

Spanish Forces in Cuba.

It is not easy to get at the strength of the forces of contending parties in a war. We remember in our late war that the statements about the armies were frequently greatly exaggerated on both sides. The rebels especially made out that they had large forces when they had not, for the purpose of producing an effect, and defeated generals always magnified vastly the numbers opposed to them. It is the same, or worse, with regard to the war in Cuba. A statement has been sent to us of the strength of the Spanish army in that island, which must be either very much overrated or it shows that the Cubans are much stronger than the Spaniards admit. We give the figures for what they are worth:—

INFANTRY.

Eight regiments of infantry of the line, two battalions of 800 men each.....	12,800
Twenty-five battalions of light infantry at 1,000.....	25,000
Two battalions of the Guard (all veterans) at 1,000.....	2,000
Two battalions of militia (estimated).....	1,000
Eleven battalions of infantry organized in Cuba, estimated to be of same strength as the Peninsular light infantry.....	11,000

ARTILLERY.

One regiment of four batteries, each eight companies.....	1,000
One regiment of mountain artillery, two battalions of four batteries each, eight companies.....	1,000

(Field artillery being organized, force not stated.)

CAVALRY.

Twenty-five squadrons, fifty companies of 150 men each (full strength in Spanish Army).....	7,500
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ENGINEERS.

One battalion, ten companies of 150 men each.....	1,500
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MARINES.

Four battalions.....	4,000
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Besides these forces in the field there are more than 40,000 volunteer troops doing garrison duty..... 40,000

Grand total..... 107,400.

If this estimate is at all reliable it must be based upon the number of troops originally sent out from Spain and those organized in Cuba, without taking into account the depletion of the army by sickness and death, losses in battle, desertions, returned soldiers, and other causes. Of the sixty-seven thousand regulars and militia it is fair to conclude there are not now more than thirty-five thousand effective men, if as many. The forty thousand volunteers might be reduced to twenty-five thousand. But these do garrison duty only, and are not very effective any way. In fact they constitute a force on paper only. Except the few Spaniards enrolled in this body the rest cannot be trusted, and the Spanish authorities are too sagacious to trust them in the field or out of sight. According to the *Almanach de Gotha*, the entire active army of Spain last year amounted to only eighty-four thousand two hundred and ninety men. How could sixty-seven thousand be spared for Cuba? How, in the disturbed condition of Spain, could the government spare more than three-fourths of its army for this colony alone? The statement is incredible, and shows that it is made for the purpose of deceiving the public both on this side of the Atlantic and in Spain. We rather think the figures given might be divided by the figure three and be nearer the truth. If the number of troops originally sent to Cuba approaches that stated there must have been a fearful loss of life, and this is a bad omen for the continuance of Spanish rule over the island. Indeed, it furnishes the most powerful argument for the prospect of Cuban independence. Admitting this extravagant statement of Spanish forces to be true, it shows the inability of Spain to put down the insurrection. Nearly eighteen months have elapsed since the war in Cuba commenced, and yet Spain is further off than ever from subduing the insurgents. If sixty-seven thousand regulars and forty thousand volunteers, according to this Spanish statement, cannot put down the insurrection in eighteen months, how long will it take? And where are the additional forces to be found to fill up the loss by disease, battle and other causes? What, too, becomes of the assertion that there is no war in Cuba of any consequence? With all the power Spain has been able to use the insurgents, so far from being suppressed, have grown stronger; and the late news of their success proves this. According to this evidence of the Spaniards themselves they have a very serious war on hand, yet our Secretary of State cannot see a case of belligerency. Red tape in the State Department, and Spanish falsehoods have proved stronger than facts or the interests and sympathies of the American people.