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President, 1963-1969

National Security File

Country File
Latin America- Cuba

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Special Group Meeting - Cuba

Here is some miscellaneous information with regard to your Special Group meeting this afternoon on Cuba.

1. Arttime Cut-off - As you know, State is pressing to cut off Arttime, largely because of his recent irresponsible activity.

Vance may express the view that a cutoff will drive Arttime up the wall and that he will go off and do something that could cause us real trouble vis-a-vis our present conflict with the East. For example, he might go off and sink a Soviet ship.

The advantage of this would be twofold - First, it would keep Arttime quiet; second, his residual power to hurt us, when we finally do cut him off, will be reduced.

On this one, I am inclined towards the DOD view.

2. Pesticides -

3. Support to RECE - One question which will arise today is whether or not to start giving some low-risk support to RECE. While State and DOD, at the working levels, originally were in favor of it, they seem to have changed their position. One reason - some of the arguments which are spelled out in the
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

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1. Artimel Cut-off - As you know, State is pressing to cut off Artimel, largely because of his recent irresponsible activity. Vance may express the view that a cutoff will drive Artimel up the wall and that he will go off and do something that could cause us real trouble vis-a-vis our present conflict with the East. For example, he might go off and sink a Soviet ship.

The advantage of this would be twofold - First, it would keep Artimel quiet; second, his residual power to hurt us, when we finally do cut him off, will be reduced.

On this one, I am inclined towards the DOD view.

2. Pesticides -

3. Support to RECE - One question which will arise today is whether or not to start giving some low-risk support to RECE. While State and DOD, at the working levels, originally were in favor of it, they seem to have changed their position. One reason - some of the arguments which are spelled out in the
attached memo on the subject. Another reason - State does not want to compromise its position on Artime (i.e., If you give aid to RECE, how can you stop aid to Artime?).

State and DOD will probably propose that, in turning down RECE, we give them $17,000. The RECE people apparently had to tap a program fund of its small contributors to keep going administratively over the last couple months when Bosch cut them off; they want to return this money to the small contributors. Arguments in favor of giving them the money are: (a) it will lessen the shock of giving RECE a negative reply, (b) they will not look bad among the exiles (we don't want them to look bad because they are "good guys"), and (c) part of RECE's problem has not been their fault. We have not been able to give RECE as prompt an answer as we would have liked.

I continue to be in favor of not getting involved with RECE; I agree that $17,000 is a small price to pay for a kiss-off.

4. Keating Gimmick -

5. CIA's Paramilitary Capability - Both DOD and State will probably oppose CIA's proposal to drop its paramilitary capability. I agree with State and DOD that, with the present world situation as it stands, this is a good capability to keep on hand if we possibly can. I would agree to an abandonment of this capability only if it were demonstrated that we could crank it up again in a very short space of time.

Gordon Chase