform for speeches and writings critical of Pinochet's government and the Chilean secret police, then known as DINA.

Two colleagues of Letelier's were in his Chevelle when it was blown apart on Sheridan Circle. One of them, Ronni Moffett, who was riding along side Letelier in the front seat, died quickly of a severed artery. Her husband, Michael, who was in the back seat, was thrown clear of the car and survived.

Letelier's colleagues at IPS, which itself had been infiltrated and spied upon by informants for the FBI during the anti-Vietnam war years, immediately decided that DINA had murdered Letelier to shut him up. And, because of disclosures of CIA involvement against Allende in Chile, they doubted the U.S. government's determination to find and bring Letelier's killers to justice if it meant embarrassing the Pinochet government. Their suspicions and anger grew when they discovered that investigators, checking out every possible motive, were asking whether anything in Letelier's and the Moffitts' private lives might be connected to the killing.

Assistant U.S. Attorney Eugene M. Propper of the major crimes division was sitting in the cafeteria in the federal courthouse here that September morning when the investigation of the Letelier killing began. Propper had just told friends at the table that two police officers with whom he had an appointment could not show up because "some ambassador" had been killed when one of Propper's supervisors came by and asked him to work on the Letelier case.

His supervisors warned him that such crimes are among the most difficult to solve and prosecute and that this one seemed particularly likely to involve unpleasant political pressures. But Propper, a prosecutor who had already begun thinking of leaving the U.S. attorney's office for private practice, agreed to take the case anyway.

A few blocks away in the Washington field office of the FBI, agent Carter Cornick had been waiting for his assignment here to take shape after his recent transfer from Puerto Rico. When the Letelier bombing occurred, Cornick was selected by FBI agent-in-charge Nick F. Stames for the job because of Cornick's availability, his knowledge of Spanish, and his investigations of other bombings in Puerto Rico.


Cornick is an outgoing man descended from several generations of Virginians who is frequently given to humor—traits not often expected in the dry stereotype of FBI agents.

Propper and Cornick, who had never met before, would spend the next 18 months on the unusually painstaking and often frustrating investigation that only last month produced arrests of a number of suspects and word that federal prosecutors here knew the details of the crime and had traced its origins to DINA and the Chilean government.

Unknown to the victims' friends and colleagues at the Institute for Policy Studies, the FBI investigation already had turned toward Chile. Agents in the nation's Cuban exile communities, aware of a growing affinity between some very militant anti-Castro Cubans and the rightist Pinochet government in Chile, began checking Cuban informants.

The FBI and the Justice Department soon realized that this part of the investigation necessarily would involve intelligence information here and abroad, so they began laying delicate groundwork. Propper, Assistant Attorney General Stanley Pottinger and CIA Director George Bush met to determine to what extent that agency could help in the investigation. A carefully worded agreement placing the Letelier case in a "national security" status allowed that cooperation.

The investigation quickly focused on the Cuban exile connection after Venezuelan authorities informed the United States that Cuban exile leader



MICHAEL TOWNLEY
... decided to cooperate

Orlando Bosch—who was being held in that country for the bombing of a Cuban commercial airliner in which 73 persons died—had implicated "the Novo brothers" in the Letelier case. By the end of October 1977, the Novos and other Cuban exiles were being brought before a federal grand jury here for questioning.

The Novo brothers—Ignacio Novo Sampol and Guillermo Novo Sampol—were known in the U.S. Cuban community and to federal agents as leaders of the Cuban Nationalist Movement, a group that wants to regain its homeland without help from the United States.

In 1964, they had fired a bazooka from across the East River toward the United Nations while Che Guevara was speaking there. They were arrested, but charges against them were dropped because they had not been properly informed of their right.

Ignacio Novo also had been charged in the early 1970s in New Jersey, with an explosives-related case, according to court records. And Guillermo Novo was on probation for a 1974 conviction in New Jersey in connection with a plot to blow up a Cuban ship and other property in Montreal.

The Cuban exile movement headed by the Novos, who had been living in this country for nearly two decades, was considered extreme even by some other militant anti-Castro Cubans. They eventually were "adopted" in a sense by the rightists in the Pinochet government in Chile, according to some sources, at a time when anti-Castro forces here felt betrayed by the U.S. government's effort at rapprochement with the Fidel Castro government.

The government's Cuban exile informants were reluctant to appear before grand juries as witnesses. Police officers and FBI agents who had used them for years were reluctant to disclose even to other central investigators the names of persons providing them with information in the Letelier case.

At the same time, in early 1977, U.S. investigators began checking the foreign travels of some of the persons whom they believed, based on information from the Cuban exile informants, to be centrally involved in the murder conspiracy. They also were planning ways to put pressure on some of those persons so they might be forced to cooperate.

In early March 1977, while most law enforcement people here were occupied with 12 Hanafi Muslims barricaded in three Washington buildings, Propper, Cornick and Assistant U. S. Attorney E. Lawrence Barcella Jr. were in Venezuela meeting with that country's secret police.

There they learned that Guillermo Novo had traveled to Chile and Venezuela in late 1974, in apparent violation of his probation in the United States. They determined to use that information to try to put pressure on Guillermo Novo.

Then, in April 1977, they decided to grant immunity from prosecution to two Cuban exiles, Jose Dionisio Suarez Esquivel and Alvin Ross Diaz, if they would cooperate with investigators. Suarez refused to testify to the grand jury, and was sentenced to jail for an 11-month contempt of court sentence with the vow that he would never talk. At a press conference at the time, Ignacio Novo and Ross accused the government of harassing Cuban exiles.

In June 1977, prosecutors made their attempt to have Guillermo Novo's probation revoked. However, Novo failed to show up for that Trenton, N.J., hearing and became a fugitive for the next 11 months.

Then prosecutors learned in the late fall of 1977 that two persons whom they believed could have been DINA agents had come into the United States on official Chilean passports and met with Cuban exiles shortly before Letelier's murder.

Propper, Cornick and others decided to make one more attempt to shake loose information on the case in February 1978. The term of the original grand jury in the case was expiring soon, and investigators felt it was time to go public with some of what they knew. The procedure took the form of "letter rogatory," a legal maneuver in which the court of one country asks the court of another country for help.

The United States used that approach to ask Chile to produce for questioning the two persons who had traveled here with the official Chilean passports and met with Cuban suspects in the Letelier investigation. That highly irregular move left the clear implication that someone in the Chilean government was involved in the murder.

Within a week, photographs of the two men had been leaked to Washington Star reporter Jeremiah O'Leary and published here and in Santiago. Almost immediately, sources in Chile identified one of the men as an American-born DINA agent, Michael Vernon Townley.

Townley, 35, is a soft-spoken and in-

ST

urder and Diplomacy

tensely articulate man who has made Chile his home for the past 20 years after his father headed a large American automotive operation there.

As he is described by people who know him, Townley is an acknowledged electronic technician with the capability of building devices to detonate bombs by remote control. He had been active in commando raids against former President Allende. He had been charged with murder in a raid in which a night watchman was killed, but the charges were dropped when Pinochet came to power in late 1973 and Townley became a DINA agent.

Diplomatic sources reportedly made it clear without making specific threats that Washington was ready to sever relations with Chile if Townley were allowed to stay there. Evidently for that reason, Chile turned Townley over to the United States.

Faced with possible prosecution for murder in the Letelier case and possible assassination himself because of his knowledge of numerous other international terrorist activities, Townley made a deal with prosecutors here. He would enter a guilty plea to a less serious charge and cooperate with the Letelier investigation. But he would not be asked to provide information on anything else.

While Townley was deciding to cooperate, FBI agents in Miami had also struck paydirt. In mid-April, they had discovered—with the help of Miami area police—two other persons believed to be involved in the Letelier case: Guillermo Novo Sampol, who 11 months earlier had failed to show up at his probation hearing, and Alvin Ross Diaz, once granted immunity but now considered a suspect in the murder. They had been caught with cocaine and weapons, apparently in the midst of a plot to sell drugs and flee the country.

Once Townley's cooperation became known publicly, FBI and prosecutors worked swiftly to begin rounding up others whom they suspect participated in the bombing. They had hoped to catch Ignacio Novo, Jose Dionisio Suarez Esquivel (freed from prison when the term of the first grand jury probing the Letelier case expired) and Virgilio Paz Romero, all in the same night. However, after a lengthy stake-out in northern New Jersey, only Ignacio Novo was apprehended.

In the hopes that Paz and Suarez will be caught and a trial could be held by autumn, prosecutors have begun putting together a case that focuses on a Chilean-ordered Letelier murder plot carried out by Cuban exiles.

Although details remain sketchy because of the government's desire to withhold the amount of its knowledge from unarrested suspects, the following outline of the government's case has emerged from various sources:

About a month before Letelier and Moffitt were killed, two Chilean secret police agents, Townley and Chilean Army Capt. Armando Fernandez Larios, were sent to the United States to find someone to kill Orlando Letelier. Townley met with Cubans in Miami with whom he had become acquainted when he lived there in the early 1970s, and with Cubans in northern New Jersey.

Over the next 10 days, the bomb was planted in Letelier's car and plans were made to blow it up with him in it. The date of the blast happened to coincide with a major 1885 event in Chilean military history, when a vice admiral named Juan Williams broke through a Spanish naval blockade off the coast of Chile and became a Chilean Naval hero. Juan Williams also was the fake name under which Townley had entered the United States.

Dramatic Political Change Caused by Pressures on C

By Charles A. Krause

Washington Post Foreign Service

SANTIAGO, Chile—The political situation here has changed dramatically in recent months after almost five years of harsh authoritarian military rule.

President Augusto Pinochet, whose name has become associated abroad with total suppression of political liberties and brutal repression of human rights, is clearly on the defensive as a result of internal and external pressures—not the least of which is the U.S. investigation into the 1976 assassination of exiled Chilean diplomat Orlando Letelier.

These pressures have already forced Pinochet to relax his grip on the country and to consider an end to the military dictatorship that he has headed since 1973, when he led the overthrow of leftist president Salvador Allende.

The question is no longer whether the military will leave power but when and under what circumstances.

Last January, Gen. Pinochet said he could see no reason to hold another election in Chile for 10 years and added that the military had no intention of leaving power until 1990 or 1991.

By March, Pinochet had cut nine years off his timetable for when the next election would be held and six or seven years off his schedule for returning Chile to civilian rule. Pinochet announced that he would have a proposed new constitution written by the government ready by the end of this year, that there will be a plebiscite to approve or disapprove the document next year and a return to an elected government here by 1984 or 1985.

Most observers here believe that the details of Pinochet's timetable for phasing out military rule and his ideas for the kind of civilian government he would like afterwards are less important than the fact that he felt it necessary to discuss the subject

in the context of other liberalization measures and concessions to foreign critics that have perceptibly changed the atmosphere here.

"The fundamental shift that has occurred is that it is now worthwhile to talk about what the future might look like," said one diplomatic observer. "It's possible that this change in ambience will be ephemeral. But, at the moment, the Christian Democrats and the other opposition parties are riding high."

A Chilean lawyer who is a leader of a centrist political party—all parties are still officially outlawed—was both more cautious and more optimistic during a recent interview.

"At this time, there isn't much repression because of international pressure. But we believe that Pinochet doesn't really want to return to democracy and that the repression could return. The Letelier case is very serious for the government and will have

an important effect on what happens," he said.

Since the United States has not yet charged any Chilean former secret police officers with a role in the political murder and the evidence against them has not yet been made public, the lawyer said, "it is impossible to say exactly what is going to happen."

"But I have the most profound belief that we will return to democracy because, really, this is a democratic country. In 1973, after the coup, I was optimistic in the long term. Now, I am optimistic in the shorter term."

Most observers here seem to believe that the 1973 coup was welcomed by the vast majority of people here after the last year of economic and political chaos under the Allende regime. But most Chileans have never considered a military solution permanent.

It has been viewed as an interlude—less agreeable to some than to others—that would eventually end. The beginning of the end started last Jan-

uary, according to most observers, and the question that could be answered within the next several months is whether civilian government will be restored in six or seven years, as Pinochet has said, or sooner, as many people here now think.

At the same time, the government has enough support and power to clamp a temporary lid on the liberalization that has already occurred if Chile's unions, political parties and leftists reassert themselves too quickly or try to provoke a direct confrontation.

The government, for example, broke up the first May Day labor demonstrations since the coup last month. But, significantly, there was little police violence and all of those arrested were allowed to go home within hours.

The hunger strike that ended last week did not achieve its primary objective of getting the government to

See CHILE, A36, Col. 2



GEN. AUG
... how muc

Chile, Under Pressure, Accelerates Move to Civilian Rule

CHILE, From A31

admit that more than 600 leftists have disappeared, probably at the hands of the secret police, since 1973, but for the first time the issue was given prominent coverage in newspapers—which are closely watched by the government.

This weekend, the government announced that it will allow the U.N. Commission on Human Rights to visit Chile later this year.

"I don't think that Chile is going to take as long to return to democracy as Pinochet and some of those around him wish," said another diplomat. "But the situation is delicate. Things are vastly improved but the bottom line is that there's nothing to prevent the government from going back. There hasn't been an institutional leap. Most of the generals haven't seen the light."

What they have seen, apparently, is that Chile's worldwide reputation as a gross violator of human rights has severely weakened the country diplo-

matically and militarily. Chile no longer receives arms aid from the United States and has obtained little diplomatic support for its border disputes with neighboring Argentina and Bolivia.

The generals also thought they saw an attempt by Pinochet last January to turn the results of a plebiscite on his rule—which netted him 75 percent of the vote—into a means of personalizing the regime. It is said that the military sensed that Pinochet harbored designs of converting the junta with power shared by the army, air force, navy and national police—into a one-man dictatorship.

Opposition to Pinochet, led by air force commandant Gen. Gustavo Leigh, began to surface. Leigh began to talk about a return to democracy as a way of countering Pinochet's apparent grab for power, according to many observers.

Then came the U.S. investigation

into the Letelier murder and a continuing stream of allegations that it was carried out by the secret police, known here as DINA, at the behest of Gen. Manuel Contreras, a close confidant of Pinochet's who headed the organization.

Supporters and opponents of the military agree that Pinochet has already been hurt by the revelations from the Letelier investigation and the intense international scrutiny and pressure to improve the human rights situation here.

The series of liberalization measures announced by the government so far—an end to the state of siege, a political amnesty, appointment of a majority civilian Cabinet and the speeded-up timetable for the constitution—are seen here as tactical concessions to world opinion.

Many opponents of the junta be-

lieve that Pinochet had no intention of seriously beginning the transition to real democracy but that the liberalization measures, coupled with continuing international pressure, have taken on a life of their own.

The country's largest political party, the Christian Democrats, has been working with two smaller parties to write a constitution that could serve as an alternative to the government effort, which is based on principles that would give interest groups—rather than political parties—representation in a new legislature.

A group of more conservative lawyers is also known to be working on a constitution while a source close to the absolutely illegal Communist Party said that a working group had been formed to consider which of the conservative economic policies implemented by the government the party

could support after a return to democracy.

The likelihood of the military allowing the Communists to become legal again, even after some form of democratic government is restored, is not considered to be very great, however.

The real unknown is the outcome of the Letelier affair. Many people here believe a large number of Chileans, including some military, could not stomach the idea that DINA carried out a political assassination and many people would find it hard to believe that Pinochet did not know about it.

There is intense debate over whether Pinochet could continue as president in the wake of clear evidence that his old confidant Contreras was involved. At a minimum, it is thought that the return to democracy would be hastened if the junta is discredited by U.S. indictments.



ORLANDO LETELIER

murder investigation raises issues

DISTRESSED PROPERTY SALE

Carter Makes the Right Move on Chile and Human Rights

It was an act that became an American president and a human rights advocate.

Jimmy Carter called home our ambassador to Chile. He improved his most decisive diplomatic act by announcing that he would halt a shipment of bombs destined for the ruling junta, a cargo that a San Francisco longshoremen's local had refused to load as a matter of conscience.

The immediate grounds for the recall of George Landau from Santiago was to serve notice on Chile's dictator, Gen. Augusto Pinochet, that he can't get away with murder — not on a Washington street, anyway. The leader of the junta, the Justice Department investigators decided, was withholding evidence in the assassination of Orlando Letelier, the Chilean exile leader, who died in the bomb explosion of his car at Sheridan Circle on Sept. 21, 1976.

CARTER POINTEDLY noted that during his time in the United States, the ambassador would participate in a thorough review of the human

rights situation in Chile, which has been a flagrant violator since the junta seized power, with CIA help, in 1974.

Further, the State Department announced that it is reconsidering all military aid, which is still being sent despite a congressional embargo because it is "in the pipeline," to countries with bad records.

No human rights advocate could ask for more. Last week, Carter in a speech before the Organization of American States, warned that he would "continue to demonstrate that there are costs to the flagrant disregard of international standards." The OAS, which was still meeting when the recall was announced, was startled by his prompt follow-up. Several delegates told U.S. representatives they were not surprised. They could, however, talk of nothing else.

The Chilean exile community is delirious. They see the beginning of the end of the Pinochet regime, which was, until Argentina caught up with it in mass jailings and kidnappings, the most brutal in Latin America.

Mary McGrory

Pinochet has reacted with furious charges that Carter and the Justice Department lawyers who pressed the Letelier investigation are "members of a Communist conspiracy." But he knows that the military is restive at the prospect of facing new world condemnation for exported political assassination.

AS LONG AS A dictator gets one dime or one gun from the United States and has an American ambassador on the scene, he is in some kind of shape at home. Pinochet still gets millions from six private U.S. banks, who declined to explain themselves to Chairman Henry Reuss of the House Banking Committee. They may now wish to answer Reuss' letter of two months ago — or even reconsider their loan policies.

Chile was made something of a pet by right-wing economists like Milton Friedman of Chicago and former Treasury Secretary William Simon, who thought of creating a model capitalist nation. But implication in a murder on a Washington street is something that the staunchest Tory cannot countenance, and Pinochet cannot expect any outcry from his patrons in U.S. banks and corporations.

The hero of this astonishing state of affairs is a Justice Department lawyer, 35-year-old Eugene M. Propper, a dogged, "non-ideological" investigator who had no thought of changing American foreign policy when he took on the investigation of the death of Letelier and his companion in the bombed car, Ronni Moffitt.

Propper, an assistant U.S. attorney, initially resisted the "Chilean connection" in the murder when it was urged on him by Letelier's widow, Isabel, and Michael Moffitt, the husband of Ronni. At one point, the FBI leaked the contents of Letelier's briefcase which purported to show he was a Castro agent. When Isabel Letelier told a U.N. Human Rights Commission that Justice had Santiago under suspicion, Attorney General Griffin Bell denied it. The Chilean Solidarity Movement, a tight network, and practiced in the uses of public opinion from its democratic tradition, complained that Bell was dragging his feet.

PROPPER, LOOKING neither to right nor left, saying nothing, tracked the clues. With the attorney general's backing, he moved into the dark corners of the Cuban exile community; he made several trips to Chile. Pinochet, who claimed he had nothing to hide, went through the motions of cooperation. Propper negoti-

ated the extradition of a vital witness, Michael Townley, an American expatriate and erstwhile agent of DINA, Chile's notorious secret police. He persisted. His most recent visit, the Pinochet press protested, was "unnecessary and officious."

He held the final pre-recall negotiations with Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher. The Chileans, and American liberals, think he has brought the Justice Department its finest hour.

When Pinochet came to Washington to participate in the Panama Canal Treaty signing, he said — when asked about his involvement in the Letelier murder — "I wouldn't have anything to do with anything like that."

Now Jimmy Carter officially doesn't believe him. And has stopped sending him bombs. He is in trouble. And Jimmy Carter has become again the hope of deliverance for millions of Latin Americans who daily face the fear of prison, torture, kidnapping or death from the likes of Augusto Pinochet.

Paraguayan Links Chile's DINA to

By Jeremiah O'Leary
Washington Star Staff Writer

An FBI agent last week quietly slipped into the capital of Paraguay, Asuncion, and conducted a secret interview with a high-ranking Paraguayan official that establishes the crucial link between the Chilean secret police and the assassination of Orlando Letelier.

This "Paraguayan connection" is another piece of evidence the United States has collected showing that the secret police of four right-wing Latin American governments — Chile, Paraguay, Argentina and Uruguay —

have been secretly collaborating for several years in organized operations against exiles and political enemies from each country, even to the extent of cooperating in assassination conspiracies.

The interview with the unnamed Paraguayan official by FBI Special Agent Calvin Clegg, according to sources close to the probe, is expected to wrap up the Justice Department's case against DINA, the secret police organization of Chile.

While officials of the State and Justice departments and the FBI would not comment on the "Paraguayan connection," the deposition of the

Four Latin Nations Cooperate Against Dissident Exiles

Paraguayan official was essential for the indictments a federal grand jury is expected to return, sometime after July 25, against former DINA chief Gen. Manuel Contreras Sepulveda.

Contreras, one of the best friends of Chile's President Augusto Pinochet, was forced into retirement recently because of exposes of the DINA plot with Cuban exiles to kill Letelier.

THE "PARAGUAYAN connection" involved official collaboration between the governments of Chile

and Paraguay to get U.S. visas for two DINA agents under false names and with phony Paraguayan passports.

There is no evidence, officials emphasized, that the Paraguayan official or his government knew what the DINA murder team planned to do in the United States. It is probable that Paraguay did not know anything except that Contreras had asked one of his counterparts for help in getting the visas in what might be called a visa-laundering operation.

Letelier Slaying

The State Department said that the Paraguayan government had cooperated fully with the investigators.

But the Clegg mission, which was arranged in large part by the State Department and Ambassador to Paraguay Robert White, resulted in the disclosure that the U.S. government has long known about the collaboration of right-wing governments in southern Latin America.

For several years, American officials have confirmed, Washington has known about the secret cooperation of the intelligence services of the four military governments in opera-

tions against exiles from each country.

EXISTENCE OF the four-nation cabal was known to the State Department and the CIA, according to well-informed official sources, for some time before the Sept. 21, 1976, assassination in Washington of the Chilean leftist politician and diplomat, Letelier.

But U.S. officials emphasized that they had never expected that there would be a political murder of a Latin dissident in the United States.

See PLOT, A-4

PLOT

Continued From A-1

It was after the investigation was begun into the Letelier murder by Assistant U.S. Attorney Eugene M. Propper and the FBI that officials discovered the so-called "Paraguay connection." This was the August 1976 trip by two members of the Chilean secret police to Asuncion, where they tried, but failed, to obtain official U.S. visas with the aid of a high-ranking Paraguayan official by passing themselves off as Paraguayans.

Sources in two U.S. government agencies said it was one thing to know about the multinational secret police collaboration and another to discover that it had reached out to cause the death of two people in the heart of Washington, Letelier and his colleague, Ronni Karpen Moffitt.

INFORMATION available to U.S. officials about the four-nation secret police pact has been closely held and carries the highest security classification. In part, officials said, this is because the CIA had succeeded in penetrating one of the four secret police services and the cables containing reports on this penetration are accessible to only a handful of officials.

In August 1976, one month before Letelier's car was blown up, Washington learned that Michael V. Townley, 36, an American expatriate living in Chile and working for DINA, and Capt. Armando Fernandez Larios of the Chilean army had gone to the Paraguayan capital.

There, with the aid of the unnamed Paraguayan official, they applied at the U.S. consulate for official U.S. visas. Reportedly one of the Paraguayan clerks in the consulate noted that the applicants were obviously not Paraguayans.

Both the Paraguayan woman consular employee and the Paraguayan official who requested the U.S. visas for the two Chileans would be important witnesses at the expected trial of Townley and three or more Cuban exiles, investigators said.

U.S. officials have realistically determined that, even if indicted, no Chilean officers will be extradited under the Chilean military government for a trial here.

COINCIDENTALLY, the U.S. ambassador to Paraguay in 1976 was George W. Landau, who is now ambassador to Chile. The applications came to Landau's attention through the embassy chain of command and he asked Washington for instructions.

The then-assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs, Harry

Shlaudeman, now ambassador to Peru, was aware of the four-nation compact for secret police mutual assistance. Shlaudeman has told The Washington Star that he cabled back immediately to Asuncion the instructions to retrieve the visas issued to Townley and Fernandez in the invented names of "Juan Williams Rose" and "Alejandro Romeral Jara." Consular officials did manage to get the visas back and the photographs that appeared to be of no importance at the time were filed away.

It was this incident in Paraguay that gave U.S. authorities possession of photographs of Townley and Fernandez, alias Williams and Romeral, a month before Letelier was assassinated in downtown Washington. No one realized the significance of the Asuncion matter in August 1976, but it was remembered by several U.S. officials aware of the four-nation secret police arrangement as soon as they heard that Letelier had been killed by a bomb.

Tracing the Asuncion pair was not easy. At first, U.S. officials in Washington decided they would have to permit Propper, Assistant U.S. Attorney Larry Barcella and FBI Special Agent Clegg to have access to all State Department cable traffic regarding both the Letelier killing and the secret police agreement.

PROPPER, BARCELLA AND CLEGG have declined to comment on any aspect of the Latin secret police matter or the case, but it is now well established that the CIA's files and reports also were made available to the investigators.

In tracking down every application for U.S. visas made from several Latin capitals, investigators soon noted that men named "Williams" and "Romeral" had made similar applications in the Chilean capital, Santiago, after being turned down by the U.S. consulate in Asuncion.

But the mystery was that the photos of the two men in Santiago bore no resemblance to the two who applied for visas in Asuncion. And when U.S. investigators asked to see "Williams" and "Romeral," they were shown pictures of two men who bore no resemblance to the two of the same name who applied in Paraguay.

Subsequently, investigators learned that the applicants in Asuncion were really involved in the Letelier case while the applicants in Santiago essentially had been used as a smokescreen. The latter two had nothing to do with the Letelier case.

In fact, investigators learned that Townley came to the United States under one of many aliases he is known to have used, while Fernandez used still another name and passport.

This point caused considerable confusion at the early stages of the probe of Letelier's murder.

WHEN THE ASUNCION photos were published by The Star and then in Chile by the newspaper El Mercurio, the true identities of Townley and Fernandez were quickly made known by readers. Identifications were made both in Washington and Santiago by people who know Townley and Fernandez.

The important point for U.S. diplomats and intelligence officers was that the governments in Santiago, Buenos Aires, Montevideo and Asuncion were working together, at least on the secret police level.

All four countries of the so-called Cono del Sur (southern cone) have many citizens from the other nations living within their boundaries. Argentina, particularly, has many Paraguayans who, because of politics or economic pressures, leave their landlocked nation and go to live in Buenos Aires. Uruguayans and Argentines quite frequently cross and recross the Rio Plata estuary. A number of Chileans, either voluntarily or through fear, went to live in neighboring lands.

One of the most obvious cases of secret police terror was that of Gen. Carlos Prats, who was commander of Chile's army and defense minister until three weeks before the armed forces rose up against the elected Marxist regime of the late President Salvador Allende. Prats and his wife went into exile in Argentina but within a year they were killed by a bomb blast in Buenos Aires. This assassination occurred after Prats wrote a letter denouncing Pinochet as a traitor without parallel in Chile's history.

U.S. OFFICIALS carefully do not say that Argentina collaborated in the Prats murder. But the agreement among the four South American secret police forces, as U.S. officials understand it, would have permitted DINA agents to operate freely in Argentina.

Since the death of Letelier, there have been substantial changes in the region and U.S. officials say collaboration among the four dictatorships is no longer as close.

Relations between Chile and Argentina have cooled over the Beagle Channel territorial dispute.

Chile, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay were all condemned in varying degrees for human rights violations by the Organization of American States, although the four are now trying to improve their image on that score.

However, U.S. officials say, the investigation into Letelier's murder has shed so much light on the secret police forces of the Southern Cone countries that they have been heavily curbed in their operations.

The Weather

Today — Variable cloudiness and humid with a 30 percent chance of thunderstorms, high near 90. Thursday — Partly cloudy, humid, high near 90. Yesterday—3 p.m. AQI: 35. Temp. range: 85-73. Details on B2.

The Washington Post

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Eight Indicted in Letelier Slaying

By Timothy S. Robinson
Washington Post Staff Writer

After a 22-month investigation, a federal grand jury here yesterday indicted the former head of Chile's secret police (DINA) and seven others in the bombing death of former Chilean ambassador Orlando Letelier on Washington's Embassy Row.

The indictment of Gen. Juan Manuel Contreras Sepulveda, a close associate of Chilean President Augusto Pinochet, was believed to be the first ever returned in the United States against a high official of a foreign country's intelligence agency.

Contreras, two DINA operatives in Chile and five Cuban exiles living in

the United States were charged by the grand jury with plotting, carrying out and covering up the September 1976 murder of Letelier, a prominent and outspoken critic of the Chilean government at the time. The explosion that ripped through Letelier's 1975 Chevelle also killed an aide, Ronni K. Moffitt, and injured her husband.

Assistant U.S. Attorney Eugene M. Propper said yesterday that the U.S. government would ask Chile for the immediate arrest and jailing for extradition of Contreras, DINA operations director Pedro Espinoza Bravo, and DINA agent Armando Fernandez Larios.

Chilean officials had no immediate response to that request, which ap-

parently is unprecedented in diplomatic and judicial channels.

The indictment accuses Espinoza of ordering the assassination during a meeting in Chile and Fernandez of coming to the United States to spy on Letelier so that the assassins would know when to strike.

The Cubans, members of the New Jersey-based Cuban Nationalist Movement, a militant anti-Castro group, are accused of helping to carry out the bombing.

The 15-page indictment was explicitly detailed because of the cooperation with U.S. authorities of American-born DINA agent Michael V. Townley, who has agreed to plead guilty to planting the bomb.

The indictment outlines with precision the alleged plot that resulted in the 9:30 a.m. blast on Sept. 21, 1976, on the placid Sheridan Circle area of embassies, chanceries and diplomats' homes.

Letelier was killed instantly when the bomb atop the A-frame of his car ripped up through the floorboards under his legs as he drove around the circle. He was on his way to work at the Institute for Policy Studies, where he had become internationally known for his outspoken criticism of the Chilean military regime.

Ronni Moffitt was sitting on the passenger's side of the front seat. She died a few seconds after the blast as she staggered from the shattered,

burning car. Her husband, and IPS co-worker, Michael Moffitt, suffered slight injuries.

The Letelier car came to rest against a Volkswagen parked within 100 yards of the Chilean ambassador's residence, and set the stage for a massive worldwide FBI investigation into the first diplomatic assassination here.

Letelier's coworkers, and others in leftist circles, immediately accused DINA, at the time the focus of allegations of massive human rights viola-

See **LETELIER**, A10, Col. 1

Backgrounds of the principals in the Letelier indictments. Page A11.



ORLANDO LETELIER
... victim of 1976 bom

Eight Are Indicted in Letelier Sl

LETELIER, From A1

tions and torture of political prisoners, of the bombing. They said DINA was concerned about the continuing attention that Letelier was able to focus on the Pinochet regime, and silenced him for that reason.

The FBI, with help from the D.C. Police Department, began the intensive lab work and search of the bomb scene. Its agents began the first of thousands of interviews, weeding out the possibility of domestic plots and other suspects before focusing on political motivations.

The Justice Department worked out careful alliances with the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency to allow their cooperation with the investigation. Within a month of the blast, the investigation was centered on the Cuban Nationalist Movement and the allegation by a jailed international terrorist that two CNM members—Ignacio Novo Sampol and Guillermo Novo Sampol—were involved in the plot.

The Novos, known for their firing of a bazooka at the United Nations in 1964 when Che Guevara was speaking there, were brought before the grand jury and questioned. Yesterday's indictment accuses them of committing perjury when they told that grand jury that they did not know anything about Letelier, DINA or the slaying.

A few months later, another Cuban Nationalist Movement leader, Jose Dionisio Suarez Esquivel, was called before the same grand jury and granted immunity from prosecution if he would testify about his alleged involvement in the plot. He refused, and was jailed for contempt of court for 11 months until that particular grand jury's term expired this year.

In February 1978, prosecutor Propser and lead FBI agent L. Carter Cornick decided to make a public request to Chile that the country produce for questioning two men who had traveled to the United States on official Chilean passports and had met with Cuban suspects in the plot.

Chile denied the existence of the two men, but after The Washington Star obtained and published the photographs of the men they were quickly identified as DINA agents Townley and Fernandez.

The United States was able to pressure Chile into turning Townley—an American citizen who grew up in Chile while his father headed a U.S. auto firm there—over to them. Once he arrived in the United States, Townley agreed to plead guilty to one count of conspiracy to murder Letelier. He spent day after day telling FBI agents and prosecutors the additional details they needed to charge others in the plot.

According to the indictment returned yesterday, the plot began in July 1976 when DINA chief Contreras asked the Paraguayan military intelligence service director to authorize the

issuance of Paraguayan passports for two DINA agents to use on an unspecified secret mission to the United States.

Contreras then ordered Fernandez to go to Paraguay to meet with that country's military intelligence agency in connection with a two-man mission, about which Espinoza would give him more details, the indictment said.

Espinoza gave false identification materials to Fernandez for the Paraguayan trip to pick up the passports, and Fernandez called Townley to arrange for Espinoza to meet him, according to the indictment.

At a second meeting that month, Espinoza told Townley that he and Fernandez "were being ordered to go to the United States on a DINA mission to assassinate Orlando Letelier," the indictment stated.

After the two men obtained Paraguayan passports, Contreras ordered Fernandez to travel to the United States in August on a DINA mission, the indictment alleges, and Espinoza gave him a ticket to the United States, where Fernandez and another DINA agent arrived on Aug. 26 to begin surveillance of Letelier.

On Sept. 7, 1976, according to the indictment, Espinoza sent Townley to the United States to "carry out the previously discussed mission to assassinate Orlando Letelier."

Townley, using a passport in the name of Hans Petersen Silva, arrived at Kennedy International Airport on Sept. 9 and got the Letelier surveillance information from Fernandez, the indictment said.

Then, according to the indictment, the following acts occurred over the next two weeks:

Sept. 9—Townley, driving an Avis rental car, went to New Jersey to meet with CNM leader Virgilio Paz Romero and asked him to set up a meeting with Guillermo Novo.

Sept. 10—Townley met in New Jersey with Guillermo Novo and Suarez and "requested their assistance" in his DINA orders to assassinate Letelier.

Sept. 13—Townley outlined the Letelier murder plot to members of the governing council of the CNM during a meeting at the Chateau Renaissance motel in North Bergen, N.J. Alvin Ross Diaz, another CNM leader, joined the others at this meeting.

Sept. 15—Guillermo Novo and Suarez gave Townley and Paz explosives and a remote-control detonating device.

Sept. 16—Paz and Townley drove to the District and checked into a Holiday Inn in Northeast Washington.

Sept. 17—Additional wires and other elements of a bomb were purchased by Paz and Townley at a Sears Roebuck and Co. store in Northeast Washington.

Sept. 18—Novo, Suarez and Ross got additional bomb parts in New Jersey, and Suarez drove to the District of Columbia to join Paz and Townley. Suarez registered at the Best Western



MICHAEL MOFFITT
... "we feel vindicated"

Envoy Motel on New York Avenue NE.

Sept. 18—Paz, Suarez and Townley constructed the bomb in a Washington motel room.

Sept. 19—In the early morning hours, Paz, Suarez Townley drove to Letelier's house in Bethesda, and Townley crawled under the car and strapped the bomb into place.

Sept. 19—Townley called his wife, Mariana Ines Callegas de Townley, who also was a DINA agent, in Santiago to have her tell DINA the bomb was in place.

Sept. 19—Townley flew back to New Jersey and was picked up by Ross. They met with Guillermo Novo, and Townley flew to Miami.

Sept. 21—The bomb exploded, and investigators surmised it was detonated by Suarez, the only member of the assassination team remaining in Washington. Later that day, Townley called Ignacio Novo in Florida and Novo told him that "Something had happened in the District of Columbia." Novo and Townley met in Florida, where Novo was briefed on the mission.

Sept. 23—Townley flew back to Chile from Florida.

Sept. 24—"Within the Republic of Chile, Michael Townley advised Pedro Espinoza that the DINA mission to assassinate Orlando Letelier had been carried out," the indictment states.

The indictment specifically charges the three Chileans and four of the Cubans—all but Ignacio Novo—with conspiracy to murder Letelier and the murder of Letelier under federal statutes, murder of Letelier under local statutes, murder of Moffitt under local statutes, and murder, by use of explosives under federal statute. Each count carries a possible life sentence.

Guillermo Novo and Ignacio Novo are charged with two counts each of lying to a grand jury, and Ignacio Novo was charged with failing to tell law enforcement authorities about the crime after it occurred—a federal

charge known as misprision of a felony.

Yesterday's indictment before U.S. District Chief Judge William B. Bryant ended 22 months of often pessimistic waiting by Michael Moffitt and others who had closely watched the progress of the investigation.

Moffitt, 27, was sitting in his office at the Institute for Policy Studies when the official news of the indictment arrived.

He said he was "satisfied, but there's still more to be done" in terms of seeing how diligent the United States will be in making sure the charges against the Chilean officials are tried.

"I hate to say, 'I told you so,'" Moffitt said, but "we feel vindicated (by the charges against DINA). We knew who was responsible and we never changed that."

IPS staffers, whose leftist think tank was infiltrated and otherwise spied on by the FBI and police during the antiwar years, early in the case publicly doubted the willingness of the FBI and other U.S. agencies to solve a crime against a leftist diplomat such as Letelier.

"It was difficult for a while until there was some kind of trust—not trust in the mushy sense, but respect," Moffitt said. He said FBI agent Cornick and prosecutor Propper are "decent people. Cornick is a damn good cop... there are obviously good cops in the FBI and Carter Cornick is one of them. We weren't trying to sell them our whole political program. We just wanted to see justice done."

Moffitt said that he now lives "out of a coffee cup and out of a beer glass and it's no substitute for a marriage. My work (anti-Chilean junta activities) is my life because the junta was responsible for the death of my wife."

He and Ronni Moffitt had been married for four months before the bombing.

Letelier had been imprisoned by the military regime after the fall of Marxist Chilean president Salvador Allende in a 1973 military coup. But after his release from a one-year prison term, he had returned to Washington—where he had served Allende as ambassador to the United States—and built up a strong following in leftist political circles.

His wife, Isabel Letelier, was vacationing in Martha's Vineyard, Mass., yesterday and could not be reached for comment.

U.S. Attorney Earl J. Silbert and his top aides, all of whom were present when the indictment was brought yesterday, praised the investigation of the case by the FBI and its Washington field office. He also commended the work by Propper and Assistant U.S. Attorney E. Lawrence Barcella Jr., the two prosecutors who will try the case before U.S. District Judge Barrington D. Parker.

Ross, Ignacio Novo and Guillermo Novo have already been arrested on Letelier-related charges and are in custody. Paz and Suarez are fugitives, and warrants have been issued for their arrest.

Also contributing to this story was Washington Post staff writer Lawrence Meyer.

The Cubans

Men of Long-Held Political Passions

By Christopher Dickey
Washington Post Staff Writer

They are veterans of a long, lost war, the five Cubans indicted yesterday in connection with the slaying of a former Chilean ambassador. Though some of them led outwardly calm, industrious lives, they were also familiar with the darkest sides of life in the Cuban communities of New Jersey and Miami.

Among the most radical, right-wing elements of those communities, conspiracy often blends with intense political hatreds, the intense desire to return to a Cuba purged of Castros revolution, and passions burn like fuses.

It is also a world of secrecy from which there erupts occasional, sometimes spectacular, outbursts of violence.

Some of the first names to come to light in the investigation of Orlando Letelier's murder were those of the Novos—Ignacio Novo Sampol an unemployed shoe and auto salesman, and his younger brother Guillermo Novo Sampol. They were implicated by another Cuban exile leader who was being held in Venezuela at the time in connection with the bombing of a Cuban commercial airliner in which 73 persons died.

The Novos were leaders of the militant Cuban Nationalist Movement based in Union City, N.J., and their names had long been familiar to the federal agents who keep an eye on the exiles' counter-revolutionary underworld.

It was the Novo brothers who were charged in 1964 with firing a bazooka at the United Nations building while Cuban revolutionary Che Guevara was speaking there, though the charges later were dropped.

Ten years later, Guillermo Novo was convicted of plotting to blow up a Cuban ship anchored in Montreal.



IGNACIO NOVO SAMPOL
... widely known in exile community

By April of last year, another member of the Cuban Nationalist Movement was drawn into the investigation. But, even though he was offered immunity for his testimony, 38-year-old salesman Jose Dionisio Suarez, Esquivel, of Elizabeth, N.J., refused to talk, and spent 11 months in jail.

Both the Novos and Suarez testified under oath that they knew nothing of Letelier's murder.

According to yesterday's indictment, however, Guillermo Novo, Suarez, and their compatriots, Virgilio Paz Romero and Alvin Ross Diaz met with DINA agent Michael Vernon Townley on Sept. 13, 1976, to plot the murder of Orlando Letelier.

By Sept. 18 the same four members of the Cuban Nationalist Movement had helped Townley construct a bomb, according to the indictment.

On Sept. 21, Letelier died when a bomb blast destroyed his car.

The Chileans

DINA Officials Inspired Fear

By Christopher Dickey
Washington Post Staff Writer

There were many people in Chile who believed that Manuel Contreras Sepulveda, the first and only head of the Directorate of National Intelligence, was the second most powerful man in the country. He was certainly one of the most feared.

Before it was dissolved last year, his agency, known as DINA, was blamed for the disappearance and torture of thousands of people as it sought to fortify the strength of the military junta and suppress its opposition, both in Chile and abroad.

As head of DINA, Contreras was answerable only to Chilean President Augusto Pinochet, with whom he reputedly was on intimate terms.

On March 21 of this year, however, as international criticism of Chile's human rights record mounted, and the investigation of Orlando Letelier's murder heated up, Contreras resigned from the Army and all government posts he had held since DINA was abolished. No official explanation for the resignation was given.

Contreras is accused in the indictment of having ordered Letelier's assassination, but the man the indictment charges with most of the plotting and supervision for the operation is Pedro Espinoza, a colonel in the Chilean army and currently commander of a garrison in southern Chile. At the time of Letelier's death, Espinoza was director of operations for DINA. Little else is known about him, though according to several sources familiar with Chilean politics, it had been widely suspected that Espinoza was in charge of stifling criticism from exiled members of the former government.

Armando Fernandez Larios, the man accused of organizing the actual



CONTRERAS SEPULVEDA
... answerable only to president

assassination of Letelier, and, with Michael Vernon Townley, contacting and coordinating the activities of the Cuban exiles involved, is a captain in Chile's army.

The son of a retired Air Force general, he took part in the storming of the Moneda Palace during the 1973 coup, and now works at the Ministry of Defense in Santiago.

THE WITNESS

Townley: He Followed Orders

By Timothy S. Robinson

Washington Post Staff Writer

Michael Vernon Townley, a soft-spoken, intense and articulate 35-year-old man who has made Chile his home for the past 20 years already is starting to be known in some circles as the "John Dean" of the Letelier affair.

He is an unlikely figure to be found in his current role—as the heavily guarded informant who has calmly told FBI agents and prosecutors how he followed orders to plant an explosive whose blast left its intended victim so mangled that hardened investigators became sick at the scene of the crime.

As he is described by people who know him, Townley is a skilled electronic technician capable of assembling devices to detonate bombs by remote control. He had been active in commando raids against the late Chilean President Salvador Allende, whose Marxist regime was toppled in a military coup by the current Chilean president, Gen. Augusto Pinochet.

Townley, an American who grew up in Chile where his father headed a large U.S. automobile operation, had become a familiar sight to Americans there by the early 1970s. He was known as a political activist who was suspected of participating in military activities of *Patria y Libertad*, a right-wing Chilean party.

Although he had been charged with murder for his alleged participation in a Concepcion raid in which a night watchman was killed, the charges were dropped when Pinochet came to power in late 1973 and Townley became an agent of DINA, the Chilean secret police agency.

Townley reportedly viewed his DINA role as that of a soldier, a man who followed orders. He is said to have worked at high levels—often

meeting directly with DINA chief Manuel Contreras Sepulveda before carrying out a mission—and went about his "business" in a calm, professional manner.

His wife is a Chilean and was also a DINA agent, according to yesterday's indictment. She is known for her flamboyant expressions of political ideology. Townley, on the other hand, has soft blue eyes and a disquietingly peaceful demeanor, according to persons who have seen him in his new role as a cooperative government witness.

Townley was expelled from Chile in early April after the U.S. put intense pressure on the country to turn him over. In the U.S., his attorneys, Seymour Glanzer and Barry W. Levine, struck up a deal by which he would enter a guilty plea to one count of conspiracy to murder Letelier and would in return cooperate in the Letelier investigation.

The deal apparently was made in hopes of a possible early parole for Townley. In the meantime, he is being escorted under heavy guard and in strictest secrecy to protect him from harm while in custody.

As a part of the deal, Townley will only have to cooperate with and provide information to U.S. authorities on his role in the Letelier murder. He reportedly has additional information about terrorist activities in other countries, but is not required to give that information to the U.S., sources have said.

As was John Dean in the Watergate affair, Townley was, by his own account, directly involved in the execution of crimes and has decided to testify against his close associates. And, as in Watergate, Townley could, as did Dean, play a central role in questioning the activities of a country's highest government officials.

U.S. Extradition Request Expected to Face Hurdles

SANTIAGO, Chile (AP) — While the Foreign Ministry was presented with a U.S. diplomatic note yesterday asking the arrest of Chile's former security police chief and two other agents on murder charges, expert observers felt chances are slight that the men will be extradited as requested.

They believe it possible, however, that a trial will be held here for retired Brig. Gen. Juan Manuel Contreras Sepulveda, Col. Pedro Espinosa Bravo and Capt. Armando Fernandez Larios.

Informed sources said Foreign Minister Hernan Cubillos received the U.S. note from Charles Grover, deputy chief of mission. Ambassador George Landau is traveling outside Santiago.

The Chileans were included for murder yesterday by a Washington grand jury in connection with the 1976 bomb killings there of exiled Chilean Socialist Orlando Letelier and an American co-worker.

The 1902 extradition treaty between Chile and the United States provides that each country will deliver persons charged with crimes in the other country, but it says neither country is bound to hand over its own citizens.

Under a later Pan American Convention of 1933, Chile obligated itself to try its own citizens if it does not extradite them and if the only reason for not extraditing is that they are Chilean citizens.

The government of President Augusto Pinochet ignored requests by The Associated Press during the past month for the chance to discuss Chilean extradition customs and procedures with a court or government expert.

Other sources said the procedure

would be somewhat like this: after arrest, the extradition request will make its way to the Chilean supreme court, which is then responsible for conducting hearings to determine the validity in Chilean jurisprudence of evidence made available by the United States.

If the court finds validity in the charges, then Contreras, Espinosa and Fernandez must either be extradited for trial in the United States or be brought to trial here. A Chilean investigation is already underway.

Apparently no special treatment is accorded military officers under the two extradition agreements.

It is understood that Chile generally chooses not to extradite its own citizens, but diplomatic sources said they believe it was done in at least one previous case.

A member of the four-man ruling military junta other than Pinochet recently told a journalist he felt certain Chile would not hand Contreras over to the United States.

A diplomatic source said the only reason he could see why Chile might agree to extradition was that the rest of the world would not believe the three were getting an unbiased trial here.

The Chilean court system has by tradition been independent and respected. The junta has no decrees limiting the court's independence as such, but anti-government lawyers claim the court is practicing a form of self-restriction.

The supreme court, for example, was hesitant to investigate accusations against the Contreras-run DINA. A former court president has complained that DINA agents blocked whatever attempts were made to investigate.

The Letelier Prosecutor: An Unlik

By Timothy S. Robinson
Washington Post Staff Writer

In Chile, he is greeted by hordes of Spanish-speaking reporters shouting "Prosecutor Propper, Prosecutor Propper" and hidden photographers wait to snap his picture as he walks down streets or comes out of buildings.

His comings and goings are documented with bold red headlines, and newspapers speculate on matters ranging from his briefcase, which they think is "James Bond-equipped," to the specially built car they say is flown to Chile from the United States for his use there, and even his alleged love life when he is in Santiago.

The object of the attention is 31-year-old Eugene M. Propper, whose life is not nearly as exotic as the Chilean press proclaims.

One of 161 assistant U.S. attorneys in the District of Columbia, he was assigned by chance two years ago to investigate what many people thought would be the unsolvable assassination of former Chilean ambassador Orlando Letelier.

Tuesday, he stood before a federal judge here and calmly asked that three Chilean secret police (DINA) officials—including the feared ex-director of the agency—be arrested in the Sept. 21, 1976, bombing murder of Letelier and an aide, Ronni K. Moffitt, on Sheridan Circle.

Along the way, in a manner unrivaled in many major investigations, the flamboyantly bearded Propper and drawling FBI agent L. Carter Cornick have become the international symbols of the dogged persistence of U.S. authorities to solve the Letelier murder case.

Propper and Cornick say they cannot directly discuss the Letelier case because of the pending trials. But a clear picture has emerged of two well-matched, plodding and innovative investigators who have come out, so far, smelling like roses in a case that easily could have generated a very different aroma.


On Sept. 21, 1976, Propper was sitting in the U.S. Courthouse cafeteria when his supervisor, Donald E. Campbell, asked him if he would take the case. He knew nothing about Chile other than what he had read in newspapers, and spoke no Spanish.

Cornick, a 38-year-old University of Virginia graduate and ex-marine, had a reputation of sorts of minor boat-rocking in the normally staid world of look-alike FBI agents, some of his acquaintances say. He had just arrived in the Washington field office after a stint in bomb-rocked Puerto Rico, and he came to mind when Washington FBI agent-in-charge Nick F. Stames was looking for a Spanish-speaking agent to assign to the Letelier case.

Cornick and Propper seemed to work together well quickly according to people who watched them at the time. Propper's ego was such that he would make seemingly outrageous demands; Cornick would soft-soap those demands so that they seemed perfectly normal when they were relayed.

Propper, who is from New Hyde Park, Long Island, earned an undergraduate degree in economics at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst and a law degree from the University of Minnesota. He worked briefly for the Justice Department be-

Celebrity in Santiago



EUGENE M. PROPPER
... at first, royal treatment

'... a cocky young man, outspoken in his views about ... office policy, but not any sort of star ...'



The Washington Post


Chilean newspaper and magazine articles devoted to "El Fiscal Propper."



L. CARTER CORNICK
... Spanish-speaking boat rocker

fore joining the U.S. attorney's office in 1972 to get trial experience.

He had worked in various sections of the prosecutor's office trying crimes including murders and rapes, and had joined the fairly elite major crimes division—where he dealt with such matters as contract murders and the widely publicized second Sting project involving undercover agents who operated a fake stolen-goods shop. At the time of the Letelier blast,



E. LAWRENCE BARCELLA JR.
... behind-the-scenes supervisor

he was contemplating leaving the office to enter the more lucrative field of private practice.

Propper was known as a cocky young man, outspoken in his views about some aspects of office policy but not any sort of "star" in the courtroom or in his handling of investigations.

In one of the more touchy aspects of the early part of the investigation, the Justice Department and the FBI

had to "sell" themselves to the friends and coworkers of the victims, who had worked at the Institute for Policy Studies, a leftist think tank here that had been spied upon and otherwise infiltrated by the bureau during antiwar days.

Despite IPS outcries for special prosecutors and meetings with two attorneys general about the slowness with which they thought the investigation was being conducted, Propper and Cornick quietly won the grudging respect of the leftists. As the case neared its apparent completion, leftists praised Cornick and Propper in one breath and castigated the agencies for which they worked in the next.

Both Propper and Cornick quickly say they have not "solved" the Letelier case, and they lavish praise just as quickly on their superiors and the hundreds of FBI agents across the United States and other investigators throughout the world who have brought the Letelier case this far.

Other point out that, in many ways, the case was the type in which the FBI is at its best—lots of laboratory work, use of informants, massive manpower available for the tedious job of solving international terrorism problems.

Two other major investigators have come to the limelight recently, for example. Assistant U.S. Attorney E. Lawrence Barcella Jr., one of Propper's supervisors, has worked behind the scenes on the case for more than a year and will join Propper in trying the case.

Robert W. Scherrer, the FBI's legal attache in Santiago, also has been indispensable to the case because of the network of contacts and the respect he had built up in eight years in South America, according to several persons involved in the case.

But the major focus of media attention in Chile was on Propper—called "Fiscal" or prosecutor there—and on Cornick or Barcella as they made a total of three trips to Santiago this spring. They have told associates how reporters for the sensationalist press in Chile would try to talk their way into hotel rooms at 8 a.m. for interviews, guess the identity of who might be with Propper at any one time, seek them out in restaurants, and try to identify persons with them by bracelets or rings.

During the first two trips, the U.S. investigators were treated royally by the press. But by the third trip, when the seriousness of the investigation and its possible aim at high Chilean officials was clear, the atmosphere changed, they have said.

That was when a racy journal accused Propper of using U.S. funds to come to Chile for an assignation with an attractive female journalist. Newspapers proclaimed in English, "FBI GO HOME." And, as in a Peter Sellers movie, photographers hanging out of Fiat windows chased an embassy station wagon at high speeds through a market district, scattering chickens as they went, trying to take pictures of Barcella and Propper.

Propper, his fame changing to notoriety so quickly after his whirlwind romance with the Chilean press, said he has no plans to return there soon.

Townley Guilty Plea Acceptance Delayed by Judge

By Timothy S. Robinson
Washington Post Staff Writers

U.S. District Judge Barrington D. Parker yesterday postponed any acceptance of a guilty plea from Michael Vernon Townley, the key government witness in the Orlando Letelier murder case.

Parker did not disclose his reasons for saying he wanted to review the

plea-bargaining agreement before deciding whether to accept it. But The Washington Post learned later that the snag developed over a section of the agreement in which the government agreed that a specific prison term would be imposed upon Townley.

The presentation by prosecutors of a plea-bargaining agreement involving a specific prison-term promise for a

defendant is extremely rare here since U.S. judges prefer to exercise sole authority over the sentencing process. However, such agreements are legally allowable and are used regularly in some jurisdictions.

The exact length of the prison term to which government prosecutors agreed for Townley could not be ascertained, although it reportedly would require him to serve "substantial" time in prison. The count to which Townley has agreed to plead carries a maximum prison sentence of life.

Townley, who grew up in Chile and became a secret police agent there during the current Chilean military regime of Gen. Augusto Pinochet, has agreed with prosecutors that he will plead guilty to one count of conspiracy to murder Letelier, former Chilean ambassador to the U.S.

Letelier and a coworker, Juan E. Moffitt, were killed Sept. 21, 1976, when a bomb exploded under the car in which they were driving around Sheridan Circle NW.

According to court testimony by an FBI agent, Townley has admitted that he was sent by the secret police agency, DINA, to the U.S. to assassinate Letelier, and actually placed the bomb under Letelier's car.

Townley's agreement three months ago to plead guilty in the case is believed to have been a major break leading to Tuesday's indictment of five Cuban exiles in the U.S. and three DINA officials in Chile for Letelier's murder.

Townley served as the conduit between the two groups as well as being directly involved in the actual assassination, according to investigators.

The still-secret plea-bargaining pact, in which Townley reportedly agrees to provide information only about activities he may have been involved in on U.S. soil or involving U.S. citizens or property, was worked out in more than two weeks of negotiations between his attorney, Seymour Glanzer, and the government.

Reporters had been notified yesterday, in the usual Justice Department

manner, that Townley's plea was expected before Judge Parker at 2 p.m. The proceeding was delayed, however, by a meeting in the judge's chambers involving prosecutors and Glanzer.

Around 2:40 p.m., Townley—a bearded, thin man wearing a blue suit—was brought into the courtroom to join the attorneys who had assembled there.

When Parker took the bench, he called Townley forward and told him that he had just learned about the plea-bargaining agreement and that he did not feel the court had been "fully advised" yet about the deal.

Parker said he wanted to "step back and review" the agreement, and reschedule the plea for some time in the near future.

"As a result, there will be no proceeding at this point," Parker said.

The indictment accuses former DINA head Gen. Manuel Contreras Sepulveda of ordering Letelier's murder, and two other DINA operatives in Chile with executing the details of the plan.

THE WASHINGTON POST
Friday, August 13, 1977



MICHAEL
... judge re

Suspect's Action In Letelier Case Disputed by Diary

By Jeremiah O'Leary
Washington Star Staff Writer

A child's diary says Jose Dionisio Suarez, a Cuban exile accused in the assassination of Chilean diplomat Orlando Letelier, was with his family in New Jersey on Sept. 19, 1976, not placing a bomb here as the government contends, his wife insists.

The wife, Marta, 37, says a diary kept by her 14-year-old daughter, also named Marta, indicates that Suarez was in Elizabeth, N.J., on that date. Mrs. Suarez, now a teacher in San Jose, Calif., said in a telephone interview that she only recently discovered her daughter kept a careful record of events in 1976.

"She does not permit me to read her diary," Mrs. Suarez said. "But she has a record in the diary that on Sunday, Sept. 19, 1976, she enjoyed telling her father about how she played the guitar at Sunday mass that day.

"And later, the diary records that my husband stayed home that Sunday to make some repairs in the bathroom so we could sell the house. My daughter also wrote that we came home from the movies, a double feature, and that she also told her father about what movie we saw."

THE MASS WAS at St. Catherine's Catholic Church. The movies attended by Mrs. Suarez, Marta and a second child, Victor, 9, were, according to the diary, "Murder on the Orient Express" and "Big Bus."

"I have not told the FBI about this," Mrs. Suarez said.

"If my husband was working here at home on that day, listening to Marta talk about the guitar mass and the movies, he could not have been in Washington as the prosecutor says," she said.

According to the grand jury indictments returned here, Suarez came to Washington on Sept. 18, three days before the explosion that killed Letelier and a colleague, Ronni Moffitt.

The FBI contends that Suarez and other members of the anti-Castro Cuban Nationalist Movement joined forces with Michael V. Townley, 35, an American in the service of Chile's DINA secret police, to assassinate Letelier.

The indictments allege that Suarez, subject of a nationwide FBI manhunt, and his Cuban-born associates, Guillermo Novo, Alvin Ross Diaz and Virgilio Paz, joined in the conspiracy to kill Letelier.

IT IS ALLEGED that the conspiracy was set into motion by Army Gen. Manuel Contreras Sepulveda, chief of DINA; Col. Pedro Espinoza, his operations chief; and Capt. Armando Fernandez.

Townley and Fernandez came to the United States to execute the plot but Townley, an American citizen with a Chilean wife, is the government's primary witness against the other conspirators, the government says.

Indictments Against 8 Outline Alleged Plot to Kill Letelier

By Jeremiah O'Leary
Washington Star Staff Writer

There was nothing to attract special attention about the arrival of the young Latin American couple at New York's JFK Airport on Aug. 26, 1976.

Capt. Armando Fernandez Larios of the Chilean army and his woman companion passed through immigration, customs and the JFK traffic jam without incident.

But, according to a grand jury indictment handed up yesterday in U.S. District Court here, the couple's visit was to have dramatic consequences, because the captain was here as an agent of DINA, the Chilean secret police, and was on a mission to spy on former Chilean Ambassador Orlando Letelier.

He was to pass the information on to the men who intended to kill Letelier, a murder squad of one American and several anti-Castro Cubans, the indictment charges.

The details of how Fernandez and the woman known to the FBI only as "Liliana Walker Martinez" allegedly carried out the mission are part of the 10-count indictment in connection with the murders of Letelier and his colleague, Ronni Karpén Moffitt.

THE GRAND JURY indicted eight persons, including the former DINA chief. Letelier and Moffitt were killed when a bomb attached to the exiled




ORLANDO LETELIER
Murdered diplomat

diplomat's car exploded at Sheridan Circle on Sept. 21, 1976.

The indictment charges that Gen. Manuel Contreras Sepulveda, former DINA chief and close friend of Chilean President Augusto Pinochet, initiated the conspiracy. The panel did not implicate anyone of higher rank in Chile, but said Contreras "ordered the assassination of Letelier either alone or with others unknown to the grand jury."

The indictment said the order to kill Letelier was conveyed by Lt. Col.



MANUEL CONTRERAS
Ex-Chilean secret police head

Pedro Espinoza, DINA's director of operations, to Fernandez and Michael V. Townley, an American expatriate working for DINA. It said Contreras and Espinoza used the resources of DINA to arrange international travel, false documentation, cash and intelligence contacts for the assassination.

The prosecutors, Assistant U.S. Attorneys Eugene M. Propper and Lawrence Barcella, immediately requested that Chief U.S. District
See LETELIER, A-8

Continued From A-1

Judge William B. Bryant issue bench warrants for the arrest of the three Chilean army officers and two Cuban exiles named in the indictment who are not in custody.

THE STATE DEPARTMENT said it sent a diplomatic note to Chile requesting the detention of the three officers and advising the Santiago military regime that formal requests for their extradition will be made as soon as possible.

In Santiago, the military government last night ordered the arrest of the three officers after receiving the U.S. detention request. The Chilean interior ministry said they were ordered placed under military detention pending the outcome of legal proceedings.

Four alleged conspirators are in U.S. custody: Townley, the 36-year-old expatriate who, U.S. officials say, has given them a full account of the plot; brothers Guillermo and Ignacio Novo, members of the anti-Castro Cuban Nationalist Movement, which is centered in northern New Jersey; and Alvin Ross Diaz, also an anti-Castro activist.

The FBI is seeking two other Cuban exiles, Virgilio Paz and Jose Dionisio Suarez.

THE GRAND JURY charged that the plot was carried out as follows:

In July 1976 Contreras contacted the director of Paraguay's military intelligence service to request that he authorize Paraguayan passports for two DINA agents to be used on an unspecified mission to the United States.

In mid-July Contreras ordered Fernandez to travel to Paraguay to make contact with the Paraguayan secret police. The DINA director of operations, Espinoza, gave Fernandez a false identity card for this journey.

At about the same time, Fernandez called Townley to arrange meetings between him and Espinoza.

On or about July 1976, the exact date being unknown to the grand jury, Pedro Espinoza told Michael Townley that Townley and Fernandez were being ordered to go to the U.S. on a DINA mission to assassinate Orlando Letelier," the indictment charges.

TOWNLEY IS MENTIONED only as a co-conspirator in the indictment and is not charged. Officials have indicated he will make a court appearance this week to plead guilty to one count of murder of a foreign diplomat. He is expected to testify for the government at the trial.

Fernandez and Townley went to Asuncion, the Paraguayan capital, July 20, 1976, and returned a week later to Chile with special Paraguayan passports issued under false names. The whole transaction was noted by American officials, who recalled it two months later when Letelier was killed.


Fernandez and his woman travel companion flew to the United States and, a couple of weeks later, began keeping tabs on Letelier's movements. Meanwhile Espinoza gave Townley his orders to come here and carry out the assassination.

Townley arrived at JFK Airport on Sept. 9, using false identification papers from DINA. He was met there by Fernandez, who gave him the information about Letelier's movements between his Bethesda home and his office near Dupont Circle. Fernandez and his companion left that day for Chile, and Townley rented a car.


DURING THE NEXT four days Townley had several meetings with Paz, Guillermo Novo, Suarez and Ross, told them of his orders from DINA and asked their help in carrying out the assassination.

On Sept. 15 Guillermo Novo and Suarez gave some explosives and a remote-control detonating device to

LETELIER: Indictment Outlines Murder Plot



JOSE DIONISIO SUAREZ



VIRGILIO PAZ



IGNACIO NOVO

These three are among those indicted in the slaying of Chilean diplomat Orlando Letelier.

Townley and Paz, who then drove to New Jersey to Washington.

In Sept. 16 Townley and Paz checked in at a Holiday Inn here and the next two days busied themselves getting parts — some at Sears Roebuck — to be used in the bomb. Guillermo Novo, Suarez and Ross obtained other parts for the bomb, and on Sept. 18 Suarez checked in at the Western Envoy Motel here. It was the day Paz, Suarez and Townley built the bomb.

On Sept. 19 Paz, Suarez and Townley drove from Northeast Washington to Letelier's home, where Townley placed the bomb in the car. That

same day Townley made a phone call to Chile to tell his wife, Mariana Ines Callejas de Townley, also a DINA agent, to advise DINA that the bomb had been placed.

LATER THAN DAY Townley went from Washington to Newark, N.J., and from there to Miami. Two days later, Sept. 21, the bomb was detonated, killing Letelier and Moffitt in morning rush hour traffic. Later that day, Townley met Ignacio Novo in Miami, briefed him on the mission and then, on Sept. 23, flew from Florida to Chile.

The indictment does not say who

set off the charge, only that the "bomb was detonated," but an FBI agent testified at a U.S. magistrate's hearing on the case in June that Townley believed Suarez had detonated the bomb.

All the defendants except Ignacio Novo are indicted for conspiracy to murder a foreign official, murdering a foreign official, two counts of first-degree murder and murder by use of explosives. Conviction on each of these charges carries a sentence of life imprisonment. Charges including false declarations could net the Novo brothers \$10,000 fines and five years imprisonment.

HOW AN EX-CHILEAN DIPLOMAT WAS KILLED IN D.C.

By Jeremiah O'Leary
Washington Star Staff Writer

NEWARK, N.J. — When Michael Vernon Townley arrived in New York from Chile in September 1976 he seemed an unremarkable traveler.

Sandy-haired, well-dressed, English-speaking men in their 30s do not attract attention at John F. Kennedy International Airport.

But Townley was on a grim mission.

According to the FBI, although Townley is an American citizen he was on assignment from DINA, the Chilean military government's secret police, to kill leftist former Chilean Foreign Minister Orlando Letelier.

He brought some of his equipment with him, 10 "electric matches" or blasting caps used to set off explosives, the FBI says, and he knew he could get dynamite from anti-Castro Cuban activists in the New Jersey-New York area.



PAZ
Sought by FBI in Letelier Slaying



SUAREZ

The rest of the things he needed to blow up Letelier's car in Washington, D.C., were available in the nation's capital, the FBI noted.

BEFORE 11 A.M. Sept. 21, 1976, Letelier and a colleague, Rorri Karpen Moffitt, were dead. They were killed when a powerful bomb exploded under Letelier's car in morning rush hour traffic at Washington's Sheridan Circle.

Yesterday FBI Special Agent Carter Cornick testified to these and other details of the double murder in court here. It was the first time the government disclosed much of its case against Townley, five Cuban exiles and an undisclosed number of Chilean officials the United States says were involved in the conspiracy to kill Letelier.

The occasion was a removal hearing sought by Assistant U.S. Attorney Eugene M. Propper to transfer one of the Cuban suspects, Alvin Ross Diaz, to federal custody in Washington.

According to Cornick's testimony, under questioning by Propper and Assistant U.S. Attorney E. Lawrence Barcella before U.S. Magistrate Serena

See LETELIER, A-6

LETELIER

Continued From A-1

Perretti, Townley constructed the bomb and attached it under the front seat of Letelier's car while it was parked near his Bethesda, Md., home. The bomb was triggered, Cornicksaid, by Jose Dionisio Suarez, a Cuban exile sought by the FBI.

CORNICK'S TESTIMONY was largely based on the account Townley, 36, allegedly has given FBI agents of the conspiracy and how it was carried out.

There was no mention yesterday of the so-called "Chilean connection," except that Townley was assisted in the United States by Chilean Army Capt. Armando Fernandez Larios.

The testimony did not say who authorized the DINA agents to murder Letelier.

As Cornick reconstructed the events of the murder, Townley arrived at JFK airport Sept. 9, 1976, and immediately called one of the Cubans, Virgilio Paz, and asked to meet with him. The two men had known one another from a previous relationship, Cornick testified.

The special agent testified that Paz and Townley met somewhere in the Newark area. Townley indicated what his mission was and asked to be put in touch with some members of the Cuban nationalist movement, Cornick said.

PAZ, ACCORDING TO the testimony, arranged for Townley to meet with Suarez, Guillermo Novo Sampol and himself at the Chateau Renaissance, a local motel, on Sept. 11 or 12. It was at this meeting, the government contends, that the conspiracy became an active scheme. Townley told Paz, Novo and Suarez of his plan to assassinate Letelier and requested their assistance.

Ross also was present at the meeting but Cornick said Townley has not mentioned anything that Ross may have said then.

Townley, who is being held for his own safety at a military base near Washington, told Cornick of his intentions and received agreement of the Cubans to help two days later, about Sept. 13 or 14.

Meanwhile a fellow DINA officer, Fernandez, was in Washington, and Townley has told the FBI that Fernandez' role was to maintain surveillance of Letelier's comings and goings so that the plotters could work out a timetable.

"TOWNLEY SAID HE and Paz went to Newark where they obtained the TNT on Sept. 15," the FBI agent testified. "Then Townley and Paz drove to Washington in Paz' Volvo. Suarez joined them later. They stayed in Washington and tried to confirm the surveillance of Letelier,

including his routes to and from work, as carried out by Fernandez. They also bought other parts that were used in making the bomb."

Since Townley brought the electric matches with him from Chile and obtained the dynamite from the Cubans in Newark, all he needed were batteries and a receiver to set off the explosion. But there was no testimony introduced to give all details of where the bomb parts came from.

Cornick testified that Townley has admitted the bomb was constructed by himself and Paz, but that Townley himself placed the bomb in position under Letelier's car. Paz and Suarez accompanied him to the Letelier neighborhood for the actual placing of the bomb, Cornick said.

AS SOON AS THE bomb was in place, Townley left Washington so as to be elsewhere when the bomb was detonated, Cornick said. That left Paz and Suarez in Washington on Sept. 21 when the fatal blast occurred.

"Did Townley tell you which of them triggered the explosion?" asked attorney Paul Goldberger, representing Diaz.

"He said he didn't know which but he had a pretty good idea," Cornick testified. "He told us he had talked to Paz at his home and he concluded, as we have, that Suarez triggered the bomb."

Ironically, Suarez was questioned by a federal grand jury here last spring and was sent to jail for nearly a year when he refused to answer questions despite a grant of immunity. Less than two months ago, federal officials had to release Suarez because the life of the grand jury had expired.

Townley, a 20-year-resident of Chile, was ideologically attuned to the military regime there and became an activist against the leftist government of Salvador Allende before joining DINA.

PROPPER AND Cornick escorted Townley to the United States from Chile when he was expelled by the Santiago government under heavy U.S. pressure and then was charged with conspiracy to murder a foreign diplomat. Since his arrival in the United States, Townley has told Propper and the FBI everything about the plot but no details have been released about which Chilean higher-ups may have been involved.

Magistrate Perretti agreed to the transfer of Ross to federal custody in Washington, and in about a week Ross will be brought to District Jail by U.S. marshals.

Indictments against the five Cubans, Townley and an unknown number of Chileans are expected to be returned by the grand jury in late June or early July.



AMBASSADOR LANDAU
To return immediately

U.S.-Chile Ties Hit New Low as Envoy Recalled

By Jeremiah O'Leary
Washington Star Staff Writer

The State Department's recall of Ambassador George W. Landau to Washington "for consultation" because of Chile's lack of cooperation in the Letelier murder investigation plunges U.S.-Chilean relations to the lowest point since the military government took over in Santiago five years ago.

Landau, a 58-year-old career diplomat, is expected to arrive here Monday for what will probably be an indefinite stay. Officials say that's because the federal investigators of the bomb-murder of former Chilean diplomat are determined to try to extradite three army officers of the Santiago military regime.

See CHILE, A-4

CHILE

Continued From A-1

In another application of diplomatic pressure on Chile, State Department spokesman John Trattner announced yesterday that the United States will delay a shipment of bomb fins to Chile until it has completed a review of human rights under the military regime. California longshoremen had refused to load the fins for shipment in protest against Chile's rights policy.

CHILE HAS ABOUT \$60 million of military equipment on order arranged before Congress imposed the cutoff in 1976 as a means of registering its indignation at the alleged violations of human rights in Chile.

Chile's president, Gen. Augusto Pinochet, and his chief military assistants have adamantly fought extradition of Chilean military men to the United States.

Recall of the ambassador could be followed by a break in diplomatic relations if Chile continues to impose obstacles to the investigation being carried out by Assistant U.S. Attorney Eugene M. Propper and the FBI.

The State and Justice departments appear determined to back Propper in his investigation of the murder of Letelier and his colleague, Ronni K. Moffitt, on Sept. 21, 1976.

The best outcome American officials say they can hope for realistically is that the Chilean government will put the three officers on trial under Chilean laws while Propper does the same in federal court here with other suspects.

The three officers suspected of taking part in the conspiracy are Gen. Manuel Contreras Sepulveda, retired former chief of the DINA secret police and once the inseparable com-

panion of Pinochet; Lt. Col. Pedro Espinoza, former DINA operations chief; and Capt. Armando Fernandez Larios, who is accused of tracking Letelier in Bethesda and Washington for several days before the bomb was put under the driver's seat of the Letelier car.

The recall of Landau was announced at the State Department's noon briefing yesterday by Trattner, who said:

"AMBASSADOR LANDAU is being recalled from Santiago for consultations with officials of the State and Justice departments concerning the Letelier-Moffitt assassination investigation. The Chilean authorities have not been forthcoming on important requests by the Justice Department which have been pending for some time. The ambassador's presence in the U.S. will also give us an opportunity to review the current state of human rights conditions in Chile and related issues."

Chile's new foreign minister, Hernan Cubillos, attending a meeting at the Organization of American States here, sought to minimize the significance of the action. He even said the recall might be useful in that it will permit Landau "to explain in detail the information which we have been making available to him lately." Cubillos did not elaborate.

Propper declined to say what requests the Chilean government was not honoring. However, from the wording of the statement, it is possible that the Chileans have failed to respond to all the questions put forth by Propper in the so-called letter's rogatory sent to the Chilean Supreme Court several months ago by Chief U.S. District Judge William Bryant.

THERE IS ALSO speculation that Propper may have asked Chilean officials to let him question Con-

treras, Espinoza and Fernandez and been turned down.

The decision to recall Landau was reached after two meetings this week between Propper and Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher.

The U.S. action represents one of the few forms of pressure the United States has with the Chilean government since there is no more military program for Chile and economic aid is minimal. Chile has ample reason for wanting very badly to retain U.S. friendship since it is in more or less continual confrontation with three hostile neighbors, Peru, Bolivia and Argentina.

The diplomatic maneuver comes at a time when Propper and the FBI have under arrest four suspects in the murder and as a nationwide manhunt continues for two other suspects.

The key figure is an American, Michael V. Townley, 36, an electronics expert who espoused rightist causes and worked for DINA. The expatriate Townley was expelled by the Chileans into the custody of FBI agents and he has been charged with one felony count of conspiracy to murder a foreign diplomat.

ACCORDING TO THE FBI, Townley is cooperating with the investigation and has acknowledged that he placed the explosive charge in Letelier's auto.

The government also charges that Townley and Fernandez, one of the Chilean army officers, as DINA agents, conspired with a terrorist cell of anti-Castro Cubans to kill the leftist Chilean politician.

Under arrest on conspiracy charges are Alvin Ross Diaz and two brothers, Guillermo and Ignacio Novo. The Cuban fugitives are Virgilio Paz and Jose Dionisio Suarez, who is believed to have detonated the remote control bomb that killed Letelier and Moffitt at Sheridan Circle.

Letelier Murder Also Nettlesome

Chile's Military Still Stained By Participation in Coup

By Jeremiah O'Leary

Washington Star Staff Writer

SANTIAGO, Chile — Man for man, the armed forces of Chile are regarded as the best in Latin America, but in recent years the code of honor by which the nation's soldiers are governed has been under a cloud, and the military has suffered.

The problem stems from the military's role in the coup of 1973 and from the murder of Orlando Letelier.

An experienced diplomat explained the state of mind of the Chilean armed forces this way:

"Every officer who graduates from the military academy here is made to swear a most sacred oath on the hilt of his sword to protect not the people or the president, but the constitution of Chile.

"When the order came on September 11 five years ago to attack the elected government of President Salvador Allende, there was no question of disobedience.

"No order in the chain of command is questioned. But it was traumatic for the Chilean officers because the order for the uprising amounted to forcing them to violate their oath.

"And that is a serious matter to Chilean officers. I think many of them decided that if they had to sully their honor, a lot of other people were going to suffer with them."

THAT EXPLANATION makes more sense than any other of the violent attack on La Moneda, the presidential palace, the arrest and imprisonment of thousands, the deaths of an unknown number of Chileans, the disappearances, the curfew and the rigor of the rule imposed on 10 million Chileans by the armed forces.

It may even be a partial explanation of how Chilean officers could have been involved in the bomb-murder of the former foreign minister, Letelier, in Washington and perhaps other murders committed by DINA, the secret police organization.

the United States on the expulsion of Michael V. Townley in the Letelier plot and has his own inquiry going against the Chilean officers involved.

The police still make political arrests and clean out small leftist cells. But their actions do not approach the magnitude of the mass seizures of 1973 when people were jailed by the thousands in open-air stadiums.

And Pinochet retired his closest friend, the DINA chief, Gen. Manuel Contreras Sepulveda, when the Letelier case began coming home to roost.

The speculation here is that Chile will prosecute the three army officers allegedly involved with Townley in the Letelier assassination but would never allow them to be extradited to the United States. In fact, the signs are that the United States is cooperating with Chile so that Gen. Hector Orozco, chief of intelligence, can proceed with the inquiry.

A HIGH-RANKING Chilean official, who did not want his name used, said the United States is sending Chile some of the evidence on which it has charged Townley and five Cuban exiles with conspiracy to commit murder and which everyone in Chile expects will lead to indictments of Contreras, Lt. Col. Pedro Espinoza and Capt. Armando Fernandez Larios.

Orozco, it was learned this week, traveled to the United States in April and was granted access to Townley, who is in custody at a military base near Washington for his own safety.

Orozco's legal adviser, attorney Miguel Schweitzer, has been to Washington three times to see Townley and to confer with Eugene Propser, the assistant U.S. attorney handling the case, and FBI agents investigating it.

Townley's Chilean wife, Mariana, has been in Washington for the past week to testify before a grand jury. She is expected to return to Santiago Saturday.

Chile has a literate, middle-class, European society with a long tradition of democratic institutions that have worked. In these surroundings, perhaps like some parts of Germany in Hitler's heyday, many Chileans could not bring themselves to believe that their officers, their DINA, could commit such acts as the arranged murder of Letelier, or the imprisonment of thousands and the disappearance of 617 persons.

It is a small country where people tend to know about one another. It has been a great shock to the Chileans to learn from the press, the church and from each other that so many atrocities were committed in their name.

Diplomats stationed here say that the majority of the people still support the military junta headed by Gen. Augusto Pinochet or see no alternative to it. It is possible that Pinochet enjoys more support from the mass of the people than he does within the regime, where institutional rivalries are rife.

The longer the Chileans are in confrontation with the United States over the Letelier affair, the more disturbed the Chileans become. There are even some signs of anti-Americanism here because it is the United States that is pressing Chile the hardest to put its house in order on the human rights issue, the Letelier case and ultimately a return to democracy.

TO SOME EXTENT, Pinochet has modified the authoritarian nature of the regime. He has cooperated with

Chile Arrests 3 Named In Letelier Indictment

By Charles A. Krause
Washington Post Foreign Service

SANTIAGO, Chile — The Chilean government last night arrested and placed under military detention three Chileans indicted yesterday in Washington in the September 1976 bombing death of former Chilean foreign minister and diplomat Orlando Letelier.

The three were identified yesterday in the indictment as Gen. Juan Manuel Contreras Sepulveda, former head of Chile's secret police (DINA), and two other DINA employees, operations director Pedro Espinoza Bravo and agent Armando Fernandez Larios.

The government statement announcing their arrests failed to say where they were being held or when they had been arrested.

The U.S. Embassy here had formally asked for the arrest and detention of the three yesterday afternoon, touching off what is expected to be a complicated legal battle over their extradition.

The statement also stressed that the three are innocent until proven guilty, and expressed the hope of Chilean President Augusto Pinochet that the case would be cleared up.

Contreras is a close associate of Pinochet.

The statement, issued by Interior Minister Sergio Fernandez, said there would be an extradition hearing before a Chilean court, but no date for the hearing was given.

A U.S. Embassy note asking for the arrests was delivered by Charles Grover, second deputy chief of mission, with the concurrence of U.S. Ambassador George W. Landau, who was in northern Chile when the indictments were announced yesterday.

The detention of the three is the first step in extradition proceedings that probably will culminate ultimately with a hearing before the Chilean Supreme Court, according to terms set forth in a 1900 treaty between Chile and the United States and later amended in 1935.

The legal battle over the extradition of the three will hinge on two seemingly contradictory provisions of the 1900 treaty, Chilean legal experts say.

According to the first provision, murder and "comprehending assassination" are extraditable offenses. But a second provision clearly sets forth that a "criminal shall not be surrendered if the offense . . . be of a political character or if he proves that the requisition for his surrender has, in fact, been made with a view to punish him for an offense of a political character."

The three suspects are expected to fight extradition.

Contreras has already retained a

prominent Santiago lawyer, Sergio Miranda Carrington, who once offered to defend Nazi war criminals at the Nuremberg trials at the end of World War II.

Miranda could not be reached for comment, but is expected by other lawyers in Chile to argue that the Letelier assassination was a political crime, and is therefore not covered by the treaty.

However, one source pointed out yesterday that Contreras and the other two Chileans are also charged with the murder of Ronni Moffitt, the female colleague of Letelier who was riding in his car at the time it was blown up.

This source said a possible way around the treaty's prohibition against extradition for political offenses might be to argue that Moffitt's death could not be considered politically motivated and that the three Chileans should be extradited to stand trial in the United States for her murder.

Another section of the 1900 treaty clearly states that "neither of the contracting parties shall be bound to deliver up its own citizens or subjects under the stipulations of this treaty." This section is interpreted here to mean that the Chilean Supreme Court could order extradition, but is not obliged to do so, even if the court decides there is sufficient evidence for the three Chileans to stand trial for the charges brought in the United States.

Another complication cited by legal sources here is that under Chilean laws conspiracy to commit a crime is not in itself a crime. The Supreme Court, these sources said, might well decide not to grant extradition for that reason.

The 1935 treaty says that if the person whose extradition is sought is a citizen of the country to which the request is addressed the surrendering state man determine whether to deliver him.

Both treaties provide for the arrest and detention of a person accused of a crime in another country when that country plans to ask for extradition.

Even if the Chilean Supreme Court does not order the three Chileans to be extradited to stand trial in the United States many observers believe the airing of the evidence against them in public will have a significant impact on Chilean public opinion about the alleged involvement by their government in the assassination of Letelier, who served as the late Salvador Allende's ambassador to Washington as well as his foreign and defense minister before Chile's 1973 coup.

Charges in Letelier Slaying

By Charles A. Krause
and Timothy S. Robinson
Washington Post Staff Writers

U.S. authorities have informed Chilean government officials that it is virtually certain that formal murder charges will be filed in the United States against at least three senior Chilean secret police officials in the Washington murder of former Chilean ambassador Orlando Letelier, according to diplomatic and investigative sources.

The notification has touched off a sharp reaction in Chile, evidenced publicly by a strong anti-American sentiment in the progovernment press and privately by an apparently orchestrated attempt in some government circles to limit Chile's continued

cooperation in the U.S. investigation, the sources said.

The shift in focus of the investigation from the United States to Chile began in April after an American-born, admitted Chilean secret police (DINA) agent, Michael Vernon Townley, acknowledged participation in the murder plot and began cooperating with the investigators.

He reportedly has provided detailed evidence about the participation of at least three of his Chilean DINA supervisors in the murder plot. Townley said he was working for them when he recruited five anti-Castro Cuban exiles in the United States to carry out the assassination.

See SANTIAGO, A25, Col. 1

SANTIAGO, From A1

Among those reportedly implicated by Townley is Gen. Manuel Contreras Sepulveda, the head of DINA at the time of the Sept. 21, 1976, bombing.

Letelier and an associate, Ronni K. Moffitt, were killed when a bomb attached to the car was detonated by a remote control device as it traveled around Sheridan Circle.

In Santiago, Chile's military government, its supporters in the press and its friends in business circles have become both frightened and furious as the U.S. investigation has turned toward the involvement of Chilean citizens.

The Chilean government has recently questioned the motives of the U.S. Justice Department official conducting the investigation in addition to not cooperating fully with U.S. requests for information, according to well-informed sources in Santiago.

The wave of anti-American feeling is the first in decades, among conservative Chileans who have traditionally looked to the United States as a friend in their efforts to stop leftists and Communists from gaining control of Chile.

"Why does your government always have to meddle in our affairs?" a very well-connected conservative businessman asked a reporter the other day. "The United States really is imperialistic."

The marked change in attitude began about three weeks ago during the most recent visit to Santiago of Assistant U.S. Attorney Eugene M. Propper, who is heading the investigation into the murder of Letelier, a former foreign minister and Chile's ambassador to the United States during the leftist government of former president Salvador Allende. Until his death, Letelier was an outspoken critic of the right-wing military regime that overthrew Allende in 1973.

Propper, accompanied by Assistant U.S. Attorney E. Lawrence Barcella, Jr. and two FBI agents, made what was his third visit to Santiago in the past three months to gather evidence to present to a grand jury investigating the Letelier affair in Washington.

On the most recent visit, the first after Townley's deportation and questioning, it soon became clear to Chilean government officials that the evidence Propper was after would be used to indict three former secret police officers, including Contreras. The former secret police head, who left the investigative agency when it was reorganized last fall, has long been a confidant of President Augusto Pinochet.

The reaction in Santiago to the Propper mission and to the headlines it generated was instantaneous and harsh as the realization sunk in that U.S. authorities and the grand jury would almost certainly charge the three Chileans with having ordered or participated in the Letelier murder.

The Chilean press reaction to Propper's visit was at times hostile. It was a sharp contrast to the earlier visits to Chile by Propper and FBI agent L. Carter Cornick, who were covered by

an unmuzzled press that considered them high-ranking American officials and treated them with respect.

Indignation, a sense of helplessness and, finally, cold anger swept through the government and its supporters at the implications of Propper's requests for information. No issue is as dangerous to the continued viability of the military government here as the Letelier case because many political observers believe that, faced with absolute proof, large numbers of Chileans would find it impossible to continue supporting a government that had ordered a cold-blooded political assassination.

The Letelier case is particularly dangerous for Pinochet because of his close connection to Contreras. "Pinochet might not have known about the Letelier murder, as the president has said he did not," said one lawyer who is not closely associated with either the government or the opposition. "But far fewer people would believe him" if Contreras is indicted in the United States.

After Propper returned to the United States, the Pinochet government went on the offensive. On May 26, Interior Minister Sergio Fernandez issued a statement which said there had been "no precise objective" for Propper's third visit to Santiago.

The statement suggested that the investigator might have had "ulterior political" motives for personally coming to Chile. The government said the visit had contributed to an "artificial climate with which Chile's enemies pretend to involve our authorities" in the Letelier case.

Persons familiar with the relationship between Chilean and U.S. officials during the case said Chilean investigators have never directly accused the U.S. investigation of being political and have treated Propper and Cornick as nonpolitical investigators.

Since the alleged involvement of DINA officials has become public, the Chilean government has begun conducting a military inquiry into the alleged Chilean involvement in the plot. Chilean investigators have traveled to Washington to gather information for use in that investigation, sources said.

The Fernandez statement also stressed that Chile would continue cooperating with U.S. authorities, but, according to informed sources in Santiago, the Chilean government has failed to turn over several pieces of information that Propper requested during his trip there.

One source said the government apparently is withholding the information, hoping that Propper will be unable to obtain a grand jury indictment without it. Other sources have said, however, that Contreras and the other two DINA officers will be indicted even if the information requested is not provided.

Top Chilean Police Face Murder Charges Here

Townley's Wife Knew Of Plot to Kill Letelier

By Jeremiah O'Leary
Washington Star Staff Writer

SANTIAGO, Chile — Mariana Callejas, the wife of Michael V. Townley, the accused assassin of Orlando Letelier, is candid.

"Why did you tell the reporters at the airport last night that your husband put the bomb in Letelier's car?" she was asked at her home here yesterday after a flight from Washington.

"I can't lie. I don't know how. It's difficult for me to lie or to ignore people," Callejas said.

In any case, she added, FBI agent Carter Cornick had already testified in court a week ago that her husband placed the bomb that killed Letelier, so she said she didn't see anything so new in that.

"But did you know about the assassination plot beforehand or that they were going to put a bomb in Letelier's car?" she was asked.

"Yes. Including the day that the attempt was made (Sept. 21, 1976), when Michael called me from Miami," she said.

CALLEJAS, WHO has kept her maiden name as many Chilean women do, was completely composed although tired from the 7,000-mile

flight from Washington to Santiago.

She said she went there at the invitation and expense of the U.S. government to testify before the grand jury and to see her husband, Michael, 36, who is in custody somewhere near Washington.

Townley's home in the Lo Curro hills overlooks the smoggy basin in which Chile's capital is located. There is a swimming pool the family has never used. The view of the snow-capped Andes is magnificent.

But Callejas is difficult to get a fix on. A wistful smile constantly plays across her face even when she discusses calamity or hardship.

One of those hardships is that she is raising two children, Chris, 15, and Brian, 12, both bilingual and blond like their father, but no money is coming in to the chalet on at 4925 Via Naranja.

"I have sold one of the cars in order to feed my children," she said.

"Obviously the government of Chile cannot help us because that would be an admission of guilt. Michael told me I ought not to be giving interviews for free when we need the money so badly."

AS SHE TALKS Callejas skips from subject to subject without distress and always in low key.

See TOWNLEY, A-4

TOWNLEY

Continued From A-1

One moment she says, "I am a Chilean and I will always be a Chilean." The next, she says clearly but without passion that she is angry that her government gave her husband over to the United States without due process of Chilean law.

At the same time, Callejas says, the grand jury treated her nicely because they are nice people and she spoke well of Assistant U.S. Attorney Eugene M. Propper and FBI agents Cornick and Robert Scherrer.

What did she have to tell the grand jury last week?

"Not very much," Townley's wife said. She said they questioned her for about 20 minutes.

"But I am not a woman to ask many questions. I knew Michael was with the DINA and that he is good with electronics, but we didn't talk much about what he was doing," she said.

She slowly wanders around the house where she and Michael Townley lived together.

"It is very lonely here now," she said.

THERE ARE NOT many books. A couple of paperbacks catch the eye: "The Terminal Man" and something in sci-fi called "The Shores of Death."

The bar contains only a bottle of tequila, looking long ignored. The hi-fi is impressive, wired by Michael, but none of the records is in sight.

"I write. I read. I keep busy with the children," Callejas said.

"What do you think of the United States? Don't you have some children by a previous marriage living there?" she was asked.

"That is a thing of the past," she said. "But I do not like it when the U.S. blackmails Chile and other countries as they do. The Americans say you'll get no food unless you do as we say. That is not right."

Mariana Callejas, three times married and now separated from her husband by one of the most publicized acts of violence ever committed in Washington, does not think she would attend a trial.

She says she cannot afford the trip and that she has to take care of the children. But it comes out that she would not want them exposed to sight of their father as a prisoner in jail and in the dock.

SHE IS A FEY woman who seems to move through life as if it were a dream, or a nightmare. It is hard to say whether she is the perfect victim of circumstances or as clever as her conversation indicates she may be.

She has told Chilean interviewers at various times that she has been a Communist, a Socialist, a Zionist, an

anti-Allende activist and, during a stay in the United States, a supporter of Eugene McCarthy.

"But he was a disappointment," she said with a sigh, as if all her men might fit that description.

Born in the small town of Rapel in the province of Coquimbo, her father was a justice of the peace. She attended high school and then college but dropped out. She explains that by saying, "I am an Aries and Aries people are always complicated. I was preoccupied with the problems of the world at an early age and this made problems with my father who was anti-Communist."

And there were her marriages. The first lasted six months until she was 17. Her second husband was Jewish and took her to live on a kibbutz in Israel.

SHE MARRIED Michael Townley after a 10-month courtship. They lived in Florida, where she worked for McCarthy's cause.

When they came back to Chile, she said, she became a collaborator in the right-wing Patria y Libertad organization against President Salvador Allende.

Life looks bleak to Mariana Callejas, but her omnipresent smile makes one wonder if she really understands how serious a turn her life has taken.

It is all very disorganized, some woeful sculpture, the unused pool, the flea market quality of the furnishings in a house that has one of the most beautiful views in Latin America.

But that view is lovely only looking outward. It is very probable that the electronic equipment and explosive caps used to kill Letelier in Washington were assembled in this house on the Via Naranja.

THIS IS HOW IT WAS DONE

SAUL LANDAU and RALPH STAVINS


Six months have passed since Orlando Letelier and Ronni Moffitt were murdered on Embassy Row in Washington. No arrests or indictments have occurred. From our own investigation, published reports and Justice Department sources the names of several of the suspected assassins are known. From independent evidence that we have gathered, the suspects' motives and key details of the crime have emerged. The FBI and Justice Department findings concur in crucial detail with the conclusions drawn from our inquiry.

The actual plot for the murder began during a debate within the Chilean junta in June 1976. Letelier had received a letter from a reliable source which described this discussion. The question arose whether or not to assassinate Letelier, whom all members of the ruling council judged a danger to the regime. Gen. Augusto Pinochet made special reference to Letelier's public attempts to isolate and denigrate the ruling junta—his part in blocking a \$63-million Dutch investment, his testimony before the United Nations and other world bodies about torture in Chile, his relationships with members of Congress and State Department officials (Letelier lunched from time to time with William Rogers, Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs, and had close contact with outspoken legislative critics of the junta, Senators Kennedy, McGovern, Abourezk and Humphrey, and Congressmen Fraser, Miller, Moffett and Harkin); his influence at international banking and lending agencies (Letelier was an economist and a former high official of the Inter-American Development Bank). Letelier stood for the Chilean law and constitution, for human rights and reason—in a word, legitimacy, underlined by his presence in Washington. All the junta had to rule with was terror.

The "moderates" around the Santiago decision-making table argued that, while Letelier constituted a clear and present danger, his assassination at that time would not augur well for future relations with Washington. The "hards" said, "kill him; the United States is soft on communism anyway." They no longer felt concerned over possible U.S. reaction to assassinations. They already felt betrayed.

The moderates prevailed. Instead of assassination a compromise was agreed upon: Letelier was stripped of his Chilean nationality by a junta decree. This decision, reached in June, was not published in the official *Gazette* until September 10, 1976.

Several elements entered into the junta debate. The most important factor was that, contrary to the public impression, U.S.-Chilean relations had suffered a steady decline over the previous year. Because of flagrant and well-documented violations of human rights, the U.S. Congress began to reduce the large benefits it had been



Marcelo Meaerico

granting to the junta since the overthrow of Allende. Congress stopped all military aid, sharply cut back economic aid, and inserted human rights provisions into aid legislation. From a 1975 peak of \$273 million, U.S. aid was halved in fiscal 1976 and halved again for fiscal 1977. Three members of Congress and their staffs traveled to Chile and, upon their return home, gave eyewitness accounts of the horrors of daily life under the military dictatorship. In addition to such open condemnation of the regime by Congressional leaders, the Ford administration voted in early 1976 to denounce Chile at the United Nations for its systematic violation of human rights, and the State Department through the U.S. Embassy in Santiago delivered signals of diplomatic disapproval.

The sum of these gestures did not indicate an impending break in relations; indeed, one could interpret them as messages to mend one's brutal ways. But the junta responded with puerile rebelliousness. Its leaders, realizing that Congress was determined to cut their aid significantly, boasted that they didn't want it anyway. Chile's economic minister announced that Chile needed no more foreign loans, since the Chilean economy was already glutted with foreign credit.

Saul Landau and Ralph Stavins were co-workers with Orlando Letelier and Ronni Moffitt at the Institute for Policy Studies in Washington, D.C. Landau, a film director (Fidel), is acting director of the Transnational Institute, IPS's international program. Stavins directs IPS's project on official illegality.

The Chilean press increased its attacks upon liberal U.S. legislators. Senator Kennedy was branded a Communist leader and cartoons in the junta-controlled Santiago dailies portrayed other powerful Senators conspiring against the junta, with Mrs. Hortensia Allende, the slain President's widow, goading them on.

Pablo Rodriguez, leader of the ultra-Right *Patria y Libertad* movement, asked on Chilean TV, "Why has Chile become an electoral banner used in the U.S. to win votes? I believe it is because to a great extent international communism has been attracting those nations where eventually there might be a conflict." Détente, according to officials in Chile, had proved that the United States could no longer be trusted. (Shortly after the murders, former Chilean Ambassador Manuel Trucco, responding to Presidential candidate Carter's attack on the junta and U.S. involvement in the coup, wrote Carter warning that his advisers were Marxist dupes.)

Letelier's published writings continued to throw doubt on the junta's economic and political legitimacy. In the August 28, 1976, issue of the *The Nation*, he published an article, "Chile: Economic 'Freedom's' Awful Toll," which connected the campaign of state terror to the junta-Milton Friedman economic model. Despite the ubiquitous terror, Letelier concluded, the generals showed no capacity to mold a viable economy, and future investment in Chile was foolhardy.

On September 10, 1976, Letelier learned of the decree stripping him of his nationality. At a scheduled speech at Madison Square Garden, New York, he gave his reply: "I was born a Chilean, I am a Chilean and I will die a Chilean. They, the Fascists, were born traitors, live as traitors, and will be remembered forever as Fascist traitors." The overflow crowd roared its approval. DINA agents attended the rally and reported to Santiago.

We believe that General Pinochet and his DINA chief, Manuel Contreras, called a special meeting to discuss these, for them, unfavorable recent events. This time the moderates lost. Pinochet ordered DINA to "hit" on Embassy Row in Washington, D.C. as Pinochet's "symbolic" response both to Letelier's resistance and to the United States' "betrayal" of its promised support.

From several sources inside the U.S. Government, we have learned that a high-level DINA official was instructed to conspire with Cuban exiles in the United States for the actual killing. The DINA-exile connection, by then many months old, had come about as naturally as a marriage between Mafia families. Shortly after the 1973 coup, Col. Eduardo Sepulveda, a close friend of Pinochet, was dispatched to Miami to meet with Cuban exile leaders. Ramiro de la Fé, a Bay of Pigs veteran who had served time for possession of explosives, and who was a spokesman for several terrorist groupings, consulted with Sepulveda and helped him set up a front group in the United States to promote the junta's image. In return, according to former exile activist, Carlos Rivero Collado,* Sepulveda promised moral and ma-

* Carlos Rivero Collado was active in Cuban exile affairs until he recently returned to Cuba, revealing all he knew of exile politics.

terial aid in the exiles' private war against Castro and the Cuban Revolution.

In early 1974, the junta blessed the arrangement by sending Julio Duran to deliver a keynote speech before the exile community in Miami. Duran, Chile's delegate to the U.N. General Assembly and a leading figure in *Patria y Libertad*, promised the exiles that henceforth, Chile would support their cause.

The exiles, most of whom the CIA had abandoned because of periodic policy changes and the fallout from Watergate, became the junta's adopted sons. The junta and the exiles shared the same enemies and ideology. Chile, not the United States, was dedicated to the overthrow of Castro; Chile, not the United States, was now the hemispheric leader in the struggle against international communism; Chile, not the United States, was willing to use terror as a routine tool of policy. The exiles had new parents, and, judging from the frequency of their visits to Chile, a new home. In 1975 Brigade 2506, composed of Bay of Pigs veterans, awarded Pinochet its "medal of freedom."

According to Carlos Rivero Collado, from 1974 to 1976 the Cuban exile terrorist groups, with Chilean moral and material aid, launched a number of violent attacks in and out of this country. Their targets included not only the Cuban Revolution but some of their newly defined enemies in the United States. In one incident, Emilio Milian, a Miami-based Cuban exile, who advocated détente with Cuba, had his legs severed when a C4 bomb exploded in his car, the identical method used later to eliminate Letelier. (For details of atrocities committed by Cuban exiles in the recent past, see "Miami, Haven for Terror," *The Nation*, March 19.)

Our evidence indicates that a high-level DINA agent landed in Miami on September 13, 1976, and met with a group of Cuban exiles who had already been alerted that a "contract" was in the offing. The DINA agent worked out the details of the Letelier assassination with four young terrorists noted for their daring and cold-bloodedness. Having secured a plastic explosive and a detonating device, they departed for Washington. There they met with DINA agents, posing as Chilean officials, stationed at the Chilean Embassy. The Washington-based operatives briefed the exiles on Letelier's habits, his car description, daily departure times, route to work, parking location, and probable work schedule at the Institute for Policy Studies during the following week.

The next afternoon, Justice Department sources confirm, a group of Cubans made an official call upon their Chilean Ambassador, Manuel Trucco, to "protest" the extradition of Rolando Otero, a fellow Cuban exile, from Chile to the United States, there to stand trial for bombings in the Miami area. This visit to the Chilean Embassy could serve in the future, should it be necessary, to explain their presence in Washington.

Upon leaving the Chilean Embassy, they probably drove to an alley behind the Institute for Policy Studies, where Letelier routinely parked his car. The explosive was taped to the I-beam of the car, under the driver's seat, for maximum impact. The car may have been

to test whether the plastic would remain in place. The day before a set of Letelier's car keys had been taken from his office and when Letelier arrived at his car at 6:30 that evening, one of his companions pointed out that the right front door was ajar. He shrugged it off, saying, "Oh, I must have gotten out on the wrong side today."

The next morning Letelier drove to National Airport, parked his car for the day, and took an Eastern shuttle to New York. He returned on Saturday for a party at his house to celebrate Chilean Independence Day.

Monday, the day before the assassination, Letelier worked at his office. At the end of the day, he phoned Isabel, his wife, confirming a dinner-work engagement at home for that evening with Michael and Ronni Moffitt. When Moffitt discovered that his own car would not start, Letelier phoned again explaining that the Moffitts would drive with him. They stayed until midnight, and then drove Letelier's car to their own home, it being agreed that they would pick him up and drive to work together the next morning.

At 8:45 Tuesday morning, a Latin woman walking in front of Letelier's residence noticed a late-model gray sedan parked near the Letelier driveway. Three occupants sat inside and one man stood by the car. She identified him as "certainly a Latin," about 30, wearing a gray suit and tie. The four appeared to be enjoying an "inside joke," she said.

At 8:55 the Moffitts arrived in the Letelier car, and pulled into Letelier's driveway. Engaged in conversation, they did not notice any other vehicles nearby. As soon as they entered the Letelier residence, one of the group of four must have crawled under Letelier's car and attached the detonating device to the plastic charge—a procedure that requires only seconds.

At 9:15, Letelier, Ronni and Michael Moffitt left the house and began the drive from Bethesda to the District of Columbia. Letelier took the route he always drove—River Road to 46th to Massachusetts Avenue. They talked about the day's business and the dreary weather. No one paid attention to a gray sedan trailing them at a "safe" distance.

As Letelier entered Sheridan Circle, a hand in the gray car depressed a button. Michael Moffitt heard the sound

of "water on a hot wire" and then saw a "white flash." Thrown clear of the explosion, Moffitt tried to free the unconscious Letelier from the wreckage on top of him. His legs had been snapped from his body and catapulted some 15 feet away. Ronni Moffitt stumbled away from the smoldering Chevrolet; she seemed to be O.K., but in fact had suffered a severed artery and soon bled to death. Michael screamed out into the world, "The Chilean Fascists have done this."

This reconstruction of the assassinations, based upon evidence gleaned in six months of probing and with some educated guessing, is supported by what we know of FBI findings. In crucial areas, our conclusions and those of the Justice Department match exactly: a DINA official, himself under orders from "above," ordered and supervised the "hit"; Cuban terrorists carried it out; plastic explosive was the murder instrument.

Most of the FBI and Justice Department officials investigating the murders have made a concerted effort to bring the perpetrators to the bar of justice. At the same time, other agents inside the government have leaked material from Letelier's briefcase, seized by the police as potential evidence at the time of the explosion. The leaked material first appeared on the desks of several officials of the Inter-American Development Bank, where Letelier had served for many years. Next, the briefcase material was given to newspaper columnists Jack Anderson and then to Evans and Novak. The columns which these men wrote attempted to discredit Letelier and divert attention from the actual killers—General Pinochet, the Chilean junta, the DINA and their Cuban exile hit men.

The names of most of the killers, their motives, and their *modus operandi* are now known to the Justice Department. What remains are the more fundamental questions: will the U.S. authorities be allowed to gather sufficient evidence to bring the killers to trial? Will they name General Pinochet and other ruling junta members who ordered the assassinations? And will the role of U.S. intelligence and defense agencies, which had previously trained junta leaders, DINA agents and the exiles, be revealed in full? □

The Witness

Townley: He Followed Orders

By Timothy S. Robinson
Washington Post Staff Writer

Michael Vernon Townley, a soft-spoken, intense and articulate 35-year-old man who has made Chile his home for the past 20 years already is starting to be known in some circles as the "John Dean" of the Letelier affair.


He is an unlikely figure to be found in his current role—as the heavily guarded informant who has calmly told FBI agents and prosecutors how he followed orders to plant an explosive whose blast left its intended victims so mangled that hardened investigators became sick at the scene of the crime.

As he is described by people who know him, Townley is a skilled electronic technician capable of assembling devices to detonate bombs by remote control. He had been active in commando raids against the late Chilean President Salvador Allende, whose Marxist regime was toppled in a military coup by the current Chilean president, Gen. Augusto Pinochet.

Townley, an American who grew up in Chile where his father headed a large U.S. automobile operation, had become a familiar sight to Americans there by the early 1970s. He was known as a political activist who was suspected of participating in military activities of Patria y Libertad, a right-wing Chilean party.

Although he had been charged with murder for his alleged participation in a Concepcion raid in which a night watchman was killed, the charges were dropped when Pinochet came to power in late 1973 and Townley became an agent of DINA, the Chilean secret police agency.

Townley was expelled from Chile in early April after the U.S. put intense pressure on the country to turn him over. In the U.S., his attorneys, Sey-



MICHAEL VERNON TOWNLEY
... unlikely figure in current role

mour Glanzer and Barry W. Levine, struck up a deal by which he would enter a guilty plea to one count of conspiracy to murder Letelier and would in return cooperate in the Letelier investigation.

As a part of the deal, Townley will only have to cooperate with and provide information to U.S. authorities on his role in the Letelier murder. He reportedly has additional information about terrorist activities in other countries, but is not required to give that information to the U.S., sources have said.

As was John Dean in the Watergate affair, Townley was, by his own account, directly involved in the execution of crimes and has decided to testify against his close associates. And, as in Watergate, Townley could, as did Dean, play a central role in questioning the activities of a country's highest government officials.

Halt in Arms for Chile Is Passed and Reversed

By John M. Goshko
Washington Post Staff Writer

The House yesterday voted to halt U.S. arms shipments to Chile until the government there surrenders three men indicted in the murder of former Chilean ambassador Orlando Letelier. Then, after protests from the Justice Department, the House reversed itself.

The confusing sequence of events stemmed from Tuesday's action by a federal grand jury, which indicted eight persons in connection with the 1975 car-bombing deaths of Letelier and an American friend, Ronni K. Moffitt, as they drove through Washington's Embassy Row.


Among those indicted were Gen. Juan Manuel Contreras Sepulveda, former head of the Chilean secret police (DINA), and two DINA employees, Pedro Espinoza Bravo and Armando Hernandez Larios. Contreras, a close associate

of Chilean President Augusto Pinochet, is believed to be the first high-ranking foreign intelligence official indicted in this country.

Yesterday, as the House was considering the fiscal 1979 foreign military aid bill, Rep. Thomas R. Harkin (D-Iowa), an outspoken human-rights advocate, introduced an amendment calling for the cutoff of all arms shipments to Chile until the three are extradited to the United States.

Congress halted military assistance to Chile in 1976 to protest alleged repression and rights abuses by the Pinochet government. However, an estimated \$24 million in so-called pipeline shipments — equipment purchased or contracted for before the cutoff—has been continuing.

The Harkin amendment called for halting all
See ARMS, A15, Col. 1



PRESIDENT PINOCHET
... a close associate indicted

Halt in Arms to Chile Voted, Then Reversed

ARMS, From A1

material in the pipeline until the three have been extradited by Chilean authorities. After an emotional debate in which House member after member took the floor to denounce Chilean "death squads," the amendment was adopted by voice vote.

But, when word of the House's action got out, it sparked an immediate protest from the Justice Department on the grounds that it was premature and inappropriate. The department then instructed its congressional liaison officers to begin contacting members of the House to make known its objections.

Robert Keuch, deputy assistant attorney general in the criminal division, said in a telephone interview last night:

"We feel such an action is improper at the present time because the formal request to Chile for extradition

hasn't been made yet, and there is no sign at this point that the Chilean judicial process will not be forthcoming in meeting the request for extradition."

Keuch said the extradition papers probably will be filed within the next two weeks, and added that it's likely to take some time before the matter is decided by the Chilean courts. He said Justice was aware of news agency reports from Santiago quoting Pinochet as saying there was some doubt about whether the three Chilean nationals will be extradited.

But, Keuch added, the interests of justice require that the appropriate legal channels be used and given an opportunity to work without actions that could be construed as undue political interference.

Privately, other Justice Department sources said actions like the House amendment could seriously impede ef-

forts to bring the three Chileans to trial, because it could be cited within Chile as an interference by Congress in its internal affairs and a politically inspired maneuver to topple the Pinochet government.

The arguments made by the Justice Department apparently had considerable impact within the House. Late in the afternoon, Rep. Charles E. Wiggins (R-Calif.) moved to reconsider the Harkin amendment, and, on that go-around, it was overturned on a roll-call vote, 243 to 166.

In the indictment, Contreras and Espinoza, DINA operations supervisor, were charged with plotting the assassination of Letelier, an outspoken foe of the Pinochet government. Fernandez Larios was named as being one of two DINA agents—the other being an American citizen, Michael V. Townley—who came to the United States to carry out the plot in cooperation with militant Cuban exiles.

Pinochet: U.S. Must Show Proof

Chilean Stresses Barriers Facing Extradition of 3

By Charles A. Krause
Washington Post Foreign Service

SANTIAGO, Chile — President Augusto Pinochet, reacting sharply to the U. S. indictment of three Chilean secret police officers for murder, said yesterday that these were merely accusations and extradition will require presentation of proof.

Asked if the action against Chile's former secret police chief and two subordinates would help the government, Pinochet defiantly declared: "Absolutely not." He also chastised State Department officials, saying they are "involved in things they have no business getting involved in."

Pinochet insisted in a meeting with reporters that he expects U.S. requests for extradition to be handled in conformity with Chilean law and international commitments. It was widely felt here, however, that he does not expect the three accused to be delivered to Washington for trial.

The key responsibility for extradition falls under the jurisdiction of Chile's Supreme Court and Pinochet made it clear that he does not intend to supersede that process by personally ordering that the three be put in U.S. hands.

Extradition procedures are spelled out in a 1902 treaty between Chile and the United States. The Supreme Court, which is officially independent of the military government, is nonetheless thought to be influenced by it.

The Supreme Court, even in the days when it functioned under democratic governments, rarely has granted extradition of Chilean citizens. Furthermore, the U.S.-Chilean extradition treaty makes it clear that crimes of "a political character" are not extraditable offenses.

At the same time, however, assassination and murder are crimes for which extradition may be granted, an apparent contradiction which lawyers here said will be the basis of the legal

See CHILE, A15, Col. 2



JUAN CONTRERAS SEPULVEDA
... accused former DINA chief

Pinochet: U.S. Must Prove Its Case to Get Extradition

CHILE, From A1

battle that is expected once the United States formally asks for the extradition of the three former secret police officers charged with the murder of Chilean exile Orlando Letelier two year ago in Washington.

If extradition is not granted, another treaty signed by both the United States and Chile provides that Chile has the obligation to try the accused here if the accusations against them are considered to be crimes under Chilean law.

Pinochet has denied since the day Letelier was assassinated that he had any personal or prior knowledge of the affair. He has continued to maintain that his government had nothing to do with it.

The Chilean president pointed out

again yesterday that the charges brought against the three former officers—Gen. Manuel Contreras Sepulveda, former head of the National Directorate of Intelligence (DINA), Pedro Spinoza Bravo, former director de operaciones at DINA (and Armando Fernandez Larios, a DINA agent who allegedly helped carry out the murder—do not constitute proof of their guilt under the U.S. system of justice.

Since it became publicly known several months ago that Contreras was under investigation, there has been widespread speculation here about whether or not Pinochet would have known about the assassination if it was in fact carried out at the instruction of Contreras—a personal friend of Pinochet's who reported directly to

the president during his years as head of DINA.

It is generally believed here that only Pinochet and Contreras know for sure what the Chilean president knew before and after the assassination occurred near Sheridan Circle in Washington. Contreras' extradition and trial in the United States could prove extremely dangerous for the current Chilean government, according to many observers in Santiago.

Supporters of Pinochet argue that he would never have ordered the expulsion to the United States of Michael Townley last April if he had suspected that DINA was involved in murdering Letelier. Townley, an American who worked for DINA, has admitted his part in actually carrying out the Letelier assassination and has provided much of the evidence against Contreras, Espinoza and Fernandez.

The Chilean government announced Tuesday night that it had placed the three Chileans under arrest after the United States formally asked for their detention pending the formal request for extradition.

The U.S.-Chilean treaty provides for the arrest and detention of accused persons for a period of two months when extradition is contemplated.

Pinochet stressed the two-month invitation yesterday in calling for proof of the charges.

Although the indictment of the three Chileans had been predicted for some time, the action of the grand jury in Washington on Tuesday has met with intense interest here. Groups gathered around newspaper kiosks reading newspaper headlines about the Letelier case.

Nonetheless, none of Chile's officially banned political parties issued statements or otherwise indicated reaction to the indictments—which some politicians were saying until recently could lead to the end of the

Envoy to Chile Recalled Over Letelier Probe

By John M. Goshko
and Timothy S. Robinson
Washington Post Staff Writers

The United States, in a strong gesture of disapproval, yesterday recalled its ambassador to Chile because of that country's alleged failure to cooperate with the investigation into the 1978 murder here of Chilean dissident Orlando Letelier.

Letelier, an outspoken critic of Chile's military regime, and an American associate, Ronni K. Moffitt, were killed on Sept. 21, 1978, when a bomb destroyed their car in the heart of Washington's Embassy Row.

In announcing the U.S. action, State Department spokesman John Trattner said: "Ambassador George W. Landau is being recalled from Santiago for consultations with the State and Justice departments. The Chilean authorities have not been forthcoming on important requests for information in the Letelier-Moffitt murder case pending by the Justice Department for some time."

The United States has said the murders were planned in Chile by the former Chilean secret police agency, DINA, and carried out here by DINA agents in collaboration with anti-Castro Cuban exiles.

Under U.S. pressure Chile expelled an American citizen, Michael V. Townley, who is now in custody here and who has admitted being the DINA agent who placed the bomb under Letelier's car.

Townley also reportedly has implicated in the plot three Chilean army officers who were assigned to DINA: Gen. Manuel Contreras Sepulveda, retired former chief of DINA and a close friend of Chilean President Augusto Pinochet; Lt. Col. Pedro Espinosa, former DINA operations chief; and Capt. Armando Fernandez Larios, who reportedly worked with Townley in bringing the bomb device to Washington.

Trattner refused to discuss the nature of the U.S. requests that the Chileans allegedly have not honored. However, reliable sources said the most important was a request that a key witness—apparently a DINA supervisor of Townley—either come to the United States to testify before a federal grand jury or allow himself to be questioned by U.S. officials in a third country.

In addition, the sources said the United States feels Chile has not cooperated in efforts to obtain information from the government of Paraguay about an attempt that was made there to obtain U.S. visas for Townley and Larios under false names.

Other sources ~~said~~ the decision to

See CHILE, A11, Col. 1

U.S. Recalls Ambassador to Santiago, Cites Chile's Failure to Aid in Probe

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recall Landau — a step that stops just short of breaking diplomatic relations — was made jointly by Deputy Secretary of State Warren M. Christopher and Eugene M. Propper, the assistant U. S. attorney heading the murder probe for the Justice Department.

However, the sources revealed, Justice Department officials were surprised and angered by the way in which the State Department, in announcing the recall, seemed to link it to controversies about human rights in Chile.

The Pinochet government, which took power in a bloody 1973 coup that included the killing of Marxist President Salvador Allende, has been accused of murdering, torturing and imprisoning its opponents. Letelier had served in the Allende government as defense minister and as ambassador to Washington.

When Trattner announced that Landau was returning to Washington, he added: "Ambassador Landau's visit will also give us a chance to review the human rights situation in Chile."

Under questioning by reporters, Trattner also said that a shipment of practice bomb parts for the Chilean air force, which has been held up in California because West Coast long-shoremen refuse to load them aboard a ship, "will not be loaded while this assessment of the human rights situation is going on."



GEORGE W. LANDAU
... to consult with State, Justice

Justice sources protested privately that State had acted improperly in leaving the impression that the hu-

man rights and murder investigation questions were tied together.


By so doing, these sources said, the State Department had undermined Justice's contention that it is interested only in bringing the murderers to trial and not in Chile's internal politics. There recently have been escalating chases within Chile that Washington is using the murder probe as a pretext to topple the Pinochet government.

Reliable sources said the decision to include the language about reviewing the Chilean human rights situation in State's public announcement was made by Christopher, who oversees human rights policy within the State Department.

However, the sources were unable to explain why Christopher, who is a former deputy attorney general, felt the two issues should be linked or whether he had checked this move with Justice.

Chilean Foreign Minister Hernan Cubillos, who is in Washington attending the annual meeting of the Organization of American States, responded to the announcement of Landau's recall by charging that the United States was not cooperating with Chile's own internal investigation of the Letelier affair.

Another Chilean government source, who declined to be identified, said the Pinochet government had been informed of the decision to recall Landau last week. Yesterday's announcement, the source charged, had



EUGENE M. PROPPER
... heads Justice Department's probe

been timed to embarrass Chile in the midst of the OAS meeting.

In addition to Townley, five other persons, all Cuban exiles, have been charged so far in connection with the Letelier assassination plot. Three are in custody in the United States, and two others are fugitives.

All of the Cuban exiles are said to be members of the Cuban Nationalist Movement, based in northern New Jersey.

Chilean Calls U.S. Move 'Out of All Proportion'

By Lewis H. Diuguid

Washington Post Staff Writer

Chilean Foreign Minister Hernan Cubillos charged yesterday that the U.S. Justice Department is applying unacceptable pressure on his country and is failing to live up to an agreement for full cooperation in the investigation of the assassination of former Chilean ambassador Orlando Letelier.

U.S. handling of the case, he said, raises the question of whether the Americans' aim "is seeing justice done or bringing down a military regime that they don't like."

Cubillos, here for the General Assembly of the Organization of American States, called yesterday's recall "out of all proportion. I find it strange that they have taken a diplomatic re-

action to what is really a criminal case."

However, he added, "I think it will help, because maybe he can explain to people here the Chilean position—as I would have done if I had the chance."

Cubillos, who two months ago became the first civilian foreign minister since the military coup of 1973, indicated that U.S. tactics could complicate extradition of any Chileans charged in the 1976 murder of Letelier.

Insisting that Chile maintains "a will to collaborate in the investigation," he said the proof of this "is the fact that we handed over" Michael Townley, the American expatriate who worked for Chile's secret police

and is accused here of playing a major role in Letelier's death.

Chile strained its own judicial process to accommodate U.S. demands at that time, he said. "We told the United States we wanted reciprocity [of cooperation] in the case. That has not been forthcoming. We are being pressured on several aspects of the case without any respect for our legal proceedings."

He pointed out that Chile initiated its own investigation on the basis of official passports with false names issued to Townley and a Chilean army officer for a trip to the United States prior to Letelier's death.

Cubillos also stated that, contrary to published accounts, an amnesty decreed by the Chilean junta in April

does not apply to persons who might eventually be charged in the Letelier case.

"We felt that somebody could be involved and we didn't want to cover it up," he said.

"The Department of Justice does not trust us or our legal system," he added.

Cubillos is a former executive of a Santiago conglomerate and was instrumental in operation of its El Mercurio newspaper when it was a principal opposition voice to the late president Salvador Allende.

At that time, according to a U.S. Senate committee investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency funneled \$1.7 million to the newspaper.