

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES.

JANUARY 24, 1859.—Ordered to be printed.

<sup>JOHN</sup>  
Mr. SLIDELL made the following

**REPORT.**

[To accompany Bill S. 497.]

*The Committee on Foreign Relations, to whom was referred the bill (S. 497) "making appropriations to facilitate the acquisition of the island of Cuba, by negotiation," have had the same under consideration, and now respectfully report:*

It is not considered necessary by your committee to enlarge upon the vast importance of the acquisition of the island of Cuba by the United States. To do so would be as much a work of supererogation as to demonstrate an elementary problem in mathematics, or one of those axioms of ethics or philosophy which have been universally received for ages. The ultimate acquisition of Cuba may be considered a fixed purpose of the United States, a purpose resulting from political and geographical necessities which have been recognized by all parties and all administrations, and in regard to which the popular voice has been expressed with a unanimity unsurpassed on any question of national policy that has heretofore engaged the public mind.

The purchase and annexation of Louisiana led, as a necessary corollary, to that of Florida, and both point with unerring certainty to the acquisition of Cuba. The sparse and feeble population of what is now the great west called in 1800 for the free navigation of the Mississippi, and the enforcement of the right of deposit at New Orleans. In three years not only were these privileges secured, but the whole of the magnificent domain of Louisiana was ours. Who now doubts the wisdom of a measure which at the time was denounced with a violence until then unparalleled in our political history?

From the day we acquired Louisiana the attention of our ablest statesmen was fixed on Cuba. What the possession of the mouth of the Mississippi had been to the people of the west that of Cuba became to the nation. To cast the eye upon the map was sufficient to predict its destiny. A brief reference will show the importance attached to the question by our leading statesmen, and the steadiness and perseverance with which they have endeavored to hasten the consummation of so vital a measure.

Mr. Jefferson in a letter to President Madison, of the 27th of April, 1809, speaking of the policy that Napoleon would probably pursue towards us, says:

"He ought to be satisfied with having forced her (Great Britain) to revoke the orders on which he pretended to retaliate, and to be particularly satisfied with us, by whose unyielding adherence to principle she has been forced into the revocation. He ought the more to conciliate our good will, as we can be such an obstacle to the new career opening on him in the Spanish colonies. That he would give us the Floridas to withhold intercourse with the residue of those colonies cannot be doubted. But that is no price, because they are ours in the first moment of the first war, and until a war they are of no particular necessity to us. But, although with difficulty, he will consent to our receiving Cuba into our Union, to prevent our aid to Mexico and the other provinces. That would be a price, and I would immediately erect a column on the southernmost limit of Cuba and inscribe on it a *ne plus ultra* as to us in that direction. We should then have only to include the north in our confederacy, which would be, of course, in the first war, and we should have such an empire for liberty as she has never surveyed since the creation; and I am persuaded no constitution was ever before so well calculated as ours for extensive empire and self-government. \* \* \*

"It will be objected to our receiving Cuba that no limit can then be drawn to our future acquisitions. Cuba can be defended by us without a navy, and this develops the principle which ought to limit our views. Nothing should ever be accepted which would require a navy to defend it."

Again, in writing to President Monroe on the 23d June, 1823, he says: "For certainly her addition to our confederacy is exactly what is wanting to advance our power as a nation to the point of its utmost interest."

And in another letter to the same, on the 24th October, 1823, he says:

"I candidly confess that I have ever looked on Cuba as the most interesting addition which could ever be made to our system of States. The control which, with Florida Point, this island would give us over the Gulf of Mexico, and the countries and isthmus bordering on it, would fill up the measure of our political well being."

John Quincy Adams while Secretary of State under Mr. Monroe, in a despatch to Mr. Nelson, our minister at Madrid, of the 28th April, 1823, says:

"In the war between France and Spain, now commencing, other interests, peculiarly ours, will in all probability be deeply involved. Whatever may be the issue of this war as between those two European powers, it may be taken for granted that the dominion of Spain upon the American continents, north and south, is irrecoverably gone. But the islands of Cuba and Porto Rico still remain nominally and so far really dependent upon her, that she yet possesses the power of transferring her own dominion over them, together with the possession of them, to others. These islands, from their local position and

natural appendages to the North American continent, and one of them, Cuba, almost in sight of our shores, from a multitude of considerations, has become an object of transcendent importance to the commercial and political interests of our Union. Its commanding position, with reference to the Gulf of Mexico and the West India seas, the character of its population, its situation midway between our southern coast and the island of St. Domingo, its safe and capacious harbor of the Havana, fronting a long line of our shores destitute of the same advantage, the nature of its productions and of its wants, furnishing the supplies and needing the returns of a commerce immensely profitable and mutually beneficial, give it an importance in the sum of our national interests with which that of no other foreign territory can be compared and little inferior to that which binds the different members of this Union together. Such, indeed, are, between the interests of that island and of this country, the geographical, commercial, moral, and political relations formed by nature, gathering in the process of time, and even now verging to maturity, that, in looking forward to the probable course of events, for the short period of half a century, it is scarcely possible to resist the conviction that the annexation of Cuba to our federal republic will be indispensable to the continuance and integrity of the Union itself. It is obvious, however, that for this event we are not yet prepared. Numerous and formidable objections to the extension of our territorial dominions beyond sea, present themselves to the first contemplation of the subject: obstacles to the system of policy by which alone that result can be compassed and maintained, are to be foreseen and surmounted, both from at home and abroad; but there are laws of political as well as of physical gravitation; and if an apple, severed by the tempest from its native tree, cannot choose but fall to the ground, Cuba, forcibly disjoined from its own unnatural connexion with Spain, and incapable of self-support, can gravitate only towards the North American Union, which, by the same law of nature, cannot cast her off from its bosom.

"The transfer of Cuba to Great Britain would be an event unpropitious to the interests of this Union. This opinion is so generally entertained, that even the groundless rumors that it was about to be accomplished, which have spread abroad, and are still teeming, may be traced to the deep and almost universal feeling of aversion to it, and to the alarm which the mere probability of its occurrence has stimulated. The question both of our right and of our power to prevent it, if necessary by force, already obtrudes itself upon our councils, and the administration is called upon, in the performance of its duties to the nation, at least to use all the means within its competency to guard against and forefend it."

On April 27, 1825, Mr. Clay, Secretary of State, in a despatch to Mr. A. H. Everett, our minister at Madrid, instructing him to use his exertions to induce Spain to make peace with her revolted colonies, says:

"The United States are satisfied with the present condition of those islands (Cuba and Porto Rico) in the hands of Spain, and with their ports open to our commerce, as they are now open. This gov-

ernment desires no political change of that condition. The population itself of the islands is incompetent at present, from its composition and its amount, to maintain self-government. The maritime force of the neighboring republics of Mexico and Colombia is not now, nor is it likely shortly to be, adequate to the protection of those islands, if the conquest of them were effected. The United States would entertain constant apprehensions of their passing from their possession to that of some less friendly sovereignty; and of all the European powers, this country prefers that Cuba and Porto Rico should remain dependent on Spain. If the war should continue between Spain and the new republics, and those islands should become the object and the theatre of it, their fortunes have such a connexion with the prosperity of the United States that they could not be indifferent spectators; and the possible contingencies of such a protracted war might bring upon the government of the United States duties and obligations the performance of which, however painful it should be, they might not be at liberty to decline."

Mr. Van Buren, writing to Mr. Van Ness, our minister to Spain, October 2, 1829, says:

"The government of the United States has always looked with the deepest interest upon the fate of those islands, but particularly of Cuba. Its geographical position, which places it almost in sight of our southern shores, and, as it were, gives it the command of the Gulf of Mexico and the West India seas, its safe and capacious harbors, its rich productions, the exchange of which, for our surplus agricultural products and manufactures, constitutes one of the most extensive and valuable branches of our foreign trade, render it of the utmost importance to the United States that no change should take place in its condition which might injuriously affect our political and commercial standing in that quarter. Other considerations, connected with a certain class of our population, make it the interest of the southern section of the Union that no attempt should be made in that island to throw off the yoke of Spanish dependence, the first effect of which would be the sudden emancipation of a numerous slave population, the result of which could not but be very sensibly felt upon the adjacent shores of the United States. On the other hand, the wisdom which induced the Spanish government to relax in its colonial system, and to adopt with regard to those islands a more liberal policy which opened their ports to general commerce, has been so far satisfactory in the view of the United States as, in addition to other considerations, to induce this government to desire that their possession should not be transferred from the Spanish crown to any other power. In conformity with this desire, the ministers of the United States at Madrid have, from time to time, been instructed attentively to watch the course of events and the secret springs of European diplomacy, which, from information received from various quarters, this government had reason to suspect had been put in motion to effect the transfer of the possession of Cuba to the powerful allies of Spain.

"You are authorized to say that the long established and well known

policy of the United States, which forbids their entangling themselves in the concerns of other nations, and which permits their physical force to be used only for the defence of their political rights and the protection of the persons and property of their citizens, equally forbids their public agents to enter into positive engagements, the performance of which would require the employment of means which the people have retained in their own hands; but that this government has every reason to believe that the same influence which once averted the blow ready to fall upon the Spanish islands would again be found effectual on the recurrence of similar events; and that the high preponderance in American affairs of the United States as a great naval power, the influence which they must at all times command as a great commercial nation, in all questions involving the interests of the general commerce of this hemisphere, would render their consent an essential preliminary to the execution of any project calculated so vitally to affect the general concerns of all the nations in any degree engaged in the commerce of America. The knowledge you possess of the public sentiment of this country in regard to Cuba will enable you to speak with confidence and effect of the probable consequences that might be expected from the communication of that sentiment to Congress, in the event of any contemplated change in the present political condition of that island."

And again, on the 13th of October, 1830: "This government has also been given to understand that, if Spain should persevere in the assertion of a hopeless claim to dominion over her former colonies, they will feel it to be their duty, as well as their interest, to attack her colonial possessions in our vicinity, Cuba and Porto Rico. Your general instructions are full upon the subject of the interest which the United States take in the fate of those islands, and particularly of the former; they inform you that we are content that Cuba should remain as it now is, but could not consent to its transfer to any European power. Motives of reasonable state policy render it more desirable to us that it should remain subject to Spain rather than to either of the South American States. Those motives will readily present themselves to your mind; they are principally founded upon an apprehension that, if possessed by the latter, it would, in the present state of things, be in greater danger of becoming subject to some European power than in its present condition. Although such are our own wishes and true interests, the President does not see on what ground he would be justified in interfering with any attempts which the South American States might think it for their interest, in the prosecution of a defensive war, to make upon the islands in question. If, indeed, an attempt should be made to disturb them, by putting arms in the hands of one portion of their population to destroy another, and which in its influence would endanger the peace of a portion of the United States, the case might be different. Against such an attempt the United States (being informed that it was in contemplation) have already protested and warmly remonstrated, in their communications last summer with the government of Mexico; but the information lately communicated to us in this regard was accompanied

by a solemn assurance that no such measures will, in any event, be resorted to; and that the contest, if forced upon them, will be carried on, on their part, with strict reference to the established rules of civilized warfare."

Mr. Buchanan, in his despatch to Mr. R. M. Saunders, of June 17, 1848, said: "With these considerations in view, the President believes that the crisis has arrived when an effort should be made to purchase the island of Cuba from Spain, and he has determined to intrust you with the performance of this most delicate and important duty. The attempt should be made, in the first instance, in a confidential conversation with the Spanish minister for foreign affairs; a written offer might produce an absolute refusal in writing, which would embarrass us hereafter in the acquisition of the island. Besides, from the incessant changes in the Spanish cabinet and policy, our desire to make the purchase might thus be made known in an official form to foreign governments, and arouse their jealousy and active opposition. Indeed, even if the present cabinet should think favorably of the proposition, they might be greatly embarrassed by having it placed on record; for in that event it would almost certainly, through some channel, reach the opposition and become the subject of discussion in the Cortes. Such delicate negotiations, at least in their incipient stages, ought always to be conducted in confidential conversation, and with the utmost secrecy and despatch."

"At your interview with the minister for foreign affairs you might introduce the subject by referring to the present distracted condition of Cuba, and the danger which exists that the population will make an attempt to accomplish a revolution. This must be well known to the Spanish government. In order to convince him of the good faith and friendship towards Spain with which this government has acted, you might read to him the first part of my despatch to General Campbell, and the order issued by the Secretary of War to the commanding general in Mexico and to the officer having charge of the embarkation of our troops at Vera Cruz. You may then touch delicately upon the danger that Spain may lose Cuba by a revolution in the island, or that it may be wrested from her by Great Britain, should a rupture take place between the two countries arising out of the dismissal of Sir Henry Bulwer, and be retained to pay the Spanish debt due to the British bond-holders. You might assure him that, whilst this government is entirely satisfied that Cuba shall remain under the dominion of Spain, we should in any event resist its acquisition by any other nation. And, finally, you might inform him that, under all these circumstances, the President had arrived at the conclusion that Spain might be willing to transfer the island to the United States for a fair and full consideration. You might cite as a precedent the cession of Louisiana to this country by Napoleon, under somewhat similar circumstances, when he was at the zenith of his power and glory. I have merely presented these topics in their natural order, and you can fill up the outline from the information communicated in this despatch, as well as from your own knowledge of the subject. Should the minister for foreign affairs lend a favorable ear to your proposi-

tion, then the question of the consideration to be paid would arise, and you have been furnished with information in this despatch which will enable you to discuss that question.

"The President would be willing to stipulate for the payment of one hundred millions of dollars. This, however, is the maximum price; and if Spain should be willing to sell, you will use your best efforts to purchase it at a rate as much below that sum as practicable. In case you should be able to conclude a treaty, you may adopt as your model, so far as the same may be applicable, the two conventions of April 30, 1803, between France and the United States, for the sale and purchase of Louisiana. The seventh and eighth articles of the first of these conventions ought, if possible, to be omitted; still, if this should be indispensable to the accomplishment of the object, articles similar to them may be retained."

Mr. Everett, in his celebrated letter of December 1, 1852, to the Comte de Sartiges, rejecting the joint proposition of the French and British governments for a tripartite convention with the United States, disclaiming, severally and collectively, all intention to obtain possession of the island of Cuba, and respectively binding themselves to discountenance all attempts to that effect on the part of any power or individuals whatever, said:

"Spain, meantime, has retained of her extensive dominions in this hemisphere but the two islands of Cuba and Porto Rico. A respectful sympathy with the fortunes of an ancient ally and a gallant people, with whom the United States have ever maintained the most friendly relations, would, if no other reason existed, make it our duty to leave her in the undisturbed possession of this little remnant of her mighty trans-Atlantic empire. The President desires to do so. No word or deed of his will ever question her title or shake her possession. But can it be expected to last very long? Can it resist this mighty current in the fortunes of the world? Is it desirable that it should do so? Can it be for the interest of Spain to cling to a possession that can only be maintained by a garrison of twenty-five or thirty thousand troops, a powerful naval force, and an annual expenditure for both arms of the service of at least twelve millions of dollars? Cuba, at this moment, costs more to Spain than the entire naval and military establishment of the United States costs the federal government. So far from being really injured by the loss of this island, there is no doubt that, were it peacefully transferred to the United States, a prosperous commerce between Cuba and Spain, resulting from ancient associations and common language and tastes, would be far more productive than the best contrived system of colonial taxation. Such, notoriously, has been the result to Great Britain of the establishment of the independence of the United States. The decline of Spain from the position which she held in the time of Charles the Fifth is coeval with the foundation of her colonial system; while within twenty-five years, and since the loss of most of her colonies, she has entered upon a course of rapid improvement unknown since the abdication of that emperor."

Mr. Marcy, in his despatch of July 23, 1853, to Mr. Pierre Soulé says:

“SIR: There are circumstances in the affairs of Spain, having a connexion with this country, which give unusual importance at this time to the mission to that government. The proximity of her remaining possessions in this hemisphere—the islands of Cuba and Porto Rico—to the United States, the present condition of the former, and the rumors of contemplated changes in its internal affairs, complicate our relations with Spain. The island of Cuba, on account of its magnitude, situation, fine climate, and rich productions, far superior in all respects to any in the West India group, is a very desirable possession to Spain, and, for the same reasons, very difficult for her to retain in its present state of dependence. The opinion generally prevails among the European nations that the Spanish dominion over it is insecure. This was clearly evinced by the alacrity with which both England and France, on occasion of the late disturbances in Cuba, volunteered their aid to sustain the Spanish rule over it, and by their recent proposition to the United States for a tripartite convention to guaranty its possession to Spain. Without an essential change in her present policy, such a change as she will most likely be unwilling to make, she cannot, it is confidently believed, long sustain, unaided, her present connexion with that island.

“What will be its destiny after it shall cease to be a dependency of Spain is a question with which some of the principal powers of Europe have seen fit to concern themselves, and in which the United States have a deep and direct interest.

“I had occasion recently, in preparing instructions for our minister to London, to present the views of the President in relation to the interference of Great Britain, as well as of France, in \* \* \* Cuban affairs. To spare myself the labor of again going over the same ground, I herewith furnish you with an extract from those instructions.

“The policy of the government of the United States in regard to Cuba, in any contingency calling for our interposition, will depend, in a great degree, upon the peculiar circumstances of the case, and cannot, therefore, now be presented with much precision beyond what is indicated in the instructions before referred to. Nothing will be done, on our part, to disturb its present connexion with Spain, unless the character of that connexion should be so changed as to affect our present or prospective security. While the United States would resist, at every hazard, the transference of Cuba to any European nation, they would exceedingly regret to see Spain resorting to any power for assistance to uphold her rule over it. Such a dependence on foreign aid would, in effect, invest the auxiliary with the character of a protector, and give it a pretext to interfere in our affairs, and also generally in those of the North American continent. In case of collision with the United States, such protecting power would be in a condition to make nearly the same use of that island to annoy us as it could do if it were the absolute possessor of it.

“Our minister at Madrid, during the administration of President Polk, was instructed to ascertain if Spain was disposed to transfer

Cuba to the United States for a liberal pecuniary consideration. I do not understand, however, that it was at that time the policy of this government to acquire that island unless its inhabitants were very generally disposed to concur in the transfer. Under certain conditions the United States might be willing to purchase it; but it is scarcely expected that you will find Spain, should you attempt to ascertain her views upon the subject, at all inclined to enter into such a negotiation. There is reason to believe that she is under obligations to Great Britain and France not to transfer this island to the United States. Were there nothing else to justify this belief but the promptness with which these two powers sent their naval forces to her aid in the late Cuban disturbances, the proposition for a tripartite convention to guaranty Cuba to Spain, and, what is more significant than either of the above facts, the sort of joint protest by England and France, to which I adverted in my instructions to Mr. Buchanan, against some of the views presented in Mr. Everett's letter of the 2d of December last to Mr. Sartiges, the French minister, would alone be satisfactory proof of such an arrangement. Independent of any embarrassment of this nature, there are many other reasons for believing that Spain will pertinaciously hold on to Cuba, and that the separation, whenever it takes place, will be the work of violence.”

From these and other extracts that might be presented it is manifest that the ultimate acquisition of Cuba has long been regarded as the fixed policy of the United States—necessary to the progressive development of our system. All agree that the end is not only desirable but inevitable. The only difference of opinion is as to the time, mode, and conditions of obtaining it.

The law of our national existence is growth. We cannot, if we would, disobey it. While we should do nothing to stimulate it unnaturally, we should be careful not to impose upon ourselves a regimen so strict as to prevent its healthful development. The tendency of the age is the expansion of the great powers of the world. England, France, and Russia, all demonstrate the existence of this pervading principle. Their growth, it is true, only operates by the absorption, partial or total, of weaker powers—generally, of inferior races. So long as this extension of territory is the result of geographical position, a higher civilization, and greater aptitude for government, and is not pursued in a direction to endanger our safety or impede our progress, we have neither the right nor the disposition to find fault with it. Let England pursue her march of conquest and annexation in India, France extend her dominions on the southern shores of the Mediterranean, and advance her frontiers to the Rhine, or Russia subjugate her barbarous neighbors in Asia; we shall look upon their progress, if not with favor, at least with indifference. We claim on this hemisphere the same privilege that they exercise on the other—

“Hanc veniam petimusque damusque vicissim.”

In this they are but obeying the laws of their organization. When they cease to grow they will soon commence that period of decadence which is the fate of all nations as of individual man.

The question of the annexation of Cuba to the United States, we

repeat, is a question but of time. The fruit that was not ripe when John Quincy Adams penned his despatch to Mr. Forsyth, (it has not yet been severed by violence from its native tree, as he anticipated,) is now mature. Shall it be plucked by a friendly hand, prepared to compensate its proprietor with a princely guerdon? or shall it fall decaying to the ground?

As Spain cannot long maintain her grasp on this distant colony, there are but three possible alternatives in the future of Cuba: First, possession by one of the great European powers. This we have declared to be incompatible with our safety, and have announced to the world that any attempt to consummate it will be resisted by all the means in our power. When first we made this declaration we were comparatively feeble. The struggle would have been fearful and unequal; but we were prepared to make it at whatever hazard. That declaration has often been repeated since. With a population nearly tripled, our financial resources and our means, offensive and defensive, increased in an infinitely larger proportion, we cannot now shrink from an issue that all were then ready to meet.

The second alternative is the independence of the island. This independence could only be nominal; it never could be maintained in fact. It would eventually fall under some protectorate, open or disguised. If under ours, annexation would soon follow as certainly as the shadow follows the substance. An European protectorate could not be tolerated. The closet philanthropists of England and France would, as the price of their protection, insist upon introducing their schemes of emancipation. Civil and servile war would soon follow, and Cuba would present, as Hayti now does, no traces of its former prosperity, but the ruins of its once noble mansions. Its uncontrolled possession by either France or England would be less dangerous and offensive to our southern States than a pretended independent black empire or republic.

The third and last alternative is annexation to the United States. How and when is this to be effected? By conquest or negotiation? Conquest, even without the hostile interference of another European power than Spain, would be expensive, but with such interference would probably involve the whole civilized world in war, entail upon us the interruption, if not the loss, of our foreign trade, and an expenditure far exceeding any sum which it has ever been contemplated to offer for the purchase of Cuba. It would, besides, in all probability, lead to servile insurrection, and to the great injury or even total destruction of the industry of the island. Purchase, then, by negotiation seems to be the only practicable course; and, in the opinion of the committee, that cannot be attempted with any reasonable prospect of success, unless the President be furnished with the means which he has suggested in his annual message, and which the bill proposes to give him.

Much has been said of the danger of confiding such powers to the Executive, and from the fierceness with which the proposition has been denounced, it might be supposed that it was without precedent. So far is this from being the case, that we have three different acts upon the statute-book, placing large sums of money at the disposition of

the President for the purpose of aiding him in negotiations for the acquisition of territory. The first is the act of February 26, 1803. Although its object was well known, viz: to be used in negotiating for the purchase of Louisiana, the act does not indicate it. It placed two millions of dollars unreservedly at the disposition of the President, for the purpose of defraying any "extraordinary expense which may be incurred in the intercourse between the United States and foreign nations." Second. The act of February 13, 1806, using precisely the same phraseology, appropriates two millions of dollars, it being understood that it was to be used in negotiating for the purchase of Florida.

The act of 3d March, 1847, "making further appropriation to bring the existing war with Mexico to a speedy and honorable conclusion," has been adopted as the model on which the present bill is framed. Its preamble states that "whereas, in the adjustment of so many complicated questions as now exist between the two countries, it may possibly happen that an expenditure of money will be called for by the stipulations of any treaty which may be entered into, therefore the sum of three millions of dollars be, and the same is hereby, appropriated, to enable the President to conclude a treaty of peace, limits, and boundaries, with the republic of Mexico; to be used by him in the event said treaty, when signed by the authorized agents of the two governments and duly ratified by Mexico, shall call for the expenditure of the same, or any part thereof." The bill now reported, appropriates, under the same conditions, thirty millions of dollars to make a treaty with Spain for the purchase of the island of Cuba.

It will be perceived that this bill defines strictly the object to which the amount appropriated shall be applied; and in this respect allows a much narrower range of discretion to the present executive than the acts of 1803, and 1806, gave to Mr. Jefferson. In those cases the object of the appropriation was as well known to the country and to the world, as if it had been specifically stated. The knowledge of that fact did not then in the slightest degree tend to defeat the intended object, nor can it do so now. Under our form of government we have no state secrets. With us, diplomacy has ceased to be enveloped with the mysteries that of yore were considered inseparable from its successful exercise. Directness in our policy, and frankness in its avowal, are in conducting our foreign intercourse not less essential to the maintenance of our national character and the permanent interests of the republic than are the same qualities to social position and the advancement of honest enterprise in private life.

Much has been said of the indelicacy of this mode of proceeding. That the offer to purchase will offend the Spanish pride, be regarded as an insult, and rejected with contempt. That instead of promoting a consummation that all admit to be desirable, it will have the opposite tendency. If this were true it would be a conclusive argument against the bill, but a brief consideration will show the fallacy of these views. For many years our desire to purchase Cuba has been known to the world. Seven years since President Fillmore communicated to Congress the instructions to our ministers on that subject, with all the correspondence connected with it. In that correspondence will

be found three letters from Mr. Saunders, detailing conversations held with Narvaez and the minister of foreign relations, in which he notified them of his authority to treat for the purchase of Cuba, and while the reply was so decided as to preclude him from making any direct proposition, yet no intimation was given that the suggestion was offensive. And why should it be so? We simply say to Spain, you have a distant possession, held by a precarious tenure, which is almost indispensable to us for the protection of our commerce, and may, from its peculiar position, the character of its population, and the mode in which it is governed, lead, at any time, to a rupture which both nations would deprecate. This possession, rich though it be in all the elements of wealth, yields to your treasury a net revenue not amounting, on the average of a series of years, to the hundredth part of the price we are prepared to give you for it. True, you have heretofore refused to consider our proposition, but circumstances are changing daily. What may not have suited you in 1848 may now be more acceptable. Should a war break out in Europe, Spain can scarcely hope to escape being involved in it. The people

reason to believe that it will be favorably entertained. Such an opportunity may occur when least expected. Spain is the country of *coups-d'etat* and pronouncements. The all-powerful minister of to-day may be a fugitive to-morrow. With the forms of a representative government, it is, in fact, a despotism sustained by the bayonet. A despotism tempered only by frequent, violent, and bloody revolutions. Her financial condition is one of extreme embarrassment. A crisis may arise when even the dynasty may be overthrown unless a large sum of money can be raised forthwith. Spain will be in the position of the needy possessor of land he cannot cultivate, having all the pride of one to whom it has descended through a long line of ancestry, but his necessities are stronger than his will; he must have money. A thrifty neighbor whose domains it will round off is at hand to furnish it. He retains the old mansion, but sells what will relieve him from immediate ruin.

The President, in his annual message, has told us that we should not, if we could, acquire Cuba by any other means than honorable negotiation, unless circumstances which he does not anticipate render a departure from such a course justifiable, under the imperative and overruling law of self preservation. He also tells us that he desires to renew the negotiations, and it may become indispensable to success that he should be intrusted with the means for making an advance to the Spanish government immediately after the signing of the treaty, without awaiting the ratification of it by the Senate. This, in point of fact, is an appeal to Congress for an expression of its opinion on the propriety of renewing the negotiation. Should we fail to give him the means which may be indispensable to success, it may well be con-

sidered by the President as an intimation that we do not desire the acquisition of the island.

It has been asserted that the people of Cuba do not desire a transfer to the United States. If this were so it would present a very serious objection to the measure. The evidence on which it is based is, that on the receipt of the President's message, addresses were made by the municipal authorities of Havana, and other towns, protesting their devotion to the crown, and their hostility to the institutions of the United States. Any one who has had an opportunity of observing the persuasive influence of the bayonet in countries where it rules supreme will know how much value to attach to such demonstrations of popular sentiment. There can be no doubt that an immense majority of the people of Cuba are not only in favor, but ardently desirous of annexation to the United States. It would be strange indeed, if they were not so; deprived of all influence even in the local affairs of the island—unrepresented in the Cortes—governed by successive hordes of hungry officials sent from the mother country to acquire fortunes to be enjoyed at home, having no sympathy with the people among whom

best authority from the most reliable sources, for asserting that nearly the entire native population of Cuba desires annexation.

Apprehensions have been expressed by some southern statesmen, of perils resulting from the different elements composing the population, and the supposed mixture of races. They are not justified by the facts. The entire population, by the census of 1850, was 1,247,230, of which 605,560 were whites, 205,570 free colored, and 436,100 slaves.

Allowing the same annual percentage of increase for each class, as shown by comparison with the previous census, the total population now is about 1,586,000, of which 742,000 are whites, 263,000 free colored, and 581,000 slaves. There is good reason to suppose that the slaves considerably exceed the estimated number, it having been, until very recently, the interest of the proprietor to under state it. The feeling of caste or race, is as marked in Cuba as in the United States. The white creole is as free from all taint of African blood as the descendant of the Goth on the plains of Castile. There is a numerous white peasantry, brave, robust, sober, and honest, not yet perhaps prepared intelligently to discharge all the duties of the citizen of a free republic, but who, from his organization physical and mental, is capable of being elevated by culture to the same level with the educated Cubans, who, as a class, are as refined, well-informed, and fitted for self-government as men of any class of any nation can be who have not inhaled with their breath the atmosphere of freedom.

Many of them accompanied by their families are to be met with every summer at our cities and watering places, observing and appreciating the working of our form of government and its marvelous results; many seeking until the arrival of more auspicious days an

asylum from the oppression that has driven them from their homes; while hundreds of their youths in our schools and colleges are acquiring our language and fitting themselves hereafter, it is to be hoped, at no distant day, to play a distinguished part in their own legislative halls, or in the counsels of the nation.

These men, who are the great proprietors of the soil, are opposed to the continuance of the African slave trade, which is carried on by Spaniards from the peninsula, renegade Americans, and other adventurers from every clime and country, tolerated and protected by the authorities of Cuba of every grade.

Were there a sincere desire to arrest the slave trade, it could be as effectually put down by Spain as it has been by Brazil. Cuba and Porto Rico are now the only marts for this illegal traffic; and if the British government had been as intent upon enforcing its treaty stipulations with Spain for its abolition as it has been in denouncing abuses of our flag, which we cannot entirely prevent, this question would long since have ceased to be a source of irritating discussion, it may be of possible future difficulty. Those who desire to extirpate the slave trade may find in their sympathy for the African a motive to support this bill.

We have, since the conclusion of the Ashburton treaty in 1842, kept up a squadron on the coast of Africa for the suppression of the slave trade, and we are still bound to continue it. The annual cost of this squadron is at least \$800,000. The cost in seventeen years amounts to \$13,600,000, (thirteen millions six hundred thousand dollars;) and this, too, with results absolutely insignificant. It appears, from a report of a select committee of the British House of Commons, made in March, 1850, that the number of slaves exported from Africa had sunk down in 1842, (the very year in which the Ashburton treaty was concluded,) to nearly 30,000. In 1843 it rose to 55,000. In 1846 it was 76,000; in 1847 it was 84,000, and was then in a state of unusual activity. Sir Charles Hotham, one of the most distinguished officers of the British navy, and who commanded on the coast of Africa for several years, was examined by that select committee. He said that the force under his command was in a high state of discipline; that his views were carried out by his officers to his entire satisfaction; that, so far from having succeeded in stopping the slave trade, he had not even crippled it to the extent of giving it a permanent check; that the slave trade had been regulated by the commercial demand for slaves, and had been little affected by the presence of his squadron, and that experience had proven the system of repression by cruisers on the coast of Africa futile—this, too, when the British squadron counted twenty-seven vessels, comprising several steamers, carrying about three hundred guns and three thousand men. The annual expense of the squadron is about \$3,500,000, with auxiliary establishments on the coast costing at least \$1,500,000 more—a total cost annually of five millions of dollars in pursuance of a system which experience has proved to be futile.

In 1847 the Brazilian slave trade was in full activity. It has been entirely suppressed for several years. The slaves now shipped from

the coast of Africa are exclusively for the Spanish islands. It is not easy to estimate the number. From the best data, however, it is supposed now to be from twenty-five to thirty thousand per year. It would cease to exist the moment we acquire possession of the Island of Cuba.

The importation of slaves into the United States was prohibited in 1808. Since then, a period of more than fifty years, but one case has occurred of its violation—that of the *Wanderer*, which has recently excited so much attention.

Another consequence which should equally enlist the sympathies of philanthropists, excepting that class whose tears are only shed for those of ebon hue, and who turn with indifference from the sufferings of men of any other complexion, is the suppression of the infamous Coolie traffic—a traffic so much the more nefarious as the Chinese is elevated above the African in the scale of creation; more civilized, more intellectual, and therefore feeling more acutely the shackles of the slave ship and the harsh discipline of the overseer. The number of Chinese shipped for Cuba since the commencement of the traffic up to March last, is 28,777; of whom 4,134 perished on the passage. From that date up to the close of the year the number landed at Havana was 9,449. We blush to say that three-fourths of the number were transported under the American and British flags—under the flags of the two countries that have been the most zealous for the suppression of the African slave trade. The ratio of mortality on the passage was 14 $\frac{3}{4}$  per cent., and a much larger proportion of these wretched beings were landed in an enfeebled condition. Coming, too, from a temperate climate, they are not capable of enduring the exposure to the tropical sun, in which the African delights to bask. When their allotted time of service shall have been completed, the small remnant of the survivors will furnish conclusive evidence of the barbarity with which they are treated. The master feels no interest in his temporary slave beyond that of extracting from him the greatest possible amount of labor during the continuance of his servitude. His death, or incapacity to labor at the end of his term, is to the master a matter of as much indifference as is the fate of the operative employed in his mill to the Manchester spinner.

Another effect of this measure, which should recommend it most strongly to the humanitarians, will be the better treatment and increased happiness of the slaves now existing in the island that would inevitably flow from it. As a general rule, the slave is well treated in proportion to his productiveness and convertible value; as an expensive instrument is more carefully handled than one of less cost. When the importation of slaves from abroad is arrested, the home production affords the only means of supplying the increasing demand for labor. It may be assumed as an axiom of political economy that the increase of population, if not the only true test, is the most reliable of the average well-being of the class to which it is applied. Tried by this test, the slave of the United States affords a very high standard as compared even with the white population of our favored land. But when comparison



is made with the statistics of African slavery in all European colonies, the results are startling. Since Las Casas, in his zeal for the protection of the Indian, originated the African slave trade, it is estimated that the whole number transported to the new world has been about 8,375,000. Of these, we, in our colonial condition, and since, have only received about 375,000. By natural increase, after deducting all who are free, we had, in 1850, 3,204,000 slaves of the African race. These, allowing the same per centage of increase for nine years, as the census returns show during the last decennial period, would now number over 4,300,000; while, from the same data, the free colored population would amount to 496,000. The British West India colonies received about 1,700,000. The whole population of those Islands, including Jamaica and Trinidad acquired from the Spaniards, and British Guiana, black, white and mixed, is but 1,062,639. The Spanish and other West India Islands received about 3,000,000. This is very much more than their entire population to-day. The proportion may vary in some of the colonies, but the general result will be found everywhere the same. A very much less number now existing of African descent, either pure or mixed, than have been imported from Africa.

There is another aspect in which this proposition may be viewed which is deserving of serious consideration. It is forcibly put in the President's annual message that the multiplied aggressions upon the persons and property of our citizens by the local authorities of Cuba for many years past present, in the person of the captain-general, the anomaly of absolute power to inflict injury without any corresponding faculty to redress it. He can, almost in sight of our shores, confiscate, without just cause, the property of an American citizen, or incarcerate his person; but if applied to for redress, we are told that he cannot act without consulting his royal mistress, at Madrid. There we are informed that it is necessary to await the return of a report of the case which is to be obtained from Cuba; and many years elapse before it is ripe for decision. These delays in most instances amount to an absolute denial of justice. And even when the obligation of indemnity is admitted, the state of the treasury or a change of ministry is pleaded as an excuse for withholding payment. This would long since have justified us in resorting to measures of reprisal that would have necessarily led to war and ultimately resulted in the conquest of the island. Indeed such is the acute sense of those wrongs prevailing among our people, that nothing but our rigid neutrality laws, which, so long as they remain unrepealed or unmodified, a chief magistrate, acting under the sanction of his official oath to see that the laws be faithfully executed, is bound to enforce, has prevented the success of organized individual enterprises that would long ere this have revolutionized the island. It is in part, probably, for this cause that the President has recommended the policy which this bill embodies, and the world cannot fail to recognize in its adoption by Congress a determination to maintain him in his efforts to preserve untarnished our national character for justice and fair dealing.

The effects of the acquisition of Cuba will be no less beneficial in its

commercial, than in its political and moral aspects. The length of the Island is about seven hundred and seventy miles, with an average breadth of about forty miles, comprising an area of 31,468 square miles. The soil is fertile, climate genial, and its ports the finest in the world. Havana is more familiarly known to us, for apart from our extensive trade, which employs several hundred American vessels, thousands of our citizens have touched at that port in our steamers on their way to California or New Orleans. They have all carried away with them vivid recollections of its magnificent harbor, and have breathed ardent prayers that their next visit should be hailed by the stars and stripes floating from the Moro. And yet Cuba can boast of several other harbors equally safe and more extensive than that of Havana.

In 1855 the importations, by official custom-house returns, were \$31,216,000, the exports \$34,803,000. As duties are levied on exports as well as imports, there can be no exaggeration in these returns, and the real amount is undoubtedly considerably larger.

When we consider that more than two-thirds of the whole area of the island is susceptible of culture, and that not a tenth part of it is now cultivated, we may form some idea of the immense development which would be given to its industry by a change from a system of monopoly and despotism to free trade and free institutions. Whatever may be the enhanced cost of production, caused by the increased value of labor, it will be nearly if not quite compensated by the removal of export duties; and of those levied on articles produced in the United States, which are now by unjust discrimination virtually excluded from consumption. It is not possible within the limits which your committee have prescribed to themselves for this report to cite more than a few of the most important. Of flour, on an average of three years, from 1848 to 1850, there were imported from the United States 5,642 barrels, paying a duty of \$10 81 per barrel. From other countries, and it is believed exclusively from Spain, 228,002 barrels, paying a duty of \$2 52 per barrel, a discrimination against our flour of nearly two hundred per cent. on its present average value in our markets. On lard, of which the importation from the United States was 10,168,000 pounds, a duty is levied of \$4 per quintal, while of olive oil 8,481,000 pounds were imported, which is chiefly used as its substitute, paying a duty of 87 cents per quintal. Of beef, dry and jerked, but 339,161 pounds were imported from the United States paying a duty of \$1 96 per quintal, while the importation from other quarters, principally from Buenos Ayres, was 30,544,000 pounds paying a duty of \$1 17. the difference being, in fact, a protection of the Spanish flag which thus enjoys a monopoly of this branch of trade. To-day, with its increased population and wealth it is fair to presume that, were Cuba annexed to the United States, with the stimulus afforded by low prices, her annual consumption of our flour would be 600,000 barrels; of our lard, 25,000,000 pounds; of our beef, 20,000,000, and of pork, the most solid and nutritious food for the laborer 10,000,000 of pounds. The same ratio of increase would be exhibited in our whole list of exports. Many

articles that now appear not at all or in very limited quantities would force their way into general consumption. The Spanish flag, deprived of the advantage of discriminating duties of tonnage and impost, would soon abandon a competition which it could not sustain on equal terms, and the whole carrying trade, foreign and domestic, would fall into the hands of our enterprising merchants and ship owners, but chiefly those of the northern and middle States, while the farmer of the west would have a new and constantly increasing market open to him for the products of the soil. With all the disadvantages under which we now labor, the American vessels entering the port of Havana alone last year numbered nine hundred and fifty-eight, with a tonnage of four hundred and three thousand four hundred and seventy-nine, (403,479.) To what figure will this be extended when ours shall be the national flag of Cuba?

The cultivation of sugar is the chief basis of the wealth and prosperity of Cuba. The average annual production, exclusive of what is consumed in the island, is about 400,000 tons; that of Louisiana about 175,000 tons. The whole amount of cane sugar from which Europe and the United States are supplied is estimated at 1,273,000 tons; of this, Cuba and Louisiana now furnish somewhat more than 45 per cent. Is it extravagant to predict that, with Cuba annexed, we should in a few years have as complete control of this great staple,—which has long since ceased to be a luxury, and become almost a necessity of life—as we now have of cotton?

There is one other consideration, of minor importance when compared with the vast political interests involved in the question of acquisition; it is that of cost. Ten years past, as appears from the published correspondence, our minister at Madrid was authorized to offer one hundred millions of dollars as the extreme price for the purchase of Cuba. If that was its value then, something may be added to it now. Assuming it to be twenty-five millions more, the annual interest, without reference to the probable premium which would be realized from a loan, bearing five per cent. interest, would be (\$6,250,000) six million two hundred and fifty thousand dollars. Of the imposts of (\$31,216,000) thirty-one millions two hundred and sixteen thousand dollars in 1856, your committee have not before them the means of ascertaining the proportion coming from the United States. From the summary of Balanzas Generales from 1848 to 1854, in the report of Commercial Relations, vol. 1, page 187, it may, however, be fairly assumed to be somewhat more than one-fourth, or about eight millions of dollars. This proportion would doubtless be largely increased. Admitting it to be (\$16,216,000) sixteen millions two hundred and sixteen thousand dollars, it would leave a balance of (\$15,000,000) fifteen millions of dollars on which duties could be levied. Under our present tariff the average rate of duties is about 18½ per cent; but as the articles on our free list are of very limited consumption in Cuba, the average there would be at least 20 per cent. This would yield a revenue from customs of (\$3,000,000) three millions of dollars. But under the stimulus of free trade and free institutions, with the removal of many burdens from the consumer, it would necessarily be greatly and speedily

augmented. It would be a moderate calculation to say that in two years it would reach four millions of dollars (\$4,000,000.) On the other hand, it may be said that our expenditure would be largely increased. Such is not the opinion of your committee. On the contrary, it is believed that from the greater security of our foreign relations, resulting from the settlement of this long agitated and disturbing question, our naval expenditure might be safely reduced, while no addition to our military establishment would be required. It has already been shown that an annual saving of eight hundred thousand dollars (\$800,000) may be effected by withdrawing the African squadron, when its services will no longer be necessary. Thus our expenditure for the interest on the debt incurred by the acquisition would be credited by four million eight hundred thousand dollars, (\$4,800,000,) leaving an annual balance of but one million four hundred and twenty-five thousand dollars (\$1,425,000) to the debit of the purchase. Is this sum to be weighed in the balance with the advantages, political and commercial, which would result from it? Your committee think that it should not.

A few words on the wealth and resources of Cuba, and your committee will close this report, which has swollen to dimensions not incommensurate with the importance of the subject, but which, it may be feared, will, under the pressure of other business during this short session, be considered as unduly trespassing on the attention of the Senate. The amount of taxes that can be levied upon any people, without paralyzing their industry and arresting their material progress, is the *experimentum crucis* of the fertility of the land they inhabit. Tried by this test, Cuba will favorably compare with any country on either side of the Atlantic.

Your committee have before them the last Cuban Budget, which presents the actual receipts and expenditures for one year, with the estimates for the same for the next six months. The income derived from direct taxes, customs, monopolies, lotteries, &c., is sixteen million three hundred and three thousand nine hundred and fifty dollars, (\$16,303,950.) The expenses are sixteen million two hundred and ninety-nine thousand six hundred and sixty-three dollars, (\$16,299,663.) This equilibrium of the Budget is accounted for by the fact that the surplus revenue is remitted to Spain. It figures under the head of "*Atenciones de la Peninsula*," and amounts to (\$1,404,059,) one million four hundred and four thousand and fifty-nine dollars, and is the only direct pecuniary advantage Spain derives from the possession of Cuba, and even this sum very much exceeds the average net revenue remitted from that island, all the expenses of the army and navy employed at or near Cuba being paid by the island. The disbursements are those of the general administration of the island, those of Havana and other cities being provided for by special imposts and taxes.

It may be moderately estimated that the personal exactions of Spanish officials amount to five millions of dollars (\$5,000,000) per annum, thus increasing the expenses of the government of Cuba, apart from those which, with us, would be considered as county or

municipal, to the enormous sum of twenty-one million three hundred thousand dollars, (\$21,300,000,) or about thirteen dollars and fifty cents (\$13 50) per head for the whole population of the island, free and slave. Under this system of government and this excessive taxation the population has, for a series of years, steadily increased at the mean rate of three per cent. per annum, about equal to that of the United States.

Since the reference of the bill to the committee, the President, in response to a resolution of the Senate requesting him, if not incompatible with the public interest, to communicate to the Senate any and all correspondence between the government of the United States and the government of her Catholic Majesty relating to any proposition for the purchase of the island of Cuba, which correspondence has not been furnished to either House of Congress, informs us that no such correspondence has taken place which has not already been communicated to Congress. He takes occasion to repeat what he said in his annual message, that it is highly important, if not indispensable to the success of any negotiation for the purchase, that the measure should receive the previous sanction of Congress.

This emphatic reiteration of his previous recommendation throws upon Congress the responsibility of failure if withheld. Indeed, the inference is sufficiently clear that, without some expression of opinion by Congress, the President will not feel justified in renewing negotiations.

The committee beg leave to append hereto various tables concerning statistical details of matters treated of in this report.

All which is respectfully submitted.

### No. 1.

#### Commerce of the Island of Cuba with foreign nations for the years 1852, 1853, and 1854, made up from the "general balances."

[From Ex. Doc. No. 107, 1st session 34th Congress, Commercial Relations of the United States.]

Countries.	1852.		1853.		1854.	
	Imports.	Exports.	Imports.	Exports.	Imports.	Exports.
Spain .....	\$10,200,429	\$3,899,634	\$7,756,905	\$3,298,871	\$9,057,428	\$3,615,092
United States .....	6,552,585	12,076,408	6,799,732	12,131,095	7,867,650	11,641,813
England .....	5,638,894	5,486,877	6,195,931	2,392,195	6,610,909	11,119,596
France .....	2,903,354	1,513,368	2,177,928	3,293,389	2,538,196	1,921,567
Germany .....	1,102,002	1,690,165	1,115,940	1,474,018	1,480,639	1,894,074
Belgium .....	493,906	321,960	998,511	466,306	635,866	811,880
Spanish America .....	2,144,618	801,160	1,677,478	514,831	2,145,370	671,380
Portugal and Brazil .....	.....	.....	.....	.....	16,945	14,188
Holland .....	243,386	327,153	88,576	246,661	194,390	951,482
Denmark .....	657,554	864,366	485,423	403,065	536,824	309,949
Russia .....	.....	463,918	.....	253,683	.....	.....
Sweden and Norway .....	27,783	15,469	47,756	16,309	14,076	23,694
Austria .....	.....	241,458	.....	138,036	.....	168,453
Italy .....	32,309	380,586	69,022	651,273	24,082	313,779
Deposit .....	463,486	.....	377,011	.....	310,865	.....
Total .....	29,780,242	27,453,936	27,789,900	31,210,405	31,394,578	32,683,731
Add for Prussia .....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	5,256

### No. 2.

#### Statement of the aggregate of revenue and expenditure of the Island of Cuba.

##### REVENUE.

Section 1.—Contributions and imports .....	\$3,026,833 69
Section 2.—Customs .....	9,807,878 87
Section 3.—Taxes and monopolies .....	1,069,795 44
Section 4.—Lotteries .....	6,719,200 00
Section 5.—State property .....	119,285 94
Section 6.—Contingencies .....	595,928 94
	<hr/>
	21,338,928 88
Deduct for sums paid as portions of the forfeitures under seizures .....	12,972 88
	<hr/>
Actual total .....	21,325,956 00

##### EXPENDITURE.

Section 1.—Grace and justice .....	\$712,755 00
Section 2.—War .....	5,866,538 36
Section 3.—Exchequer .....	7,645,145 43
Section 4.— { Ordinary expenses .....	2,386,634 16
{ Extraordinary expenses .....	1,190,700 37
Section 5.—Executive department .....	2,115,833 12
Section 6.—Attentions (remittances) of the peninsula .....	1,404,059 00
	<hr/>
Total .....	21,321,665 44

\* From this sum should be deducted \$5,022,000, which figures among the expenditures of the exchequer under the government guaranty of prizes in the lotteries, and which is included in the sum of \$7,645,145 43 set down as expended by that department. This leaves a net revenue from that source of \$1,697,200, and a total net revenue of \$16,105 96.

ACQUISITION OF CUBA.

ACQUISITION OF CUBA.

No. 3.

Comparative statement of the number of sea-going vessels entering the port of Havana for the years named.

	American.		Spanish.		English.		French.		Other nations.		Aggregate of each month.	
	Number.	Tonnage.	Number.	Tonnage.	Number.	Tonnage.	Number.	Tonnage.	Number.	Tonnage.	Number.	Tonnage.
1858.												
January	101	44,169	54	10,803	13	6,256	1	1,050	14	3,845	123	66,116
February	79	37,387	29	5,986	22	9,978	3	1,635	13	3,710	146	58,684
March	781	44,402	32	7,029	11	4,824	5	3,948	9	2,756	156	63,013
April	102	42,402	66	12,523	21	9,247	2	1,228	21	6,053	219	72,653
May	49	20,529	61	12,981	15	5,984	3	1,769	10	3,065	211	71,221
June	59	26,528	65	14,895	11	5,184	2	1,109	13	4,372	160	54,966
July	50	20,409	67	15,058	10	4,181	1	336	12	4,617	144	44,751
August	54	20,768	32	10,956	11	5,394	2	999	10	3,996	103	40,575
September	60	31,097	18	4,626	10	5,443	2	1,748	12	3,271	102	35,587
October	78	35,548	56	13,976	15	7,500	3	1,956	10	3,283	161	60,067
November	69	30,313	66	17,729	7	4,052	3	853	15	3,399	160	56,340
December	55	23,825	68	19,182	15	6,090	1	614	12	3,782	209	55,483
Total for 1858	956	393,572	653	151,027	161	741,127	26	12,662	79	46,432	1,949	679,815
Total for 1857	909	406,673	684	153,651	152	64,110	67	28,760	141	42,972	1,853	696,366
1856	863	384,759	622	159,534	131	59,013	62	26,153	132	38,993	1,815	662,426
1855	869	376,327	597	120,861	116	49,963	122	53,522	113	31,462	1,717	613,155
1854	903	326,968	571	111,029	122	56,556	69	18,740	127	30,927	1,782	557,186
1853	813	304,136	553	114,029	136	58,324	93	20,877	123	33,620	1,717	527,403
1852	750	308,136	576	114,326	143	55,487	52	12,538	124	36,723	1,647	520,186
1851	856	344,046	550	114,216	191	58,308	47	11,124	156	40,789	1,600	568,483
1850	634	266,269	541	107,320	164	65,136	51	12,466	152	40,827	1,548	493,469

No. 4.

Table of the total production of sugar, consumption, &c.

	Tons.
Cane sugar	2,057,653
Palm sugar	100,000
Beet-root sugar	164,822
Maple sugar	20,247
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,342,722</b>

But the quantity of sugar from which the United States, England, Europe, and the Mediterranean is to be supplied reaches only 1,273,000 tons. Thus, for the 300,000,000 souls who are dependent on it, it gives but about eight pounds per head, while the consumption in England is triple that quantity, and in the United States twenty pounds per head. The use of sugar in the world is rapidly increasing. In France it has doubled in thirty years. It has increased more than fifty per cent. in England in fifteen years. In the Zollverein it has quadrupled. The following table will show the imports and production of sugar in Great Britain, France, and the United States, during many years:

Consumption of sugar in Great Britain, France, and United States.

Years.	Sugar duty paid in France.				Great Britain.	United States.			Average amount.
	Colonial.	Foreign.	Beet root.	Total.		Foreign.	Louisiana.	Total.	
1841	74,515	12,042	27,162	114,719	203,200	65,601	38,000	103,606	49.52
1842	77,449	8,210	35,070	110,729	193,823	69,474	39,200	108,674	45.42
1843	79,455	9,685	29,155	118,295	204,016	28,854	64,360	93,214	42.30
1844	87,269	10,269	32,075	129,628	206,000	83,601	44,400	128,006	41.62
1845	90,258	11,542	35,132	137,932	249,831	86,336	45,000	133,336	40.40
1846	78,632	15,185	46,845	140,662	261,932	44,974	83,028	128,002	41.85
1847	87,298	9,626	52,369	149,292	220,275	98,410	71,040	169,450	34.95
1848	46,371	9,540	48,103	106,014	309,494	14,214	107,000	211,214	29.40
1849	63,335	18,979	43,793	126,107	259,041	103,121	99,180	202,301	31.00
1850	50,996	23,662	67,297	142,155	310,391	84,813	110,600	194,413	32.22
1851			74,999		329,715	190,193	102,000	292,193	32.32
1852	32,030	14,682	67,445	114,357	360,720	228,772	118,272	347,045	28.00
1853	32,841	15,044	87,120	135,005	380,488	232,213	160,967	393,180	30.72
1854	40,115	18,943	85,625	144,681	475,095	227,982	224,662	452,644	
1855	45,372	49,222	52,902	148,097	384,224	226,942	173,317	410,259	
1856	46,767	16,456	95,103	158,326	397,445	272,631	115,713	388,344	
1857	42,466	25,689	*132,000	200,155	367,475	388,501	36,933	425,434	

\* To close of February.

The production of beet-root sugar in France was for four years as follows:

	No. working.	Kilos.
1854	303	77,848,208
1855	208	50,180,864
1856	275	91,003,098
1857	341	132,000,000

The figures for 1857 are only to March 1, and exceed by 54,000,000 kilogrammes the product of last year. The production in the Zollverein in 1855 was as follows :

	Cwt.
Prussia .....	14,099,263
Anhalt .....	2,301,364
Bavaria .....	247,126
Saxony .....	131,968
Wurtemberg .....	603,256
Baden .....	988,825
Hesse .....	59,137
Huringen .....	122,965
Brunswick .....	634,496

Giving a total of 19,188,402. The increase in the consumption is immense. In 1841 the total for the three countries above named was 420,000 tons. This has increased to 800,000 tons, or a quantity nearly doubled, and the supply has come from Louisiana and from beet roots; the former failed considerably in the last two years, and, as a consequence, nearly convulsed the world. The value of sugar in the open market, then, seems to depend upon the precarious crop of Louisiana, since, when that fails, the prices rise all over the world.—*U. S. Economist.*

No. 5.

Table of number of Chinese shipped from China from 1847 to March 23, 1858.

The following table, derived from a reliable source, exhibits the total number of vessels that have arrived at this port since 1847 with Asiatics; their flags, tonnage, number of Asiatics shipped and landed, number and per centage of deaths, &c., which, I think, will not be deemed uninteresting:

Flags of vessels.	Numbers.	Tonnage.	Asiatics, number shipped.	Landed.	Deaths.	Per centage of deaths.
American .....	13	13,545	6,744	5,929	815	12
British .....	29	21,275	10,791	9,265	1,566	14
Dutch .....	8	5,003	2,773	2,463	310	11
French .....	7	6,037	3,635	3,154	501	13
Spanish .....	5	2,038	1,779	1,459	290	11
Portuguese .....	3	1,246	1,049	1,021	28	2
Peruvian .....	3	2,484	1,314	813	502	38
Bremen .....	1	560	249	236	13	5
Norwegian .....	1	470	291	179	42	19
Chilean .....	1	250	202	135	47	23
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>53,008</b>	<b>28,777</b>	<b>24,643</b>	<b>4,134</b>	<b>14</b>

From the foregoing it will be seen that the loss of life on the total number shipped actually amounts to 14 $\frac{3}{4}$  per cent.; and whilst the number of deaths of those brought hither in Portuguese ships amounts to only 2 $\frac{3}{4}$  per cent., the number brought in American ships amounts to 12 per cent., in British ships to 14 $\frac{3}{4}$  per cent., and in French ships to 13 $\frac{3}{4}$  per cent., whilst in Peruvian ships the number of deaths amounts to 38 $\frac{1}{4}$  per cent.

No. 6.

Population of the West Indies, as stated in Colton's Atlas of the World, volume 1.

Hayti—Haytien empire .....	572,070
Dominican republic .....	136,000
Cuba (slaves 330,425) .....	1,009,060
Porto Rico .....	447,914
French islands—Guadalupe and dependencies .....	154,975
Martinique .....	121,478
French Guiana .....	22,110
St. Bartholomew .....	9,000
Danish islands—St. Thomas .....	13,666
Santa Cruz .....	23,729
St. John .....	2,228
Dutch islands—Curaçoa, &c. ....	39,623
Dutch Guiana .....	28,497
British islands—Bahamas .....	61,080
Turk's island .....	27,519
Jamaica <sup>o</sup> .....	4,428
Caymans .....	377,433
Trinidad <sup>o</sup> .....	1,760
Tobago .....	68,645
Granada .....	13,208
St. Vincent .....	32,671
Barbados .....	30,128
St. Lucia .....	135,939
Dominica .....	24,516
Montserrat .....	22,061
Antigua .....	7,653
St. Christopher's .....	37,757
Nevis .....	23,177
Barbuda .....	9,601
Anguilla .....	1,707
Virgin islands .....	3,052
British Guiana .....	6,689
.....	127,695
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>963,639</b>
.....	<b>3,575,376</b>

<sup>o</sup> Acquired from Spain.