

who had just manumitted his slaves to take a free part in the war. The Spaniards reached Nuevitas, burning some plantations and other property belonging to Cubans. His little army having been depleted, Valmaseda made a trip for Havana to confer with Lerundi, and return with reinforcements. His troops, strengthened with arms and men, and numbering between 4,000 and 5,000, perhaps even less, took up their march across the country, carrying their own water and supplies in good part, and encountering a persistent enemy all the way. It is this march which has given to Valmaseda all the credit which he has gained in the present campaign as a brave and pushing soldier. As far as Las Tunas he seems to have encountered the men of Santa Lucia; beyond that, and near Bayamo, small forces of reconnaissance belonging to Céspedes. As is generally believed, he found Bayamo in ashes, proof of the stubborn, and even self-sacrificing determination which the wealthy and popular leaders of the cause of independence have carried into the war. What may be called a handsome episode of this small campaign took place at Baire, whither came the Spanish Commander, Quiroz, from Santiago de Cuba, to encounter the Rebels under Donato Marmol, and get beaten by means of bayonet-hooks and machetes. The actual present positions of the campaign are not understood. It is not certain that Valmaseda has left Bayamo; not certain that Céspedes has fallen back upon Guáimá near the mountains of the Sierra Maestra, in which are the Cuban copper mines, and which are said to favor a long and baffling campaign. Neither can it be positively asserted that the city of Puerto-Principe has been taken by the Rebel forces of Quesada. That city was stoutly garrisoned, even its churches having been put in a condition of defense some time ago. All the facts which at present seem to bear upon the standard rumor and report just stated, are that Quesada had marched toward the Puerto, and that families are leaving Villa Clara, a town much nearer, to come to the capital. Official papers have it that 3,000 persons, including insurgents and their families, had come into Santiago de Cuba, Palma, Cúcuta, Baracoa, and other towns, asking the pardon of the Government. The Spanish paper at Manzanillo moralizes over the feeding of 400 half starved children of rebels by Valmaseda's commissary. The Count himself writes home that he gave the insurgents a bad beating on the Canto River. This river is, by the way, the best in Cuba, and is navigable up to Bayamo, which would probably have furnished the Spaniards an excellent base of supplies had Céspedes not burned it, he himself being the principal sufferer in the loss of its property, and if not he, his colleague Aguilera, whose wealth has been generally remarked. There are stories that Céspedes and Aguilera crossed the Canto River with only 80 men; that great discontent existed in the rebel army because of want of pay; that Céspedes had promised his men all the gold they could steal in Manzanillo; that the rebels were treating of surrender. Probably no part of the world is more surprisingly fertile in the kind of irresponsible lying which takes the shape of rumor than the tropics; and one reason for it here is that Government has undertaken a monopoly in all matters of intelligence. What is said of the wholesale surrender of insurgents must be taken with some grains of allowance. It is implied by the language of the official paper that three thousand rebels had lately been asking pardon, whereas it is probably nearer the truth that those who sought the Spanish authorities were the people of the burned and wasted Bayamo neighborhood, and not, in any remarkable number, soldiers of the insurgent army. Again, the Spaniards have a way of shading all news that can give the slightest comfort or inspiration to the rebellion. It was lately said officially that a vessel, the American Avette, had been taken by a Spanish *lancha cañonera* on suspicion, but for the rest we are in the dark. We heard of a vessel from Nassau seized in which there were an unusual number of *tibalantes*, or ship hands, but the papers dare not, or will not, after the suspicion that the tribunals were here young Cubans who went out to find the flag of Céspedes. A paper of Trinidad has been telling the story that Céspedes had put the question of surrender with liberal terms to his council-of-war, and that a majority had gone for surrender; but I need hardly say that this tale, though held of more or less account on the side of the newest guns and greatest munitions, is unworthy of any credit. The rumor has not been wanting at the capital, based perhaps upon the fancy just related, that Céspedes has sent his proxy to the capital to arrange a settlement, and that soon all will be over. It will be borne in mind, however, that the latest known act of Céspedes, the burning of Bayamo, was in its nature by no means an overture for peace. The men who entered upon the leading work of the rebellion staked property, wealth, life, upon it. Aguilera, Santa Lucia, Liguero, Céspedes, and others, have emancipated their slaves, and have imperiled all of the very considerable quantity of estate they own. Even now, some of them have lost plantations and houses by the war. Their friends boast that they can, at any time, have an abundance of men, and aver that their sole want is in arms. In short, it is believed by those who favor the cause of Cuba earnestly, that it contains too strong a moral and patriotic investment this time to fail soon, or, rather, to fail at all. The Cubans do not speak of failure, in fact. This morning appears an article in the official organ stating that a great, and, in some respects, a friendly pressure has been brought to bear upon the insurgents to induce them to accept the most liberal terms of surrender that can possibly be offered. Céspedes, who is acting for his cause very much as a President and Secretary of War combined, has a real influence over the leaders of the revolt; and the case of Bayamo appears to have recorded his opinion as to terms. The Spaniards would, of course, felicitate themselves greatly upon his surrender. The worst I can perceive of the very meager news which comes to hand respecting the war is that on the 17th a steamer took to Manzanillo a battalion of troops and a piece of artillery. The Government papers are not yet able to report any of the insurgent neighborhoods as quieted; there is trouble of a kind around Santiago de Cuba; and the country to an extent not reckoned some disposed for an insurrection. It is only the reinforcement of the guns which can count in the summing up. You are aware of the Cuban complaint that the United States are giving guns to Spain, but will send none, allow none to come to Cuba, or give or lend their money; and all this after four months of Cuban struggle practically in the interest of the United States, and of emancipation and republican self-government. You have Cuba within arms-length, which is many miles nearer than Crete, and with an Americanized and liberalized people, willing and anxious to rescue themselves out of the shadow of the traditions which bind them unwillingly to the form of Slavery. Yet the British are said to be helping the islanders where the Yankees will not. No one knows that anything comes from the north. Against the apathy of the United States the Cuban protest is simple, and may be reported thus: Attend to your Alabama case if you please, and win it; but do not deny us the outright sympathy, and virtual aid and comfort which you have given to Mexico, Ireland, and Crete. Does Mr. Seward want to buy the island from Spain for \$100,000,000? Perhaps we might let him have it for thirty times less. Only send us \$3,000,000 and 10,000 guns, and that is enough. We will trust the rest.

The Captain-General has liberally announced himself as having come to offer the Cubans the good fruits of the Revolution in Spain, but that is not to say he can tolerate a revolution in and for the now so-called Always-Faithful Isle. In fact, he brings the authority of insurrection to put down insurrection, and holds that there is such a thing as treason, if not to Queen Isabella, certainly to Spain. A number of the papers of the capital having made themselves organs

of the idea that there can be no treason while the country is governed by an insurrection of which Dulce is the instrument, that authority has written a letter as follows to the political Governor:

I have seen, with the greatest regret, the attacks which some periodicals direct against the integrity of the territory, with public slander of the good name of Spain. It is impossible that such a mode of conduct, so scandalous in its manner and inspiration, can recognize any cause which it is not indispensable to destroy, while the liberty of the press, in all countries an element of civilization and progress, only serves in the island of Cuba to be an instrument of the basest passions, converting it into an organ of insult, injury, and calumny.

You will remember that without exciting injury to any one, and obeying a sentiment of reparation and of justice, the Provisional Government was the first to proclaim the saving principles of the revolution of September. These principles are its standard, and I will permit none, by the use of mercenary weapons, to abuse the right to sacred as that of the free emission of written thought.

The penalty marked out by the decree of the Provisional Government is that of the Code, and in default of this that of the laws of Parilla.

All a head against the dignity of the nation, all phrases which directly or indirectly attack the integrity of its territory, all articles or paragraphs which tend to favor the cause of the insurrection, are inasmuch as they are punishable by the laws, subject to the action of the tribunals, and I charge you in the fulfillment of your duties to energetically prosecute and denounce them.

Responsible for these offences in the first place are the author or director of the periodical; in the second place the editor, in the third place the printer.

Thus, then, I charge you, finally, to display the greatest zeal in the carrying out of the instructions of your office. God guard you many years.

DOMINGO DULCE.

Havana, Jan. 29, 1895.

Here is to be seen the temper of the Captain-General, never quite bent out of its Spanish shape and consistency by events through which he has gone, with a head growing grayer day by day. Gen. Dulce married a fair Cubana, and there is, therefore, an island side to his character; but of this no matter now. He will, I fear, sweep away, some legitimate free speech with the awful broom which he has just put in motion against what he considers license, but which, after all, perhaps he overrates. It is but just to say that Spain and the Spaniards have not been civilly treated in some of the minor presses; that there is much or little offense in this according to the skin of the victim; but it is very true that the swarming papers of Cuba have endeavored to express a hearty sympathy for Cuba. *La Prensa* to-day has an article in which it says that if on the night of the last disturbance in the city any one had pronounced openly the names of the influential and wealthy families implicated in the Cuban movement there would have been scenes of bloodshed and horror to which the late massacres would have appeared mild. You will perceive that this is a plain confession of the meretricious means exercised to do the wrongs committed not long ago on the people of Havana.

THE MILITARY SITUATION. [FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT.]

HAVANA, Jan. 30.—The campaign now carried on four months in the Eastern quarter will better satisfy you as a display, on however small a scale, of the moral energy than as a matter of strategic curiosity. Yet it will not be out of the way to review briefly the courses so far pursued by the Spaniards, and ascertain what we know of this much perplexed and falsified question of the Insurrection. At the start Count Valmaseda was sent direct to the southeastern port of Manzanillo, whence he might operate on the inland district about Yara, in which the Insurrection took its rise with Céspedes for chief. As incredulous, perhaps, as others, that the rising there was general, or respectable, Valmaseda very soon carried his force backward by sea to the coast-town of Ventientes, near that more dangerous outbreak was about to happen in the rich town of Puerto-Principe. He marched to this point, set down by it, opened negotiations with the citizens, and if Gov. Lerundi be reported right, wrote pastoral letters when he should have been fighting. Valmaseda is a fat, heavy soldier, never held to be brilliant; but when commanding at the Puerto he was not averse to social pleasures, became a popular townsman, and hence counted upon his influence with a good part of those who were to secede from the existing form of things along with the well-known Marquis of Santa Lucia. Valmaseda's negotiation had so far advanced that the brothers Arango, chief Lieutenants of the Marquis, were disposed to yield in consideration of an ample programme from Spain; but the firm and fervent nativism of Santa Lucia carried the day, and it was decided with a great deal of spirit to rebel. The Spaniards, after consuming a month to no purpose, were mystified by the event. Valmaseda in no good temper marched on Nuevitas, opposed by the Camagueyans, as the people of the Puerto region are called, under lead of the Marquis of Santa Lucia,