

A CUBAN VESSEL SEIZED BY A BRITISH GUNBOAT.

HAVANA, Jan. 7.—The following intelligence has been received from Nassau: The schooner *Violin* left Nassau on the 17th of December, having cleared for Puerto Plata, with a cargo of arms and ammunition. On the 18th the schooner *Tweed* sailed for Jacksonville, having on board 60 Cubans. On the 19th inst., while at sea, the *Tweed* transferred the Cubans to the *Violin*. The British gunboat *Lapwing* was watching the transfer, and after it was accomplished took both schooners in tow, and brought them back to Nassau.

THE NUMBER OF THE SPANISH TROOPS.

WASHINGTON, Jan. 7.—Rear Admiral Poor writes to the Department from Key West, Dec. 28th that he had received from the U. S. Consul-General at Havana, a slip cut from a newspaper in that city relating to the arrival of the Spanish frigate *Navas de Toloto*. The number of troops brought by her added to those already on the island makes the total 13,784. The Consul-General says there are no foreign men-of-war at Havana, and there is nothing new in the political situation.

THE WASHINGTON CHARGES AGAINST THE CUBANS—THEIR DENIAL BY THE JUNTA.

THEIR DENIAL BY THE JUNTA.

To the Editor of *The Tribune*.

SIR: A telegram from Washington published in this day's *Harald*, gives the following statements, purporting to proceed from a high official source: That intercepted letters show that the Cuban Junta is badly demoralized, and distracted by internal dissensions; that one member of the Junta has written to a friend in Cuba stating that the Cuban Envoy, Mr. Lemus, is a weak, inefficient, ambitious, and pompous official; that in another letter Mr. Aldama is called a traitor; that nearly every member of the Junta is abused by some one or other of his colleagues in the fiercest manner, and characterized by them with the vilest epithets. Although the close analogy between the above statements and the action recently attributed to the Junta in a false telegram from Havana published in the press of this city, is sufficiently apparent, we feel it our duty thus publicly to declare that not one of us has ever written the letters referred to, nor any other in the remotest degree containing any such expressions; that the Junta is not and never has been distracted by internal dissensions; and we defy the Spanish Minister, any of his satellites, or any one else in Washington to produce any such letter written by any one of us. We trust that the non-acceptance of this challenge will be sufficient proof of the falsity of the charges made against us, and that it will at the same time demonstrate how unreliable is the statement from Washington that the insurrection is "on its last legs." We are, Sir, respectfully yours,

M. DE ALDAMA, HILARIO CISNEROS,

FRANCISCO TRESSER, JOSE MD. MORA,

New-York, Jan. 7, 1870. T. M. MESTRE.

THE REVOLUTIONARY ORGAN IN ANSWER TO THE REPORT OF THE CUBAN COLLAPSE.

We extract from *La Revolucion*, the Cuban official organ published in this city, a few paragraphs in answer to an article in yesterday's *Herald*, purporting to come from Washington:

At last Mr. Fish speaks in *The Herald*. All the journals and impartial men of the country agree in condemning the narrow policy which the Secretary of State has evinced, while preserving a profound silence; in fact, saying nothing at all, and—what is still worse in a Minister—doing nothing. Mr. Fish, catching the contagion of the Spanish influence by which he is surrounded, has permitted himself to find a place for his hopes and fears in documents, either fictitious, or, at any rate, of no value.

It is said that there are in the Secretary's office certain intercepted letters in which accusations are found against distinguished persons, and in which a Cuban General, or Generals have manifested a desire to surrender to the Captain-General.

Who intercepted these letters? It could not have been the American Government, which has not either the means or the power to do so; it must be then the Spanish Government, that same Government which has pretended now for seven days that a circular of the Junta had declared the rebellion at an end; the same Government which has practiced lying for ages before the face of every nation, the origin of which is with itself. These letters of which *The Herald* speaks are forged. We have not read them, nor, in fact, have we seen them; but we do not hesitate to say they are unqualified fabrications.

If not, why should their authors be kept in the background? Why not let us have their dates and precise import?

The very fact of their being so important, as is claimed, shows that they are of spurious origin. It may have been that some Cuban—though it is difficult to believe it—has, because of discontentment or misrepresentation, spoken of *Miraké Latorre* as an ambitious man, and of *Aldama* as a traitor; but what would this amount to? As to the General spoken of—if there be such a General—where is his command? Why does he not carry out his threat?

Several days ago it was announced that 1,500 Cubans had surrendered at Las Tunas, but to-day the telegraph which announced the news now informs us that the fact has not been confirmed, and that it is uncertain. Where is this extraordinary General? we again ask.

Mr. Fish attributes the ill-luck of the Cuban cause to the incapacity of the Junta. *The Herald* and *own*, every day, as well as a thousand other papers, attribute all this to Mr. Fish. The last suggestion is suspicious, even looking at the statement from an American point of view.

The members of the Junta and all Cubans know perfectly well—and have said so—that Cuba would triumph with or without the aid of foreign nations; and if any one expected aid from the United States, it was not as a matter of charity, but they supposed that such conduct would least comport with the natural, traditional American policy. If Mr. Fish had a different understanding of what that policy was, or if he relied upon occult plans or mysterious combinations—that is another matter. He is, in fact, but a minister named by the President. Gen. Grant is responsible, and Mr. Grant knows better than we do what is American policy.

Now Mr. Fish speaks of sympathies, and of how, though feeling their influence upon himself, he has been obliged to disband expeditions, and capture ships of war. We could say something upon this point, but it is an old story, and of but little consequence. The most important, new, and curious revelation made is that which comes from the Secretary's lips, to-day disclosed for the first time, viz.: that he had drawn up and prepared a proclamation in favor of the Cubans, ready to be signed by the President. That is a fact which we placed before the public in a former number, afterward republished, as it was, in many of the American journals. It was at the time spoken of as an extraordinary piece of news.

Mr. Fish continues solemnly the statement made by us, that a proclamation in favor of Cuban recognition was to have been made by the President on the 30th of September. This, the Secretary says was true, in effect that there was only wanting the signature of the Executive. But, adds the Minister, soon after this, disaster after disaster happened to the Cuban arms, and the President found himself compelled by necessity, and against his will, to refuse his signature.

What happened in this unhappy month of September? Our memory does not record a single disaster as having happened in the whole of that month, neither great nor small. If we examine the documents presented by Mr. Fish, we do not find that Mr. Plumb (who was not asleep when unfavorable reports could be made) spoke of anything as having occurred during that month of an unfavorable character. If we examine our dispatches and letters, the same state of things is disclosed. Per contra. During the battle of Las Tunas, a real battle in fact, wherein the Spaniards acknowledged a loss of 172 men killed, and which fact was sent up in an official report to *Caballero de Rodas*. The Spanish official report of that action showed very clearly that the Cubans were not mere bandits; that they had fire-arms; that they were not ignorant of the art of war; but, on the other hand, explained how veterans were dislodged, and driven out of their trenches. The Spaniards called it a victory; so they did the night at Cullao, but did they ever acknowledge, for that matter, that they had been beaten at Trafalgar?