

ning of the downfall of the Spanish reign in Cuba. If the Spaniards here have any sense, they will let well alone. QUASIMODO.

CUBA.

Valmaseda's Expedition—The Havana Volunteers—Valuable Co-Operation—New Suggestions.

From Our Own Correspondent.

HAVANA, Saturday, June 17, 1871.

VALMASEDA leaves to-morrow morning, on the steamer *Rapido*, to undertake his proposed campaign in the Central Department. The horses belonging to the Staff, and a number of pack-horses, together with nearly one and a half million of rations, were shipped on the steamer *San Quintin*, at Batabano, today. The public imagines that VALMASEDA will go direct from here to Puerto Principe, but such is not the case. He leaves Batabano on Sunday morning, and will proceed on the south side of the island to Cienfuegos, where he will remain a short time, take two companies of Vincayan volunteers with him, and then continue along the coast, leaving rations at the mouth of the Canto. According to the news he receives at Santa Cruz del Sur, or at Manzanillo, regarding the conspiracy and other affairs in the Eastern Department, he may return westward to Santa Cruz del Sur, or proceed to Santiago de Cuba, and remain there for a week or more. After attending to matters at Santiago de Cuba, should his presence be required there, he will get the necessary information as to matters and things on the southern coast of the island, from Manzanillo westward, leaving all his train at Las Tunas, going down and then return himself to Las Tunas, and proceeding to Sancti Spiritus, where he will leave the two companies of Vincayans and take the Battalion of Rodas with him to the coast again. Then he will embark in a steamer and land at Vertientes, whence he will proceed by slow marches to Sancti Spiritus. Immediately on entering the Central Department he will use his utmost endeavors to circulate a new proclamation among the insurgents, and several dozens of *presentados* have already been engaged to scatter it at the risk of their lives. The proclamation does not differ essentially from other proclamations which have been issued, except that in this document VALMASEDA styles the Cubans "Soldiers," a term which hitherto has not been applied to them, and which may induce many of them to surrender. The astuteness of VALMASEDA in styling the Cubans soldiers, and offering an unconditional pardon to those who have fought with arms in their hands, may produce ill feeling between the fighting Cubans and those who hold civil appointments under the Republic, but VALMASEDA is unwise when he says, "return to the respect which you entertained toward the legitimate authorities," for that lack of respect is one of the principal causes of the revolution. The respect which the Cubans entertained for their so-called legitimate authorities was such, that they wanted to get rid of them at any price; these same legitimate authorities only created the respect of fear, and their rule was submitted to because it was enforced by bayonets.

THE VOLUNTEERS OF HAVANA.

In connection with VALMASEDA'S new campaign comes the often-disputed question as to whether the Havana volunteers are really soldiers, loyal Spaniards and ready to carry out their offers. Judging from what has occurred, and is now occurring, these volunteers are not soldiers, or if called so, of a very irregular and disobedient kind; that they are probably Spaniards, but not very loyal ones and that they are not united. At the dinner given by the General the Colonels of Volunteers offered the services of their men to go into the country. VALMASEDA accepted their services for the military line near Moron stating plainly: "Gentlemen, if after going to the Central Department people will ask why I don't move ahead with great rapidity, you can tell them it is because I must move slowly, for I need three more columns. If you will send two thousand men to the military line at Moron, I shall take the troops thence, and can then move with quickness." The volunteers held meeting after meeting; and as guarding the military line is an entirely different business from talking about the same, the Second, Third, Seventh and First Light Battalions point blank refused to furnish their quota. It is even undecided whether the rest will go, and it appears that charges made against prominent military officers of being unwilling to finish the war, because then their chances of making money will cease, are also true about some of the leaders of the Spanish party. Spaniards in Santiago de Cuba furnished provisions, clothing and medicines to the insurgents, and Spaniards in Havana are directly and indirectly accused by their own countrymen of doing the same thing. Even names are mentioned in certain circles, and it is very likely that there is some truth in all this. At any rate, it is certain that prominent steam-ship owners and provision-dealers are in high glee while the revolution continues.

NEW SUGGESTIONS.

That funny, nondescript sparrow, who writes so much patriotic stuff in the *Voz de Cuba*, but who, I am assured, is one of the principal opponents of the idea that the volunteers should take the field, wishes the authorities to offer a prize to the head of every prominent insurgent, and cites examples in proof of why it should be done; if the *Gonion* could take the catching by contract, and receive a commission on every prominent insurgent caught, without endangering his own personal safety. But, today, the editorial of the *Voz* is on a new track, all tending to the same end, namely, the appointment of that famous General, CONCHA, as Captain-General. CONCHA'S appointment would be the signal of a few executions, and the true begin-