

CUBAN AFFAIRS.

ARRIVAL OF THE STEAM-SHIP MORRO CASTLE.

The steam-ship *Morro Castle*, from Havana July 2, arrived at this port yesterday. We are indebted to the courtesy of Purser ALBERT for the early delivery of our mail parcels.

A Crusade Against De Rodas-Serrano and Prim Kept in Power by the Cuban War--Bembeta Holds His Ground Near Sancti Spiritus--A Proof of Spanish Weakness--Cuban Hatred of Spain--Captured Correspondence--Miscellaneous.

From Our Own Correspondent.

HAVANA, Saturday, July 2, 1870.

The claquers are at work, and the paying public will soon contribute its voice of praise or condemnation. The work of bringing RODAS into disrepute has begun, and if the class of persons who talk against him are taken into consideration, I am compelled to the conclusion that RODAS will have the island at an early day, disliked by the majority of people, and thoroughly disgusted with the inhabitants of Cuba and their peculiar ways of reasoning. This conclusion may seem strange and out of place at a time when all the "truly loyal" are in ecstasies, apparently, about the great success of RODAS in exterminating the revolution in the Camaguey, (this, of course, is the fact only according to the journals and official bulletins,) and of inaugurating a system of comparative honesty. (which is true) among the employes of the revenue and other departments. In order to explain the dissatisfaction against RODAS, I shall simply give you a conversation which I had with two Spanish gentlemen, one of them an officer of the army, and the other editor of one of the ultra Havana journals. These gentlemen say that RODAS has not done anything of importance in the Camaguey, and the successes obtained there were due to the large agglomeration of Spanish troops which had been concentrated, but that matters had taken a worse turn in the Eastern Department and Cinco Villas; that RODAS is doing everything in his power to ruin VALMASEDA, to whom he has failed to send reinforcements when asked for, in order to discredit VALMASEDA and raise himself; that VALMASEDA left Bayamo a short time ago to capture the Cuban Chambers and several prominent leaders, asking the co-operation of RODAS. The movement would have been successful, but RODAS not only failed to aid the movement, but also ordered VALMASEDA back to Bayamo. My military informant then added: "You are aware that we are nearly all adherents of the BOURBONS, and hate this present Government. RODAS dare not finish the rebellion, because his orders and compromises with the Provisional Government prohibit him from doing so, as the war in Cuba keeps SERRANO and PRIM in power. If RODAS does not leave here soon, another Dulce affair will take place. We want VALMASEDA as Captain-General to command the forces in the field, and Gen. CARBO can remain here and dispatch office matters as at present." Your correspondent does not agree altogether with his informants, who exaggerate matters, but who are nevertheless very active in union with thousands of others to promote this crusade against RODAS. The simple facts are that LERSUNDI did not finish the rebellion. DULCE followed suit, and RODAS will share the same fate; and it is a matter of extreme doubt whether the successor of RODAS will have more luck; that the reports from the Camaguey have been somewhat overrated, and that both Spaniards and Cubans are doing an immense amount of boasting are abundantly proven by the last military movements.

BEMBETA INVADERS SANCTI SPIRITUS.

For the past two months it has been whispered among the Cubans here that BEMBETA would leave the Camaguey district and move into the Cinco Villas in order to revolutionize the whole country and compel RODAS to abandon Puerto Principe. In connection with BEMBETA's movement other leaders were to "raise the country" near Cienfuegos, Colon, Matanzas, and, if possible, the Vuelta Abajo, thus surrounding, as it were, the City of Havana itself. This great plan has been both a success and a failure. BEMBETA crossed the Spanish lines between Moron and Ciego de Avila with the utmost ease at the head of six hundred well armed and equipped men. The small Spanish detachments fled from before him without offering any of those heroic battles for which they have become so famous in the official reports, and retired toward the towns. BEMBETA distributed proclamations all over the country, and continued his march triumphantly to the very doors of Sancti Spiritus, and the Havana laborantes expected every day to hear that their fighting countryman, BEMBETA, had captured Sancti Spiritus, and was moving onward like an avalanche. Hundreds of letters written to the revolutionary leaders in the Camaguey had assured them that over five thousand armed men were ready to rise and join them the moment any leader of renown would make his appearance in the Cinco Villas, and the result proved that it was a cruel and bitter falsehood. Instead of these five thousand well armed and equipped fighting men, but little over two hundred joined BEMBETA, the rest hiding in the woods and moving toward the towns.

WHAT THE RAID PROVES.

The majority of these people are fired of the war, because they see no chance of its being over for a long time, and if they join the Cuban army, their families will die of starvation. This was the cause of BEMBETA's failure, but it has also proved that six hundred men were sufficient to march a distance of two hundred miles without being attacked by the Spaniards, and that two thousand men under able leaders would compel the Spaniards to abandon the entire country between Moron and Sancti Spiritus, and confine themselves to the protection of the towns and settlements, while they would also have to withdraw some troops from the Camaguey. The Governor of Matanzas reports that the movement of Colon and Macagua has proved a success for the Spaniards. This movement was part of BEMBETA's movement and is therefore only deferred, as well as those near Cienfuegos and Villa Clara. The telegraph near those places had been cut, but is now being repaired. The *Diario*, which first acknowledged that BEMBETA had between five and six hundred with him, came out yesterday with the announcement that his force amounted to only 150 men, and that it was well known in Sancti Spiritus that BEMBETA had been routed. This is incorrect, as not even a Cuban battle had taken place.

BEMBETA'S POSITION.

BEMBETA failed to receive the promised reinforcements, and, although the Havana and other island journals state positively that he had already returned, or rather retreated in disorder to the Central Department, he has not made any such move, but was encamped at the Lomas de Banas, where he was being joined by various bands of from ten to fifty men, the Cubans not belonging to the army, however, being very shy and unwilling to join him. One of these auxiliary bands attacked the Spanish fort, Jicotea, but were unable to capture it, although they killed eleven men, losing seven themselves. Among the eleven was the Captain of Partido and a Lieutenant of the army. The Spanish General, MORALES DE LOS RIOS, is making strenuous efforts to drive BEMBETA back to Puerto Principe, and the Spanish columns of VALVERDE, ARIAS and several others, are stationed at convenient supporting distances to prevent BEMBETA from marching further into the heart of the Cinco Villas.

CHOLERA TO DICTATE TERMS.

The principal cause of BEMBETA's arrested movement was the failure of the countrymen to flock to his standard, and the breaking out of the cholera among his troops, carrying off in four days eighty-nine men. The cholera is making ravages also among the Spaniards, and unless it abates considerably, the visitor of the Ganges will dictate an armistice and compel both sides to take care of themselves and suspend all movements. Several persons, who were carrying ammunition to BEMBETA, had been caught, two being shot in the vicinity of Sancti Spiritus, which proves that the Cubans have many and very staunch friends in the towns. Both of the men shot were volunteers.

THE DIARIO ON CUBAN EDUCATION.

The *Diario*, in its review for Spain, lays great

stress on the mischief which has been wrought and the damage effected to the Spanish cause by the teachers in Cuba, accusing them of having instilled anti-national ideas into the minds of the youth confided to their education. The *Diario* says that those who take up arms against Spain, having Spanish blood in their veins, stain the holy memory of their fathers, and will never be heroes or martyrs, but renegades. The Cubans, it appears, have no desire whatsoever to become Spanish heroes or martyrs, but seem to have a great fancy to become Cuban heroes and martyrs. This appreciation depends altogether on taste. The *Diario* then advises the Cuban youth not to believe those false apostles, who preach the advantages of treason, but advises them to remain faithful and loyal to Spain. This sermon of the *Diario* comes very late, as there is hardly a child in Cuba who does not consider himself an insurgent by right of birth, and would consider it an offense if people should consider him otherwise than as an insurgent. The teaching of professors, parents and relatives has been carried on too long and successfully to be eradicated.

IMPORTANT CORRESPONDENCE.

Among the correspondence, brought by the *Upton*, and captured by the Spaniards, are several very interesting and important letters, including several of the Cuban Colonel F. J. CISNEROS, the leader of the expedition, who tells ZAMBRANA, the Secretary of the Cuban Congress, that he compliments him on his attitude taken in the Quesada question, and that he has more hopes of triumph now than formerly; also that he knows that he (ZAMBRANA) must be informed of all the steps taken by QUESADA to discredit them (the Cubans). CISNEROS promises to return with another expedition from New York within two months. A Cuban residing in Key West writes to his brother the following very complimentary epistle about the Americans.

Every day that passes is another proof of the shamelessness of the Americans, as I see that that they will never recognize us. The infamous conduct with which they treat us makes me hate them much more than formerly, and strengthens my anti-annexation ideas daily, which is a very sad thing, as I shed tears of pain whenever I think that my poor Cuba might be annexed some day. Long life to Cuba independent, but never American, united to the United States. Let Heaven look upon us with eyes of pity.

LUIS.

This is only one of the many instances where Cubans express their fondness for us, and the fact remains, that only long and continued intercourse, as was the case at New-Orleans, will destroy the mutual dislike between the Anglo-Saxon and the Latin races, whether born in Europe or America. CARLOS A. ARGUELLES, writing from New-York under date of 11th of May to the citizen JOAQUIN ANGARICA, is glad that ANGARICA can take revenge for PIFE's blood, and believes that ANGARICA has killed many Spaniards in the name of ARGUELLES, and if he has not done it to do so at once, and tell the killed Spaniards that it is done in the name of his brother, ARGUELLES, and wishes that his friends live long and kill plenty. Such a sanguinary man as the writer would make a good fighter. He ought to be in Cuba fighting and not writing letters.

PUERTO PRINCIPE.

In a communication to the Captain-General, the commander of the Central Department says that Col. IJARDO's column, operating along the River Caunao, had assaulted and taken the intrenchments which the Cubans had raised at Caswaldad and Bucy Sabana. The Cubans had thirty-seven men killed, including their leader, ALEJANDRO MOLA. Three of his men were captured, also the Subprefect, DON FERNANDO VARONA. Fifty-one hats were burned, and arms, war munitions, sugar, horses, medicines, one flag, and important documents, taken by the Spaniards. Soon after the engagements, twenty-nine presentados came to the Spanish lines.

EASTERN DEPARTMENT.

According to a report sent in by the Lieutenant-Colonel of the First Artillery Battalion, he has surprised a Cuban camp near Chaparra; the Cuban losses amounted to nineteen men, including the Prefect of the Department, and two leaders, called FROB. GONZALEZ and MAREANO BATISTO. The commander of the steamer *Cruz of the South*, reports that on his way from Puerto Principe to that place he had two small encounters with Cuban forces, killing six, including Capt. EMILE RUIZ, a native of Havana, who came to Cuba with the expedition of the *Perrit*. In those several encounters the Spaniards did not even have one man wounded. The commander of the column operating between Holgun and Mayari, reports the capture of five Cuban camps, the Cubans losing during those engagements thirty-one men killed, including the officers, PEDRO PRIETO and JUAN GONZALEZ. RAFAEL GONZALEZ and four of his men, taken prisoners during the fight, were executed as soon as it was over. The column brought to Holgun 137 "presentados."

CAPTURE OF A WRECKER.

The Spanish gun-boat *Creole* has captured near Cape Mora, a suspicious looking sloop, called the *John Grey*. The attention of the gun-boat was drawn upon her, she showing no colors when requested to, and after being boarded, no document whatever being produced to prove her business or nationality, excepting a permit from the Nassau authorities allowing her to run for twelve months as a wrecker in the Bahamas, said permit being dated April, 1870. The sloop was towed to Baracoa, where a tribunal has been formed to investigate the matter, and decide whether she is a lawful prize or not. The Captain and crew are negroes.

QUASIMODO.

THE SITUATION IN CUBA.

Continuation of the War--The Island Lost to Spain--The Party of Independence--Mistakes of the Spanish Government--Cuba's Probable Future--Effect of the Agitation in the United States--Unpopularity of the Captain-General with the Volunteers.

HAVANA, Monday, June 27, 1870.

To the Editor of the *New-York Times*:

I have just arrived here from a visit to the principal cities and towns in the eastern part of this island, near to several of which the insurgents continue to hold their ground; and, if they are not increasing in numbers, they are as confident and as determined as ever not to submit again to the rule of Spain, regardless of all the terrible consequences that may result from the contest. I am more than ever convinced from what I saw and heard from Spanish officers, and from foreigners traveling, and others sojourning in the country, that the island is lost to Spain forever. It has already cost her more since the insurrection broke out than she ever drew in any ten years from the Cuban treasury. But this is nothing compared to the drain upon the population. I have it upon the authority of her own officers that nearly, if not quite one-half of the troops sent out from Spain since the revolt, have fallen victims to exposure, neglect, and the climate. While at St. Jago 180 were brought in there from the insurgent district, chiefly in a dying state. Three died in the street on their way to the hospital. The deaths in camp are not, of course, reported; but the officers spoke of it as being frightful; and yet the rainy or sickly season has only now commenced.

THE NATIVES FOR INDEPENDENCE.

The native population are almost unanimous for independence, secretly if not openly; and as every one born in Cuba, even though of Spanish parentage, is suspected and watched, and the Spaniards so outspoken and bitter in their indiscriminate denunciations of them on all occasions, they cannot, if they would, affiliate with them nor sympathize with them, even when all their interests are on that side. The Spanish Government having never allowed the natives to participate in the honors or emoluments of office, or rarely to take any part in the councils or in framing the laws by which they have been governed, this process of alienation has been increasing with the increase of population and the increase of wealth and importance of the island. It is but the natural result of that false and despotic system of government practised by Spain in all her American colonies, and which caused them to rise, one after another, and shake off the Spanish yoke. To expect any other result in Cuba now would be contrary to human nature

and to our reason and judgment. It is merely a question of time.

CUBA'S POSSIBLE FUTURE.

Spain has never profited by all her sad experience in her American colonies. Long after they had actually gained their independence, and had been acknowledged by all the principal Governments in Europe and America, she refused to admit it, or to have any intercourse with them; and thus so completely alienated them that commerce between them has never been resumed, and if she would even now yield, and accept of what is so generally believed to be inevitable, and give them their freedom, she could make favorable terms, and in so doing secure an exchange of her peculiar products in the future for the sugar which she sends and has received exclusively from Cuba. But the old Castilian pride still predominates in the hearts of the people, and still rules in the councils of the nation in the government of her colonies, notwithstanding the great reforms made at home; and if she cannot save it, will do her utmost to destroy it; and in prolonging the contest will destroy the industry of the country and create in the Cubans, as she did among her other American colonists, such a love for military honors and political power among the leading men that her future may be read in the past history of Mexico, Venezuela, Buenos Ayres, Paraguay, and other Spanish-American Republics.

CUBA AND THE UNITED STATES.

I do not, however, think as many do, that our Government ought of right, or is in duty bound to interfere in any way in the struggle. Indeed, I believe the cause of the Cubans has been damaged rather than bettered by the angry discussions in Congress, and by agitating the subject among our people. It has gored the Government and citizens of Spain into madness and desperation. They have treated the Cubans as outlaws, and have in turn been outlawed. Spain will not yield until her resources are exhausted and her credit destroyed, unless her rural population, who are now the greatest sufferers, cry out against sending any more recruits there to become victims to the obstinacy of their rulers. My sympathies have naturally been with the Cubans; but I have never thought their grievances were such as to justify them in attempting to right themselves by revolution. The rapid increase in the productions and the wealth of the country, shows they are far from being intolerable or ruinously oppressive. And the time selected, too, was not well chosen. They would have made more friends to their cause if they had waited to see what reforms the new Government at home would grant them. It looked too much like taking the advantage of the unsettled state of affairs there to release themselves by force because Spain was too weak then to oppose them, and consequently no overtures of conciliation could be proposed by the new Government, although so favorable to reform at home.

THE CAPTAIN-GENERAL IN THE INTERIOR.

As in the case in all wars, but more especially in civil wars, the amount of money squandered and robbed by the officers, exceeds the amount honestly dispensed for the object of the war. Their wretched bad management of the commissary and sanitary departments, too, sacrifices more lives than are lost by fighting. About fifty invalids came on board at Nuevitas, from the army guarding the City of Principe, about forty miles in the interior, where the Captain-General has been since the month of March. Although there was nearly an equal number of officers with them, no one seemed to have any thought or care of them, and many were unable to help themselves in any way. The Captain-General issues his bulletin every few days, announcing the close of the war, and that the insurgents are surrendering in large numbers, and yet a steamer leaves every few days with fresh troops. It is constantly reported that the volunteers, seeing no end of the war in prospect, after so many promises have been made by the Captain-General, that they have threatened his life if he returns to Havana before it is over. As he went there for only a week or two, has accomplished nothing by being there, and actually has nothing to do there, there is good reason to believe there is some truth in the report.

ABILITY OF THE CUBANS TO CONTINUE THE WAR.

The war on the part of the Government is now limited by the force of circumstances to the defensive. The Cubans are fully able of themselves, without any assistance from outside, to carry on interminately defensive war and keep the Spaniards shut up within reach of their ships of war. They can subsist on the resources of the country, and sleep in the road or in the field, in rain or shine, without any ill effects; while a night's exposure, or a little excess in the cheap common rum of the country or its fruits, is often fatal to the unacclimated Spaniards. With all these disadvantages, it requires no prophet to predict the result.

DAVIS HATCH.