on as too extreme. The only party which showed any support for Maura were the Liberal-Autonomists, though there was little enthusiasm in Cuba itself. Also Maura’s arrogant presentation of the ms to the Cortes was calculated to anger rather than please. But a party of the Conservatives, led by Maura’s friend, Ramón Herrera, induced to break away from their negative colleagues and establish the group of ‘Reformistas’ to back reform. For some months there was a chance that Maura’s scheme might work; even Máximo Gómez later admitted that if these reforms had come earlier, there might have been no new rebellion. But, as in the case of most moderate ms put forward by imperial governments, there was little support for Maura even among his own administration.

1893 was a year of difficulty for the Spanish politicians. In the middle of the summer there were a series of riots in San Sebastián in favour of autonomy, and those who opposed Maura argued that his proposed autonomy in Cuba could lead to the disintegration of Spain. September came an Arab attack on the Spanish Moroccan outpost elilla and the consequent beginning of a new war there: Martínez Pos, kingmaker and pacifier of the Cubans, went to Melilla to hand a new Spanish expeditionary army. Some weeks before, an attempt had been made on his life by a young anarchist, Paulino Pallás: another young anarchist, Santiago Salvador, attempted to revenge on the society which had condemned his friend Pallás (death), and threw a bomb, in the Teatro del Liceo in Barcelona, of the second act of Rossini’s William Tell: thirty people were dead, eighty wounded. All the threats of ruin, internal and external, had seemed to threaten Spain, thus glowing violently in the aura even among his own administration.

In February 1894 as the date for the next and, as he hoped, final rising in Cuba against Spain. But those planters (particularly in Puerto Príncipe) who were on the side of rebellion were anxious to finish the harvest, and once again economic or commercial motives delayed a Cuban rebellion. Puerto Príncipe was an essential province, and Martí and Máximo Gómez (in New York from April 1894) therefore waited, but this postponement confirmed both in their belief that they could not once again wait for the rich. On 30 September 1894, Gómez wrote to Maceo, in Costa Rica recovering from a wound, allegedly inflicted by Spanish would-be assassins, but otherwise in the same superb physical state as in the 1870s, ‘After November 15 we must be prepared to move immediately.’

During late 1894 Martí, impoverished, often ill, probably suffering from tuberculosis, ‘laboured as one inspired ... The organization of the conspiracy in Cuba was crystallizing ... Cigar workers responded nobly ... At the end of October Martí let it be known he would have $5,000 more.’ Working with the recollection of innumerable past mistakes, from Narciso López onwards, it was agreed that no rising would begin until at least four provinces (out of the six) were reliably reported ready for revolution and one province as well as Oriente was ready for the reception of rebel officers. Three expeditions were meantime gathered together in the Florida port of Fernandina, near Jacksonville. But thanks to the carelessness or treachery of their field commander, Colonel López Queralta, the U.S. authorities caught the whole group on 14 January 1895. This was a bad blow. In fact it also served as a stimulus. Before, no one had thought that Martí could assemble such a large force and in secret. Those who had believed Martí to be a poet and a dreamer were more impressed by ‘the imaginative promise of his plan than by its temporary frustration’. Two weeks later, on 29 January, Martí, with a representative from

Hugh Thomas, Cuba: The Pursuit of Freedom.

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36 Rubens, Liberty, 15-16.
37 Documentos de Carlos Baliño, 13.
38 Rubens, Liberty, 72-3.
39 Ibid., 74.