terday from Havana, and the correspon-ce from Cuba given in another column tocontain some ence relating to Notwithsta day rtant points of in contain a ne very important points of in-ng to the State of affairs in tellige Notwithstanding the fiaming ac-counts of Spanish victories and annihilation of neurgents with which the Heavilland have been filled for months, the labor of sup-pressing the revolution does not seem to diand its final extinction is as far other, as ever. With the guerilla off, if not farther, as ever. With the g Parthian policy pursued by the I Spanish forces experience a continu and patriots the al m Spanish forces experience a communication way, while no such thing as a decisive engagement has taken place. It has been stated that fully twenty-five hundred troops are placed hors de combat monthly, which loss has a comparable to the combat monthly. diminished in a remarkable degree the number of troops and volunteers now in the field. It olunteers r

cial telegrams which t

published

is no doubt to this fact, which has placed the Spaniards on the defensive, that the entire ab-sence of offensive movements by the Spanish troops is owing. All their present efforts troops is owing. All their present efforts seem to be confined to the holding of the towns of Puerto Principe, Las Tunas and Villa Clara. The diminished moral force of troops in this situation favors the development of disease among them, and reports of the increase of cholers and yellow fever abound.

A still more significant item of the recent news reports is the statement that the Harana. news reports is the statement that the Havana volunteers have, of their own accord, surren-dered to detachments from the ships of war,

the Morro and Cabaños fortresses, which com-mand the city of Havana. The government mand the city of Havana. The government has no regular troops to place in these im-portant places, and the volunteers who had been placed in them some months ago not long since defied General Dulce, and finally drove him from the post of authority. Three weeks of supreme command, which they have held in the name of General Espinar, with the knowledge it has given them of the extraorlong since defied Gen dge it has given them of the extraor-demands the revolution is daily pressdinary demands the revolution to using pro-ing upon the Spanish resources in Havana, has showed them how impossible it is to attain their hopes of triumph, and rendered them as tame as lambs for the coming of General tame Rodas. In In this officer they now place all their but the very knowledge they have of the weakness of the colonial das, in the very knowledge they maintened of the weakness of the colonial rennment, in both men and money, will which that

money, will h which that prove the greatest difficulty culty with which that contend on his arrival to-day or to-morrow in Havana.

The truth is that the Spanish government in Cuba to-day is as hollow a shell as was the government of Jeff Davis during the winter of 1861-05. A marked success to the patietas, such as the fall of Puerto Principe, or a defeat such as the fall of Puerto Principe, or a worder to Valmaseda, or the capture of Los Tunas or of Holguin, any one of which may be considered an impending event, would deliver half of the ports of the island to President Cespedes, and open foreign commerce and supplies to the new republic. Such an event would confine the defensive operations of the

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would confine the defensive operations of the Spaniards to the Western Department and a limited territory around Santiago de Cuba in the east. The resources of the colonial govlimited territory around some the colonial government to-day are wonderfully diminished. The imports have sunk to a small figure, carrying with them the customs revenues, while the impossibility of collecting the internal revenues has induced a reduction of the rate to one-half of its original assessment. The revenues the consequence of 1869 has already been colnue from the crops of 1869 has already bee nue from the crops of the crops of the evils which General Rodas will havana. His only These are a portion

on arriving in Havana. His only resource, both for men and money, will lie in the enthu-siasm of the Havana volunteers. Under other circumstances they might have contributed ten thousand men to the army in the field and ten millions of dollars to the Now that they have di he treasury as a discovered how a loa. w inade-

quate these would be to meet the n we l ta doubt their enthusiasm will be equal to the re i Rather do we incline to believe that the march of the Havana volunteers down the causeway n the heights of the Cabaña to the eading fro bay is but the beginning of the Spanish exodus from Cuba, which will culminate at a future day in the return of the Cuban refugees now

ating the bread of exile in foreign lands.