

SPAIN

The Reinforcements for the Suppression of the Cuban Insurrection.

CADIZ, Jan. 14, 1869.

The Cuban insurrection seems to be gaining ground, notwithstanding the highly favorable reports that most of the journals publish about the movement. If we are to believe these inspired organs, the insurrection is a very trifling affair, carried on by worthless bushwhackers for personal ends, and we are assured that it will soon be suffocated by General Dulce, who needs no more troops to accomplish his work. We heard every three or four days the same story about General Eversund, but he did not suppress the insurrection and he asked continually for troops. And now General Dulce is demanding reinforcements, and it is said that the government will send him, as soon as possible, 15,000 additional men. Five thousand are under orders now, and will sail from Cadiz in a very few days. Three batteries of artillery will accompany the brigade. These are armed with the Krupp steel gun, and are said to be very effective. A new organization has been made of the troops going out. They are to act in companies and battalions instead of retaining their present formation. A large number of cazadores, or light infantry, are to be sent, as they are better calculated for bushwhacking than the regiments of the line. All these movements of troops are extremely burdensome to the treasury just now. It is almost, if not entirely, empty, and all its receipts are applied to the transportation of soldiers to Cuba, as well as from point to point in Spain, to put down the republicans. If the treasury was tolerably full the entire body of 15,000 men would be sent to Cuba in ten days from this time, as foreign marine transportation could be secured. As it is, the limited accommodations of the Lopez line are taxed to the utmost, and but little is afforded. The balance of the corps to be sent out cannot arrive in time to be of much service before the hot season sets in. In which operations in the field will be extremely dangerous to acclimatized troops. Already many of the journals are beginning to croak and publish all sorts of evils. It is admitted by many that a tremendous effort must be promptly made or the island is lost forever. One paper states that 4,000 men of the volunteer force of Barcelona have offered their services to go to Cuba to assist to put down the insurrection. The government feels exceedingly grateful for this patriotic offer, but it does not propose to accept it as it is very naturally a little afraid of these gentlemen, who would more likely go over to the patriots than fight against them. The government picks its volunteers and selects its regiments. It does not send out volunteers or soldiers without knowing on which side they may be counted. They are quite sensible in this respect.

The Spanish Throne and Montpensier's Prospects—Disinterested Patriotism—French and Bourbon Co-operation—Colonial Elections to the Cortes.

MADRID, Jan. 20, 1869.

Now that the political composition of the Constitutional Assembly is definitely settled, and it appears that the ministerialists have the control, the discussion of the question of who shall be King is revived. Montpensier's friends are pushing his claims with an energy and zeal that begin to tell. Several papers have come out now in his favor, but they have no particular influence. It is purely a question of subsidy with Spanish journalists, and the party that pays highest is sure to win, so far as the journals are concerned. An editor told me a few days since that Montpensier, Isabella, Carlos VII. and all the other pretendants were using money on the press here in a very liberal manner. The government gives patronage to such journals as support Montpensier, and the editors are generally enjoying some fat sinecure. You will thus see just now the Spanish journalists are in high feather, though what possible use they can be to any party is more than I can imagine. The friends of Montpensier find themselves in the face of a serious obstacle when they urge his election as king, from the unfriendly attitude of the Emperor of France. It is quite settled that he will look upon any attempt to place an Orleanist on the Spanish throne with the utmost disfavor, and it is not certain that he would not take ulterior measures to prevent the consummation of an act that might prove eventually a little dangerous to his throne. The more earnest become the cries for Montpensier the more attentive does the Emperor show himself to the ex-Queen Isabella. Your Paris correspondent will tell you of the growing intimacy between the Bourbons and the Imperial family. Each day the attentions of the Emperor towards the Queen are more marked. The Spaniards see in all this a conspiracy, and I think they are not far from right. In the first place the Empress is a very faithful Catholic of the Isabella school. She believes in Church supremacy and would crush out all sorts of heresy in France if she had the power. It is her influence that maintains a French corps of occupation in the Holy City, and she has felt quite as keenly the attempts made by the revolutionists of Spain to curtail the privileges of the Church and to extend the blessings of a free education to the masses. In all these points she is quite of accord with the ex-Queen, whose loyal subject she was for many years and whom she regards now as little less than her sovereign. Naturally enough she is a warm advocate of the rights of Isabella and is using every means to bring about her restoration.

The Emperor, while anxious to support the divine right of rulers, when once established, is also desirous of avoiding all the annoying and troublesome complications that would arise if Spain should elect an Orleanist as King, or, what would be worse, become a republic. He is no worse off than thousands of Spaniards who do not clearly see their way out of the difficulty, and it is not strange that he should seek to restore Queen Isabella to the throne and thereby avoid all dissensions between the two nations, and even gain an ally in case of war. With Isabella on the throne again France could count on the friendship and support of the Spanish government, whatever might be the feeling of the people. That he is hostile to the present order of things is clear from his recent order forbidding the subscription to the City of Madrid loan advertised for days in the French papers, but finally suppressed by orders from high quarters.

The only Olozaga has been unable as yet to obtain a relaxation of this order, and it is doubtful whether

he ever will. Besides this indication of an ill-will against Spain, I can say, on good authority, that the Empress has written her mother, the Countess de Montijo, to leave Spain as soon as possible and to go to Paris, as there is a probability of a misunderstanding arising very soon between France and Spain that would make her stay here dangerous. The Countess will therefore leave in a short time for Paris, and be out of the way of any troubles of whatever character that may arise. The government is evidently very uneasy at this sudden turn of affairs, and scarcely knows what to do. Its semi-official organs talk very boldly and profess to care very little about the Emperor's opinions; but all that is gasconade. They are greatly alarmed, and it is not quite sure but that Montpensier will be dropped and Espartero taken up by the journals in behalf of the government. Montpensier cannot be chosen in face of the open opposition of France, and I doubt whether he would accept the crown if there was danger of any difficulties arising between the two nations in consequence thereof. He is no madcap, Montpensier. He looks before he leaps, if he ever leaps, and counts the full cost. On the whole, I think it may be safely predicted that the Orleanist will not sit on the Spanish throne, unless there is a great change in the opinions of Napoleon, which is very unlikely. They still talk of the Italian princes, but I do not think they possess any strength. It is possible that public opinion may be manufactured in their favor, but at present the people have scarcely given them a glance. We shall soon see who is likely to be the unfortunate man to sit upon the Spanish throne.

The official *Gaceta* of this morning contains a long decree of the Minister of the Colonies, bearing date December 14, but only now published, providing for elections to the Cortes from Cuba and Porto Rico. After a long preamble, in which the government gives its reasons for not carrying out the principles adopted in the mother country in enlarging the rights of the colonists and enumerates the difficulties lying in its path, especially those caused by the institution of slavery, it proceeds to decree the manner of conducting the elections, which are to be called when the civil governors think best. No person shall vote who is not a Spaniard, fully enjoying all his rights and who pays taxes to the amount of twenty-five dollars a year to the government, and he must be twenty-five years of age. The civil governors are to carry out the details of the election and to have general control of the same, and they have power to suspend the election in any district where it may appear advisable. The machinery is much the same as that used here, and requires no further explanation. After reading the decree over one naturally asks when will the election be likely to occur and why is that a taxpaying qualification imposed in the colonies which does not exist here? I do not believe any one can answer satisfactorily either question. Certainly there seems to be no reason why colonists should be compelled to pay twenty-five dollars a year in taxes when nothing of the kind is expected here. There may be good cause for the invidious distinction, but I fail to see it. It is simply a part and parcel of the system always adopted by Spain in governing her colonies. They are regarded more in the light of profitable slaves than worthy equals. Spain never will cease to regard Cuba and Porto Rico as rich milch cows, at whose teats the seedy and needy individual Spaniard, and nation as well, must be always tagging. How much money can we get out of the poor devils in Cuba? is the question first propounded by every Spanish government, not how shall we make them better satisfied with their relations with the mother country? Even now, in the face of a fierce and stubborn rebellion, the government professedly founded on the will of the people cannot extend to the colonies the rights enjoyed in the peninsula, but must make a monstrous distinction between their people and those here. Spaniards never can learn, even by experience, until it is too late. Cuba will probably accept the terms offered, but not with that satisfaction that she would feel if she obtained all her rights. By the law Cuba is entitled to eighteen delegates and Porto Rico to eleven. The election cannot be held in time to enable their delegates to participate in the earlier proceedings of the Assembly, in which their own interests are likely to be affected. But that is nothing to the mother country.