

# THE CAPTURE OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA.

BY WILLIAM R. SHAFTER, MAJOR-GENERAL U. S. V.,  
Commander of the Expedition.



At the time I assumed command of the forces assembling at Tampa, Florida, I had almost completed my thirty-seventh year of service in the army. At twenty-six I had gone to the Potomac as first lieutenant in the Seventh Michigan Infantry.<sup>1</sup> That was in June, 1861. A year later I was wounded in the battle of Fair Oaks,<sup>2</sup> and after I recovered was commissioned a major of the Nineteenth Michigan, raised under the new call for three hundred thousand men, and assigned to the West. Early in 1863, during the reconnaissance toward Spring Hill, I was captured by Van Dorn,<sup>3</sup> and held in Libby Prison till May 5, 1863. I was then exchanged and promoted, commanding my regiment for a time as lieutenant-colonel. In April, 1864, I was made colonel of the Seventeenth United States Colored Infantry. My regiment was with Thomas at the battle of Nashville, Tennessee,<sup>4</sup> in December, and took part in the pursuit of Hood's defeated army into the northern part of Alabama. It was mustered out of service February 15, 1865, at Nashville. After the increase of the regular army, in July, 1866, I was appointed lieutenant-colonel of the Forty-first Infantry, and sent to the Rio Grande, serving in Texas

until 1879. I had command of the troops along the Mexican border during the troubles of 1877 and 1878, and made some acquaintance with the Spanish character and language. I was appointed colonel of the First Infantry in March, 1879, and served thereafter in the West until the army was concentrated in the East on the prospect of trouble with Spain.

When I took command at Tampa on May 2, 1898, I relieved General Wade, who was my junior in the regular army; but upon our appointment as major-generals eight days later, under the law which says that where officers have the same grade and date of commission the one who has served longest as a commissioned officer shall rank, he became senior to me and resumed the command. In the Civil War he had joined the volunteers two months earlier than myself. However, as it had been decided that I should lead the first expedition to Cuba, General Wade was transferred to the camp at Chickamauga, and on May 20 I was again in charge. Five days later my command was designated as the Fifth Army-Corps.

My selection for command had been made on the recommendation of the major-general commanding the army. In a conversation with General Miles he explained to me that

<sup>1</sup> General Shafter was asked by the editor to outline his army experience as an introduction to his narrative of the Santiago campaign. It is proper to state that the following foot-notes, derived from the "Official Records" of the Civil War, have been added without his suggestion or knowledge.

These extracts are of interest as indicating the ground of his transference from the volunteers to a grade nearly as high in the regular service.—EDITOR.

<sup>2</sup> General Dana said in his report of that battle: "Lieutenant Shafter, Seventh Michigan Volunteers, in charge of the pioneers, who was slightly wounded, but kept the field, furnished beautiful exhibitions of gallant conduct and intelligent activity."—EDITOR.

<sup>3</sup> The battle of Thompson's Station, March 5, 1863. Fourteen hundred men were captured by an overwhelming force under Van Dorn and Forrest. Colonel Utley of the Twenty-second Wisconsin, a part of whose command retreated, said in his report: "It gives me pleasure to say that the officers and men of the Nineteenth Michigan behaved gallantly. I saw them repulse several charges where the enemy outnumbered them three to

one. All this time the Eighty-fifth and Thirty-third Indiana had been engaged in an almost hand-to-hand fight with a greatly superior force. . . . There never was a time after the battery and cavalry had deserted us that we could have broken from the hills without being cut to pieces, neither could those that escaped have done so if it had not been for the obstinate resistance of those they deserted." General Baird reported: "The bravery of the little band, surrounded and captured, was so conspicuous as to elicit the applause of the enemy himself, and we are informed that Colonels Coburn [in command] and Gilbert and Major Shafter of the Nineteenth Michigan were permitted on this account to retain their horses and side-arms." In the Nineteenth Michigan, about five hundred strong, twenty men were killed and eighty-three wounded.—EDITOR.

<sup>4</sup> In this battle Colonel Shafter's regiment, for the first time under fire, lost sixteen killed and sixty-eight wounded. Colonel Morgan, the brigade commander, reported: "Colonel Shafter, Seventeenth [United States Colored Infantry], acquitted himself well, is cool and brave, and a good disciplinarian."—EDITOR.



when he and the Secretary of War were in consultation with the President he pointed to my name as his choice of a leader for the contemplated movement. This was to be a reconnaissance in force to the southern coast of Cuba, in Santa Clara province, where I was to put myself in communication with General Gomez, supply him with arms and ammunition, and ascertain the number of his men and their positions, it being supposed that the insurgents could not show their actual strength until they had real support. There was a great lack of information about Gomez's forces, and our first effort was intended to develop the amount of dependence to be placed on Cuban coöperation. As we were to get off as soon as possible, I began preparations on taking command, and on May 4 asked that Generals Lawton and Kent be assigned to me, and directed that the transports be prepared for the reception of troops and animals. But that particular expedition was abandoned upon receipt of the news that Cervera had left the Cape Verde Islands, for all the ships of our navy would be required to look after the Spanish fleet, and none would be left to convoy us.

Meantime troops and material were arriving constantly; the volunteers were being drilled; and, on my order, facilities were created on the merchant transports for the greater convenience and comfort of the men. Even on May 21 some of the regiments were without arms or uniforms. Target-practice was ordered, it having been found that three hundred in the Seventy-first New York had never fired a gun. An attempt was made to place artillery on the transports for protection against attack, but the plan was futile. On May 24, in urging the requirements of the force, I expressed the belief that the first battle would probably be the decisive one.

On May 30 we were called upon to act promptly, it having been telegraphed from the headquarters of the army: "Admiral Schley reports that two cruisers and two torpedo-boats have been seen in the harbor of Santiago. Go with your force to capture garrison at Santiago, and assist in capturing harbor and fleet." This despatch, which, among other directions, said, "Limit the animals to the least number required for artillery and transportation, as it is expected that you will go but a short distance inland," was signed by General Miles, who left that evening for Tampa. During the loading and embarkation he and I were in daily consultation, our offices being under the same roof.

We were undertaking an offensive military expedition, by sea, against a foreign enemy—something that no officer in our army had ever had any experience with. Our facilities were limited, and our depot greatly congested, because the business exceeded by far the usual demands on the railroad. It was not a question of procuring everything that a theorist might say such an expedition ought to have. The emergency was there. I took what was at hand that could be got into the ships that were furnished me, selecting the material according to our prospective needs and the relative necessities. On June 3 I reported to the adjutant-general the non-arrival of the medical stores, and said: "In my opinion, the expedition should not sail without them." We did not go without them, but we were being urged to make all possible haste, which we were doing, and the next day I telegraphed in regard to the causes of delay in loading. The officers having the work in hand were not at fault. They were experts and did their work well. In shipping the artillery to Tampa, the parts had been so loaded that by a confusion of cars there was much trouble in assembling the parts; this, however, was done, and the artillery was run down to the port, where it was again taken apart and properly stowed on ship-board. It is not true that any of the artillery arrived in a confused state at Daiquiri.

There was not room for all the troops we wished to carry; therefore the transportation and animals had to be limited to the lowest point of necessity. General Wheeler's cavalry division was put on board without horses. They were trained troops, drilled to fight on foot, and much more effective than the volunteer troops I would otherwise have taken. Our main supplies were to be carried by pack-trains. I had never seen a good road in a Spanish country, and Santiago did not disappoint my expectations. Only a limited amount of artillery was taken, because I knew that the Spaniards in Cuba did not rely on that arm; and, in fact, their entire defenses at the city were armed with seventeen old-fashioned muzzle-loading bronze guns, eight short breech-loaders, two rapid-fire Krupp guns, and, I believe, two machine-guns landed with the detachment from Cervera's fleet. In my present opinion, we could have done without half the artillery we carried. The wagons were as few as possible, but they occupied so much room that when it came to ambulances it was a question which should be left behind. I decided to take seven ambulances with the first fleet,



and to rely in part upon wagons to carry the sick and wounded. I knew that on muddy roads wagons could be made as comfortable for the wounded as ambulances, and that the wagons would do double service, carrying supplies to the front and the disabled to the rear. As a matter of fact, ten additional ambulances were shipped with the troops that sailed two days after our departure, and they arrived on June 26, so that we began the serious attack with seventeen ambulances, enough according to our expectations; but we did have more wounded than was anticipated. In the embarkation I had ordered that all the litters should be carried by the troops as they boarded the transports.

On the evening of June 7 I was ordered to sail without delay, but with not less than ten thousand men. For lack of transportation, General Snyder's division had to be left behind. General Bates's two regiments of regulars and one squadron of cavalry with their horses had arrived on transports from Mobile, and formed part of the expedition. The orders to sail were given on the 8th. I was on my way to embark on the *Segurança*, my headquarters ship, when I received a despatch directing the expedition to await further orders. A tug was despatched to recall some of the transports which were nearly out to sea. It was reported by the navy that Spanish cruisers had been seen in the Nicholas Channel. While it is supposed that the rumor arose from some of our vessels mistaking one another at night, I never doubted the wisdom of the halt, and would rather be at Tampa now than to have sailed with rash indifference to a reported danger. We waited a week, utilizing the time to shift some of the troops, perfect our equipment, and take on more forage and rations. It is not true that the ships were dangerously overcrowded, though of course there was some discomfort, or that the delay impaired the health of the men. In turn they were put ashore for exercise, and were given every facility for bathing, and most of the transports were kept tied to the wharves.

The actual sailing took place on June 14, with 815 officers, 16,072 enlisted men, about 1000 mules, and a similar number of horses. Captain Taylor of the battle-ship *Indiana*, in command of the convoy, had entire control of the sea management of the fleet, and each

transport carried a naval cadet as signal-officer, as the cadets were well instructed. The decision as to what the transport fleet should do rested with me. To provide for the anticipated difficulties in landing the expedition, two barges and three tugs were taken, which were ample. One of the tugs, the *Uncle Sam*, I believe never left Tampa Bay, though why I have never learned; another tug, the *Bessie*, suffered a breakdown in her machinery and remained at Key West; and one of the barges, in tow, broke away in the night. Owing to these accidents, we arrived off Santiago with only one barge and one steam-lighter, the *Laura*, and were seriously embarrassed thereby.

Otherwise, everything went well on the voyage. A number of Cubans were with the fleet. On my ship was Dr. Castillo, a former surgeon in the navy, who was born and brought up near Santiago, on the very ground we were to operate on, and as a boy knew it well; there was also a civil engineer by profession, who had been reared in the city of Santiago; but neither of these men had been there for some years. The latter had done surveying over the ground and was practically familiar with it. They did not know the coast very well. I was frequently in consultation with them, and was constantly studying the situation. These men were familiar with all the conditions, topographical and climatic. I had a pamphlet giving a history of the English expedition against Havana, made at the same season of the year, in 1761; I knew that the same climatic conditions were to be found about Santiago that existed in Havana; and I had no doubt that very soon we should be confronted with all the diseases incidental to that climate, and my experience verified it absolutely. The English had the same difficulties to contend with in rains, diseases, etc. Of the expedition which besieged Havana from June 6 to August 12, 1762, it is recorded that "the loss of the English army and navy exceeded 1790 in men and officers. The greater part of them died of sickness which raged both on shore and aboard ship." The losses sustained from the same causes<sup>1</sup> by the colonial troops, which formed part of the expedition, were also very heavy.

The description given in the "Journal of carried away two thirds of our fine army. Twenty thousand men were dead or dying in the hospitals. The new regiments lost half their number within twenty-four hours after landing. The crews of the vessels were also cut off, leaving the remnant of these brave men no means of escape."—W. R. S.

<sup>1</sup> The French expedition sent to Santo Domingo in 1801 was still more disastrous. Napoleon himself, in speaking of it, says: "I armed thirty ships and sixteen frigates, which carried successively about twenty-five thousand men to Santo Domingo. . . . In the meantime yellow fever broke out among our troops, and in three weeks



the Siege of Havana" corresponds very closely to the way in which the men of my own army were stricken down, though our losses were very much less, as may be seen by the following comparison: The English army numbered 14,000 men, our army 20,000. From the date of our arrival in Cuba, June 20, to August 24, at which time the last of the Fifth Corps left Santiago, 13 officers, 296 men, and 9 civilian employees died of disease; 24 officers and 226 men were killed, 83 officers and 1214 men were wounded, only 13 deaths resulting from wounds received in action.

We made quick work of it. The English were much longer and suffered proportionately. I estimated that the troops would have immunity for two or three weeks, and to be successful with my force it was to be a dash or nothing. I carried with me on the *Segurança* the foreign military attachés, together with a few of the newspaper correspondents, who in all numbered about a hundred. Lieutenant Miley of my staff had general charge of them. Personally, I came very little in contact with the correspondents. It is my opinion that newspaper men should not be allowed to accompany an army, but they all came with credentials from the Secretary of War, and I gave them passage. I recognize that, with a people like ours, it may be better to risk the injury their news even under censorship may do than cause the dissatisfaction their exclusion would give rise to at home. So far as my observation extended, most of them were disposed to do what was right; they used a wise discretion and obeyed the regulations. Two or three of them at the outset in Cuba were willing to instruct me in my military duties, but were not encouraged, and since then, with military intuition, have made more ado over my alleged shortcomings than the army did over its work.


Proceeding without incident, we rounded the northeast coast of Cuba and arrived off Santiago about noon of June 20. Admiral Sampson met us, came on board my ship, and said that he was glad I was there. We arranged for the afternoon a visit to General Garcia at Aserraderos, west of Santiago. The admiral and I went in my ship, and off Aserraderos transferred to the *Gloucester*. Near the landing-place the admiral took me ashore in his boat. We each rode a mule up a trail for a mile and a half into the hills, where on a thickly grown height we found General Rabi's camp. The Cuban troops, such as they had, were turned out and lined up on each side. They were in rags and half

naked, but were well armed, and looked intensely interested over our coming. Their camp was a weird sight, composed of huts that could be put up in an hour and vacated in a minute. It resembled an Indian cantonment in disorder. I saw no pickets, but supposed there were such, for there was evidence of discipline.

General Rabi received us, and sent in haste for General Garcia, who was back in the hills. He came in half an hour and greeted us warmly. He declared that he was profoundly grateful for the action of the United States in sending us there, and that he placed himself and his men at my disposal. He appeared to be considerably affected in telling how happy he was that we had arrived, and that he looked forward to the speedy delivery of his country. I explained that I had no authority to enter into any arrangements with the Cuban forces, other than to avail myself of their assistance when they chose to give it. I told General Garcia that I could assume no authority over him, and that he would be under me only so far as he chose to yield to my orders. He simply assented, and said that he was ready to do anything and everything in his power. I told him, however, that while he coöperated with me I would furnish him ammunition and rations, but that was all. I was favorably impressed by Garcia's earnestness and honesty of purpose. He was intensely interested, as well he might be, for he saw that the military as well as the naval power of the United States had come to assist in the deliverance of his people. All that Garcia said in that interview as to his troops and the disposition of the Spaniards proved to be accurate, and all his promises were kept to the extent of his ability.

As I was there to get information and advice on which to base my plans, we gathered in General Rabi's hut and talked for about an hour, from three to four o'clock in the afternoon, or thereabouts. I asked that a guard be placed to keep out intruders, and in the midst of the conversation had to ask Lieutenant Miley to remove a person who had edged in, and who proved to be a correspondent. Garcia advised me to land to the eastward of Santiago, on account of the natural conformation of the ground. I could see for myself that eastward there were towns with some facilities for landing from ships, while westward there was nothing of the kind—a bold coast thickly wooded and covered with a dense undergrowth. We had only a rough, inaccurate





- A, Plaza : cathedral on the south side ; governor's palace and municipal building on the north side.
- 1, Military hospital.
  - 2, Reina Mercedes barracks.
  - 3, Conch barracks.
  - 4, Old cemetery.
  - 5, Plaza de Marte.
  - 6, Santa Ana Church.
  - 7, Artillery or Dolores barracks.
  - 8, Civil hospital.
  - 9, Fort La Pedrera.
  - 10, Fort St. Ines.
  - 11, Fort Cuabitas.
  - 12, Fort San Antonio.
  - 13, Bull-ring.
  - 14, Fort Yarayo.
  - 15, Slaughter-house.
  - 16, Gas.
  - 17, Fort Gasometer.
  - 18, Fort Horno.
  - 19, Fort Centro Benefico.
  - 20, Fort Las Cañadas.
  - 21, Fort Beneficencio.
  - 22, Fort Santa Ursula.
  - 23, Fort Canovar.
  - 24, Trenches.
  - 25, 6¼-inch muzzle-loading rifle.
  - 26, 5-inch m.-l. r.
  - 27, Two 3½-inch m.-l. r.
  - 28, Trench.
  - 32, 6-inch breech-loading howitzer.
  - 33, Two 3½-inch m.-l. r.
  - 34, 6-inch m.-l. r.
  - 35, 5-inch m.-l. r. and two 3-inch m.-l. r.
  - 36, Two guns.
  - 37, " "

MAP OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA, SHOWING THE POSITIONS OF TROOPS IN THE LAST DAYS OF THE SIEGE.



pencil-sketch of the ground and roads east of Santiago, and I questioned Garcia fully as to the roads and streams, and the character of the country. Our conversation related wholly to military questions. Immediately upon the conclusion of the conversation, I dictated to Lieutenant Miley a memorandum, given below, embodying my decision as to place of landing and attack. A copy of this was taken by Lieutenant Staunton of Admiral Sampson's staff, and the part to be taken by the Cubans was fully explained to Generals Garcia, Rabi, and Castillo. The information as to numbers was inaccurate, but it was given as the opinion of the Cuban officers, who had the best opportunities for knowing. Admiral Sampson listened to all the conversation and heard the memorandum read, but had no suggestions to make that I recall.

#### NOTES ON CONFERENCE BETWEEN GENERAL SHAFTER AND GENERAL GARCIA.

ABOUT 12,000 Spanish soldiers at Santiago and vicinity. Spaniards can concentrate at any moment about 4000 on the west. Proposal made of a feint of 3000 or 4000 men at some point west of Santiago de Cuba, and then land expedition at Daiquiri and march on Santiago. Plan proposed for General Castillo to have about 1000 men at Daiquiri, while navy bombards, and will capture escaping Spaniards. General Shafter then proposed a plan, that on the morning of the 22d he would have the navy bombard Daiquiri, Aguadores, Siboney, and Cabañas, as a feint, and land whole expedition at Daiquiri. About 5000 Spaniards between city and Daiquiri. General Garcia says Daiquiri is the best base, and General Shafter accepts it. The following numbers of Spaniards were then given by General Castillo: force at Daiquiri, near wharf, 300 men; at Siboney, 600 men; Aguadores, 150 men; Jutici, 150 men; Sardinero, 100 men. It was then decided that General Castillo will take on board the transports 500 men from Aserraderos, to be landed at Tajababo and joined to his command now there and 500 strong; with this 1000 men he will be at Daiquiri and assist at landing on the morning of the 22d. General Rabi will, on 22d, make a demonstration at Cabañas (to the west) with 500 men, while navy shells. It was then decided by General Garcia to bring his men, about 3000 or 4000 strong, from his camp near Palma to Aserraderos, and be ready to embark on the transports the morning of the 24th, and then be taken to Daiquiri, to join General Shafter. To-morrow (the 21st) navy will make transfer of 500 men to Tajababo, under General Castillo; 500 men under General Rabi will make demonstration on Cabañas on the morning of the 22d.

The above plan, made at Garcia's headquarters, was put into action as arranged, except that Castillo's thousand Cubans were

two hours late in coming up behind the Spaniards at Daiquiri. We had no refreshment at General Rabi's headquarters except an excellent cup of coffee. Garcia said they were straitened for food, and I sent two thousand rations ashore immediately upon my return to the *Segurança* that night. Though they had a few beef-cattle, their main dependence was wild fruits and palm sprouts; they were virtually "grazing." General Garcia was very friendly in the leave-taking. We walked to the foot of the hill, mounted our mules, and rode to the beach. Rabi had his troops all out lining the road and presenting arms. There was a sequel to the incident of the eavesdropping correspondent. Later he approached Lieutenant Miley with an urgent request for an interview with me, claiming that if only he could lay before me information which he possessed I would change the plan I had formed for a better one. Lieutenant Miley asked, "How do you know anything about General Shafter's plan?" to which there was no response, whereupon Lieutenant Miley added that no interview could be had.

During the 21st, five hundred of Rabi's Cubans were carried by the navy east to Tajababo to join Castillo's five hundred, and the fleet got in position to make the landing the following morning. Some of my transports with General Kent's division went west to threaten a landing at Cabañas. Early on June 22d I wrote to Admiral Sampson:

I shall commence landing this morning. It is my intention to proceed from Daiquiri to Santiago as rapidly as I can and take some of my land transportation. The animals are in absolute need of some rest, and for that reason I may not get very far to-day. I request you keep in touch during the advance, and be prepared to receive any message I may wish to transmit from along the bluffs or any of the small towns, and to render any assistance necessary.

Soon after coming on board the *Segurança*, some of the naval officers suggested that, in their opinion, the first thing to do was to drive the Spanish troops from the Morro and Socapa batteries, thus enabling the navy to remove the mines in the harbor; but after my interview with General Garcia, and having seen the character of the shore on my way down to Aserraderos, I regarded this as entirely out of the question. My plan as announced at the close of the interview and in the above letter makes it clear that I regarded Santiago, and not Morro, as my true objective, the latter necessarily falling with the former. There could have been no



misunderstanding as to my purpose. My instructions enjoined upon me, in the first part, to "capture garrison at Santiago," and the military situation would of itself have compelled that effort. It was reasonable to suppose that the Spaniards in the district, if given time, would concentrate to oppose me. In a dash for the city I had the advantage over most of the Spanish detachments. Nearly three thousand from Manzanillo got in on July 3, but thereafter I was between the environed garrison and the thirteen thousand at Holguin and San Luis; troops from the former place are said to have started for Santiago, but were discouraged by a Cuban attack. But on other grounds the idea of moving first against the Morro was not to be considered. It was protected by a rugged piece of country, devoid of water, densely covered with a poisonous undergrowth, and so impenetrable that the railroad running obliquely from Aguadores toward Santiago, and a trail, would have been the only means of making a circuitous approach. Two regiments were as many troops as could be utilized there in aggressive operations. In the operations against Santiago, General Duffield, with his troops at Siboney, was directed to guard against any movement from Aguadores on our base. On June 30 he was ordered to make a feint at Aguadores, to detain the Spanish troops in the vicinity. This movement was well executed. By capturing the garrison of the city, everything to be desired would follow, as in fact it did. When the fall of the city appeared imminent, Cervera's fleet was ordered to sea and was destroyed by Sampson's fleet. If he had stayed he would have had to surrender his ships or blow them up, surrendering his men. It is nonsense to say he could have kept us from occupying the city. He might have wasted his ammunition in pounding the town where his own people would have been, in case we had captured it by assault, but the ground was such that we could easily have protected ourselves and taken position to clear his decks with musketry fire, and even bring artillery to bear. He tried to help the defense, in the only practicable way, by having a thousand of his men ashore during the battle of July 1 and 2. He could not have kept me from completing the investment of the town, and then his doom would have been sealed, as Blanco well knew when he ordered him to leave, in the belief that the town must fall.

On account of the sending of the transports with a part of Kent's division to Cabañas, and the activity of the navy at different

points, the Spaniards could not anticipate the real place of landing. On the second day ashore, the 23d, I telegraphed to Washington: "The assistance of the navy has been of the greatest benefit and enthusiastically given. Without them, I could not have landed in ten days, and perhaps not at all, as I believe I should have lost so many boats in the surf." This last referred to the fact that Admiral Sampson gave us the use of his small boats, manned by sailors, and his launches. Unfortunately, two men were drowned in the landing. They were thrown into the water at the Daiquiri pier, and were carried down by the weight of their ammunition-belts. This pier was of great use to us, but could be approached only by the barge and small boats, as the water was shallow, and not at all when the water was rough. It was put into condition to answer our purposes for the first emergency. Very soon a pier was extemporized at Siboney, which shortened the supply-route by eight or ten miles.

I had determined to land at both Siboney and Daiquiri, but as I had been led to believe that there was a considerable force at Siboney, and that Daiquiri, being farther away, naturally would have a lesser force, I thought I would disembark Lawton's and Wheeler's divisions at the latter place first and move them to the rear of Siboney, thus forcing any Spanish troops at Siboney to leave. We approached the shore, the warships leading and keeping up a well-directed fire on the town, the hills, and up the valley, wherever anything could be seen, or wherever troops might be concealed. That there were troops there in some numbers is not to be disputed, from the fact that immediately upon our approaching the town flames burst out, beginning at the row of houses nearest the water, and extending toward the interior. The transports were brought in as close as possible, from a quarter of a mile to a mile and a half of the shore, and were concentrated as near the point of landing as safety to the ships would permit. The boats from each of the ships were lowered; the small boats that had been lent from the admiral's fleet were put in strings of five or six, with a steam-launch in front of them, and the men immediately filled them and were all ready to start for the shore upon the cessation of firing. When the signal was given, everybody started with eagerness, and in a very short time a large number of troops were landed and on the way toward the interior. From the deck of my ship I saw the first American flag go up on a blockhouse



overlooking the bay. It was a little flag, where obtained or by whom raised I do not know. We had a few flags that I had secured in Tampa for raising in the towns, but we did not have them at the front until the day after Santiago fell. I borrowed a small flag from General Wheeler's headquarters to raise over the city. The navy thought it strange we did not at once raise a flag on the Morro, but we had none to raise until two days later. We were not carrying extra baggage. When we had occasion for the flags, we sent for them.

The first day of landing was beautiful. In the morning the sea was calm, but there was some surf. I went ashore early, and was ashore every day to see that everything was going rapidly and systematically, while still having my headquarters on the *Segurança*. I knew the necessity for getting rations on land, especially as captains who had sailed on that coast told me that we were liable any day to have tornadoes. If a storm should arise without plenty of supplies ashore, great suffering would follow, and if the storm lasted long enough, disaster would ensue, as there were no supplies to be had in the country. For that reason I remained behind at first to attend to what I regarded as the only serious problem of the campaign, and it was not until I had on shore three days' supplies more than the daily needs that I considered my command safe. During that time I had no anxiety for the troops. Division commanders were required to make strong encampments and to guard well against surprise, and I twice rode out to the advance camps to inform myself by personal observation as to the situation. The landing of the two divisions of Wheeler and Lawton was completed on the second day, the 23d, when we began to unload the animals, all of them being landed at Daiquiri, as well as the greater part of the forage. The side-hatches were opened, and the animals were pushed out on a platform and into the sea. Men accustomed to handle mules know that they will always follow the bell-mare, usually a gray mare. Our men adopted the trick of walking up and down the beach, ringing a bell. The mules responded to the sound, and when a number were herded on the beach the mules could see them, and others getting out of the water, and headed for shore. Many were towed by boats until they were near the shore, and then were turned loose. The horses were taken off in the same manner, but with more difficulty, for they would not respond to the bell. The two thousand

mules and horses were landed in about two days, with the loss of only twenty animals, a success which I regarded as wonderful, considering that there was a heavy surf on the second day.

From my experience in scouting, I knew something of the danger of putting animals in the water. Once, in Texas, when I had occasion to cross the Rio Grande into Mexico, I took the horses of four troops and rushed them down into the water, where the current immediately carried them against a bluff on the Texas side. The horses began at once to swim round in a circle, which is called "milling." There were three hundred horses in the water, swimming as close as they could get, and trying to get back to our side of the river. They would rise, throw their fore feet against the perpendicular cliffs, falling back into the water, and then join again in the milling. We had previously crossed two or three horses to a sand-spit on the Mexican side. Finally some of the herd, discovering them, started across, and the other shore was gained without the loss of an animal. But I was greatly concerned at the time, for, not long before, General Gibbon, in moving the Second Cavalry across a stream in Wyoming or Dakota, had drowned two companies of horses, and I thought I had lost my whole outfit when I saw them swimming in a current so strong that they could not get back.

The unloading of the wagons began immediately after the animals and three or four ambulances had been taken off. As soon as a load of wagons came ashore they were set up, teams hooked on, loaded, and started for the front. The transports were loaded and unloaded with great care and good judgment by Colonel Humphrey, one of the ablest quartermasters, who thoroughly knew his business and was indefatigable in his work, assisted by Captain James McKay, a ship-captain of great experience. We had valuable assistance in the disembarkation from Captain C. F. Goodrich of the navy. A few vessels were sent back to the United States before they were unloaded, because they could make the trip and return with troops before the rations and forage they contained were needed. They were in effect floating warehouses utilized as troop-ships. A ship with fresh beef on board steamed back to New York, carried troops to Porto Rico, and returned to New York, still with a lot of beef on board which was in perfect condition. No stores were spoiled by reason of sending ships back. Ships having perishable stores were unloaded first, and we had more of that class



of stores than could be handled during the absence of the ships that were sent away. The unloading of the subsistence stores was in charge of Colonel Weston, who gave it his constant and personal attention, and who had the lighter *Laura* at his disposal, with orders that it should not be taken for any other purpose whatever. There was transportation enough to take stores away as fast as they could be unloaded, but it was ten days before we got three days' rations ahead at the front. One pack-train was assigned to each of the three divisions, one was reserved for the carrying of ammunition, leaving one for emergencies. As soon as the wagons were all on shore and a little surplus had been brought up, a portion of the wagons and about half the pack-trains (three additional trains having arrived) were kept at headquarters under Captain Plummer of my staff, to be used whenever they were needed, the other wagons being assigned *pro rata* to the divisions. In the latter days of the siege I was feeding 20,000 of our soldiers, 5000 Cuban soldiers, and 15,000 to 18,000 refugees, issuing about 40,000 rations daily.

Respecting the medical department of the army, a commanding officer never supervises a requisition for medical stores at military posts or anywhere else. That is purely professional. The medical officer makes all requisitions, and forwards them direct to the medical department or to the surgeon-general at Washington, a general in command in the field furnishing the means of transporting the medical supplies. At the disembarkation, I supposed that each regimental surgeon would take his medicine-chest in the boat with him; a few did, but the majority left them behind, and there was considerable trouble to get them ashore and to their owners. I directed that the first three wagons set up should be devoted to carrying these medicine-chests of the regiments to the front. The chief surgeon reported to me that at no time did he have as full a supply of medicines as he required, and on four separate occasions he reported that the medicines were virtually exhausted. On one of these occasions he recommended that the medical stores be taken from the Spanish military hospital. This I declined to permit, and I directed him to take from the drug-stores in Santiago such medicines as he could use. In moving the wounded and sick to the rear immediately after the battle I could have used more transportation, especially if there had been another road, but the disabled reached the rear

as fast as they could be cared for at the general hospital. Captain Plummer went every morning to the hospital to supply such transportation as was needed. I had a thousand men at work the greater part of the time on the road from Siboney to the front, and to prevent the road from becoming blockaded an order had to be issued, with a guard put on to enforce it, that wagons should not leave the front after nine o'clock in the morning, and at Siboney wagons should not be permitted to leave for the return trip until after eleven o'clock in the morning. The wagons leaving the front before nine would reach Siboney before the start was made from there; this was necessary, as it was impossible in many places for wagons to pass each other.

My orders for the landing of the expedition provided that the men and material needed to take possession of the country should be put ashore before the non-combatants. This did not please the enterprising correspondents, who had to obey the order to "remain aboard ship until the landing be accomplished, and until notified they can land." A writer who considered that his prominence entitled him to a special set of military regulations came to me and asked that he and two or three of his colleagues be excepted from the orders. I told him that all of the correspondents would be treated alike. He objected, stating that he and his friends did not belong in the general class; that their work was of a higher order and entitled them to the favor of being put ashore separately and in advance of the others who were on the *Olivette*. I replied that all the correspondents would be treated alike. While this interview did not disarrange the plan of march on Santiago, it was apparent later that such a trifling incident might have a marked effect on the course of military history.

After the army already landed was well advanced, that part of Kent's division which had remained aboard off Cabañas, as a feint, was landed at Siboney, but not until Young's brigade of the cavalry division had had its brush with the Spaniards at Las Guasimas on June 24. I had intended that Lawton should keep ahead, but in going into camp on the previous evening some of the cavalry had moved on in the search for suitable ground. They were in the lead, therefore, when the march was resumed, and in attacking the well-placed Spanish column of observation did so with a knowledge of its position and after proper dispositions had



been made. There was no ambush as reported. The engagement, though unimportant, had an inspiring effect on the army, showing as it did that the Spanish troops could not stand against us. It proved to the men that they could whip the Spaniards if they could get at them. When I received, on June 25, General Wheeler's report of this fight and of his subsequent advance beyond Sevilla, I at once wrote: "Keep your front thoroughly picketed, and also your right flank, and well in advance, but do not try any forward movement until further orders. From where you are now, or approximately there, I wish to advance in force, and will not move until the troops are well in hand. I will see you to-day there." Again I wrote him on the 26th: "I had expected to join you to-day, but there have been so many things that needed special attention that I could not do so. I mean to come to-morrow. Do not advance, but have the country to the right and left of the road carefully reconnoitered. I especially desire to know if there is a short cut to the right of Caney, as I believe it will be a good plan to put a division in there and assault the town on that road."

The same day I sent this message to Admiral Sampson:

I shall, if I can, put a large force in Caney, and one perhaps still farther west, near the pipe-line conveying water to the city, the ground in that vicinity being less brushy than that between the bay and the San Juan River, making my main attack from the northeast and east. If I can get the enemy in my front and the city at my back, I can very soon make them surrender or drive them toward the Morro. You will hear my guns, of course, and can tell about where the action is taking place. I will be obliged if you can prevent any reinforcements crossing the railroad at Aguadores, but without destroying the bridge, as I may need it. I wish to express to you again the many obligations the army is under for your assistance. I have not, as yet, as much forage or rations ashore as I would like to have, but cannot delay for them any longer.

On the 27th reinforcements were beginning to arrive, and I wrote General Wheeler: "I will not feel justified in advancing until I get them on shore. The government seems to be very solicitous about us, and it is possible they have information we know nothing about." I urged him again to learn if there was "any means of moving a division off to your right, bringing it at El Caney, a good point, from which I do not believe we will be expected." On June 28 I telegraphed the Secretary of War:

I have not yet unloaded the siege-guns, but will do so as soon as I can. I do not intend to take them to the front until we are stopped or need them. It is going to be a very difficult undertaking to get them up, and if attempted now would block the road. I have four light batteries at the front, and they are heavy enough to overcome anything the Spaniards have. If we have to besiege the town I will get the guns up. The advance picket is now within two and one half miles of Santiago. Officers making reconnaissances were within one and one half miles to-day and met with no opposition.

On June 30 we were ready to strike, and the last preparations were made. Our advance was strongly posted at El Pozo, where the road ran near and parallel to the Seco River, which supplied us with water. My headquarters were established a little way back near a creek, and not far from the junction of the trail which led north to El Caney. This made the position a convenient one during the battle, and as it could not be bettered at any time I remained there until the surrender. When we pitched our tents we were about a mile from the pickets, with the greater part of the army behind us. Between our position and San Juan there was a dense forest coursed by the river and by a branch running from El Caney. Colonel Derby of the engineers and his officers had been making a topographical study of the ground in our front. The result of their work was brought to me every night, and it amounted to a careful reconnaissance of the forest before the battle. Consequently we knew that the ground to be operated on was as difficult as could well be, since movement was hardly possible except by the road to San Juan and the trail to El Caney. The Spaniards had not tried to keep our scouts out of the forest, and from the start we had found no signs of an aggressive defense.

In the afternoon of the 30th the division commanders were summoned to headquarters, the cavalry division, owing to General Wheeler's illness, being represented by General Sumner, commanding in Wheeler's absence. I explained my plan to be to put a brigade on the road between Santiago and El Caney, to keep the Spaniards at the latter place from retreating on the city, and then with the rest of Lawton's division and the divisions of Wheeler and Kent and Bates's brigade to attack the Spanish position in front of Santiago. Both Lawton and Chaffee were of the opinion that they could dispose of the Spaniards at El Caney in two hours' time; therefore I modified my plan, assigning Law-



ton's whole division for the attack of El Caney, and directed Bates's independent brigade to his support, that there should be no lack of force, and directed them, after taking El Caney, to march by the road southwest directly on Santiago until they came up to the right of Sumner, who would be deployed between the San Juan and El Caney roads, with Kent completing the line to the left of the former road. They were experienced officers, who only needed to know the general plan, which was simple, and as Kent and Sumner both had to go forward by the single main road it seemed possible, if all went well, to suit the action of the latter to Lawton's progress; but, as events turned out, they were sent forward independently of him.

Lawton's division marched during the night by the trail toward El Caney, accompanied by Capron's battery and Bates's brigade. His fire was heard at about six o'clock, and when the two hours were up I began to feel anxious. From a hill half a mile north of my headquarters I had a good view with my glass of the Spanish position at San Juan, and could see the progress made by Lawton as indicated by the smoke. After another hour it was clear to me that Lawton had more work cut out for him than he had counted on, and I decided to send the main column forward, as they were already under fire. They understood that they were to assail the Spanish blockhouses and trenches as soon as they could get into position, for there was no longer any intention of waiting until Lawton should come up on the right.

The field-telegraph had been extended to El Pozo, where Colonel McClernand, my adjutant-general, was stationed; Lieutenant Miley was with the advancing column; Major Noble was with me, employed in communicating with Lawton, to whom he made two trips during the day; Captain Plummer and Lieutenant Brooke had charge of the matter of getting ammunition and rations forward, and my other staff-officers attended to various duties. At ten o'clock Miley sent this message by courier:

Since writing last note have gone forward one quarter of a mile, about, and overtaken Colonel Sumner. Colonel Carroll's brigade is ahead, and Colonel Wood's brigade has its head with General Sumner. General Sumner has halted Colonel Wood and ordered Colonel Carroll to move to the front and attempt to turn to the right at the river. Where I am writing the earthworks are visible at one thousand yards, and it is feared that the fire of rapid-fire guns will be directed down this road. It is suggested that the light batteries at El Pozo at once open fire upon these

works with shell, and keep up the fire until the troops come into danger from our fire. Captain Howze has just returned, and says he has been about five hundred yards beyond the San Juan River. Colonel Carroll's whole brigade is across the river, he reports, and ready to turn to the right. General Kent is waiting with the head of his column one half mile to rear. Everybody is cool and determined. The two light batteries should be kept back to avoid confusion in the rear if a reverse is suffered.

McClernand, who first received the message, added, "Fire by battery ordered," meaning Grimes, who was at El Pozo, and forwarded it to me. The following message from McClernand to Miley indicates the situation at about half-past ten as seen from El Pozo: "Your message saying you are at crossing of San Juan received and sent to General Shafter. The rear of the infantry column is now here. I have told General Shafter we are complying with his order for Kent and Sumner to fight all their men if they can do so to advantage. From present firing I think Lawton is at it hard. Don't let him fight it out alone." Shortly afterward he added: "The troops should press on in front. The men standing along the road are being hit by bullets." There were sharpshooters in trees, undoubtedly, to prevent our advance. I do not think that there were any sharpshooters in the rear of our lines. The Mausers have a range of more than two miles, and it was dropping bullets which gave this impression. Later I received this despatch from Miley: "While we seem to have a good deal of ammunition yet, a quantity must be pushed forward to the San Juan River at once. The heights must be taken at all hazards. A retreat now would mean a disastrous defeat."

From my position on the hill I could see every movement of the advancing column, the troops going into position, and men crawling back and forth in the grass. As the fight progressed I was impressed with the fact that we were meeting with a very stubborn resistance at El Caney, and I began to fear that I had made a mistake in making two fights in one day, and sent Major Noble with orders to Lawton to hasten with his troops along the Caney road, placing himself on the right of Wheeler. When the order reached him, the troops were in the act of making the final charge; nothing could stop them, and when that charge was over, the fight at El Caney was won. It was then near evening. Lawton advanced immediately down the Santiago road, and after crossing the San Juan River was attacked. It was



dark, and he could not know what he had run into, so he halted and sent word of the situation to me and asked what he should do. I knew the necessity of having him on the line at Wheeler's right in the morning, and sent a courier to him with orders to retrace his steps to El Pozo. During the halt his troops got a little rest, but after midnight they retraced the road taken the previous night, passing my headquarters, and moved to the front on the El Pozo road, and were placed on Wheeler's right. This movement was completed about noon on the 2d. Bates's brigade had been sent back earlier in the evening and had taken position on Kent's extreme left. When we consider that their rest on the night of June 30 had been destroyed by the preparations to go to El Caney, and the march, that they had been engaged in battle all day, and then had marched eleven miles in the dark over rough, muddy ground, the fatigue of it can well be imagined. It was a most remarkable and arduous performance. The untiring qualities of Lawton's men were illustrated by an incident told by a correspondent, who, as they were coming in, observed a corporal of the Twenty-fifth Colored Regiment carrying one of the pets of the company, a little dog, in his arms. He said, "Corporal, did n't you march all night before last?" "Yes, sah." "Did n't you fight all day yesterday at El Caney?" "'Deed, I did." "Did n't you march all last night?" "Yes, sah." "Then why are you carrying that dog?" "Why, boss, the dog's tired."

We had met with such a stout resistance that I expected a fierce struggle on the morning of the 2d. The chief problem was to get Lawton on the line, and to intrench the position we had gained.

Shortly after two o'clock of the afternoon of July 1 I received this message from McClernand: "If you have a troop of cavalry or a company of infantry to spare, they can do good work out here stopping stragglers. This does not imply any reverse at the front, but the firing was probably hotter than some like." Soon after, I received a cheering message from Miley, dated 2:05 P.M.: "Undoubtedly we have the heights. The artillery must be pushed forward at once and strongly intrenched by night. I believe the road is clear, unless Bates is in the road. The Gatling guns and the Hotchkiss guns have gone forward, likewise dynamite-guns. I believe they are on the hill now. Ammunition must be brought forward, and food for the men. We will strongly intrench on the hill to-night. Every-

body in good spirits, determined and cool. General Wheeler is with me, and I have read this to him. Send forward intrenching-tools at once." Toward four o'clock came this, dated 3:20 P.M.

Our men are probably one mile from the river, pushing the enemy, and will certainly have taken everything on the hill. Captain Best's battery is now on the hill, and second battery must be rushed forward with all possible despatch. A train of 45-caliber ammunition has just passed, and caliber-30 ammunition must be pushed forward with energy. Also get food forward, and fresh troops, if any can be spared from General Bates's brigade. Our men are going to be too tired to dig much to-night. So far as I can learn our losses are not great.

When this passed through McClernand's hands, he ordered forward Grimes's battery, which had been held near him. I went to El Pozo, and McClernand advised Miley as follows:

The general was just here. By his order I sent directions to Kent and Wheeler to intrench at night-time and hold position. General has ordered Lawton to press the enemy; I hear him driving them, I think, near Ducrot House. He says he will send on ammunition and rations. I will send, by the general's directions, another battery.

I ordered Colonel Derby to gather up the intrenching-tools and attend to the distribution of them. He got them to San Juan Hill about midnight, and the men worked in relays until morning. There was plenty of ammunition still, but more was got to the front. Rations were scarce, for the men had generally taken off their haversacks in going into action, but pack-trains and wagon-trains of food were sent to the front during the night. During the evening of July 1 I sent the following despatch to Colonel McClernand:

I wish the four batteries put in position to-night where they can open on the town at about four o'clock in the morning and simply knock down those buildings in front of them. Ammunition, rations, and intrenching-tools, all that we have, I send up. Lawton has captured Caney and will join before daylight on the extreme right, bringing a battery with him. We ought to knock that part of the town to pieces in a short time. Communicate this to both division commanders.

Some of the guns opened in the morning, but as there was insufficient cover for them they were withdrawn and placed at El Pozo. Every available man was put on the line. It was plain that the Spanish position at the apex of the city, nearest us, was very strong, and that an assault would result in great loss of life. A fierce fusillade was kept up



intermittently, and the strain from the heat, fatigue of battle, and loss of sleep was tremendous.

Garcia had been sent with his whole force round the city to the northwest to intercept the Spanish reinforcements. On July 2 he advised me of his position by courier, and I replied at once:

I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your note of this date. General Lawton could not get through last night without returning by the road he went to El Caney. He is now in the right of the line near Santiago, and his right must be near you. General Pando is expected with five thousand men. He must be stopped, and you must do it. I believe the troops in the city will surrender very soon.

Learning during the day that, in the opinion of some of the officers, our position in case Pando's forces should arrive might be endangered, I sent for the division commanders to meet me at El Pozo. Wheeler, Lawton, Kent, and Bates came at about eight and remained an hour. I told them they were called to give their opinion of the situation in their front; that it was possible we might have to fall back; that if such a movement was made it would devolve upon me to take the whole responsibility; that I wanted their opinions to assist me in forming my decision. Beginning with the junior officer, each gave his opinion, and they did not all think alike. I expressed no opinion, but told them we would remain where we were for the present. I then mounted my horse and rode away. They hastened to the front, for as we were breaking up fierce firing was heard on Lawton's lines. It was the attack called the night sortie, but it did not amount to much, though there was wild firing in the dark.

Early the next morning, July 3, I sent a despatch to the Secretary of War which expressed my great anxiety. We were maintaining a thin line of investment about six miles long, the tension was great, Garcia had reported the Spanish reinforcements from Manzanillo near at hand, and if they should join in sufficient force, and also the garrisons at Holguin and San Luis, numbering thirteen thousand men, the position of our army would be critical. In addition to this, the situation was made more serious by the fact that storms at sea might arise at any time, preventing the landing of stores, and the rains might make the road to the front impassable. I felt it my duty to forewarn the department that such a move was possible, so I said, in part:

We have the town well invested on the north and east, but with a very thin line. Upon approaching it we find it of such a character, and the defenses so strong, it will be impossible to carry it by storm with my present force, and I am seriously considering withdrawing about five miles and taking up a new position on the high ground between the San Juan River and Siboney, so as to get our supplies to a large extent by use of the railroad, which we can use, having engine and cars at Siboney. Our losses up to date will aggregate a thousand, but lists have not yet been made. But little sickness outside of exhaustion from intense heat and exertions of the battle of day before yesterday.

Even then I was preparing to push the siege, and at half-past eight in the morning sent this demand to the Spanish commander: "I have the honor to inform you, unless you surrender, I shall be obliged to shell Santiago de Cuba. Please instruct the citizens of all foreign countries, and all women and children, that they should leave the city before 10 A. M. to-morrow." This was sent to General Wheeler for transmission by flag of truce, and he was asked to inform the other commanders of its contents. Before the morning was over, Cervera had gone to his destruction, and I knew the Spaniards regarded the situation as desperate. This knowledge immediately changed the situation. It came to me first from Lawton's lines and under date of 1:45 P. M. I advised Colonel McClernand: "Lieutenant Allen, Second Cavalry, from our extreme right, where he overlooked the bay, states that Admiral Cervera's fleet steamed out this morning and engaged our fleet. The French consul, who came into our lines yesterday, informed General Garcia that Admiral Cervera said yesterday that it was better to die fighting than to sink his ships. Rush this information all around our lines at the front."

In the afternoon I asked Colonel McClernand to "send to the front and bring me news of flag of truce. I judge from the perfect quiet that matters are under discussion. I believe that they will surrender now that the fleet has gone and that Pando cannot reach them." General Toral's reply was not received until 6:30 P. M. In it he said: "It is my duty to say to you that this city will not surrender, and that I will inform the foreign consuls and inhabitants of the contents of your message." The next day, July 4, I received word from Garcia that about four thousand Spaniards from Manzanillo, under Escario, had passed into Santiago on the evening of July 3, by an unused road. They came in on the Cobre road, and Garcia



had failed to stop them. I decided to place no further dependence on him, and to complete the investment with troops I could control, for we were expecting a much larger body of Spaniards from Holguin. My reinforcements had been arriving since the 2d, and Lawton and Ludlow extended north until we touched the waters of the bay.

My extreme left (Bates's left) was in the air, so to speak, about a mile from the eastern shore of the bay, but did not command the road to Morro. I considered the right of the line of so much greater importance that I did not intend to weaken it by extending my left to the bay. Nothing would have pleased me so much as to have had the whole Spanish army march toward the Morro. I knew they had only a small force at Aguadores, and I took measures that it should not be forced from its position. With a greater army I might have invested the town, held everybody there by fear of an immediate attack, and detached a force to assail the Morro and open the way for the fleet; but with the force at my disposal the point of danger was on my extreme right.

At 8:45 P. M. of the day that Cervera went out, I telegraphed the adjutant-general in Washington:

Your telegram inquiring about my health just received. I am still very much exhausted. I have eaten a little this afternoon, for the first time in four days. The good news has inspired everybody. When the news of the disaster to the Spanish fleet reached the front, which was during a period of truce, a regimental band, that had managed to keep their instruments on the line, played "The Star-Spangled Banner" and "There'll be a hot time in the old town to-night," men cheering from one end of the line to the other. Officers and men, without even shelter-tents, have been soaked for five days in the afternoon rains, but all are happy.

When we embarked I considered myself in excellent health for a man of my age, sixty-three. I had never been on the sick-list for any length of time. On June 30 I was on my horse nearly all day, looking at the country and preparing for the battle next day. It was very hot, and I came near suffering a sunstroke. I was nauseated and very dizzy at first. During the battle of July 1 I felt very ill, though I kept on my horse most of the day; July 2 I transacted the business of headquarters, though for a time I found it necessary to lie down. As for four days I was unable to take food, I began to fear a serious illness. I never had any idea of giving up, and in reply to an inquiry of the Secretary of War, I telegraphed:

I am not at present so much ill as exhausted from the intense strain that has been on me for the last two months. I am also suffering from an attack of gout, which prevents me from moving about. I have, however, the whole business in my hand, and am managing it through able staff-officers. When I do have to give up, I will, of course, follow your order, but I hope to be better soon.

But I feared that my illness was going to increase, and if it had, I should have had to give up and cast about as to my successor. Wheeler, the next in rank, had been very ill up to the morning of July 1, and on the night of the 2d we regarded him as a sick man; but he was improving, and we hoped he would get along, as he did. All the general officers were ailing more or less.

Physical strain and discomfort attend on every military campaign. The man who can carry lightly his responsibility for the lives of thousands of men is not fit to command. It is not an easy thing to say "Go ahead" when you know that human life is going to be sacrificed. Then there is always the uncertainty. You have to stake all on what you determine to do. The man on the opposing side is also doing something, and you never know what the result is going to be until it has demonstrated itself; and, until it has, there is intense anxiety. In addition to the responsibility for human life, and the risk to reputation, which by comparison is nothing, if you are making a mistake it may prove fatal to the cause for which you are fighting. As a matter of fact, men of an easy sense of responsibility never get to high command.

At the request of the foreign consuls and in the interest of the women and children, I gave notice that the threatened bombardment would not take place until noon of July 5. On that day I telegraphed to Washington that I should not open fire until I got Lieutenant Hobson and his men out of the city, and should not then if the taking of the place required an assault, as I considered that starving the enemy out was better.

Having a number of Spanish prisoners, I determined to effect the exchange of Hobson, if possible. On the 6th General Toral assented to my proposition, and Lieutenant Miley was sent to effect it. The commissioner appointed by the Spanish commander was Major Yrlés. The meeting took place under the broad ceiba-tree where the surrender afterward was made. About an hour was consumed in arranging the details. Three Spanish officers were taken out blindfolded. To Lieutenant Miley's surprise, the Spanish commissioner



selected an officer who had been wounded in the arm at the battle of San Juan, an acquaintance of his. We had intended to parole him if he had not been taken, and Lieutenant Miley had a paper in his pocket for that purpose. Seven Spanish soldiers were exchanged for the seven American sailors. Lieutenant Hobson was then brought within our lines, where he was enthusiastically cheered by the army.

I had learned from the English consul that Hobson was confined in one of the large buildings nearest us. It was in plain sight, and from it floated the red cross. It was under rifle fire, and as it was a building full of windows I was afraid he might be in danger; gun fire would not have been directed toward it, but shots will go astray, especially rifle-shots. The fleet, which was bombarding eight miles away, would be likely to hit it. I was very glad to get Hobson and his men out of the way. The fact that they were released by the army has never been acknowledged by officers of the navy, who simply speak of the return of Mr. Hobson to his duty.

On the same day, June 6, Captain Chadwick came to see me to arrange about joint operations, in obedience to a telegram from the President. I accepted the proposition of Admiral Sampson that he should bombard the town from the sea, because he was not willing to come into the harbor, which after Cervera went out I thought was perfectly feasible.

Small parties of men, women, and children had been coming out of Santiago continually from the time we reached Sevilla. In the main they kept on to Siboney. I did not think it right to fire on a city filled with women and children, if it could be avoided. I also knew that two thirds of the people in the city were our friends. In giving those people the opportunity to come out, I was aware that I was saddling my supply department with a great burden, for I knew the refugees could not bring out much food. I also knew that I relieved General Toral of the necessity of feeding them; but that did not weigh particularly with me so far as General Toral was concerned, as I knew the Spaniards were down to nothing but rice. The condition of the refugees was pitiable. While they were coming out, the truce, which was in the nature of a cessation of firing, did not prevent preparations on both sides.

During the advance and the fighting it was impossible to give my attention to the correspondents. They were free to go where

they liked, and some of them were wounded. After the great stress was over, I received a despatch from Washington calling my attention to the fact that a newspaper was reporting us in great need,—the men suffering for food and clothing,—and the situation desperate. The correspondent whose request to be put on shore before his fellows had been refused by me was mentioned as the author of the statements. I met him in the road, told him what had been telegraphed to me, and asked for his authority. He said that some of it he had seen, and the rest he had heard from others. I told him the statements were not true, and also advised Washington to that effect. I did not see his panicky despatch of July 3 until after he had been taken on General Miles's ship, bound for Porto Rico. If we had been fighting a stronger power it might have done us a great deal of harm, and if I had known the character of the despatch when I met him in the road, I should have placed him under arrest and ordered him out of Cuba, as an ordinary measure of protection to the army.

When I reminded General Toral on the 6th that the situation had changed so as to be still more in our favor, he asked for time to consult with Madrid. To facilitate that end, I allowed the cable-operators to return from El Caney, and also the British consul, who was useful in the negotiations. As a result, on July 8 General Toral offered to march away if he might do so with his arms and be unmolested as far as Holguin. I favored the acceptance of this proposition, and said so in my telegram to Washington. I took that position without consulting with any one. Later in the day I met some of my division commanders, and they all felt as I did. General Wheeler advised it strongly, and wrote out his views at his own suggestion. The retirement of General Toral would leave us in possession of all the intended fruits of the campaign, would save us the care of his army, and would obviate the great loss of life to follow from sickness and a possible assault. None of us felt that we were losing much, and the chance of getting the army away in good health, so that it might be useful elsewhere, was a strong incentive. All knew that sickness was upon us, and we still believed that Havana would be the scene of the last campaign of the war. But the Secretary of War said "No," possibly because the authorities possessed information of a tendency at Madrid to sue for peace. In my reply to General Toral I had prepared



him for an adverse decision. This finished the first stage of the negotiations.

The truce was ended at 4 P. M. on the 10th, the Spaniards getting in the first shots, but their cannon were silenced before dark. Every few minutes the fleet dropped a shell into the city, firing from off Aguadores. This fire was continued on the 11th, and about noon the last gun of the campaign was fired. Early in the morning of this day I received the following telegram:

WASHINGTON, D. C., July 11, 1898.

MAJOR-GENERAL SHAFTER: Should Spanish surrender unconditionally and desire to return to Spain, the United States government will ship them there direct at its own expense.

R. A. ALGER,  
Secretary of War.

I again summoned General Toral to surrender, telling him I was authorized to say that my government would transport his entire command to Spain, and this offer, as he informed me, he at once communicated to Madrid. Our troops were now fast succumbing to rains, exposure, and exhaustion, and a speedy termination of the siege was longed for, but the negotiations were too promising to warrant the losses of an assault.

At the time I told General Toral of the offer of the government to transport his command back to Spain at our expense, he asked me if the offer included his entire command, consisting of the Fourth Army-Corps, which included about twelve thousand more troops in the towns of the province. At first I thought the proposition was made only to gain time, that the interior garrisons were all coming down upon us, and that he was waiting for them. But in talking privately with Mr. Mason, acting English consul, I was assured that there was no double-dealing in the matter, and that they were in earnest about surrendering. I was then convinced, from the fact that General Toral said he was authorized by Captain-General Blanco to do this, that Spain had determined to quit. I turned to Lieutenant Miley, and said: "This settles it, and closes the war." Otherwise, why should they relieve us of the care of eleven thousand five hundred prisoners in Santiago, and give us twelve thousand more that could march toward Havana, or, at any rate, could keep out of our way? In my despatch to the President I said in the concluding paragraph: "In my opinion this closes the war with Spain." They thought in Washington that I was over-sanguine, and this part of the despatch was not given to the public until

three or four days later, when the French minister called to inquire upon what terms peace could be had.

On the 12th I informed General Toral that General Miles, the commander-in-chief of the United States army, had arrived at my camp and asked for a personal interview. He consented, and it took place between the lines about noon of the 13th. General Miles, and Miley, Derby, and McKittrick of my staff, and Colonel Maus were with me. I conducted the negotiations with General Toral during the first part of the interview. Later, General Miles spoke with him in confirmation of what I had said as to our reinforcements and our strength, and in answer to some of General Toral's objections that his duty and his honor made it imperative that he should prolong the contest. I did not then, and do not now, regard it as any part of the official interview. At no time during his stay did General Miles give any orders as to the dispositions or arrangements I had made in reference to the siege. He asked me what I thought of sending some troops to Cabañas, west of the harbor entrance. I said I did not think it a proper place for an attack, and added that I had no troops that could be spared from the trenches for the purpose. He then replied that he would send General Henry, with troops that had come with him and that were on board transports, to land and make an attack toward the Socapa battery. General Henry steamed to Cabañas, but the troops were not landed.

During the interview with General Toral General Miles called me aside to say that they were talking to gain time, and that I had better break off and make an assault. I replied: "General, let's wait awhile and see. We can make the assault any time; but when we do, negotiations will stop, and I believe they are going to surrender." He said: "Well, then you had better break off to-morrow morning at daylight." I replied: "General, we might as well break off now as to-morrow at daylight." Mr. Mason, who was there as interpreter, had said to me that they ought to receive a reply from the Spanish government during that night, and it would be impossible to get a flag of truce out by daylight to inform us of its contents. I said to Mr. Mason: "Tell General Toral that he may have until twelve o'clock to-morrow to make an official answer." We then returned to our lines.

Next morning at nine o'clock a flag of truce came out notifying us of the surrender. Immediately after that, an interview was



arranged with General Toral, at which General Miles was present, and arrangements were made for commissioners to draw the terms of capitulation, to meet at two o'clock that afternoon. I rode back to General Wheeler's camp, and designated Wheeler, Lawton, and Miley as our commissioners. They met at two o'clock of the 14th and had three sessions, the last session lasting until about one o'clock that night. Work was resumed at nine o'clock next morning, and continued without interruption until about 2:30 P. M. of the 15th, when the preliminaries of the capitulation were signed.

Our commissioners went out with the idea that the surrender had been unconditional; but within half an hour they discovered that the Spanish commissioners were only empowered to draw up preliminaries, which were not to be binding until the approval of Spain had been received. On account of the trouble experienced in communicating with Madrid, they did not expect a reply inside of two or three days. Then we thought it a plan to gain time; but on talking with Mr. Mason, who was acting as one of the Spanish commissioners, we were led to believe they were acting in good faith and that the time demanded was reasonable. If they should surrender without the approbation of the home government, the officers feared that the army would not be permitted to land on the shores of Spain. Indeed, it has been reported that General Toral was mobbed when he arrived home, and was obliged to return on board his ship and go to another port.

Early on the 16th a letter came from General Toral saying that Madrid had approved the capitulation and that his commissioners were ready to make the preliminaries final. I replied that our commissioners would be ready at twelve, but General Toral answered at once that his commissioners would not be ready before two, at which time the commissioners met. By five o'clock the surrender was signed. General Toral was present on the afternoon of the 16th during the whole of the time that the commissioners sat. I appeared at four o'clock, and from that time until about six he and I were engaged in arranging the details for the formal surrender of the 17th. The meetings of the commissioners were held about midway between the American and Spanish lines, under the ceiba-tree where all the conferences had taken place. The commissioners sat on the ground and wrote with pencils, using a board resting on a camp-stool for a table. Two copies of the agreement were drawn

up, in English and Spanish, on separate sheets. The English copy was first signed by the American commissioners and afterward by the Spanish; the Spanish copy first by the Spanish commissioners and then by the American. The Spanish commissioners took the Spanish copy and the American commissioners the English. In addition there were two unsigned copies, the American commissioners taking the Spanish copy and the Spanish the English copy. The Spanish commissioners were Colonel Escario, Colonel Fontan, and Mr. Mason.

Earlier in the day I asked Admiral Sampson by message to send a representative to the formal surrender the next day, and about noon I personally invited General Garcia to be present. I never had an opportunity of asking Garcia about a letter received a few days later, purporting to come from him, in which dissatisfaction was expressed that he had not been invited to witness the ceremony. As I knew that it was not so, and that he knew it, I have always doubted the authenticity of the letter. The invitation was given in the presence of half a dozen members of my staff; it applied only to General Garcia and his staff, as did my invitation to my own generals. In reply, he asked me if he had been correctly informed that I was going to continue the Spanish civil officials in power. I told him that I so intended for the present. He then drew himself up and rather dramatically said he was sorry he could not go with me, but he could not go where Spain ruled. I replied: "Very well; I am sorry you feel that way about it, but for the present I know of no better men than those now in office."

As witnesses of the ceremony of surrender, I took the general officers with their staffs, and a guard of one hundred men. General Toral brought out with him his general officers and staffs and a body of troops of the same number. General Ludlow had given me the sword and spurs taken from the body of General Vara del Rey, who had been killed in the defense of El Caney, and requested me to give them to General Toral. During the interview prior to the declaration of surrender, I handed General Toral the sword, informing him of the circumstances and the request from the officer who had secured it that it be taken back by General del Rey's companions to his home in Spain, and given to his family. The presentation of these articles was entirely unexpected by General Toral, and as I spoke in English it was not until the translation was completed that he



fully realized what I was doing. He then showed a great deal of feeling; in fact, he could hardly speak, as his emotions nearly overpowered him. He received the sword and spurs and handed them to one of his staff, all of whom were equally surprised and gratified.

General Toral then made the formal declaration of the surrender. He placed himself in front of the hundred men that he had been permitted to bring out to represent the Spanish army, with his officers near him. Our detachment was drawn up in lines fronting them. Advancing to the front of the center of his troops, he drew his sword and presented arms, and said: "I surrender the Spanish troops under my command, and this place." I was about twenty feet in front of and facing him, and, causing my command to present arms, replied that I accepted his surrender in behalf of the government of the United States.

This completed the ceremony of the surrender so far as the troops were concerned.

I did not meet General Linares, who had been severely wounded, but I had many interviews with General Toral after the surrender. I found him fair and honest, always disposed to do what was right, and not inclined to make any demands that were unreasonable. At all times he exercised the greatest care for and control over his men.

We rode into the city after the surrender, and at noon the American flag was raised on the governor's palace by Captain William H. McKittrick and Lieutenant John D. Miley of my staff, and Lieutenant Joseph Wheeler, Jr., of General Wheeler's staff. One hundred mounted men from the Second Cavalry, commanded by Captain Brett, and from the Ninth Infantry, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Ewers, were drawn up on the plaza in front of the palace. The generals and their staffs were grouped directly in front of the flag-staff, and precisely at twelve o'clock the flag was hoisted. All the officers uncovered, arms were presented, and the band played "The Star-Spangled Banner." This completed the ceremony of taking possession.

From this time on our troops had only to guard the prisoners and make themselves as comfortable as possible. The transports came at once into the harbor, and the unloading of all stores, tentage, etc., was pushed with all possible despatch. The sickness among the troops was increasing every day, a large number of the cases being reported to me as yellow fever. Very many of the men were also being taken down by malarial fevers,

the greatest number in one day, as I now recall, being about eight hundred and fifty.

Early in August I received a communication from the War Department suggesting, on the advice of the surgeon-general, that the troops should remain at Santiago until the danger of yellow fever was past. I was told that the dangerous months were August, September, and October. I did not believe it wise to send the men to the hills, as there was no place where the elevation was above the yellow-fever line, and the difficulty of feeding the men would be great—in fact, almost impossible, as everything would have to be carried on pack-mules. The place where they were then encamped, about the city, had less rainfall than any other part of the province, and I regarded it then, and do now, as the best location to encamp troops. I thought the matter over and determined upon a telegram to the Secretary of War, telling him that in my opinion it would be very unwise and would probably result in the death of thousands of men if they were required to stay in Cuba. At the time we all knew it was absolutely necessary for them to stay until after the departure of the Spanish prisoners. I wished to see how far I was sustained in my opinion as to the situation by the general officers of the command, and sent for them. When they assembled I read the opinion of the surgeon-general and asked for their views of the situation. Each expressed his views as to staying there and *stamping out the disease in Cuba*, or removing to the United States. One officer was decided in his opinion that it was my duty not only not to wait for orders, but immediately to take such ships as were in the harbor, load them with troops, and start them for the United States. I told him we would not leave until we had orders, if we left our bones there. But every officer at the meeting felt as I did, that the only salvation for the survivors of that army was to leave Cuba as soon as possible. I then said: "I am glad to see that you all coincide with my views." I bade them good afternoon, and as they were about to go General Bates asked: "General, would you not like to have us embody our views in a letter to you?" I replied: "It is a good idea, and I shall be glad to have you do so." He answered: "We will go out and prepare a letter." They went into the front room, and after a while came back with a letter which received the signatures of all the general officers, the paper that has been called the "round-robin." I understood later that General Wood drafted



the letter. Their views coincided so strikingly with my own that I forwarded the letter with my message to the adjutant-general. While they were preparing the letter—and there was no particular secrecy about it—some newspaper men obtained a copy, or were permitted to see it, and it was telegraphed the next morning, or possibly that night, to the public press. I regretted this very much, as it occasioned throughout the whole land a great deal of unnecessary alarm, and, I have no doubt, was very embarrassing to the government. Colonel Roosevelt was at the conference, and asked me if I had any objection to his telegraphing his own views to the authorities. I replied that if he chose to send anything over his own signature and on his own responsibility, he might do so.

The disposition of the surrendered troops toward our soldiers was remarkable for its friendliness. As a nation we had not been thrown much in contact with Spaniards, and I was astonished, the moment the surrender was made, to see the cordial relations that were immediately established between the troops on both sides. The behavior of the Spaniards was exemplary; they were delighted with the prospect of going back to Spain, and just before their departure I received a letter purporting to be from a soldier of the Spanish infantry, in which he expressed the kindly feelings of eleven thousand Spanish soldiers, their warmest gratitude, and their appreciation of the kindness that had been shown them by our army.

In closing this article, I must refer to the spirit that animated the entire army under my command, from the time they gathered together at Tampa until their return home and dispersion at Montauk Point. They constantly showed a disposition to do all in their power to carry out the wishes of the commander and to promote the interests of the government. This sentiment pervaded officers and men alike. The good will shown toward me and toward one another in that campaign is remarkable in military annals.

From the organization of the Fifth Corps until its dispersion at Montauk, not a single officer was brought to trial for any offense. There was not the slightest friction or ill feeling among the general officers, or, so far as I know, among other officers; and I do not think a single man was court-martialed. I also wish to call attention to the fact that in the history of this nation this was the first time that an army composed almost entirely of the regulars has fought a campaign. Heretofore in all campaigns the volunteers, who of course are the bulwark of our nation, have many times outnumbered the regulars. In the War of the Rebellion the latter cut no figure at all except as to the officers. In the Fifth Army-Corps I had virtually the whole of the regular army of the United States. That was brought about by the fact that when I left Tampa the volunteer troops were just beginning to arrive, and I had but three regiments of volunteers, the Seventy-first New York, the Second Massachusetts, and the "Rough Riders," the latter a regiment which had been raised, as the regular regiments are, by enlistments from Maine to Washington Territory, and the members of which were nearly all inured to the vicissitudes of a soldier's life, and were in every respect perfect soldiers except that they were not drilled and disciplined as an organization.

Santiago has been called a soldiers' campaign. There is a great deal of truth in that, but the implication that any important movement or action was taken without orders or forethought is untrue. When the final attack was made on July 1, individual officers and men, and in fact most of the officers and men, distinguished themselves by gallant and intelligent performance of duty. They were intelligent American soldiers; each one was thinking of what he was doing, and not depending for all his thinking on the officers over him. In that respect the soldiers of the American army are superior to those of any other army in the world.

## THE ORATOR.

BY GEORGE EDWARD WOODBERRY.

I SAW him stand upon the Judgment-Day  
 Who in his life all human wrath had braved,  
 The appealing angel in his voice, and say:  
 "If but one soul be lost, how is man saved?"