

The Cuban Situation.

Those who sympathize cordially with the Cuban struggle for independence,—and they are very many among our people,—cannot but admit that the insurrectionary cause is now fast losing ground. Whether the present aspect of the Cuban situation may not be only one of those tidal ebbs which even successful revolutions undergo, we shall not undertake to decide. But it seems to us that the facts will hardly justify this interpretation. It seems more probable that, unless speedy external relief is furnished, the Cuban cause must succumb.

The latest news from the insurgent camps bears on its face the marks of desperation. When the rifle is abandoned for the torch, when war becomes mere incendiarism, and, more especially, when these last resorts are applied in a territory claimed as the special domain of the insurgent cause, the significance of this mode of warfare cannot be mistaken. It certainly is no sign of strength, but rather one of weakness, for the insurgents to burn the plantations they are now burning. Some of them are owned by men whose sympathy has certainly not been Spanish, and who will hardly appreciate the rigor with which these incendiary operations are carried on, without some further proof of their necessity. Guaimero, which was lately burned by its commander, under strict orders from QUESADA, was once the "capital" of the Cospedes Government, and how its destruction can be anything but a sign of weakness, it is difficult to conceive.

Again, the manner of destruction indicates desperation. It is done in haste and without respect to person or property. How does the following read for an order? "Immediately you will burn the town you command, so that one stone does not remain upon the other. You will have enough tar and rum as combustibles. Inform the families in the town *two hours* previous to commencing work. *Patria y libertad.* QUESADA." One must indeed be devoted to "country and liberty" to see bright hopes for either in this mode of warfare.

And all this we say in no spirit of hostile criticism, which would be entirely foreign to our sympathies. But we say it in justification of the conduct of our own Government, which has constantly, though perhaps reluctantly, declined to accept this sort of evidence as proof that such a revolution existed in Cuba as entitled it to belligerent recognition. We grant that the foolish stories of "great Spanish victories" are as exaggerated as those of "Cuban successes;" but the point is not which party is doing the more damage to the island, but whether that sort of a movement is in progress, and that sort of military power in the field, that can command recognition. That has been the question all along, and the situation of affairs to-day—however it may change hereafter—justifies the course of the Government.