

# THE CUBAN REVOLUTION.

## THE FERNANDO PO PRISONERS—CUBAN LEADER SHOT—ARRIVAL OF SPANISH TROOPS.

HAVANA, March 20.—The baggage of the Fernando Po prisoners has gone aboard the steamer, and the expedition sails to-morrow, positively. In a skirmish near Villa Clara the insurgent leader, Moya, was captured and subsequently shot. A steamer arrived to-day from Spain with 1,000 soldiers.

## EMBARKATION OF THE FERNANDO PO PRISONERS—GREAT EXCITEMENT.

HAVANA, March 20, via LAKE CITY, Fla., 21st.—The fleet of transports with the State prisoners on board sailed to-day for Fernando Po, conveyed by the Spanish frigate *Leontida*, which will accompany them as far as the Bahama Channel. The wharves and roofs of houses commanding a view of the harbor were crowded by people to witness the departure of the prisoners. The embarkation was effected in an orderly manner under the guard of the military forces. Some trouble occurred on one of the wharves. It is reported that a thief was caught plying his trade, and was badly beaten, and finally taken to the volunteers' barracks. About the same time there was a disturbance near the Governor's palace. A Cuban cried out: "Death to Spain! Viva Cespedes!" He was instantly shot dead by one of the sentries on guard before the palace. Later in the day Police Commissary Romero, who was suspected of sympathy for the man arrested on the wharf, was assaulted in the street by the populace, who shot and killed him. The Captain General hearing of the affair, and hoping to pacify the people, went to the barracks, and immediately organized a Court Martial for the trial of the so-called thief, who, after a brief investigation, was sentenced to be shot. Intense excitement prevails throughout the city. Frequent cries have been heard of "*Viva Cespedes*," and there are fears of a riot.

## FINANCE—THE AMERICAN VICE-CONSUL-GENERAL. (FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT.)

HAVANA, Feb. 27.—Caballero de Rodas, whom the Republicans of Spain call a butcher, is about to succeed in the government of the island Captain-General Dulce, who is an invalid. If Caballero deserves his reputation he will serve in Cuba the same purpose Calleja did in Mexico. Henceforth the war here on the part of Spain may not be considered as for conversion or civilization, but for revenge and punishment. But there is one thing the Spaniards cannot fight. That is the tiger of finance. Take their boasts and purposes, then, at market value. If they have an intention to exterminate the Cubans, it is only limited by a want of means. Supposing that plenty of Spaniards wish to fight, will Cuba pay? and does any one think that Spain, which has always made Cuba pay for her own bleeding, can afford to bleed for her? Here are grave questions. The planters and merchants who counseled the Captain-General in his late decree of additional imposts, believe that they can raise by this means 5,500,000 escudos, or half as many dollars. The new imposts, by the way, have been exaggerated in report, by reckoning the South American instead of the Spanish escudo, which is one-quarter less. They are, in fact, only a half-dollar per box on sugar, \$1 25 per hoghead of Mascabado, \$1 per tierce of tobacco-leaf, and a half-dollar per thousand of cigars. Add to these 5 per cent over import dues, and 25 per cent upon the earnings of industry and commerce. The five per cent added to customs is said to be sterile, for the reason that Havana, in her present distress, has few imports of account. Crops of sugar and tobacco are liable to the chances of a devastating war. Therefore, when the planters were lately asked to pledge their estates for a loan, they could only offer combustibles for security in a time of conflagration: The loan is to be 8,000,000, backed by the 5,500,000 aforesaid. Some one thinks that the Spanish bank, which is to collect and issue these sums, can manage to keep its paper in a tolerable state of liquidation, and at the end of three years cancel the debt. But the bank has already issued 16,000,000 of paper, some of which is at a heavy discount in Spain, and it is admitted that the loan itself may be increased to 16,000,000 more. Once past the 8,000,000, there will be no end to borrowing, if there is anybody to borrow from. Meanwhile the war will be draining the resources of a limited number of money lenders, a number proportionate to one million and a half of people, minus the Cubans. Havana is already poor, and the devices of the Government for raising money are what financiers would call squeezing. From 10,000 to 15,000 Cubans and aliens have left the island since the beginning of the insurrection. In two days of last week more than 1,000 took out passports. These facts signify that Cuba, and Havana especially, are impoverished. Ten or fifteen millions of wealth must have gone away with the exiles the richest of whom had banked largely in the North at some time previously. Merchants send their sugar away, but their money does not return to Cuba. The island is being cleared of its industries and commerce, to become a battle-ground for hatred—that is the fact. Cuban money returns to the island in munitions of war, if it comes back at all. One of the papers makes note that manufactured tobacco will be twelve millions less in Cuba during the present year than the year foregoing, while the export of leaf tobacco is doubling. This shows how much one of the most popular and profitable industries of the island is suffering, even though the estimate may be a light one, as forecasting what is to happen. There are not a few who believe that they see in the present elements of warfare and loss the utter ruin of their country. Debt, desperation, forced loans, and the violent uptearing of Slavery, sure to be swept away at last, will, they think, accomplish this. If the Spaniards win a desert, they may call it peace if they can. Then they may count the cost.

They do certainly boast, though perhaps the best of them hold rather back. It is with the old pride, which even in men of courage, when they reject teaching, may go before a fall. Such is the provincial tradition of Spain, at all events. That the Spaniards profess high contempt of the rebels let their own words show. One of the leaders of the troops sent out to Jaguey writes home: "You know that hereabout are a great many parrots in the mountains, but I must tell you that the number of them appears to have increased very lately, for the rebels all scream the same way." The organ of the Volunteers, which did not object to the massacres in the city, speaks with more exaggerated scorn. "What importance," says the *Voz de Cuba*, "can or ought to have an insurrection which everywhere is shamefully routed—which at the beginning could not capture a dozen soldiers in the Tunas; which could not impede the passage of Capt. Machin, who with 40 horses overran a space of as many leagues, occupied wholly by the rebels; which besieged the Governor of Holguin in a private house during 25 or 30 days, and never once gave it a serious assault; which raised the siege and fled without combat, hardly knowing that Benegasal was about with but 400 men; which constructs very good intrenchments, but not even attempts to defend them; which at last—and this is most significant—concentrates all its forces to oppose the column of Count Valmaseda—falls upon it repeatedly, harassing it continually during a march of 70 odd leagues across virgin forests and over obstacles, natural and artificial, of all kinds—awaits it with 8,000 or 10,000 men, when the Count had hardly 1,500 at the pass of the greatest river of the isle—yet in spite of all these advantages, not for a single instant puts his column in peril, or causes it more loss than that of twenty-five men. What have we to fear from such enemies? How can we conceive the idea that they will ever become terrible? But if the insurrection does not count a single military glory, if as an organized force it merits only laughing and disdain, there are in the country numbers of bandits whose exploits enable us to form an idea of what Cuba will become after a few years if abandoned by Spain."

The same organ, which roars at the rebels, knows how to bleat before authority. Complaining of the censorship, it makes the strange confession: "We have written under censorships of other times, we have published papers under the press law of Nocedal, the hardest and most capacious which existed in Spain. But never has happened what happens now; never as now have we been put to our wits' end."

It is now generally understood that the American Vice-Consul General has offered his resignation some days before the end of his term, because the Captain-General has refused to treat him as other than a commercial agent. The Consul has been right enough in bringing earnestly to the attention of that authority the manner in which some Americans were lately treated by the armed rabble. Gen. Dulce has warrant, I believe, not to recognize him except by favor in any diplomatic capacity, as the United States have their Minister in Spain. On the strength of that, the Consul has been denied any right or privilege to take out passports for his countrymen. Gen. Dulce furthermore suspecting that the Consul's office gives aid to the rebels, which I am far from believing that it can just now, the attitude of the Consul has brought up some question as to the status of foreigners, concerning which the island has some singular laws. By royal order of 1817, strangers are put into three classes—transient, domiciliated, and naturalized. The transient cannot establish themselves in the country; the law allows them only residence for a given time. This is fixed by an article of the ordinance of Government and Politics which says that no stranger can reside in the isle for more than three months without having obtained a letter of domiciliation. The 19th article of the Instruction given to Petty Courts provides that when a stranger shall have resided in their jurisdictions more than the legalized time, the agents of administration shall give notice to the authorities upon which they depend. According to the royal order those who wish to domiciliate must, after agreeing to some other expressed conditions, take oath of fidelity and vassalage (*vassalaje*) by which he becomes subject to Spanish laws altogether and puts himself outside of the protection of his nationality. He thus obtains the right to reside and establish himself in the country. After domiciliation for five years he may become naturalized. The Spanish authority to whom I owe this information argues that these conditions are exacted in the Peninsula by the Commercial Code, and it will not do to allege their late disuse in order to set at naught rules which each nation has the imprescriptible right to make for itself.

The Western risings have brought down a shower of proclamations and orders. As the proclamations show the temper, and the orders the purpose, of the ruling Spaniards, I shall give you specimens of both. It is the object of the proclamation, in the main, to exalt Spanish nobility and honor at the expense of the ingrate ragamuffinism which opposes them. In one of the best of these papers an interesting allusion is made to the United States. "The revolution in Cuba," says the Governor of Trinidad, "is a suicide, because it does not hold, while pursuing its allusions, elements sufficient for independence, and cannot hope for annexation to the United States without the absorption of its inhabitants. It can only be free and happy, and attain a constant and progressive future, moral and material, by forming an integral part of the Spanish nation, to which they are united by custom, blood, religion, history. What can then be the object of revolution? Liberty and rights. These the country concedes. Independence? It is suicide. Guarantees? The only Government which has liberally conducted the country has promised by all pacific and legal means to occupy itself with reform. Notwithstanding, the revolution began because monstrous ambitions, wearing the mask of patriotism, make necessary the sacrifice of the country, which is already visited with complete ruin and desolation in the jurisdictions of Bayamo, Manzanillo and Holguin; and is nearly as unfortunate in that of Puerto Principe. The Governor of Sancti-Spiritu decrees what will serve as example of the regimen prevailing in every town of the Western department. 1. Every man of the city and neighborhood able to cooperate for the public tranquillity will hold himself ready to defend the Government. 2. The Commissary of Police will at once form, by streets and districts, lists of all the inhabitants over 17 years old, to be presented to the Commandant without loss of time. 3. The Commandant will divide the lists into rounds of 50 men each. 4. He will declare when each round shall have its turn on guard. 5. Round-captains will report delinquents in or out of the ranks, at once. Roundmen will have arms only when on duty. 7. Citizens who subscribed to sustain volunteers are exempt from service. Over and above these rules the military have decreed in various towns: 1. Punishment by court-martial of all offenses which may be construed as treasonable. 2. No meetings of any kind. 3. No opinion or news adverse to the Government. 4. No arms-bearing by civilians. 5. Dealers to report arms sold, or on hand. 6. Passports to go anywhere out of town. 7. Martial law generally. Other towns beside that of Sancti-Spiritu are in a bad way. Benba in the district of Colon is not a large town, but it boasts a council composed of six regidores, a syndic, and the alcalde. Somebody writes that only two of them can come to meeting; three regidores having changed domicile, the syndic gone north, and the other not being found.