

### rumored Failure of the Cuban Revolution—What Our Government Should Do.

In our Washington correspondence to-day will be found despatches which, if absolutely true, leave us little room to doubt, that the patriot cause in Cuba is practically dead. Our correspondent, who has access to the best sources of information, is evidently satisfied with the credibility and general accuracy of the report which he has made. If, as we have said, the report be true, there is, in point of fact, no rebellion on the island. The insurgents, it is said, have been reduced to a mere handful of men, some armed and some unarmed, who are living by plunder, and whose only remaining strength consists in the Micawber-like hope that something may turn up. They occupy no town, they possess no stronghold, and when seen at all they are seen on the narrow roads, obscure bridle paths and generally in places where the soldiers of the regular army are least likely to be found. This, however, is not all. It appears from certain intercepted letters that the Junta itself is badly demoralized, and that petty wrangling about precedence and leadership occupies their time, to the exclusion almost of their proper business. The letters generally betray distrust. One letter denounces Lemus; another calls Aldama a traitor, and another actually proposes a surrender to the Captain General. The fact that so many soldiers had to be sent from Spain to put down the insurrection, and which to so many seemed to imply that the rising was really powerful, is explained by the other fact that cholera, yellow fever and other diseases have done more to kill off Spaniards than Cuban bullets and sabres. We have again to say that if this intelligence is found to be truthful in its essential features there is no longer any rebellion in Cuba, and the revolution has turned out a lamentable failure.

It is our conviction, however, that, much as the Cubans are themselves to blame, much as they have bungled their proper work, and much as they allowed opportunity to slip, the American government, unless it is quick to clear its skirts, will have some sins to answer for. No one who has watched this Cuban business from its commencement will refuse to admit that in the earlier months of General Grant's administration the Cubans had good reason to count on American sympathy and support. Our government had conferences with the Spanish Minister in Washington; our Minister at Madrid had conferences with the Spanish government, and the conferences in both capitals had Cuba for their subject. It is a fact also that Minister Lemus had dealings with Secretary Fish—dealings which implicated our government, which encouraged the Cubans, and which, unless covered by some early and daring stroke of policy, will leave a permanent stain on General Grant's administration. If Secretary Fish encouraged the Cubans to buy munitions of war and other supplies, and promised protection in American waters, he did much, so much, in fact, that he ought to have done more. General Grant, too, ought to have known that this was a half-hearted policy that was dangerous in the extreme unless contingencies were carefully provided for. That the Cuban Junta and those who acted with them proved themselves a parcel of blundering blockheads is no justification of the conduct of our present administration. The administration has not in this Cuban business proved itself true to the American people, and certainly we have yet to wait for evidence of high, broad and farseeing statesmanship in the same direction. Facts, however, are facts, and, whatever our inclinations, we have no choice but to bow to them. Between the blundering of Cubans on the one hand and the blundering of our administration on the other there are no longer any grounds on which belligerent rights can be granted to what has been called the Cuban republic.

If the news which we publish be correct—and we have no reason to doubt that it is correct—the situation is new. We must look at it as it is, and make the best of it. If six months ago, or even later, the administration had followed our advice and accorded belligerent rights to the Cuban insurgents one of two things must have resulted—either Cuba would have won her independence or Spain would have been compelled to offer us the island on reasonable terms. In the earlier stages of the insurrection, according even to Secretary Fish himself, there was good reason to believe that the insurgents were making headway, and that they would soon be masters of the situation. This was the time for the administration to act. Had the action been prompt and emphatic lovers of liberty and justice all the world over would have approved, and trouble in Cuba would have been ended. In such circumstances the dreaded comparison suggested by the Alabama depredations would have been impossible. But the opportunity has been lost, and the question now is, what should the administration do? To grant belligerent rights at this stage would make the American people the laughing stock of the nations. What, then, is the proper course for the administration? They are in a difficulty. The American people are indignant. Congress will soon make its voice heard, and, unless we greatly mistake, General Grant and his Secretaries will be severely blamed. One way of escape still remains. We, not Spain, have put down the Cuban rebellion. We, not Spanish volunteers, have preserved Spanish honor and spared Spanish pride. In Cuba, if our intelligence is reliable, there is no longer an insurrection, and the "Ever Faithful Isle" is still Spanish property. To us, therefore, Spain stands deeply indebted. Rightly or wrongly, we have befriended Spain and been unkind to Cuba. Spain owes us a debt of gratitude. How can she pay it? Let us answer the question. Cuba is subdued, not pacified; crushed, not contented. A loyal and dutiful colony to the mother country it never again can be. Spain needs money. We want peace on all our borders, and it is our desire to have America for the Americans. Spain is about to contract another heavy loan. Let our administration at once make Spain an offer. Let the offer be liberal. The idea of selling the island is not new to Prim and Serrano. The proposal cannot offend them. If Spain accepts the offer Cuba will be ours, and all the world will admire the magnanimity of the American people. This arrangement will give Spain the money she needs, and it will give the Cubans the liberty they

sigh for. In the bosom of the great republic they will be free, prosperous and happy. No other course can save the administration of General Grant from universal condemnation. It is for us to make the offer. If Spain will not open her eyes to facts and come to terms the blame will be hers, not ours. Our course will still be clear. If Spain will not sell the island we shall have a right before all the world and in spite of all the quibbles of international law to give her timely but peremptory notice to quit. Let General Grant and his advisers think of these things and let them act wisely and with becoming promptitude. The course we advise seems their only way of salvation.